Class-based Structural Violence in Britain

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SUMMARY

This thesis identifies and analyses the major patterns of class-based structural violence (based on the differential access to class power) in some of the main areas of social organisation in Britain in the period from 1979 to 2010 (the period of neoliberal consolidation in Britain). It does this by pioneering the empirical operationalisation of a neo-Galtungian concept and typology of structural violence. Additionally, the thesis refines the theoretical lens on structural violence for the primary purpose of improving its ability to reach new insights in the process of the empirical analysis of class-based structural violence. These improvements are to a large extent based on a theoretical and typological synthesis of Galtung's theory of structural violence with Amartya Sen's conceptualisation of instrumental freedoms. To avoid a static examination of social structures, my work analyses the dynamics of various forms of structural violence in the analysed period understood as the dialectical interplay of structural and subjective agential factors.

The extensive and sustained employment of the concept of class-based structural violence in this thesis through a number of specific case studies contributes to a more integrated understanding of the research problem and verifies the hypothesis about the existence of extensive and systemic class-based structural violence in Britain across several main dimensions of social life. My study also elucidates the character of this structural violence and some of the most prominent causal mechanisms by which it is reproduced.

This initial cartography of class-based structural violence in Britain also identifies a number of new research questions in relation to the analysed topic.

"Peace is a revolutionary idea."

Johan Galtung

"More than machinery, we need humanity. More than cleverness, we need wisdom, kindness and gentleness."

after Charlie Chaplin

Contents

Acknowledgments

INTRODUCTION

These are times of most extraordinary inequalities. Extreme wealth and power is concentrated in the hands of capitalist organisations and individuals such as Bill Gates, whose apparent "net worth" of around $50 billion in 2009 was greater than the GDP of 140 countries (Blankfeld, 2009), while – according to the (now former) UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler (Ziegler, 2004) – *36 million people* died from hunger and malnutrition each year! This radical injustice magnifies the same fundamental, global capitalist class dynamics which operate (in less extreme ways) in Britain.

Class-based structural violence based on differential access to power produces an immense amount of suffering, inequality, oppression and deprivation, stifling human individual and collective potential. This violence and deprivation are also a frequent source of direct physical violence.

Structural violence is the infliction of harm embedded in social, political and economic structures[1]. Especially if it is suspected that this kind of violence is deep-rooted, routine and systemic, the committed and meticulous prevention, reduction and, wherever possible, removal of violence, of the infliction of harm and suffering should be treated as ethical, political and scholarly issues of the greatest importance. One major obstacle to the establishment of a more peaceful society is the habitual failure to detect or adequately valorise the more insidious forms of harm which spring from contemporary social structures and social processes. Galtung (1969, 173) noted that "the object of structural violence may be persuaded not to perceive this at all. (…) Structural violence is silent, it does not show – it is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters. In a static society, personal violence will be registered, whereas structural violence may be seen as about as natural as the air around us" (Galtung, 1969, 173).

Social life based on the rejection of violence requires the identification of the more hidden forms, instigators and consequences of violence. One major focus of peace research is to advance the understanding of violence, i.e. of the factors which undermine negative and positive

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[1] I will later provide a more elaborate definition of structural violence.

peace[2]. The other two main interests of peace research – the prevention and reduction of violence – are dependent on the adequate detection and diagnosis of violence.

Analyses of structural violence, including my own, are centrally concerned with "the routine, ordinary and normative violence of everyday life ("terror as usual")" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004, 5). The ubiquity, misrecognition and invisibility of everyday social oppression (i.e. of culturally normalised, impersonal, structural violence) confirm the need to unmask structural violence, i.e. to "[reveal] the violence of the privileged in all its nakedness" (Sartre, [1965] 2008, 251)[3]. This thesis works under the assumption that it is meaningful to seek to verify and analyse the existence of "mass human suffering and violence that result from the structures of capitalism" (Leech, 2012, 7). There is a need to identify and better understand which social structures and processes (re)produce structural violence, what the nature of that violence is and how it is (re)produced.

Somewhat surprisingly considering the relative popularity of the term "structural violence" and, to a lesser extent, of Galtung's broad theory of structural violence, it appears possible that no studies which substantially engage with the operative framework of Galtung's theory (his typology of structural violence), both theoretically and empirically in particular, have so far been published. Moreover, there have been no studies which directly examine the question of the extent and character of class-based structural violence in Britain, at least not through any elaborate attempt to engage with the theoretically informed Galtungian concept of structural violence. In fact, it is even possible that there have been no studies substantially applying Galtung's (elaborated) theory of structural violence to any aspect of British society.

As a consequence of this lack of serious attempts to engage with Galtung's concept of structural violence, the class-based nature of much structural violence remains to be further explored. The same applies to the patterns of structural violence in various segments of the social

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[2] Negative peace has been defined as the absence of overt physical violence, while positive peace presupposes the existence of cooperative, non-exploitative and non-domineering social relationships (Curle, 1971).

[3] Galtung (1996, 196-97) also noted that "the study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society. One way cultural violence works is by changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable; an example being 'murder on behalf of the country as right, on behalf of oneself wrong'. Another way is by making reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent. (…) Hence, peace studies is in need of a violence typology, in much the same way as a pathology is among the prerequisites for health studies. (…) Violence studies, an indispensable part of peace studies, may be a cabinet of horrors; but like pathology they reflect a reality to be known and understood".

structure, which have also apparently not been subjected to previous analysis using a developed theory of structural violence (as opposed to somewhat under-theorised analyses of perceived social injustices and forms of oppression which are characterised as structural violence with few if any explicit criteria – see for example Lykes, 2001). Several further limitations of existing studies, as well as my approach to compensating for and transcending these deficiencies in the course of my inquiry, are mentioned at the end of this section and in the following chapter.

This thesis aims to identify and analyse the major patterns of class-based violence and oppression in several of the main areas of social organisation in Britain in the period from 1979 to 2010 (the beginning of the government of Margaret Thatcher and the end of New Labour's term in office). It seeks to do this by pioneering the operationalisation of Johan Galtung's concept and typology of structural violence. The thesis also seeks to refine the theoretical lens on structural violence for the primary purpose of improving its ability to reach new insights in the empirical operationalisation of the concept of structural violence. My exploratory work in relation to the typology which can best facilitate insights regarding the necessary criteria of structural violence should be of help in verifying the hypothesis about the ubiquity of class-based structural violence and in analysing how this class violence is woven throughout the fabric of contemporary British society. I will discuss the novelty of my approach presently, and in the methodology chapter I will elaborate on the advantages of my "meta-analytical" approach. My analysis of class-based structural violence in the period between 1979 and 2010 seeks to historically situate the examination of class-based violence in Britain rather than to offer a comparative analysis of this period and the period which preceded it. Additionally, it is important to note that, while it is my chosen subject of analysis, structural violence in Britain does not exceed such violence in many other countries, and is in various ways similar to structural violence in other "comparable Western countries".

My use of the concept and typology of structural violence should help to uncover unequal and oppressive class relationships based on the differential access to economic, political and social power and resources. The analysis of structural violence and of its roots may also be of help in the construction of more peaceful social structures and of "systems with the strength to withstand decivilizing impulses" (van der Wusten, 2005, 80). This work will advance at least an implicit understanding of some of the "ways of remedying the deprivations and the disparities"

(Sen, 2004, xvi) which constitute or contribute to structural violence. The identification of the major sources of structural violence can in some cases provide an implicit explanatory account of public policy measures which would help to address, reduce and, where possible, eliminate these forms of structural violence, as well as potentially the forms of personal violence which partially stem from this structural violence and the associated forms of deprivation. This is an issue to which I will briefly return later.

Political science, sociology and political economy can increase their service to democratisation, human development and the advancement of peace by becoming to a greater extent "infused with an ethnographic, anthropological sensibility in which scientific observation is combined with moral and political witnessing" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004, 5). My research also contains elements of a critical social science and advocacy approach which shares this basic orientation. It is committed to the ideal of humane democratic change, universal human emancipation and the empowerment of the vulnerable, the outcast and the dispossessed. I hope this study might also be useful to a broader layer of engaged scholars, writers and campaigners interested in the construction of a kinder, freer, more democratic and more humane society.

The following are the main contributions to knowledge which I sought to make in this work.

1) My thesis is based on an extensive and sustained employment of the concept of structural violence with a focus on empirical analysis of some of the essential social structures. A broad empirical application of the concept of structural violence (at least in its more elaborate Galtungian sense) has apparently not yet been attempted in Britain (nor, it seems, in the rest of the "developed Western" world)[4].

2) At the same time, my critical operationalisation of the (modified) Galtungian typology and of the concept of class-based structural violence is also a practical response to Kenneth Boulding's (1977) critique of Galtung's theory of structurally violent class relationships as an untested hypothesis. My study seeks to verify this hypothesis about the existence of extensive and systemic class-based structural violence across several

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[4] Van der Wusten (2005, 66) noted: "There has not been a sustained effort since the 1970s to study structural violence empirically".

main social structures (i.e. it seeks to verify the hypothesis that class violence is woven throughout the fabric of contemporary British society), as well as to illuminate some of the most prominent causal mechanisms which lay behind it.

3) As an effort to pioneer the empirical operationalisation of a (neo-)Galtungian typology of structural violence, this work includes the modification of Galtung's conceptual apparatus and a partial theoretical and typological synthesis of Galtung's theory of structural violence with Amartya Sen's conceptualisation of instrumental freedoms. This empirical operationalisation and theoretical and analytical synthesis advances the theoretical and methodological instrumentarium for future research. My neo-Galtungian identification, analysis and elucidation of structural violence enables better understanding and contains an implicit explanatory value.

4) The operationalisation of the concept of structural violence in this thesis helps to systematise empirical analysis of class violence through the use of my categorisation of various subtypes of structural violence. This should be particularly useful for further research into public policies, since analysis of public policies often neglects or underemphasises the role and impact of class-based structural violence[5].

5) This thesis also initiates a neo-Galtungian response to the valid critiques by van Benthem van den Bergh (1972), Boulding (1977) and Brown (1981) of Galtung's analytical approach as a theoretical construct which does not provide (nor attempts to provide) an account of structural change and of structural violence as a historical process. My analysis of neoliberal consolidation in Britain in the period between 1979 and 2010, although secondary to the aim of identifying and analysing the existence and character of structural violence as such, aids in the understanding of the dynamics of such violence as

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[5] My analysis centres on the structures of the British state and on some of its major interactions with private capitalist initiative. Of course, other examinations of structural violence may shift their emphases onto different actors and different vantage points, which may require the use of different subtypes in the typology of structural violence.

a structured historical process (or set of processes). In relation to this I will also indicate some major trends relating to structural violence, which I will quantify on the basis of the availability of data and the apparent relevance of quantified elements and examples[6]. Additionally, my analysis examines the "contextual impact" (van der Wusten, 2005, 64) of structural violence on the evolution of the neoliberal order by helping to lay bare the way in which structures and dynamics of class violence strengthen and entrench patterns of class domination in the neoliberal period.

6) My thesis, which seeks to develop an initial cartography of class-based structural violence in Britain, also helps to identify a number of new research questions in relation to the analysed topic. Additionally, it could also be of use for future comparative analyses of structural violence in other developing and developed countries, as well as for analyses of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of different and contending research programmes in this area of research.

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[6] One such relevant element concerns the prices of basic services used by very large segments of the population (e.g. gas and public transport). While this kind of analysis is not a central aspect of my study, it also helps to corroborate the systematic and pernicious nature of structural violence, and it may help to detect further research topics and problems.

Chapter 1

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Neo-Galtungian Theoretical Lens

My theoretical viewpoint, shaping the questions, hypotheses and the methods of their verification in this study, is based on two overall orienting lenses: a neo-Galtungian structural violence perspective and a neo-Marxian class theory. The purpose of this chapter is to advance an operative theoretical and analytical perspective on class-based structural violence as a working hypothesis (rather than to, for example, provide a very detailed exploration of theoretical approaches to class structure).

The neo-Galtungian theoretical perspective is based on the distinction between positive and negative peace. The negative notion of peace can support powerful *status quo* interests by helping to obscure objectively antagonistic interests (Curle, 1971). A seemingly "peaceful" social system often conceals and minimises the existence of massive and systemic structural violence[7]. Functionalist and optimistically linear accounts of industrial and technological development, bureaucratisation and other supposed aspects and correlates of "development" (Jacoby, 2008) tend to obscure the often harmful and dysfunctional character of contemporary social orders by failing to develop a broader understanding of violence. Instead of acknowledging the "untruth" of Western capitalism's "prevailing justifications" (Habermas, 1971, 25), some mainstream currents of political and social research amounted to "uncritical, technological and scientistic [sic] rationalization of the *status quo*" (Lawler, 1995, 68). The perception of some researchers belonging to mainstream academic currents is even that they are pursuing "value-free" analysis, although their work often effectively upholds established social and political norms. This

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[7] In his rejection of the impoverished perspective which fails to acknowledge this, Schmid referred to the "wealth of social science theory developed for the control and integration of the national system" (1968, 219). He also noted the propensity of politically orthodox social researchers to more or less consciously adopt "a system perspective and a value orientation which is identical with those of the existing international institutions and lies very close to those of the rich and powerful nations" (ibid., 221). Such internalised, usually relatively covert, biases are not a viable basis for the truthful exploration of systemic deficiencies and contradictions.

perspective which rejects or marginalises moral concerns risks quietly adopting and endorsing "the subjectivist preferences of the powerful" (Jacoby, 2008, 49), or at least the dominant prejudices of the social order which it is investigating, thus supporting the "naturalisation" of pro-*status quo* biases. The conception of total academic neutrality in social analysis also sometimes seems to neglect that, in relation to many social conflicts, "reality takes sides" (i.e. there is little balance in social power, resources etc.), and that truth-seeking analysis needs to adequately reflect this fact.

Mildly ameliorative social study perspectives also do not fundamentally challenge the social and ideological orthodoxies. In contrast to such possibly inauthentic positioning which, in some cases at least, "performs the double function of serving the dominant class while allowing the technicians of practical knowledge to maintain an illusory distance from their employers" (Sartre, [1965] 2008, 251), there is an alternative current of opinion according to which the task of the authentic intellectual is to cultivate a "value-committed attitude" (Ingram, 1987, 4), to commit oneself "on the side of the oppressed" by pursuing "a work of practical exposure by combating ideologies and revealing the violence they mask or justify" (Sartre, [1965] 2008, 254). This dissenting, critical perspective may be advantaged in ascertaining whether the British political, economic and social order is founded on systematic structural violence. Humanistic and scientific perspectives can remain compatible. Fearless analysis of the deep patterns of systemic, structural violence in one's own society may almost of necessity lead to an alignment of scientific and dissenting humanistic perspectives, considering the political and career risks and heterodox commitments which such an approach potentially entails[8].

In contrast to the negative (and one-dimensional) conceptualisation of peace, positive peace is not merely the absence of manifest, direct violence and war. It presupposes the existence of cooperative, non-exploitative and non-domineering social relationships[9]. In its absolute, ideal form this is a utopian vision. Attempts at radical systemic change sometimes may not be feasible

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[8] As Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004, 26) noted, this approach entails "a more human role of engaged witness over that of scientific spectator", since courageous "anthropological witnessing obviously positions the anthropologist inside human events as a responsive, reflexive, and morally or politically committed being, a person who can be counted to "take sides" when necessary and to eschew the privileges of neutrality. This stance flies directly in the face of academic non-engagement".

[9] "A peaceful relationship would, on a personal scale, mean friendship and understanding sufficiently strong to overcome any differences that might occur. On a larger scale, peaceful relationships would imply active association, planned cooperation, an intelligent effort to forestall or resolve potential conflict" (Curle, 1971, 15).

and may even lead to an intensification of violence. The identification of structural violence does not necessarily imply a radical and immediate rejection of it. Effective opposition to violence and oppression requires a sensitivity to the concrete historical context in which efforts to effect change are being carried out. However, I shall attempt to show that the more discerning analytical concept of positive peace can help to reveal and magnify violence that is usually hidden or misrecognised. Along with the concept of structural violence, it can help to identify the deeper structural roots of warfare and of social antagonisms more broadly. In so doing it can guide critical analysis, social advocacy and public policy. My analysis should help to reveal whether the concept of structural violence (as the absence of positive peace) aids in the pursuit of these three interests.

The following is probably Galtung's (1996, 197) most well-known definition of violence, including structural violence:

"I see violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to *life*, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. (…) The four classes of basic needs – an outcome of extensive dialogues in many parts of the world – are: *survival needs* (negation: death, mortality); *well-being needs* (negation: misery, morbidity), *identity, meaning needs* (negation: alienation); and *freedom needs* (negation: repression)" (Galtung, 1996, 197).

It is often not obvious and undisputed which phenomena inhibit the satisfaction of human needs. In themselves, however, Galtung's four classes of fundamental needs do not appear particularly controversial (at least in the tradition of the Enlightenment and of democratic politics), and there is some research which appears to confirm their universality (Tay and Diener, 2011). Even so, Galtung himself acknowledged the lack of complete consensus regarding the meaning of human potential realisations, human needs and human well-being (1969). However, as he pointed out (1969, 168):

"It is not so important to arrive at anything like *the* definition, or *the* typology – for there are obviously many types of violence. More important is to indicate theoretically significant dimensions of violence that can lead thinking, research and, potentially, action, towards the most important problems. If peace action is to be regarded highly because it is action against violence, then the concept of violence must be broad enough to include the most important varieties, yet

specific enough to serve as a basis for concrete action".

I concur with Farmer (2004a, 305), who noted that the concept of structural violence is primarily "intended to inform the study of the social machinery of oppression". My analytical employment of the concept of structural violence sought to find out whether a neo-Galtungian conceptualisation of structural violence provides a solid basis for the study of the class machinery of oppression.

The concept of structural violence, especially in Galtung's version, has increasingly become one of the prevailing approaches in Peace Studies (Vorobej, 2008). While it is clearly not possible to reach a universally accepted, academically and politically uncontroversial definition of structural violence – especially since it is contingent on "some view about what makes human life valuable" (Vorobej, 2008, 85) - the basis for the normative framework of this thesis can be found in the UN's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which was developed through a high level of progressive social consensus (see Morsink, 2000). Article 1 and Article 2 of the Declaration encapsulate its basic normative message:

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in the spirit of brotherhood. (…) Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" (United Nations, [1948] 2008, 3).

This work also accepts that message as its normative foundation[10]. The empirically established, significant human capacity and potential capacity for the organisation of society on the basis of empathy and cooperation (see Sponsel and Gregor, 1994; Boulding, 2000; Blumberg, 2006), notwithstanding various limitations, indicate the plausibility of this normative

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[10] Vorobej (2008, 91) summarised this heterodox vision of politically and ethically engaged scholarship which is characteristic of the intellectual tradition to which Galtung also belongs: "Peace Studies does not pretend to be value neutral. Nor does it pretend to describe in purely "objective" terms a world about which it is fundamentally disinterested. On the contrary, scholars in the field of Peace Studies, including Galtung, openly embrace certain values and openly articulate a commitment to effect social change that is congruent with those values". In a similar vein, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgeois (2004, 8 and 25) approvingly wrote about the "scientific practice in defence of humanity and human rights", despatching "an unabashed clarion for frank political engagement in situations (…) of chronic structural violence".

orientation[11]. The ensuing analysis will operate under the assumption that, by endorsing the creative potential of human beings and of their societies, this value-committed attitude can complement the more immediate and historically static understanding and investigation of differences between actual and potential human realisations.

The recognition that the disparity between these two states leads to needs-deprivation also partially informs my definition of structural violence, but I do not concur with Barnett's (2008) and Jacoby's (2008, 39) claim that "this difference (…) should only be regarded as indicative of violence if this gap is known to be avoidable". Knowledge of human potential for nonviolent and cooperative social relationships cannot, and therefore also need not, be absolute, nor should it assume a conservative, historically static perspective. Knowledge of human potential is most seriously advanced through praxis, a unity of theory and practice. To be human is to become human (Jaspers, 1971)[12]. However, it is important to recognise that the scarcity of various economic and other resources which are at society's disposal sets certain ineluctable limitations on human development. My analysis will also help to reveal instances in which social resources are being misallocated and expropriated from the public.

Existing indicators of social development (e.g the UN's Human Development Index), as relatively crude as they arguably are, provide some idea about the real potential for human development, i.e. of the potential realisations of the human being, which is also Galtung's main concern. Partly for this reason, Gronow and Hilppö (1970) were wrong in denying the possibility of any objective basis on which potential human realisations could be conceptualised. However, the comparative analysis of human development indicators in different countries as a method of ascertaining human potential is in fact a somewhat "conservative" and static approach to this

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[11] Another advantage of this normative perspective is that it can effectively respond to Barnett's (2008) criticism according to which Galtung's definition of structural violence means that the sociable and egalitarian removal of privilege would automatically constitute violence against the privileged. By this narrow logic (which Barnett only tentatively employs), the abolition of slavery *eo ipso* constituted violence against the slaveholders (rather than being understood as a development which supported the fuller development of the former slave owners' humanity). Barnett's relativistic, non-normative viewpoint is surpassed by a universalising normative framework which supports sustainable, egalitarian, nonviolent and cooperative solutions to social problems.

[12] As Gandhi (1938) wrote: "To believe what has not occurred in history will not occur at all is to argue disbelief in the dignity of man".

problem, as it in practice equates human historical potential with human historical actuality[13].

Still, historical and cross-country comparisons of social achievements in and commitments to satisfying human needs, which my thesis will (peripherally) include, are a basic indication of human potential. The argument that such commitments and achievements cannot be replicated in contemporary Britain (due to domestic, international and transnational, structural and systemic, economic and political constraints) would – if it was possible to prove it – actually help to further verify my hypothesis about the deep-seated and systemic nature of structural violence in Britain. The extirpation of viable democratic alternatives should in itself be considered as a major form of structural violence on the basis of a modified perspective to which I will now turn.

Although it has the advantage of potentially reducing or limiting the arbitrary character of judgments relating to what violence is or is not, one fundamental problem with the definition centred on known human potential is that it ignores those forms of violence which may or may not be avoidable (such as the basic structural violence associated with the bureaucratic apparatus of all complex systems of social organisation) but which lead to needs-deprivation and should nonetheless be taken into account in analytical and policy considerations[14]. For this reason, it may be useful and necessary to adopt another perspective on violence which Galtung himself provided. According to this alternative definition, "violence is needs-deprivation" (Galtung, 1996, 200), i.e. whatever causes injury and harm, whatever causes human well-being to be lower than it would otherwise be. This alternative conceptualisation of violence is less dependent on historically or psychologically confirmed human potential, and is therefore freer to examine deep-rooted structural violence. Indeed, this is going to be the operative definition in my research,

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[13] Although it does often deal with meaningful differences in the actuality, and it is, in political terms, currently quite *avant-garde* considering the emphasis (whose existence this thesis will partly demonstrate) on the "race to the bottom" in conditions of neoliberal globalisation.

[14] Besides, views regarding the avoidability or inevitability of certain forms of structural violence are often largely dependent on one's more or less arbitrary ideological perspective. It should be noted that, even when it is unacknowledged by academics and other social actors, David Hume's emotivist ethical theory may still be scientifically valid. As shown by Baron Cohen's (2011) discussion of studies regarding the strong and partly unavoidable influence of emotions on ethical reasoning, there is scientific support for Hume's emotivist ethical theory (which posits that "morals and criticism are not so properly objects of understanding as of taste and sentiment" – Hume, [1748] 2007, 165). This would confirm that there is a certain inevitable degree of arbitrariness in discussions of human needs, considering the importance of normative reasoning in the process of determining and interpreting human needs (as well as considering the contingent nature of human being in history).

which also accepts Galtung's aforementioned classification of fundamental human needs into four basic classes (survival needs, well-being needs, identity, meaning needs and freedom needs).

Galtung defined "all influence relations where there is no (direct) subject or where the structure is the subject (…) as structural" (Gronow and Hilppö, 1970). The main concern in his and my research of structurally-based needs-deprivation are the objective consequences rather than subjective intentions of social actors (Galtung 1969), which is why intent to cause harm is not a necessary criterion for classifying a form of structurally-induced needs-deprivation as structural violence.

Lawler (1995), Bufacchi (2005) and Coady (2008) have criticised Galtung's concept of structural violence for its expansiveness, which supposedly renders the concept ubiquitous and therefore meaningless. This criticism misses the central points of the Galtungian concept of structural violence, which are, firstly, that violence should not be understood in a reductionist manner, as a one-dimensional phenomenon, and secondly, that the structures and institutions of all current (including nominally democratic) societies lead to the routinisation of structural violence. Bourdieu (1977) advanced a similar perspective according to which the everyday and omnipresent character of violence leads to its familiarity which contributes to its invisibility. Taussig (1987) called this general kind of violence "terror as usual". As various authors besides Bourdieu (including Gramsci, [n.d.] 2005 and Foucault, [1976] 1998) have also theorised, this routinised (regulatory and disciplinary) structural (as well as cultural) violence can be more effective and efficient than direct physical violence in ensuring that the existing relationships of domination are preserved and strengthened. This routinisation of increasing violence and domination is precisely why it is important "to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions)" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004, 20). In fact, it is also possible that important hidden relationships of violence and oppression might be revealed if the critique of Britain in the twenty-first century was to be approached from an "extra-terrestrial", sociologically imaginative "thirty-first century" perspective.

While I intend to show that my operationalisation of the concept of structural violence helps to illumine some of the central social issues from the perspective of understanding the

oppressive and violent character and effects of major social structures in the UK, it is important to emphasise that British social structures also create, sustain and/or are otherwise complicit in various grave forms of structural violence abroad. Thus, for example, the UK military budget was around £37 billion in 2014 (SIPRI, 2015) despite the fact that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has claimed that $30 billion a year would be sufficient to eradicate world hunger, which affects close to a billion people (FAO, 2008). In 2004, Professor Jean Ziegler (UN's Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food at the time) said that *around 36 million people* were dying as a result of hunger and malnutrition every year (Ziegler, 2004). According to these figures, around half of the UK annual military budget would be sufficient to save the lives of tens of millions of starving people each year. The resources spent on the UK military budget could therefore perhaps save the lives of *hundreds of millions of people* in the space of a single decade. The following emphasis made by Galtung (1969, 171) is important in relation to this: "If people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation"[15].

It appears that theorists and analysts of structural violence have almost universally eschewed considerations of mainstream theoretical perspectives (including statism, managerialism and pluralism) in their examinations of the concept of structural violence, possibly as a result of failing to find fruitful insights from these theoretical viewpoints – or even to find attempts to credibly engage with the issue of structural violence. There are a few exceptions to this general pattern of eschewing discussions of these theoretical apparatuses in relation to the problem of structural violence. Ó Tuathail (1987) briefly criticised the statist theoretical perspective for its neglect of structural violence and its lack of interest in positive peace. Van der Wusten (2005) pointed out that the statist perspectives integrally involve a commitment to the organisation of structural violence. He also noted that "negligence of internal conflict" (2005, 74) is characteristic of realist perspectives.

Managerialist, statist and classical pluralist approaches to the analysis of social relationships of power largely ignore the existence of structural violence as their perspective does not actively seek to focus on (or even register) the problem of class-based structural violence, thereby impeding the elucidation of this research theme. They do not share the concept of

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[15] Ziegler (2013) put it even more directly: "A child who dies from hunger is a murdered child".

structural violence. Also, class-based violence as such is not in the focus of their theoretical and methodological approaches. For these reasons, I did not consider the analytical apparatuses of the aforementioned theoretical approaches to be sufficiently conducive to the purpose of fruitfully elucidating the main aspects of my research theme. No one appears to have so far identified the grounds of commensurability between the Galtungian theory of structural violence and non-Marxian theories of class and of class power[16]. My approach seeks to explore how the (integrated) neo-Marxian and neo-Galtungian perspectives can be used to investigate class-based structural violence. Of course, attempts to use other methodological and analytical approaches for the purpose of investigating structural violence are also to be welcomed.

The Neo-Marxian Theoretical Lens

The primary focus of the ensuing discussion is to demarcate and crystallise my specific employment of the concept of class for the limited purposes of my specific research agenda, i.e. an initial operationalisation of the concept of class-based structural violence in the context of an attempt to initiate a cartography of such violence across a range of social structures and processes. Other theoretical interpretations and operationalisations of the concept of class may be better calibrated for other types of research into structural violence. Attempts to apply these different class and stratification theories and models might be an interesting and valuable addition to this under-explored field of research.

In opposition to postmodernist authors such as Pakulski and Waters (1996), who claimed that the distribution of wealth was becoming progressively more egalitarian by the end of the twentieth century, various authors - often with a (more or less) neo-Marxian position on class such as Westergaard (1996), Leys (2003), Harvey (2006), Dorling (2011) and others - have identified a very sharp increase in class inequalities in the last decades of the century. Furthermore, in contrast to some post-modernist theorists (Dahrendorf, 1959; Beck, 1992; Pakulski and Waters, 1996), who propagated a view that the general importance of class and of class inequalities is declining, and (in Beck's case) that society is witnessing the individualisation of social and economic risk, Westergaard (ibid.), Dorling (ibid.) and others (including non-

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[16] It seems clearer that these other theoretical approaches may be better attuned to the requirements of detecting factors which mitigate structural violence.

Marxists such as Stiglitz, 2013; Picketty, 2014) have argued that the importance of class inequalities for one's life chances is actually increasing.

Just as class inequalities were beginning to explode in the 1980s, resurgent capitalist ideology in the dominant media and academia began to expound opposite perspectives, often with a radical disregard for empirical facts: "While rich and poor have grown further apart, both predominant ideology and social theory have set out to dismiss this; or to argue that it does not matter anyway. If we are to believe the commentators, politicians and academic theorists who have set this tone in the current debate, class inequality has lost social, moral and political force" (Westergaard, 1996, 141). In reality, class relations and class locations most often crucially determine both individual life chances and the functioning of social institutions.

One definitional, conceptual point is particularly important for the forthcoming discussion. The clash between those who claim class is still important and those who claim it is decreasing in importance is sometimes actually a result of strongly differing definitions of what the term "class" is supposed to denote. Although various post-modernist theorists (Beck, 1992; Casey, 1995; Pakulski and Waters, 1996 etc.), as well as some post- and neo-Marxists – notably E.P. Thompson (Thompson, 1966) – analysed (or even defined) "class" as essentially subjective identification and action, or denied that there is any validity in methodologies which distinguish between structure and action (Poulantzas, 1978), I agree with those who, after Marx in *The Poverty of Philosophy* ([1847] 1955), distinguish between a "class in itself", the objectively existing mass that is "already a class in opposition to capital" (Marx, [1847] 1955, 195), and a class conscious, organised "class for itself". This distinction between class membership vs. class awareness and class-based collective organisation, or (to put it differently) between structural "class determination" and politico-ideological, subjective "class position", also accepted by many non-Marxists including Max Weber (see Giddens, 1973) and C.W. Mills (1963), seems useful for preserving the analytically objectivist approach to social theory[17].

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[17] This is, however, a theoretical and analytical model (ideal-type), which cannot comprehensively condense the complexities of concrete historical existence. Though Poulantzas appears to have somewhat overlooked the usefulness of the polemical bent inherent in the division between "*Klasse an sich*" and "*Klasse für sich*" (Marx [1847] 1955), dialectical thinkers who did not abandon this distinction could still concur with his understanding that "class powers (...) are constitutively tied to the political and ideological relations which (...) are not simply added on to the relations of production that are 'already there', but are themselves present in the form specific to each mode of production, in the constitution of the relations of production" (Poulantzas, 1978, 21). It would certainly be wrong to

The examination of class-based structural violence makes it particularly important to set out a perspective which is capable of acknowledging and accounting for the underlying class relations of economic and social power and the related phenomena of disadvantage and discrimination in contemporary society. My theoretical starting point on class is therefore based on direct empirical insights about fundamental social relations between large structural segments of contemporary British society, especially the primary class relations between: a) the segment of the population which is dominant (economically, politically and socially) and the part of the population which is subordinate and is largely an object of rule; b) the segment of the population which governs (over the state and/or the economy and the main collective processes of social and cultural reproduction, depending on the specific class fraction in question) and the segment of the population which performs labour functions (in production and services) under managerial direction and which only has limited democratic rights; c) the segment of the population which owns and/or controls the means of production, distribution and exchange and "appropriates surplus through wage labor and market rents" (Skocpol, 1979, 56) and the segment of the population which owns and controls far smaller resources, cannot live from its private possessions, is compelled to sell its labour power for a wage to the owners of the means of production, distribution and exchange, or to financially rely on their family members or on the state benefits for the unemployed.

This outline of major class cleavages is based on a dialectical, non-orthodox, non-reductionist neo-Marxist perspective "focused on changes in the mode of production and their social relations as the generators of historical change" (Hobsbawm, 2010, 150). Of course, these social relations constitute a complex interplay of economic, political, cultural and psychological

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consider the relationship between these two modes of viewing class as firmly separated in concrete life, let alone as uni-directional. Subjective class positioning can significantly reverberate on processes of material class determination and reproduction, and *vice versa*. Yet although "class in itself" and "class for itself" intertwine and influence each other, there may often be no linear correlation between changes in class consciousness and class-based organisation on the one side, and change in the objective structure of class positions on the other, as Poulantzas (1978) also noted. Class consciousness, organisation and action (patterns of ideology, behaviour, political affiliations etc.) are highly contingent, not necessarily a direct reflection of - or in direct correspondence with - the objective, material structure of class positions. The centrality of class relations in shaping social inequalities, or even the centrality of class in determining the main lines of long-term social antagonisms, also do not automatically translate into overt and conscious conflict. Antagonistic class interests are woven into the very fabric of the economy and society, and their manifestations tend to fundamentally break out of the established, regularised channels for communicating these interests only under exceptional historical circumstances.

factors. As scholars including Bourdieu (1984; 1999), Skeggs (1997; 2004) and Reay (1998; 2005) have emphasised, there is a need to take account of the cultural, emotional and psychic factors in the formation and reproduction of class inequalities, which are co-constitutive with material factors in the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. Apart from being determined by material patterns of production, distribution and exchange, class relations and affiliations are also determined by cultural, lifestyle and consumption factors and patterns (Bourdieu, 1984, Crompton, 1993; Kenway, 1995). Although I have highlighted the major material class cleavages (which also tend to entail various subjective and cultural correlates of domination and submission, privilege and disadvantage, feelings and cultural narratives of superiority and inferiority, etc.), my discussion of class-based structural violence - especially in the analysis of some major aspects of the welfare state and of social services (education, healthcare and housing) and of the changing ways in which different classes satisfy their needs in these regards - weaves together the understanding of production-based and cultural and consumption-based patterns of class relationships. Especially considering the highly dialectical relationship between these phenomena, the decision about the balance between the analytical focus on production-based and consumption-based relationships is somewhat arbitrary. Class-based structural violence can be approached from various analytical angles in relation to material and cultural, "production-based" and "consumption-based" class phenomena[18].

The basic class cleavages which I have just noted point to the existence of two major opposed classes: the capitalist class and the working class. The working class consists of the great majority of the population which is expropriated from the essential means of production, distribution and exchange, has few or no supervisory functions and is compelled (to a large extent through relatively impersonal market forces) to sell its labour power to capitalists.

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[18] This does not mean that one should not be guided by certain analytical and normative criteria in order to avoid obscuring the existence of important aspects of reality. One such important example was provided by Holton and Turner (1994), who emphasised the need to take into account the vital role of women and of gender relations in the formation of class relations, critiquing the neglect of these processes in the occupational stratification and class schemes. Reay (1998) also highlighted the marginalisation of women's relationships to class in reductionist accounts of class, e.g. in those approaches (e.g. Goldthorpe et al., 1980; Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992) which may over-emphasise how women's social class is "mediated through their relationships with men" (Reay, 1998a). In this work I acknowledge the importance of the gendered aspects of class formation and reproduction, including in the section on the gender system (see below).

Workers have to sell their labour power for a price lower than the overall value of the fruits of their labour[19]. However, as I have discussed elsewhere (Jakopovich, 2014a), concrete (economic as well as cultural) circumstances in many cases dilute this straightforward ideal-type. The basic "classical" criteria for defining the capitalist class, on the other hand, are the ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange and the employment of wage labour (Engels, [1888] 1967) in order to make profits through the extraction and appropriation of surplus value, which is "the revenue of the bourgeois class in capitalist society" and is "uncompensated labour (…) which the (...) wage worker gives the capitalist without receiving any value in exchange" (Mandel, 1973, 18)[20]. Chapter 7 identifies several forms of structural violence which this fundamental capitalist relationship entails.

Although classes are aggregates of contradictory and combined interests, and the divergence of interests between workers and capitalists far outstrips the antagonisms between different fractions of the dominant class, Mills' (1956, 170) made a sensible point (perhaps especially in the context of the Keynesian post-war period) when he claimed it would be mistaken "to believe that the political apparatus is merely an extension of the corporate world, or that it had been taken over by the representatives of the corporate rich". I will return to this issue in chapter 1. More research may be needed to ascertain whether the classical Marxist concept of a "ruling class" (according to which the capitalist class also, in an undiluted way, rules politically)

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[19] In the course of my analysis, especially when referring to the classes that are mostly on the receiving end of class-based structural violence, I will often also mention the "lower class" as a shorter way of referring to the "upper levels" of the working class along with the "lower working class" (the working and the unemployed poor). The unemployed poor are in some neo-Marxian and other approaches categorised as the "underclass", which Wright defines as the "category of social agents who are economically oppressed but not consistently exploited within a given class system" (Wright, 1994, 48). It seems to be more accurate to specify that they are not consistently exploited through the wage system and the extraction of surplus labour, as opposed to various other forms of exploitation through market rents (e.g. housing rent), in addition to routinely suffering the brunt of other forms of class-based cultural and structural violence.

[20] Poulantzas (1975), Hegedüs (1976) and Wright (1985) distinguished between juridical ownership and effective "possession" (control over the operation of the means of production and of the labour process) by managers. Pahl and Winkler (1974, 15), on the other hand, distinguished between strategic control and managerial "operational control". Some also argued that managers take part in the exploitation of workers on account of their "ownership of capital assets" and their "control of organisational assets" (Wright, 1985, 283), while Carchedi (1977) talked about the "function of capital" which managerial layers perform. Top managers could thus be said to constitute a part of the capitalist class in so far as they have effective possession over capital, or perform "the function of capital", direct the labour process and are able to hire and fire: "In practical terms it is management itself which effectively has the capacity to transfer rights to control organization assets from one person to another, and this could be considered one crucial aspect of having a property right in the asset itself" (Wright, 1985, 81). For a critique of the central managerialist assumptions, see Jakopovich, 2014a.

is valid or too deterministic and reductionist (at least when applied to contemporary Britain). This is why I shall use the term "dominant class" when referring to the capitalist class, which does not imply a view of the state as a mere instrument of the capitalist class, and is therefore somewhat less contentious than the concept of a "ruling class"[21]. My subsequent discussion will show that neo-pluralists, elitists, neo-Marxists and also the most prominent statist theorists (see Skocpol, 1979 and Mann, 2013) agree with the notion that the capitalist class tends to play a privileged and dominant role in economic and political life. This thesis will help to confirm that the state elite (consisting of the holders of high political and administrative office) in Britain is to a significant degree dependent on and systematically privileges the interests of large capital. This dominant segment of capital in Britain is largely finance-based, and is now thoroughly financialised[22], yet it also encompasses sectors such as the energy, pharmaceutical, retail, media, arms and security industries. Their influence, and the influence of their interests, on the political process and on the process of organising social consent more broadly, serves to perpetuate their economically dominant (and domineering) position. As long as political functionaries privilege the interests of, and depend on, the dominant segment of the capitalist class, this dominant segment of the capitalist class can be considered to be the politically dominant class elite, the inner core of the dominant class.

I, however, do not agree with Scott's (1997) assertion that the state elite, i.e. the governing elite directly dependent on and representing the interests of the capitalist class, nonetheless consists of other classes as well. As a governing state elite committed to the preservation of capitalism and of their own privileged and hierarchically superior position within the political and social system, leading state officials (leading politicians and the most senior members of the civil service and of the military) *ipso facto* belong to the dominant class (as a special and semi-autonomous fraction of that class). Members of the state elite do not primarily belong to the dominant class in the sense of having private ownership over the means of economic activity (i.e. the means of production, exchange and distribution, although they are

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[21] Furthermore, it appears somewhat imprecise, as Mills (1956) also noted, to assign a politically "ruling" position to all capitalists, even in the case of some of those who own and direct medium to large capital. In fact, even Marx noted in his analyses of mid-19th century France ([1850] 1978, [1852] 1979) that only some fractions of the capitalist class controlled the state apparatus.

[22] For a further clarification of the process of financialisation see chapter 6.

often private capitalists as well), but in the sense of being positioned at the top of the social pyramid of power and status, and in the sense of directing massive state resources as well as many of the general conditions of capital accumulation, of capitalist power relations and of the capitalist social order. I will demonstrate that the general exercise of state power, of governance over segments of the economy, over state-owned enterprises and institutions, as well as the state's generalised rule over the population (through laws, regulations, the ideological apparatus etc.), closely conform to and powerfully shape the prevailing paradigm of hierarchical and (somewhat) authoritarian "capital relations" based on alienated labour (in Marx's sense of the term – see Marx, [1844] 2004). These "capital relations" are not always and necessarily based on "private enterprise" (see Mészáros, 1995).

There are, of course, innumerable gradations between the two "polar" opposites (the capitalist and the working class) in relation to the major class cleavages which I have mentioned. This includes various middle class fractions. One major segment of the middle class is the "petite bourgeoisie", or the "traditional" or "old" middle class, which primarily consists of traditional and new small proprietors, small landlords and investors, as well as, in some cases, the self-employed. The other segment of the middle class is the "new middle class" category, which is internally heterogeneous according to hierarchical levels, public or private sector occupation, membership of professional and (lower) managerial grades, etc. (Roberts, 2011). The chasm of differing material interests of various fractions of the middle class (and upper working class) can open on a large number of issues, some of which are of fundamental importance to their material and status situation. Perhaps the most lucid categorisation of the material basis of the "middle class" position in the Marxian tradition was made by Carchedi (1977), who distinguished the "middle class" from the "working class" on the basis of separation – consistently made at the level of the relations of production – between the "function of labour", which is the only function ordinary workers have access to, and the "function of capital", which supervisory ("middle class") wage-workers perform, although they do not own the means of production and do not control the extended reproduction of capital, therefore experiencing exploitation as well. This "capital function" consists of organising the exploitation of others (which objectively pits supervisors against workers' interests to a degree) without really contributing to the labour process itself. However, this can be only one dimension of the work activity of supervisors, who

in the course of their job frequently also perform tasks closer to the productive function of job coordination[23]. There are also a range of other cultural factors which distinguish the middle class position, which I primarily discuss in chapter 5 (with reference to health, education and housing), but which are not in the focus of my analysis.

One of the essential methodological problems of, for example, Goldthorpe et al.'s (1980) stratification scheme (based on a theoretical conflation of production-based and market-based criteria) and of Wright's (2005) class categorisation (constructed through skill-based and organisation-based criteria) is the relatively arbitrary nature of "class" categories based on a hierarchy of occupational positions which do not actually cluster into discontinuous, clearly demarcated groups (Prandy and Blackburn, 1997; Blackburn, 1998, Bergman and Joye, 2001). These "class" categories are of dubious theoretical value, especially since they are mainly gradational rather than being truly relational (on this point see also Bradley, 2014). The relative arbitrariness of this typology is reinforced by the somewhat "artificial" nature of primary classifications such as promotion opportunities, levels of autonomy and job security, which are in fact continuous variables (Prandy and Blackburn, 1997)[24]. As Giddens (1973, 78) noticed in what

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[23] Determining what degree of the capital function is necessary in order to warrant positioning an employee in the "middle class" (in accordance with this materially-based perspective) is therefore likely to be a contentious matter. Armstrong et al. (1986) usefully suggested that the primary determinant of the class position of supervisors is how their class interests are attached to their job tasks. From the perspective I have taken, it would seem most constructive to restrict the use of the (non-petit bourgeois) "middle class" category only to those whose basic job description or job obligations focus on the execution of the function of capital, since this option is at least founded on the goal of reaching a less arbitrary conceptualisation, and can help avoid the trivialisation of the "middle class" category (which often happens through the inclusion in the "middle class" of all the employees who, for instance by virtue of their seniority, can be said to possess certain basic supervisory entitlements, although these constitute a relatively marginal aspect of their work load, both quantitatively and in terms of the importance of these activities to managers who monitor their job performance). An additional point to bear in mind here is that, as Marx illustrated in his famous reference to the orchestra conductor (Marx, [1867] 1976, 644), "work of coordination and unity" of the labour process need not imply "work of supervision and management" in the capitalist sense (to use Carchedi's phrases). Similarly, although draughtsmen, planning engineers and programmers are undoubtedly positioned higher than ordinary manual workers on any serious *stratification* scale (considering their higher skills, higher income and better work conditions, participation in the conceptual side of production, higher status etc.), they cannot be considered to automatically belong to a higher *class* by the criteria used here, since these higher-end technical workers "act in a cooperative way towards manual workers (…) [,] they are not concerned with monitoring the intensity of manual labour, they do not control that labour, but are rather chiefly concerned with the craft aim of ensuring the quality of the finished product" (Smith, 1986, 90). This analysis could also be extended to plenty of professional "white collar" work as well. Of course, concrete analyses of the complex and changing reality of work, including the identification of "contradictory class locations" (Wright, 1976), are needed.

[24] As Prandy (1998) emphasised in his critique of the (not very dissimilar) Rose and O'Reilly (1997) stratification scheme: "In this particular case we are actually dealing with a (secondary) classification of a set of (primary)

is also one of the foundations of my critique of neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist class and stratification schemes, the approach which bases class categories on the variable market-based individual resources and capabilities includes the possibility of constructing "as many classes as there are concrete individuals participating in market relationships", leading to possibly innumerable, under-theorised, *ad hoc* divisions. Variables concerning the character of the work experience entail a similar flaw as far as constructing class schemes is concerned (considering that differences in work conditions exist along a continuum).

In addition to the already mentioned conceptual conflicts about class which largely stem from disparate terminological or analytical conventions (the binary structure-agency debate has largely been surpassed by social theorists through the adoption of greater theoretical dialecticity, which I will soon discuss), another major line of division in approaches to class analysis revolves around the level and direction of concrete inquiries. It is here that some of the biggest methodological inadequacies still go unnoticed. In particular, short-range, mid-range and long-range investigative class models (be they empirical, theoretical, or both) are commonly muddled up according to the conventional preoccupations of the mainstream debate. For example, plenty of vulgar materialist - and even more sophisticated neo-Marxist - writing (e.g. Westergaard's or Wright's class schemes) tends to invest the Marxian objectivist "class in itself" model with a non-existent clear and immediate predictive meaning (especially in relation to individual behaviour), since this is a concern that the contemporary sociological debate on class has consistently favoured, even though this integration of mid-range and long-range levels is not necessarily in the spirit of Marx's approach (especially in his mature and non-propagandist works), let alone in the spirit of leading modern Marxists such as Gramsci ([n.d.] 2005). The Marxian conceptualisation of material class structure, at least in its most lucid and intellectually cogent form, is a long-range theory which aims to cast light only on the more fundamental, abstracted structural social relationships, and on the broad lines of historical development. It does not preclude the use of a variety of other methodologies and classifications in the course of some concrete empirical inquiries, and particularly in the detection of immediate predictive

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classifications, because the data being used to (attempt to) construct the classes are responses to a set of items, usually reduced to dichotomies, about features of the employment contract".

social variables for the level of everyday life[25].

Although Marx's historical materialist theory postulates that class relations are grounded in relations of production, Gramsci ([n.d.] 2005) and various other neo-Marxists refined and transcended the original base-superstructure model by placing emphasis on the relative autonomy of non-economic factors, and even the structural Marxist Louis Althusser identified that economic relations might not be dominant, even if they are determinant in the last instance (see Larrain, 2003). Various non-Marxists including Max Weber ([1905] 2010) also understood the active influence of non-economic factors such as culture in social processes, including class formation. In particular, grand historical narratives based on simply "decyphering" the influence of (abstractly isolated) material factors have rightly gone out of fashion. This is not the embracement of the postmodernist "incredulity towards meta-narratives" (Lyotard, 1984, xxiv) *en general*, since dialectical thought has the ability to preserve an understanding of totality along with the heterogeneity of relevant social factors. However, it would be wrong to conflate the partial analytical separation of material, ideological and other agential factors with a vulgar materialist theory. To the extent relevant for this work, I shall use this interpretative approach in order to retain a certain methodological elegance and expositional clarity. In Wright's (2005, 180) words, "specific definitions and elaborations of the concept of class (...) are shaped by the diverse kinds of questions class is thought to answer". Of course, although agency and structure are dialectically intertwined, an analytical separation for research purposes is possible (Archer, 1982 and 1996). For Crompton (2008, 68-69), "it is not possible to identify particular schemes which are "right" or "wrong"; rather, different schemes are more or less appropriate for particular tasks". Even when a specific lens (such as neo-Marxian theory) is applicable to a wide diapason of phenomena, it still needs to be calibrated in accordance with the specific research focus.

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[25] In fact, my own "meta-analytical" approach to the investigation of structural violence had to also rely on divergent theories of class, considering that my lens on class is heterodox – and hence underused in empirical social research. The basic criteria which I used in the assessment of the appropriateness of sources were their internal validity, reliability and relevance in the context of a given case study. Partly considering the somewhat obfuscating character of most stratification schemes in relation to the category of the dominant class (whose existence these perspectives generally do not even explicitly acknowledge), I sought to employ my own categorisation when identifying and discussing this class as a whole as well as its fractions. I also qualify and modify the findings of authors using other class and stratification schemes in those cases concerning the subordinate classes where I identified obstacles to the commensurability of our differing categorisations.

Even if this eclectic tolerance was dismissed as an escape from the need for theoretical consistence and coherence, it is true that various analytical perspectives on class might be appropriate depending on the particular application in question. My analytical approach will largely concentrate on the structural violence embedded in the dominant mode of production (broadly conceived to include not just production but also distribution and exchange), its recent mutations and some of its key institutional pillars which are vitally important for the reproduction and, in some cases, intensification of the underlying relations of class domination and servility in the British economic and political order. However, my use of the dialectical, neo-Marxian analytical lens is not used as a general substitute for investigations of various other material and cultural factors which I shall also examine in the course of my analysis of structural violence, and which are commonly used in the construction of stratification schemes. Perhaps few social scientists would entirely dismiss David Lockwood's (1958) now almost "classical" (material and cultural) typology of "class situation" – work situation, market situation and status situation – though some would, after Weber, distinguish "status groups" from "social classes" (see Wright (ed.), 2005). Runciman's (1990) stratification model based on differences in ownership, control and marketability is also broadly plausible in its enumeration of variables relevant for social power dynamics that are conventionally subsumed under the contentious concept of "class structure". Similarly, Bourdieu's renowned account of economic, social and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) points to the multi-causal sources of class power, which are rather difficult to theoretically isolate from each other in a credible manner. It is doubtless that "no class, when analysing concrete society, can ever be defined only on the economic level: its economic level (...) is, however, a necessary although not a sufficient step" (Carchedi, 1977, 45). This is largely why sociology has been moving away from the more constricted, overly economistic interpretations of class formations (Bottero, 2005). Class-based social formations emerge through numerous mediations, and the aforementioned (market-based, status-based and cultural) factors enumerated by Lockwood, Runciman, Bourdieu and others are also relevant for my analysis of class-based structural violence. Class-based structural violence is based on various economically, politically and culturally constructed social hierarchies.

Unlike the neo-Marxian perspective which I have defended, the more conventional stratification schemes are not particularly suited to the aim of grasping the central material

relationships of the capitalist society. My approach advocates the practice of distinguishing between different levels and forms of "class" analysis. In addition to greater conceptual clarity, a focused emphasis on the salient theoretical points, an added advantage of this methodical multi-tiered approach is that – unlike most research which tries to force together theoretical and short-term predictive criteria for the sake of convenient "one-size-catch-all" schemes - my approach discards false pretensions that a theory grounded in the social relations of production and mainly focused on the material aspects of these relations can (in a non-mediated form) consistently serve as a precise predictor of immediate social phenomena, by the same token as it rejects the assumption that a complex stratificational agglomeration of work, market (and in some approaches status) elements can do justice to the goal of comprehending, conveying and keeping sight on the roots of fundamental (objective) class antagonisms rooted in the capitalist mode of production.

Although the focus of this work is largely on analysing class-based structural violence through the analysis of the mutating dominant mode of production, distribution and exchange (encompassing the analysis of key government institutions which mediate – and frequently orchestrate – these developments), the topic of class-based structural violence opens up many new research possibilities and perspectives. Considering the significance of this form of structural violence, what is also greatly needed are studies seeking to analyse how it affects specific classes and class fractions: various working class fractions, the middle classes and middle class fractions (including groupings such as the "petite bourgeoisie" and the "new middle class"), and the capitalist class and its various class fractions as well. Studies of class-based structural violence which focus on examining specific experiences of structural violence among different classes and class fractions (and the various objective and subjective forms of intra-class competition) may be able to fruitfully employ various aforementioned stratification and class schemes and lenses.

The objectivist relational definition of the class structure based on the fundamental material antagonisms stemming from the relations of production, distribution and exchange is commonly accused of reducing the complexity of social interests and contradictions to a single source[26]. As far as the relationship between class and non-class lines of division (like ethnicity or

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[26] This criticism neglects the fact that the analytical emphasis on the key structural economic cleavages does not

gender) is concerned, "in practice the two twine together, to reinforce the effects of class rather than to go against them" (Westergaard, 1996, 149). Thus, for instance, enormous differences in economic and social power persist among women (as well as among men) depending on which class they belong to. In terms of more narrowly economic criteria, "disparities of pay and conditions of work are, by and large, as sharp among earning women as among earning men, according to the "class" of work done. Opportunities for advancement and the risks of demotion differ at least as much among women as among men, according to the individual's level of work and point of origin in the class structure" (Westergaard, 1996, 150). Of course, it is also often true that various other social formations and constructs such as religion, gender, race and ethnicity "not only blur the basic class divides but also generate their own divisions" (Thrift and Williams, 1987, 7), as well as their own forms of structural violence. The main point for my discussion here, however, is that these multiple social positions and various structural determinants of violence (including non-class determinants) do not "cancel each other out" (as implied, among others, by Pakulski and Waters, 1996), but coexist and mutually interact in various, often complex, ways[27]. Anthias (2005) called this "translocational positionality"; others prefer to use the simpler term "intersectionality" (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Studies of other forms of structural violence that are not class-based (or at least not primarily class-based), and of cultural aspects of class, are certainly also needed[28].

Moreover, it is important to establish how these different aspects of inequality, discrimination and disadvantage are bounded by the general matrix of class formation and reproduction; "a reconstruction of the central core is necessary" (Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn, 1980, 281), on the basis of which the character of the interplay between class and non-class lines of social division can be better understood. This important inquiry is mostly beyond the scope of this work, but my aforementioned basic perspective on class structure, which to a large extent

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preclude a serious consideration of other inter-class tensions and gradations of interest, as demonstrated (for example) by Erik Olin Wright's (1976) exploration of "contradictory class locations", as well as by elaborate analyses of class structure by Carchedi (1977), Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn (1980), Cottrell (1984), Wright (2005) and others. For a more detailed discussion of these class schemes, see Jakopovich, 2014a. On the flipside, serious analyses of class-based cultural inequalities also do not preclude the understanding of the material bases of class inequality and oppression (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984).

[27] Stuart Hall's (1978) notion that, for black people, class is lived through race is an example of these complexities. The following section will focus on intersectionality, and I will also discuss it in more detail in the rest of the thesis.

[28] A number of studies have already explored gendered structural violence (e.g. Farmer et al. (eds.), 1997; Price, 2012, Anderson, 2015) and racialised structural violence (e.g. Wacquant, 2004; Bourgois, 2004).

focuses on the central material class antagonisms, is one possible (partial, provisional and context-specific) theoretical and operative approach to this research question.

The Class Basis of Structural Violence

Although the concept of structural violence can refer to violence present in all systems of social interaction, my research will focus on exploring the relations between structural arrangements related to the differential access to class power and the resulting harm inflicted mostly on the disadvantaged classes in society. In other words, I will examine how the deep-rooted violence of capitalist social structures creates disparities of power and, consequently, class-based disadvantage in the pursuit of human needs. As Amartya Sen (2004, xvi) emphasised in the foreword to Paul Farmer's (2004b) book on structural violence: "The asymmetry of power can indeed generate a kind of quiet brutality. We know, of course, that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. But inequalities of power in general prevent the sharing of various opportunities. They can devastate the lives of those who are far removed from the levers of control. Even their own lives are dominated by decisions taken by others". The disparities of class power are the basis of class-based structural violence. More specifically, as I will show in this thesis, the more capitalist class agency is unfettered, the more democratic agency tends to be fettered. Capitalist class power and democratic rights of the broad population tend to be inversely related.

Elaborating his view of structural violence, Galtung (1969, 171) noted that "there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances". My thesis will test the hypothesis that class-based structural violence constitutes a very common and prominent form of structural violence. In pointing that "above all *the power to decide over the distribution of resources* is unevenly distributed" (ibid., 171), Galtung himself implied the centrality of class-based structural violence (in the sense of unequal and oppressive social class relationships and the unequal access to class power in its various aspects, encompassing the access to economic, political, cultural and other resources). He wrote:

"The archetypal violent structure, in my view, has exploitation as a center-piece. This simply means that some, the top dogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs. There is 'unequal exchange', a euphemism" (Galtung, 1996, 198)[29].

Exploitation (primarily through the expropriation of the fruits of surplus labour, or "surplus value" in Marx's account) and domination (in the relations of production, distribution and exchange) are the source of antagonistic class interests; they are the primary causal link "between the wellbeing of one class and the deprivation of another'', giving the antagonism "an 'objective' character" (Wright, 1985, 36). The antagonism between capitalists who are driven by the logic of capital accumulation and workers who are compelled to protect their livelihood is an inherent characteristic of the capitalist system. Class analysis – as I understand it - is differentiated from conventional stratification models (with their gradational taxonomies) precisely by this relational approach, which (in its expanded form) encompasses the examination of class positions and interactions within the relations of production, distribution and exchange. In a class society, these fundamental socio-economic relations are characterised by objective antagonisms. Economic and social inequalities are not just a result of different abilities, effort or chance – they are fundamentally a result of (more or less concealed) structural violence, coercion and exploitation, as I shall subsequently demonstrate. One of the central functions of class analysis must be to elucidate this essential fact. Such analysis can, however, place emphases on different sets of class relationships and on relationships between different levels of the class structure. My analysis will mainly focus on the fundamental material antagonisms between the tiny minority which controls the majority of resources (i.e. private capitalists and the state elite) vs. the subordinate (middle and lower) classes. I will also note some major interest-based antagonisms between the middle and lower classes (mostly in the sections on education, healthcare and housing in chapter 4), while realising that much further analysis is required in relation to the patterns of structural (and cultural) violence between the middle and lower classes (as well as between various class fractions).

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[29] In common with Galtung's original perspective, my neo-Galtungian perspective also integrates the theory of structural violence with a (neo-)Marxian view of class structure as a set of relationships largely based on exploitative economic and political arrangements.

While measurement of at least some forms of structural violence can pose complex problems (see Vorobej, 2008; Coady, 2008), the analysis of social inequality and of patterns of structural domination is often an excellent method of advancing the understanding of the causal relationships behind the difference between potential and actual human realisations, potential and actual levels of human well-being, and behind needs-deprivation more generally. Class inequality and class domination, oppression and exploitation (which I shall soon define for my purposes) are the central criteria for identifying class-based structural violence. An important strength of the neo-Marxian class perspective in seeking to understand structural violence is that it helps to uncover the structure's key economic, political and social relational features, the ways in which objectively antagonistic economic and political interests and hierarchical relationships determine different outcomes for different social classes. Galtung's objectivist conceptualisation of structural violence also to a large degree centres on the issue of the inequitable distribution of resources, particularly on the basis of the mechanism of exploitation, which is in social research to a large extent associated with class relationships.

Various other prominent analysts of structural violence have largely focused on the role of unequal class relationships in the creation and perpetuation of structural violence (e.g. Farmer, 2004a and 2004b, Leech, 2012)[30]. Amartya Sen (2004, xiv) noted that Paul Farmer analyses the patterns of structural violence through the procedure of "exemplification", and Leech's analysis and exposition also operate under a fairly basic definition of structural violence and without a typology of violence. Although my work is informed by this theoretical current which identifies unequal class relationships as one of the central causes of structural violence, it significantly differs from Farmer's and Leech's approaches as it seeks to employ and develop a more elaborate analytical framework based on a more elaborate neo-Galtungian definition and typology of structural violence. More precise delineation and categorisation of the concept contribute to terminological and analytical precision and clarity. They also facilitate a more systematic and multi-faceted exploration of structural violence in its different forms.

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[30] Leech (2012, 4) wrote: "Inequality, both in power and in wealth, lie at the core of structural violence when they result from social structures that disproportionately benefit one group of people while preventing others from meeting their fundamental needs. Therefore social structures that cause human suffering and death constitute structural violence". Leech's minimalist focus only on "fundamental needs" is at odds with Galtung's (and my) more expansive perspective in relation to structural violence.

Class-based Structural Violence and Intersectionality

Intersectional approaches to the study of structural violence attempt to grasp the interactive relationship/mutual reproduction of multiple interlocking and dynamic forms of structural violence. Early scholarly efforts to develop intersectional analyses prominently included the development of integrative race, gender and class studies which were pioneered in the 1970s and 1980s by women activist-intellectuals such as Angela Davis, Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, Audre Lord, the members of the African American women's Combahee River Collective, and others (see Barnett, 2003; Colling, Parson and Arrigoni, 2014; Corman and Vandrovcová, 2014)[31].

Those neo-Marxist perspectives which have been enriched by the theory of intersectionality have tended to eschew the earlier view of racist, sexist and other forms of oppression and inequality as merely secondary or entirely a derivative of class oppression[32]. Analysis of class-based structural violence should not perpetuate the rendering of vulnerable and socially marginalised people invisible. In fact, transformative anti-oppressive thought and practice need to challenge all patterns of exclusion of any other sentient beings from the moral community, as my subsequent discussion will also indicate. Since the varied forms of violence and oppression are interrelated, individual struggles need to generalise insights and the challenge against the violent ruling order through a unifying movement and struggle[33].

An underlying limitation of all analytical approaches is that they are still able to concretely analyse only some of the intersections: a process of dubious exclusion of some intersections is always at work, and it is generally likely to entail the exclusion and even erasure

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[31] There are various other (often non-academic) predecessors to this analytical and practical turn. For example, as Hancock (2007, 63) pointed out, "both Martin Luther King and Emma Goldman's experiences at the crossroads of multiple social movements presaged the arguments put forth by intersectionality theorists today". The anarchist geographer and Paris Communard Élisée Reclus was also a pioneering intersectional thinker, which was most prominently reflected in his thought concerning the intersectional relationship between speciesism and oppressive human relationships (Corman and Vandrovcová, 2014).

[32] As I have already pointed out in the section on my neo-Marxian lens, these types of reductionist analyses are also present in non-Marxian stratification theories.

[33] For an overview of studies which established the critical importance of broad, intersectional alliances and of inclusive and unitive participation patterns for averting negative outcomes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century revolutions, see Foran, 2001.

of more heterodox, radical, culturally and politically *avant-garde* concerns. In other words, emergent and more advanced intersectional concerns are "crowded out" and frequently even rendered invisible. The fact that various groups of people may face distinctive challenges and may enjoy distinctive advantages underscores the need for all people to pay attention to oppressive practices they may be engaging in, and to put an end to them. Oppressive practices should be identified and resolutely and consistently challenged both in relation to other people and in relation to all other sentient beings, i.e. non-human animals who are also capable of experiencing pain, fear and suffering, and frequently pleasure and joy as well (e.g. DeGrazia, 1996; Bekoff, 2007). Critical animal studies therefore constitute a crucial theoretical and practical intervention which seeks to further the liberation of non-human and human animals from all forms of domination and oppression by "[advancing] a holistic understanding of the commonality of oppressions, such that speciesism, sexism, racism, ableism, statism, classism, militarism and other hierarchical ideologies and institutions are viewed as parts of a larger, interlocking, global system of domination" (Best et al., 2007, 5).

As Crenshaw (1991) regarded the marginalisation of black women's experience in domestic violence projects as an impediment to the advancement of gender equality and of the anti-racist project[34], so the marginalisation of vulnerable groups more generally undermines the emancipatory project in general, as well as its various components. The enmeshment of various forms of violence and oppression means that the endeavour to dismantle the system of class domination requires a simultaneous challenge to violence and oppression that occur along racist, sexist, ableist, ageist, heterosexist, speciesist and other lines. Liberation from all systems of oppression is predicated on the creation of a society in which everybody matters.

Hancock (2007) identified three approaches to the analysis of social inequalities: unitary, multiple and intersectional. She defined the "unitary" approach as one in which only a single category is examined, which is considered to be primary and stable. The "multiple" approach is one in which several categories are addressed under the assumption that they matter equally, are stable and can be examined through an additive procedure, by which individual categories are

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[34] Notably, even though she called for a more intersectional approach, Crenshaw (ibid.) omitted various other inequalities in her analysis, even class inequalities (although she acknowledged the significance of class).

layered onto each other. The "intersectional" approach, according to Hancock's definition, implies not only that there are multiple categories, but that they matter equally, are fluid rather than stable, and are mutually constitutive in the sense that the original intersecting categories become a new entity. As Walby et al. (2012) pointed out, this typology loses sight of the possibility of asymmetries between categories since it differentiates categories as either being dominant (in the "unitary" approach) or equal to other categories (in the case of the "multiple" and "intersectional" approach). Practical research actually requires that the stability and fluidity of categories of inequalities (and, by extension, of structural violence) are balanced "so they are sufficiently stable as to be available for practical analysis, while recognizing that they change" (ibid., 228). It also requires openness towards the context-specific importance of specific categories and an adequate identification of specific categories of inequality (and structural violence) along with a recognition that their intersection influences their character (ibid.).

In contrast to Hancock, who emphasised that the intersection of categories changes them beyond recognition, McCall (2005, 1773) rejected this anti-categorical approach which "deconstructs analytical categories" and instead recommended what she defined as an inter-categorical approach which "provisionally adopt[s] existing analytical categories to document relationships of inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality among multiple and conflicting dimensions". Walby et al. (2012, 230; also see Felski, 1997; Sayer, 1997) agreed with McCall that the conceptualisation of categories as fluid presents an impediment to practical analysis and that distinctions between forms of inequality should be retained (they expressed a preference for using the terms "inequality" or "set of unequal social relations" rather than "category", which may offer "connotations of unified blocks"). Walby et al (ibid.) argued, in my view correctly, that it is mistaken to adopt a dichotomous analytical approach which, while rightly rejecting the position that inequalities are merely additive, perceives them as being mutually constitutive to such an extent that they cannot be analytically disaggregated. It seems more practical – both in the sense of adequately acknowledging different forms of inequality and structural violence and in the sense of adequately acknowledging their specific interactions with other forms of inequality and structural violence - to understand these phenomena as mutually shaping yet also, to some degree and for certain analytical purposes, as distinct. As Walby et al. (ibid., 237) put it: "At the point of intersection complex systems

mutually adapt, each changing the other, but they do not usually destroy each other. Each remains visible, although each is changed".

The treatment of numerous intersecting variables as secondary in this study is the result of my quest for a degree of analytical practicality which all forms of pragmatic research require to some degree. It is not a reflection of a reductionist perspective still present in some currents of supposedly progressive opinion, according to which other inequalities and forms of oppression (including racism, sexism, ableism, etc.) are somehow subsumable by class-based categories. In certain cases it can be legitimate to focus research on a particular category (e.g. disability studies or, as is the case here, on class analysis), provided that the existence of various other intersections of violence and oppression is acknowledged, and (where possible) at least some attention is accorded to them.

Analysis focused on class-based structural violence often misses various other hierarchical relationships and forms of structural violence with which it intersects and which help to shape specific types of structural violence and the broader systemic patterns. My exploratory study, which attempts to situate the analysis of class-based structural violence in its broader socio-economic and cultural context, therefore identifies various intersections of violence and oppression which serve as important dimensions and angles of analysis, to which future investigation of structural violence should devote further attention. Rather than constituting a comprehensive analysis of the multitudinous intersections of various types of structural violence, this work includes a number of notes which could perhaps serve as a guide for future attempts to elaborate a more totalising analysis of the interlocking systems of structural violence, as well as for more focused and systematic studies of specific areas of social life. Considering that a "meta-analysis" of the numerous intersections of different types of structural violence is a vast, immensely complex research agenda, it would probably require a collaborative research project[35]. Intersectional analysis in my thesis will largely focus on the intersections

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[35] However, any such project would, in my opinion, optimally entail a postpositivist acknowledgment of the ineluctable (human) limitations which inhere within every analytical perspective. The immense multiplicity of forms of individual and collective harm resulting from structural and cultural violence clearly cannot be comprehensively grasped by any single research project. Other radical perspectives on systems of domination, including Steven Best's (2014) and Dana Williams's (2012, 17), also operate under the assumption that "inequality takes many forms, more than we can identify or comfortably analyze at once". While noting these ineluctable research limitations, Williams (ibid., 16-17) emphasised the need to bear in mind the way in which authoritarian and oppressive structures and

between class-based structural violence and speciesism, racism and the gender system, as three major foundational systems of domination and oppression in which capitalist structural violence itself is to a significant degree rooted (and *vice versa*).

Speciesism and Class-based Structural Violence

Human enslavement, exploitation of and violence towards hundreds of billions and trillions of animals (non-human sentient beings) is objectively the greatest direct human cause of suffering on Earth. At least *55 billion non-human land animals* are deliberately killed every year by the farming industry – over 150 million land animals *every day* (Mitchell, 2011)! It has been estimated that between *1 to 3 trillion fishes* are caught in the wild each year (Mood, 2010)! Scientific research has established that they are also able to experience fear and pain (for a summary of this research see Mood, ibid.).

Human domination over and violence towards non-human animals has provided the substrate of habitual cruelty, cold indifference and authoritarianism on which other forms of domination and oppression could thrive[36]. Referring to research by Thomas (1983) and Mason (1997), Charles Patterson (2002, 11-12) outlined some of the main brutalising effects of speciesist oppression on human society:

"Since violence begets violence, the enslavement of animals injected a higher level of domination and coercion into human history (…). The historian Keith Thomas likewise believes that the domestication of animals created a more authoritarian attitude since 'human rule over the lower creatures provided the mental analogue on which many political and social arrangements were based'. Jim Mason maintains that making intensive animal agriculture the foundation of our society has built ruthlessness, detachment, and socially acceptable violence and cruelty into the very bone marrow of our culture, thus cutting us off from a greater sense of kinship with the

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practices affect the totality of social life:

"The practice of domination taints human relationships and interactions, causing manipulation, tension, distrust, malice, revenge, danger, and violence. Consequently, domination pollutes society and degrades its overall cooperative potential. Even people who are in very advantageous positions are negatively impacted by missing opportunities for broader friendships, experiences, and perspectives".

[36] The great (Jewish) writer Isaac Bashevis Singer (1982, 257) remarked:

"In their behaviour toward creatures, all men were Nazis. The smugness with which man could do with other species as he pleased exemplified the most extreme racist theories, the principle that might is right."

other inhabitants of the natural world. Once animal exploitation was institutionalized and accepted as part of the natural order of things, it opened the door to similar ways of treating other human beings, thus paving the way for such atrocities as human slavery and the Holocaust".

Besides these kinds of - to a large degree cultural - mechanisms by which speciesism and class violence reinforce each other, others have also explored the more strictly structural intersections between these two phenomena (see Nibert, 2013). The question of the intersections of speciesist and class violence is an immense and immensely important topic. Unfortunately, I will certainly not be able to do it justice here. However, I will briefly remark on certain specific key contributions of speciesist oppression to class-based and other forms of violence in the following section on the gender system, as well as in the chapters on education and healthcare. Much further research into the intersections of speciesist and class oppression is greatly needed.

Racism and Class-based Structural Violence

Racist structural violence is based on needs-deprivation that is caused by systemic inequalities in power and life chances. Marxists tend to emphasise that, rather than simply constituting a "conspiracy" of white people against other "races"[37], the key factor driving the development of modern racist oppression were capitalist efforts to legitimise colonialism and slavery (by presenting non-white people as subhuman and therefore worthy of being subjugated and objectified broadly in line with the way humans treat non-human animals[38]), as well as, more recently, the effort to reproduce capitalist social relations by dividing the subordinate classes (e.g. Williams, 1961; Callinicos, 1992; Mills, 2009). Tracing the development of racist ideology in Britain, Fryer (1984, 134) wrote: "Racism emerged in the oral tradition in Barbados in the 17th century and crystallised in print in Britain in the 18th, as the ideology of the plantocracy, the class of sugar-planters and slave-merchants that dominated England's Caribbean colonies".

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[37] As modern scientific research indicates (e.g. Rose et al., 1984; Wade et al., 2018), the concept of "race" is not based in knowledge of human biology but is rather a social construct. It has historically been primarily used to legitimate and otherwise facilitate the dehumanisation and oppression of non-white people.

[38] Other intersectional implications of this particular insight still elude most Marxists. It indicates not only that racism strongly intersects with class oppression, but with speciesist violence and oppression as well. In the section on education in chapter 5 I will briefly expand on this point with reference to some empirical psychological research.

Contemporary racist structural violence continues to be largely rooted in the capitalist mode of production; it is best understood not as some kind of homogenised "white rule" (although white people have tended to enjoy special privileges on account of their physical appearance and ethnicity) but rather as a phenomenon largely based on the system of capitalist class rule (also see Callinicos, 1992; Marable, 2004; Cole, 2009), as my subsequent discussion will also indicate.

Mills (2009, 272) pointed out that, although the development and persistence of racism may be best understood through the application of a historical materialist lens, Marxist perspectives have frequently struggled to reach an understanding of racism which acknowledges its multidimensionality. While the classical Marxist theorisation of racism transcends transhistorical arguments about *inherent* human ethno-racial tribalism (which are popular on the far right), and advances the understanding of capitalism as a racialised mode of production, it needs to be qualified by taking into account that, while modern racist "thought" and practice emerged out of Western capitalist imperialism, they are also characterised by a degree of autonomy from capitalist "class interests and projects" (Mills, 2009, 272). Consequently, "class-reductionist Marxism (...) fails to recognize the import and social reality of race" (ibid., 273)[39].

Overtly biological (especially skin-coded) racism, or rather a combination of overt biological and cultural racism, was dominant in the earlier period of capitalist colonialism and of the capitalist slave economy. Non-colour-coded racisms, including anti-Semitism and anti-Irish racism, were also pervasive. In more recent decades, structural racism in Britain has continued to be constituted along biologically and culturally racist lines, in addition to the intensification of xeno-racism (e.g. Sivanandan, 2001; Cole, 2009). Sivanandan (2001, 2) described xeno-racism as "a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial countries, but at the newer categories of the displaced and dispossessed whites, who are beating at western Europe's doors, the Europe that displaced them in the first place. It is racism in substance but xeno in form – a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white. It is

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[39] Frantz Fanon (1991, 40), who was himself to a large extent guided by a Marxist lens on social oppression, acknowledged the complex etiology of racism by stating that "Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem". It is certainly reductionist to entirely reduce the phenomenon of racism to capitalism. Tribalism and the tyranny of the majority over (ethno-racial as well as sexual, religious etc.) minorities have been abundantly in evidence in a wide variety of non-capitalist historical contexts.

xeno-racism"[40].

Xeno-racist discrimination against immigrant workers has been a major form of racist oppression in contemporary Britain. Reliance on immigrant labour has been a prominent structural feature of British capitalism after the Second World War, when the country opened its door to the immigration of workers from its Asian and Caribbean colonies and former colonies (Sivanandan, 1976; Callinicos, 1992). In the context of processes of European integration, this existing reserve pool of labour (which was subjected to increasingly harsh immigration controls) was supplemented with the other pools of reserve labour, especially from the less economically developed Southern Europe (Sivanandan, 1976) and later from the new Central and Eastern European EU accession states as well.

The use of immigrant work often helps the employers and the state elites to profitably regulate social and economic relations and activity. The increase in immigration tends to increase labour supply, especially of low-status and insecure seasonal and otherwise precarious labour, and it also increases the "reserve army of labour" (Sivanandan, 1976; Standing, 2011), whose existence facilitates labour discipline as it increases competition for jobs[41].

By dividing immigrant and non-immigrant workers and setting people belonging to the subordinate classes against each other, the dominant class deflects subordinate class challenges to its own power and solidifies its political and economic hegemony (I will briefly expand on this in chapter 5). The underpayment of immigrant labour frequently contributes to the super-exploitation[42] of immigrant workers (Gorz, 1970), as well as to a competitive "race to the bottom" in terms of wages and working conditions[43]. The institutional and structural xeno-racism

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[40] The culturally racist and xeno-racist dynamic, which (as subsequent discussion will show) characterised both Conservative and Labour administrations in the studied period, was given open expression by Margaret Thatcher in an interview she gave to *World in Action* on 30th January 1978: "People are really afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture" (Thatcher in Callinicos, 1992).

[41] However, data for 17 OECD economies (Jean and Jimenez, 2007), as well as more focused UK studies (Dustmann et al., 2007; Lemos and Portes, 2008), found that EU and other overseas immigration at the beginning of the twenty-first century had very little, if any, discernible impact on unemployment levels. The effects of immigration on subjective feelings of job and resource competition and insecurity are a different matter. Economic and political functions of immigration in some cases also rest on people's attitudes and the way they interpret subjective experiences.

[42] That is the extraction of additional surplus labour and surplus value/the making of extra profit from immigrant labour in comparison to non-immigrant labour.

[43] Although the general consensus is that immigration has had very small effects on UK wage levels (as summarised by Lemos and Portes, 2008), some negative wage effects on workers in unskilled and low-paid work have been

which facilitates this super-exploitation and downward competition rests on the relative disenfranchisement and social and political marginalisation of immigrant workers, who are set apart by discriminatory and exclusionary nationality laws and other social and cultural factors. They are also less integrated into the labour movement and their individual and collective agency is more restricted as a result of their more precarious and otherwise disadvantaged legal, social and economic situation, which limits their ability to actively and effectively resist exploitation (e.g. Sivanandan, 1976).

As the African-American radical intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois ([1935] 1969, 701) pointed out, while the oppression of black people is not in the real interest of white workers, and while the participation of black workers in the labour market enabled employers to lower the wages of white workers, the latter "were compensated for by a sort of public and psychological wage". Racist ideology and practice still entail some of these compensatory mechanisms through which the more backward elements of the subordinate classes are induced to acquiesce to capitalist rule and turn against other oppressed people. Fundamentally, "racism offers white workers the comfort of believing themselves part of the dominant group; it also provides, in times of crisis, a ready made scapegoat, in the shape of the oppressed group" (Callinicos, 1992). Nativism, as the ethno-centric (and to some degree ethno-racist) variant of the same basic phenomenon of creating in-groups and out-groups, also relies on a misplaced form of solidarity, which is rooted in the view that the "indigenous" population holds a material and status-based stake in the "national community", which is analogous with the existence of outsiders (and hence also of "intruders"). As Benedict Anderson (1983, 15-16) famously argued, the nation is "an imagined

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identified (Dustmann et al., 2007). Nickell and Saleheen (2009) found that a 10 per cent increase in the proportion of immigrants working in semi-skilled and unskilled services led to a 5.2 per cent reduction in general wage levels in this sector. On the other hand, Dustman et al. (2007) found that immigration has had a modest positive effect on the average wage increase experienced by "native" employees, and that immigrant workers tended to work in less skilled and lower-paid jobs than non-immigrant workers with comparable levels of education. Migrants have tended to do low-skilled and low-status jobs which "indigenous" workers refuse to do (e.g. Sivanandan, 1976). Besides, the negative wage effects of immigration on unskilled and low-paid workers are, in the final analysis, the result of an unregulated (neoliberal) labour market, the weakness of organised labour and inadequate labour protection, including a meagre national minimum wage. The introduction under New Labour of a harsh, highly regimented and dehumanising points-based immigration regime has severely restricted non-EU immigrant's work options and their opportunities to gain permanent status, let alone citizenship, which appears to have contributed to the increase in the number of insecure, "casualised" workers, or the "precariat" (Standing, 2011). If the hyper-exploitation of immigrant workers was prohibited, much of the potential negative impact of immigrant labour on some "native" workers would also be prevented or reduced. However, capitalist undercutting of wages and conditions will probably persist to some extent as long as the commodification of labour is not overcome.

political community", particularly because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship". It tends to subsists on nativist, xenophobic and ethno-racist oppression and discrimination by which the in-group maintains certain advantages *vis-á-vis* the out-group, to the detriment of the unity and collective agential power of the subordinate classes[44].

The September 11 attacks and the terroristic "War on Terror" that ensued led to the intensification of Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism, which is a type of cultural racism that frequently intersects with xeno- and ethno-racism[45]. This anti-Muslim racism gained institutional and structural expression through the policies of successive governments, as well as in the mass and other (primarily right-wing) media and in a variety of other social structures[46]. Elite actors have been stoking oppressive and dehumanising anti-Muslim ideology and practice to a large extent in order to create a social climate conducive to the perpetuation of military interventions in Muslim-majority countries, as well as to facilitate the strengthening of domestic surveillance and state repression, in addition to the more general utility of anti-Muslim racism as one of the key tools in the repertoire of elite divide and rule strategies and tactics (see Kundnani, 2014; Nineham, 2015). Anti-Muslim racism, which is predicated on the notion of Muslims both as "enemies within" and "enemies from without", indicates that racist violence at home and imperialist violence abroad are inextricably linked. This section as well as subsequent discussion

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[44] Gorz (1970, 28) observed how some of the advantages that are frequently enjoyed by "indigenous" workers facilitate the fragmentation of the subordinate classes. He noted that "recourse to foreign workers leads, in particular, to the exclusion of an important part of the proletariat from trade-union action; a considerable decrease in the political and electoral weight of the working class; a still more considerable weakening of its ideological force and cohesion". The "imported proletariat (...) leads a marginal existence deprived of political, trade-union and civil rights. (...) To diminish the 'national' working class by 20 per cent is to 'promote' that number of workers into tertiary and technical activities; to depreciate the social and economic value of manual work and manual workers as a whole; to deepen the separation between manual and technical, intellectual and tertiary work; to inflate correspondingly the social and political importance of the 'middle strata', and by racist and chauvinist propaganda, to encourage backward elements in the 'national' working class to identify themselves ideologically with the petty-bourgeoisie" (ibid., 28-29).

[45] Discrimination against Muslims is sometimes seen as a convenient, culturally racist substitute for the much less socially accepted, yet certainly persisting, biological racism (for more on the distinction between biological and cultural racism see Balibar, [1991] 2011; Seymour, 2010).

[46] The Runnymede Trust report (1997) identified the following four dimensions of Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism: prejudice (which is institutionalised through the dominant media and pervades everyday social interaction), discrimination (e.g. in employment practices and in the provision of various social services, including health and education), exclusion (from public life, employment, positions of responsibility in economic and political life) and violence (including verbal abuse, the vandalising of property and physical violence).

of the intersections of class-based and racist structural and cultural violence demonstrate that these types of social violence cannot be successfully challenged in isolation one from the other[47].

The Gender System and Class-based Structural Violence

In contrast to trans-historical (biologically determinist and/or narrowly culturalist) arguments about the causes of gender oppression, "classical" Marxian analysis identifies its primary origins in the formation of class-based modes of production and the oppressive family structures and gender ideologies which accompanied (and were in interplay with) these changing modes of production (see Engels, 1884). "Classical" Marxian analysis therefore helped to pioneer the general understanding of gender in contemporary scholarship as "culturally constructed, historically changing, and often unstable systems of difference" which are, however, also to some extent "based on physical, morphological, and anatomical differences between the sexes" (Wiesner-Hanks, 2015, 238 and 235).

The classical Marxist account may actually need to be modified by recognising how physical differences between the sexes may have played a role in the development of gender oppression even *before* the emergence of class society[48]. Two important factors may have been men's generally greater physical strength (which frequently would have enabled them to

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[47] In a brilliant passage, Marx (1965, 236-237) remarked on this interrelatedness of racist and class oppression:
"And most important of all! Every industrial and commercial centre in England possesses a working class *divided* into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the *ruling* nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country *against Ireland*, thus strengthening their domination *over himself*. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. (…) The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the *English rule in Ireland*. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This *antagonism* is the *secret of the impotence of the English working class*, despite its organisation. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it."

[48] It is clear that divisive and discriminatory gender relations cannot all be explained with reference to class relations. For example, evidence suggests that, unfortunately, some degree of tribalism and conceptual othering (conceptual separation into in-groups and out-groups) may be instinctual (in the sense of being partly rooted in human biology). Tajfel's (1970; 1978) studies found that test subjects arbitrarily divided into separate groups on the basis of trivial criteria showed favouritism for those belonging to their own group, even when this was at the expense of greater benefits for their own group. However, it is clear that such divisive and discriminatory instincts can be largely or completely overcome and possibly (and hopefully) even altogether extinguished. The existence of certain cultures of peace is an indicator of this (see for example Boulding, 2000).

physically advance their real or perceived interests), as well as women's ability to nurse small children. Both of these factors seem likely to have played a major role in the fact that men tended to assume a dominant role in the hunting of large animals and later in "domestication" (enslavement) of animals and in agriculture more generally (see for example Lerner, 1987)[49]. The increase in the importance of the sexual division of labour in agricultural societies (especially due to plough farming and herding) in the context of the development of surplus value and of class inequalities appears to have been a major factor in the emergence of patriarchy and of (socially) monogamous marriage with its patrilinear succession in which property rights were traced through the father (see for example Engels, 1884; Goody, 1976; Alesina et al., 2013). This appears to have been based on and supportive of the formation of explicitly patriarchal kinship and family structures in which the father (the "patriarch") assumed the role of the head of the household/the family chief. In the emerging patriarchal family, this meant that the dominant men assumed ownership and control over the means of subsistence (the land, the enslaved animals, etc.) and over the instruments of agricultural labour, which allowed them to dominate over the women as well as over children and younger men in the family, in the community and in broader society (see for example Engels, ibid.; German, 1981). The traditional patriarchal family, in its various incarnations across a very wide range of cultures, closely mirrored broader (violent and domineering) social ideology and organisation, replicating and supporting increased hierarchy formation that characterised the emerging class society. The family and wider patriarchal structures quite rigidly denied women access to productive resources and participation in public affairs, legitimising and enforcing women's subservience to (primarily dominant) men.

The industrial revolution to a significant extent transformed and eroded the old patriarchal family structure by largely destroying domestic production (i.e. the family as the unit of production) and "forcing women and children, as well as men, into the factory system" (German, 1981; also see Engels, [1845] 1973). Lindsey German (1981) pointed out that capitalist exploitation and dispossession of the peasants "lay the basis for the men and women of the

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[49] The practices of hunting and "domestication" are very likely to have fostered the development of patriarchal and other hierarchical relations through the aforementioned process of providing the mental and cultural analogue for the development of more violent and domineering relations between people. In her analysis of human sexual evolution, Fisher (1979) identified the roots of sexist violence in the speciesist violence of "domestication".

propertyless class, the proletariat, to be equal. Both had to rely on wage labour, and men had lost their property. That was why Engels made such a distinction between the bourgeois and the proletarian families". However, hierarchical family relations persisted. Furthermore, for a variety of complex reasons - including the frequently devastating effects of women's entry into the factory system on infant mortality and on social reproduction more broadly; the decline of the Chartist movement (which held the promise of women's political involvement and the overcoming of working-class political and social conservatism); and the consolidation of craft unions (which refused to organise the unskilled, immigrant and women workers) - working-class families in the nineteenth century began to revert to more patriarchal family arrangements. These were characterised by the withdrawal of women with children from wage labour and the perpetuation of women's generally socio-politically inferior and marginalised position (Thompson, 1976; German, 1998). Rather than disappearing following the destruction of the family as a productive unit due to the development of capitalist wage relations, the family of the subordinate classes was thus reconstructed in such a way that, despite increased participation of women in the labour market, a sexual division of labour continued with men taking the responsibility for being the family's main "breadwinners" while women continued to hold the primary responsibility for housework and childcare. They consequently lacked independent means of existence and, as a result of carrying out a relatively atomised home-centred existence and of being stripped of requisite civic rights, lacked the means to participate as equals in the regulation of public affairs and to collectively organise in defence of their rights (McGregor, 1985; German, 1998), including the right to be protected from physical, emotional and sexual violence. Simultaneously, at the same time as it proclaimed men to be superior to women, prevailing gender ideology helped to diminish the rights of men as well, even solidifying their position as the slaves of the state through compulsory conscription in times of war.

The twentieth century in Britain and internationally was characterised by quite revolutionary changes in the personal lives and social position of women. This included significantly increasing participation of women in the labour market and in public life, the acquisition of universal suffrage (for all non-incarcerated adult citizens), the increase in women's rights and economic and social independence (including through greater access to birth control measures), the narrowing of the pay gap (although significant income inequalities remain – see

chapter 8), etc. Near the end of New Labour rule, around two-thirds of women were in paid employment (Roberts, 2011)[50]. Women's increased participation in the economy facilitated various progressive changes, including the development of women's economic independence, a greater degree of women's personal autonomy and participation in public life. However, the capitalist class seized upon this development by exploiting women as a source of cheap flexible labour, pitting workers against each other and, in so doing, also undercutting the wages and conditions of some male workers (German, 1998). Much political campaigning, as well as a number of significant strikes for equal pay in the 1970s (see German, ibid.) challenged these practices. Several equal pay bills (most prominently the Equal Pay Act in 1970) were also introduced yet, as already mentioned, the gender pay gap continued to persist (see chapter 8). Furthermore, a gender division of labour tended to persist, so that managers and supervisors tended to still be male (Halford and Savage, 1995; Roberts, 2011)[51]. Although some groups of women have been experiencing less downward mobility then their male counterparts in recent decades[52], and Blackburn et al. (2009), using the Cambridge Social Interaction and Stratification Scale, found that by the end of New Labour rule women predominated in higher status (primarily office-based) jobs in addition to being around a third more likely to attend university (Ratcliffe, 2012)[53], the managerial positions tended to remain very predominantly occupied by men (Roberts, 2011). Of course, very significant differences in life chances and levels of personal agential and social power persist both among women and men depending on their social class

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[50] The process of women's entry into the labour market gathered pace between the two world wars, largely due to the rapid expansion of certain industries (including electrical goods, food processing, motor vehicles, chemicals, insurance and finance), and it particularly accelerated after the Second World War. Abbott (2006) pointed out that, as women's participation rate in the labour market was increasing, it was declining for men: in 1988 75.7 per cent of men and 52.2 per cent of women were economically active, while the comparable figures in 2003 were 71.2 per cent of men and 55.6 per cent of women. The declining participation of men was "partly because of an increase in men, especially in their fifties and sixties, on long-term sick leave, taking early retirement or being made redundant and unable to gain employment and partly because of the increase in female employment" (ibid., 86).

[51] Even the (nominally left-wing) unions retained leadership structures with very disproportionately low numbers of women (German, 1998).

[52] Roberts (2011, 120 and 118) noted that "up to now (…) female office staff have been more likely to occupy intermediate positions for life, or to experience demotion into working class jobs following career breaks" but that since the Second World War "there has been much more inter-generational continuity between lower-level white-collar fathers (and presumably mothers also) and their daughters, than between the parents and sons", as the sons have been far more likely to experience downward mobility from office work into manual work.

[53] Among young people, well-qualified young women have been particularly successful in progressing from higher education or from intermediate non-manual occupations into professional employment (Egerton and Savage, 2000; Savage, 2000; Roberts, 2011).

position, ethnic origin and citizenship and immigration status, sexuality, age, health and disability status, geographical location, etc.

Although the share of housework done by men has been increasing since at least the 1970s (German, 1998), this share remained very unequal. A study by the Institute for Economic and Social Research (Kan and Laurie, 2016) found that in all ethnic groups women spent significantly more time doing housework than men, and that around 70 per cent of housework was still done by women[54]. At least in those cases where it is more than a reflection of unequal levels of engagement in wage labour, the unequal sharing of the burden of labour at home releases men to engage in comparatively more leisure and public and political activity. However, while the rejection of gendered structural violence requires the adoption of non-oppressive personal practices in the present historical moment – such as the practice of more egalitarian sharing of domestic and waged labour, commitment to the cultivation of kindness and nonviolence in personal relationships, etc. – there are limitations to the degree to which changes in personal behaviour can perform a prefigurative function by "building a new society in the shell of the old" (as the IWW famously put it). For example, a more equitable sharing of the burden of social reproduction, which is currently disproportionately borne by women, would not end the privatised nature of domestic labour which could, in a more advanced social organisation of life, be largely socialised, and whose oppressive character could also be greatly diminished if working time was reduced to leave people with more free time. Placing the emphasis only on how the burden of social reproduction is distributed between the cohabiting partners or spouses reduces a systemic problem to a relationship problem between couples; it obscures the fact that the performance of housework and childcare also serves to reproduce the labour force *for capital.* It contributes to the creation of surplus value that is appropriated by the capitalist class by lowering the cost of labour power (German, 1998).

The radicalised perspective which identifies the privatised family as one of the foundations of gender-based and class-based cultural and structural violence facilitates the radicalisation of the solution to the problem of women's oppression (as well as of gender and class oppression more generally). As Sheila McGregor (1985) pointed out, the micro-perspective

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[54] Kan and Laurie (ibid.), also found that women from the mixed ethnic background were found to do the lowest share of housework (still 65 per cent) while Pakistani women did the greatest share (83 per cent).

"obscures the solution. If the problem is the unequal division of labour in the home and not the family as such, then it can be remedied by individual men and women sharing the work in the home. If the family is the root cause of women's oppression, the problem can only be solved by the abolition of the family". More communal living arrangements/designs for living based on wider cooperative networks of mutual aid and socialised structures of support (encompassing easily accessible social services such as day care centres and neighbourhood restaurants) would enable the socialisation of the burden of social reproduction which is currently privatised.

The perspective of socialisation helps to reveal that there is no inherent antagonism of interests between the sexes in relation to the labour of social reproduction and the egalitarian participation of women and men in public life, as these antagonisms largely stem from the gendered and class organisation of society. Historical materialist analysis needs to also investigate the various ways in which gender ideology, as a social construct primarily of class society (and a form of cultural violence), in turn legitimises and helps to perpetuate oppressive and alienating gender roles, as well as supporting wider unequal and domineering social patterns, including class-based structural violence. Gender ideology (gender-based cultural violence) and gendered structural violence facilitate the fetishisation and entrenchment of the privatised family and of conservative and authoritarian "family values", which are among the primary cultural and structural bases of the capitalist social order. The nuclear family is also based on the ideology (and, much less consistently, the practice) of sexual and romantic monogamy and the attendant sexual and emotional repression, on which the bourgeois social order and its authoritarian and violent social relations are to a significant degree based (see for example Reich 1951; Marcuse, 1972)[55].

Furthermore, especially considering the often semi- or subconscious character of gender roles and of gendered behaviour, it does not necessarily follow that most people who are engaged in gender-oppressive living arrangements perceive their interests as being served through the

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[55] Furthermore, as German (1998, 53) observed, "the atomisation of family life means the multiplication of commodities" (such as domestic electrical appliances which could be shared under more communal living arrangements), and it supports and stimulates commodity production more generally, especially by commodifying ever wider areas of personal and social life (e.g. catering, child care and old-age care, social work etc., which have to a large extent become parts of the "service industry").

perpetuation of gender inequality[56]. Men's and women's acceptance of gender roles, even when they perceive these roles to be beneficial to their interests, actually helps to perpetuate the oppression of people of all sexes. Men, and in some ways especially lower-class men, are also victims of gender ideology and of gendered social practices - in terms of impediments which the gender system also imposes on their human self-expression, self-actualisation and cultural evolution, as well as on their mental and physical well-being more generally. These aspects of culturally- and structurally-embedded suffering include, for example, much higher rates of imprisonment (around 95 to 96 per cent of current prisoners in England are men – House of Commons Library, 2017), suicide (75 per cent of people in the UK who committed suicide in 2015 were men – Samaritans, 2017) and sleeping rough (88 per cent of rough sleepers in England in 2013 were men - Crisis, 2013).

Additionally, gender ideology and gendered social practices (such as gendered job segregation, unequal sharing of domestic and wage labour, unequal participation in public life and manifold gendered forms of antagonistic personal interaction) contribute to the alienation and hence fragmentation of all people and of the subordinate classes, impeding their unity and organised solidarity, which are required to successfully challenge class inequality and other social divisions through the construction of intersectional, non-oppressive, inclusive and dealienating liberation movements that can advance the processes of democratisation/socialisation and universal human emancipation, which is contingent on the establishment of a unified, nonhierarchical society[57].

Only a unitive emancipatory agenda which recognises currently unrecognised or neglected sufferings of all people and of all sentient beings will be able to construct a society based on kindness and compassion for all. This universalist, unitive agenda - the consistent application of the Wobbly insight that "an injury to one is an injury to all" - would, as its major

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[56] Clearly, many have in the past and many still do. One among many possible examples is the attitude of early trade unions to the entry of women into the labour market. Bureaucratic, craft trade unions tended to exclude women, as well as unskilled, immigrant and ethnic minority workers, as a threat to the standards of existing workers. It was the new, often more radical, general and industrial unions which pioneered the inclusion of these initially excluded categories of workers (e.g. Kornbluh, 2011; German, 1998).

[57] This aspiration was also characteristic of the libertarian socialist women's liberation movement in the Spanish Revolution. This movement had an uncommonly radical vision of women's liberation, which it conceived of as an integral yet autonomous part of the struggle against capitalist and statist structural violence (see for example Ackelsberg, 2005).

component, also entail endeavouring to overcome divisions within the subordinate classes by overcoming gender ideology and gendered social practices, i.e. gendered cultural and structural violence which helps to perpetuate class-based structural violence and other forms of alienation and oppression as well.

My discussion of the intersectional character of oppression and cultural and structural violence (both in this section and throughout the thesis) indicates that liberation from violence will require the creation of a peaceful, humane society based on mutually compassionate, caring and non-oppressive relationships between all people and towards all sentient beings. As my analysis of deep-rooted structural and cultural violence will further indicate and Birt (2014, 170) also emphasised, the achievement of "the beloved community" (as the likes of A. J. Muste and Martin Luther King, Jr. called this vision of a truly peaceful society) "would be a revolutionary development, and only a revolutionary movement can bring it about".

Structural Violence and Development

As Galtung (1985) recognised, the problems addressed by the concept of structural violence overlap to a significant extent with problems addressed by the concept of human development defined as welfare, satisfaction of basic needs and the provision of opportunities for self-realisation (van der Wusten, 2005), i.e. with the concept of development broadly defined as "the realization of human potential" (Flint, 2005, 8), Both concepts are centrally concerned with addressing the problem of "premature death, or life chances thwarted" (ibid., 8), i.e. with addressing the problem of death, suffering and human underdevelopment as a result of social inequality, lack of opportunity and neglect of human needs. In this perspective "structural violence is the reverse of development" (ibid., 8), although it is easier to unambiguously define and indicate negative peace and the associated negative freedoms (from overt military violence, starvation, etc.) than it is to do the same for positive peace and positive freedoms (van der Wusten, 2005), since the former deals with the more basic (primarily survival) needs and the latter are concerned with needs of a higher order (e.g. the need to find meaning in life). Barnett (2008) sought to draw out what he saw as Amartya Sen's agency-focused improvements to the Galtungian perspective on structural violence, without sufficiently noting that, from its beginning, Galtung's theory of structural violence encompassed Sen's concerns regarding free agency

through the concept of "freedom needs" (the suppression of which constitutes one of the central forms of structural violence in Galtung's typology). In any case, Sen's (1999) human capabilities approach and his theory of positive and negative freedoms (i.e. people's freedom to control their own lives and freedom from coercion, see Sen, 1985) are largely compatible with the Galtungian perspective on structural violence and negative and positive peace. Both are concerned with identifying the restriction of the capacity and options for free individual and social development. Containing and obstructing human physical and mental potential through oppressive social structures constitutes a form of structural violence (Galtung, 1996; Jacoby, 2008).

My approach therefore also seeks to help operationalise the theoretical synthesis of Galtung's concept of positive peace with Sen's conception of human development as individual and public freedom. This conception of peace as freedom and empowerment includes "the equitable distribution of economic opportunities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, protective security and freedom from direct violence" (Barnett, 2008, 75). By empowering the broad population, i.e. by fostering the capacity for (relatively) free agency, democratisation is antithetical to at least some forms of structural violence which stifle the broad public's agential power in the interest of the dominant class and of its concentration of political and economic power. Democratic power (in the sense of the broad population's agential power and democratic control over public affairs on the basis of equal civic rights) also tends to be positively related to generally stronger human rights regimes encompassing not just political but also economic, social and cultural rights (Sen, 1999), which tend to be positively related to general human well-being and genuine human security, as the Global Peace Index also shows (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015).

Violence, both in its personal and structural forms, can be multidimensional and multidirectional (van der Wusten, 2005)[58]. In this context it is important to acknowledge that there appears to be a degree of truth in the viewpoint that the structurally violent political and social order is, at least in certain circumstances, "to a large extent a regulatory mechanism for the

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[58] Van der Wusten (2005, 70) further noted that "the connection of violence and development can therefore be conceptualized as a loop but this loop is not necessarily straightforward in the sense of a positive or negative feedback dynamic. This is so for two reasons. The multidimensional nature of nonoverlapping violence as development allows for different relations that are not necessarily all in the same direction. Many of these relations are complicated because the political order plays an intermediary role that produces further ramifications".

control of direct violence" (van der Wusten, 2005, 70; see also Mann, 1984). This does not *eo ipso* mean that the avoidance and control of direct violence merit (most kinds of) contemporary structural violence, nor does it negate the probability that in many or most cases structural violence constitutes the major cause of conflictive attitudes and of direct violence. Grievances and antagonisms which result in direct violence are often related to relative deprivation, the inability "to satisfy needs such as sustenance, security, affection and self-actualisation" (Jacoby, 2008, 122; see also Khan, 1978; Duffield, 1999). By examining how structural violence hinders the fulfilment of human needs we can also gain important insights into the underlying causes of direct violence.

The aim of my research is to analyse the sources and the character of some of the main forms of class-based structural violence rather than to examine the interaction between these forms of structural violence and factors which may mitigate it; let alone is the purpose of this research to attempt to somehow "measure" the significance of one against the other. However, by pioneering the operationalisation of neo-Galtungian categories of structural violence, this study helps to lay the groundwork for these possible different kinds of ensuing research projects.

The basic Galtungian analytical perspective, which is seen by some (Jacoby, 2008) as seeking to moderate the staid scientism which characterised earlier peace research, has to some extent offered the basis for fairly mainstream analytical approaches to human development. In particular, this includes the UNDPs Human Development Reports, which have employed the Human Development Index (HDI)[59] that have (apart from its various other purposes) served to explore the links between indicators of development and structural violence (largely in the negative direction)[60].

One possibly valid point in relation to Galtung's views on human development is that his dualistic contraposition of violence vs. peace risks simplifying "the continuous nature of social

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[59] The HDI measures the level of human development and structural violence on the basis of factors including life expectancy, income distribution, attainment of education and access to vital services.
[60] The limitation of the HDI in ascertaining the character of the links between violence and development is associated with its more generally limited approach – a scientist straitjacket which handicaps the investigation of less quantifiable aspects of social reality (despite the apparent Galtungian influence, certainly in the sense that HDI transcends the narrow and crude obsession with GDP levels and similar limiting economic perspectives and indicators). The HDI's narrow quantitative focus on measuring structural epiphenomena renounces the investigation of the deeper roots of structural violence. Such radical analysis is one of the central purposes of inquiries into the class character and class mechanisms of structural violence. Besides, as Farmer (2004b, 31) pointed out, "the experience of suffering (…) is not effectively conveyed by statistics or graphs".

conditions to polar opposites" and might therefore lack sensitivity to "the rather more dialectical (or in Boulding's [1977] terms 'evolutionary') character of social change" (Barnett, 2008, 77). This argument is more pertinent to the critique of indiscriminate and undialectical normative and political assessments of different forms of structural violence. It is possible to acknowledge the potential historical inevitability and, in some cases, even necessity of certain milder forms of structural violence (in order to prevent even more severe personal and structural violence or to focus on overcoming morally or strategically more important forms of structural violence) without evading the radical diagnosis of structurally-embedded violence and of its origins. As previously mentioned, my "objectivist" focus on resource allocation (or misallocation, as the case may be) will frequently provide a stronger and more focused empirical grounding for the identification of structural violence. This focus permits one to uncover the discriminatory class patterns of wealth and resource distribution in society (which are still objectively discriminatory even if elaborate economic and other justifications are developed for them). However, as Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) have also emphasised, it is important to maintain a wider understanding of inter-human violence as a set of processes which encompass all forms of control, domination and cruelty that inhibit human freedoms and needs. As previously noted, the application of a neo-Galtungian categorical apparatus is an important starting point, possibly a vitally important fundament, for further research projects which can gain new insights regarding structural violence through the method of successive approximations.

My analysis of structural violence will be able to acknowledge the historically conditioned character of resource allocation and class-based structural violence by analysing the processes of neoliberal consolidation and by comparing various indicators of social well-being in Britain in the Keynesian and the neoliberal periods.

The Categories of Structural Violence

Galtung's concept of structural violence seeks to place the task of demarcating violent from nonviolent acts, institutions and behaviours on a more objective basis. Mainstream functionalist approaches - exemplified by Boulding's (1977) linear functionalist critique of

Galtung's theory of structural violence - tend to uncritically accept (or at least fail to sufficiently question and concretely oppose) the conventional (and essentially one-dimensional) definition of violence as intentionally physically harmful and destructive behaviour, at least if it is not relatively covert and is not perceived as legitimate. A clear example of this is the largely undisputed violence of rioting as opposed to the perceived "peacefulness" of a social order based on intense and systematic (but socially accepted) class domination and oppression.

Galtung (1969) distinguished between direct and structural violence (both of which limit and inhibit the fulfilment of human needs). While focusing my attention primarily on what might be seen as less controversial, more tangible and objective (as well as class-based) forms of structural violence, I shall simultaneously employ an expanded definition of structural violence in the sense that it will - unlike Galtung's approach - encompass some "direct" forms of structural violence (which he defines as personal violence on account of there being a clearly identifiable actor which causes the difference between actual and potential realisation/actual and potential well-being – Galtung, 1969) alongside relatively impersonal forms of violence[61]. Galtung's categorisation of direct and personal as opposed to structural violence is problematic because these categories attempt to "confine" and simplify phenomena which exist on a continuum and may therefore not be adequately understood and operationalised through such binary, reductionist and essentially non-dialectical conceptualisations. Instances of structural violence (as violence embedded in social structures) can be "direct" (e.g. armed state repression of striking workers and protesting citizens) and they may appear to be a purely "personal" form of violence (e.g. in the case of police violence). Real social life does not entail such straightforward demarcations between "personal" and "impersonal", "direct" and "indirect" violence[62]. My analysis of structural violence will, however, also primarily focus on the less

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[61] This dualistic terminology (personal and impersonal/structural violence, direct and indirect structural violence) is used here for ease of exposition and for reasons of cogency. My effort to grasp both more "direct" and more "indirect" forms of structural violence (without clinging to Galtung's dichotomous perception of these phenomena as "direct" vs. "structural" violence) is also a practical answer to Boulding's (1977) critique of Galtung's approach for its overly taxonomic character. My analysis of structural violence also encompasses the analysis of both the input side and of the output side, which is the side of the victims of structural violence (see Kohler and Alcock, 1976).

[62] One of the advantages of my expanded perspective on structural violence is that it can encompass the structuralist transcendence of the reductionist focus on individual agency without neglecting the more direct forms of structural violence which (in common with many apparently less "direct" forms of structural violence) stem from the dialectical interplay of the existing structural framework and of agential, policy-driven (and thus also "behavioural"/volitional and subjectively co-determined) change.

direct forms of structural violence (rather than on the more direct forms of violence which Galtung classified as non-structural).

This expanded understanding of structural violence, rather than simply losing sight of the importance of armed conflict in a broad discourse about social inequality and oppression (which Mitchell, 1981 asserts is a danger with the focus on structural violence), helps to adequately contextualise it in its actual social substrate. The consideration of both "direct" and "indirect" structural violence can therefore facilitate deeper, systemic analyses of armed conflict and other direct forms of violence.

Despite the general reservations concerning Galtung's approach to the categorisation of violence which I have pointed out, his multidimensional perspective on violence, including the multidimensional categorisation of structural violence, was a pioneering approach which provides a firm basis for my own typology[63].

Galtung identified the following categories of structural violence: exploitation ("strong" and "weak"), penetration, segmentation, marginalisation and fragmentation. In addition to Galtung's definition of exploitation (which I have already quoted), he described his categories of structural violence in the following (laconic) way:

"The next four terms can be seen as parts of exploitation or as reinforcing components in the structure. They function by impeding consciousness formation and mobilization, two conditions for effective struggle against exploitation. *Penetration*, implanting the topdog inside the underdog so to speak, combined with *segmentation*, giving the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on, will do the first job. And *marginalization*, keeping the underdogs on the outside, combined with *fragmentation*, keeping the underdogs away from each other, will do the second job. However, these four should also be seen as structural violence in their own right, and more particularly as variations on the general theme of structurally built-in repression" (Galtung, 1996, 199).

My own categorisation seeks to clarify this typology, and to add several additional categories which should help to identify and elucidate the character of some forms of structural

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[63] In a similarly broad manner, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004a, 1) characterise structural violence as "the violence of poverty, hunger, social exclusion and domination. (...) Violence can never be understood solely in terms of physicality - force, assault, or the infliction of pain - alone. Violence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the victim".

violence (i.e. forms of needs-deprivation) which Galtung's typology does not adequately do. For reasons of economy I will only give definitions of those subtypes of violence which are of direct use to my analysis of structural violence in Britain and which I will empirically examine in the course of this work. Readers can find out more about the other subtypes of violence which he identifies in Galtung, 1996. Table 1 presents my modified categorisation of structural violence.

	MORE DIRECT STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE	**LESS DIRECT STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE**
SURVIVAL NEEDS	KILLING	EXPLOITATION A (stronger)
		VIOLATION OF SECURITY NEEDS (stronger)
WELL-BEING NEEDS	MAIMING	EXPLOITATION B (weaker)
		NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
		VIOLATION OF SECURITY NEEDS (weaker)
		RESTRICTION OF WELFARE PROVISION
	BLOCKADE/SIEGE, SANCTIONS	VIOLATION OF WELL-BEING NEEDS (not otherwise specified)
		MARGINALISATION
		EDUCATIONAL DEPRIVATION
IDENTITY/MEANING NEEDS	DESOCIALISATION	PENETRATION
	SOCIALISATION and RESOCIALISATION	SEGMENTATION
		ALIENATION OF MEANING
		VIOLATION OF DIGNITY AND STATUS NEEDS
	SECONDARY CITIZEN	
FREEDOM NEEDS	REPRESSION	FRAGMENTATION
		RESTRICTION OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORGANISATION AND ACTIVITY
	DETENTION	RESTRICTION OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
		RESTRICTION OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
	EXPULSION	RESTRICTION OF OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
		RESTRICTION OF PERSONAL/INDIVIDUAL AGENTIAL POWER

Table 1. Typology of structural violence. Modified from Galtung, 1996.

These various subtypes of violence often closely interact with each other (and often co-determine each other). I will seek to bring out some of the key connections between them in the course of my empirical analysis, but it is important to note that no "comprehensive", exhaustive analysis of the connections is possible as the links between these subtypes are innumerable. Furthermore, my analysis will test the utility of Galtung's categories for the understanding of structural violence. I have also modified his typology somewhat by adding the following subtypes of structural violence: restriction of democratic accountability, restriction of democratic participation, restriction of democratic political activity, restriction of individual/personal agential power, educational deprivation, alienation of meaning/purpose, violation of human dignity and status needs, violation of human rights, violation of security needs, and the violation of well-being needs. Galtung's broad categorisation of structural violence does not (at least not explicitly and precisely) address these specific forms of structural violence. I will define these subtypes presently. There is a great variety of human needs whose satisfaction can be inhibited due to structural violence. My neo-Galtungian categorisation only relates to what I considered to be the most pertinent forms of needs-deprivation due to class-based structural violence. There is no final typology which cannot be improved on, and specific research interests and approaches partly condition the exact type of categorisation which can be fruitfully employed.

While Galtung incorporated the concern with human capabilities and free agency in his concept of structural violence, which is largely concerned with the stifling of human potential realisations, his typology of structural violence did not altogether clearly embody this central overall concern with the stifling of human potential and human capacity for (relatively) free agency. However, most of his subtypes of both structural and direct violence – including repression, detention, expulsion, fragmentation, marginalisation, penetration and segmentation (arguably along with the subtype of exploitation) - explicitly relate to the question of agential power and free agency. Although Galtung's subtypes of structural violence often explicate and certainly imply this concern for robust individual and democratic agential power, I add several additional subtypes of structural violence, primarily against freedom needs (i.e. restrictions of democratic agential power), largely on the basis of Amartya Sen's subtypes of key instrumental freedoms[64]. These include the restriction of democratic participation, restriction of democratic

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[64] They include the freedom to participate in political life (Sen, 1999).

accountability, restriction of freedom of (nonviolent and democratic) political activity, the restriction of personal/individual agential power and the violation of human rights.

Restriction of democratic accountability refers to the restriction of the ability of the broad population to scrutinise authorities, as well as to subject political and other important institutional authorities (e.g. large corporations) to democratic control and responsibility (I will sometimes refer to this type of structural violence as *restriction of democratic control*: I use these terms as synonyms for the purposes of this thesis). This concept focuses on the democratic limitations imposed on the policies and activities of the organs of political and economic authority (the government, state, quasi- independent, international and transnational agencies, as well as organs of economic power such as companies). My use of this concept encompasses restrictions of transparency guarantees, which Sen (1999) identified as one of the instrumental freedoms.

A closely related form of structural violence is the *restriction of democratic participation* in public affairs and the institutions of political and economic life. The concept of restriction of democratic participation focuses on the limitations placed on popular participation in decision-making. This (in my rather than Sen's conceptualisation of democratic participation) extends beyond the participation in the selection of political representatives to include wider popular participation in government as well as in other major aspects of social life, e.g. workers' participation in workplace and company decision-making. The ideal form of this would be integral democratic self-government[65].

Restriction of freedom of nonviolent and democratic political activity (which I shall henceforth refer to simply as the restriction of political activity, for obvious reasons of economy) here primarily refers to administrative restrictions on popular capacity for political organisation and action (other than those which refer to restrictions of democratic participation in institutional – social and economic and political – decision-making, which I have categorised as a separate subtype), in which politics is understood in its broad sense as the collective practice of conducting public affairs. The legal prohibition of sympathy strikes is one prominent example of this.

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[65] I will further discuss the concept of democratic self-government and the categories restriction of democratic accountability and restriction of democratic participation, which are (as I will show) key to understanding class-based structural violence, in the subsection "Structural Violence and Democratic Control", as well as in the subsequent case studies.

The structural violence of *marginalisation* refers to the wide range of phenomena which lead to social exclusion, disenfranchisement and disadvantage, the process of being pushed to the fringe of social life and stripped of various rights and opportunities. This includes the experience of being relatively "voiceless" in public affairs and in important matters of public and/or personal concern (due to a range of factors, for example due to lack of time as a result of a long working day).

Galtung understands *exploitation* as a central form of structural violence. For him "exploitation simply means that some, the top dogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs. There is 'unequal exchange', a euphemism" (Galtung, 1996, 198). For all the normative elegance and radicalism (in the positive sense of "going to the root") which this definition arguably possesses, it may be too vaguely and broadly expressed for the purpose of explicitly identifying the material relational basis of exploitation[66]. This line of inquiry seems appropriate for some research agendas, but Galtung's definition of exploitation seems impractical for my analytical approach considering the relative ubiquity of this phenomenon of "unequal exchange" in my studied topic. Furthermore, the existence of a significant number of overlapping categories and forms of structural violence also renders the direct application of Galtung's definition of exploitation overly cumbersome for my research purposes. This is why I found a more focused approach towards exploitation to be preferable. The social relationship of exploitation is less ambiguous in cases where one social group (such as the capitalist class) takes advantage of another less advantaged social group in a relatively straightforward way (even though this exploitative process is also routinely mediated by social structures). In my work, the general concept of exploitation is going to be concretised through the investigation of the various specific mechanisms by which it takes place. My operationalisation of the concept of exploitation will largely focus on the insights about the exploitative extraction of unpaid surplus labour and the resulting surplus value provided by the labour theory of value[67] (and, most famously, Marx), including the extraction of market surpluses

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[66] It therefore fails to acknowledge the qualitative difference between various forms of unequal exchange (which, for example, includes the qualitative difference between the direct exploitation of slaves by slave holders and the social advantages accrued by an opera singer partly on account of her natural talent).

[67] As McNally (2011, 48) noted, workplace exploitation is based on "the gap between workers' output and the value of their wages".

(such as interest on credit; see also chapter 6)[68].

Negative externalities are a specific subtype of exploitation. They are costs of capitalist activity and market exchange which are transferred onto others who are not party to this market exchange.

The *violation of human rights and civil liberties* can entail numerous violations of legal and/or normative rights, including core democratic political rights such as the freedom of expression and voting rights. In common with some other general forms of structural violence (e.g. educational deprivation), this form of violence can in some cases inhibit the satisfaction of all fundamental human needs, including not just freedom needs but also survival, well-being and identity needs.

Restriction of personal/individual agential power encompasses a wide range of phenomena which constrain agency and limit the ability of individuals to act autonomously[69]. Every conceivable form of society constrains individual autonomy to some degree, and I shall only refer to this phenomenon in terms of structural violence in those cases where it is not at all clear – or even likely – that this restriction of personal autonomy is necessary in order to preserve the (established and largely non-controversial) human rights of other members of society and the well-being of the broad population. The denial and suppression of the autonomy of individuals belonging to the lower class in particular is, as I will show, often a method of control and a consequence (as well as a further catalyst) of exploitation and marginalisation, instead of simply being an inevitable side-effect of sociability. Processes which constrain individual agential power are very numerous, and some other categories of structural violence which I will use also address these processes[70]. I will therefore only refer to this subtype of

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[68] The word "exploitative", which I repeatedly use in my thesis, is not a mere epithet, but is used specifically to identify my category of structural violence (exploitation).

[69] "Structural violence is also meaningful as a blueprint (…) used to threaten people into subordination: if you do not behave, we shall have to reintroduce all the disagreeable structures we had before" (Galtung, 1969, 172). Such threats (on the basis of cultural as well as structural violence) inhibit human potential by dissuading people from engaging in volitional activity (Jacoby, 2008). An important example of this is the threat of unemployment, the threat this poses for an individual's livelihood and the way it inhibits individual autonomy.

[70] For example, hunger can be classified as a violation of well-being needs, a violation of freedom from want and, accordingly, a restriction of individual agential power as well (since a hungry person's agency is constrained by her or his need to satisfy this need).

structural violence in cases where other subtypes were not as relevant and suitable for categorising the studied phenomena. I will use these additional categories of structural violence (restriction of democratic accountability, of democratic participation, of democratic political activity and of individual agential power, which to a large degree focus on violence against freedom needs) in those cases where none of Galtung's categories related to the question of agency address the type of mechanism by which individual and/or collective democratic agential power is restricted[71].

For Galtung's subtype of *misery* (as a form of structural violence against well-being needs) I substitute the term *restriction of welfare provision*, which encompasses the restriction of a wide variety of public services important for human well-being including, for example, housing and health provision[72]. This term is focused on broad government policy rather than on individual behaviour and it is more appropriate than "misery" for the purposes of encompassing the existence of various forms of deprivation on a continuum.

Violations of dignity and status needs are forms of structural violence which entail the violation of the inherent human right to be treated in ways which do not negate one's personhood, human value and the consequent right to ethical treatment. Human rights "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person" (United Nations, 1966). Conversely, serious and systematic violations of human rights and of basic human needs, either wilful or as a result of negligence, constitute clear violations of human dignity. Considering the multitude of ways in which the rights of the UK population are undermined and which I will subsequently discuss, it would not be practical (within the confines of my thesis) to seek to systematically highlight and explore the very numerous instances in which human dignity was and is being undermined by class-based structural violence. The need for social status (i.e. to be valued in society on the basis of one's position in society and in the social hierarchy), as well as violations of this need, are

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[71] Considering the great multiplicity of existing and potential mechanisms through which agential power may be adversely affected (e.g. due to the lack of transparent institutional procedures, institutional barriers to democratic self-organisation and democratic control of decision-making processes, material and other constraints on the free and effective distribution of relevant information, etc.), the modification and expansion of Galtung's categorisation should perhaps also seek to preserve the elegant cogency and breadth which is a characteristic of Galtung's typology. This is why I opted for my own cogent and still fairly elementary mode of classification, which will however not prevent me from noting and discussing the multiplicity of specific mechanisms through which the structural violence of restriction of individual and democratic agential power occurs.

[72] Galtung and I are certainly not unique in classifying this as structural violence. Van der Wusten (2005, 62), for example, noted that "conditions where livelihood supports are withheld (enforced or not) can also count as violence".

clearly more pronounced in class-riven societies, especially because material and social positioning and sense of personal worth tend to be very dependent on one's social status.

The structural violence of *repression* in this classification entails direct physical violence which is embedded in and/or carried out by social structures. This term primarily relates to armed military and police coercion.

Alienation of meaning can only partially be conceptualised with reference to Marx's (1844 [2000]) theory of alienation and his concept of *Gattungswesen* or "species-being", which refers to innate human nature, innate human potential and forward-looking freedom to purposefully conceptualise one's future instead of simply being objectified by (often reified) forces outside of one's conscious control. Other subtypes of structural violence which I will use will correspond to some elements of this Marxian theory of alienation[73]. While these different subtypes of structural violence deal with the deprivation of some of the material, psychological and cultural needs that are implied in Marx's theory of alienation, the subtype alienation of meaning here largely refers to the phenomena characterised by social patterns which are driven by particularistic interests that do not advance the satisfaction of a variety of types of material, psychological and cultural needs of the broad population (that are not all directly addressed by Marx's theory of alienation) and are therefore socially meaningless. This subtype does, however, refer to the harm inflicted on the need for meaning by the capitalist emphasis on exchange over use value. In other words, use values (i.e. the products of human labour which possess utility in the sense of being able to directly satisfy a real human need) are subordinated to the pursuit of exchange values, that is the values produced for market exchange, on which profit-making is based (see Marx, [1867] 1967a)[74]. Considering the difficulties of determining what innate human nature, human potential, and real material, psychological and cultural needs are, I will only refer to this form of structural violence in some of the most relevant cases where the alienation of meaning can be less controversially identified or posited. More detailed studies of this form of

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[73] The structural violence of exploitation covers Marx's concept of workers' alienation from the products of their labour. The alienation of workers from the process of working is covered by the category of restriction of democratic accountability and the restriction of democratic participation (which, as I already mentioned, extends to democratic participation in workplace and broader socio-economic decision-making). The restriction of individual agential power entails both the individual's inability to participate in economic decision-making and her or his inability to actualise one's "species-being", i.e. to realise one's existential freedom/autonomy.

[74] Furthermore, the concept of alienation from one's "species-being"/alienation from the potential for self-actualisation unites the Marxian and the Galtungian (and neo-Galtungian) concepts of alienation.

structural and cultural violence, based to a large degree on concrete insights from psychology, are needed.

Educational deprivation can, depending on the exact form of deprivation, be classified as structural violence against all four main classes of human needs. Lack of knowledge can undermine the satisfaction of survival and well-being needs, as well as of identity needs and of freedom needs. Genuinely democratic public life requires the attainment of a high educational level by the broad population, which is otherwise unable to adequately scrutinise public policies and social processes, as well as to deliberate on and participate in the setting and implementation of public policies and of broader social, economic and cultural life.

The subtype *violation of security needs* (of which the subtype *violation of survival needs* is a more extreme form) refers to a wide range of instances of structural violence which lead to vulnerability and which impede and/or undermine the satisfaction of individual and collective human needs for security. The operative concept I use is human security which transcends the focus on the state as a referent object of security to concentrate instead on the individual as the main referent object of security and on the wide diapason of phenomena which lead to vulnerability (Kerr, 2013).

The subtype *violation of well-being needs* will refer to needs (other than survival and security needs, which are covered by different subtypes) which impede the satisfaction of a wide range of additional material, psychological, social and cultural needs.

The violence of *penetration* can be sensibly conceptualised both as a form of structural and cultural violence. Galtung laconically defined it as "implanting the topdog inside the underdog" (Galtung, 1996, 199), i.e. the "implanting" of hegemonic ideology that is to a large extent organised by the privileged segment of society and is to a large degree internalised by the disadvantaged. This term is essentially interchangeable with the term indoctrination. I will refer to this form of violence in relation to the creation of structurally conditioned ideological and cognitive impediments to the fostering of critical consciousness and to independent "consciousness formation and mobilization" (ibid., 199) of the subaltern classes.

Segmentation is another form of violence which can be categorised as being cultural as well as structural. It "[gives] the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on" (ibid., 199). In other words, it also supports the existence of subordinate social classes as it "[impedes]

consciousness formation and mobilization" (ibid., 199) by structurally hindering the attainment of a comprehensive view of the social reality and obstructing the understanding/cognition of social processes and problems. Segmentation partially overlaps with the restriction of democratic accountability (for example, the limitation of transparency guarantees can be classified under both of these subtypes).

Fragmentation, or "keeping the underdogs away from each other" (Galtung, 1996, 199), refers to the various types of processes which lead to structural violence by inhibiting group cohesion and solidarity required for democratic organisation and unity. In identifying the presence of this kind of structural violence I will focus on those instances where it is easier to infer at least a degree of dominant class's intent on producing fragmentation.

Galtung also noted that the habituation of structural violence is made possible by cultural violence which ensures that exploitation and oppression are perceived and subjectively felt as normal and (at least somewhat) acceptable (Galtung, 1990; 1996). Cultural violence is exercised through ideologies, languages, artistic and scientific institutions and processes (Jacoby, 2008)[75]. Reification of capitalist relations is one of the crucial forms of cultural violence, since it helps to "normalize atrocious behaviour and violence toward others" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004, 21). There is a dialectical interplay between structural and cultural violence, and they are mutually constitutive. Cultural violence is to a large degree expressed through major social structures and institutions (of the education system, the dominant segment of the mass media etc.). My analysis of class-based structural violence takes account of various class-based social, political, economic and cultural forms of disadvantage, discrimination and exclusion which result in needs-deprivation. This analysis is not comprehensive but is based on the selection of relevant and strongly indicative collections of data, which open wider perspectives for future research.

I focus on two centrally-important complexes or sets of patterns of structural violence in

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[75] Writing on the oppression of blacks in the United States, Galtung noted the recognisable general phenomenon in the mainstream of contemporary Western academia: "After some time, direct violence is forgotten, slavery is forgotten, and only two labels show up, pale enough for college textbooks: 'discrimination' for massive structural violence and 'prejudice' for massive cultural violence. Sanitation of language: itself cultural violence" (Galtung, 1996, 200).

relation to some essential key nodes or "check-points" of general social reproduction of British society:

1) Some of the more direct state contributions to structural violence through the structural workings of major government institutions, the organisation of the welfare system and of services which are of central public importance – healthcare, education and housing.

2) Structural violence in several main aspects of economic life, encompassing a) financialisation and the economic crisis as the major structurally violent manifestation of the contradictions and forms of structural violence inherent in the processes of financialisation, as well as b) poverty and social exclusion[76].

Structural Violence and Democratic Control

Structural violence, including class-based structural violence, is based on relationships of domination and subordination, in which unequal power is expressed through and is reliant on authoritarian, hierarchically organised social relationships. Authoritarian social relationships are also the very foundation of capitalist class power. As various authors including Ralf Dahrendorf (1959) and Dana Williams (2012) have noted, capitalist property relations rest on authority relations. Property can be monopolised by a segment of society because authoritarian social relations give power holders in key social institutions (primarily state institutions and private companies) power to enforce these property relations by maintaining the central social division between those who hold power, give orders (sometimes also through mediators such as managers and supervisors) and make key decisions vs. those who are supposed to take orders and obey. This was a basic reason why the formal abolition of private property in "state socialist" countries did not put an end to structurally violent, alienated, oligarchic power (indeed, "state socialist" regimes often intensified these anti-democratic phenomena)[77].

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[76] Of course, considering the interactions between politics and the economy, the state and private capitalist initiative (which my analysis seeks to acknowledge throughout this work), these two themes are going to be partially interlinked in my analysis (in accordance with real life).

[77] Considering its main characteristics, including the perpetuation of a dominant class and of hierarchical and exploitative capital relations, which are radically at odds with humane libertarian socialism, "State socialism may quite as well be called State capitalism" (Pannekoek, [1950] 2003, 32).

As the discussion concerning my theoretical lens and approach to intersectional analysis has already indicated, my stance in favour of the construction of a peaceful social order is rooted in a revolutionary peacemaking approach which seeks to free all sentient beings from systems of violence, domination and oppression. Those who are serious about ending social relationships of violence, domination and subordination must, in addition to confronting speciesism, focus on challenging disparities in social power and the attendant hierarchies of decision-making. These hierarchies constitute relationships based on the exclusion of those placed lower in political, economic and other social hierarchies from regular, cooperative decision-making about public affairs, i.e. from effective cooperative control over important political, economic and social processes and social affairs. Authoritarian social relationships based on those who give orders and those who take them – which characterise both social democratic and "state socialist" conceptions of decision-making - are antithetical to libertarian socialist praxis on which the creation of a truly democratic and peaceful social order depends. Libertarian socialist praxis seeks to achieve a synthesis of social equality, cooperation and mutual aid and individual and social freedom through a revolutionary democratic transformation of popular consciousness and the transformation and supplanting of existing social structures with a new system of integral (political, economic and social) democracy based on democratic self-government. The creation of an integral and enlightened system of political, economic and social democracy requires the dismantling of the various systems of domination and of oppression, including those based on class, racist, gender, ableist, ageist and speciesist oppression, as my previous discussion has already indicated and my subsequent exposition will further clarify.

Since these relationships of domination are the major generators of structural violence, it is not possible to effectively challenge such violence if progressive social forces focus only or primarily on combating the epiphenomena or symptoms of these underlying hierarchical relationships. The capitalist system is founded on structural violence, as it is a system based on wage slavery, alienated labour, and hierarchical and authoritarian economic, social and political organisation (see for example Chomsky, 2005). Socially ameliorating projects that were restricted to challenging some of the harmful symptoms of the underlying systemic relationships of domination and subordination, including social democracy, created their own specific forms of statist bureaucratic structural violence (for one classical analysis in the British context see Miliband,

[1961] 2009)[78]. Consequently, libertarian socialist perspectives, which include a variety of tradi-tions and encompass libertarian strands of Marxism (prominently including Luxemburgism, which seeks to establish a system of council democracy but is not opposed to the supporting role of a revolutionary democratic party in the struggle for liberation), share the understanding that structurally violent social relationships cannot be overcome within the framework of capital rela-tions and of the state, which – as the analyses both of capitalist and of pseudo-socialist states have confirmed (e.g. Draper, 1987; Gill, 1990; Miliband, [1961] 2009; Chomsky, 1986) - is a system of bureaucratic rule that perpetuates the existence of a dominant class. While numerous historical continuities of state violence are immediately recognisable, future research of struc-tural violence in contemporary Britain and elsewhere would benefit from much more detailed examination of the great multiplicity of forms of structural violence that inhere in the state, which is a very complex, expansive and multi-faceted system of domination[79]. My work will provide one such exploratory attempt to advance the cartography of state violence, and of capi-talist structural violence more generally.

True liberation from class-based structural violence is predicated on the transcendence of the state through the construction of a nonviolent, democratic republic – a peaceful social order based on a system of integral democratic self-government, i.e. a free association of workers and citizens empowered by cooperative mechanisms for the harmonisation of interests and the over-

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[78] As Miley (2017, 221) wrote:

"The social rights guaranteed by the welfare state, the de-commodification of basic material needs, the provision of public goods such as free healthcare and free education for all citizens, certainly contributed to an expansion of options and resources available for most individuals, and in this respect can be said to have had a democracy-enhancing effect. But these same social rights were achieved and provided through the expansion of bureaucratic state hierarchies – a paternalistic state, rendering its services to a pacified citizenry; a state that could intervene to ameliorate the effects of capitalist social-property relations, but at the expense of burying forever the now-forgotten dream of workers' control over the means and ways of subsistence and production".

[79] The anarchist theorist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon ([1851] 1969, 294) identified the state as the systematic perpetrator of numerous forms of imposition and domination:

"To be governed is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-driven, numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have neither the right, nor the wisdom, nor the virtue to do so.... To be governed is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, for-bidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under the pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general inter-est, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, be-trayed; and, to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonored. That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality".

coming of conflict, which would enable the transcendence of the state and of other coercive modes of regulating social relations. Democratic self-government is based on the principles of equal self-determination and of human self-actualisation, which entail the right of all people "to be the self-governing, consciously and rationally cooperative protagonists of the historical process, the conscious and cooperative creators of a freer, more advanced human community, rather than being merely reduced to the position of objects of capitalist rule. In other words, democratic self-government is the democratically cooperative, socially coordinated expression of the principles of human dignity and equal self-determination" (Jakopovich, 2018a; also see Marković, 1982)[80]. I shall return to some practical political implications of these general principles later, especially in chapters 3 and 5. My subsequent analysis of the structurally violent character of the state will support the revolutionary democratic conclusion that the creation of authentic democracy requires a revolution against capital and against the state carried through the socialisation/democratisation of political and social governance – the creation of a truly democratic, non-violent and self-governing republic[81].

My concrete analysis of the democratic deficits in existing state and wider social structures will also entail the identification of a set of radically democratic vantage points (provisional democratic benchmarks) which deepen the understanding of the roots and extent of structural violence, and of what overcoming class-based structural violence would entail in structural, radical policy terms. By identifying the potential and the general principles of authentically democratic organisation, democratic imagination can also help to identify the obstacles (structural as well as cultural) to a fuller democratisation of society. The conceptualisation of democratic alter-

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[80] Rousseau was an early modern theorist who recognised the integrative function of participatory democracy, since it builds the cooperative democratic character in individuals and is essential for binding them into a democratic polity (see Rousseau, [1762] 1968; Pateman, 1989). John Stuart Mill also remarked on the indispensable educative function of participation, which enables people to transcend self-regarding modes of thought and conduct and facilitate the development of democratic transformative capacities (Mill, 1963; Pateman, ibid.).

[81] Marx ([1871] 2000, 599) described the Paris Commune in the following way: "It was a Revolution against the *State* itself, this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by the people for the people of its own social life. It was not a revolution to transfer it from one fraction of the ruling class to the other, but a Revolution to break down this horrid machinery of class domination itself". This oligarchic machinery of coercive bureaucratic and repressive police and military power can only be overcome through a thoroughgoing political, economic and social democratisation of public life.

natives to the *status quo* necessarily also entails a philosophical and imaginative forward-looking dimension, which has been evicted from much social research[82].

METHODOLOGY

My thesis is based on a "case study" approach to inquiry. Case studies tend to be focused explorations of events, processes, structures etc. circumscribed by activity and time. They are based on various data collection procedures (Stake, 1995). More specifically, my analysis of class-based structural violence is based on taking Britain in the period of 1979-2010 as a case study based on a series of smaller case studies (which focus on narrower social structures and processes) while seeking to note wider social interrelations and patterns.

A degree of abstraction is necessary in every social inquiry. Although I attempted to significantly advance the understanding of the main patterns and the character of class-based structural violence in Britain, I did not do this under any illusion that it is possible to reach a definitive understanding of this issue. I attempted to detect and explicate only what I considered to be the more significant (and usually less disputable) forms of class-based structural violence, while nonetheless seeking to retain a sufficiently focused and exploratory perspective capable of uncovering more or less unacknowledged instances of class-based structural violence in Britain. I also abstracted some of the clearest and most pervasive forms of structural violence where I thought that noting and explicating them would unnecessarily burden my exposition[83]. I sought to balance this concern with the aim to detect and explicitly acknowledge the various common types and instances of structural violence which have a specific privileged position in systemic reproduction and development (particularly as central forms and manifestations of conflict over decisively influential political and economic resources), in addition to detecting and analysing less central forms of structural violence.

I employed a similar purposive "sampling" approach when choosing a number of central

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[82] As Henry Giroux (2015) pointed out, "in a culture drowning in a love affair with empiricism and data, that which is not measurable withers. Lost here are the registers of compassion, care for the other, the radical imagination, a democratic vision and a passion for justice".

[83] For example, economic processes and government policies which produce poverty and deprivation routinely also restrict the individual agency of people afflicted by this poverty and deprivation, yet I did not consider it practical to note this extremely common causal relationship throughout my analysis.

aspects of social structure and some of the most relevant social processes which reflect structural violence, illustrate key themes and raise questions of wider significance. In contrast to the highly fragmentary analytical approach (in the sense of eschewing broad and synoptic perspectives) which to a large degree dominates many contemporary analyses of social phenomena, my approach seeks to gain at least a basic understanding of the system's totality (in relation to the investigated phenomenon of structural violence). Such an operationalisation of Galtung's concept of structural violence has apparently not previously been attempted in relation to Britain, nor generally. I base my pursuit of this aim on a series of case studies covering several of the major aspects of the social structure, while seeking to integrate these analyses into a synoptic ("bird's eye") perspective.

This "macro-perspective" has several advantages. Firstly, it is able to identify interconnections and wider patterns that bind various different aspects of social structure and spheres of social life.

Secondly, as Neuman (1996, 187) noted: "Validity arises out of the cumulative impact of hundreds of small, diverse details that only together create a heavy weight of evidence". My approach, which entails a "meta-analysis" of numerous other empirical investigations by other researchers (which it theoretically and empirically synthesises and interprets) [84], has the advantage of being able to test the hypothesis that class-based structural violence permeates the entire system, i.e. it can be used to test the supposition that capitalist social relations systematically create structural violence throughout many of the main patterns, institutions and structures of social life. Somewhat paradoxically, by identifying more general patterns such broad assessments can sometimes enable deeper, more radical insights about the nature of social systems, social change, social processes and deep structures, leading to more fundamental research questions and answers.

Thirdly, the "macro-perspective" may provide various trailblazing paths for further, more specialised inquiries, especially in relatively novel areas of research which are still very exploratory, even tentative. A kind of surveying work can help to unveil (both implicitly and explicitly) new theoretical, methodological and empirical perspectives. Such exploratory work

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[84] "Meta-analytical" in the sense that one of its central aspects is to organise the results from many studies (see Neuman, 2006), although without subjecting them to a statistical analysis.

may both stimulate the pursuit of broader insights and help to determine which aspects particularly require greater focus and further research. My research tries to do the same, and I will identify some questions for future research in the course of my thesis.

Related to this last point is the fourth possible advantage of my approach, which is that a broad application of a nascent theoretical and methodological framework, especially when it has not previously been properly tested in practice, may help to explore and develop the general applicability and veracity of this analytical framework. The breadth of my research perspective helped me to test Galtung's theory and typology of structural violence. In relation to the broad theory, the perspective I adopted solidified my view that structural violence should be understood as needs-deprivation resulting from social structures, regardless of confirmed human potential. Had I adopted a narrower focus on some particular segment of the social structure, I might not have observed that some forms of structurally-induced needs-deprivation merit being classified as violent regardless of confirmed human potential to transcend them (just as some argue that the act of killing cannot be totally abolished, yet that does not change the violent character of this act). Furthermore, by subjecting Galtung's typology to a broad, extensive test across a variety of social structures, sets of social relationships and policy complexes, I was able to detect its limitations and to identify the improvements (including Amartya Sen's categories of instrumental freedoms) which can advance both the comprehensiveness and the precision of the neo-Galtungian analytical apparatus in relation to the investigation into the character of structural violence. A narrower focus on a smaller segment of the social structure would have limited my ability to subject Galtung's theory and typology of structural violence to a more extensive test, which probably would have resulted in a more impoverished conceptual framework. My modification and development of Galtung's typology largely resulted from several particular analytical foci which I adopted in the course of a broader, synoptic inquiry. Also, my broad initial cartography of class-based structural violence brought significant insights about the systemic nature of such violence in contemporary society, as well as about the major contours and patterns of structural violence which different perspectives, employing different "degrees of magnification", would not have been able to uncover. As well as in the case of other research topics, an exposition based on a significant level of concentration and compression can have its legitimate purposes.

It is also true that macro-perspectives cannot give as much attention to detail, some of which can significantly advance the understanding of particular phenomena and of various under-appreciated complex relationships[85]. A narrower research focus can enable more detailed analysis which can more thoroughly corroborate narrower findings. It can also more easily enable the investigation of counter-factors which mitigate structural violence. For these and other reasons, micro-analytical approaches to the investigation of structural violence are certainly also necessary and should be welcomed.

However, in spite of its various real and potential weaknesses, it is legitimate to adopt the approach I have taken as an analytical hypothesis, and to see to what results it will lead (especially considering the aforementioned advantages of this approach). Arguments can always be deployed to dispute a piece of work on the basis of particularistic theoretical perspectives and personal research interests. Of course, in the analysis of extremely complex social relationships, one focuses on those aspects one wants to specifically illuminate. One crucial aim of intelligible and socially useful research should be to avoid "missing the wood from the trees", since not all data and details truly contribute to understanding. The concrete application of this general principle can obviously differ on the basis of the character of one's research field and one's research aims, personal interests, intended readership (e.g. those more interested in more condensed and/or inter-disciplinary as opposed to highly specialised studies), etc. Crucially, every research programme in social studies of necessity abstracts from the immense multiplicity of social interconnections, which does not mean that these other factors and interactions are necessarily considered unimportant.

The primarily national level of my analysis means that this work does not attempt to examine levels of structural violence in the rest of the world, while maintaining certain aspects of comparative analysis which help to indicate the potential avoidability - as well as the specific character and intensity - of some forms of structural violence in Britain. This comparative element is, however, only of secondary importance in my research. A systematic comparative analysis of structural violence remains as a potential subject of future studies.

My thesis is based on a concurrent transformative mixed methods approach which is

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[85] However, as previously noted, the macro-perspective also uncovers complex and deep relationships which the narrower perspective often may not be able to do to the same degree.

based on the use of a specific ideological and/or theoretical lens and the concurrent collection of qualitative and quantitative data (Creswell, 2009). My integrative literature review served as a basis for my two central theoretical lenses: a broadly neo-Marxian optic on class and a modified Galtungian theory of structural violence, which provided the themes of my research with a conceptual framework, a series of foundational hypotheses and variables (which I discussed in the previous chapter), many of which I kept under continual review. I sought to collect reasonably detailed information required to develop my understanding of the complex and multi-faceted character of class-based structural violence in Britain. The ensuing data analysis and interpretation entailed simultaneously comparing and refining both my data and my evolving typology of structural violence. Since a series of hypotheses regarding the nature of various forms of structural violence inheres in this typology, my adjustments of the typology simultaneously helped to refine my hypotheses. While I have adopted a largely deductive style in the exposition of my study (in order to facilitate clarity), and while the aforementioned initial theoretical lenses strongly informed my analysis, my research was exploratory and also partially inductive: I partly constructed my conceptual framework and typology on the basis of reviewing and organising the gathered and analysed data.

My data collection included both qualitative and quantitative data, as both of these types of data contribute to the understanding of the research problem. The qualitative analytical approach is dominant, with quantifications when I judged them to be necessary or useful and possible. The sequencing of my analytical procedures consisted of non-linear, interrelated stages and was in many cases concurrent, but the following can be classified as relatively separate levels of analysis.

Firstly, I collected data by examining documents and observing social structures and processes through the use of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included government documents and reports, documents and reports published by international institutions, NGO reports and newspaper articles in some of the main broadsheets. Secondary sources consisted of academic studies, as well as expert studies produced by researchers in NGOs. My analysis sought to traverse all of the data sources.

Following the collection of raw data, I organised this data chronologically and categorically, using a straightforward personal type of coding to prepare, organise and cluster the

material which I collected in advance of conducting more thorough analysis. Coding is the process of organising the data into segments of text prior to engaging in analysis which brings meaning to information (Rossman and Rallis, 1998). In concordance with my combination of inductive and deductive analytical approaches, I used a combination of predetermined, emergent and evolving codes, continually reviewing my data and the theoretical framework. My analysis culminated in the description, interpretation and interrelation of researched themes, and in the interpretation of their broader meaning. This interpretation led to certain methodological, theoretical and empirical lessons and findings as well as to questions for future research. As already mentioned, the theoretical introduction included an integrative literature review relating to the concept of structural violence and the concept of class.

I sought to validate my findings (i.e. to check and improve the accuracy of my findings) throughout the process of inquiry, in accordance with the general guidelines provided by Yin, 2003 and Creswell, 2009. Some of the procedures which I employed as part of my validation strategy (while qualifying their "reach" and analytical power) included the converging of several types of sources (which I have mentioned) and of qualitative and quantitative data in the construction and corroboration of my arguments. This can help to increase reliability and internal validity of research (Merriam, 1988). Other aspects of my validation strategy included the presentation of discrepant information which contradicts my general argument and the general trends relating to structural violence, as well as the use of external reviewers to provide an objective assessment of my data and of my interpretation. An important additional way in which I sought to validate my findings about structural violence was by identifying and analysing it through the prism of a neo-Galtungian typology of structural violence which I adapted on the basis of Johan Galtung's and Amartya Sen's categories of (respectively) structural violence and instrumental freedoms (which was discussed in the previous chapter). While other prominent empirical studies of structural violence do not attempt to categorise this type of violence into different subtypes (e.g. Lykes, 2001, Farmer, 2004b), my use of categories of structural violence helps to place the analysis of this violence on a less arbitrary, more precise basis, supporting both the validity and the reliability of my research. Moreover, in my thesis I note the tentative, provisional and indicative character of some suppositions and of some research findings in cases where I thought further research and further data were required to validate them, but was not in a

position to pursue these lines of inquiry myself. By noting rather than ignoring some of these cases I sought to help identify possible future research problems and topics.

My attempt to provide reasonably detailed descriptions while identifying the most salient points relating to class-based structural violence should also provide a solid framework for comparisons with other approaches to investigating structural violence, as well as in relation to possible future inquiries which would investigate the counter-factors which mitigate structural violence.

I also openly acknowledge my left-democratic normative vantage point (in the purpose statement in the introduction and in the section on the theoretical perspective which I adopt), thereby suggesting how my heterodox personal outlook and advocacy motivation inform my general selection and interpretation of the data. However, I am aware that the use of discrepant information can "[add] to the credibility of an account" (Creswell, 2009, 192). Although my research does not seek to investigate the counter-factors which mitigate class-based structural violence, I do note in the course of the thesis some of the most important discrepant information and trends which limit and even reduce structural violence, thereby acknowledging the multi-directional nature of structural violence trends.

My approach to inquiry is partially related to the post-positivist analytical framework. Adherents of post-positivism "believe that a reality does exist but that it can only be known imperfectly and probabilistically, in part because of the researchers' limitations" (Robson, 2011, 20). In my approach, I chose a theoretical approach which I sought to develop logically and consistently. Such attempts to develop an analytical approach can help test whether the starting theoretical propositions are valid. However, as Palonen (1978, 105) emphasised, open research questions and theory conflicts are some of the drivers of scientific progress, and "there are never "final judgments" on the validity of theories. One can always contest both the judgements of validity and the criteria of validity". My approach also acknowledges the likely veracity of Sartre's ([1965] 2008) insight regarding the often inevitable obstacles placed in front of critical intellectual inquiry[86].

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[86] "The intellectual's most immediate enemy is what I will term the false intellectual and what Nizan called a watch-dog – a type created by the dominant class to defend its particularist ideology by arguments which claim to be rigorous products of exact reasoning. (…) It would be simplistic to imagine that the false intellectual is merely an individual who has 'sold out' – unless we understand the bargain that makes a technician of knowledge into a false

One such issue in relation to the assumed objectivity of some social science methodologies concerns the kind of sources used in research. Segments of academia are rather self-referential and eschew the regular use of primary sources, which is reminiscent of medieval scholastics meditating on how many teeth a horse has, but considering it vulgar to open the horse's mouth and count them. Sartre ([1965] 2008, 241) noted how such imposed analytical conventions sometimes serve to fetter and blunt social analysis: "To check the freedom of research in the name of ideas which are manifestly false, it is consequently necessary to fetter free scientific and technical thought with norms which do not belong to science, and to erect external barriers to the spirit of inquiry, while trying to believe and to make others believe that they are inherent to any inquiry".

In line with critical inquiry approaches (Robson, 2011), I also took account of the ways in which mainstream data collection practices are often implicated (although not always consciously) in the reproduction of systems of class oppression. While I primarily used academic sources, I did not uncritically accept restrictive views on the use of non-academic primary sources. The use of non-academic sources, particularly in my chosen field of research, is indispensable because much academic literature either avoids or insufficiently explores certain questions, particularly those relating to the harm caused by dominant social structures[87]. Besides, one would have to provide evidence for the assumption that the (factually true) use of non-academic primary sources is *a priori* inadequate. It seems clear to me that such rejection of many factual non-academic primary sources impoverishes much social analysis. Judicious use of clearly factually true and corroborative, as well as of partially indicative, primary sources can provide a much stronger empirical grounding for analysis than should be expected of scholastic abstract schemes which abstract from the realities of social life.

I did not want to neglect qualitative public documents such as newspapers and official reports because, as I have indicated, my research topic required me to draw from a broader well

intellectual as a little less crude than is normally implied. (…) They ignore their alienation as men (actual or potential men) and think only of their power as functionaries. They wear the appearance of intellectuals and also start by contesting the ideology of the dominant class – but their's is a pseudo-contestation, whose rapid exhaustion merely serves to demonstrate that the dominant ideology is resistant to all contestation. In other words, the false intellectual, unlike the true, does not say no, but rather cultivates the 'no, but …' or the 'I know, but still …' attitude" (Sartre, [1965] 2008, 252).

[87] In contrast, Piketty (2014) even makes good use of Austin's and Balzac's "ethnographic" novels in his analysis of trends relating to wealth and income inequality in Europe and the US since the eighteenth century.

of knowledge and information on structural violence in British social life. When using journalistic sources, I have attempted to use the works of serious specialised non-academic experts with a high degree of credibility, usually by using factual and documentary qualitative data which they provide, without being led (let alone bound) by their interpretations of this data. Research by experts in NGOs also provides much useful documentary, qualitative and quantitative information for the purposes of my inquiry which I often would have missed had I narrowly restricted my data gathering approach to collecting data only from academic sources (since they are sometimes overly self-referential and do not draw sufficiently from a variety of public sources).

In terms of the narrative structure which I adopted, I sought to historicise and transcend the static portrayal of structural violence by integrating my various categorisations of structural violence within a discussion of multifaceted social processes (i.e. by being led by the exposition of the unified basic logic and evolution of social structures rather than by attempting to segment the discussion of these different forms of structural violence). This historicising account also enabled me to help bring to light the role of agency in the development of structural violence, although this research problem was not my central concern and it requires much further analysis.

My approach also entails a *plaidoyer* for the integration of considerations of structural violence into various kinds of analyses of social structure and public policy. This aim provided the narrative structure which I adopted with a hint of a certain "didactic" function in relation to existing social analysis approaches (although it is indubitably possible to make further improvements to this narrative structure, as well as to detect its limitations in relation to some research agendas). The consideration of structural violence should in my opinion be, at least to some extent, integrally incorporated in most analyses of social structure and, perhaps in particular, of public policy. This concern does not, of course, always need to be explicated, yet it should routinely inform social analysis, especially considering the ethical, social and political significance (I would, on the basis of my normative viewpoint, even say centrality) of the issue of violence[88].

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[88] In conducting my interpretative inquiry, I accept the essential validity of Creswell's (2009, 176) point that researchers' interpretations "cannot be separated from their own backgrounds, history, contexts, and prior

Chapter 2

THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

This chapter will outline my perspective on the state, as well as certain convergences between the major theories of the state based on the acknowledgement of the existence of a dominant class in contemporary capitalist societies, and of the state's anti-democratic alignment with the interests of capital. In the following sections, I examine the basic patterns of class domination through the state. As I have already pointed out, this class domination is a crucial obstacle to the establishment of a system of governance that would be based on democratic participation and democratic accountability. Finally, I discuss the role of popular agency in relation to structural violence and some additional operative modes of capitalist institutional domination over the state.

Theories of the State

The core research question in this thesis concerns the ways in which structural class violence permeates some of the major social processes and institutions in the UK. The inquiry into the fundamental institutional architecture and dynamics of structural violence needs to encompass the analysis of the influence of state structures and state policies on the forms and degrees of structural violence. This is why one of the central themes in my thesis is the structural violence organised by and through what Franco Basaglia (1987) referred to as the official state "institutions of violence". Much of the ruling order's regulatory and disciplinary violence is carried out by "the gloved hand of the state" (Scheper-Hughes, 2004, 178), with concealed and/or routinised violence.

The primary purpose of this and the following chapter is to elucidate some of the basic ways in which unequal class relations that are reproduced through the British system of government contribute to structural violence (especially by elucidating the ways in which these

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understandings". I have already discussed the issues of subjectivity and normativity when setting out my theoretical perspective.

relations impact on the agential power of the lower and middle classes).

Following the discussion about my use of the concept of the "dominant class" (in the section about my neo-Marxian theoretical lens), in this chapter I will outline how fundamental class forces shape the state, on the basis of which I will (in subsequent chapters) examine the main forms of structural violence embedded in the central government institutions, as well as the role of the state institutions in the wider social architecture of structurally violent class relationships.

Rather than engaging in a detailed discussion about the possible relevance and validity of the many competing theories of the state (including pluralist, neo-pluralist, corporatist, managerialist, elite theory, Marxist, neo-Marxist, structuralist Marxist, poststructuralist, rational choice perspectives of the state, and postmodernist theories), which would go beyond the scope of this work and would distract from my specific focus on the analysis of class-based structural violence, this chapter will specify my operative and partly axiomatic perspective on the state in relation to my research topic. However, I will begin by seeking some common denominators of different state theories relating to the issue of class domination, as well by noting how the conceptual demarcation lines of my (broadly neo-Marxian) position are actually aligned with a number of theoretical convergences that have occurred between the main theories of the state.

Dahl (1967) posited with respect to early pluralist theory about US society in the 1960s: "The fundamental axiom of American pluralist theory and practice is, I believe, this: instead of a single center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign"[89]. In fact, a diametrically opposed view of monist power distribution (according to which there is a wholly sovereign centre) is not a prerequisite of the axiom about the existence of a dominant class which is privileged in government policy-making. In other words, the theory of capitalist class domination in society is not logically dependent on the assumption about its total sovereignty, and dialectical neo-Marxist perspectives on power distribution (e.g. Silver, 2003) strongly confirm Dahl's axiom about the absence of a wholly

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[89] Caporaso (1988, 3) may have come closer to the *differentia specifica* of classical pluralist theory when he stated that "pluralism, the reigning version of domestic politics, saw everything as being capable of reduction to group process. (...) The pluralistic state was primarily passive, reacting to pressures emanating from society". It is this view, as well as the similar pluralist conception of the state as "a mere arena in which political groups make demands and engage in political struggles and compromises" (Skocpol, 1985, 5), which has drawn criticisms from neo-Marxist (e.g. Miliband, 1969) as well as statist/state-centred perspectives (e.g. Skocpol, 1985).

sovereign power centre[90]. Partly at least in response to social conflict in Western countries in the 1960s and 70s, a neo-pluralist theory developed as a way of reconciling the original pluralist emphasis on the influence of varied groups on policy-making with the realisation that some groups, especially the state elite, corporations and the capitalist class, tend to become dominant and privileged in the policy process (McConnell, 1966; Lowi, 1969; Kelso, 1978; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; Richardson, 2000), which leads to structures that exclude the public from policy-making (Lowi, 1969; Richardson, 2000; Richardson, 2010). The pluralist Lindblom (1977, 175) also acknowledged that the government's dependence on economic growth is likely to lead to the prioritising of the demands of business for favourable economic policies, resulting in its "privileged position in government". This is a position of structural power which even leads to the absence of real democratic control on many issues of major importance to citizens. Capitalist market forces and concerns often determine government policies[91]. In his discussion of the systematic structural pro-capitalist biases in US city governments, Elkin (1986) pointed out how the political elites' need to obtain credit from the capitalist market, to avoid capital flight and fiscal problems, as well as the politicians' dependence on private campaign contributions, lead to the privileging of capital by the political elites on the basis of mutual interest.

Although he observed that business interests tend to be privileged by the state, Lindblom (ibid.) maintained the view of the state being fragmented, with various groups contributing to its policies. It is, however, not necessary to accept the view of the state as essentially fragmented in

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[90] Galbraith (1963), a non-Marxist, similarly noted the existence of "countervailing powers". These could also be identified through the analysis of factors which mitigate structural violence. More problematic is the wider "legitimating discourse" (Merelman, 2003) of many pluralists about a (supposedly) predominantly reactive and responsive state and a political process based on tolerant coalition-building and gradual democratic reform. The main assumptions of prominent US pluralists such as Truman (1951) and Dahl (1967) - about the degree to which power is dispersed among different social groups and that the political system in the US and other Western countries is open, pluralistic and consensus-based - have been subjected to strong critique. Empirical reality of conflict in US society (including the segregation of African-Americans, the Civil Rights, anti-war, gay and feminist movements, etc. – see Lockwood, 1964) undermined the notion about the existence of a consensus-based democratic system open to all interests. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974) noted how the concept of consensus often conceals the structural relationships of manipulation, domination and coercion in the political process. Empirical insight, as the pluralist Putnam remarked following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., exposed the inadequacy of the pluralist conceptual apparatus (Putnam in Merelman, 2003).

[91] Lindblom (1977, 175) stated: "Any government official who understands the requirements of his position and the responsibilities that market orientated systems throw on businessmen will therefore grant them a privileged position. He does not have to be bribed, duped or pressured to do so. (…) He simply understands (…) that public affairs in market orientated systems are in the hands of two group leaders, government and business, who must collaborate and that to make the system work government leadership must often defer to business leadership".

order to accept the insight that various groups and forces are able to exert some degree of influence on it[92]. Richardson and Jordan (1979) noted how in Britain the state was fragmented into a number of policy communities where particular interest groups may be dominant. As my analysis in chapter 3 in particular will indicate, their emphasis on the dispersal of power within the state and the absence of a single interest group dominating across a wide variety of policy areas may have been mistaken in its overly strong rejection of the notion of the integral, largely centralised state and a powerful and often largely unified core executive (as other research - including by Gamble, 1988, Weir and Beetham, 1999, and Richardson, 2010 - also indicates). It is even possible to accept the notion that the various elites belonging to the dominant class are to a large extent fragmented (as pluralists and some elite theorists such as Mills, 1956 posited), that they are relatively autonomous from each other and often in conflict with each other (ibid.), yet that they still share a fundamental common interest in the preservation of their privileged position and of the capitalist system which sustains it.

The initial pluralist emphasis on the (supposed) essential openness of the policy-process in Britain to most groups and its supposed reliance on consensus-based decision-making (Jordan and Richardson, 1982) was mistaken, as my discussion in the following chapters (particularly in chapter 3, where I examine structural limitations on democracy in the central government institutions) indicates. Marsh (2002) noted that the existence of a plurality of policy communities and groups does not necessarily signify the existence of real political pluralism and dispersal of power. The neo-pluralist Rhodes pointed out (see Rhodes, 1990; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992) that policy networks in the UK have been characterised by a highly restrictive membership and insulation from the Parliament and the general public, which are consistently marginalised in the policy-making process. Further compromising their own role as guardians of real political pluralism and openness, policy communities also "decide which issues will be included and excluded from the policy arena" (Rhodes, 1997, 34), i.e. they serve as gate-keepers of the policy process[93]. In the next chapter I will note how even the established policy networks were destabilised and partly excluded from policy-making by the Thatcher government.

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[92] The question about the degree of fragmentation and integration of the state elite – and of the capitalist class as a whole - can only be resolved though empirical analysis.

[93] The degree of pluralism in the various policy-making processes and policy networks in the UK is an important topic deserving of detailed research in light of the theory of structural violence. One of the reasons why this type of

While the advocate of statist or state-centred theory Skocpol (1979) sought to advance the conceptualisation of the state as an autonomous structure and actor whose interests may radically clash with the interests of the capitalist class, she also acknowledged that neo-Marxists such as Miliband (1970, 1973, 1977), Poulantzas (1973), Anderson (1974) and Therborn (1978) recognised that the state has the potential to exercise agency independently of direct capitalist control. Some neo-Marxist views of the state in some cases even, as Skocpol (ibid.) also noted, tentatively accepted the possibility that the state under capitalism has the potential (at least under the leadership of an anti-capitalist government) to fundamentally break with capitalist interests, although this was seen as requiring a simultaneous process of the democratisation of the state in some neo-Marxist analyses (see Carrillo, 1977)[94].

Marx ([1850] 1978; [1871] 1974) noted that the state in a capitalist system is structurally biased in favour of capitalist interests and needs to be replaced by a fundamentally different set of administrative apparatuses which would, due to their much more democratic structural character, be adequate for the purpose of truly serving the broad population rather than (primarily) the dominant class. Jessop (1978, 62) summarised Marx's position in this way: "Marx implies that the state is a system of political domination whose effectiveness is to be found in its institutional structure as much as in the social categories, fractions of classes that control it. (…) The analysis of the inherent bias of the system of political representation and state intervention is logically prior to an examination of the social forces that manage to wield state power". Certainly outside of the exceptional political circumstance of an anti-systemic government wielding the instruments of state power and strongly motivated to challenge the fundamental structural constraints inherent in the organisation of state power and in the existing mode of production, Skocpol's (ibid.) emphasis on the potential ability of the state elite to negate the fundamental interests of the capitalist class may have been somewhat undialectical in its sharp

assessment goes beyond the scope and focus of this work is that my work focuses on the sources and mechanisms of class-based structural violence rather than also focusing on factors which mitigate it.

[94] This view saw the need to transform state structures through a process of democratisation which would transcend a simple change of state personnel. While Poulantzas' (1969) structuralist attack on Miliband's (1969) point about the relative autonomy of the state personnel went too far (by intransigently negating the empirical evidence of the government elite and of state officials strongly going against the interests of the capitalist class in certain circumstances – see Sassoon, 2014), it was valid to emphasise the existence of power which rests in state structures. It is reductionist to conceive of state structures merely as transmission belts of the state elites, as it is also reductionist to conceive of state officials merely as the transmission belts of the state structure.

distinction between political and economic power, which - in a capitalist class system oriented around the imperatives of competitive capital accumulation and market power - tends to be fused to a significant degree. This fusion of economic and political power probably precludes a fundamental autonomy of the state elite from the rest of the dominant class (at least in most cases). This discussion may not be as pertinent in the neoliberal period since, as my subsequent discussion will indicate, the state under neoliberalism appears to have become even more directly (but not unequivocally) wedded to the interests of the capitalist class. Moreover, Skocpol (ibid.) also, even in the Keynesian period, acknowledged that the state usually does align itself with the dominant class in order to ensure the continued subordination of the subaltern classes. In turn, most neo-Marxists would probably broadly concur with this observation about the state made by Skocpol (1979, 29):

"The state properly conceived is no mere arena in which socioeconomic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations. Of course, these basic state organizations are built up and must operate within the context of class-divided socioeconomic relations (…)".

More problematic is Skocpol's (ibid., 30) statement that "resources may be used to strengthen the bulk and autonomy of the state itself – something necessarily threatening to the dominant class unless greater state power is indispensably needed and actually used to support dominant-class interests. But the use of state power to support dominant-class interests is not inevitable. Indeed, attempts of state rulers merely to perform the state's "own" functions may create conflicts of interest with the dominant class". Without organised executors of state functions, the state is a reified abstraction. Although Skocpol referred to "state rulers", her analysis, including in the passage which I just quoted, did not always sufficiently draw out the conclusion that while the state, as a vast and complex system of institutions and relationships, does operate according to various specific logics which are not entirely a result of conscious will and action, it is, however, not an "automated" and self-regulating entity (with its "own" functions, to use Skocpol's phrase) but one largely reliant on the volitional activities, political, economic and administrative choices of a variety of human actors, especially the state elite. As I already

mentioned in the section on my general theoretical perspective, I conceptualise class as a social category and the state elite as a fraction of the dominant class (unlike Skocpol, who seemed to treat the state elite as somehow potentially "trans-class", akin to Hobbes's Leviathan). In my perspective, the strengthening of the state in a capitalist system (in the absence of an anti-systemic government) does not signify the state's radical negation of the interests of the dominant class as a whole, but may instead constitute a limitation of the power of other *fractions* of the dominant class in favour of the power of the state elite and/or of the state's class adjudicating function. In a state still largely governed by the state elite (rather than by nascent organs of participatory democratic popular self-government), this class adjudicating function of the state, rather than being an expression of the state's fundamentally independent class position, remains ultimately orientated towards the preservation of political legitimacy of the existing class system and the preservation of the existing "public order". This has particularly been the case in the neoliberal period in which, as this thesis will show, the state has strongly privileged the interests of the dominant class over the interests of the subaltern classes.

As already noted, neo-Marxists would agree with neo-pluralists and statists that the state in capitalism, even in the neoliberal period of capitalist globalisation, retains a certain separation and autonomy from capital by performing the function of a "collective capitalist". Altvater (1973) and Aglietta (1979) argued that the capitalist economy requires state regulation in order to ensure its stability and to secure the preservation of capitalist property relations as well as the general conditions that are required and beneficial for capital accumulation (which includes the preservation of public order and of the system's political legitimacy). Block (1987a, 1987b) noted that private capitalists tend to strongly oppose reforms which may help ensure the long-term sustainability of the system, which underscores the importance of the state as the promoter of long-term common interests of the capitalist class. This appears to largely be the result, as Block (ibid.) and Carnoy (1984) observed, of the fact that state managers depend more directly on the state of the economy as a whole[95]. Finepol and Skocpol (1995) pointed out that Carnoy's

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[95] Carnoy (ibid., 218) argued that state managers are dependent on the performance of the economy because "economic activity produces state revenues and because public support for a regime will decline unless accumulation continues to take place. State managers willingly do what they know they must to facilitate capital accumulation. Given that the level of economic activity is largely determined by private investment decisions, such managers are particularly sensitive to overall 'business confidence' ".

account is not clear on whether the policies of state elites are always ultimately useful for capital. This is of course an empirical question which requires the examination of specific policies and of the specific historical context. In fact, neo-Marxist perspectives which eschew the deterministic emphases of "orthodox" Marxism have partly converged with neo-pluralist and statist perspectives with regard to the contingent character of the state's exact positioning in relation to different classes. Following the perspective of later Poulantzas' (1978, 123) on the state's precise character being dependent on the character of class conflict and on the "relationship of forces", Jessop's (1990, 267) neo-Marxist view emphasises the dialectical interplay of structure and agency, which entails the conception of the state as "a specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries, no institutional fixity and no pre-given formal or substantive unity". Jessop's perspective on the contingent nature of the state, however, also entails an understanding that the specific character of the state constitutes a "crystallization of past strategies" (ibid., 129) and that the structures of modes of operation of the state "are more open to some types of political strategy than others" (ibid., 260), i.e. that certain patterns of activity and certain actors are privileged while some are disadvantaged and even marginalised.

Miliband (1969) and Scott (1991) empirically confirmed the existence of capitalist domination over the state apparatus in Britain [96] even before the full consolidation of neoliberalism which has, in the course of the last few decades, led to a massive increase in economic inequality (including income and wealth inequality) between capitalists and the rest of the population and the evolution of a much more market-driven state which has systematically imported private capitalist service providers and market-based criteria (see Leys, 2004; these issues will also be discussed in this work, especially in chapter 4). These developments were accompanied and facilitated by the processes of party convergence behind pro-corporate economic policies, the entrenchment of centralised party-political regimes and an impositional core executive (which I particularly analyse in the following chapter), the corporate concentration of ownership and power over critically important segments of the mass media (Kuhn, 2007) and the weakening of the organised collective economic and political voices

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[96] On the basis of his own analysis of the state and of class relations in Britain, Scott (1991, 151-2) concluded that "Britain is ruled by a capitalist class whose economic dominance is sustained by the operations of the state and whose members are disproportionately represented in the power elite which rules the state apparatus. That is to say, Britain does have a ruling class".

among the subordinate classes. This included the decline of the party-political left through the rise of the highly centralised and pro-capitalist New Labour, as well as the decline of trade union power (see Coulter, 2014; Millward et al., 2000; Smith and Morton, 2008; Bryson and Forth, 2011; Brown and Marsden, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Bach et al., 2009). Harvey (2010), partly on the basis of his empirical analysis of the process of the resurgence of capitalist power on the basis of capitalist neoliberal political initiative (jointly carried out by private capitalist and state elites), even stated the following in relation to the relationship between the capitalist class and the state in neoliberalism: "High politics in many countries of the world is primarily determined by big money which is in the possession of the ruling class. So if it was ever true that the capitalist state is the executive board of the ruling class, then it is so today".

As I have shown and McLennan (1989) also noted, the neo-pluralist and neo-Marxist innovative interpretations and modified emphases led to a significant degree of convergence between their views of the state (especially in relation to the question of the state's relative autonomy and the recognition of the close alignment between state elite and private capitalists). I have also identified a degree of convergence between neo-Marxist and state-centred approaches in relation to the question of relative state autonomy *vis-à-vis* the capitalist class, and in relation to the contingent nature of the state in the capitalist system. Most significantly for my investigation of class-based structural violence, the Neo-Marxist, neo-pluralist and statist perspectives all acknowledge the existence of a dominant class in contemporary capitalist societies, and the state's alignment with the interests of capital (especially large capital). Yet, as I have already remarked, it is the broadly neo-Marxian perspective which exhibits particular concern for and focus on the issue of class-based inequality and oppression, and is focused on the main relational aspects of the class structure, which are the primary reasons why I shall employ a synthesis of this perspective with the neo-Galtungian approach to structural violence. As my previous discussion on democratic control has shown, the (libertarian) Marxian perspective is also radically divergent from those perspectives which consider the (more or less oligarchic) state as the final answer to human macro-organisation.

The Basic Patterns of Class Domination through the State

The creation of the capitalist market through an authoritarian, coercive and predatory state was the defining feature of early British capitalist development (which was not unlike capitalist development in other countries). The primitive capitalist accumulation and commodification of human labour (which was initially not codified solely in the form of the wage system) was mostly initiated and enforced by the state. These processes relied on severe state violence and the dispossession of the subordinate classes. This primarily entailed the privatisation of commonly held land (through the enclosures of communal land and Highland clearances), dislocating de-ruralisation and urbanisation, imperialist conquest and a gargantuan colonialist dispossession and exploitation of slave labour (including the triangular/transatlantic slave trade of course), and the strengthening of the coercive powers of the state (Thompson, 1963; Arrighi, 1994; Newsinger, 2000; Doogan, 2009)[97]. Similarly, the rise of neoliberalism, that new radicalised form of "accumulation through dispossession" (to use the phrase popularised by Harvey, 2007), was also critically reliant on the coercive and organisational power of the elite-run state, both in Britain and internationally (Gamble, 1988; Harvey, 2007; Glyn, 2007; Klein, 2008; also see Jakopovich, 2011a). My subsequent discussion (especially in chapter 4) explores whether, not entirely unlike the process of primitive capitalist accumulation, privatisations initiated under Thatcher and continued by New Labour constituted a state-coordinated private capitalist expropriation of the wider public.

The contemporary state continues to be the principal institutional designer, defender and enforcer of the social relations of production – including the whole scope of property relations, and the basic operation of the market (see Ingham, 2016). Its material power and official and ideological authority are constructed through a complex web of regulatory, coordinating,

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[97] The creation and maintenance of neoliberal policies have also entailed police and secret service repression against organised labour (most prominently during the miners' strike and the police assault on miners at Orgreave – see Milne, 2004 and Peak, 1984), as well as (usually less drastic) repressive measures against many political demonstrations (including through the unwarranted practice of containing peaceful protestors inside police cordons/"kettling" – see Lewis, 2011). Repression has taken a wide variety of forms which require further analysis. Some of the less direct forms of repression could be classified as the structural violence of fragmentation and restriction of democratic political activity. One prominent such example has been the widespread practice of police and secret service cooperation with construction companies in their blacklisting and victimisation of striking or otherwise "industrially militant" – but law-abiding - construction workers (see Smith and Chamberlain, 2015).

ideological and other institutions and apparatuses, yet it ultimately rests on the state's monopoly on the use of physical force (Malešević, 2010). In conjunction with its relatively sophisticated employment of varied controlling and moderating mechanisms and strategies in the general organisation of social consent, the state's firm combination of centralist, authoritarian and anti-egalitarian laws, procedures and practices (which I shall explore in this thesis) cements its functional character as a system of social organisation which is, to some extent, imposed on the broad population, as a rule over citizens rather than a nonviolent, participatory democratic republic (in the sense of a truly open and egalitarian *res publica*). The ensuing discussion will show that the contemporary UK state is a resolutely hierarchical organisation whose anti-participatory (anti-democratic) institutional setting is only mildly tempered – and by no means transcended – through occasional popular (yet greatly constrained and controlled) elections for some of the state's key political posts. In the case of the United Kingdom, this most importantly includes the election of the national legislature and the (indirect) election of the party-political segment of the executive government (an issue to which I shall soon return). Even if the act of electing political representatives was generally a result of truly free and informed choice expressed though a fair electoral system, which it is not (as I shall show in the next chapter), the British population is between elections generally excluded from serious, active participation in political affairs, and are largely confined to being the objects of centralised political rule[98].

For five years following the casting of their ballots, the general electorate is not consulted on policy through mechanisms of participatory decision-making (apart from a rare referendum). They are not expected and educated to be enlightened protagonists of democratic political life.

The state retains a complex and extensive body of law, departments, regulations and agencies engaged in the construction and reproduction of a wide array of social relations, some of which need not have any "translucent" and immediate bearing on the repressive and

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[98] The apologists and adulators of present-day democratic standards in the UK would do well to remember that not just the ancient Athenians, but even the male citizens of populous ancient Rome in the days of the Republic – and even in the first several decades of the Empire - had much greater participatory democratic rights (a direct vote on the passage of legislation, the election of magistrates and consultation and debate in the *contiones* public assemblies) than modern British citizens do (see Nicolet, 1980; Taylor, 1991), although in conjunction with widespread slavery. Two thousand years later, political decision-making in the UK (as well as in other economically developed societies) remains the almost absolute preserve of narrow political and economic elites of the dominant class, whose oligarchic power greatly exceeds the ineluctable organisational requirements of contemporary societies. This of course does not mean that a utopistic direct democracy is a viable democratic alternative to the existing regime in Britain.

ideological apparatuses of class power (although they are all constructed within the confines of the given class context). It is the concrete interrelationship between economic, political and wider social and ideological factors which solidifies the state's predominant functional articulation of the mode of - and balance between - its class domineering and class adjudicating roles. It appears that before the Thatcher government's transformation of the state and the economy, which occurred in the context of a broader international and transnational ascent of neoliberalism, the British state was significantly closer to fulfilling the sometimes proclaimed social democratic ideal of an equalising terrain of struggle, an arbiter or moderator through whose structures conflicting class interests not only clashed, but were also capable of being rationally "reconciled". This view was predicated on the assumption that the hierarchical structure and organisation of the state in capitalism permitted the attainment of such radical plasticity, the transcendence of fundamentally antagonistic class relations (based on domination and subordination) within the core political and administrative structures of the capitalist system. Regardless of the ultimate fallacy of this position, very substantial concessions and compromises were indeed made by both capital and labour in the post-Second World War period, and the general policy style tended to be relatively consensual (Beer, 1956; 1965; Richardson, 2000).

The state today remains "the condensation of a relationship of forces" (Poulantzas, 1978, 123) and it remains located "within a complex dialectic of structures and strategies" (Jessop, 1990, 129). One important question is whether the balance of class forces has shifted so much in favour of the capitalist class that state policies tend to align very closely with the demands of large capital and whether they generally stand in sharp opposition to the interests of the working and middle classes, causing structural violence to the broad layers of the population on a systemic basis. Although this work is not focused on providing a historical comparative analysis, the subsequent discussion provides some significant indications as to whether the British state has become more structurally violent in relation to the analysed structures and policy complexes and more closely and directly associated with capitalist interests. A plausible explanatory factor in relation to the organisation of capitalist hegemony by the state elite and other segments of the organised capitalist minority includes the maintenance of a power bloc (Poulantzas, 1978), "an alignment of divergent and partially conflicting groups which are united through a common focus on the exercise of state power" (Scott, 1991, 33). In addition to the power bloc interested in

preserving political power in the stricter sense, the dominant class and the state elite also maintain "the outer circles" of the bloc under their general leadership, an unequal alliance with different class factions, status groups etc. - elements of the relatively privileged middle class(es) in particular (although the imperatives of political rule include the granting of various concessions to the lower class as well). The state elite's granting of certain status and economic concessions to these varied groups is often a limited electoral strategy, as well as often being a secondary side-effect of policies focused on benefiting the very wealthy (e.g. tax breaks, the deregulation of the housing market in favour of landlords and house owners, etc.)[99]. On the other hand, the neoliberal capitalist dynamic leads to an increasingly more extreme concentration of power and resources (see chapter 7), undermining the established interests and position of the middle class(es), exacerbating class polarisation between the capitalist class and other classes in relation to many aspects of social life, and contributing to the "proletarianisation" of the (lower) middle classes. While some of my analysis (for example of structural violence in relation to housing and health care) may point toward that conclusion, future research should conduct a more focused and systematic analysis of the impact and character of structural violence in relation to specific classes and class fractions.

The reduction in destabilising class conflict (in terms of active and truly challenging working class resistance - see for example Sassoon, 2014; also see McIlroy, 2008 regarding the sharp decline in the number of strikes and working days lost to strike activity) in the second half of the 1980s, the 1990s and in the first decade of the twenty-first century (especially following the Thatcher government's victorious confrontations with the steel workers, newspaper printers, miners and others – including through anti-trade union legislation - in the 1980s), and the concomitant decline in materially represented intra-state contradictions, is very likely to have been a contributory factor in the reduction in the relatively autonomous, class-adjudicating role of the state. Namely, as Poulantzas (1978) also noted, the state's relative autonomy is partly the

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[99] The neoliberal challenge to the principles of universal welfare provision, as well as the creation of an increasingly exclusive and (as I show in chapter 4) avarice-based private housing market (which are both in some contexts likely to reduce the support for the welfare state and legitimise and encourage egotistic individual economic behaviour), are a good example of how the inter-class alliance between the "upper" and the "middle" classes is sometimes forged not through direct capitalist concessions to the "middle classes", but through an envelopment of other classes by a capitalist logic which (as I will show) inheres in a wide array of government policies and economic and social changes.

result of the condensation of class contradictions; these are, on the other hand, among the central rationales for the state's autonomous functioning. Consequently, the decline in the intensity of open class conflict and in strongly materialised intra-state class contradictions diminish both the functional rationale and very probably the mechanism of the state's relative autonomy. The reduction of collectively expressed and effective opposition of the subordinate classes to the power of the dominant class is therefore likely to have contributed to the closer and more direct alignment of large capital with the state (Harvey, 2007). In short, the transformation of the state is strongly dependent on patterns of class conflict and the balance of class power, which is one of the reasons why it appears reasonable to posit that a pronounced tendency of "liberal" market state rule is to (re)affirm the functional nature of the state as "the national power of capital over labour, of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism" (Marx and Engels, 1950, 468-9). The rest of this thesis will demonstrate that, especially in the context of "liberal" market capitalism, the state enables and orchestrates various forms of class exploitation and a domineering, structurally violent capitalist hegemony (which is not to deny that it retains a variety of substantial class-adjudicating functions as well). This entire thesis will also clarify why it would be misleading to conceptualise the state and the market as inherently antagonistic binaries (in the present context, at least, in which both the state and the market are two largely integrated modes of sustaining the capitalist system). I shall indicate how the prevailing, legalised and legitimised market relationships are to a large degree institutionalised through the initiative and the mechanisms of the state and how, conversely, the state and its agenda are to a very significant extent being forged by and for the benefit of dominant market forces and actors. I posit that both the existing market and the existing state are aspects of the aforementioned alienating capital relations which restrict individual and collective democratic agential power. Through the economic and wider social power which it wields, the capitalist class is capable of effecting major and decisive influence on the political processes and the state (see also Leys, 2003; Harvey, 2007). An important factor behind this state of affairs is that the political and electoral process is itself dominated by economically well-resourced actors, which marginalises the middle and lower classes, restricting democratic accountability and democratic participation. The system of political campaigning (including by the dominant segment of mass media, which routinely has a pro-capitalist and pro-neoliberal ideological function – Negrine,

1994; Weir and Beetham, 1999; Kuhn, 2007; Curran and Seaton, 2009) helps to ensure that the economically dominant remain politically dominant. This is a major point to which I shall soon return.

Marx's observation in *The German Ideology* ([1932] 1963, 93) that "the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interest" challenges the crude economistic notion of the capitalist state being entirely malleable by private capitalist interests to the detriment of their longer-term collective interests. Nonetheless, it is clear that even in its "golden age", although it was equalising, Keynesian corporatism never fully equalised the political playing field. This work will provide some indications that in recent decades the power disparity between the broad (lower and middle class) population and organised capitalist forces with vastly greater economic resources has expanded and deepened in various respects. This power disparity constitutes the basis of structural violence against the broad population's freedom needs, as well as, in a more mediated way, against other human needs.

As already noted, the alignment of large capital with the state elite does not preclude a certain degree of state autonomy and a formal separation of political and economic governance. This separation may actually support the existence of class-based forms of structural violence because democratic control relies on transparency and the reduction of distance between the public sphere (which is to a large degree ensured through the political processes embedded in the state) and the economic sphere. It should therefore not be difficult to perceive the negative implication of the "liberal" market capitalist developments on democracy. State elites in a "liberal" market capitalist system have no real interest in advancing integral - social, political and economic - democracy (which would assume more cooperative and participatory democratic/councilist forms of regulating political and economic decision-making). They also tend to eschew committedly *dirigiste* statist approaches, opting instead for a generally *laissez-faire* approach which supports the partial separation of the state from many or even most processes of economic governance. Depoliticisation of the economy (i.e. the removal of economic decision-making from the sphere of public deliberation) is, by definition, anti-democratic (see Chang, 2010). The understanding of this essential fact may be of help in revealing some of the motives behind a wide range of government policies, and possibly behind the general thrust of government strategy under neoliberalism, including such developments as

the privatisation of industry, the granting of independence to the Bank of England (to a large extent placing the financial sector outside of the sphere of party-political responsibility and party-political competition, and thus outside of more direct forms of public control), the significant increase in the number of independent and semi-independent government agencies and of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations, the outsourcing of public services to the private sector and "public-private partnerships" [100]. The processes of privatisation, deregulation, financialisation (see chapter 6), the decline in the provision of social services (see especially chapter 5) and deunionisation (see Bryson and Forth, 2011) were the main forms of the freeing of the economy from democratic control and of the privatisation of the state in the examined period.

Especially by carrying out the privatisation of public firms, services and assets, the government extended the sphere of the capitalist market and consequently (as I will later show) of commodified social relationships. In this and other ways (which I discuss in this thesis), the state facilitated a further expansion of capitalist control and a further concentration of wealth and power in the hands of private capitalists. Since they are not democratically elected representatives of the public, private capitalists are generally not accountable to the democratic will of the employers, consumers and the general public. This arrangement constitutes structural violence: the restriction of democratic accountability and of democratic participation in economic and public life.

The privatisation created new largely unaccountable (effective) private monopolies and oligopolies. They were transnational in the case of oil companies like BP, and "the big six" oligopolistic energy (gas and electricity) companies which have also been essentially permitted by the government to engage in exploitative, oligopolist price formation (Helm et al., 2011). The monopolies and oligopolies were national in the case of some companies (e.g. British Telecom), and local in the case of train operating companies which came out of the privatisation of the railway system (state-supported private regional railway companies are allowed to operate without direct competition), with very little incentive to increase efficiency (Leys, 2003) or moderate, let alone reduce, train fares, which were among the highest in Europe at the end of New Labour's rule (The Guardian, 2012a). The granting of lucrative PFI (Private Finance

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[100] These developments will be further analysed in chapters 4 and 5.

Initiative) contracts has also favoured the interests of large capital (Pollock, 2004; Liebe and Pollock, 2009; Pollock and Price, 2010, see also the section on health care in chapter 5).

Large companies have also been allowed to maintain special tax arrangements with the state [101] and to avoid taxation through inter-firm resource transfers, complex accounting procedures and offshore tax havens (O'Brien and Williams, 2010; Shaxson, 2011). Additionally, by failing to minimise the extent of inequality (due to unequal wealth and differences in social and cultural capital) in the access to legal representation, successive governments also helped to ensure the legal superiority of large capital and of the wealthy over the subordinate classes, as well as over small entrepreneurs. These legal inequalities extend to patent, copyright, libel and trademarks laws, which also support monopolistic and oligopolistic market power. By supporting a major class-based imbalance of power and of the ability to defend one's (individual and collective) interests, these phenomena support exploitation and restrict democratic accountability (in addition to producing various other forms of structural violence which I shall later examine).

Furthermore, in chapters 6 and 7 I verify the hypothesis that privileged treatment and much leeway in the creation of structural violence are conferred onto the financial sector. It is one of the hegemonic fractions of capital which has been systematically advantaged by state policies, to the detriment of other economic sectors and of proclaimed "free market" principles (most evidently in the massive state bailout/socialisation of losses of the failed private financial sector). The government's acceptance of radical and far-reaching financial deregulation and of new financial instruments particularly benefited those financial speculators who were in a position to use their monopolistic and oligopolistic powers (Chang, 2010). The chapters I have just mentioned will analyse how these and other developments have supported the existence of widespread class-based structural violence.

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[101] For example, it was alleged that the British billlionaire Sir Phillip Green retained £300 million by living a part of the year in Monaco, thus avoiding income tax (Cohen, 2006). Cohen (ibid.) emphasised the salient point in the *Observer*: "If I were in the Inland Revenue, I would fret about the moment when the little people who stupidly pay taxes realise that the state is treating them like fools. It insists that they must hand over their earnings on pain of punishment by the courts, while inviting Phillip Green to Buckingham Palace to be honoured by the Queen". The largest capitalist families in Britain have extensively used tax loopholes, including the Mittals and the Rausings, while Rupert Murdoch, who has made great fortunes and controls some leading UK media, had hardly made any tax contributions to the UK after more than a decade of major presence on the UK media market (BBC, 1999a).

Popular Agency and Structural Violence

As Bailey and Shibata (2014, 240) have pointed out, "a focus on the structured nature of domination in different capitalist societies risks overplaying the systemic *capacity* for domination, and under-emphasising the scope for effective resistance to, or disruption of, this capacity". In addition to identifying structurally violent, domineering and exploitative relationship patterns, there is a need to illuminate the factors which complicate and hinder the reproduction of these relationships. This particularly includes the (potentially and actually) disruptive and protagonistic role of the subordinate classes (e.g. Marx, [1867] 1976; Cleaver, 1979; Eden, 2012; Bailey and Shibata, 2014).

The capacity for workers' resistance to capital is immanent in the capitalist system; it is embedded in the basic capitalist relationship between capital and labour. The labour theory of value (see Marx, [1867] 1976), which is based on the understanding that the creation of value rests on the expenditure of the workers' labour power, reveals the underlying centrality of the working class in the accumulation of capital and in wider social reproduction. Capitalist attempts to commodify workers' labour power constitute the reification of a social (socially constructed) relationship, by which "a relation between people takes on the character of a thing" (Lukács, 1971, 83; also see Marx, [1867] 1976; Bailey and Shibata, 2014). This mystification obscures the role of agency in the reproduction of capitalist social relationships. The labour theory of value, which recognises that capital is a social relationship, also has a broader, complementary counterpart in the consent theory of power, by which reified systems of oligarchic domination more generally are also demystified as socially constructed sets of relationships open to contestation and sublation/overcoming. The understanding that power, at least in the last instance, rests on the implicit consent of the governed was already advanced by Ibn Khaldun in the fourteenth century (see Rabi, 1967), as well as by Étienne de La Boétie in the sixteenth century (see Sharp, 1973; Bleiker, 2000)[102]. Prominent social theorists and researchers who further

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[102] Anton Pannekoek ([1950] 2003, 33) also pointed this out when he wrote that "the working class, certainly, has its numbers (…). It has its momentous economic function, its direct hold over the machines, its power to run or stop them. But they are of no avail as long as their minds are dependent on and filled with the masters' ideas, as long as the workers are separate, selfish, narrow-minded, competing individuals".

elaborated the consent theory of power include Hannah Arendt (1970) and Gene Sharp (1973)[103].

Sharp (1973, 12; also see Martin, 1982) emphasised that the key sources of the rulers' power, which he identified as authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources and sanctions, "depend *intimately* upon the obedience and cooperation of the subjects" (this cooperation or consent can range from active support for the ruling system to passive acquiescence to it). In that sense, Sharp saw power as pluralistic: it resides in multiple "loci of power", i.e. in multiple social agents and in a variety of social locations. Consequently, ruling elites need to constantly cultivate the submissive cooperation of these potentially disobedient loci of power and fragment them in ways which preclude the emergence of a unified, counter-hegemonic force or set of forces.

Since the elite's power is ultimately based on the consent of the governed (and is therefore intersubjectively constructed/"communicatively produced" - Arendt, 1970), the oligarchy's establishment of control over the broad population is never final, never complete and permanently secured. Power cannot be permanently acquired because it is a set of relationships which need to be constantly reproduced. As Arendt (ibid., 41) pointed out, the contingent nature of a regime's power is based on the need for some form of popular participation in that power (however passive that participation may be): "All political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them"[104]. Although Sharp and Arendt (the latter to a lesser extent – see Habermas, 1986) acknowledged the role of a range of structural factors in the reproduction of social power, their theorisations of power operate on overly high levels of abstraction to be able to provide the conceptual tools required for complex analyses of the structures of power and of the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. However, Marxian analyses of structural power and of structural violence, which ground the role of agency in concrete (materially and culturally circumscribed) historical contexts, can qualify, correct and enrich the

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[103] Antonio Gramsci ([n.d.] 2005) was another prominent thinker who noted the role of consent in his theory of hegemony, which emphasised that domination requires that dominated groups are convinced to acquiesce to the system(s) of domination through cultural as well as other structural and coercive means.

[104] The (implicit or explicit) consent theory of power is a foundational component of many libertarian socialist perspectives on required (collective and individual) ethico-political positioning. Notably, it is the basis of Sartre's ([1948] 1975, 188) Marxist existentialist ontology and ethics: "The basic idea of existentialism is that even in the most crushing situations, the most difficult circumstances, man [sic] is free. Man is never powerless except when he is persuaded that he is and the responsibility of man is immense because he becomes what he decides to be".

consent theory of power[105]. Analyses of the various factors which impede the effective withdrawal of the broad population's consent to the ruling order can help to explain why the oppressed populations fail to actualise their latent power, and they reveal the limited character of "people power" (i.e. the existence of manifold factors by which it is mediated and constrained), rather than disproving its very existence (latent or overt) or its potentially hegemonic character (as a result of a democratic transformation).

Although the abstract character of the general consent theory of power greatly limits its usefulness in the concrete analyses of the complexities of social power distribution and of social change, the kernel of truth which it contains - concerning the historical contingency of power and the consequent potential for the actualisation of "people power"/democratic power - also effectively challenges the foundational neoliberal dogma that "there is no alternative" to the rule of the capitalist state and of the (neoliberal) capitalist market[106]. Structural violence does not entirely and permanently "incarcerate" human historical potential.

While my thesis primarily focuses on the infliction of structural violence by the dominant class, the institutions which it largely controls and the processes which it primarily steers, the interpretation of historical change can greatly benefit from the observation of the series of contestations - including class conflict - which are among the major driving factors of historical change. The lens of class conflict therefore also provides unique insights into the causal factors and the major features of social change in the neoliberal period. Although my thesis will outline some key insights regarding the dialectic between structural violence and the resistance of the oppressed, further detailed analyses of the dialectical relationship between structural violence and agency are needed.

The dialectic of class conflict under capitalism has to a large extent been driven by the

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[105] Martin (1989) also remarked that, in addition to other limitations of Sharp's theory of power, it does not take into account the possibility of conflict between the different loci of popular power (although it isn't incompatible with these and other types of concrete insights). My analysis helps to identify some of the major divisions in the ranks of the oppressed, including some of the inter- and intra-class rankings and coalitions of dominators which traverse class boundaries (these include cross-class alignments of bureaucrats, racists, sexists, ageists, speciesists, etc).

[106] Despite his criticisms of Sharp's theorisation, Martin (ibid.) also warned about the "paralysis of analysis" and acknowledged that Sharp's activism-oriented approach to scholarship employs different criteria:

"If the aim is to advance the careers of intellectuals who stand by the side observing society but preferring to avoid interaction with it, then a complex, erudite theory serves admirably. On the other hand, if the aim is to provide some insights which can be used by activists, then a simple, straightforward, easy-to-apply theory is far superior, so long as it grasps certain basic insights. By this criterion, Sharp's theory is highly successful".

systemic emphasis on competitive accumulation and the increase in surplus value, especially in its less regulated neoliberal variety, which intensifies capital's tendency to expand and intensify commodification (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 2005; Bailey and Shibata, 2014). This inherent feature of the capitalist mode of production, however, invariably results in contestations and disruptions of capital's immediate agenda, and potentially even in more radical, counter-hegemonic action by the subordinate classes (Marx, [1867] 1967; Bailey and Shibata, 2014).

The regularised types of contestations, including the enduring struggle between workers and capitalists over the share of the spoils of workers' labour (i.e. over the rate of exploitation), do not even seek to escape the fundamental coordinates of structural violence by breaking free from the logic of capital relations and from other structurally violent patterns of oppression, domination and exploitation which underpin the entire functioning of the ruling order[107]. Liberation from social orders based on structural violence, as my discussion in chapter 3 will also argue, would (*inter alia*) require the realisation of the potential for a protagonistic, historically transformative and creatively rebellious role of the currently subordinate social classes. This process of liberation requires that the subordinate classes become self-constitutive, self-governing agents of their self-emancipation[108]. My previous discussion in the section on democratic control in chapter 1, as well as subsequent analysis, help to confirm that the notion of a free and peaceful society governed and/or created by a benevolent oligarchy is a *contradictio in adjecto.* A peaceful society can only be created through the self-liberation of the broad

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[107] Typically undemocratic and frequently overtly anti-democratic, though often benevolent, union bureaucrats tend to, at best, only organise workers along hierarchical principles and only as wage labourers. Trade union activity has tended to be more an accommodation to the system than resistance against it. Most often, trade unions treat their members more as service recipients/"customers" than as protagonists of democratising labour struggles. By contrast, the radically democratic and transformative current in the labour movement has sought to help put an end to capitalist structural violence by helping to overcome the commodity character of labour (i.e. to end wage slavery) and hierarchical relations more generally. This current in the labour movement has sought to help bring workplaces and enterprises under workers' control and to help place wider economic, political and social institutions under democratic public control. For an overview of this alternative strand in the history of the labour movement, see for example Jakopovich, 2007.

[108] Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 521) observed:

"As long as the working class defines itself by an acquired status, or even by a theoretically conquered State, it appears only as 'capital', a part of capital (variable capital), and does not leave the *plan(e) of capital*. At best, the plan(e) becomes bureaucratic. On the other hand, it is by leaving the plan(e) of capital, and never ceasing to leave it, that a mass becomes increasingly revolutionary and destroys the dominant equilibrium of the denumerable sets".

population[109]. Radically democratic, peacemaking resistance to structural violence requires the engagement of the broad population in processes of intensely motivated learning, material and cultural empowerment through a liberatory pedagogy of praxis, a unity of theory and practice which enables the oppressed population to discard its age-old (objective and subjective) positioning based on submission and servility. The subordinate population's organisational and cultural capacity for democratic self-government can only be developed through praxis, especially because, as Marxian analysis has revealed, one's consciousness is co-determined by one's social being. The broad population therefore "must learn how to use power, by using power. There is no other way" (Luxemburg, 1918a). There is a significant amount of historical and more micro-sociological empirical evidence indicative of the importance of participation for political socialisation[110].

One of the major strategic features of the work by which transformative democratic forces can help advance these processes of popular empowerment is the construction of a broad system of democratic, politically and culturally rebellious coalitions, alliances and communities. Such progressive social forces can pool human and material resources and strengthen and escalate the challenge against capitalist structural violence, against all systems of oppression and domination, and against the manifold forms of cultural violence which sustain them. It is through the operation of such broad campaigning political and social forces, which cannot be sustainable unless they retain their independence from authoritarian and manipulative special interest groups (including political party apparatuses and bureaucratic trade union structures), that the most politically and culturally advanced forces can more effectively begin to address uneven levels of

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[109] The first clause of the *Rules* of the First International (approved and largely written by Marx) also stated: "The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves" (International Workingmen's Association, 1867).

[110] For example, Blauner's (1964) analysis of the character structures in different US industries established that the largely internally self-organised teamwork in the printing and chemical industries contributed to the workers' sense of self-esteem and self-worth, which in turn facilitated workers' wider civic engagement/democratic participation. An analysis of individual political attitudes and behaviour by Almond and Verba (1965) found a positive relationship in all five countries between political participation and people's sense of political efficacy, which is essential for democratic public engagement. As Almond and Verba (ibid., 206-7) remarked, "in many ways (…) the belief in one's competence is a key political attitude". In his essay *Portrait of the Underdog*, Knupfer (1954, 263) outlined the psychological handicap which a lowly social position tends to (re)produce. He pointed to the "deeply ingrained habits of doing what one is told" among the oppressed, who suffer "a lack of self-confidence which increases the unwillingness of the lower status person to participate in many phases of our predominantly middle-class culture beyond what would be a realistic withdrawal adapted to the reduced chances of being effective".

consciousness and help to accumulate and cultivate the organisational and other political and cultural resources at the disposal of the oppressed population. The acquisition and development of these resources increases the broad population's effectiveness in more immediate struggles while simultaneously increasing its capacity for self-government.

The Ascent of Thatcherism

The ascent of neoliberalism was not merely a product of blind and random historical forces, but was a result of the dynamic balance of class and other social forces and of the dialectic of social struggles. A major underlying cause of neoliberal change was the developing crisis of profitability since the late 1960s (Glynn and Sutcliffe, 1972) which was exacerbated by the labour movement's and the socialist left's increasingly energetic and militant action and increased economic and political demands (Harvey, 2006; Sassoon, 2014). Workers were increasing their remunerative demands and there was an increase in unofficial industrial action, so that around 95 per cent of all strikes were unofficial by the late 1960s (Cohen, 2006). Union and rank-and-file militancy was complemented by militancy of other left-wing forces, including the Labour left, segments of which were promoting the Bullock Report calling for industrial democracy in Britain, and even more radical plans for workers' control (e.g. through the Institute for Workers' Control)[111]. These, however, took place in the context of labour sectionalism and economism, working class fragmentation, low levels of working class consciousness and the weakness of organised socialist forces (Hobsbawm, 1978).

The nascent anti-systemic trends and contestations were, from the 1970s, accompanied

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[111] The radicalisation of socialist and labour resistance in Britain occurred in a wider international and transnational context of the intensification of social struggles and the resurgence of the left. In Europe, the end of the 1960s and the 1970s witnessed the French general strike and student rebellion of 1968 followed by the incorporation of plans for workers' control or participation into the programmes of the major French political parties; the Italian wave of factory occupations in 1969-70; the Portuguese Revolution and the end of the dictatorship in Spain; the radicalisation of the Yugoslav (proto-)socialist project in the direction of social self-government (especially following the major constitutional changes in 1974); the introduction of "democratic factory councils" (Bedriftsforsamlinger) in 1973 in Norway; the possibility of a radicalisation and expansion of the socialisation of ownership and control *via* the Rehn-Meidner plan along with the participatory Joint Consultation Act in 1976 in Sweden; the EEC Commission's Fifth Directive on Company Law which endorsed the German model of workers' participation; UNESCO's promotion of democratic participation; the increasing popularity of Eurocommunist and other left-wing parties in various parts of the continent, etc. (e.g. Sassoon, 1998). Seeing British trends in this wider context helps to explain why the elite of the dominant class was so resolute in its neoliberal assault on democratic forces and democratic and social rights.

by a systemic crisis of capital accumulation, a combination of stagnation and inflation ("stagflation"), and surging unemployment (over one million by 1975 – Bédarida, 2005). The capitulation of the Labour government under Callahan's premiership to the IMF's demand for strict austerity measures in exchange for loans (in 1975-6) helped to create a balance of payments crisis and a general crisis of legitimation. It set the stage for Conservative resurgence as it contributed to a "severe economic recession (…) intersecting with political collapse". (Nairn, 1981). The Keynesian crisis of legitimacy in the context of collapsing profits and collapsing growth levels, along with the rise of sectional forms of labour struggle which weakened workers' solidarity and trade union legitimacy (Hobsbawm, ibid.), the Labour elite's acceptance of austerity measures, and the risk of future major advances by radically democratic counter-hegemonic forces, encouraged the right-wing elite in the Conservative Party and the wider establishment to go on the counter-offensive by exploiting the crisis to construct a new socially authoritarian and economically neoliberal mode of economic, political and social governance[112]. Although the Thatcher and Reagan governments spearheaded the construction of the institutional architecture of global neoliberal capitalism, their policies built on and helped to entrench the already emerging institutional architecture of transnational (economic, political and social) governance and the pre-existing processes of economic globalisation, which is to a large extent based on the increase in the mobility of capital and the process of financialisation[113], which I will discuss in chapter 6[114].

The intensification, expansion and (to some degree) the radicalisation of the workers' demands induced an attempt to contain the workers' offensive through a neoliberal counter-offensive, a resurgence of capitalist class power (also see Harvey, 2007). This attempt to regain control and strengthen capitalist domination was pursued through a more intense and systematic

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[112] For more detailed analyses of this process see for example Gamble, 1988; Hall, 2011; Jakopovich, 2011a.

[113] David Harvey advanced the understanding of these processes through the theory of the spatio-temporal fix to the problem of overaccumulation (see Harvey, 2004).

[114] As a result of these pre-existing processes, already in the early 1980s, Sweden experienced capital flight during the administration of the Social Democratic Party (which was attempting to move in the direction of more authentically democratic socialist policies). The experience of France in the early 1980s provides another example of how economic globalisation undermined social democracy. The attempt by Mitterand's Socialist government in 1980-82 to carry out independent macroeconomic policies by expanding the public sector (especially through nationalisations) and by engaging in redistributive spending was also conclusively defeated, largely due to capital flight and a collapsing trade balance, which resulted in the government's policy reversal in the direction of austerity measures (Yeates, 2001).

capitalist capture of the state and the subordination of other social logics to the logic of the neoliberal market. Thatcher initiated this twin agenda of creating a "strong state" and "freeing the economy" (Gamble, 1988), which subsequent administrations pursued as well, although I will note certain differences between them in subsequent discussion.

The Thatcher administration combined more overt forms of coercion, such as the militarised strike-breaking activity against the miners' strike and other strikes (Milne, 2004; Peak, 1984), the introduction of anti-strike and anti-union legislation (see Smith and Morton, 2008; Coulter, 2014), the strengthening of the carceral system (which I will briefly note in chapter 5) etc. with a series of accompanying ideological offensives. The regime combined an authoritarian discourse of "modernisation", including as its central axis the ideology of the "free market", with a variety of socially authoritarian and traditionalist ideological perspectives and policy emphases which facilitated the cultivation of nativism, racism, "traditional family values" (focused on the perpetuation of patriarchal gendered relations, authoritarian control of young people, sexual puritanism, heterosexist and ideologically compulsory monogamy as the foundation for the privatised/atomised family unit, the cultivation of militarism as an ideology as well as in practice, most prominently by waging the Falklands War), etc. Stuart Hall (2011, 18) effectively summarised the Thatcher government's two-pronged ideological approach: "'The market' was a modern, rational, efficient, practically-oriented discourse, inscribed in the everyday. Nationalist discourse, with its imperialist undertow (what Paul Gilroy calls its 'melancholia', the unrequited mourning for a lost object), was haunted by the fantasy of a late return to the flag, family values, national character, imperial glory and the spirit of Palmerstonian gunboat diplomacy". The rest of this thesis will shed further light on the Thatcher government and on subsequent Conservative and New Labour regimes as specific strategic syntheses of structural and cultural violence.

Despite the economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s and the attacks on organised labour by successive Conservative governments, the subordinate classes in various sectors of the economy retained a relatively high level of trade union organisation, including (according to figures from 1990) a higher level of unionisation than Germany, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Morgan, 1995). Morgan (ibid.) also pointed out that, according to TUC survey data, "45 percent of respondents stated that one of the reasons they had not joined was because they

had not been asked to", which is an indication of the unions' inadequate organising efforts. The report *Trends in Trade Unions* (see Morgan, ibid.), which was commissioned by the TUC in 1995, found that of the 494 ballots for which details were available 324 (66 per cent) had produced majorities in favour of industrial action, yet in only 82 (25 per cent) of these cases did strikes actually take place. This is an indication of the workers' continued willingness to economically resist employers, as well as of trade unions' habitual reluctance to support workers' engagement in industrial action (let alone militant forms of industrial action). Union leaders have used these ballot outcomes favouring industrial action as bargaining leverage in negotiations with employers, and tended to call them off in exchange for some concessions. The unions' risk- and conflict-averse attitude is likely to have frequently squandered opportunities for greater advancement of the workers' position (Morgan, 1995). Morgan (ibid.) also noted that "the majority of trade unions that responded to the TUC survey noted that nearly three quarters (72 percent) of industrial action lasts less than 24 hours", yet "overall industrial action was fairly successful with 59 percent of those responding saying they had won all or some demands. And no unions reported victimisations". Even in the period often considered to have been neoliberalism's heyday (even "the end of history"), resistance tended to be fruitful, yet it was too rarely tried.

In this work I will outline some of the major empirical patterns of contestation which have affected the extent and character of some of the major forms of structural violence in the examined case studies (by constraining, stopping or modifying these structurally violent policies and/or patterns), as well as in the broad processes of the emergence and consolidation of neoliberalism. I will also outline some key principles on which radical resistance to structural violence would need to be based, including certain key aspects of radically democratic (democratic socialist) change which are needed for the overcoming of the current social order which is based on structural violence, i.e. which are required for the establishment of a higher type of social order based on positive peace. Clearly, much further research is required to thoroughly investigate this crucial social question and, most importantly, to contribute to the development of an emancipatory praxis.

The Operative Modes of the Capitalist Institutional Domination over the State

At the beginning of this chapter I already noted some of the major factors which help to align state elites with the interests of large capital (including capital's control over credit lines which the state requires for its activity, the risk of capital flight and the state's general involvement in wider economic processes embedded in the capitalist market). In this section I will discuss some of the significant additional operative modes which contribute to the existence of a state-corporate nexus supportive of capitalist interests. As this section and the rest of the thesis will demonstrate, this corporate-state nexus has played a central role in restricting democratic accountability and democratic participation.

Democratic rhetoric notwithstanding, seizing political power in Britain appears to have required very large economic resources which are more accessible to the dominant class. Large corporations and individual capitalists have in recent decades continued to seek to advance their economic and political interests through, among other factors, the funding of political parties, the setting-up of neoliberal and right-wing think tanks and their increasingly concentrated and oligopolistic ownership of the mass media (Kuhn, 2007). As party expenditures and the cost of fighting elections remained high (the total reported UK campaign expenditure by all political parties was £31.5 million in 2010 – Electoral Commission, 2011), the success of political parties remained strongly dependent on their financial resources. In recent times it has been almost impossible for a UK political party to gain parliamentary representation without expensive marketing campaigns "involving advertising, mailshots, market research, computerised databases, call centres, and so on" (Peston, 2008, 263). The Conservative Party received £42m in the period between 2005 and 2010 from financial capitalists in the City of London (Watt, 2011). It does not seem implausible that the limited nature of government-initiated reforms of the financial institutions and markets following their recent crisis was partially associated with the doubling of the share of party donations by the financial sector between 2010 and 2012, from 25 to more than 50 per cent of the Conservative Party's total funding (Leys, 2013). Both New Labour and the Conservatives also received substantial secret donations and loans, and in 2006 the *Sunday Times*

claimed that £10 million were secretly loaned to the Labour Party (Peston, 2008)[115]. Capitalist funding of political parties and political campaigns contradicts the basic democratic "one person one vote" principle, thus weakening democratic control[116]. It is extremely likely that these patterns of party funding enable private capitalist actors to further their influence over party-political agendas, "possibly exercising undue influence on [the parties'] policy-making and conduct in government (and opposition)" (Weir and Beetham, 1999, 98). Is genuine democracy possible if the strength of political parties to a large extent depends on how much money they have, on whether they are richly funded by wealthy individuals and big business and supported by elite-controlled media?

Formal and informal ties between capitalists and the political elites[117] in state institutions and all the main parties do not appear to have become less routine in recent times, and may have even been more pronounced and significant in the last few decades. Significantly, New Labour leaders decided to substantially reduce the party's dependence on trade union funding[118],

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[115] The Conservative Party in particular sought to arrange the contributions it received as commercial loans, in order to exploit a loophole created by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000 which excluded loans deemed to be "of commercial nature" from the legal disclosure requirements (Ewing, 2007). The party also received very large direct donations by individual capitalists: "In 2007 Lord Laidlaw donated £2.9 million (…), in 2001 Sir Paul Getty gave £5 million to the Conservative Party in a single donation, Lord Ashcroft's company Bearwood Corporate Services has made a series of cash and non-cash donations of over £5 million to the Conservative Party" (Rowbottom, 2010, 121).

[116] By contrast, trade unions, which have been major funders of the Labour Party, represent (or they are at least supposed to represent) the interests of the broad segments of the population belonging to the subordinate classes.

[117] An important example of the latter kind of relationship was the friendship between the Prime Minister Tony Blair and business tycoons such as Rupert Murdoch, as well as numerous other examples of socialising between politicians and businessmen at private parties etc. (see Sampson, 2005). Members of the state elite tend not to socialise with members of the lower classes, which presents an obstacle to the latter's egalitarian participation in public affairs and contributes to their marginalisation from public life.

[118] The recasting of the social democratic approach to interest representation and relationship with trade unions was a fundamental feature of internal social democratic party transformation throughout Europe, including the UK (Howell, 2001). These different lines of attack against the established influence of the organised labour movement on party policy also required the acquisition of greater financial independence *vis-à-vis* the trade unions. The Labour Party leadership therefore sought new sources of funding from wealthy donors (Leys, 2003; Peele, 2004). Partly as a result of this, "between 1986 and 2005, trade union contributions to the Labour Party declined from three-quarters to under a third of its total funds" (Leach et al., 2011, 146-7). Rowbottom (2010, 121) mentioned several of the wealthy donors which the Labour Party now relied on: "Lord Sainsbury has made several donations of £2 million or more to the Labour Party; Lakshmi Mittal has made two donations of £2 million to the Labour Party". The composition of the Labour leadership changed as well: wealthy capitalists such as Lord Young, Lord Sainsbury, Lord Simon, Lord Drayson, and Geoffrey Robinson acquired prominent positions in the government, while trade union leaders had none (Leys, 2003; Shaw, 2007). Smith (2003, 588) even stated that "the wholesale importation of business expertise into the interstices of government at all levels is one of New Labour's most distinctive and enduring features (...). This scale of business penetration was quite unprecedented in peacetime".

preferring campaign funds and other donations from capitalist firms and private capitalists instead (Leach et al., 2011). These patterns of capitalist party-political financing constitute and/or contribute to various forms of structural violence, including the limitation of democratic accountability, the limitation of democratic participation, and the partial political marginalisation of the lower- and middle-class population, whose ability to fully participate in the political process is directly and indirectly stifled by the existing system of political financing. Capitalist party-political financing is also likely to have contributed to the structural violence of penetration and segmentation, but more research is required to confirm this. It is a reasonable supposition that these infringements of the broad population's freedom needs and of their democratic agential power regularly contribute to other forms of structural violence (including exploitation, the restriction of welfare provision and of various human rights, etc.).

These subtypes of structural violence were often also supported through other kinds of private capitalist financial influence over the process of political deliberation, which allowed the evasion of party spending limits, although there were also no legal caps on donations to political parties (Rowbottom, 2010). Apart from the pro-capitalist and pro-neoliberal influence of the elite-controlled (state and corporate) mass media (see Negrine, 1994; Weir and Beetham, 1999; Kuhn, 2007; Curran and Seaton, 2009) and direct individual capitalist presence in the formal policy networks of the state (which I shall return to presently), the business (and other elite and right-wing) lobby groups in recent decades also appeared to be much likelier than socialist and other progressive interest and campaign groups to possess greater resources and insider status (regularised consultative status) within government, including access to and input in early policy thinking and early legislative plans, influence on agenda-setting, and the like (Monbiot, 2001; Smith, 2003; Jones, 2016)[119]. In addition to various formal business associations and policy forums such as the Confederation of British Industry and the Business Council for Britain, this has also included elite organisations which do not formally declare their upper-class

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[119] The largely "Blairite" Labour Party-affiliated think-tank and campaign group Progress was also privileged (*vis-à-vis* other, more left-wing Labour policy institutes and campaign groups) in terms of the kinds of donations that it managed to obtain. For example, it received donations from Pfizer (the giant pharmaceutical corporation), the company Network Rail (which emerged from the privatisation of British Railways), the British Retail Consortium, etc. (Pickard, 2012).

allegiances[120]. Widespread and powerful business lobbying appears to have facilitated the existence of an unscrupulous contingent of political mercenaries in the legislature, as well as in other branches of government (for a notable exploration of this phenomenon see Palast, 2003). "Cash for peerages" and various "cash for access" scandals are significant indications of the presence of the restriction of democratic accountability and participation, as well as of the marginalisation of the broad public in the political system.

A large network of policy institutes also supported the domination of elite interests, policy agendas and arguments, in this way contributing to the structural violence of indoctrination and segmentation (by mystifying oppressive class relationships), as my analysis of the damaging social consequences of neoliberalism will show. In the UK, these organisations appear to have been mostly dedicated to advancing the interests of the dominant class and promoting neoliberal and right-wing policies and perspectives (Desai, 1994; Denham and Garnett, 1998; Ball and Exley, 2010; Monbiot, 2011). The sources of funding of neoliberal think tanks are concealed although they are publicly subsidised through charity law (Monbiot, 2011), which arguably places undue limits on their democratic accountability. Monbiot (ibid.) made a reasonable supposition that the "sponsorship by millionaires and corporations explains why free-market thinktanks outnumber and outspend the thinktanks arguing for public services and the distribution of wealth".

Corporations and wealthy individuals have regularly sought (with varying but often very significant degrees of success) to satisfy their (real or perceived) interests outside of the official or publicly visible political process and irrespective of official political and administrative channels[121]. As subsequent discussion will show, the state elite has supported and facilitated this

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[120] The Taxpayers Alliance, for example, purports to represent the interests of taxpayers in general, yet its policy demands (e.g. the opposition to all tax increases, the abolition of inheritance taxes, the intransigent opposition to large public spending), as well as its exposés of (allegedly) wasteful and superfluous forms of government spending, may have often served the material interests of those with higher incomes and wealth, who are understandably less interested in social services and the welfare state. Many donors and leading members of the Taxpayers Alliance are also members or supporters of the Conservative Party. The organisation's interest-based and ideological bias, despite such views already being represented through many other organisations, does not prevent it from receiving a large amount of uncritical coverage in the (often corporate-owned) mass media (Leach et al., 2011).

[121] The 2001 letter written by Tony Blair to the Romanian Prime Minister in support of the multi-billionaire Lakshmi Mittal, who at the time was not yet even a British citizen and had very limited interests in the UK, but was a significant donor to the Labour Party (Armstrong, 2010), is an example of this dubious dynamic. Formula One owner Bernie Ecclestone's £1 million donation to the Labour Party was portrayed as the incentive that convinced

restriction of democratic accountability and of democratic public participation in decision-making. Conflicts of interest (and of potential bribery) in the British political system are significant and widespread (Weir and Beetham, 1999; Monbiot, 2001; Whyte et al., 2015). Direct examples of the practice of ignoring flagrant conflict of interest situations can sometimes be found in the widespread, normalised practice of placing corporate figures in positions of influence in the government, and *vice versa* (i.e. the appointment of former politicians and civil servants in senior corporate positions), often even without transparent criteria and some kind of transparent selection process (Wilks-Heeg, 2015)[122]. New Labour's acceptance of the "revolving door" pattern of career trajectories between business directorships and political office served to legitimise a well-established older pattern (Wilks-Heeg, 2015) [123]. Mainly focusing on environmental regulatory bodies, executive agencies and quangos, Monbiot (2001) and Sampson (2005) documented many such conflict of interest cases under New Labour's administration, with numerous supporting sources. Regardless of the precise legal character of these practices (and in general they may be entirely legal), they may facilitate systematic government

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Labour to drop its opposition to tobacco advertising in motor racing (Hertz, 2002). Similarly, there were also allegations that the firm Capita was awarded government contracts because it gave a loan to the Labour Party (Peston, 2008). Rowbottom (2010) mentioned some other cases which were alleged to have constituted "cash for favours". Ascertaining the truth behind the hypothesis about direct capitalist bribery of politicians is not something I can do. However, this section, as well as the previous and subsequent discussion, also discusses the more evident (yet somewhat subtler) forms of capitalist influence on government policies and state organisation.

[122] Writing at the turn of the twenty-first century, Monbiot (2001, 204) noted: "While David Sainsbury, a Labour peer, is one of the businessmen closest to Tony Blair, his cousin and predecessor as chairman of the firm, the Conservative peer Sir John Sainsbury (now Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover), appears to have been Margaret Thatcher's most frequent confidant. His brother, Sir Tim Sainsbury, another member of the Sainsbury board, was a Conservative MP who once held the same government post as David Sainsbury (…) The opposition is unlikely to challenge the superstores' power. The shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, who – if he took office – would be responsible for most of the decisions affecting the supermarket chains, is Archie Norman, previously the Chief Executive of Asda. Frances Maude, the shadow Foreign Secretary, was one of Asda's non-executive directors".

[123] Notably, Lord Wakeham, the former Conservative chief whip, managed to accumulate sixteen directorships, while some Labour and Conservative peers had even more directorships. Writing in the heyday of New Labour, Sampson (2005, 331) noted that "ex-secretaries of the cabinet, like Lord Armstrong, Lord Butler and Lord Wilson, are still recruited by Shell, BP or BSkyB". However, González-Bailón et al. (2012) found that only a relatively small proportion of former government ministers, MPs and civil servants assume positions on company boards. Furthermore, while in 2001/02 conditions were imposed on 20 per cent of applications by civil servants seeking permission to take up external positions, this figure rose to 34 per cent in 2008-09 (Wilks-Heeg et al., 2012). In line with these trends, it could be posited that the problem of structural violence associated with conflicts of interest resulting from these revolving door practices diminished in this period. One unknown variable which precludes a more definite assessment of associated structural violence trends is the degree of undue influence and policy capture which resulted from "revolving door" practices.

collaboration with corporate interests[124]. The capture of the state by private interests may have been made easier since 1979 by Conservative governments' attempts to systematically consult and increasingly involve business interests in the wide range of policy-making processes and government and state functions (Weir and Beetham, 1999), as well as through New Labour's further introduction of "a plethora of agencies and processes that are largely uncharted, still less codified or publicly accountable. The personnel staffing these informal innovations constitute a nomenklatura-type caste in British government" (Smith, 2003).

The number of quangos (or, to use a formal term, of non-departmental public bodies/NDPBs, which are formally accountable to ministers and departments but which operate at arms-length from them) began increasing in the 1980s under the Conservative administration (Weir and Beetham, 1999). They are, as Monbiot (2001) had also documented, sometimes occupied by individuals with private interests who are "blatantly biased" (Weir and Beetham, 1999, 204). Lack of constitutional rules and of a constitutional "watch-dog" enables the informality of quangos, and the lack of adequate public access to their activities, to be used in order to further particularistic and elite interests: "The quango state removes layers and areas of policy-making and action from parliamentary – and public – gaze. The absence of a constitutional framework and the informal and secretive nature of its policy process blocks scrutiny and parliamentary and public debate about policy goals and outcomes" (ibid., 232). Weir and Beetham (ibid., 231) observed that "the Cabinet Office has admitted that neither ministers not Parliament had the information necessary to judge how [executive NDPBs] were performing, and noted weak departmental controls and ministerial neglect stating that, in some cases, the relationship between departments and NDPBs was 'practically non-existent' ". This lack of government oversight and control limits the scope for the democratic accountability of unelected holders of various important administrative and executive functions[125].

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[124] Some of these patterns of capitalist influence over the political process are long-established. In his 1961 book Aaronovitch (1961, 149) wrote: "We therefore have Cabinets and Cabinet Committees led by and composed of businessmen (...) continuously drawing in their colleagues from finance and industry for consultation and decision-making. [These committees] represent the main forums (clubs and dinner parties aside) where finance capital can decide State policy, reconcile conflicting interests or win out over rivals".

[125] Executive agencies, which also carry out a vast quantity of governmental functions, are more accountable to officials in government departments, but are also not always subjected to adequate ministerial, let alone public, scrutiny (ibid.). As Weir and Beetham (ibid.) also noted, the degree(s) to which executive agencies are accountable to the public, and the actual character(s) of this accountability, require further analysis.

Weir and Beetham (ibid., 296) found that the informal, flexible and discretionary nature of the processes of policy-making and government in Britain "makes it easy for government and its officials to co-opt and bargain with organised interests and private companies and to blur the boundaries of the public domain and private enterprise". New studies are required to provide further confirmation that the widespread and regularised practices of private capitalist involvement in public policy-making (e.g. Weir and Beetham, 1999; Monbiot, 2001; Sampson, 2005) constitute the partial privatisation of public policy-planning and policy-making. It does appear that democratic practices would be compromised if the process of planning, deliberating on and implementing government policy was powerfully influenced, and even decisively swayed, by private dominant class interests, since this would marginalise the broad lower and middle class population which does not own or control large businesses and generally lacks access to these policy-making channels, and would therefore restrict its capacity to participate in political deliberation and decision-making, as well as its broader capacity to hold the government democratically accountable. It also seems probable that the structural violence of penetration often results from the government's adoption of corporate-led policies and its associated, frequently unqualified, presentation of private corporate interest as public good (Chang, 2010). The state in this way helps to perpetuate a public ideology which privileges private capitalist interests (which are, as I will further substantiate later, routinely exploitative), and which popularises the presumption that the interests of company shareholders (even short-term shareholders) and managers are shared by their workers, their suppliers, and the country as a whole. The promotion of this ideological belief constitutes the violence of penetration and exploitation.

It is quite clear that many of the various lobbying and policy networks and bodies, including numerous "old-boy networks" and alliances of convenience, constitute a well-organised, complex web of private interests at the heart of government, and in its numerous associated organs and arteries. The "revolving door" pattern of intertwining economic and political careers and appointments leads to an institutionalisation of dubious (although not necessarily illegal) practices. It indicates that the state is at least partly geared towards servicing the interests of large capital, and that large capital is strongly participating in a wide range of governmental processes.

Simultaneously with this (state-facilitated) private capitalist penetration into the varied structures of state decision-making processes, corporate practices and interests have penetrated the core areas of the public sector. Since the Thatcher government's introduction of the doctrine of "New Public Management", characterised by the importation of private sector techniques into the public sector (Peele, 2004), including "a more aggressive use of performance-related pay and short-term contracts for bureaucrats; more frequent contracting-out of government services; a more active exchange of personnel between the public and private sectors" (Chang, 2010, 45), successive governments have managed to gradually effect a radical transformation of public administration in Britain. Among other changes (some of which will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4), successive Conservative and New Labour administrations advanced the development of internal markets, the contracting out of public services to private companies, which was often pursued at the expense of the taxpayer and has tended to confuse governmental responsibilities with private interests (Leys, 2003), thus restricting democratic accountability and privileging short-term and particularistic market-based criteria over the will of the public and over the public interest (as I show in my analysis of public services in chapter 4) and apparently contributing to neoliberal indoctrination and segmentation (by obstructing the understanding of the objectively antagonistic nature of class interests). New Labour continued the practice of seeking (supposedly) "best suppliers" within the existing framework of partial and creeping privatisation (see also chapter 3), although with some scope for greater flexibility, so that after 1999 there may have generally been less strict compulsion to set up tendering and internal markets (Pyper, 2007). These changes to the functioning of state services and of the state administration developed along with increased emphasis on financial "efficiency", a managerial culture modelled on the private sector and committed to the use of rigid performance indicators and benchmarking (Leys, 2003; Peele, 2004), which contributed to the erosion of the public service ethos of the civil service (Leys, 2003). The rise of new, highly-paid public sector managerial layers aided in the introduction of a modernised technocratic discourse and operational framework focused on prioritising the neoliberal principles of financial (pseudo-)efficiency over the citizen-centred provision of social services (ibid.), let alone democratic accountability and participation. In the course of neoliberal change, marketisation partially enveloped even such existentially important areas of public policy such as environmental and food safety and healthcare (see the section on

health care in chapter 4). The New Labour government even supported the EU's decision to allow the patenting of genes (Leys, 2003), which is a rather radical and, arguably, very exploitative form of privatisation.

Rhodes (1994) also noted the existence of trends which contributed to the "hollowing out of the state", referring primarily to the administrative reform under Thatcher, privatisations, the reduction in the scale and scope of state intervention, as well as the development of alternative systems of delivering services (e.g. executive agencies) which reduced the functions of central and local government, thus contributing to the existence of a variety of policy-and decision-making actors apart from the central state (but sometimes also, as already noted, to less transparent lines of command). Jessop (2002, 67) challenged the view that this leads to a pluralist dispersal of power by noting that supposedly self-regulating policy networks are actually to a significant extent organised by the state authorities which "provide the group rules for governance, ensure the compatibility of different mechanisms and regimes, deploy a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence and information". Marsh, Richards and Smith (2003) found that policy networks in Britain encompass very significant power asymmetries and that the core executive has retained its dominant role in the policy process. Policy networks, even when they retained a significant level of autonomy in relation to the core executive (some of these instances are also noted in the following chapter), are likely to have predominantly serviced dominant class interests (as the aforementioned prevalence of pro-capitalist policy institutes also indicates). Weir and Beetham (1999, 275) found that "certain interests – most especially those of big business generally – have more finance, expertise, information, status and access to Whitehall".

Concluding Thoughts

In this chapter I have outlined how the dominant class maintains its power over the state through an alliance between the corporate and state elites. One important modality of this is the reliance of the major political parties on corporate and private capitalist donations and loans to cover their expensive marketing campaigns, which have been of major importance for their

electoral success. The New Labour elite reduced the Labour Party's reliance on trade union funding and the party's (always partial and inconsistent) partnership with the unions in favour of a closer relationship with large capital, which also included a preference for campaign funds from capitalist sources. This system of capitalist party-political financing has contributed to the restriction of democratic accountability, the restriction of participation and the political marginalisation of the subordinate classes, whose ability to hold the parties to account and to participate in the political process have been greatly reduced by the elitist patterns of financing.

The elite-controlled (state and corporate) mass media and a large network of elite-controlled and financed think-tanks also supported the hegemony of the dominant class by contributing to the structural violence of indoctrination and segmentation, which have as their side-effect the restriction of the elite's accountability to the broad population. The elite's accountability is also reduced by corporate lobbying and by the widespread practice of placing corporate figures in positions of influence in government, which ease the capture of the state by private interests. The broad population, which does not own or control large businesses, almost invariably lacks access to these policy-making channels, which very severely restricts its capacity to hold the government democratically accountable and to effectively participate in political deliberation and decision-making.

The capture of the state by the dominant class was effectively facilitated since 1979 by Conservative governments' systematic consultation and involvement of business interests in a wide range of policy-making processes and state functions., as well as through the "revolving door" pattern of intertwining economic and political careers and appointments. Furthermore, the Thatcher government's introduction of "New Public Management" facilitated the penetration of corporate, managerialist and market-driven criteria, practices and interests into core areas of the public sector.

New Labour accepted and actively promoted these anti-democratic practices of allowing the widespread and regularised participation of capitalists in public policy-making and the introduction of managerialist market-driven criteria into the functioning of the state and of public services. It also deepened these democracy-restricting processes through the introduction of numerous agencies, quangos and other mechanisms by which policy-making and policy implementation can largely take place outside of the reach of public scrutiny and control.

Successive Conservative and New Labour governments further advanced the privatisation of various facets of the public sector by the dominant class through the development of internal markets, including the contracting of public services to private companies, which has restricted democratic accountability by introducing the private sector into decision-making about the public services/public affairs and by privileging short-term and particularistic market-based criteria over the will of the public and the public interest. As I will show in later chapters, New Labour even intensified and deepened some of these marketising processes.

The main structural changes in the relationship between the state and the private sector which the Thatcher administration largely inaugurated and subsequent Conservative and New Labour administrations continued to implement – including the managerialist administrative reform, the reduction in the scale and scope of state intervention into the economy, the various types of privatisations of state assets and services, the development of alternative systems of delivering public services (especially the greater use of agencies, quangos etc.), the increased involvement of the private sector in a wide range of policy-making processes and state functions – have all restricted democratic accountability and the scope for democratic participation, thus facilitating the core function of the state as a provider of services to the dominant class and the protector of its hegemony.

The rest of this thesis will (in addition to its other aims) help to demonstrate the continued dominance of the capitalist class over the political system. This can be inferred on the basis of evidence demonstrating the close institutional alignment of the state elite with capitalist interests, as well as by identifying the existence of a general pro-capitalist and neoliberal supra-party consensus of the political and state elites in the form of an unflinching unwillingness to credibly challenge any of the fundamental ideological presumptions of the capitalist system (including private ownership even of many natural monopolies and major means of production, distribution and exchange, as well as the capitalist extraction of unpaid surplus labour), or even numerous more or less derivative ones, such as the inequality-intensifying neoliberal market, which tends to strongly support the dominance of large capital (see Chang, 2010). These pro-capitalist commitments are some of the fundamental factors concerning the state's role in the perpetration of class-based structural violence.

Chapter 3

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

A researcher of structural violence (especially of the kind which is embedded in central social institutions) in one's country of residence, and perhaps especially if she or he is foreign-born, risks being negatively perceived as somehow "disloyal" to the country, even if the motivation behind their analysis is based on their care and concern for the people who live in it and suffer from these forms of violence. I have already noted in the theoretical introduction that my aim in this thesis is not to examine factors which may mitigate structural violence. However, it may be useful at the beginning of this chapter to emphasise again that the following analysis may of necessity be to a certain degree one-sided, as the object of my analysis here is not the totality of the state's modes of functioning. Instead, the object and focus of my analysis here are those aspects of the institutional foundations of the government apparatus which centrally contribute to structural violence (which in this chapter especially includes the aforementioned subtypes of structural violence against freedom needs). I will also note certain limitations to structural violence, although an analysis of factors which contribute to air pollution, for example, would not be expected to simultaneously examine the factors which may explain why it was still possible to breathe in that atmosphere.

The structural position of the government apparatus, which is commandeered by the state elite (consisting of powerful and leading government and party-political officials, as well as of powerful and leading officials in the civil service, the military and the intelligence services), in Britain (not unlike other countries of course) reflects in a specific way the prevailing (im)balance of power and the strongly hierarchical class division of labour and power in society. The government apparatus, and its top echelons in particular, are (as the subsequent analysis of this apparatus and the modes of its institutional operation will further substantiate) powerfully impregnated by the particularistic political and economic interests of the dominant class. Through the content of state policies and the mode of their institutional conceptualisation,

implementation and operation the government in recent decades has to a large extent represented the general hierarchical interests of the dominant class, while partially retaining the specificity of its interests (see Therborn, 1978; Scott, 1991). The state is deeply implicated in the reproduction of capitalist class relationships. It is the central regulator of the structures, institutions and processes which underpin class power; it is therefore also heavily implicated in the reproduction of the interests of the dominant (capitalist) class – both through the agency of the state elite and the structural bases of class power within the state, which are the topic of this (as well as the previous) chapter. Rather than examining the fault lines between the state elite and the rest of the dominant class which does not belong to the state elite (which is certainly an important issue that merits further analysis), my approach here focuses on providing an analysis of government institutions from the aspect of (at least a partial) contextualisation of the general patterning of state activities focused on the reproduction of structurally violent class relations. This view aims to transcend the narrow perspectives which overemphasise the role of "free subjectivity" in politics without succumbing to a reductionist structuralist perspective which dismisses the presence of volitional or agency-driven aspects of policy-making.

While it is not possible here to examine in great detail the complex topography of the state apparatus and the complex variations within each of the separate major branches of government, the following discussion will nonetheless present a broader portrait of the institutional foundations of government and an introductory analysis of factors which function as significant facilitators of class-based structural violence by limiting democratic safeguards necessary for the unimpeded, egalitarian satisfaction of the broad population's freedom needs, which strongly facilitates other forms of structural violence (i.e. violence against the satisfaction of other needs). This perspective will also allow me to identify several questions requiring further research from the perspective of analysing structural violence.

Following a discussion of how the institutional architecture and mode of operation of the core executive contributes to structural violence, I will examine the structurally violent character of the parliamentary and party-political systems, focusing on the way these interact with the broad population. The discussion will largely focus on the state's and the political system's restrictions of democratic accountability and of participation. This section will also include some remarks on the need to transcend capitalist and statist social relations based on structural

violence, and outline what a radically democratic challenge to structurally violence forms of government would look like. In the conclusion, this short exposition will introduce a radically democratic set of benchmarks by which the extent of structural violence in the British system of government, as well as distance from a state of positive peace, can be measured.

The Core Executive

Since unequal access to power facilitates the (re)production of structurally violent social relationships of domination and subordination, democratic checks and balances and the separation of powers between government branches are important for the prevention and moderation of structural violence, as they can act as constraints on powerful political actors and can foster institutional accountability and limit the centralist concentration of institutional power in the hands of the state elite or in the hands of the dominant class more broadly. Accordingly, as I will show in this chapter, an important source of structural violence against freedom needs in the UK political system (not unlike the political systems of many other economically developed and nominally liberal states) has been the absence of a sufficiently clear separation of powers with a sufficiently robust and independent mechanism of checks and balances which would prevent arbitrary rule and too much concentration of power in the hands of a small elite[126]. This is particularly evident in relation to the core executive[127] and the legislature, whose power is to a

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[126] In the light of public choice theory which uses economic analysis to shed light on problems of political science and postulates the constancy of the motivational structure of the individual agent across different institutional settings (Brennan and Hamlin, 1996), Daintith and Page (1999) noted that institutional frameworks do not necessarily lead to distinctive preferences and behaviours. This point is valid as a corrective to the overly formalistic structuralist preconceptions about the significance of the separation of powers on actual human behaviour, yet it should not detract from the critical analysis of the institutional architecture of the state and of the limitations on the satisfaction of freedom needs which may partly be exacerbated by – or even inhere in - this institutional framework. Additionally, one important question is what would research applying public choice theory reveal about the character and extent of structural violence in the actual functioning of government and state institutions. I suspect it may reveal a picture that is often more problematic with regard to the scale and nature of structural violence than the one which emerges from a more formal institutional analysis.

[127] I will be referring to the core government executive (especially the Prime Minister, his close advisors and enforcers, the Cabinet and the leading members of the civil service) rather than to the broader part of the executive which is situated in government agencies, quangos etc., and/or is predominantly carrying out an administrative function (i.e. public administration), which I cannot examine here. The examination of devolved executive powers in

significant degree effectively fused (Daintith and Page, 1999; Weir and Beetham, 1999; Leach, Coxall and Robins, 2006) since the Cabinet is determined by and relies on a parliamentary majority (determined through a non-proportional electoral system which I will soon discuss), while the policy course of the legislature is predominantly set by the ruling party's inner-circle (perhaps especially the Cabinet), as well as by centralist party-political machines of leading parties which have tended to limit the independence and local accountability of MPs. As Daintith and Page (1999, 10) have noted in relation to this partial fusion of the executive and the parliamentary branches of government in the UK, "there are obvious difficulties in arguing that a constitution incorporating the principle of parliamentary government, in which the leadership of the majority party in the House of Commons directs the action of the executive", conforms with the doctrine of the separation of powers based on the mutual constraint of separate branches of government[128].

The Prime Minister and his close government colleagues (including Cabinet members) are in a very powerful position due to their general ability to exclude opposition parties from government decision-making and due to their command of a loyal, powerful and quite centralised state bureaucracy. Indeed, these powers are generally underpinned by statute law which the government can alter in order to further solidify its power (Beetham and Weir, 1999). Additional limitations on checks and balances which would help ensure democratic accountability are made possible by the fact that, in the British system of government, the leadership of the governing political party or parties is able to use the powers of the Royal Prerogative, which contributes to a situation in which "scarcely any legal rules constrain British premiers" (ibid., 148). This, as I will show presently, increases the ability of the Prime Minister and of his or her inner circle of leading politicians to weaken or marginalise the legislative

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Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as of the European Council and Commission (which also exercise executive power in Britain), are beyond the scope of my study.

[128] In book XI of *The Spirit of the Laws* Montesquieu ([1748] 1988) somewhat simplistically referred to the English "balance of power" between the monarchy, the aristocracy and the early capitalist elite, as well as, more formally, between the king, the Parliament and the judiciary. It is indubitable that the separation of powers is now in place to some degree (and various institutional and social safeguards often help to guarantee much stronger checks and balances than those that were in place in Montesquieu's time – see especially the discussion on the judiciary), but my analysis below will indicate that a clear and sharp separation of institutional power, not to mention the (rather incongruous) notion of an equal balance of social power between different classes, has not been accepted as a credible goal in the contemporary British system of government (nor does it seem that this was ever at the forefront of the mainstream political agenda).

branch of government in certain cases[129].

The independence and power of the judiciary and of the legislature are also weakened by the power of the Privy Council, the unelected body of advisors to the sovereign, to issue Orders in Council - sometimes under the Royal Prerogative - on highly important administrative issues with potentially deep structural implications, i.e. to effectively legislate independently of Parliament in certain cases, although in practice this power is limited in scope and is apparently controlled by the Cabinet (Peele, 2004). Reorganisation of government functions is a prominent example of a major issue which can be decided upon without parliamentary approval through Orders in Council (ibid.). Margaret Thatcher's government radically restructured the civil service through the use of such powers of the Royal Prerogative (see Weir and Beetham, 1999). Orders in Council constitute a restriction of government accountability: in addition to not requiring parliamentary authorisation, these special powers are often "also protected from judicial scrutiny. The courts have held that many of the powers exercised under the royal prerogative are not open to judicial review" (Nortona, 2007, 387). Moreover, the exercise of these powers of the Royal Prerogative is not even publicly recorded (House of Commons, 2002), contributing to segmentation (by obstructing the full and transparent view of the process of government) as well as to the restriction of democratic accountability. The convenience of these executive powers for anti-democratic purposes appears to be substantial[130].

More broadly, the relative centralisation of power in the core government executive, i.e. the concentration of many major decision-making powers at the summit of government, is also a result of its various forms of dominance over non-representative functional branches of the state - most importantly the organs of state coercion (such as the army, the secret services and the police), the administrative apparatus, and the judiciary (in an arms-length manner, as we shall see)

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[129] This is not to deny that a range of arguments could be advanced in support of the notion that the stability and coherence of the government's policy agenda - which may depend on such a dominance of the largest political party in the House of Commons - offset the restrictions of democratic accountability (associated with this limitation of the principle of the separation of powers which centralises power in the hands of a ruling party that rarely acquires the majority of the popular vote) by limiting or preventing other forms of structural violence which may result from an insufficiently coherent legislative programme. Perhaps it may be possible to advance the understanding of this problem through a comparative analysis (in the light of the theory of structural violence) of the functioning of coalition-based and single-party governments.

[130] Some of these prerogative powers, including the government's power to proclaim a state of emergency (Peele, 2004), as well as the figure of the Monarch herself, may also be useful for the preservation of the *status quo* in extreme circumstances such as a coup (Norton, 2007b), as well as revolutionary or radical reformist turmoil.

- as well as over local government [131] and the legislature through the often domineeringly protagonistic role of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in setting the legislative agenda[132]. The precise effects of this concentration of decision-making powers in the core government executive can vary greatly depending on the actual policies of the ruling party, and on its mode of public conduct. Concerning the concrete British context since 1979, a number of studies (including Gamble, 1988; Maloney and Richardson, 1995; Weir and Beetham, 1999; Kettell, 2006 and Faucher-King and le Galés, 2010) have shown how the strength and determination of the executive branch of government facilitated a relatively swift and forceful introduction of relatively authoritarian and neoliberal policies, which, as this thesis will show, led to and supported many severe forms of class-based structural violence[133]. Richardson (2000) noted that Conservatives under Thatcher

"systematically changed the underlying bases of the consultations which they continued to conduct with the affected interests. The consultations were often only after the extensive re-writing, by government, of old public policy "franchises". (…) In many ways, the Thatcher Government's preference formation process became detached from the traditional post-war institutions of British policy making. Hitherto stable and well "regulated" (via public or private regulation) policy sectors were systematically destabilized by the Thatcher government (…). In Britain, by the mid-1980s, the balance of power had shifted decidedly in favour of governments in terms of setting the agenda and initiating policy change. Thus, the policy process could often take an episodic character – bouts of an impositional style as new policy ideas were introduced by the Government, followed by old style consultation via (often reconstructed) policy

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[131] The reform of local government initiated during the administration of Margaret Thatcher led to the weakening of "the strong independent system of local government [able] to challenge the central government's authority" (Peele, 2004, 35; see also Gamble, 1988), which appears to have constituted another significant limitation of the executive government's accountability. Further examination of structural violence in relation to local government is necessary.

[132] One particularly notable limitation of the executive's ability to control the legislature is the ability of the House of Commons to oust the Prime Minister and his Cabinet through a vote of no confidence (which happened in 1979). Another relevant check on executive power is the fairly free nature of the parliamentary candidate selection process, which mostly takes place at the constituency level (although the party executive may seek to influence the process of selection). Labour and Conservative Party members also have the power to deselect sitting MPs, although this power is very rarely used (Leach et al., 2011).

[133] A major factor which facilitated the neoliberal shift was the fact that successive governments between 1979 and 2010 all had safe majorities. While safe parliamentary majorities routinely limit the potential for democratic control over the ruling party, they could also, in case of a government committed to seriously and consistently addressing the problem of structural violence in society, actually facilitate the development of democratic and human rights and well-being by reducing the obstacles to progressive change.

communities and networks".

The traditional understanding of the Prime Minister's position laid much emphasis on the primacy of cabinet government, in which the Prime Minister was formally just *primus inter pares*, first among equals. The challenge to the convention of cabinet government (formally established during the reign of the Hanoverian dynasty in the eighteenth century and constituting the institutional conclusion to the struggle against absolutism and autocracy) was already present during Margaret Thatcher's premiership (Hennessy, 1986; Weir and Beetham, 1999), and before that as well. The strict adherence to Cabinet and Privy Council confidentiality, and to the notion of collective responsibility of the Cabinet (Peele, 2004), especially considering the power of the Prime Minister and of the Cabinet Office, further centralise decision-making and limit dissent (although never entirely), which may increase the potential for the curtailment of democratic accountability. The strengthening of the position of the Prime Minister, which has occurred since Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979 (Gamble, 1988; Burch and Holliday, 1999; Weir and Beetham, 1999; Peele, 2004; Kettell, 2006), was to a large extent due to increased institutional support which the Prime Minister has acquired, including an increase in the size of the Cabinet Office and in the number of private advisors which Tony Blair introduced (Burch and Holliday, 1999; Weir and Beetham, 1999). Weir and Beetham (ibid., 138) noted that the Cabinet Office (which services the cabinet committee system and liases with the governing party machine) functions as the "nerve-centre for coordinating and 'reinventing' government at the centre". Moreover, it "can always be mobilised to provide a 'Prime Minister's Department' function on any issue which the Prime Minister signals, its intelligence operations are at his or her command, and its coordinating role can often serve a premier's interests at the centre" (ibid., 138). Weir and Beetham's analysis of the lack of formal and transparent rules regulating the conduct of the Prime Minister, of other ministers and of the Cabinet concluded that this lack of political constraints limits democratic accountability by weakening safeguards against "arbitrary conduct by a determined Prime Minister or ministers" (ibid., 150).

Especially following the Thatcher government's radical restructuring of the relationship between the ruling party-political elite and the civil service, the former has been able to instrumentalise the civil service "as a strongly partisan force on behalf of the 'government of the day', even to the point of supplying misleading information in its cause. (…) [The ministers']

120

close relations with officials create an identity of interests between them and a shared vision of the interests of the state which is easily confused with their own joint interests. (…) This fusion makes the government of the day vastly more powerful in its dealings with Parliament, the media, other interests, and the public" (ibid., 187-189). On the basis of their meticulous analysis of the power of the core executive, Weir and Beetham (ibid., 150) stated that "the political constraints within the executive are not sufficient to prevent arbitrary conduct by a determined Prime Minister or ministers. Those rules which exist are neither transparent nor effective". However, Prime Ministers tend not to have the requisite resources and expertise which would enable them to comprehensively intervene in departmental policy-making. Central government is "a federation of departments" in which the Prime Minister and the Treasury (whose financial influence strongly impacts other departments) perform a centralising and coordinating function (ibid., 186).

The core government executive has frequently displayed a significant lack of responsiveness towards the will of the broad electorate, which is a consequence of its limited democratic accountability. This included the governments relatively frequently breaking policy promises made in general election manifestos (Weir and Beetham, 1999) and the disregard towards the mass popular opposition to the invasion of Iraq (including the 15th February 2003 anti-war protest held in London, in which between 750,000 and 2 million people took part – BBC News, 2003), the largely inconsequential popular dislike of some of the (politically supported) existing banking and tax-related practices (which will be further discussed in chapters 5 and 6), as well as the concerted disregard by all the main parties towards the popular support for the re-nationalisation of energy and rail companies (Dahlgreen, 2013) and the apparent disregard towards the popular opposition to the lack of council housing and the continued rise in housing prices, to give only a few relevant examples of the gap between the forceful will of the *hoi olligoi* and the impotent want (or opposition, as the case may be) of the *hoi polloi.* These instances illustrate the wider point about the routine restrictions of democratic accountability in the British system of government[134]. A counter-argument to this critique of government policy

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[134] However, although it is useful to note in this context that the broad population's high levels of support for the reintroduction of the death penalty (to give just one example) indicate the multidirectional nature of structural violence (since, for example, the limitation of democratic accountability, at least in some regressive social contexts where the broad layers of the population support highly authoritarian policies, can actually help to preserve some

decisions, which may also be fruitfully explored, is that the government is elected to do what it judges to be best for the public good, rather than to closely follow the will of its electors, which could potentially lead to an aggregate increase in (and greater intensity of) structural violence, inhibiting the satisfaction of many important human needs (especially since elected representatives are supposed to be better informed on the issues). One (partial) way to challenge this view may depend on the ability to demonstrate the existence of a potential for the development of mass critical intellectuality through the application of a democratising political pedagogy focused on the development of critical consciousness, the capacity for democratic self-organisation and a dialogical and humanising political culture (see for example Freire, 1972, 2001 and 2013).

The Parliament, Party Politics, and Citizens

The UK Parliament is a major source of government authority as well as legitimacy, considering it is the highest-ranking government body directly elected by the general population. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty still accords a substantial degree of influence to this institution and it confers on the legislature significant rights to supervise the executive and examine and overturn most laws.

However, in the context of real political life, Parliament frequently lacks the structural and subjective means to effectively challenge the executive and its prerogative powers. The legislature mostly consists of politicians who have been (especially since the rise of post-social democratic trends in the Labour Party, which led to a hyper-centralist internal party regime – Kettell, 2006; Faucher-King and le Galés, 2010; Leach et al., 2011), in general, carefully controlled and "cultivated" by party elites, and whose compliance with the wishes of the party

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human rights). It should nonetheless be fruitful to examine in more detail the presence of structural violence (especially against freedom needs and, more specifically, against democratic accountability and democratic participation) through the analysis of this gap between the electorate's predominant policy preferences and the governments' actual policy decisions. Such an analysis of structural violence would in my opinion need to operate in a way which acknowledges the normative importance of the classical liberal notion of freedom as liberty and the enjoyment of basic human rights which are universally shared. Without this normative framework even the government's rejection of racist and fascistic popular demands against human rights could be misperceived as an unwarranted form of structural violence against freedom needs.

leadership is ensured through a variety of inducements as well as disincentives, especially on the basis of the party leadership's and government's power of patronage (Weir and Beetham, 1999). This constitutes the curtailing of democratic accountability since the political influence of the (supposed) parliamentary representatives of the electors is quite tightly controlled by narrow leadership circles. This leadership seeks to maintain a tight, anti-pluralist organisation of the parliamentary wings of their party, which helps to ensure – particularly through the activities of the party whip and other party managers and leaders – that the MPs voting behaviour in Parliament and their wider activities generally (but certainly not always) conform to the expectations of the party elites which often supported their political rise and which partly base their power over the MPs on extensive patronage, including various kinds of public (and sometimes also private business) appointments, as well as the ability to prevent MPs from advancing in their political careers and in other spheres of public life. The "inner core" in mainstream political parties (leading party officials and party employees) and in the state apparatus tended to function under a rigidly bureaucratic and centralist regime. As I have already mentioned, even the Labour Party, which was traditionally associated with the labour movement and with popular democratic norms, assumed a rigidly undemocratic internal regime under New Labour which restricted democratic accountability and, often, the meaningful participation of Labour Party members [135]. These centralist tendencies undermine (representative and participatory) democratic norms and democratic control in favour of a different kind of rationality based on technocratic efficiency and executive power (Hay, 1999; Shaw, 2008;

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[135] The concentration of power inside the party largely rests in the hands of the National Executive Committee, the National Policy Forum and the cabinet or shadow cabinet, as the case may be (Faucher-King and Le Galés, 2010). The New Labour "modernisation" agenda was predicated on the success of its centralising and anti-pluralist preparatory work within the party and its internal processes. This entailed a considerable disempowerment of trade unions, the party conference and the National Executive Committee (NEC) in the party's decision-making processes (Peele, 2004). The NEC was restructured so that unions lost their majority, while the establishment of the agenda-setting National Policy Forum (in 1990) and the Joint Policy Committee (under Tony Blair), both controlled by the leadership and operating in private, drastically reduced the policy-making importance of the NEC and the annual conference (ibid.). Moreover, think tanks and advisors largely replaced policy forums (which often served to legitimate decisions that had already been taken) and party activists (including activist intellectuals) in policy deliberation (e.g. Faucher-King and Galès, 2010). The constriction of inner-party deliberation and debate seems to have facilitated the stifling of Labour's traditional programmatic orientation, and the creation of New Labour. Furthermore, under Blair, political campaigns, party communications and presentations were increasingly professionalised (Peele, 2004; Faucher-King and Le Galés, 2010). Membership services were centralised as well (Faucher-King and Galès, 2010). The party increasingly resembled an elite political machine more than a democratic, solidaristic community.

Faucher-King and le Galés, 2010).

This tight internal control facilitated (perhaps especially since the rise of neoliberal ideology and practice) to a significant degree the programmatic and policy convergence of the Labour Party with the Conservative Party (Hay, 1999; Leys, 2003; Shaw, 2008; Faucher-King and Le Galés, 2010), helping to enable the party elites of all mainstream parties to partly merge their interests with corporate interests, facilitating the partial rejection of value-based distinctions in favour of technical, symbolic and ritualistic distinctions between the mainstream political parties[136]. These processes, by apparently contributing to indoctrination and segmentation (by possibly obscuring social processes and obstructing the subordinate social classes from reaching an understanding of the class-based nature of policy-making) and by restricting the scope of political choice, seem to have contributed to the restriction of democratic accountability and of democratic participation. The absence of deep ideological discord was to a large extent substituted and concealed by tribalist inter-party competition, narrowly prescribed and monotonously performed conflicts, often accompanied by an unconvincing veneer of open debate. It seems that Parliament was thus often confined to being a "chattering house" while decisions were effectively made in advance by the executive (the Prime Minister and the government departments in particular), which tends to instruct the parliamentary machinery how it must vote. This allows for a cynical kind of political manoeuvrability, generally advantageous in any "Machiavellian" political set-up, and perhaps particularly so in the neoliberal constellation of social and political forces, characterised as it is by the increased role of financial capitalist party donors (as I have shown in the previous chapter) and of pro-capitalist mass media (Weir and Beetham, 1999; Kuhn, 2007; Curran and Seaton, 2009). Especially in the neoliberal ideological and material climate, Conservative and Labour party leaderships regularly tended to regard serious internal party criticism as dangerously seditious, casting light on the elites' conception of democratic dialogue (see Faucher-King and Le Galés, 2010)[137].

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[136] A comparative analysis of the main parties regarding the precise character and extent of structural violence present in their organisational framework and internal and public discourse is another important topic which research into structural violence should examine.

[137] The annual Labour Party conference (where pre-organised sessions on pre-selected topics replaced genuine debate and deliberation, let alone dissent and genuine conference sovereignty), as well as the NEC, were left quite powerless in the face of a small clique of New Labour politicians and advisors in Downing Street (Routledge, 2003, Kettell, 2006). The proportion of trade union votes at the conference was reduced from 87 per cent to 70 per cent in

These limitations placed on internal party-political pluralism seem likely to have played a large role in the development of technocratic perspectives, narrowing the coordinates of legitimate political choice and depoliticising large swathes of social and economic policy, contributing to the restriction of democratic control and of democratic participation. These changes appear likely to have, in turn, promoted anti-political cynicism and disengagement from party politics, including through a decline in party membership and the weakening of grassroots party organisations (Whiteley, 2009). Pollsters, public relations specialists and similar political technocrats to a large degree sidelined more traditional forms of party activism (Bob, 2004; Faucher-King and le Galés, 2010)[138]. They have routinely facilitated demagogic approaches to political communication, which contribute to indoctrination and segmentation, hinder informed participatory democratic engagement in politics and curtail democratic accountability. The genuine dissidents and democratic tribunes among the MPs, particularly on the trade unionist, democratic socialist and anti-militarist wing of the Labour Party, were systematically marginalised both by the party system and by the dominant segment of the mass media in recent decades. The entire parliamentary process was sometimes marginalised in situations which might lead to potential backbench revolts against certain major government policies, including the

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1992 and to 50 percent in 1995. The trade union numerical advantage in the electoral college for the party's leadership was also removed, and in 1993 unions, MPs and MEPs and Constituency Labour Parties were each given 33 per cent of the vote (Peele, 2004). New Labour also broke with the established party norm that various strands of opinion need to be given space within the parliamentary party, let alone that there should be a balance between different wings in the party (Peele, 2004). Instead, Blair aggressively pushed his own protégés: "Blair's attempts to impose control on the Labour candidate selection process in Scotland, Wales and in London (using methods he had condemned in his modernization of Labour) belied his commitment to a greater pluralism" (Peele, 2004, 21). The National Parliamentary Panel was created in 1997 as a single focal point for the screening of election candidates, possibly contributing to a further erosion of pluralism in the selection process. The unions lost their right to sponsor MPs (the prospect of trade union resources being used had exerted a significant degree of influence on the selection process). The setting up of a new process called "affirmative nomination", which allowed for a new MP selection process only if there is a 50 per cent membership vote calling for it (Peele, 2004), also may have increased the power of the leadership at the expense of democratic accountability to the party as a whole.

[138] Furthermore, by transferring certain decision-making powers away from the (usually more left-wing) trade unionists and party activists who attended Constituency Labour Party meetings and giving it to the wider membership through postal votes (on issues chosen and worded by the party leadership), Kinnock, Smith and Blair undermined the influence of organised Labour Party grassroots in various election mechanisms (Leys, 2003; Peele, 2004). The plural character of the party rank-and-file was not allowed to be openly and substantially displayed in the party's highly controlled decision-making processes. The leadership also sought to broaden the base of individual membership by attracting new, more mainstream members (Peele, 2004), which is also likely to have helped to weaken the position of the party's critical left wing.

decision to start wars[139].

As already noted in the previous chapter, the rising power and political, legal and economic reach of international and supra-national institutions, especially the European Union (but also the Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, NATO and G7), has been a further major challenge to the power of the UK Parliament and has, consequently, contributed to the limitation of democratic accountability in Britain. EU legislation does not have to pass through domestic parliamentary approval, and has instead increased the prerogative powers of the partially supra-national EU bureaucracy, thus eroding the practice and the principle of traditional "representative", let alone truly democratically accountable government (as well as eroding the independent agential power of the national executive government)[140]. New international and supra-national levels of political decision-making may have led to more oligarchic forms of rule and to less transparent "lines of command" which have, in addition to the aforementioned increase in the role of independent agencies, mass privatisations etc., also contributed to a partial "hollowing out of the state" [141]. This is one of the reasons why future investigations of structural violence should also analyse these international and transnational developments.

The legitimacy and representative nature of the UK Parliament were not aided by poor general election turnout (71.5 per cent in 1997, 59.4 per cent in 2001, 61.4 per cent in 2005 and 65,1 per cent in 2010 - UK Political Info, 2010). The local election turnout was even worse (Peele, 2004). Additionally, the non-proportional, single member plurality (or "first-past-the-

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[139] Precisely this happened in the case of the invasion of Iraq, when Blair sought to use a parliamentary vote (even though his power of Royal Prerogative allowed him to declare war without parliamentary approval) in order to gain legitimacy for the decision to join the US invasion, yet the Parliament was prevented from conducting timely and substantive debates on the merits of the decision to wage war, and even the dossier about Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction was presented to the MPs just three hours before the House of Commons debate on the prospect of war with Iraq (Sampson, 2005; Kettell, 2006). This further demonstrates my earlier point about the executive's restriction of parliamentary scrutiny and therefore the restriction of democratic accountability. In 2013, when the UK government decided to offer military support for the French intervention in defence of the military dictatorship in Mali (against Islamist militants and Tuareg rebels), the Parliament was not even consulted (Wintour and Watt, 2013).
[140] This is not to deny the fact that EU institutions also introduced certain checks and balances in relation to the operation of the executive government in Britain. I am not able to analyse these complexities here.
[141] A more democratic restriction of the UK Parliament (and of executive government) has been the devolution of some aspects of government. The general principle of devolution has numerous precedents, for instance in Germany's federal system of government. However, UK devolution has occurred according to national rather than regional or other divisions, and the national administrations of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland may not have advanced participatory democratic decentralisation of decision-making.

post") system of elections for the House of Commons helped to ensure that the will of the electors would be misrepresented, contributing to a dispersal of votes, a challenge to the electoral will and voice of the broad population and to the restriction of its human (voting) rights[142]. This misrepresentation of the will of the population (not including that segment of the population belonging to the dominant class, which has other, more effective means of influencing the electoral process) reduced democratic control, contributed to the marginalisation of those whose electoral will was misrepresented and enabled the Thatcher government to dismantle the post-WWII social contract and to restore a form of radical, largely unregulated capitalism without ever gaining the support of more than a third of eligible voters (Nunns, 2013)[143]. In the 2005 general election Labour also won decisive power with the votes of just 22 per cent of the total UK electorate (Kampfner, 2009)[144].

In the parliamentary elections of 2015, out of the 46.4 million people who were eligible to vote, 35 million people did not vote for the Conservative Party (BBC News, 2015), a party strongly committed to the continued close alignment of the state with capitalist interests. The Conservatives still managed to gain a parliamentary majority and to establish very strong centralised rule over the country. Most people's votes in that election were wasted: "Of the almost 31 million people who took part on May 7th, the votes of 15.4 million people didn't help anyone get elected. That's 50% of voters who don't have someone they want in Westminster" (Mortimer, 2015). The Green Party received only one parliamentary seat although 1.1 million people voted for it. UKIP gained just one MP although it received over 3.8 million votes, while "the Conservative Party required on average just 34,000 votes per MP" (Garland and Terry, 2015, 11). See figure 1.

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[142] It may be useful if the setting of electoral district boundaries was also subjected to analysis informed by the theory of structural violence.

[143] The position of elite and other right-wing forces in elections has also been strengthened by the denial of the right to vote to immigrants who haven't got citizenship status. Prisoners have also been denied the right to vote. This is, of course, only one of many restrictions which the most disenfranchised segments of the population, including immigrants and prisoners, face with regard to their ability to participate in public life.

[144] The 1983 general election is another major example of the pro-*status quo* character of the UK electoral system, as the SDP-Liberal Alliance got 25.4 per cent share of the votes, which translated into just 3.5 per cent of the seats (Democratic Audit, 2013).

VOTES PER MP ELECTED

Source: Garland and Terry (2015)

Figure 1: Number of votes per MP elected in the 2015 UK general election.

This is not a very democratically responsive and open electoral system, but one to a large extent based on the violation of voting rights (which are human rights), the marginalisation of large segments of the population (who are left unrepresented or whose voice is misrepresented) and significant restrictions of democratic participation and accountability (due to this lack of democratic responsiveness).

Considering that MPs lack the access, resources, time and expertise to subject the immense range of government policies, practices and its legislative agenda to effective scrutiny, Parliament's actual oversight over the varied affairs and organs of the state is in many (although not all) cases quite cursory (Hansard Society, 1993; Weir and Beetham, 1999). This is the case despite the existence of parliamentary select committees, as they have been found to be marginal to the process of policy-making due to a range of factors including their weak powers to obtain necessary information from ministers and their officials, their lack of resources, as well as - partly due to the predominance of ruling party and other "establishment" MPs - a common lack of political will to resolutely challenge prevailing policies and practices (Weir and Beetham, 1999). The secrecy associated with the cabinet committee structure, and with more informal policy-making bodies and mechanisms, also prevent MPs from effectively scrutinising policy options, processes and choices (ibid.). Besides its general inability to present a serious counterweight to the compact will of the executive, the Parliament and its select committees hold very weak jurisdiction over the various segments of the state apparatus, especially the military and the secret (or "security") services (Weir and Beetham, 1999; Kettell, 2006)[145].

Furthermore, MPs only examine a very small proportion of "secondary" or "delegated" legislation (which usually takes the form of statutory instruments (SIs) and Orders in Council, or quasi-legislative "administrative orders, regulations and codes of practice" – Weir and Beetham, 1999, 389) through which ministers can make "executive law", rules and regulations that are

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[145] Kettell (ibid.) has meticulously shown how the Parliament was systematically excluded and prevented from scrutinising the executive's (and, in particular, the Prime Minister's) push for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. His analysis of the policy process which led to the UK invasion led him to conclude that the British system of government is "founded on intractably and deeply entrenched principles of centralisation, hierarchy, and elitism (...) characterised by a deep-seated adherence to a model of government marked by a strong and relatively unfettered executive at the expense of more responsive and participatory form of decision-making. (...) [The existing] model of democracy [is] characterised by the apotheosis of strong and decisive leadership, by a limited notion of representation, and by a relative paucity of effective checks and balances on the use of executive power" (Kettell, 2006, 2-4).

supposed to follow on from the acts of Parliament and which "have the same force of law as the actual Act" (ibid., 389). According to the Law Society, executive law is in some cases even more important than "primary legislation" and "should therefore be accorded the necessary time for full and detailed scrutiny" (Hansard Society, 1993, 286). Instead, partly due to the aforementioned general limitations on MPs ability to supervise and control the legislative process, "the vast majority [of these SIs and Orders in Council] go through unseen" (Weir and Beetham, 1999, 390). MPs also have no power to amend secondary legislation (ibid.). This is very probably a major reason why the volume and scope of secondary legislation and of statutory instruments have significantly increased under the Thatcher and Major's premierships: "The volume of instruments has grown inexorably, as has the range of powers they confer on ministers and officials" (ibid., 390). Andrew Bennet MP, the former chairman of the Commons SI Committee, noted the growing use of secondary legislation to deal with provisions which would have previously been included in primary legislation (Bennet, 1990). Some Acts enable ministers to evade serious parliamentary scrutiny by conferring on them powers to amend and/or repeal primary legislation through the use of statutory instruments (Weir and Beetham, 1999). These varied restrictions on the ability of the Parliament to oversee government and state processes and structures constitute a further complex set of limitations of democratic accountability which require further research.

The House of Lords has in recent decades retained a significant legislative role that may frequently contribute to government accountability due to its scrutinising function, which entails the examination and partial influence over bills made by the House of Commons (see the section on the judiciary below with regard to the loss of the previous judicial role that the House of Lords had). However, the legitimacy, independence, democratic representative nature and accountability of the House of Lords – and therefore also its ability and willingness to hold central government to account - are damaged due to the process of government (especially Prime Ministerial) patronage by which "life peers" are installed, prompting the name "the 'House of Cronies' " (Sampson, 2005, 30). The House of Lords co-optation and patronage paradigm appeared to have undertaken a particularly vulgar form in the "cash for honours" scandal. It was suspected and the police subsequently led an investigation (without any charges being brought forward by the Crown Prosecution Service, allegedly due to lack of evidence) into whether the

Labour Party had illegally given peerages to Labour Party donors and lenders (Peston, 2008). The closed and elitist nature of the process by which peers in the House of Lords are selected is a significant limitation on the independence of the House of Lords. This process constitutes a limitation of democratic accountability (since it is based on political patronage rather than on democratic elections or on some type of transparent public and/or expert consultation or selection process). The patronage system helps to increase the chances that people who are generally "safe" politically, and who belong to privileged layers of society, including capitalists and predictably conformist former MPs and government ministers, become peers. It is also telling in this sense that "in 2002 a third of the 682 peers (excluding bishops and law lords) had directorships" (Sampson, 2005, 331). It is therefore not realistic to expect their mass transformation into consistent promoters of the interests of the subordinate classes[146]. Following its occasional resistance to the governments' legislative agenda, the House of Lords almost invariably ended up submitting to the governments' legislative will (Weir and Beetham, 1999).

The restriction of the broad population's participation in and control over the political process was also partially sustained by the exclusionary patterns of MP selection (often based on quite narrowly conceived forms of cultural and social capital in accordance with self-regarding party-political criteria rather than on public-spirited criteria and a high level of education). This factor, and the associated high proportion of MPs with privileged social backgrounds, make the Parliament less representative of the general population and contribute to the political marginalisation of individuals with lower-class backgrounds (who are much less likely to gain significant political positions, which also reduces the potential for their political participation, at least on these higher levels of political life, and this may also demotivate individuals belonging to the subordinate classes from actively taking part in political life). The composition of the House of Commons partly displays the relatively privileged political trajectory of public school and Oxbridge educated lawyers, journalists, lecturers, financial consultants, company directors etc., and even the Labour Party's parliamentary party composition has included a decline in the number of traditional working-class MPs such as ex-miners and engineers (Norris and

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[146] However, despite the fact its membership is selected through Prime Ministerial and party patronage, the House of Lords retains a corrective role. Large segments of it have (at least in recent times) frequently assumed a more progressive stance protective of human welfare and of civil liberties.

Lovenduski, 1997)[147]. By 2010, the dominance of middle- and upper-class politicians may have reached its apogee in "post-aristocratic" Britain[148].

However, the class backgrounds of politicians are not of decisive importance. Just as the *nouveaux riches* are often no less a part of the dominant class than the longer-established economic elites are (in fact, "patrician" traditionalism now also appears to increasingly rest on money, existing status and aspirational emulation rather than on actual "breeding"), "it is all but inevitable that recruits from the subordinate classes into the upper reaches of the state system should, by the very fact of their entry into it, become part of the class which continues to dominate it" (Miliband, 1969, 65)[149].

As I have previously indicated, the Parliament is, largely as a result of the above-mentioned factors, to a significant extent a field of ritualised politics, while decisions are often actually made in advance by the executive, which regularly instructs the parliamentary party

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[147] Politicians from these kinds of backgrounds are more likely to have been initiated into (the broadly conceived) social elite, and are thus probably more likely to accept and uphold the elite's values and interests (as their political behaviour seems to generally confirm). For that reason, and for other reasons connected to their privileged backgrounds, they are more likely to possess the confidence, ambition and various social, cultural and material resources (Norris and Lovenduski, 1997) necessary to become party candidates and to subsequently win parliamentary seats. The recruitment of political elites from the upper class has traditionally included the internalisation of class biases and class-based deference by the electorate and the party membership (Ranney, 1965; Greenwood, 1988). Research based on data from the last years of Margaret Thatcher's premiership shows that Conservative MPs were far more affluent than Labour MPs, Labour and Conservative membership, and the general electorate. By 2010, two-thirds of MPs originated from professional backgrounds (Streeting, 2011), and were five times likelier to have been privately educated (Sutton Trust, 2010). The register of the House of Commons members' interests published in 2005 revealed that fifty-eight MPs (of the total number of 646 MPs) had large business interests, non-executive and executive directorships, while ten MPs derived large incomes from the ownership of land and property. This excluded other MPs whose extra-parliamentary incomes were limited to shareholdings, as well as the twenty-one MPs who were practising professionals alongside their parliamentary careers (Williams, 2006).

[148] All three leading political figures of the 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government's cabinet (the Prime Minister David Cameron, the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg and the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne) went to leading public schools. There were 23 millionaires in David Cameron's initial cabinet of 29 members (Owen, 2010). The popular phrase "we're all in this together", invoked in order to justify the government's welfare cuts, sounded particularly hollow when spoken by David Cameron and George Osborne, Eton-educated millionaire offspring of wealthy financier parents. The historical continuity of a part of the current Conservative elite is also reflected in the fact that Samantha Cameron, the wife of David Cameron, is related to "a slave owner who received the equivalent of millions of pounds as compensation from the British government when the trade in humans was abolished" (Walker, 2013a).

[149] If they are to survive in their positions, and especially if they want to further prosper politically, these new recruits from the subordinate classes have been powerfully (though not always successfully) propelled into becoming integrated into a rigidly hierarchical, highly centralised decision-making apparatus of government, which clearly reduced their potential to remain or become democratic tribunes, limiting their accountability to the public. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that individuals from privileged class backgrounds can be politically highly progressive.

machineries on how to vote. This type of centralised political decision-making is susceptible to unrepresentative, exclusive and elitist influences, since it makes MPs dependent on centralised party bureaucracies, often in opposition to the interests and the will of their constituents. The parliamentary and non-parliamentary political and state technocracy often displays a strong tendency to (at least try to) monopolise relevant information. Future analyses of structural violence which inheres in state structures should carefully investigate the violence of segmentation and the curtailments of democratic accountability which appears to routinely characterise state and government handling of information. Here it is possible to make a general observation that, despite some limited party-political variation, the state has in recent decades (and longer, of course) been developing centralised, organised and fairly intrusive databases and controls on citizens, with limited concern for citizens' rights and privacy. On the other hand, from the Official Secrets Act to the everyday minutiae of bureaucratic activities, the state elite has often passionately defended its "right" to conceal information from the citizens, and even from oppositional segments of the state and party-political elite (e.g. Weir and Beetham, 1999; Kettell, 2006)[150]. Weir and Beetham (1999, 367) found that the state elite was to a large extent successful in this aim:

"The political reality is that ministers can generally avoid giving a full account of their or their officials' actions, and can rely on the loyalty, ambition and discipline of their party majority to ensure that no sanctions are applied to them, even in case where they are guilty of breaking major conventions, such as not lying to the House. Further, the loose nature of ministerial responsibility and accountability in action; the executive's refusal to allow civil servants to give evidence in their own right; and the limits on openness under the current code of access, all make it virtually impossible for Parliament to police, let alone enforce, the accountability of the executive to the House of Commons".

However, the introduction of statutory freedom of information rules under the New Labour administration has significantly restricted the scope for official secrecy. Furthermore, the formal processes of public consultations alleviate the exclusion of some segments of the public

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[150] In 2008 Damian Green, the Conservative Party's spokesman on immigration, was briefly imprisoned and had his documents confiscated under a dubious eighteenth-century law against "misconduct in public office". He was told by officers he could face life imprisonment, all as a result of his publication of a politically embarrassing leak from inside government, which was later found not to be secret or relevant to national security (Kampfner, 2009).

from policy-assessment and policy-making, but these consultation processes have been found to be "unsystematic, (…) often rushed" and sometimes quite arbitrary with regard to the choice of individuals and organisations that are consulted or excluded from consultation processes (ibid., 296). They are somewhat tokenistic, as much formative policy-making and negotiation happens in policy communities which are closed to public scrutiny, in processes which may subvert formal public consultation procedures (ibid.).

The political and state elite often also appears to be presenting the mystifying aura of outwardly transparent, yet intellectually rather inaccessible (not to mention tedious) political knowledge and rationality necessarily impervious to the average citizen, which would help to permanently exclude large segments of the population from participation in and scrutiny over public affairs and deliberation of social alternatives. Further analyses of the various forms of structural violence which are, it would appear, related to this form of political communication (including segmentation, restriction of democratic accountability and of participation) are needed. Political and social knowledge is of course necessary for adequate participation in public affairs, and the educational deprivation of the general population (which I will return to in chapter 5) – perhaps especially in relation to politics - presents a formidable obstacle to democratic self-government. Furthermore, through the centralist mode of conducting political affairs, political elites routinely encourage the estrangement of the population from political deliberation and decision-making, and the reproduction of a quite rigid division of labour in areas beyond the political sphere (in the narrow sense of the term "political") through an elaborate web of state and private practices and apparatuses, which extend to areas like the education system, the dominant segment of the mass media, and so on (Poulantzas, 1978; see also chapter 5). This helps to explain the prevalence of party-political quietism and of political fragmentation of the subordinate classes in recent decades. A system of integral social self-government would, by contrast, enable the development of an integrated democratic network of cooperative free associations, thus extending and deepening social bonds and social engagement among the broad population, whose mutual affairs would be regulated through cooperative democratic control over extended social reproduction. The capitalist system of "representative democracy" eschews the very notion of integral political, economic and social democracy[151].

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[151] Miley (2017, 222) remarked that "the restriction of democratic voice and accountability to the domains of the

There is clearly a need for detailed analyses of popular patterns of engagement and disengagement, and of the varied patterns of fragmentation among the subordinate classes. It is, however, clear that under the capitalist system large segments of the population live a fairly atomised personal and political existence disengaged from any active conception of democratic life. At the turn of the century, eighteen per cent of the UK population were found to have no civic engagement at all, which rose to thirty per cent if voting was excluded (Pantazis et al., 2006). By the end of New Labour's rule there were more members of the Caravan Club than of all UK political parties put together, as just over 1 per cent of the population were political party members, a low figure by European standards (Wheeler, 2011). It is a reasonable supposition that low levels of party membership in turn helped in various ways to further solidify the elitist monopolisation of party politics (including through the increased reliance of political parties on business donations – Ewing, 2007; Leach et al., 2013), contributing to the reduction of participation and democratic accountability[152]. It also seems to be a reasonable supposition (partially based on observation) that the privatisation of political and economic life developed alongside, and partly ensured its continuity due to, the largely private and isolating character of the broad population's existence (as a result of the sharp separation between private and public spheres of life), which contributes to the fragmentation of the subordinate classes. Another associated hypothesis which also requires further analysis is that authoritarian and intellectually degrading influences in various spheres of life, including the frequently distracting consumer culture (which may partially be a kind of compensation for lack of community and lack of freedom in public affairs, as well as in many aspects of personal affairs), the still rather authoritarian education system (see the section on education in chapter 5) and the capitalist anti-democratic "command economy" (see chapter 8 in particular), present significant obstacles to enlightened political engagement (scrutiny, criticism and participation), let alone authentic democratic self-government. There is also a need to examine how these conditions of

legislature and executive, its exclusion from other institutions with direct impact on the lives and wellbeing of citizens, seems arbitrary, if not outright contradictory, and is certainly very difficult to justify on democratic grounds".

[152] More recent trends of popular political re-engagement, especially since Jeremy Corbyn's successful campaign to become leader of the Labour Party, appear to have partly reversed these tendencies. Besides, the decline in party-political membership in the previous several decades may have helped to facilitate influential extra-party forms of political activism and engagement.

contemporary life may facilitate other forms of structural violence, including segmentation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalisation. Bottomore (1973, 122) was convincing in suggesting there was a strong link between broader conditions of life in capitalist society and the political disempowerment and disengagement of the subordinate classes: "Can we accept that democratic government, which requires of the individual independent judgement and active participation in deciding important social issues, will flourish when in one of the most important spheres of life – that of work and economic production – the great majority of individuals are denied the opportunity to take an effective part in reaching the decisions which vitally affect their lives? It does not seem to me that a man can live in a condition of complete and unalterable subordination during much of his life, and yet acquire the habits of responsible choice and self-government which political democracy calls for"[153]. Political disengagement of the subordinate classes (which leads to fragmentation and to the restriction of democratic accountability and of participation) is also likely to be the result of some other contributory factors which I shall now briefly discuss.

As I have already indicated, the capture of internal party life and decision-making structures by party elites (most significantly in the Labour Party) restricted the potential for democratic control and participation, contributing to the political fragmentation of the subordinate and particularly lower classes (especially by neglecting the need to provide adequate impulses, structures and processes for better self-organisation of the party grassroots)[154]. Moreover, it seems a reasonable supposition that party rank-and-file and intellectuals are less likely to remain members and to engage in party-political life if they are structurally and rigidly prevented from shaping party policies. The weakening of trade unions (see Millward et al., 2000; Smith and Morton, 2008; Bryson and Forth, 2011; Brown and Marsden, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Bach et al., 2009; Coulter, 2014), the frequent dislocations and the destabilisation of personal material circumstances of the broad population due to neoliberal change (see for example the

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[153] John Stuart Mill (1963, 186) made the same general point: "We do not learn to read or write (...) by being merely told how to do it, but by doing it, so it is only by practising popular government on a limited scale that the people will ever learn how to exercise it on a larger".

[154] It bears repeating that certain sections of the subordinate class population, including prisoners and undocumented migrants, who face the possibility of being imprisoned in ordinary prisons or in detention camps (an intense form of structural violence the threat of which drastically violates people's security needs), have their individual agential power severely restricted, which, in addition to their generally stigmatised and marginalised status and cultural and material position in society, greatly weakens their capacity for democratic participation in public life.

section on housing in chapter 5), and other asymmetries in the access to necessary political resources are also likely to exert a disempowering influence on the generally under-educated, routinely disunited, and hence resource-poor subordinate classes, thus reinforcing fragmentation, the reduction of democratic accountability and democratic participation. Bottomore effectively sketched out some of these impediments to popular political mobilisation, which reproduce various patterns of social marginalisation:

"Great inequalities of wealth and income plainly influence the extent to which individuals can participate in the activities of ruling the community. A rich man may have difficulty entering the kingdom of heaven, but he will find it relatively easy to get into the higher councils of a political party, or into some branch of government. He can also exert an influence on political life in other ways: by controlling media of communication, by making acquaintances in the higher circles of politics, by taking a prominent part in the activities of pressure groups and advisory bodies of one kind or another. A poor man has none of these advantages: he has no relationships with influential people, he has little time or energy to devote to political activity, and little opportunity to acquire a thorough knowledge of political ideas or facts. The differences which originate in economic inequalities are enhanced by educational differences. In most of the Western democracies the kind of education provided for those classes which mainly provide the rulers of the community is sharply differentiated from that which is provided for the more numerous class of those who are ruled. The educational system in most Western societies does not only consolidate the distinction between rulers and ruled; it keeps alive and flourishing the whole ideology of elite rule" (Bottomore, 1973, 123).

Meanwhile, the elite-managed (corporate and state) mass media (see Weir and Beetham, 1999; Kuhn, 2007; Curran and Seaton, 2009) are likely to have had a disorientating and demoralising effect on the population, possibly contributing to the spread of anomie, cynicism, and a lack of confidence in the possibility of deep structural change, which damage emancipatory initiatives to mobilise citizens for reformist and anti-systemic democratic change. There is a need for further research into these and associated patterns of cultural violence. More specifically, studies could, for example, investigate whether this or some other supposition is closer to reality [155]. The mass media proprietors and managers have quite routinely been

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[155] The directly contrasting notion is that the mainstream state and corporate media routinely support (with their

complicit with other segments of the dominant class in making the scrutiny and control of governments less accessible to the broad public (Weir and Beetham, 1999; Curran and Seaton, 2009).

Alongside the more general and permanent exclusion of the broad population from the experience of actual government in the capitalist economy and under the current "representative" system of political rule (which, as the previous discussion has already noted, often appears to partly negate even more basic forms of democratic engagement, let alone the radical concept of democracy as integral self-government), another demobilising factor which reduces citizen engagement with party politics has very probably been the aforementioned non-proportional "first-past-the-post" or simple plurality electoral system which, as I have already shown, acts as a formidable entry barrier for new and alternative political forces, contributing to the curtailment of democratic control and participation and the political marginalisation of the subordinate classes.

The rise and maintenance of "liberal" market capitalism cannot be properly understood unless sufficient attention is given to the very powerful executive, the largely centralised state apparatus and the highly centralised large capital. This largely centralising model of distributing social power reduces the oxygen needed for the system's internal democratic dynamism, which would be precisely the idea in an essentially elitist system of rule largely designed to maintain and advance the interests of large capital and of political elites, rather than the interests of the disenfranchised broad population, which frequently lacks sufficient powers to hold the dominant class, political and economic elites to account. Within that complex of relationships, including a choice between two major capitalist parties (the Conservative Party and New Labour), periodic elections lost much of their democratic function. The rest of this thesis will provide further evidence for the thesis that the British party-political elites had developed a way of effectively governing in a single-party manner in relation to various policy complexes (e.g. the deregulated financial system, pro-privatisation policy, the marketisation of education, health and housing), despite numerous nuances in the conceptualisation and implementation of these general policy

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choice of topics and with the approach to the analysis of these topics) the ability and the will of the broad population to become adequately politically orientated and to proactively participate in democratic deliberation and cooperative democratic decision-making. It may be difficult to acquire credible empirical confirmation for this notion.

trends.

The electoral system may also have had a limiting effect on democratic accountability due to the fact MPs are elected every five years (in contrast to the demand for an annual or biennial Parliament which was made by the Chartists when they struggled for universal male suffrage in the nineteenth century - Foot, 2005) and MPs are rarely deselected, which makes it more difficult to keep unsatisfactory and unrepresentative MPs in check. Election campaigns are to a large extent determined by the level of financial resources and are conducted through the mass media which are generally committed to – or at least accommodated to - the preservation of the capitalist social system (see Negrine, 1994; Weir and Beetham, 1999; Kuhn, 2007; Curran and Seaton, 2009), effectively excluding candidates and parties which are poorer and are marginalised due to the lack of coverage and support from the mass corporate and state media[156]. In summation, parliamentary rituals and the formal ratification of (some of) the decisions made by the central government, as well as the technocratic rule in various other state institutions, partly serve to mystify and enforce the significant restrictions on democratic control over political, economic and social processes. Various other wider conditions of political life also strongly act against broad citizen participation in and scrutiny over government. In the context of *de jure* and *de facto* privatisation of much of public life (see for example the discussions on education and housing developments in chapter 5), the asymmetry of financial, organisational, temporal, communication, intellectual and other resources at the disposal of the subordinate classes in comparison with the dominant class has disempowered the middle and lower classes, precluding the participatory democratic organisation of political life. Although my discussion has identified the existence of a variety of important checks and balances in the executive and legislative branches of government, it is also the case that a population deprived of real political choice and of sufficient institutional opportunities for significant and regular political involvement is, *ipso facto*, deprived of real political freedom. However, the election of Jeremy

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[156] However, in this context it is useful to note that trade union support for Jeremy Corbyn's Labour leadership election campaign demonstrates the existence of alternative financing options for some dissident politicians (at least within the Labour Party). The relatively effective operation of his campaign through the social media is another useful illustration of the counter-power which can sometimes be marshalled by dissident political actors. Nonetheless, it should also be borne in mind how difficult Corbyn had found being placed on the ballot paper in the first place. As he himself attested (personal communication, 16 June 2015), he secured the necessary support (the nomination of 35 Labour MPs) just a couple of minutes before the deadline for nominations.

Corbyn as the leader of the Labour Party, which has introduced a sharp break with the previous bi-partisan support for the broadly neoliberal socio-economic variant of capitalism, also evinced the continued existence of a significant degree of dynamism which is occasionally present within the British political system.

Concluding Thoughts

I have shown that the British system of government drastically impedes the satisfaction of the broad populations' freedom needs in a variety of ways. One of the major democracy-restricting factors is the absence of a clear separation of governmental powers and of a sufficiently strong and independent mechanism of checks and balances which could ensure a high degree of democratic accountability. The executive and the legislature are to a significant extent fused as the leadership of the ruling party in the House of Commons also controls the executive. The power of the executive is further strengthened (and democratic accountability is further constrained) by its ability to use the powers of the Royal Prerogative, which allows British premiers and the government's inner circle to marginalise the legislative branch of government in relation to many matters.

In addition to its domineeringly protagonistic role in setting the legislative agenda, the core executive also dominates various non-representative functional branches of government including the organs of state coercion, the administrative apparatus, and, in an arms-length manner, the judiciary. The oligarchic concentration of decision-making powers in the core executive is a major obstacle to the democratic (cooperative and egalitarian) sharing of political and social power. The state elite's monopolisation of power in this way constitutes a radical restriction of democratic accountability and of democratic participation.

The strengthening of the power of the Prime Minister under Thatcher's regime, as well as under New Labour (prominently, Blair's government increased the institutional support given to the Prime Minister and limited the decision-making influence of the Cabinet in favour of the Prime Minister's inner circle of advisers and operatives) increase the potential for the curtailment of democratic accountability, as the decision-making concerning the invasion of Iraq, which was even carried out behind the Cabinet's back, tragically demonstrated. Lack of constraints on the oligarchic executive serves to limit its accountability to the public. Indeed, as I have noted, the

political and state elite has been able to systematically ignore the will of the broad population in relation to a wide variety of policy areas.

Under both Conservative and New Labour administrations, Parliament – although it is the highest directly elected governmental body - frequently lacked the structural and subjective means to effectively challenge the executive. Its composition has been based on the non-proportional, single member plurality system of elections which misrepresents the will of the electors, violating their voting rights, marginalising large segments of the population who are left unrepresented and whose electoral voice is misrepresented, and consequently restricting democratic accountability and participation. The restriction of democratic accountability was exacerbated by the development of a rigidly undemocratic internal party regime in the Labour Party in particular, which helped to ensure that MPs voting behaviour and wider political activity was in accordance with the neoliberal and authoritarian expectations of the party leadership. This internal party regime also sharply restricted the ability of party membership to meaningfully participate in party political activities and to hold the party's structures to account. The restrictions of democratic accountability and democratic participation facilitated the general programmatic and policy convergence of the Labour Party with the Conservative Party. This, in turn, intensified the restriction of democratic accountability by restricting the scope of political choice. The ability to subject the political process to democratic control was also reduced as a result of the technocratic mode of government which this policy convergence supported. The narrowing of the coordinates of political choice and discourse was aided by the general lack of real internal party-political pluralism and the increasing replacement – both under the Conservatives and New Labour - of traditional forms of party politics with a technocratic elite consisting of public relations specialists and similar political operatives. This narrowing of political life apparently increased the violence of segmentation and indoctrination, and it contributed to the depoliticisation of large swathes of social and economic policy, which also had the effect of restricting democratic accountability and the scope for popular participation. The technocratic political elite's demagogic approaches to political communication certainly contributed to segmentation and indoctrination, hindering informed participatory democratic engagement and democratic control of political and social processes.

This weakening of democratic control mechanisms and possibilities was further aug-

mented through the elite's systematic efforts to monopolise relevant information (while routinely invading citizens' privacy and keeping significant amounts of data on them). New Labour did not end these data-monopolising practices, although it did introduce a relatively minor relaxation of the rules regarding official secrets. New Labour inherited from the New Right this elitist neoliberal approach to politics, and proceeded to adapt it to its own anti-democratic needs. The prevailing neoliberal type of party politics favoured the goals of technocratic efficiency and executive power, rather than supporting the practices of open democratic dialogue and the cooperative democratic participation in political and wider social governance.

The development of an authentically democratic progressive alternative to the *status quo* has been impeded by various subjective and objective factors, which I analysed in this chapter and throughout the thesis. These have prominently included various asymmetries in the access to necessary social and political resources, which have had disempowering effects on the subordinate classes, reinforcing their fragmentation, limiting their ability to effectively participate in public affairs and to subject social processes to democratic control. The educational deprivation of the broad population, which I will further discuss presently and in the section on education in chapter 5, has been one of the major factors hindering democratic citizenship. This educational deprivation is itself in part a consequence of the privatisation of political and economic life, which isolates individuals belonging to the broad population and fragments the subordinate classes. As I will briefly discuss a bit later, combating educational deprivation requires active movement-oriented education for democratic citizenship, a critical pedagogy of praxis.

The accountability of the executive was also reduced by the legislature's lack of access, time, expertise and various other resources which would be required in order for it to be able to subject the core executive's policies and practices to effective scrutiny. In fact, Parliament's actual oversight over the state's various affairs and structures is in many cases only cursory, partly also because it holds very weak jurisdiction over the various segments of the state apparatus - prominently including the military and the state's secret services – as well as due to its inability to examine the great majority of "secondary" or "delegated" legislation (i.e. statutory instruments, Orders in Council and other forms of "executive law", rules and regulations).

The ability of the broad population to democratically control and effectively participate in the political process and social affairs more generally was severely limited under both Conserva-

tive and New Labour administrations in the analysed period as a result of the increasing political, legal and economic influence of a variety of international and supranational institutions, in addition to the variety of other globalising economic and social processes by which economic and political elites have partly been able to bypass existing forms of (very limited) democratic control on the national level. However, as I pointed out, there are complexities which have meant that in some cases certain international and supranational institutions and systems of government, including the generally anti-democratic EU, also offered some protection from unaccountable actions by the UK government. Other developments, including mass privatisations and the increase in the role of independent and semi-independent agencies, also contributed to the "hollowing out of the state", thus reducing the scope for democratic control.

As I have discussed, Parliament and the political parties of which it is comprised generally lack the structural and subjective means to keep the government executive (particularly its highest echelons) in check. Democratic accountability has especially been restricted as a result of the hyper-centralist internal party regimes (in the case of the major parties), their influence on the selection of parliamentary candidates, and the party leadership's and government's power of patronage, which have contributed to the political influence of the (supposed) parliamentary representatives of the electors being greatly limited by narrow leadership circles.

Far from enabling cooperative democratic control over social affairs, the existing parliamentary system, even when its representative (quasi-democratic) function is more pronounced, is still an elitist form of alienated political power which acts as a substitute for the broad population's democratic participation in decision-making. In other words, the capitalist form of "multiparty democracy" is based on the monopolisation of political and social life by oligarchic clusters of alienated power[157]. Bureaucratic and statist forms of governance (including "state socialist" systems) do not surpass the neoliberal capitalist system which is characterised by severe restrictions of democratic control and participation; these bureaucratic types of regimes reproduce and often deepen forms of alienating political mediation and domination (i.e. they perpetuate the bureaucratic and oligarchic concentration of political and social power).

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[157] Noam Chomsky (2005, 48) succinctly remarked that democratic procedures at best operate within a narrow range in a capitalist system, "and even within this narrow range its functioning is enormously biased by the concentrations of private power and by the authoritarian and passive modes of thinking that are induced by autocratic institutions such as industries (…) Capitalism and democracy are ultimately quite incompatible".

A radical challenge to structural violence requires radically (authentically) democratic structures and processes which would transcend social relations based on capitalist and state domination and violence. A truly democratic, nonviolent republic based on integral democratic self-government requires the supplanting of the "representative" system of government with a network of self-governing councils and assemblies and a delegate system which would allow citizens to assume control over general social regulation, i.e. to direct and control the main social and political processes and to elect (by direct and secret ballot) their political delegates from the basic work-based and territorially-based organisations and communities to which these delegates would, unlike professional politicians in the capitalist system, be bound with direct and concrete material and social interests[158]. Unlike the contemporary system of capitalist "democracy", the delegate system in the context of a system of democratic self-government is not restricted to a formal right of the oppressed members of the population to (very occasionally) vote on which members of the alienated political elite - organised in elite-controlled political parties which seek to monopolise decision-making about public affairs - are going to rule over them (see Vratuša et al., 1979; Jakopovich, 2018a).

The point of the democratic delegate system is "to enable the citizens and the working population to become protagonists of decision-making at all levels of society; to thus enable the largely unmediated expression of the broad population's interests and to foster their political creativity, democratic sovereignty and conscious and egalitarian self-government, cooperation and mutual aid across the entire diapason of economic, social and political structures and institutions" (Jakopovich, ibid.). I shall presently mention some important mechanisms for increasing the ability of the broad population to hold functionaries in political, economic and social institutions truly accountable.

The challenge to deep-rooted forms of structural violence would benefit from analysis of previous radical efforts to combat and eradicate capitalist structural violence. The Yugoslav (proto-)socialist experiment initiated (especially through the reforms based on the 1974 Constitution) the construction of an extraordinary vertically and horizontally integrated system of social self-government based on direct democratic participation (through direct democratic decision-

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[158] In the case of work-based delegates, this would also entail them generally maintaining their employment status in the organisations of associated labour which delegated them.

making in workers' and citizens' assemblies and through referenda) and on a delegate system of economic, political and social decision-making as a near-universal principle of social organisation from the base to the top. In former Yugoslavia, the (highly contradictory and flawed) attempt to develop social self-government was also conceived (at least by the most visionary minds of the Yugoslav revolution) as a way of transcending social relations based on capitalist and state domination and violence. This is how Vratuša et al. (1979, 85) succinctly described the Yugoslav delegate system's mode of operation, at least in theory:

"The major element of the delegate system is expressed in the right of working people in basic self-governing organisations and associations and socio-political organisations to organise delegations for the direct realisation of their rights, obligations and organised participation in the function of the assemblies of socio-political communities. (...) The elected delegations, alone or in conjunction with other delegations with which they share common interests, from their composition delegate delegates into the appropriate councils of the assemblies of socio-political communities and self-governing communities of interest. The delegates remain permanently linked, both through work and through self-governing structures, with the delegations which delegated them, and through these delegations with the basic self-governing organisations and communities. The most important elements which make this link strong and permanent are the basic positions and guidelines which the base gives to their delegates for their work in the assembly, the obligation to keep the base informed about their work, as well as the delegates' accountability to the base"[159].

"Self-governing communities of interest" were also developed as a mode of self-regulating the relationships between the providers and recipients of various social services (I will briefly return to this model in chapter 5). The delegate assemblies of these "self-governing communities of interest" and of other bodies of social self-government were expected to operate through self-managing agreements and social contracts, and the Yugoslav Constitution also promoted the harmonisation of interests of basic organs and communities of self-government by directing the delegations to mutually cooperate and seek to reach agreement on all issues of common interest (Matić, 1979). Attempts to develop an advanced system of authentic democracy in Britain would also require the development of some such cooperative framework of mutual rela-

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[159] For an analysis of the contradictory Yugoslav project to establish social self-government, see Jakopovich, 2018a.

tions between various self-managing economic, political and social bodies. The radically democratic system would integrate the network of workers' and citizens' councils and assemblies horizontally[160] and vertically. This form of governance would spring from the various basic organisations of free associated labour, as well as from municipal organisations and from organisations in various other socio-political communities and institutions, and would culminate in the assembly of democratic delegates on the level of the entire republic[161] (which should transcend the developmentally stifling shell of the nation-state through some form of democratic confederalism[162]).

The Yugoslav sociologist Rudi Supek ([1975] 2015, 6) outlined some of the key principles of the system of democratic delegation which can prevent the distancing of delegates from their social base. Firstly, the self-governing delegate system requires that "the members of the self-governing body are elected for limited periods; the principle of rotation must be strictly observed and excludes perpetuation of power of professional politicians". Additionally, this system requires that delegates are "directly responsible to their electorate (and not to any political organisation)" and that they are "obliged to give account regularly to the community which they represent and subject to recall". Also, delegates "must not enjoy any material privileges"[163]. An-

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[160] Matić (1979, 622) wrote the following in relation to the insufficiently horizontally integrated nature of the Yugoslav delegate system: "Various opportunities were not used: to link up the delegations in municipalities with the delegations in the appropriate organisations of associated labour, communities of interest; inter-city regional and other forms of associating delegations, which would clear up new paths of self-governing integration and self-governing resolution of social problems, without the mediation of the state and other organs".

[161] The radical democratisation of public administration requires a mode of governance which adequately integrates administrative functions and enables adequate public overview of and control over extended social reproduction. In relation to this requirement, Marković (1982, 119) noted that "a tendency of decentralised decision-making (concerning particular social needs) does not exclude a necessary minimum of centralized democratic regulation (concerning the needs of the whole society)". However, as Marković (ibid.) also observed, administrative professionals "may be indispensable for the selection of the most adequate means when the ends have already been defined. But they are poorly prepared for the choice of ends, of long-range projects for the determination of policies. This kind of task requires a different sort of competence to be found in persons of wisdom and integrity across the lines of professional division of labour". The surpassing of alienated political power would reduce the need to closely supervise some technical aspects of decision-making, which would significantly simplify the exercise of democratic self-government, as public policies would be made through participatory democratic mechanisms, including the system of democratic delegates, while strictly democratically accountable public servants would carry out the administrative and technical functions in accordance with these democratically determined public policies.

[162=] Although democratic confederalism is primarily associated with Abdullah Öcalan's (2011) conceptualisation of a type of political order which transcends the nation-state, I use this term in the broader libertarian socialist sense of a cosmopolitan, post-nation state democratic (self-governing) republic, rather than necessarily subscribing to all aspects of Öcalan's specific conceptualisation of such a system.

[163] The Yugoslav philosopher Mihailo Marković (1982, 33) also observed that the establishment and maintenance of the system of democratic self-government required that the delegates do not receive any material privileges or superior status for their public service - "nothing but confidence, respect and love".

other mechanism which would be needed to keep delegates democratically accountable to the base is the institution of the delegation as the mediator between the self-governing organisations and communities on the one side and delegates on the other, thus helping to ensure that delegates remain democratically accountable by participating in assembly decision-making in accordance with the guidelines of their self-governing base[164]. Clearly, this concept of self-government sharply contrasts with the much less democratically accountable system of capitalist "representation" which is founded on the alienated political power over the rest of society being held in the hands of professional politicians/state and party-political elites.

The broad public influence of political parties as "the carriers of the bureaucratization of social life" (Supek, [1975] 2015, 6) partly mirrors the bureaucratised internal relationships within the major political parties. As my analysis has indicated, internal party relations (certainly in the case of all of the major electoral parties) have been based on highly hierarchical relationships of elite domination and members' servility, or at least members' impotent opposition to the domineering party elite. The dominant conception of the party rank-and-file objectifies them as sources of income and as activist "foot soldiers" who are otherwise largely politically inconsequential and excluded from effective democratic participation in party structures. Party members have generally been discouraged from such democratic participation, instead of being encouraged and enskilled to become competent and creative protagonists in decision-making processes. This type of hierarchical and undemocratic internal party organisation helps to establish the ideological and organisational basis for the objectifying and undemocratic positioning of political parties towards the rest of society. "Representative" electoral parties contribute to the bureaucratisation of social life, the perpetuation of oligarchic power of the dominant class over society. Restrictions of democratic accountability and democratic participation on the organisational party-political level help to entrench restrictions of democratic accountability and popular participation on the systemic level. A system of self-governing democracy based on truly democratic

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[164] This is how Matić (1979, 619) put it:

"Since the direct participation of all working people in decision-making in the immense number of self-governing organisations and communities is technically impossible and irrational, the duty of delegations is to enable – through constant activity, by informing the base and delegates, and through initiatives in favour of the taking up of certain positions in the basic organisations and communities of self-government - that the self-governing social base is able to be as influential an actor as possible by participating in an organised, conscious and timely manner in the process of preparing, determining and implementing assembly decisions".

new public institutions therefore requires the abolition of alienated political power above society - "not only of the state but also of political parties and, in general, of all forms of mass organization insofar as they are the carriers of the bureaucratization of social life" (Supek, ibid., 6).

A radically (authentically) democratic conception of political party organisation would be based on the close alignment of political parties with the organs of social self-government, not in order to dominate these democratic organs but instead, as the Yugoslav political theorist Josip Žvan (1967, 821) pointed out, in order to "enskill the working class and the associated producers in general for the functions of self-government" (Žvan, 1967, 821). In a radically democratic system, political parties would be stripped of their commandeering governmental functions and would focus on providing political education, "develop[ing] citizens' initiative" (Žvan, 1967, 820), fostering the development of critical consciousness and helping to articulate the liberatory political and social agenda and strategy without encroaching on the autonomy of the self-governing bodies (Marković, 1971)[165]. Rather than seeking to substitute the self-emancipatory activity of the broad population, transformative democratic political parties would seek to address the problem of uneven levels of education and consciousness among the broad population by educating, enskilling and otherwise empowering members of the subordinate classes.

It is likely that the radical transcendence of the domineering relationship between political parties and the broad population would also entail the transcendence of the objectified position of the party rank-and-file as an aspect of the same transformative process – at least among those parties which took part in this struggle for radical democratisation. Political organisations committed to this process should be expected to develop an emancipatory collective praxis focused on the democratic (political, economic and cultural) empowerment of their membership, which needs to discard habits of obedience and servility if the organisation in question is to effectively foster the broad population's organisational and cultural capacity for democratic self-government. As the libertarian Marxist Anton Pannekoek ([1938] 1975, 103) emphasised, radical democracy "cannot be attained by an ignorant mass, confident followers of a party presenting

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[165] Marković (1981) observed that the authoritarian political party should be replaced by "a political organization that aspires to educate and not to rule, to prepare rational solutions rather than to decide about them, to build up criteria of evaluation rather than to evaluate itself, to engage in dialogue in order to clear up issues rather than to settle them. Under such conditions, the pluralism of political life will (...) be a pluralism of visions, of options, of imaginative approaches in a really free society".

itself as an expert leadership. It can be attained only if the workers themselves, the entire class, understand the conditions, ways and means of their fight. (…) They must (…) act themselves, decide themselves, hence think out and know for themselves". In a similar vein, Rosa Luxemburg ([1904] 2010, 98) warned about the dangers of the substitutionist, bureaucratic approach which perpetuates undemocratic patterns of rule and thus impedes the development of the broad population's capacity for self-government: "Nothing will more surely enslave a young labor movement to an intellectual elite hungry for power than this bureaucratic straightjacket, which will immobilise the movement and turn it into an automaton manipulated by the Central Committee". Luxemburg (ibid., 89) counterposed creative democratic initiative and self-discipline to bureaucratic and oligarchic policing and imposition: "The self-discipline of the Social Democracy is not merely the replacement of the authority of bourgeois rulers with the authority of a socialist central committee. The working class will acquire the sense of the new discipline, the freely assumed self-discipline of the Social Democracy, not as a result of the discipline imposed on it by the capitalist state, but by extirpating, to the last root, its old habits of obedience and servility"[166].

The surpassing of class domination is predicated on the development of mass critical intellectuality. This requires a dialectical emancipatory process of instruction and self-education, so that the old divisions between the order-givers and the order-takers can begin to be transcended. Such a transformative elevation of popular consciousness can take place only in the course of the struggle for the construction of a radically democratic society, in which the working class cannot simply follow the directives of the "sage revolutionary leadership" but must exercise self-emancipatory initiative and acquire the capacity for enlightened self-government.

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[166] Daniel Guerin ([1965] 2017, 63) similarly emphasised the educational effect of democratic participation: "Apprenticeship both in democracy and management (...) inculcates in them [the workers] the sense of their responsibilities, instead of maintaining, as is the case under the yoke of the omnipotent state, millennial habits of passivity, submission, and the inferiority complex left to them by a slavish past".

Chapter 4

PRIVATISATION AND MARKETISATION OF THE STATE

The first part of this chapter briefly remarks on the role of the labour movement and other forms of popular agency in limiting the scope for the neoliberal privatisation drive, as well as on some of the labour movement's key subjective and structural limiting features which facilitated the success of the neoliberal onslaught, including the privatisation of large swathes of the economy. Following this introductory part, my discussion focuses on challenging the main neoliberal arguments about the superiority of private over other forms of ownership, with reference to the actual record of several major privatised industries and services. Having illustrated the ideological and interest-based privatisation agenda, I then also examine the multi-faceted character of the privatising drive, which has included not just direct sell-off of public assets but also contracting out of services to private companies (this includes the system of private rail franchises), as well as other relatively discreet, multi-stage (i.e. creeping) forms of privatisation/"privatisation by stealth" and semi-privatisation (Hall, 2011), which I will discuss in more detail in relation to housing, education and healthcare in chapter 5. The final segment of this chapter revisits the issue of popular agency in resisting privatisation, and is followed by some concluding remarks, in which I especially highlight how privatisation has contributed to the restrictions of democratic accountability and democratic participation.

Considering the complex interplay of objective and subjective, structural and agential factors which drive historical change, as well as considering the very significant variations in the contours which epochal shifts (such as the ascent of neoliberalism) assume in different countries, it is reasonable to question the argument that the rise of the New Right and of their neoliberal project was inevitable. The miners' strike of 1984-5 is an important case in point. The defeat of the strike greatly accelerated the reduction in the power of workers relative to employers (Darlington, 2005), and was itself a part of a longer chain of labour defeats (such as the defeat of

the steel strike in 1981). However, in contrast to other authors' claims that the Thatcher government was prepared to deploy unlimited resources to defeat the miners and that the miners' militancy played to the government's advantage (Goodman, 1985; Adeney and Lloyd, 1986; Taylor, 1993; Routledge, 1993), a number of authors (see Callinicos and Simons, 1985; Darlington, 2005; Cohen, 2006) made a strong argument in favour of the supposition that the miners' failure to employ to a sufficient extent the militant tactics of mass and flying pickets (which they successfully used in the 1972 strike), combined with the demise of rank-and-file organisation and of left-wing networks, as well as a lack of sufficient solidarity industrial action from other trade unions, were some of the crucial factors which contributed to the miners' defeat.

The scale of the industrial resistance, including major conflicts besides the miners' strike (such as the Wapping industrial dispute in 1986), although insufficient and inadequate for the immediate circumstances to which it was responding, very probably also helped to deter the government from pursuing a more thoroughgoing privatisation programme. Other disruptions, including the urban riots/disturbances in Brixton, Broadwater Farm, Bristol and Liverpool in the early 1980s, as well as the mass rebellion against the poll tax in 1990 (which resulted in the removal of this regressive flat-rate tax on every adult), also very probably helped to somewhat constrain and limit the government's privatisation programme, and its neoliberal agenda more generally.

By the beginning of the 1990s, successive Conservative administrations had privatised major national companies including British Telecom, British Gas, British Airways, British Steel, British Rail and British Coal. New Labour embraced, extended and deepened this privatisation agenda. Largely as a result of these waves of privatisations, the contribution of state companies to the UK GDP fell from 12 per cent in 1979 to less than 2 per cent at the beginning of the 21st century (Glyn, 2007). The great Keynesian endeavour was to a large extent annulled.

Nationalisation of industry, which mostly took place in the post-WWII period, played a significant role in easing public planning, macroeconomic management and democratic control over the economy, although even the Labour governments refused to move towards the socialisation of nationalised industries by introducing democratic public ownership. Nonetheless, nationalisation was one aspect of reducing the extent to which social services and the national economy were subjected to the processes of commodification. By narrowing the spheres of

private enrichment, nationalisation also reduced and controlled economic and political inequality. Indeed, the nationalisation of a large segment of the economy increased the resources at the government's disposal that could be put towards the purposes of redistributive policies. Being electorally responsible for the enterprises which it owned, the government was also directly responsible for the well-being of the environment, the well-being of consumers and the well-being of employees, including the equitable distribution of the fruits of labour and respect for trade union rights. As R. H. Tawney observed in 1919, democratic public (and even just state) management of industry "can organise the problem of organising production and distribution as a whole, instead of piecemeal. It can wait, and need not snatch at an immediate profit at the cost of prejudicing the future of the industry. It can enlist on its side motives to which the private profit-maker (if he is aware of their existence) cannot appeal. It can put the welfare of human beings, worker and consumer, first" (Tawney, 1919, 127, in Hannah, 2009).

Much domestic and international experience proves that nationalised industries can be very successful even in narrow economic terms. British municipal enterprises, for example, may have performed better than privately owned ones (Foreman-Peck and Waterson, 1985; Millward and Ward, 1987). Below I shall provide data indicating that, while they were nationalised, industries generally performed much better than they have since they were privatised. Some state-owned enterprises in the 1970s and 1980s were, however, under-performing (Hannah, 2009), at least when performance is measured conventionally, in terms of profitability. Pro-privatisation ideology tended to ignore inconvenient facts as well as nuances, forcing economic analysis into its ideologically predetermined and indoctrinating parameters. The supposed "overmanning" of some nationalised companies (Hannah, 2009), for instance, might be seen both as a liability and as provision of employment to the otherwise unemployed, as well as, in certain cases, a way of helping to maintain health and safety standards and high standards of public service. It is obvious, however, that British nationalised industries did not always perform well even by standards that were commonly agreed on. The nationalised French gas, electricity, railways and telecommunications industries attained significantly higher productivity levels than the nationalised British firms in the same industries (O'Mahony, 1999; Hannah, 2009).

An additional credible rationale for nationalising electricity, water, gas, telecommunications and railways was that these are natural monopolies and a "free market"

might consequently lead to suboptimal output and high prices (Hannah, 2009), in addition to the general need for special public care of these resources. While some previously nationalised industries were formally de-monopolised in the process of privatisation – such as the largest electricity generating company, which was split into three companies (Hannah, 2009)[167] - some other privatisations tended to strengthen monopoly power and monopolistic and oligopolistic relations. They consequently appear to have diminished democratic accountability and to have facilitated the exploitation of consumers and of the general public. The new private regional railway companies, for example, became effective monopolies, which is likely to have greatly contributed to the significant decline in the general affordability of railway travel by facilitating hyper-exploitative profit-making (Brignall, 2009). Rail fares increased by 23.5 per cent in real terms between 1995 (the privatisation of British Rail began in 1994) and 2016 (Department for Transport, 2017)[168]. Additionally, value for money appears to have been negatively affected in some respects, including as a result of train overcrowding, frequent cancellation of services and the Ladbroke Grove, Hatfield and Potters Bar rail crashes between 1999 and 2002 (Parker, 2004).

Various industry regulators, such as the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Office of Water Services (Ofwat), Office of Communications (Ofcom) and the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), appear to have had overly-restricted powers and/or may have tended to interpret their functions in relatively narrow, self-limiting terms (Helm, 2003). This may have

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[167] Yet the newly created regional electricity companies "retained local monopolies" (Sampson, 2005, 287), and "a new National Grid company took over the pylons and distribution system without real competition, while its directors were so relentless in increasing their pay-packets that the company was dubbed National Greed" (*ibid.*, 287). More fundamentally, the state monopolies in various important ways did not function like typical private ones, especially due to (some degree of) democratic accountability of governments and the essentially anti-monopolistic rationale of nationalisations (in the sense of avoiding the social costs associated with private oligopolies and monopolies).

[168] 2013 was the 10th year in a row in which ticket prices rose above inflation (Penny, 2013). Long-distance train fares in England have been found to be by far the most expensive in Europe (Calder, 2013). Most European rail services are state-owned. One study found that the government could have saved £1.2 billion annually by renationalising the entire rail service, as the privatised railway structure led to non-productive increases in cost, to a large extent due to "higher interest payments in order to keep Network Rail's debts off the government balance sheet; debt write-offs; costs arising as a result of fragmentation of the railway system into many organisations; profit margins of complex tiers of contractors and sub-contractors; and dividend payments to private investors" (Taylor and Sloman, 2012, 17). In addition to this cost-inefficient structure of the privatised railway system and the aforementioned high cost of rail travel, consumer value for money has also (among various other factors which I cannot examine here for reasons of space) been negatively affected by the fact that the leakage of funds out of the railway system limits funds available for rail improvements (Taylor and Sloman, ibid.). Especially considering the profit-making orientation of other privatised industries as well, these other spheres of economic activity have doubtlessly also had less then optimal amounts of funds available for production and service improvements.

allowed rent-seeking cartels to develop (or at least often produced continuously increasing prices consistent with the existence of cartels). Privatisation, and the attendant processes of commodification and profit-seeking, have led to large price increases in some other privatised industries as well. Domestic unmetered water charges in England and Wales rose by 39 per cent post-privatisation (even after allowing for inflation), in the period from 1989/1990 and 1995/6 (Centre for Study of the Regulated Industries, 1996). The National Audit Office (2015) report established that the water companies were regional monopoly suppliers to most consumers, and that the average household bill for water and sewerage in 2014/15 represented a 40 per cent price increase in real terms since these were privatised in 1989[169].

The picture is mixed with regards to post-privatisation price changes. Although across-the-board price reductions as a result of privatisation were announced, prices increased (as I have shown) in the case of train fares, water and sewerage bills[170]. On the other hand, average real charges by the privatised telecommunications industry declined by 48 per cent between 1984 and 1999, electricity charges for domestic consumers in England and Wales fell by 26 per cent between 1990 and 1999, and domestic gas bills fell by an average of 2.6 per cent a year in real terms between 1986 and 1997 (Parker, 1999). However, the Competition and Markets Authority

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[169] Most of this price increase, which was significantly above inflation, happened between 1990 and 1995 (under John Major's government), as the Office of Water Services (Ofwat) introduced and maintained stricter control over company charging schemes under New Labour (Bakker, 2001; National Audit Office, 2015). which also gave ministers the right to provide statutory guidance to Ofwat on charging and introduced alternative charging arrangements for vulnerable households, although water poverty remained a major problem (Bekker, 2001). Privatisation and commodification of water provision also brought a lasting abandonment of more solidaristic and equitable practices and agendas, including the aim of inter-regional price equalisation and charging according to people's ability to pay. In its place an emphasis on "efficiency maximisation" (based on each customer paying the actual costs of their usage of the water and sewerage systems) was introduced. As a result of this, in 1999/2000 the average unmeasured water and sewerage charges for domestic customers in the South West were twice as much as the lowest average regional charge for those who were using the services of Thames Water (Bakker, 2001). Although New Labour introduced additional controls on company behaviour, higher service standards and some protections for low-income and other vulnerable groups, it accepted the commodifying approach to this and other essential public service utilities, which entailed treating them as a service to a customer rather than as the right of a citizen (Bakker, ibid.). This approach entails the violation of the human right to water and of people's well-being and security needs. It is also highly exploitative, as the public does not share in the profit from these utilities while having to pay for their costs. The value for money for consumers is also greatly reduced due to the industry's prioritisation of private profit-making over public gain (for example, the financial surplus could instead be reinvested into improvements of the infrastructure): "While pay-outs to shareholders in 2010/11 totalled £1.5bn, this reward is paid for by a negligence that allows 3.4 billion litres of water to leak from the system every day in the UK – (a total that has only) reduced by 5% over the past 13 years" (Northern Ireland Public Service Alliance, 2013, 17).

[170] Beder (n.d.) noted: "The supposed disciplines of the market have been eclipsed by price manipulation by private electricity companies seeking to boost the price of electricity and maximise profits. Price volatility and manipulation are an inevitable function of electricity markets, whatever their design".

(2015) found that the UK's six large energy companies were able to take advantage of their unilateral market power by charging domestic customers £1.2 billion more annually in the 2009-2013 period than they would have in a hypothetical scenario in which competition was more effective. In the case of energy (especially gas, electricity and oil) companies, lack of public control and democratic accountability has been alleged to have contributed to an exploitative oligopolistic collusion in pricing, an unchecked rise in gas and electricity charges (e.g. Scottish Power's 19 per cent increase in gas charges in 2011 alone - King, 2011). Partly as a direct result of the high pricing of heating by the privatised gas and electricity companies, around 30,000 people died annually of hypothermia and related causes at the turn of the century (BBC, 1999b). This constituted a major violation of basic security and survival needs.

In several ways, privatisation also eroded democratic agential power. Unlike public enterprises, there is little scope for democratic accountability (let alone democratic participation in decision-making) in British private businesses, since they are run on essentially authoritarian principles where ownership and managerial rights, shares and money, often trump human rights, workers' rights, consumer rights, environmental and other public concerns[171]. Privatisation implied a concerted, general challenge against the left, the Labour Party, trade unions, and their redistributive welfare state project, along with its accompanying democratising tendencies. The weakening of trade unions (as organisations which can help to foster employers' accountability and workers' democratic participation in the economy) in the process of and following privatisations was achieved by placing them on the defensive, through anti-union legislation, demoralisation, mass redundancies in privatised (previously more often unionised) industries[172] and the reaffirmation of the managerial prerogative in companies which, due to being privately owned, were no longer in the responsibility of the government (see Coulter, 2014; Millward et al., 2000; Smith and Morton, 2008; Bryson and Forth, 2011; Brown and Marsden, 2011; Roberts,

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[171] The fact that some privatised industries, including electricity and water, were taken over by foreign-based firms (Sampson, 2005) did not help to maintain their accountability to the British public.

[172] In most of the major industries that were privatised, there were massive job losses in the immediate pre- and post-privatisation periods, although these job losses to a large degree followed long-term structural trends which in some cases went back two decades or more prior to privatisation. The number of British Gas workers fell from 101,600 in 1979 to 91,900 at privatisation date (in 1986) to 69,971 in 1994, partly due to the widespread use of outsourcing (Florio, 2006). Job shedding in preparation for the privatisation of the water industry in 1989 also facilitated the transformation of this industry into a capital-intensive business. Employment in the English and Welsh water industry fell from 60,000 in 1977 to 30,000 in 1999 (Bakker, 2001).

2011; Bach et al., 2009). This lack of direct political responsibility is one of the ways in which privatisation is likely to have contributed to exploitative private enrichment and a dramatic rise in income and wealth inequality (see especially chapters 6 and 7, which focus on these processes). While some of these inequality-increasing effects of privatisation were more medium- and long-range, others were more rapid. Companies in the financial sector made large and in some cases enormous gains as investors and from legal, consultancy, accountancy and flotation fees (Parker, 2004). In many cases investors prospered from massive rises in share values: "Where privatisation shares were bought at flotation by foreign investors, there was a net welfare loss to the UK due to underpricing; when bought by domestic investors there was a redistribution of wealth from government or taxpayers to domestic shareholders" (ibid., 18)[173].

Private capitalist control also restricted democratic accountability and contributed to the violation of the workers' security and (*ipso facto*) well-being needs in privatised industries[174]. Privatisation also made workers more vulnerable by marginalising trade unions, which helped to hold management to account and were therefore the major obstacles to the increase of managerial prerogatives[175]. In the final analysis, privatisation damaged the public interest and

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[173] Senior management greatly prospered from privatisations as a result of increased salaries and the introduction of bonuses and stock options (Parker, 2004). Within four years of the privatisation of the electricity industry, the same top directors who had led the nationalised companies had nearly quadrupled their salaries (Hobson, 1999). The salaries of 215 members of boards of UK utility companies experienced "a nominal increase of around 600 percent" in the period from before privatisation to 1996 – in addition to obtaining significant stock option schemes (Florio, 2006, 196).

[174] Thus in the water sector, for instance, although job stability post-privatisation improved in comparison to the period of preparation for privatisation, the feelings of job insecurity among workers were significantly increased (Saunders and Harris, 1994), partly as a result of "the employees' lack of information about company long-term strategies concerning sector diversification, mergers, and acquisitions" (Florio, 2006, 200). However, Dessy and Florio (2005) in their analysis of wage trends in water supply, air transport, railways and gas and electricity industries did not find evidence for the expectation that privatisation led to permanent reductions of wages, with the exception of the gas industry in which wages for non-manual workers "permanently" decreased by 8 per cent after privatisation. One possible explanation for this is that it was a result of the reorganisation of the privatised industries: "Increasing wages for employees staying in the same industries are matched by a shift to procurement, and by lower wages in the contracted-out employment" (ibid., 12). Additionally, it should be noted that the wages in privatised companies decreased (often in a modest and gradual way) as a share of value added (Florio, 2006).

[175] The rate of unionisation in the water sector was nearly halved after privatisation, partly because water sector companies "diversified outside their regulated core business into new services (engineering design, laboratory analyses, etc.) in which the unions were not very well represented" (Florio, 2006, 200). The fragmentation of workers was also advanced by the replacement of national bargaining by a decentralised bargaining system which allowed company management to refuse to recognise a particular union without undoing its negotiations and arrangements with other unions. Additionally, the widespread introduction of performance-related pay individualised negotiations, ending the unionisation of managers and increasing the polarisation between managers and workers (Florio, ibid.). The fragmentation of workers through the widening of pay differentials (e.g. between skilled and

facilitated capitalist exploitation by restricting the democratic accountability of privatised industries due to the entrenchment of capitalist control, by facilitating the siphoning of profits into private hands (without even bringing the supposed advantages of privatisation that were promised), and even by decreasing the affordability of products and services and damaging economic growth (see below). Privatisations appear to have strongly contributed to the extension of exploitative (resource extractive) practices of tax avoidance, and in some cases probably evasion as well, since the same motivation for the systematic use of these practices did not exist while the various privatised industries and services – and their economic gains - were still in public ownership. Tax evasion and avoidance by privatised companies are important indicators of their parasitic, highly exploitative positioning in society[176].

Furthermore, the rise in economic inequality has supported political inequality. Private profit advantages capitalist political actors (as, for example, the discussion of party politics, campaign financing and think tanks in chapter 1 indicates) and contributes to the (partial) capitalist capture of the institutions of the state (as I demonstrate throughout this thesis), hence contributing to exploitative and accountability-restricting class policies with discriminate against and marginalise the broad middle- and lower-class population. It seems quite uncontroversial to dismiss the possibility that publicly controlled banks would have engaged in the same kind of democratically unaccountable, reckless and speculative activity that has cost the British state at least £1,5 trillion in the form of bank bailouts, which constituted the exploitative socialisation of private banks' losses (Rowley, 2011). It also, along with the wider impact of the economic recession (including through the loss of tax revenues and the increase in interest rates on government bonds as a risk premium – Ingham, 2016), severely weakened the state's fiscal position. Financial speculation and the economic crisis which it helped to bring about have damaged the UK state budget and economy – not to mention society - in various incalculable ways (including through a massive loss of productive capacity and limitations placed on

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unskilled workers) was largely a consequence of job losses, the weakening of trade unions (perhaps especially through de-unionisation) and the decline of collective bargaining (Parker, 2004).

[176] For instance, it was discovered that Thames Water, a major privatised water utility company, had not paid any corporation tax in 2012, despite a declared profit of over half a billion pounds in that year (Lea, 2013). In relation to Private Finance Initiative (a major type of "privatisation by stealth" which I will later discuss), a report by the Northern Ireland Public Service Alliance (2013, 10) pointed out that near the end of New Labour's rule "the ultimate owners of 90 PFI schemes [were] registered offshore. HSBC Infrastructure paid less than 0.3% tax on £38m profit made on 33 PFI projects [in 2012]".

consumption and public services – Ingham, 2016; also see chapter 6). They also cost the global economy many trillions of pounds. Furthermore, considering the moderation of private pecuniary motives in the public sector, it would seem absurd to suggest that publicly-owned enterprises, especially if they were transparently run, would have supported a comparable development of the exploitative tax avoidance and evasion system, which is presently siphoning enormous riches (also trillions of pounds) from the public purse and transferring them onto the secret accounts of the very wealthy (corporations as well as individuals). The subsidies given by the state to the new privatised sector, the railway companies for example, have also been massive (Hannah, 2009)[177]. These subventions have constituted additional redistribution of wealth at the taxpayer's expense. In this and other ways, privatisation, i.e. the exploitative private appropriation of commonly produced wealth, opened up immense opportunities for the further private appropriation of social wealth (or "accumulation by dispossession" – Harvey, 2003).

Contradicting neoliberal mythopoesis, state-owned enterprises experienced relatively robust growth of productivity in the post-war decades (Foreman-Peck and Waterson, 1985). The newly privatised industries attained a mixed record of success as well as failure in terms of improving productivity, depending on the industry in question (Parker, 1993), and the gains in productivity during the 1980s were actually mainly attained while the later privatised industries were still in state ownership (Bishop and Kay, 1988). Besides, the increase of productivity associated with the privatisation drive was far from being an unambiguous indicator of social advancement, since "this [productivity] growth was largely due to job cuts rather than increased output" (Kitson, 2009, 51). These alleged improvements came at an enormous cost to many people's lives, and at a great cost to the economy (i.e. they led to various negative externalities). One such major social cost was that, in the space of less than a decade, millions of workers in previously state-owned companies were made redundant, and millions of them were then permanently removed from the unemployment register (Briscoe, 2005), at great expense to the taxpayers, to the state budget, to effective demand and to economic stability. Many of the

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[177] Government subsidies enabled the debt financing of rail infrastructure through the Network Rail subsidy regime, which has been instrumental to sustaining the practice of franchising private train operating companies. They are thus able to make very large profits while the public accumulates increasing liabilities as a result of this arrangement (Bowman, 2015). One conservative estimate is that "the public money going into the railways has increased from around £2.4 billion per year before privatisation (in the period 1990/91 to 1994/95), to approximately £5.4 billion per year in the period 2005/06 to 2009/10 (all at 2009/10 prices)" (Taylor and Sloman, 2012).

privatised industries fared badly as well; deindustrialisation in Britain occurred with particular speed (O'Mahony, 2009), which limited the satisfaction of the workers' and of the wider population's security needs. Privatisations also occurred in the most propulsive and promising economic sectors. Some of the most valuable companies listed on the UK stock exchange have been privatised, including oil and telecom companies (Megginson et al., 2005). The privatised British Petroleum (later re-named BP) in 2012 alone made a profit of almost $12 *billion* (BP, 2012), despite massive business problems and gargantuan fines which were brought on by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Bay of Mexico in 2010. Any progressive critique of the ideology and of the policies of fiscal austerity and welfare state reduction should take these kinds of privatisation-related losses to the state budget into account. It was to be presumed that private companies would not take over public enterprises out of altruism, but in order to increase their financial gains yet, instead of restructuring these state firms and developing better management, the state cheaply sold them for the private sector to profit from them, thus contributing to the exploitation of the wider population[178].

In contrast to prevailing assumptions and claims (most forcefully advanced by the capitalist class and its mass media) about the supposed growth-enhancing effects of economic policies which favour the rich, and the alleged growth-reducing effects of policies which reduce inequality, neoliberal policies have failed, both in Britain (Kitson, 2009) and internationally (Chang, 2010), to accelerate economic growth in the last three decades, or even to reach growth levels which characterised the more egalitarian Keynesian "golden age". The neoliberal privatisation argument is also greatly weakened by the fact that "the economic successes of many European economies, such as Austria, Finland, France, Norway and Italy after the Second World War, were achieved with very large SOE [state-owned enterprise] sectors at least until the 1980s. In Finland and France especially, the SOE sector was at the forefront of technological modernization" (Chang, 2007, 110). Indeed, various authors claim that the UK was still an

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[178]Advocates of neoliberalism often make the bold claim (contradicted by aforementioned evidence about most productivity gains having been made in the restructuring prior to privatisation) that these supposedly beneficial financial gains acquired after privatisations could not have happened without privatisations. This could be beside the point (from the perspective of the public good) if the sought-after gains and efficiencies in themselves constituted the exploitation of workers, of consumers and of the general public (including through the negative externalities associated with increased redundancies), at least unless the advocates of such measures were able to show that these adjustments were necessary for the protection of long-term living standards.

economically very successful country prior to privatisations and other Thatcherite reforms, and was one of the wealthiest countries in the world (McCloskey, 1991; Supple, 1994). The comparative analysis of growth rates by Crafts (1995, in Tomlinson, 2009) reveals that Britain's annual growth "shortfall" was less than 1 per cent. Broadberry's (2009) data, although it leads to the identification of some weaknesses in performance during the post-war period, shows that nationalised British industries actually managed to narrow the gap relative to the United States. In a similar vein, Feinstein noted that the UK's comparative disadvantage in growth rates was very small and that the growth rates were lower, like the US growth rates, largely as a result of the fact that Britain and the United States had already attained "a higher level of development" (Feinstein, 1990, 288)[179]. Considering (in addition to all of what I have just mentioned in relation to the question of productivity) that existing data indicate that industry delivers faster productivity gains than the service sector (Feinstein, 1999), and that Thatcher's policies led to speedy deindustrialisation, the entire privatisation argument based on supposedly inevitable productivity failings of state-owned enterprises becomes senseless. Neoliberals managed to set the parameters of change, to foist on society their interpretation of what the "solution" to the economic crisis should have been. This amounted to great cultural violence, apparently including the structural violence of segmentation and penetration/indoctrination (considering the implantation of neoliberal criteria into general political discourse and the obstruction of the fuller view of economic processes, antagonistic class interests and democratic possibilities).

As I document in chapter 7, the hope that the privately accumulated wealth would, somehow, equitably trickle down to the rest of society has been proven to have been entirely misguided. The magic failed to materialise. Instead, inequality exploded on an unprecedented scale, reducing effective demand and destabilising the economy, as chapters 5 and 6 will also show (i.e. leading to negative externalities and to serious impediments to the satisfaction of security needs). It appears that the rise of financialisation as a systemic fix to the trends of overaccumulation (see chapter 6), and as a self-serving method of enrichment – as well as the driving factor behind the greatest global economic crisis since the 1930s - can to a large extent be traced to the domestic and global privatisation drive (including, of course, the granting of

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[179] It is indicative of the UK's highly developed, relatively high-tech economy in the Keynesian golden age that the UK was then among the world's highest spenders on R&D (Tunzelmann, 2009).

independence to central national banks), which has been a major ingredient of the neoliberal assault on economic and social democracy. This restriction of democracy appears to have solidified the decision to abandon the vision of a mixed economy in favour of largely unrestrained private capitalist hegemony.

Privatisation of industry, which was portrayed by the political and economic agenda-setters as a necessary measure to save industry and the country's general economic prosperity, aided a wider macroeconomic shift which powerfully undermined both of these proclaimed goals. Kitson (2009, 52) presented several factors which appear to have been behind the decline of manufacturing following privatisations:

"The relative decline of manufacturing may have been exacerbated by UK macroeconomic policy during the 1980s and early 1990s. 'The overriding priority' of controlling inflation led to periodic overvaluation of the exchange rate which was particularly damaging during the initial monetarist policies in 1979-80 and during the UK's membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Furthermore, the prosperity of the private sector was hindered by the retrenchment of the public sector. The government's attempts to reduce the size of the public sector and public borrowing reduced investment in infrastructure and education".

To this I would add that, considering the capitalist overriding interest in profit-making, it was also to be expected that private capital would seek more profitable investment opportunities overseas (be it in pursuit of cheaper labour, higher-skilled labour, lower infrastructure costs, laxer regulation, or some other comparative advantage). Due to this neglect of use value and of wider social considerations, it was also to be expected that private capital would often privilege private equity investments and other corporate raiding and socially harmful practices above more patient and constructive approaches to economic activity (see chapters 6 and 7). Private equity firms are "powerful associations of money-capitalists" who buy companies cheaply, sell off their most valuable assets and then sell them, massively profiting from the entire exercise (Montgomerie, 2008) and/or, as typically happens, "aim to increase the profitability and market value of an acquired company over a period of three to five years in order to sell it at a profit. (…) Having bought out the shareholders and broken any alliance with the enterprise management, the increased profits remain entirely in the hands of the financial entrepreneurs, further increasing the trend towards the redistribution of the surplus away from wages and salaries to money-

capital" (Ingham, 2016, 160). The prevalence of private equity investments increased under New Labour (Montgomerie, 2008) and "by early 2007 about 20 per cent of all private-sector workers in Britain were employed by private equity-owned enterprises" (Ingham, 2016, 160).

This privileging of quick opportunities for intense profit-making reached its apogee in financialisation and the boom of the narrowly conceived financial sector, whose speculative possibilities enable the acquisition of unparalleled returns. Productive activity in the "real" economy was increasingly perceived as quaint. As a result, the manufacturing sector, a major UK exporting sector (Rowthorn, 2001; Kitson, 2009), was to a large degree abandoned by the state, contributing to the persistent balance of payments deficit (Kitson, 2009) and problems with ensuring effective demand (see chapter 6), which were partially and temporarily compensated by the financial "bubble", as entire UK regions were given over to economic depression (Scott, 2009). These developments constituted structural violence, as they also produced generally unacknowledged negative externalities (e.g. due to unemployment benefits and other benefits introduced to deal with the rise in unemployment following privatisations - O'Mahony, 2009) and the violation of security needs.

Privatisation has also introduced other risks and destabilising, insecurity-producing factors (including the reduction of effective demand due to increased unemployment, stagnation and reduction of wages, newly introduced market prices and the commodification of public services, which I further discuss in chapter 5 in particular) which the state was largely left to absorb (and which it does very inadequately). Many private corporations in the UK are concealing enormous gains from taxpayers (partly acquired through the exploitation of their employees), and UK taxpayers' money has often even been redistributed by the government to leading oligopolistic companies. Hence some privatised corporations have received direct subsidies (*nota bene*: subsidies, not loans) by the government, tax exemptions, and some other indirect forms of state subsidies (Leys, 2003; Self, 2010)[180], which – considering the refusal of

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[180] The privatised British Aerospace received £650 million to construct two new jet models in 1998 and 2000, and in 1997 the government gave £200 million to Rolls Royce's (another privatised company) project of building a jet engine, along with numerous smaller donations to Rupert Murdoch's Sky TV, to Ford, to the lottery company Camelot etc. New Labour's three largest donations to companies up to 2000 "alone, when averaged across the three years in which they were concluded, represent an increase of 130 per cent on the favours distributed by the Conservatives during their last five years in office" (Monbiot, 2001, 349). Other large industries and companies, for

these companies to share their gains with the broad public – amounts to a further exploitation and dispossession of the broad public.

The privatisation of state services and functions complemented the privatisations of many major state assets. I will outline here and in subsequent chapters that the introduction of capitalist principles into previously autonomous intra-state practices brings us to the sphere of "attempts characteristic of neoliberalism to depoliticise economic policy-making by, for example, transferring control over interest rates to 'independent' central banks and franchising out the provision of public services to private firms that allow politicians, bureaucrats and business executives to hide from democratic accountability behind the mantle of commercial secrecy" (Callinicos, 2009, 84).

The privatising agenda of successive governments since Thatcher came to power often unfolded in indirect and relatively discreet ways. Some sectors, including the utilities in England and Wales, where high consumer charges ensured a cash surplus, were directly privatised. In other sectors (including health and education) which did not offer such low-risk profit-making opportunities, the focus has been on contracting out profitable elements of the service, as well as on "public-private partnerships", which provide corporations with steady and decades-long sources of revenue (Shaoul, 2001; Ruane, 2010). Private Finance Initiatives (PFI's), which are perhaps the dominant type of public-private partnerships (ibid.), are contractual partnerships between the public and the private sector where the government takes out "loans" from private finances to provide services or build infrastructure, sometimes even allowing privately-financed consortia to retain the infrastructure after its construction has been repaid with interest by the public sector (Williams, 2006). Moreover, PFI's regularly exceeded by far the financial costs that the government would have needed to carry out the same projects or to provide the same services (Pollock, Shaoul and Vickers, 2002; Pollock, 2004; Pollock and Price, 2010; see also the section on health care in chapter 4)[181]. It is indicative that the Conservative government concealed costs and other details of contracts of the Private Finance Initiative (even from the National Audit

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instance in the pharmaceutical and, of course, the arms industry (as well as privatised railways etc.), also receive massive state subsidies (Leys, 2003; Williams, 2006).

[181] For example, in 1999 it was revealed that a confidential property deal between a consortium of four companies building a Royal Infirmary in Edinburgh and the NHS cost the taxpayers £990 million, instead of £180 million it would have cost if it had been financed by the state (Herald, 19 January 1999 in Monbiot, 2001).

Office), restricting democratic accountability and causing the structural violence of segmentation (by eroding transparency guarantees). New Labour first publicly opposed this covert use of public funds in opposition, then embraced it when in power (Williams, 2006). PFI's "push spending into the future as building costs are paid in an annual rental rather than as lump-sum construction costs. Moreover, more is paid out over the life of the project than would be the case with ordinary contracts. This is because of the considerably higher rates of return allowed to the private sector contractors than the government would pay on its own borrowing (…). Over and above temporary accounting advantages from PFI, the contractor constructs and often then manages the whole project" (Glyn, 2007, 43-44). PFI's appropriate the public assets and taxpayers' money, semi-covertly transferring many vital and profitable parts of the public infrastructure into private hands without formally privatising them. In this way, companies are "sustaining their share prices by turning public capital into private cash. The purpose of the Private Finance Initiative is to deliver the assets of the state to the corporations" (ibid., 92). The exploitative PFI model epitomises the *leitmotif* of the neoliberal transformation of the state: the capture of numerous major social institutions and processes by private corporate interests. Recent administrations have begun to introduce private procurement of government contracts for various services that were hitherto the preserve of state authorities. Consequently, even private prisons and private military companies were allowed to be established, which facilitated exploitation and limited democratic accountability (see Pozen, 2003; Kotz, 2010).

Between 1987 and 2003 private provision of goods and services rose from 37 to 48 per cent of the UK government's current expenditure (Glyn, 2007). The introduction of outsourcing and competitive private tendering was largely a neoliberal decision oriented towards supporting private profit-making, which is indicated by two points (even without the more direct study of political decision-making and agenda-setting processes). Firstly, the explicit cost-saving agenda reflects the replacement of broader social reasoning and meaning by narrowly economic, capitalist rationales. Secondly, although one review established that the contracting out of previously public sector services to the private sector led to 10-30 per cent cost savings (Domberger and Jensen, 1997) - possibly through an increased rate of exploitation through the greater use of casualised labour than may be the case with public sector workers - there is no proof that these cost-cuts were a result of privatisation *per se*, rather than of the introduction of

competition and tighter financial control, which need not be achievable only through privatisation and contracting out of previously public services to the private sector (Glyn, 2007). As my further discussion (in the following chapter) of the processes of privatisation and marketisation in the spheres of education, healthcare and housing will demonstrate, the incontrovertible fact is that private provision of goods and services expands the scope for the processes of capitalist commodification and for the dispossession of the broad public in the interest of the capitalist class.

Concluding Thoughts

Rather than having been inevitable, Thatcher's successful privatisation drive reflected the prevailing balance of class forces in that period. While the balance is historically contingent and dynamic, the forces of labour failed to successfully increase and mobilise workers' counter-power.

Cohen's account (2006) reveals some of the "subjective" and strategic roots of this epochal failure. The increased labour militancy in the late 1960s and 1970s managed to exert very significant economic and political influence (the miners' strike in 1974 even played a major role in the downfall of the Heath government) but it did not transcend the earlier limitations of most trade union organisation and activity, namely sectionalism, economism and the lack of a transformative strategy. The "Winter of Discontent", a mass strike wave between late 1978 and early 1979, failed to sufficiently build workers' counter-hegemony, but it indicated the potential for it.

The dominance of reformist and bureaucratic trade union ideology acted as an impediment to powerful movement building and the sufficient mobilisation of workers' resistance – the development of workers' counter-power - that was needed to effectively challenge Thatcher's regime. Consequently, union bureaucracies (including workplace officials) systematically, across a broad range of industries and industrial disputes, obstructed the development of rank-and-file workers' organisation. This severely damaged workers' ability to effectively resist the Thatcher government's agenda, as union democracy – workers' self-

organisation - is a crucial source of workers' power (Cohen, 2006; Parker and Gruelle, 2005)[182].

Effective picketing and solidarity action was also obstructed. The attempt to form a public sector trade union alliance was consequently delayed until it was too late (union leaders appear to have only embarked on this project following the defeat of the 1981 steel strike – Cohen, 2006). Although the series of defeats which the labour movement experienced in its struggles against the Thatcherite agenda was not simply the result of the structural forces of capital and of its state, it led to a great demoralisation among the workers and the unions, as it strongly promoted the idea that "there is no alternative".

It would appear that one of the major impediments to the strengthening of organised labour in the period of New Labour rule, in addition to the structural, ideological and cultural trends that were especially set off under Thatcher's rule, was the focus of most large unions on cultivating the partnership with the Labour Party instead of with progressive social movements. This union orientation largely persisted even despite New Labour's unequivocally neoliberal capitalist, statist, militarist and imperialist agenda, and despite its general unresponsiveness to the many unions' and the TUC's continued loyalty to it (Coulter, 2014). Had the unions pursued (and been capable of pursuing) a much more confrontational and democratic model of anti-systemic social movement unionism[183], it is possible they could have powerfully constrained New Labour's regressive agenda, and perhaps even built the foundations for a powerful democratic counter-hegemonic challenge to the ruling neoliberal capitalist and imperialist regime. One important conceptual framework and model for this ambitious, counter-hegemonic

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[182] In addition to broad empirical evidence presented by the authors cited above and many others, research by Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1998, 20) on tactic- and strategy-related differences in outcomes in union recognition elections found that rank-and-file-based organising campaigns built through worker-to-worker communication and collaboration achieved "win rates that were 10 to 30 per cent higher than traditional campaigns". "Top-down" and centralist organising campaigns were successful in 38 per cent of cases, while 67 per cent of rank-and-file-based campaigns were successful. Summarising the findings of this study, Cohen (2006, 153) wrote: "Sometimes referred to as 'internal organising', the simple tactic of getting unionised workers to organise the plant, office or store next door has clearly worked".

[183] Social movement unionism is characterised by union outreach to social movements, engagement in wider issues of social justice and commitment to union democracy (Hyman, 1997; Moody, 1997). As I remarked elsewhere (Jakopovich, 2011b, 74): "In accordance with its overall goal of maximising workers' democratic power, social movement unionism is committed to a comprehensive approach for change which also advances the broad interests of the working class beyond the workplaces, in the communities, through corporate campaigns, and on the national and international political scene". The more democratic class unions such as the Italian COBAS (Comitati di Base - 'committees of the base') unions and CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), or the French SUD (Solidaires Unitaires Démocratiques) unions, are some of the leading positive European examples of the kind of grassroots-led, social movement unionism which is rare in Britain.

form of social movement unionism was provided by the trade union movement COSATU (the Confederation of South African Trade Unions) in the 1980s in South Africa. Notwithstanding some of COSATU's limitations (such as its limited conception of democracy and its failure to stand up to ANC's accommodation to the existing capitalist and statist order), this approach built a powerful alliance between the labour movement and civil society organisations, welding labour and community struggles and helping to organise a mass rebellion against the Apartheid regime (Hirschsohn, 2007; Lethbridge, 2009)[184].

As this and other chapters demonstrate, the failure of progressive forces to achieve counter-hegemony has enabled state and corporate elites to extend and intensify the appropriation of socially produced wealth. I have provided evidence to show that this process relied on the structural and cultural violence of indoctrination and segmentation which centred on the misrepresentation of the performance record and performance potential of nationalised industries, the reification of "market realities" and the obstruction of the view of democratic public ownership as a possible progressive alternative both to private and state ownership. With the aid of ideological and material violence, successive Conservative administrations by the early 1990s achieved a historic privatisation of state assets by (cheaply) selling off most of the major national companies. In this way, the state elite enabled the private sector to exploit these companies (which had received decades of public investment) as vehicles for private profit-making (i.e. siphoning the fruits of surplus labour into private hands). Both Conservative and New Labour governments deepened the exploitation of the public by redistributing taxpayers' money to these privatised companies through direct and indirect subsidies, tax exemptions and tax reliefs. Furthermore, privatisations tended to strengthen monopolistic and oligopolistic relations which reduce democratic accountability and thus facilitate the exploitation of consumers and of the general public. Oligopolisation and privatisation as such (as a result of the

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[184] In terms of the strength of their democratic challenge to class-based structural violence, the great libertarian socialist labour unions of the first half of the twentieth century – especially the Spanish CNT – may still be unparalleled (see Peirats, 2010; Jakopovich, 2007). In contemporary Britain, the internal structures of all of the major unions are highly bureaucratic. Democratic labour activity therefore generally needs to take the form of rank-and-file organisations and networks operating within union structures as well as from without, entirely independently of union bureaucracy in some cases. However, union militants should refuse to just focus their energies on forming small breakaway unions, which would entail isolating themselves from the mass of less advanced workers, effectively turning their backs on workers who remain in large bureaucratic unions, and therefore strengthening the bureaucratic elements in those unions (see for example Darlington, 2014).

attendant processes of commodification and profit-seeking) sustain high prices and in some cases led to price increases, most prominently in the case of rail fares and water charges, while telecommunications-related, gas and electricity charges were actually reduced. Problems with affordability of services were exacerbated by the emergence of new private monopolies and oligopolies, which in many cases led to major violations of basic security and survival needs (e.g. in the case of tens of thousands who died from the effects of hypothermia because they couldn't afford to have heating). Affordability problems and some price increases continued under New Labour, which accepted the general commodifying approach to public service utilities, although industry regulators in the case of some utilities moderated price increases during the Labour government in comparison to the faster increases under the Conservative administrations (e.g. water charges rose most under John Major's government). Labour also introduced some additional controls on company behaviour, improved service standards and some protections for low-income and otherwise vulnerable groups.

Privatisations appear to have strongly contributed to the extension of exploitative (resource extractive) practices of tax avoidance and evasion, as well as the processes of financialisation and various related forms of economic activity based on highly exploitative short-term and speculative profit-seeking (prominently including private equity investments). These as well as other factors, including rising salaries for senior management and the introduction of bonuses and stock options, have greatly contributed to the increase in social inequality. The narrow-minded pursuit of profit also led to mass redundancies, which resulted in the severe violations of the workers' security, survival and well-being needs. Mass redundancies also led to major negative externalities in the form of increased costs for the taxpayers and the state budget. Increased unemployment and increased inequality both had as their consequences the reduction of effective demand and economic stability. I shall further discuss the link between inequality and the reduction of effective demand and economic stability in chapters 6 and 7.

Furthermore, privatisation greatly facilitated the restriction of democratic accountability and democratic participation. The transfer of ownership and control into private hands restricted the (already limited) means of democratic control over company activity, since private companies (in Britain as elsewhere) are run on essentially authoritarian principles. The decision-making rights and powers of company owners and managers have been strong and extensive,

while the rights of the community and wider society to regulate company behaviour have in general been very limited, and the right of workers to participate in the running of the companies has been practically non-existent. As a major aspect of the concerted right-wing attack on left-wing forces and the trade unions, privatisation and the process leading up to it also reduced democratic accountability in companies and over the economy by resulting in mass redundancies in privatised industries, which contributed to the weakening of trade union organisation and the reaffirmation of the managerial prerogative. Job losses and the associated decline of trade union organisation and of collective bargaining, as well as the use of outsourcing, led to the fragmentation of the workers, including through the increase in pay differentials. The fragmentation of workers in turn weakened their collective agential power, thus helping to reinforce the restrictions of democratic accountability and of democratic participation.

Furthermore, the increase in economic inequality has supported political inequality since greater material resources advantage capitalist political actors (as I have already shown in chapter 2). This is one of the major ways in which privatisation has also contributed to exploitative and accountability-restricting state policies which discriminate against and marginalise the subordinate classes.

Most major privatisations in the form of direct sell-off of state assets took place in the 1980s and the early 1990s. New Labour accepted this Conservative legacy and focused on deepening the privatisation process, primarily through the contracting out of public services to private companies, the promotion of public-private partnerships and Private Finance Initiatives in many areas of social life, including transport, the military, education, healthcare and other public services (Parker, 2004). The following chapter (especially the sections on healthcare, education and housing) will focus on these forms of creeping privatisation, whose common denominator, as I shall show, is the restriction of the workers' and the broad population's ability to democratically control economic, social and political processes.

Chapter 5

THE WELFARE SYSTEM

The initial part of this chapter puts the character of the UK welfare system and changes to it into a historical and international context. I then examine the regress of the welfare state under the Conservative and New Labour administrations, followed by discussions of changes to the tax system and to pension provision. In the concluding section, I outline how the regress of the welfare state has been based on restrictions of democratic control. The analysis in this chapter provides a basis for the discussion of poverty and income inequality in chapter 8.

The Regress of the Welfare State

The quite rapid increase in UK welfare expenditure which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s was in line with a general trend among OECD countries (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000; Johnson, 2009). It followed the general Keynesian reliance on the welfare state as a tool of demand management (as well as a tool for providing important services outside of the limitations of the market), and was hardly profligate. In fact, "the UK had both the lowest overall growth rate of social expenditure and the lowest rate of growth of real benefits of the seven major OECD countries over the 1960-75 period" (Johnson, 2009, 223-224; OECD, 1985)[185].

More egalitarian and welfarist policies, such as those that the Scandinavian countries carried through, do not seem to necessarily harm national economies. Indeed, the period of particularly high UK welfare expenditure growth in the 1950s and 1960s is now known to academics as the "golden age" of post-war development, for it was characterised, along with similar trends in various European and other countries (Chang, 2010), by "the strongest and most sustained economic boom ever experienced by the developed economies" (Johnson, 2009, 227;

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[185] However, as Ginsburg (2001a) noted, Britain's social expenditure as a percentage of GDP was slightly above the OECD average in the 1960s, only to fall below the average following "Thatcherite" reforms.

see also Johnson, 1986). The notion that high government spending harms growth is particularly unfounded[186]. In his study, Sala-i-Martin concluded that "no measure of government spending (…) appears to affect growth in a significant way" (Salai-i-Martin, 1997). Lindert (2004) found that countries with high levels of government spending do not perform any worse in conventional economic terms in comparison with countries which have low levels of government spending. The OECD's thorough historical analysis also "failed to reveal an inverse relationship between public sector size and economic performance as reflected in GDP growth rates, unemployment rates and inflation rates, or between public sector growth and inflation rates" (OECD, 1985, 15). Johnson (2009, 227-8) noted:

"Between 1960 and 1981 the country with the highest growth of social expenditure, Japan, also had the highest annual growth rate of GDP, while the UK had the lowest growth rates of both GDP and social expenditure. Germany, the other stellar economic performer, had the highest share of social expenditure as a proportion of GDP of all the major OECD countries in both 1960 and 1981. (…) Since Britain has, for much of the post-war period, spent less on welfare state transfers and services than many of its major competitors (…), it is difficult to see how the welfare state could have been responsible for the relatively poor growth performance in the British economy. In fact, high welfare expenditure financed by progressive taxation clearly has a positive macroeconomic impact in terms of automatic stabilization of the economy".

These cross-country and historical indicators demonstrate the potential economic benefit (even in conventional economic terms) - of greater institutional and structural commitment to satisfying human welfare needs. The UK governments' restrictions of welfare provision have been contributing to wider economic insecurity (I will elaborate on this in chapter 6). Detailed comparative analysis may be able to provide further evidence for this point.

A large public sector (which need not be bureaucratically-run and can also be partially decentralised, mutualised, cooperative and put under participatory democratic control) appears to be a necessary factor in ensuring egalitarian social and economic development. Widely accessible high-quality lower level and higher education, good healthcare and decent housing

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[186] I am here merely illustrating the incoherence of the supposedly "performance-oriented" neoliberal ideology. The fetishism of growth, with all its devastating ecological consequences, is one of the main ingredients of neoliberal ideology, despite the distinctly poor results of neoliberal regimes (in comparison to Keynesian regimes) in this regard.

correlate with higher levels of social and economic innovativeness, as the Scandinavian social democratic experience powerfully indicates (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). A large public sector, neoliberal propaganda notwithstanding, tends to be positively correlated with a "community spirit" and broad civic engagement: "Among the advanced Western democracies, social trust and group membership are, if anything, positively correlated with the size of government. Social capital appears to be highest of all in the big-spending welfare states of Scandinavia" (Putnam, 2001, 281). High welfare expenditure may therefore not only be good for social well-being and a more equitable distribution of wealth. Humane social policies, including non-market provision of healthcare, housing, education and social care, may contribute to short and long-term economic prosperity, dynamism, stability and development (Wilkinson and Pickett, op.cit.). This is what the anti-egalitarians have tended to omit in their attacks on the welfare state, and what egalitarians have failed to emphasise enough when they attempted to defend it. The economic recession of recent years and heightened economic instability in recent decades of neoliberal supremacy (Woolf, 2009; Harvey, 2010; Foster and McChesney, 2012) underscore the conclusion that this is not "the best of all possible worlds".

The principle and popular expectation of the universality of social services partially limited the ability of neoliberal political elites to undermine the welfare state. As Mishra (2014, 23) pointed out, neo-conservatives were constrained in their efforts to effect a retrenchment of universal social services such as healthcare, education and old-age pensions, and "the major reason for this would seem to be the widespread and continuing popular support for these services. Since they are enjoyed by all or the vast majority of income classes and social groups, the constituency for them is nation-wide". Drastic "frontal" attacks on some of the major public services (especially healthcare and partly education as well) have generally not been considered politically feasible. The drastic plans against the welfare state which were made by the Central Policy Review Staff (the government's policy institute) in 1982, including proposals to deindex the social security benefits, to replace public healthcare with a private health insurance system and to end state financing of higher education, provoked a strong public outcry and resistance when they were leaked. This pressurised the Conservative government into issuing a series of promises that such sweeping measures have been ruled out (Mishra, ibid.; also see the section on healthcare below).

The efforts of classical social democracy to maintain a relatively generous welfare state had entailed a commitment to a (somewhat) redistributionist and decommodifying notion of social justice and greater social equality (Crosland, 1956). The controlled and gradual regress of the welfare state was to a large extent an aspect of a wider assault on the existing redistributive and decommodifying tendencies in the British system. This regress of the welfare system included – with certain variations between Conservative and New Labour administrations (which I will note) - the development of a regressive taxation system; the partial retreat from the principle and practice of universality in welfare provision; the sharp move towards a less generous, more disciplinary, more humiliating and disempowering benefits and wider welfare system; the move from a (somewhat) redistributive welfare system to one which is more supportive of private profit-making and inequality; the weakening of pension provision; the commodification, stagnation and even weakening of housing and healthcare provision. The latter two aspects of welfare provision are examined in the following sections, while the former aspects of welfare regress are discussed in the following subsections.

The System of Taxation

The neoliberal attack on the welfare state had quite dramatic effects on the level of social inequality, including wealth inequality. The Institute of Fiscal Studies conducted an analysis which concluded that half the increase in inequality could be attributable to the changes in the tax and benefit system (Goodman et al., 1997), demonstrating the link between the restriction of welfare provision and the rise of inequality as the entrenchment of exploitative redistribution patterns. In terms of income poverty, Glasmeier et al. (2008, 3) noted (on the basis of data from the UK Department of Work and Pensions and using the standard objective measure of relative poverty, i.e. households with less than 60 per cent of the median income) that "the number of people in the UK living in poor households (…) doubled between 1979 and 1997, from just over 7 million to over 14 million. The total then fell by 2 million over the subsequent seven years up to 2004-5, but then rose again to 13 million in 2005/6".

Johnson noted that "comparing the 1978/9 tax/benefit system with the 1994/5 system, it can be shown that the poorest one-tenth would have been 40 per cent better off in 1994/5 if the

1978/9 tax/benefit system had still been in place; only the richest tenth of the population gained unambiguously from the intervening tax and benefit changes" (Johnson, 2009). These changes supported exploitative economic patterns. The New Labour government failed to significantly reverse these regressive redistributive trends (Johnson, 2009).

The system of relatively progressive taxation was a result of redistributive and welfare policies which reached their zenith during the post-WWII years of Keynesian systemic compromise between private, state and social interests. It developed to a large extent in response to public outrage at the inequities of unfettered capitalism. In turn, the recent reversal of this historic compromise is directly linked to the onslaught of neoliberal material and ideological counter-hegemony. Indicating the relevance of tax reductions for corporations and the wealthy, deregulation of economic practices, the lowering of welfare standards and "wage restraint", increasing productivity and so on – neoliberal ideology successfully preached that private enrichment would trickle-down to the rest of society (thus ending the need for Keynesian redistributive measures). This coincided with the political ascendancy of the New Right which, as I have already noted, included the partial disempowerment of existing mechanisms and tools of partial democratic control over capital (like the trade unions, left-wing Labour Party factions and semi-autonomous local authorities).

The trends towards reducing the tax burden on the wealthiest individuals and on corporations, as well as towards an increase in the use of tax evasion and tax avoidance, were of course international (Lansley, 2006). The UK state policy and the private sector stood at the forefront of some of these practices, particularly through the operation of major tax havens on British territories (Shaxson, 2011). The arguments in favour of reducing the tax burden of the rich typically revolve around the unquestioning insistence on retaining and encouraging "business confidence" and "private initiative". If this was really the case, it would still effectively mean that corporations have been blackmailing the public to let them get away with paying less (and in some cases very little) in taxes. Thus, if the claims about the need to retain low levels of taxation in order to retain corporate investment were correct, the nature of this arrangement would still constitute the restriction of democratic accountability and the corporate exploitation of their privileged economic position.

The Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher redistributed the tax burden from

earners of capital to income earners, from the rich to the poor (Leys, 2003). Top income tax rates fell from 83 per cent (and even 98 per cent for investment income) to 40 per cent during her time as Prime Minister (HMSO, 1992), which supported the exploitative and regressive redistributive patterns largely based on the extraction of workers' unpaid surplus labour, profit-making through interest and the exploitation of consumers. Simultaneously, the Thatcher administration increased VAT, an indirect form of taxation felt most by the poorer sections of the population, from 8 per cent to 15 per cent (HMSO, 1992), facilitating the exploitative neoliberal pattern of the poor giving more so that the rich could give less. Future governments also laid emphasis on indirect, regressive forms of taxation (such as the VAT) and lower income tax in the name of providing better incentives for work and enterprise (Glynn, 2007). The changes in the tax system led to a radical reversal of state policy and ideology, to a point where the tax system became (formally) barely progressive (in terms of taxing wealth as well as income), and in reality (considering tax avoidance and tax evasion among the richest segment of the population) regressive (Lansley, 2006). The regressive nature of the taxation system contributes to capitalist exploitation because it sustains and exacerbates the capitalist expropriation of the subordinate classes.

The general taxation trends turned Britain into a low-tax country in comparison to the EU and G7 averages at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Clark and Dilnot, 2009). Yet the overall tax burden (all taxes and social security contributions as a percentage of GDP) actually rose from 39 per cent in 1979 to 43 per cent in 1989 (HMSO, 1992), with the increased charges largely falling on the subordinate classes, as I have already indicated. According to Gilmour (1993), the real incomes of the poorest 10 per cent of the UK population dropped by 6 per cent (after housing costs) in this period. In 1979 the bottom fifth of the population was found to have accounted for 10 per cent of after-tax income (excluding hidden income of course); by 1989 their share of income was found to have fallen to just 7 per cent. The top fifth's income share (not including income concealed through tax avoidance and evasion), however, apparently increased from 37 to 43 per cent (Gilmour, 1993). The "Thatcherites" of all parties were deceitful about these exploitative redistributive trends in their vociferous ideological attacks on the social democratic and socialist perspectives. However, New Labour did raise the top income tax rate from 40 to 45 per cent in 2009 and to 50 per cent in 2010 (Eaton, 2012).

Even in the stronger days of the UK welfare state, social welfare contributions ensured that wealth redistribution occurred mainly *within* the work-dependent population or the broadly defined working class, i.e. from the employed to the unemployed, as a form of collective social insurance (Glyn, 2007). Considering the fact that this form of welfare provision limits the progressive character of the redistribution of wealth, it also helps to sustain exploitative economic patterns.

The Crisis of the "Left Hand of the State"

While it initially may have appeared that the welfare state is going to be resilient to the general "liberal" market capitalist trajectory[187], the changes brought in since the removal of the Conservatives and the rise of New Labour brought into doubt, and the subsequent coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats appears to have to a large degree disproved that presumption (Atkinson et al., 2012). Even prior to the advent of neoliberal hegemony, Poulantzas (1978, 43) recognised that "through its activities and effects, the State intervenes in all the relations of power in order to assign them a class pertinency and enmesh them in the web of class power". The internal dynamics of the "liberal" market system, the capitalist state and the corporate elites appear to ceaselessly work to extend the reach of the capitalist market, including by commodifying and undermining the social provision of welfare, at least where it is not fundamentally important (from the standpoint of ensuring continued class domination) to maintain them at their previous levels and in their previous forms. The wider changes in society have to a large extent removed the political and economic base on which the old welfare state had relied for its existence. This has included the shift away from the "social state" and welfare in favour of finance (in particular) as an alternative source of economic stimulus (see chapters 5 and 6), the strengthening of the globalised capitalist influence on the state, the weakening of the Labour left and of the trade unions (see Shaw, 2007; Coulter, 2014; Millward et al., 2000; Smith and Morton, 2008; Bryson and Forth, 2011; Brown and Marsden, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Bach et al., 2009), extensive privatisations, the "marketisation"/commodification of public services

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[187] Indeed, initially it was. The Thatcher administration avoided frontally attacking some of the pillars of the welfare state, especially in her first term (Taylor-Gooby, 2001).

(including through semi-privatisations, PFI's and the outsourcing of public sector activities to the private sector), the corporate capitalist oligopolisation of large segments of the mass media (see Kuhn, 2007), and the reduction in local government autonomy (Gamble, 1988; Leach et al., 2011). This ideological and policy shift has relied on the use of a globalisation discourse which, as I already quoted earlier, is "a means of abrogating certain welfare obligations. This is a period of 'state denial' in which big government absolves itself of certain welfare functions, by presenting itself as incapable of dealing with technological, demographic and global forces beyond its control" (Doogan, 2009, 119).

In reality, neoliberalism constitutes only the crisis of the "left hand of the state" (Bourdieu, 2003), of social Keynesianism rather than of the more structurally violent, coercive and militarist state structures and functions. The neoliberal policies behind the decline of social housing, of the NHS, the education system, of wages, employment, the benefits system and other forms of welfare provision (which my ensuing discussion will examine), appear to have been partially complemented with the rise of the coercive state, the intensification of coercive state measures and the expansion of the prison system (Hall et al., 1978; Cohen, 2003; Jamieson and Yates, 2009; Prison Reform Trust, 2011). The number of prisoners in England & Wales sharply increased from 45,000 in 1992 to 85,000 in 2010 (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2014)[188]. Imprisonment, as a direct and partly physical form of structural violence, sharply restricts prisoners' human rights, individual agency and human dignity. Further studies are needed in order to attempt to assess the (real or likely) aggregate impact of the policy of mass incarceration on structural violence in UK society, as well as to examine the structural violence which is being committed against prisoners' friends and families. They are usually the unacknowledged "collateral damage" of the current penal system.

The expansion of the carceral system, along with its principle of violent objectification, was a major aspect of the neo-conservative authoritarian populist emphasis on "law and order", which included a xeno- and ethno-racist dynamic as well (Jamieson and Yates, 2009). New Labour, despite the perception (largely a veneer) of greater liberality, expanded and deepened

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[188] This is despite reoffence rates rising instead of falling as the prison population expanded (Dugan, 2008), and despite the study conducted by the New Economics Foundation which established that the annual cost of imprisoning a young offender is £140,000, which is about six times as much as it would cost to send them to Eton (Doyle, 2010), where children of wealthy parents are, in effect, sent to prepare for (social, economic and political) rule.

this reactionary "law and order" agenda through the introduction of new criminal offences, longer prison sentences, harsher prison and youth offender regimes, ASBOs, the increase in surveillance, the intensification of xeno-racist violence, the imprisonment of terrorism suspects without trial, etc. (Hall, 2011)[189]. The New Labour government's involvement in the terroristic "War on Terror", as well as its complicity with the US's "rendition" (kidnapping) and torture programmes, were further manifestations of the resurgent "right hand of the state" under New Labour rule.

It was simultaneously with these authoritarian developments that the "left hand of the state" was assailed. A battery of government measures in the decades since the start of Thatcher's administration has constituted a significant restriction of welfare provision. The ideology of residual welfare provision for the poor and the destitute has replaced the (mostly social democratic) universal welfare ideology (Clark and Dilnot, 2009)[190]. Consequently, means-testing

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[189] In recent years, racist structuring of the "criminal justice" policy terrain, which helps to fragment the subordinate classes (especially on the basis of xeno-/ethno-racist and culturally racist stereotypes), was also increasingly characterised by anti-Muslim racism. The proportion of Muslim prisoners in UK prisoners increased from 7.7 per cent in 2002 to 13.4 per cent in 2012 (Harding et al., 2017). The incarceration of undocumented immigrants (many of them are refugees from wars which the UK played a part in starting) in "detention centres" is another major and drastic form of structural violence which strongly intersects with class-based structural violence in various ways, including the pressure this places on unincarcerated undocumented immigrants to acquiesce to their continued superexploitation and political and social marginalisation which severely restricts their various human rights and their capacity for democratic participation, in addition to the role their marginalisation plays in the fragmentation of the subordinate classes. Class-based factors in the cultural and structural violence of indoctrination, segmentation and fragmentation against criminalised and dehumanised social pariahs (including at least some people who are - or are suspected of having a greater potential to become - violent offenders, sex offenders, offenders involved in property-related crimes, etc.) also frequently intersect with various biological disadvantages. These include mental health problems, various personality disorders and mental disabilities. Social misfits may not actually have a "trans-historically" constituted disability or disorder. In other words, perceived mental disabilities and disorders can also be social constructs (for example, the American Psychiatric Association only removed homosexuality from its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1973 and the World Health Organization only removed homosexuality from its International Classification of Diseases in 1990 – Drescher, 2015). Violent objectification and exclusion are the central principles which inhere in the notion of punitive deterrence. Ruthless criminalisation as the process of "othering" (of troubled, disadvantaged and deprived individuals and groups) provides the socio-cultural substrate for the entire capitalist system of domination. As Angela Davis (2011, 43-46) pointed out: "Democratic rights are defined in relation to what is denied to people in prisons (…) all over the world. This is a flawed conception of democracy". We need to "think more deeply about the very powerful and profound extent to which such practices inform the kind of democracy we inhabit today". For discussions concerning ways to overcome these various intersections of violence and oppression through the project for a radical prison abolitionist democracy, see Davis, 2011; Critical Resistance Collective, 2009; Jakopovich, 2018b.

[190] However, in contrast to the ideology about the universality of post-war social insurance schemes, many people, mostly women, were not covered in the post-war period, or had only a very limited contribution record, which made them ineligible to receive benefits (including unemployment, maternity, sickness and other benefits as well as National Insurance pensions) in their own right, so that many married women derived their pension rights on

has replaced the previous, more universal welfare system, perhaps most importantly through the residualisation of council housing, although the practice of universal state welfare is still present in the (rather basic) provision of basic services such as education and healthcare. It appears that nothing has been left entirely intact, however. The provision of healthcare, even within the NHS, has been readjusted so it would increasingly rely on exploitative (profit extracting) private companies, as I will show in the section on healthcare below. Council housing has been reserved mostly for the "marginal" segments of society, and it has largely been replaced by an increasingly exploitative, profiteering private renting sector (as shown in the section on housing below). The quality of the various other public services has been reduced under the weight of marketisation and cost reduction and "productivity saving" targets which undermined the existing service ethos (Leys, 2003; Pollock, 2004). The UK also advanced a welfare system with, by Nordic standards, low public spending on pensions and healthcare, weak employment protection and weak trade union rights (Leys, 2003).

Despite the increased welfare demands due to rising living costs (see especially the section on housing), a drastic fall in the proportion of the economically active population as a result of economic change, especially under Conservative rule (O'Mahony, 2009), in addition to a rise in (low-waged) single parenthood (to 1,3 million in 1991) and a rise in the proportion of the elderly population from 13 to 18 per cent of the total between the late 1950s and mid-1990s (Johnson, 2009), social security spending remained stable in the period between the mid-1980s and the end of the twentieth century, reflecting the "rather tight control of benefit rates, which have mostly fallen relative to earnings since 1979", as well as "the move away from contributory benefits to those tested on incomes" (Clark and Dilnot, 2009, 375). This restrictive benefits regime sharply limited welfare provision and, by curtailing the previous progressive redistributive character of the welfare state, it additionally contributed to the exploitation of the subordinate classes through the reduction in the quality and the scope of welfare provision and by increasing the requirement of citizens to satisfy their needs through coercive additional

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account of their husbands' contributions (Ginsburg, 1992). Furthermore, Hakim (1989) estimated that in the mid-1980s around 7 per cent of the labour force was in regular paid employment without receiving National Insurance coverage. Around 80 per cent of these were women, most of whom were in part-time and low-paid work at home. The existence of a casualised economy and of undocumented migrant workers may have actually increased the number of workers who were not covered by National Insurance to over 10 per cent of the labour force.

payments for healthcare, education, housing etc.[191] The abandonment of the universal welfare ideology in favour of means-testing also contributed to the fragmentation of the lower class into the "deserving" (including some working families with children and the disabled – Ginsburg, 1992) and "undeserving poor", as well as into the benefits-receiving and unsupported fractions of the working class[192]. Xenophobic and ethno-racist discourse was also cultivated by right-wing state and media elites in order to create a perception of "scarce resources" and to foment an ethno-racist competitive attitude among the broad population with regard to welfare provision[193]. The structural and cultural violence of fragmentation of the subordinate classes was based on other socio-psychological mechanisms, including venting, a phenomenon in which "victims of systemic violence and humiliation take out their frustrations and resentments not on their perpetrators, who are stronger, but on others, whom they find close at hand and who are weaker" (Miley, 2017, 225). Beedell et al. (2013) found that the residents living in poor areas of Bristol didn't direct their *ressentiment* against the rich and powerful but instead engaged in venting against vulnerable individuals (such as single mothers, ex-prisoner benefit-claimants and people

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[191]Women have long tended to lose the most from benefit cuts, as "the great majority of social assistance claimants are women, which is in part a reflection of the failure of the social insurance system to protect women and give them an independent income" (Ginsburg, 1992, 153; also see UNISON, n.d.).

[192] Further investigations (especially social psychological investigations) of the repercussions of these processes would be very useful.

[193] In fact, rather than immigrants being a drain on a country's resources, immigration tends to confer various rarely acknowledged economic advantages on the country which receives them. This includes a saving in terms of avoiding the social costs of supporting these workers during their childhood and adolescence, and - in the case of workers who come unaccompanied by their families – infrastructural savings including housing, education, healthcare, transport and other forms of social infrastructure (Gorz, 1970; Sivanandan, 1976). Gorz (1970, 29) made the claim that "the fact that the developed capitalist countries thus save a whole range of different social costs, and shift the burden of these costs onto the less developed countries, making them subsidize monopolist development, is economically important". However, the country receiving immigrants does experience pressures on housing and social services, although it should also be noted that "all the evidence suggests that migrants – especially migrants from the new EU states – are net contributors to the public purse, not a drain. The most comprehensive study on this topic found that the latter paid in via taxes about 30% more than they cost our public services. In particular, they were far less likely to claim benefits and tax credits, and far less likely to live in social housing" (Portes, 2013). Migrant workers also improve the demographic ratio and "research for the government's Migration Advisory Committee found that migrants imposed less than proportionate costs on the health and education system. This is mostly a natural consequence of the fact that migrants are more likely to be young and healthy, and health spending goes overwhelmingly on the old and sick" (ibid.). Sivanandan (1976) remarked that a fraction of the saving accrued from the use of ready-made migrant workers, as well as from their contributions to the government budget through the system of taxation, would have been enough to sufficiently replenish the housing stock and improve living conditions.

with disabilities who are tenants in social housing), on account of their perceived "benefit scrounging"[194].

In the context of the move away from the more universal and somewhat more generous Keynesian and social democratic principles of welfare provision, income support has, through various changes that have been introduced (especially since the Conservative Party came to power in 1979), been transformed "into a much less generous and more disciplinarian system" (Ginsburg, 1992, 155)[195]. Various forms of social assistance, perhaps especially income support for the unemployed, have increasingly functioned in a way which reinforces class discipline and class structure by playing "a central role in enforcing labour discipline or 'work incentive' ", with benefit levels for unemployed claimants being so meagre that they ensure "that there is little incentive to refuse low-paid employment" (Ginsburg, ibid., 153). Sharp restrictions of welfare provision continued under New Labour. Research by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2011) established that out-of-work benefits for a single adult of working age amounted to 40 per cent of the weekly minimum of what people think they need, while a couple with two children received 62 per cent of the weekly minimum[196]. In line with general exploitative, agency- and welfare-restricting trends analysed in several other parts in this thesis, the restructuring of the social welfare and employment systems was to a large extent oriented towards supporting the commodification of labour, especially as it facilitated the development of a flexible, non-

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[194] This dehumanising, scapegoating dynamic is complemented by an anxiety-producing neoliberal ideology of achievement and self-sufficiency as a virtue, which leads some workers' to project their "heightened fears and doubts about one's own worth on to others, the 'undeserving', the 'leeches', the 'scroungers', especially in times of increasingly precarious and scarce employment" (Miley, 2017, 226). This cruel narrative frequently destroys the underdog's sense of self-worth, leading to intense feelings of shame and even self-loathing (see for example Greenwood, 2017).

[195] Various changes between 1979 and 1988 reduced total benefits expenditure for the unemployed in real terms by around "7 per cent of the total which would have been spent if the 1979 system had remained unchanged" (Ginsburg, 1992, 156). In rare contrast to this contraction of the welfare state stood the Youth Training Scheme, which was set up in 1983 (based on Labour's temporary Youth Opportunities Programme), and was costing around £1 billion a year by the mid-1980s. It may not have been brought about without popular resistance to Thatcherism, including in the form of the "inner city riots" of 1981 (Ginsburg, ibid.). Restrictions of public services disproportionately affected certain categories of the population, including the poor, ethnic minorities and women (see Ginsburg, ibid..

[196] In the context of neoliberal structural, ideological and cultural hegemony (which is largely a product of intense structural and cultural violence), the declining rate of unemployment benefits coincided with the broad public's increasingly harsh and unrealistic assessments of the character and level of these benefits. NatCen Social Research (2011 in Miley, 2017) found that the percentage of the British population which agreed with the statement that "unemployment benefits are too high and discourage work" increased from around a third of the population to over 60 per cent between 1983 and 2011, while support for the statement that "unemployment benefits are too low and so cause hardship" declined from over 50 per cent to just 20 per cent of the population.

unionised, insecure workforce, willing (or effectively forced) to accept work in poor conditions and for small wages. By increasing the risks of unemployment, this erosion of welfare provision is likely to have helped to discipline the workforce, and it has compelled – under successive Conservative and New Labour administrations - many benefit claimants to engage in "workfare", i.e. to work in order to receive unemployment benefits (e.g. Ginsburg, 1992; Daguerre, 2004). Workfare and the influence of the restriction of welfare provision on the commodification of labour more broadly have restricted individual agency and supported exploitative work arrangements which violate well-being and security needs and restrict democratic participation and democratic accountability by entrenching the subordinate and dependent position of the lower class in relation to the capitalist class.

Various accompanying phenomena supportive of structural violence emerged as a consequence of the aforementioned changes in welfare provision. The Thatcher government's radical neoliberal restructuring of class relationships, misrepresented as "an attack on the big state", created a greater dependency on the state as a result of the sharp rise in unemployment (which I will further discuss in chapter 8) and of the increased demand for state benefits (Clark and Dilnot, 2009). The dependence on in-work benefits helps to facilitate employers' exploitation of workers (especially since the state eases the financial burden of employers by helping to ensure the basic reproduction of labour power). These benefits also help to facilitate the sustainability of high levels of unemployment (by partly compensating for the failure of the labour market to ensure the basic reproduction of this labour power). This produced and sustained various social costs (see especially chapter 8), including the violation of the security needs of the unemployed population and of those at (real and/or perceived) risk of unemployment.

The supposed concern over the budget deficit (supposedly due to the "big state") as a rationale for restricting welfare was also misleading because budget deficits were not characteristic of the "Keynesian era". Indeed, the Keynesian "golden age", which was characterised by a rather centralised and continually growing state expenditure, was also notable for its usually balanced budgets, "not least because of the 'feedback' effects of high employment and growing tax revenues" (Tomlinson, 2009). Yet again, the "liberal" market economy, as recent

years have dramatically demonstrated, fails to deliver the very goods which it is supposed to be able to deliver more successfully than a Keynesian or social democratic regime could.

An additional contrast between the stated aims of the neoliberal approach to welfare and its actual results can be found in the way in which, especially in more recent years and following three decades of wage repression (Lansley, 2010; TUC, 2012; McNally, 2012), segments of the population on benefits have found it financially more sensible to stay off work than to seek these low-paying jobs and lose (or risk losing) their benefits (Robinson-Tillet and Menon, 2013). This is another way in which the state has helped to sustain workplace exploitation (as well as the exploitation of the taxpaying public as a form of negative externality) and, arguably, also the alienation of meaning (since staying off work was made more economically beneficial than working in low-paying jobs – despite the political elite's rhetoric about its determination to tackle welfare dependency).

Changes in welfare provision have enabled elite free-riding. Various state benefits to the working poor (including Working Tax Credits, which were introduced in 2003 for low-paid workers over 25 - Alcock, 2014) constitute a massive taxpayers' subsidy to employers (Whittaker, 2012), such as the giant retail oligopolists, who are thus able to keep their workers on the (very low) minimum wage without (at least in most cases) jeopardising the basic reproduction of labour power. Conservative estimates based on the figures by the Institute for Fiscal Studies suggest that as much as £300 million in additional in-work benefits and tax credits are borne by the taxpayer as a result of private contractors paying many of their workers a "living wage" (UNISON, 2013)[197]. The housing benefit has rightly also been dubbed "the landlords' benefit", since it involves the state paying for the high rents to house the unemployed as well as the working poor (for whom there is often no council housing available). It is (in contrast to

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[197] Furthermore, by making low-paid employment more attractive, New Labour's introduction of working tax credits encouraged the move from welfare to work (Alcock, 2014), which helped to expand the pool of workers and job-seekers and therefore also facilitated exploitative downward competition over wages and conditions. Another problem with tax credits (and other benefits, especially those that are means-tested) is that many of those eligible to receive them do not take up these benefits, either because they are unaware of their rights or are unable to claim them, e.g. because they find it too complicated (Alcock, ibid.). For example, the Department of Work and Pensions (2010 in Alcock, ibid.) estimated that the take-up rates for Working Tax Credits were 55-59 per cent (by number claimed) and 72-81 per cent (by amount of money claimed). Furthermore, tax credits, in common (as I have already noted) with other benefits, sometimes lead people into a poverty trap, as they face the withdrawal of these benefits if their wages increase. As I have already mentioned, this, in addition to increased tax and National Insurance contributions, creates incentives for the recipients of the benefits not to seek to increase their wages (Alcock, ibid.).

proclaimed neoliberal ideology about the superiority and sufficiency of the "invisible hand" of the market) designed to moderate the effects of the privatised housing market, at enormous expense to the taxpayers, helping to prolong the existence of an inflated and exploitative housing market and to deflect demands for the more affordable council housing and for rent controls. In early 2013, the housing benefit amounted to £23 billion, or around 10 per cent of the overall welfare bill (Kober, 2013). In other words, a large proportion of the state welfare budget is oriented towards sustaining the enrichment of private landlords through the exploitative expropriation of UK taxpayers. So much for the sanctity of citizens' private property, "socialised"/undemocratically confiscated through taxes and then privatised again. The various aforementioned facts regarding the economic inefficiency of the neoliberal approach to the provision of welfare are indicative of a structurally violent system which produces immense avoidable harm to human well-being.

The prevailing political assumption in contemporary Britain appears to still be that in order to ensure the longer-term sustainability of the system, some services must remain at least partially independent of the profit logic. The still to a large extent socialised nature of the NHS has been one of the strongest examples of this principle. In addition to the unpopularity (among large sections of the population) of strong cuts on some forms of social welfare and various aspects of social spending (like the NHS), trends including the demographic pressure of an ageing population (which requires greater allocation of resources for pensions, disability benefits and healthcare – Chang, 2010) and the continued problems of unemployment have contributed to the overall stability and even slight increases in UK social spending near the end of New Labour's term in office (Johnson, 2009), despite neoliberal economic reforms. UK social spending as a percentage of GDP rose from 17.9 per cent in 1980 to 21.8 per cent in 2001 (Glyn, 2009). These figures, however, should not obscure the changes in the structure of welfare provision, the decline in social protection that is offered to individuals and the changes in the form of the delivery of social services (see Doogan, 2009).

New Labour also continued the practice of subjecting benefit claimants to strict (and routinely very rigid) means-testing (Leys, 2003), which meant that welfare provision was strictly limited (as I will show in chapter 8, the fraudulent claiming of benefits was a massively exaggerated problem), regardless of the existence of permanent structural unemployment under

neoliberal capitalism[198]. Furthermore, New Labour reduced benefits for the disabled and single parents in addition to promoting a "welfare to work" programme for getting young unemployed people to work for their benefits (for large corporations which are in this way able to exploit state-subsidised labour) and to seek and uncritically accept offers of employment (Leys, 2003), which led to a limitation of their individual agency and, arguably, at least in some cases, of their human dignity (as a result of this, often humiliating, curtailment of individual agential power). The post-social democratic state has to a significant extent shifted from the (always limited and contradictory) ethic of service and care towards an attitude of rigidity and belligerence towards its citizens. In so doing, as chapter 7 will further substantiate, the state has exhibited a disregard for the goal of ensuring the adequate satisfaction of well-being needs by ending severe restrictions of welfare provision and by challenging the exploitation of the middle and lower classes by the capitalist class. It put "large new resources into policing social security benefits fraud while drastically cutting back on safety and health inspection and the policing of tax evasion, especially by businesses; shifting the tax burden from the rich to the poor (to 'reward enterprise'); and tolerating the development of a 'black economy' (estimated in 2000 at between 5 and 8 per cent of GDP) among small businesses and self-employed manual workers" (Leys, 2003, 53).

Britain's distributive patterns have in recent decades been among the most anti-egalitarian in the Western world (Luxembourg Income Study, 2003; Glyn, 2007). Yet, despite negative effects of lowering aggregate demand and increasing personal insecurity and social inequality, the consensus among the Western and British political elites has long posited that combating public deficits should happen through reducing social welfare instead of raising taxes (European Commission, 2000). Consecutive Conservative governments initiated widespread cuts in most forms of social security, while New Labour broadly followed the pattern of degrading the character of the welfare system in accordance with the post-social democratic, neoliberal system that was inaugurated in the late 1970s.

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[198] Poulantzas was correct when he wrote that "unemployment relief is itself directly geared to reproduction of the capitalist work ideology [since] in no case must assistance allow claimants to forget the abject and humiliating character of the unemployed workers' situation" (Poulantzas, 1978, 187).

However, as I have noted, New Labour did also introduce various additional forms of assistance for the poorer segment of society which, in addition to some changes in the system of taxation, represented a partial shift away from the very regressive character of Conservative tax and benefit reforms. Research by Adam and Browne (2010) examined the impact of the tax and benefit changes under New Labour by comparing the tax and benefit system in 1997 with the 2009-2010 system. This comparison adjusted for price inflation (and taking into account the impact of regressive indirect tax changes) found that New Labour's tax and benefit changes raised the incomes of the poorest two tenths by a little over 15 per cent, while leaving the incomes of the richest three tenths largely unaffected. The second comparison which they made was based on the adjustment of the inherited system according to average incomes. The use of this benchmark showed smaller gains in the income for the bottom four tenths (3-4 per cent), but it also showed small losses for the richest four tenths (of up to 2 per cent), which indicated that the changes may have been mildly redistributive (at least as long as the existence of concealed income of the very rich and the super-rich is disregarded). UK public social expenditure as a share of GDP substantially increased under New Labour, from 18.3 per cent in 1995 to 23.8 per cent in 2010 (OECD, n.d.).

The attitude towards and treatment of non-citizens by the state has tended to be particularly uncaring, so they have been systematically marginalised by the welfare system. Immigrants were lawfully denied access to social assistance (Ginsburg, 1992), as they largely continue to be. In particular, the approach to asylum seekers' welfare needs by Conservative and New Labour administrations has been characterised by the intensification of xeno-racist structural violence. Before the 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act, asylum seekers had the right to the same welfare benefits as UK citizens, although at 90 per cent of the normal rate, and they were also able to claim housing benefit if they needed assistance to cover rent. The 1996 Act stripped asylum seekers of all of their rights to housing and financial support if they "failed to claim asylum at a UK port of entry" or if they "received a negative decision on their asylum claim or appeal" (Fekete, 2001, 30). New Labour's approach was characterised by a particularly intense emphasis on deterring non-EU immigration, which centrally entailed not just a highly authoritarian and dehumanising "points-based" approach to allowing immigrants entry and stay in the country, along with an elaborate and draconian system of surveillance and control to

enforce this points-based immigration system, but also a highly restrictive and punitive approach to those who were already resident in Britain. New Labour's 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act reconceptualised and reorganised the provision of housing and social care for asylum seekers as a matter of immigration control, placing asylum seekers under the increasingly totalitarian "care" of the Home Office. The New Labour government also introduced the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) as a section of the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Department to regulate asylum seekers' entry and settlement in the country using a range of new control mechanisms (Fekete, 2001). Those asylum seekers who manage to pass the NASS destitution test are given accommodation and transportation to the part of the country which the NASS had selected for them. The asylum seeker's consent or lack thereof is considered irrelevant. This is a regime of totalitarian control which strips asylum seekers of their dignity, restricting their human rights, individual and collective agential power[199].

Changes in Pension Provision

Pensions (as a major form of welfare provision) were also significantly restricted for broad segments of the population both during and following the Thatcher and Major Conservative governments (see Ginsburg, 1992; Leys, 2003; Blackburn, 2003 and 2006; Doogan, 2009). In 1988, the Thatcher government undermined the indexed State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS, introduced in 1978 to supplement the basic flat-rate pension) by basing future pensions on whole lifetime earnings rather than the best twenty years, as well as by inducing people to opt out of SERPS in favour of occupational pensions and private pension schemes (Ginsburg, 1992). The membership in occupational pensions schemes had stagnated since the mid-1960s at around half of the labour force, "with the young, part-time women

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[199] In April 2000, asylum seekers' rights, dignity and individual autonomy were also assaulted through a national scheme replacing cash benefits with NASS vouchers, which were set to be worth only 70 per cent of income support, just £36.54 per week for a single person over 25. These vouchers were legitimised as a way of preventing asylum seekers from "shopping around" Europe for the "best deal" on social security benefits (Fekete, 2001). They had to be "spent at designated supermarkets. Any change for unused portions of the vouchers [was] pocketed by the retailer. (…) Just as the pink triangle and the yellow star of David marked out gays and Jews as 'deviant', vouchers [branded] asylum seekers as fraudsters" (ibid., 34-35). In 2002, these vouchers were scrapped in favour of cash payments following criticism by various campaign groups and a riot and fire at the Yarl's Wood "detention centre"/concentration camp (BBC News, 2002).

workers, short-service workers, older new employees and unskilled manual workers unlikely to be covered" (Ginsburg, 1992, 151)[200]. In the decades preceding the end of New Labour rule, Britain was increasingly moving away from the notion that employers are morally and legally obligated to provide substantial pensions to their employees. Those "final-salary" or "defined-benefit" pension schemes (which guarantee pensions as a fixed proportion to employee earnings, but their calculation has moved from the employees' final salary to average salary – Doogan, 2009) that still existed were very rarely open to new employees by the end of New Labour rule, and were therefore set to disappear once the existing members of these pension plans died (Peston, 2008). Private sector employees in some cases saw the withdrawal of salary-indexed schemes altogether (Doogan, 2009). The impact of the various restrictions of pension provision was moderated by the New Labour government's introduction of pension credits for poorer pensioners in 2003. Thirty-five per cent of pensioners qualified for this credit in 2004 (Blackburn, 2006). It is important to note that pension credits also increase negative externalities and exploitation since they constitute the socialisation of costs which would otherwise have to be borne by employers.

An analysis by several unions (PCS et al., 2013) noted the major trends in relation to private pension provision. The number of private sector workers participating in defined benefit schemes fell from 34 per cent in 1997 to 11 per cent in 2012, although corporate profits in the same period remained relatively stable. This constituted a further restriction of welfare provision and a further reinforcement of exploitative unequal distribution of socially produced wealth. The small minority of private sector employees who were still in a defined benefit scheme just after the end of New Labour rule received the average pension that was very similar in amount to the average pension which public sector employees received – which amounted to "less than half the income of a full-time worker on the national minimum wage" (PCS et al., 10)[201]. Private sector

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[200] In addition to excluding these and unemployed segments of the population (including women engaged in unpaid housework) from coverage, existing pension schemes also led many, most often women, into the "pension trap" by lifting people financially just enough to make them ineligible to receive other forms of social assistance. Yet pensions were sufficiently meagre in some cases that in 1985 36 per cent of pensioner households were also eligible to receive other benefits (Walker et al., 1989). In addition to aforementioned reasons, women were also more exposed to poverty in old age due to their greater longevity (on average).

[201] Women (ibid.) and ethnic minority employees in the private sector were likely to experience particularly severe restrictions of pension provision due to the gap in income, and many of the jobs in which they are more likely to end up or even predominate (including catering and cleaning roles) do not include any pension provision.

pensions have collapsed in the first decade of the twentieth century (i.e. during New Labour's term in office) from covering almost half of all private sector workers to only a third of them participating in workplace pension schemes. In addition to increasing the levels of pensioner poverty, this resulted in increased costs (negative externalities) to the taxpayer through various types of social assistance (pension credit, housing and council tax benefit, as well as additional healthcare and social care costs – ibid.). While so many workers have been stripped of their pensions, "the directors of large companies continue to net very generous pensions averaging £175,000 per year in retirement" (ibid., 9). The removal of employee pensions has also facilitated exploitation by enabling senior management to increase its salaries, as well as to increase profits for shareholders. Furthermore, workers' pensions were also cut when numerous pension funds experienced financial losses following the stock market crash, although private sector pensions receive massive subsidies by the taxpayer. The report by PCS et al. (ibid., 10) pointed out that "research by Richard Murphy shows that private sector pension schemes received £37.6bn in tax reliefs in 2007/08 – that same year they paid out pensions worth only £35bn. As Murphy states, 'Pension fund performance over the last decade has been a history of almost perpetual loss-making despite the enormous subsidies.' A quarter of that pensions tax relief goes to the richest 1%". These are extraordinarily exploitative patterns of pension provision.

The report by PCS et al. (ibid.), which also effectively demonstrates how public sector pension provision was restricted, notes that the private employers' severe restrictions of pension provision for their employees have been used by right-wing social forces to provoke their envy and resentment towards public sector employees. This fragmentation of the subordinate classes also contributes to the structural and cultural violence of indoctrination and segmentation by, among other mechanisms, helping to mystify the simple fact that the inferior position of private sector employees in relation to pension provision is due to the actions of private sector employers rather than being the fault of public sector employees.

The cost of public sector pensions was in fact been quite stable and low, with the median payment at the end of New Labour rule being around £5,600, while the average pension for a woman worker in local government was just £2,600 (Independent Public Service Pensions Commission, 2011). The Labour government also renegotiated public sector pensions to the

detriment of public sector workers, capping future pension costs and raising retirement age for new workers to 65. These changes, which forced existing workers to work longer into their old age while preventing many younger people from finding work, severely violated the well-being needs of members of the subordinate classes.

Moreover, the PCS et al. (ibid.) pointed out that the state pension actually declined in value between the early 1980s up to the end of New Labour's rule – from being worth 25 per cent of the average male worker's wage to just 15 per cent. This indicates the significant degree of restrictions of pension provision. At the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century France spent "over twice as much on pensions as the UK, Germany two-thirds more. The truth is that the basic state pension is currently £102 a week, worth only 57% of the government's official weekly pensioner poverty level of £178. Two and a half million pensioners in the UK live below that level. Even before the above inflation energy price rises this year, 3.5 million pensioners lived in fuel poverty" (ibid., 11). This also led to negative externalities (increased costs to the taxpayer) in the form of pension credit, housing and council tax benefit, as well as additional healthcare and social care costs. Additionally, the broad public has been harmed by the exploitative pattern of how tax relief is distributed: "a quarter of all tax relief on pensions, amounting to more than £10bn annually, goes to the richest 1% in the country" (PCS et al., ibid, 11).

As this short overview of changes to the pensions system has shown, both public and private sector pension provision deteriorated in the 1979-2010 period, under both Conservative and New Labour administrations. The restriction of pension provision included a decrease in pension coverage and size of pensions, as well as its postponement to (in most cases) 65 years of age. These changes produced negative externalities in the form of higher social costs (including pension tax credit which New Labour introduced). Furthermore, pension tax relief disproportionately benefited the richest pensioners, resulting in additional exploitation. As a functional aspect of the neoliberal system, the current UK pensions system contributes to the exploitation of the subordinate classes by supporting the anti-redistributive patterns in the wider neoliberal economy.

Concluding Remarks

As I have shown, successive Conservative and New Labour administrations presided over the regress of the welfare system. The Conservative administrations established an exploitative, regressive taxation system which New Labour did not fundamentally challenge. Both Conservative and New Labour administrations partially abandoned welfare universalism in favour of a less generous, more disciplinary benefit and welfare system. While it did not radically challenge these restrictions of welfare provision and also engaged in systematic xeno-racist structural violence, New Labour introduced a range of tax credits and in-work benefits which alleviated the financial situation of some of the poorer segments of the population. However, rather than constituting a solidaristic, socialist attempt to challenge social inequalities, this approach promoted an individualist focus on immediate personal gain through state transfers which also help to maintain the exploitative housing, labour and other markets by "mopping up" some of their consequences (negative externalities). In other words, this constituted regress from the functioning of the welfare system as a form of wealth redistribution (although mostly *among* the subordinate classes) to a type of welfare which is increasingly geared towards supporting – both ideologically and materially - the further enrichment of the rich. This highly differentiated approach based on the abandonment of welfare universalism and on bureaucratic paternalism (with its disciplinary welfare approach towards some of the most vulnerable people in society) contributed to the fragmentation of the subordinate classes, weakening their collective agential power and therefore impeding the potential for democratic accountability and participation.

While both under the Conservatives and New Labour the welfare system was supportive of private profit-making, public social expenditure increased substantially under New Labour. Furthermore, its tax and benefit changes appear to have been mildly redistributive, although they did not fundamentally challenge the prevailing patterns of income and wealth inequality. Pensions provision both for private and public sector employees also deteriorated in the studied period. The policies of successive governments facilitated the restriction of this form of welfare provision as well.

The transformation of the UK's social services (including education, healthcare, community care and housing) – away from state-run provision based on national structures

towards a fragmented mixture of public-private arrangements – was prepared in a piecemeal manner under Thatcher in the period between 1979-1987, which was followed by a period of legislative change in the years 1987-9 and a period of implementation under John Major's and New Labour governments (Jones, 2006)[202].

The generally restrictive and routinely deteriorating patterns of social assistance under "liberal" market capitalism disprove once again the supposed long-term "trickle-down" benefits of the largely unfettered rule of the neoliberal market. In this way the existing limited welfare system contributes to the exploitation of the subordinate classes by supporting the anti-redistributive patterns in the wider neoliberal economy. As I show in various parts of this thesis (especially chapters 5, 6 and 7), these inequality-producing trends contribute to numerous other social costs and negative externalities, as well as to the violation of security needs and the restriction of individual agential power and of democratic control (since unequal resources tend to produce unequal capacity for political influence, as I have already noted in chapter 2).

At the same time, lack of democratic control has been central to the restrictions of welfare provision. Since class relations are founded on the democratic deficit (as I have shown throughout this thesis), unequal class patterns of the distribution of socially produced wealth are based on this lack of democracy. The welfare system is governed by a largely unaccountable state elite invested in the preservation of wealth inequalities and elite privileges, which also necessitates the misappropriation of socially produced wealth for the particularistic interests of the capitalist (private and state) elites. Instead of subsidising elite interests (e.g. military companies and foreign military interventions), an enlightened cooperative system of democratic self-government would instead focus resources on creating a solidaristic and egalitarian system of collective insurance and mutual aid.

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[202] Jones (2006, 177) pointed out that the Major governments in the 1990-1997 period "translated the changes into practice. (…) At least as far as the health and social services were concerned, Thatcher was correct when she told a Newsweek reporter that 'There is no such thing as Majorism'. All the major changes had been piloted through Parliament by the time John Major took office".

HEALTH CARE

The analysis of health-related structural violence in this section will encompass a discussion both of narrowly-defined "healthcare policies" understood as those aspects of health policy that deal with "the way in which health services are funded, organised or held accountable" and with broadly-defined health care, i.e. public health policies which seek to "improve health through changes in lifestyle or the physical, biological and/or social environments" (Gray, 2009, 101). The former approach focuses on the health status of individuals and on the provision of personal health services/clinical interventions which tend to concern themselves with sick individuals and high-risk groups. Public health policies, on the other hand, require a population health approach which identifies and acts on the full array of determinants of the broad public's health (Institute of Medicine, 2003). Causes of ill health include aspects related to both the physical and social environment, as well as to behavioural patterns. The Institute of Medicine report (ibid.) remarked that "health risk is related to a complex of social, economic, and political factors that both surpass and powerfully interact with "downstream" elements such as individual behaviors, biological traits, and access to health care services. (...) Many of the determinants of health are part of the broad economic and social context and, thus, beyond the direct control of administrators in public - and private-sector health care organizations". For this reason, as I will later further elaborate, structural violence in relation to health and health care can only be resolutely challenged and largely overcome through a radical, humanitarian socialist health care system that is largely focused on improving primary care, disease prevention and health promotion, and which largely bases the achievement of these aims on a radically democratic form of social governance and on transformative socio-political intervention that positively addresses the social determinants of health.

On the basis of this expansive perspective on health and health care, this section will encompass a discussion of the broad class patterns of health inequalities, followed by an introductory analysis of the democracy-restricting restructuring and marketisation of the NHS. I will also outline the key patterns of resistance and acquiescence to these changes. The following section, which is a compressed empirical reiteration of the earlier discussion of the class patterns of public health and healthcare inequalities, will outline evidence that class position is a strong

predictor of longevity and mortality levels. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks summarising the changes in health care provision in the studied period, in addition to making some general remarks on the role of the democratisation of the provision of healthcare services and of the democratic socialisation of the approach to public health in combating and overcoming health-related class-based structural violence.

Class Patterns of Health Inequality

Although the public provision of health care in Britain entails health care standards which have been far superior to those in many other countries, various severe health care-related deprivations have persisted and healthcare provision for the dominant class tends to be far superior to the healthcare provision that is made available to the subordinate classes. Sharp class inequalities in the access to healthcare services appear to persist wherever the provision of social services is not entirely socialised or public. The provision of healthcare services, despite a significant level of government involvement through the National Health Service, in recent decades has not occurred only through the public sector, nor is the NHS itself entirely freed from the profit logic. I shall expand on this point in the discussion on marketisation below.

The allocation of resources for health cannot be separated from wider class patterns and class relationships of domination and subordination. The state elite significantly restricts healthcare provision.

Nonetheless, the capitalist system, especially in the more developed multi-party states, often ensures a significant level of medical care. This is partly a result of the importance of maintaining a relatively healthy population able to participate in economic life (Navarro, 1986). The multi-party "representative democracies" generally pay attention to the preservation of a certain standard of universal medical care, partly also in order to ensure the continued allegiance of the population to the main parties and to the existing political and economic system. However, the profit motive, as one of the fundamental organising principles of contemporary capitalist societies, including Britain, routinely functions quite independent of humanistic concerns. On a regular basis, capital has fiercely opposed the imposition of optimal health and medical standards. Doyal and Pennell (1979), for example, pointed out how political and economic elites reject

adequate regulation of pollution (which is responsible for various respiratory diseases, cancer etc.), or of cancerous foods, cancerous preparation methods and food additives, to give just a few examples. Also, a study by Walton et al. (2015) estimated that at the end of New Labour rule around 9,500 people in London may have been dying early each year (equivalent to 140,743 life-years lost) as a result of long-term exposure to air pollution. The state elite's failure to take decisive action to prevent such levels of air pollution (Vidal, 2016), its profound failure to comply with EU legislation on air pollution (Vidal, 2013; Vaughan, 2016) and its active lobbying against strong EU air pollution regulation (Birkett, 2012; Boffey and Perraudin, 2015; Vaughan, 2016), at least in part due to the power of vested interests of the automotive and other polluting industries[203], constituted major violations of the population's well-being, security and survival needs. It has especially affected children from lower class backgrounds[204]. Moreover, the profit logic leads companies to produce and openly promote unhealthy food and lifestyles[205], and governments sometimes collude with such harmful and exploitative business interests (Paterson, 1981; Doyal and Pennell, 1979; Gornall, 2014a, 2014b)[206]. These kinds of patterns of structural violence require further detailed investigation.

Intersectional analysis of health-related oppression and structural violence needs to also take into account the grave implications of the current animal exploitation-based food system on human health. Animal agriculture and agribusiness (a major segment of global and UK capital which encompasses the giant factory farms, slaughterhouses and meat processing companies, growers of food given to animals, farm equipment manufacturers, the pharmaceutical companies

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[203] A Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) briefing openly opposed the adoption of stricter EU anti-pollution legislation on the grounds that it would increase the "administrative burden for industry and government" (DEFRA in Boffey and Perraudin, 2015).

[204] An unpublished 2013 Greater London authority report found that illegal air pollution disproportionately affected deprived schools (Vaughan and Addley, 2016).

[205] One prominent example of this is the advertising of unhealthy foods to children.

[206] Between 2010 and 2014, government officials and ministers had 130 meetings with supermarket and alcohol industry lobbyists (very few of which were publicly documented) while the government was considering whether to introduce alcohol price controls, a policy which they ultimately dropped (Gornall, 2014a). Almost half of the MPs in 2014 were members of the all party parliamentary group which supports the beer industry, while numbers of those MPs who belong to groups supporting other alcohol industries were not disclosed (Gornall, 2014b). The politicians' favourable attitudes towards the broader retail and alcohol industries have stifled public health campaigns, as well as government regulation of alcohol consumption. Prof. Sir Ian Gilmore, special adviser on alcohol for the Royal College of Physicians, asserted that "the drinks industry continues to have high-level access to government ministers and officials while no forum currently exists for the public health community to put forward its case in an environment free from vested interests" (Gilmore in Mason, 2014).

which provide antibiotics and other drugs for the more efficient exploitation of captive animals, etc.) are given massive government subsidies (Friends of the Earth, 2009) although animal agriculture is perpetrating immense violence against *hundreds of billions* and even *trillions* of non-human sentient beings every year (Mood, 2010; Mitchell, 2011), and even though it also represents an immense threat to human health and long-term survival. A systematic review of evidence concerning the impacts of dietary change on several environmental factors established that annual greenhouse gas emissions would halve and new land used every year for each person would near-halve if humanity adopted a plant-based diet (Aleksandrowicz et al., 2016). A study by Chatham House has established that a major reduction in the consumption of animal-derived products is crucial to prevent devastating climate change (Bailey, Froggatt and Wellesley, 2014).

Furthermore, a study published in the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA* established that a global conversion to a plant-based diet would lead to 8.1 million fewer human deaths per year (Springmann et al., 2015). There are indications that a scientific consensus is slowly emerging about the health need for a radical food system change towards a whole food/minimally processed plant-based diet (e.g. True Health Initiative, 2017; Springmann et al., 2015; Aune et al., 2017; Freston, 2012; Greger, 2012; American Institute for Cancer Research, n.d.; American College of Cardiology, n.d.; World Health Organization, n.d.)[207]. Still, in 2015, while the NHS was compelled to (rather listlessly) acknowledge the weight of scientific evidence supportive of this kind of radical dietary change (NHS, 2014), it was established that only one in four UK adults consumed the NHS-recommended *minimum* amount of plant-based food (Bodkin, 2017). As the Chatham House report noted, "there is a striking paucity of efforts to reduce consumption of meat and dairy products" (Bailey, Froggatt and Wellesley, 2014, 2), even as the public health crisis associated with current unhealthy dietary patterns is causing immense human suffering as well as placing an enormous strain on the NHS budget. The

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[207] In addition to its major contributory dietary effect on most chronic diseases (Greger, 2012), animal agriculture has also been playing a major role in the emergence of new strains of flu viruses (this has included swine flu and the avian influenza, which spread from poultry farms – Akhtar, 2013). Major infectious diseases including HIV, Ebola, and SARS have also been related to patterns of animal exploitation (Greger, 2007), as have Creutzfeld-Jakob disease, Salmonella, Camylobacter (Harvey, 2018) etc. The use of antibiotics in meat, egg and dairy production is also a major driver of the antibiotic resistance crisis, which is having increasingly disastrous consequences on human health (Ventola, 2015). At least 700,000 people already die globally every year due to drug-resistant infections, and 10 million people are predicted to be dying from them *every year* by 2050 unless decisive action is taken to curb the development of antibiotic resistance (Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2016).

hesitance and sluggishness of the institutional response to the present health crisis has significant parallels with the institutional response to cigarette smoking: it took over 7000 studies about the harmfulness of smoking before the US Surgeon General released his first report against smoking (Greger, 2017). Much more attention should be given to the efforts of powerful animal-exploiting and other processed food and drink industries to control and undermine public health initiatives (see for example Greger, 2011; 2015; Harcombe, 2017). The collusion between the food and drink industry and the UK government has resulted in some of the most severe violations of well-being, security and survival needs. One prominent example of the lack of government independence from special commercial interests of the food and drink industry concerns the process of developing UK government dietary guidelines. At least since the Balance of Good Health national food guide, which was introduced in 1994, through to its successors, the Eatwell Plate (introduced in 2007) and the Eatwell Guide (a slightly revised and rebranded national dietary guide which was introduced in 2016), members of the food and drinks industry have closely collaborated with government bodies in the design of dietary guidelines for the broad public (Richardson and Brady, 1997; Public Health England, 2014; Harcombe, 2017).

An intersectional focus on human-animal relations (which are still largely reified and made invisible even in social research) helps to unveil how the currently hegemonic food system based on the exploitation of animals imperils human health, especially the health of the poorest and most marginalised and oppressed segments of the population. The raising of animals for food (i.e. the expropriation of arable land and of scarce fresh water for the production of animal-derived food) is also a major contributor to human hunger and water poverty on the global level. On the basis of research by FAO (2008), Bekhechi (2016) noted:

"It would take 40 million tons of food to eliminate the most extreme cases of world hunger, yet nearly 20 times that amount of grain is fed to farmed animals every year in order to produce meat. In a world where an estimated 850 million people do not have enough to eat, it is criminally wasteful to feed perfectly edible food to animals on farms in order to produce a burger rather than feeding it directly to people, especially when you consider that it takes roughly six pounds of grain to produce one pound of pork. As long as a single child goes hungry, this kind of waste is unconscionable"[208].

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[208] In addition to various aforementioned broad categories of health risks associated with the present dietary patterns

The current extremely harmful patterns of food production and consumption would not be possible if governments internationally (very much including the UK government) did not permit agribusiness and other food companies to externalise environmental and health costs of animal exploitation for food. Currently tax payers' money is being used to (very inadequately) deal with these costs, and even to massively subsidise the production of food which leads to excruciating physical and psychological animal suffering, to environmental destruction and grave harm to human health and, by extension, the public budget. In 2008 alone, around £720 million of public money were given out in subsidies (through EU's Common Agricultural Policy) to the factory farming of animals in the UK (Friends of the Earth, 2009; also see Monbiot, 2013). The state elite's support for animal agriculture sustains enormous exploitation, as well as the manifold violations (some of which I have mentioned above) of well-being, security and survival needs of all sentient beings.

An additional category of health risks, more directly related to contemporary work patterns than to patterns of consumption (like the ones mentioned above), includes chronic and/or intense work-related stress and other mental and physical illnesses and accidents at work. Emphasising class patterns of health disadvantage, Navarro (1986) noted that in economically developed countries manual workers remain the category of the population which suffers accidents at work more than any other section of society. Clapp et al. (2005) claimed that, in the US, about 12 per cent of deaths from cancer are work-related, while Meldrum et al. (2005) found that in the US around 15 to 20 per cent of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease cases are a result of unhealthy working conditions (they also noted that no such studies existed for the UK). Speaking of the situation in the United States, Novotny (1998, 139) asserted that "less than 10 percent of the chemicals in the workplace have been adequately tested for carcinogeneity". Detailed studies examining these types of violations of well-being, security and survival needs are greatly needed for Britain as well.

A further critique of the approach toward health under capitalism is that the medical

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based on the exploitation of animals, which tend to especially imperil the lives and the well-being of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy, various other specific health hazards should be identified. For example, slaughterhouses and animal factory farms are largely located in poor human communities, whose lack of political power exposes them to associated reductions in water and air quality (DeMello, 2012). The racist marginalisation of some of the most disempowered segments of the human population frequently supports these forms of capitalist externalisation/dumping of costs onto the wider community.

system frequently individualises guilt concerning bad health and obscures the underlying social causes of most health problems (Dorling, 2015), thus depoliticising the issue and contributing to the structural violence of penetration, segmentation and fragmentation, since these types of discourse partly mystify the social causes of health inequalities and, in a reductionist manner, socially and politically divide people on the basis of their perceived and simplistically assessed level of individual "health responsibility"[209]. The examination of patterns of fragmentation in relation to discourses of individual health responsibility is a significant topic which further research into cultural and structural violence in relation to health should embark on. The medical system also ensures profit outlets for pharmaceutical companies and their often very sub-optimal, profit-oriented and exploitative medical solutions (Navarro, 1986; Gotzsche, 2013). Pharmaceutical and other private medical corporations prioritise the most profitable rather than most health-efficient methods of preserving health, i.e. they are primarily rent- and profit-oriented rather than being primarily led by optimal public health-based criteria[210]. Specialised analyses of health-related structural violence should also encompass detailed investigations of how the profit-oriented development of health treatments supports sub-optimal and exploitative therapeutic approaches which limit the satisfaction of well-being, security and survival needs. Extensive studies (see Department of Health, 1999) have broadly established that working-class people are more likely to engage in unhealthy lifestyles (e.g. to smoke, have higher alcohol consumption levels, have less healthy nutrition etc.). Apart from typically lower levels of education and cultural capital usually associated with the poorer segments of the working class in particular, additional causes of health inequality include cultural and material constraints on obtaining proper healthcare and on maintaining a healthy lifestyle. This includes a broad array of psychological and material deprivations often associated with lower-class life (some of which I discuss in chapter 7) that lead to a wide range of violations of well-being, security and survival

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[209] Gregg, Waldfogel and Washbrook (2005) found that, in the UK, low-income families with children whose incomes were increasing from 1998 to 2003 increased their spending on children's footwear, clothing, books, fruit and vegetables, but reduced their spending on alcohol and tobacco. This study provided further confirmation for the notion that healthier lifestyles follow increases in income.

[210] One important manifestation of this has been the limitations placed on the greater use of nutraceuticals (including the absence of systematic public health education campaigns about them) in economically developed Western countries, despite a very large body of scientific evidence about their numerous and often potent preventative and (complementary) therapeutic effects. This has largely been the result of the limited scope for achieving their desired exclusivity (they tend not to be easily patentable) and profitability in comparison with pharmaceutical drugs (Weiss, 1997; Le and Pathak, 2011).

needs.

Sharp material inequalities in access to healthcare and healthy living conditions are among the most basic factors in the relation between class and personal health. Health-related inequalities in living conditions include different, class-defined opportunities for maintaining healthy nutrition (Lobstein, 1995; Wrigley, 1998). Although there are still pockets of what could be considered absolute poverty in the UK - certainly including rough sleepers and newly arrived refugees, who receive very meagre benefits and are prohibited from working, and whose children are therefore often likely to suffer from hunger (Barasi, 2005) – the calorific intake of the great majority of the UK population has generally been more than sufficient in recent decades. However, according to a 1991 survey of low-income families, a fifth of parents and a tenth of children went hungry at least once a month (National Children's Home, 1991), and at the end of New Labour rule over three and a half million adults (8 per cent) could not afford to eat properly on a regular basis (Gordon et al., 2013). This evinced the limitations in the state provision of welfare and a clear violation of security and well-being needs of a large proportion of the population. Largely as a result of poor housing conditions, lack of heating etc., over two-thirds of families on income support reported ill health, most commonly asthma, bronchitis and eczema (Cohen et al., 1992). The Grenfell Tower fire in London in 2017, in which at least 79 people died or went missing, tragically helped to reveal housing-related class and other social determinants of health[211]. Furthermore, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, the high prices of heating by the privatised gas and electricity companies contributed to around 30,000 people dying annually of hypothermia and related causes at the turn of the century (BBC, 1999b). In addition to the already mentioned lack of sufficient access to swift and optimal treatment, these and other material inequalities in access to health constitute the violation of well-being, security and survival needs, as well as structural violence of health-related marginalisation.

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[211] This tragedy highlighted the unwillingness of the government to impose stricter safety regulations on landlords, the political and social marginalisation of people belonging to the subordinate classes and to ethnic minorities, the associated restrictions on residents' democratic participation in housing-related decision-making and the unaccountable nature of higher-level as well as local authorities (in this case the Kensington and Chelsea Council) which are characterised by bureaucratic modes of operation and a narrow financial calculus in place of humane care. The Grenfell Tower fire also highlighted the severe consequences of "austerity measures" imposed on the fire service and of restrictions on access to legal aid, which had impeded the ability of the residents at Grenfell to advance their case against the council (which had repeatedly ignored their concerns about safety) in the courts (Mckee, 2017).

The second major set of sources of class-related health inequalities concerns the unequal class distribution of cultural capital. Class inequalities in access to healthcare, despite the existence of the NHS, remain very deep. Not only is the dominant class able to purchase higher quality, quicker, more comfortable and more extensive private healthcare services, but studies have also shown that patients from professional and managerial occupations appear to have been receiving much better quality and more extensive NHS services relative to need (Hart, 1985; Benzeval et al., 1995; Le Grand, 2006), which is a further indication of the relative marginalisation of individuals belonging to the subordinate classes in general and the lower class (the working and unemployed poor) in particular in relation to healthcare access. According to these authors, the latter advantage is mostly due to the cultural "middle-" and "upper-class" assets, such as better education, greater confidence and a more pronounced sense of entitlement, which increase their ability to successfully push their interests[212]. Partly as a result of frequently higher levels of cultural capital, middle- and upper-class individuals are also likelier to engage in health-promoting behaviour.

A third major aspect of class-based health inequalities is class-induced psycho-social deprivation, which takes different forms and contributes to the relative health-related marginalisation of individuals belonging to the subordinate classes[213]. Various studies found

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[212] Payne, Payne and Bond (2006, 333) summarised some of the main aspects of the class-related inequalities in cultural capital relating to healthcare access:

"For instance, compared with less advantaged groups, well-educated people in jobs where they have personal autonomy, and can control others, are more likely to be knowledgeable about good health practice, have higher expectations of the effectiveness of taking action against illness and expect faster and better medical treatment to protect their health. This cultural 'mindset' can be seen as contributing to their lower levels of illness, translating any material advantages into attitudes conducive to good health."

Considering the general economic, political and cultural marginalisation of people who are migrants and/or belong to ethnic minorities, they are likely to be at particular risk of multiple forms of disadvantage with regard to accessing healthcare.

[213] For instance, smoking cannot simply be considered as an individual choice regardless of the individual's social and psychological context. A study by Graham and Blackburn (1998), which found that single mothers on income support suffer from significantly lower levels of "psycho-social health" and might therefore be more likely to smoke as a means of relief, bears this out. According to Morris and Ritchie (1994), there is a causal link between financial hardship experienced by parents in poor families and incidence of depression and stress-related disorders. A longitudinal study of the civil service by Rose and Marmot (1981) found that the incidence of heart disease among low-status male workers in the civil service was four times higher than it was for the highest ranking employees. For both men and women, the highest incidence of heart disease has been identified among the lowest social class (this generally corresponds with the "lower class" in my classification), with a general inverse class gradient (Ashwell, 1996; Department of Health, 1994). The class gap regarding the incidence of heart disease widened under the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 90s (Department of Health, 1994).

systematically better health and survival rates among people in controlling work positions compared to people with little control over their working lives (Marmot et al., 1991; Bosma et al., 1997; Marmot, 2004). Work in low-status, closely supervised and repetitive jobs has been shown to cause increased output of "stress hormones", which are linked to coronary heart disease (Blane, 1985). Similar problems have been associated with unemployment. There is strong evidence that unemployed people suffer from various psychological problems more frequently, and men who reported periods of unemployment were found to be at almost double the risk of dying prematurely, even after adjusting for a range of factors such as pre-existing health conditions (Benzeval et al., 1995)[214]. These and other structurally-supported and partially status-based, cultural and psycho-social phenomena, which (among other adverse effects) lead to the alienation of meaning among many people excluded from the world of work (or at least the world of satisfying work), and which violate their need for status and dignity, contribute to lower-class deprivation and marginalisation in access to health care. As the aforementioned studies show (and further research should more comprehensively analyse), severe violations of well-being, security and survival needs are frequently the end result. Many other social inequalities and forms of psycho-social deprivation also contribute to poor health[215]. Chapter 8 contains a further discussion of the association between poverty and poor mental and physical health.

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[214] Other factors in addition to stress seem to be at play. Dorling (2015), for example, noted how the feelings of shame felt by those on the lower rungs of the class hierarchy produces mental health problems and sometimes results in suicide, partly as a result of wider social attitudes and the public discourse and policies affecting those in poverty (see Walker, 2013b).

[215] Intersectional analysis can help to uncover many of these other factors which lead to psycho-social deprivation and poor health. To note a prominent example, Fekete (2001, 36) pointed out the following in relation to asylum seekers, whose xeno-racist victimisation (which I discuss in the rest of chapter 5) also places them among the lowest levels of the subordinate classes:

"Research by the King's Fund has concluded that there is a marked deterioration in asylum seekers' mental health in the first six months of their stay, particularly in the form of depression and anxiety. Such mental health problems are a direct result of the politics of deterrence, as those who must shop with vouchers and who are ferried around the country, not knowing where they will end up, experience disorientation, uncertainty, loneliness and isolation. Grinding down the victims of torture, children, the elderly, is, I suppose, the harsh medicine that unctuous politicians prescribe for the protection of the deserving majority from the undeserving – foreign – poor".

This extreme oppression and marginalisation of the poor segments of the migrant population is both dependent on and supportive of their drastic socio-political disempowerment, which prominently includes their especially severely restricted ability to effectively participate in public life and to hold economic, social and political institutions to account.

The Marketisation of the NHS

Carrier and Kendall (2015) pointed out that prior to the introduction of New Public Management into the NHS in the 1980s, the health service was run through shared management by health professionals (doctors as well as nurses) and NHS treasurers and administrators on regional, area and district levels, which allowed for a greater consideration of the need for the autonomy of health professionals. In 1983, the NHS management inquiry team, which was set up by the Ministry of Health, concluded in managerialist fashion that "at all levels in the National Health Service there is a lack of a clearly defined general management function. (...) If Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS today she would almost certainly be searching for the people in charge" (Fowler, 1984). The Thatcher government very speedily introduced general managers in each District Health Authority and Regional Health Authority, as well as on the national level, thus transferring into the public sector managerial hierarchy and practices typical of the private sector. This included an emphasis on a particular kind of "cost efficiency" largely conceived as an abandonment of ambitious coordinated planning and targets for meeting real health needs of the population in favour of the imposition of strict cash-limits on the operation of patient-oriented healthcare. In other words, the discourse of "cost efficiency" was in large part designed as a cover for the rationing of healthcare provision. The structural and cultural violence of indoctrination was thus used in order to facilitate the structural violence that is the restriction of healthcare provision, which produces the alienation of meaning and the violation of people's well-being, security and survival needs. This was made possible by the bureaucratic and managerialist structuring of the healthcare system, i.e. by severely restricting democratic accountability and the scope for democratic participation in matters concerning healthcare. In a pattern which continued under subsequent New Labour governments, health authorities were thus compelled into making "cost efficiencies" (to a large degree by limiting patient care and employee pay and conditions) as well as to contract-out health services to the private sector and to model their managerial structures on the private sector. This, however occurred in combination with direct political interventions of the bureaucratic centralist kind (Carrier and Kendall, ibid.).

Proposals to effect a radical privatisation of healthcare were dropped by the Thatcher

administration in response to strong public opposition. Boomla (2013) outlined the contours of the resistance – including solidaristic labour action - which forced the Conservative government of the time to soften its neoliberal agenda in relation to healthcare:

"There was a spate of hospital occupations, although some of them lost their immediate demands. There were large TUC-organised demonstrations against the cuts. But it was the 1982 nurses' strike that really bowled the Tories over. Selective strikes started in May and a national strike took place in June. In Sheffield a dozen nurses and occupational therapists went on a tour of the local coal mines, and by lunchtime four pits were on sympathy strike. By the summer there was support for all-out action at the NUPE and COHSE (now both part of Unison) union conferences. This culminated in a Day of Action. There were 120,000 on the London demonstration. One million workers went on strike in Scotland, 750,000 in Wales; 157 coal mines were on strike and 43 ports were closed. It could not be ignored by the press. Indeed no national newspapers were published that day! Margaret Thatcher, the lady who was "not for turning", was forced to abandon her plans, and declare at the Tory party conference in October 1982, "The NHS is safe in our hands" - meaning there was to be no wholesale privatisation of the NHS."

It was in response to widespread public opposition – both active and passive - that the Conservative government issued promises that wholesale privatisation had been ruled out (Boomla, 2013; Mishra, 2014). Yet it was very probably the active resistance which was instrumental in helping to dramatise the situation and to galvanise, mobilise and unify the opposition to the Conservative plans for healthcare. Active and united resistance tends to be of vital importance for challenging elite attempts at indoctrination, and for overcoming the fragmented and ineffectual character of atomised public dissatisfaction with elite agendas.

The Thatcher administration's healthcare agenda, although it was stifled by popular opposition, to a large extent focused on facilitating the move towards the marketisation of the NHS. This mainly happened through the creation of an internal market, the emphasis on "cost-effective" performance indicators, introduction of compulsory contract tendering (which enabled greater participation of private service providers in the provision of health care), encouragement of a private hospital system and of private health insurance schemes[216] (Gabe et al., 2004). As I

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[216] The number of private hospital beds rose by 58 per cent between 1979 and 1989, and private insurance grew

will show in the course of this discussion, marketisation was based on the exploitative introduction of the profit motive in the provision of healthcare. These neoliberal healthcare processes, largely rationalised as necessary "cost-efficiency" adjustments, were initiated despite evidence which showed that the total UK health expenditure was already significantly below average compared to other highly developed Western countries, especially compared to relatively socially developed Nordic countries (Schieber et al., 1992; Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). This is an indication that the UK state restriction of welfare provision (in the aforementioned broad sense of the term) was at a comparatively high level. These "cost-efficiency" adjustments were actually not very cost-efficient, since the creation of internal markets and the largely unchecked prices of large pharmaceutical corporations enabled highly exploitative private profit-making from the provision of healthcare (Pollock and Price, 2010; Abboud et al., 2013; Laurance, 2013), which is a basic human and public need.

New Labour largely accepted the combination of market-based and managerial-bureaucratic healthcare governance mechanisms inherited from the previous Conservative administrations (Lister, 2008). However, in a balancing act fairly typical of New Labour strategising, it also sought to further the devolution of healthcare governance from central government while determining the coordinates of devolved healthcare management through the introduction of some improved new standards and targets for care delivery as well as through the introduction of a national system of inspecting healthcare activities. Meanwhile, it continued to further the marketisation of healthcare and the development of managerialist structures and practices. These trends prominently included the establishment of NHS Trusts and third sector bodies, as well as the encouragement and facilitation of private-sector involvement in healthcare (Fatchett, 2012). The common thread unifying these twin associated modes of NHS governance is the oligarchic disempowerment of the health professionals, the patients and of the broader public. New Labour's approach to healthcare policy thus entailed both continuities and discontinuities with the Conservative stance towards healthcare. On the one hand, after the hospital beds crisis in the winter of 1999/2000, which was caused by a two-year moratorium on public spending in healthcare (Shaw, 2007), Labour reversed the Conservative policy of public health service underinvestment. The NHS budget was thus doubled between 1997 and 2005, in

from 5 to 13 per cent in the same period (Gabe et al., 2004).

an effort to match average EU spending on health (Driver, 2006; Shaw, 2007). While this measure will have reduced the restriction of welfare provision to some extent, its effect on levels of structural violence was ambiguous, partly because in a semi-privatised system of healthcare provision the increase in the healthcare budget also constituted an increase in the private appropriation of public funds given to healthcare [217]. The incremental character of the marketisation and privatisation of health care reduced the patients' perception of it, which impeded their mobilisation (Lethbridge, 2009). However, consideration of the role of popular resistance in relation to patterns of structural violence can seldom gain a comprehensive insight into the agential factors behind government policies. To give just one example, widespread popular opposition to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, which the anti-war movement – itself partially an outcome of the broader international mobilisation and ferment of the then resurgent anti/alter-globalisation and anti-capitalist movements (Nineham, 2005) - had helped to articulate and mobilise, was a major cause of New Labour's very significant loss of support in the polls and subsequent electoral losses in the 2005 general elections (see Allen et al, 2010). It is very probable that the political damage which New Labour incurred from popular opinion and from the political forces opposing its pro-war policy had a significant effect on various aspects of the government's policy-making, including its commitment to increased welfare spending through the NHS and the various tax benefits which it introduced in its second term[218].

A further corrective to the problems which were introduced into the health service during the period of Conservative rule was New Labour's aforementioned development of a centralised system of government inspections and healthcare standards, which were intended to address the problem of healthcare fragmentation that was caused by Conservative policies (Shaw, 2007). Further analysis may help to elucidate how efficient this system may have been in helping to moderate the restriction of healthcare provision caused by neoliberal healthcare reforms.

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[217] State elites can also in some circumstances exploitatively appropriate public funds.

[218] The existence of various (actual and potential) reverberations of wider political trends and of social movement trajectories on the outcomes of labour struggles is among of the factors which indicate the greater promise of social movement unionism compared to more sectional/insular types of trade union activity. In the period of New Labour rule, unions did begin to engage more with wider communities and with social movements (Gall, 2005). A prominent examples of this trend were the support given to the anti-war movement, insufficient though it was (see for example German and Murray, 2005), as well as quite strong British trade union participation at the 2004 European Social Forum in London (Bieler, 2007), before the international "alter-globalisation movement" experienced a greater degree of splintering for a variety of political, cultural and logistical reasons.

Simultaneously, the Labour government maintained (but modified) the Conservative policy of encouraging the development of an internal market in healthcare. Despite opposing the private provision of public healthcare in its 1997 manifesto (Shaw, 2007), Labour continued the practice of separating funders from providers of healthcare, i.e. the government continued to pay for healthcare services which it contracted out to private providers, thus facilitating exploitative private profit-making from a basic public need. Private providers seek private gain (which, again, does not mean that state officials cannot and do not in some cases behave exploitatively in relation to the state budget)[219]. The introduction of PFI (Private Finance Initiative) contracts in the NHS since 1999 has led to higher costs

"due to financing costs which would not be incurred under public financing. (…) The costs of raising finance at North Durham, Carlisle, and Worcester added an average of 39% to the total capital costs of the schemes. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, private debt always costs more than public debt. Secondly, the amount of capital to be raised through loans or equity under PFI is inflated by financing charges such as professional fees and the "rolled up interest" due during the construction period when the PFI consortium is not yet receiving any payments from the NHS trust. In addition there are fees for preparing the PFI bid and contract negotiations, which are not always identified in advance. (…) The switch in 1991 from government grant to debt finance means that all new investment, whether publicly or privately financed, increases the cost of capital to NHS trusts and translates into new revenue pressures" (Pollock, Shaoul and Vickers, 2002; see also Pollock and Price, 2010).

High interest rates on PFI loans in particular have enabled hyper-exploitative private profit-making through corporate appropriation of public funds:

"The rewards to PFI investors and shareholders are shrouded in secrecy, but an analysis of the financial projections for three hospital projects at the time the contracts were signed has shown that pure equity investors expected to receive £168m for £0.5m of equity invested in the Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, equity of £100 in Hairmyres PFI hospital was expected to generate £89.14m for investors, and for Hereford hospital equity of £1000 was expected to

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[219] It would, however, be difficult to persuasively argue that there is not less scope for exploitative appropriation of public funds in a fully socialised system of healthcare provision (especially in a transparent, democratic political system which would prevent widespread corruption by government officials).

generate £55.7m. These high rewards are contractually protected and underwritten by the government. The genius of PFI is the way it diverts public resources from public to private interests, providing guaranteed profits to its backers in a time of austerity" (Pollock and Price, 2010, 1281).

Liebe and Pollock (2009) calculated that PFI capital investment in the health service amounting to £12.3 billion (in contracts which had been signed by early 2009) would lead to "£41.4 billion worth of payments to private consortia for the use of the buildings plus a further £29.1 billion worth of payments for associated services, such as maintenance, cleaning and estates management. Thus, PFI, as a PPP [public-private partnership], permits corporations to access generous amounts of public funds without the risks associated with taking over entire service providing institutions" (Ruane, 2010, 521). According to the chair of the Public Accounts Committee, PFIs are "probably the most secure projects to which the banks could lend" (National Audit Office, 2010 in Pollock and Price, 2010, 1281).

The New Labour administration also furthered the marketisation of the health service by setting a target of an 11 per cent increase in the private provision of NHS treatment, from 4 per cent in 2005 to 15 per cent in 2008 (Faucher-King and Le Galès, 2010). Similarly to Private Finance Initiatives, it was established that the contracting-out of services offered poor value for money (Pollock, 2004), and private sector costs were routinely higher than comparable public sector services (Driver, 2006), which is a further indication of the exploitative nature of these privatising processes[220]. The Health Select Committee investigating the government's use of private Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) also suggested there was a lack of adequate "value for money", and that the state's fixed payments for ISTC's (regardless of whether they actually performed the specific services for which they were paid) led to their market advantage and the closure of major NHS hospitals (Health Select Committee, 2006)[221]. Furthermore, the Blair government enabled (despite significant internal party criticism and with a very narrow majority of votes) the most "successful" hospitals to opt out of the public

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[220] Furthermore, private healthcare companies rely on NHS-trained staff (Dorling, 2015). Private gain is the public's loss in this way as well.
[221] There were also concerns that the emphasis on "consumer choice", which the contracting of private services was meant to provide, would amplify inequalities between lower classes and the more resourceful middle and upper classes (and hence to health-related marginalisation of the lower classes), although early results of this policy approach were not sufficiently documented (Lewis and Dixon, 2005).

healthcare system and reorganise as Foundation Trust hospitals, which enjoy managerial autonomy, legal independence from the Department of State and the Secretary of State, and are allowed to borrow from private and public borrowers (Driver, 2006). Foundation trusts are regulated by Monitor, a new regulator which encourages the trusts to prioritise the delivery of significant financial surpluses over clinical need, and trust managers, largely driven by neoliberal profit-oriented principles, are acting in a manner similar to private capitalists (Trade Union Co-ordinating Group, 2013). This increased independence from the state (and the absence of new mechanisms of democratic scrutiny which would compensate for the lack of government control) imposes limitations on democratic accountability. In addition to further fragmenting the NHS into competing units, the introduction of foundation trusts also helped to facilitate the transfer of large financial losses from the use of PFI schemes onto the taxpayer (Trade Union Co-ordinating Group, 2013).

Additionally, Labour failed to sufficiently (and in an adequate way, considering its semi-privatising approach) reverse the under-funding of the NHS, although it did substantially increase NHS expenditure. Despite a very substantial expansion of professional healthcare personnel and resources enabled by this (Shaw, 2007), some aspects of this budget increase were not conducive to improving patient care, and were exploitative. Throughout its years in power, New Labour continued to facilitate the use of PFIs in healthcare provision, despite the already mentioned problems regarding value for money related to the private provision of health are services. Also as a result of this exploitative marketisation, just between 2003 and 2004 government spending on management consultants' advice for the NHS rose by 340 per cent from £25 million to £85 million, and then reached £133 million in 2005 (Shaw, 2007). Furthermore, several authors (Craig, 2006; Shaw, 2007) underlined concerns that cost-cutting targets laid down by these consultants were actually detrimental to patient care and healthcare provision, i.e. that they constituted a restriction of welfare provision[222]. Deep into the period of New Labour

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[222] It is possible to argue that savings on NHS spending were necessary in order to prevent or reduce more important or more threatening or severe forms of structural violence. While the purpose of this work is not to offer cost-benefit analyses of various forms of structural violence, it seems clear that good healthcare is a basic form of human security, that it should be perceived as a basic human right, and that it requires very generous investment and prioritisation. Especially in the context of extreme class inequalities, and of enormous resources being committed to dubious expenses (the total cost of Trident nuclear weapons replacement, maintenance and decommissioning may be *£205 billion* – CND, 2016), the argument about the inevitability of sharp savings on NHS spending sounds hollow.

rule, waiting times for MRI scans, for instance, could still be more than a year (with potentially catastrophic consequences for patients' health), and a hospital survey in 2006 "revealed that three quarters of them were having to reduce patient care due to budget constraints" (Craig, 2006, 21). Lack of hospital funding for full PFI loan repayments, which would have to be repaid for three to six decades (Gaffney et al., 1999 and Pollock et al., 1999), also contributed to a bed shortage (Pollock and Price, 2010). NHS hospital capacity in England was reduced by almost a third (73,882 beds) between 1992-3 and 2009-10 (ibid.).

Between Resistance and Acquiescence

It is at least in part due to popular and trade union opposition and resistance to healthcare budgetary savings that the problem of underfunding did not get even worse. Many thousands of people demonstrated against the degradation of the healthcare service in a series of protests, and large campaigns successfully mobilised thousands of people, both during New Labour's second term in office and under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government, against the closing of the Lewisham Hospital, Stafford Hospital and of the A&E department at Whittington Hospital (Boomla, 2013; Franklin, 2013). Especially considering the widespread public opposition to NHS spending cuts (Bowcott, 2009), the restrictions of healthcare provision that did occur were largely a consequence of limited democratic control.

A major obstacle to greater democratic control was the fact that "New Public Management"/"new managerialism", which forcefully introduced neoliberal modes of institutional operation and a neoliberal "rationality" into state structures (e.g. Hall, 2003). This tended to augment the fragmentation between the non-capitalist classes, as this neoliberal institutional "rationality" to some degree infected the relations between the supervisors and the workers on the one side and between service providers and service recipients on the other, as I will presently demonstrate with reference to the Mid Staffordshire hospital scandal). "New Public Management" also facilitated the strengthening of the coalition between the lower echelons of state bureaucracy with the corporate and state elite. This alignment of lower-level state administrators with the authoritarian neoliberal order's agenda-setters, as well as with the system's structures and modes of operation, was to a large degree imposed on them by the decision-making elite's operational control - from the control over hiring and firing to the

proliferation and entrenchment of neoliberal targets. These are some among a variety of reasons (which, on some level, also include ideological factors) why the lower echelons in this bureaucratic coalition of dominators are neglectful of the need to challenge (usually at all, let alone resolutely) bureaucratically-imposed impediments to the provision of good healthcare, which have included understaffing, targets and performance monitoring (Powell and Mannion, 2016).

Trade union bureaucracies have also tended not to challenge (often at all, let alone resolutely) managerial control over the work process and the associated degradation of public and private services (Carter and Kline, 2017). They objectified union members as passive consumers of trade union services (see ibid.), rather than treating them as participatory democratic, self-emancipatory protagonists of labour struggles. Unions have frequently failed to even seriously carry out their more basic reactive, defensive functions, even while NHS staff was being exposed to systematic bullying and intimidation by the managers (Carter and Kline, 2017; Powell and Mannion, 2016).

One major example of the failure of healthcare unions and staff to protect healthcare standards from neoliberal change is the Mid Staffordshire hospital scandal, which took place under the New Labour administration. According to a disputed figure between 400 and 1,200 patients may have died in this small district general hospital between January 2005 and March 2009 due to poor care (Campbell, 2013). The Mid Staffordshire National Health Service Foundation Trust Inquiry (Francis, 2013; hereafter the Francis Report) found misdiagnosis and poor care as a regular feature of several parts of the hospital[223]. Carter and Kline (ibid.) noted that the character of the two unions at the Mid Staffordshire Hospital Trust, the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) and Unison, facilitated extremely poor standards of care. Both of these unions accepted the "social partnership" model of unionism, which generally entails a withdrawal of trade unions from the struggle over organisational and labour process change as it leads to the incorporation of union officials and representatives in the management of organisational change

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[223] The Francis Report, for example, found that "patients were often left for long periods in sheets soiled with urine and faeces; meals were placed out of reach and taken away without being touched; cloths were used both to clean ward surfaces and toilets; and receptionists without medical training assessed patients coming into the Accident and Emergency department (A&E)" (Carter and Kline, 2017, 223).

(Carter and Kline, ibid.; Upchurch et al., 2008)[224].

In accordance with their bureaucratic service model of unionism according to which the function of a union is to collaborate with the managerial layers while providing (poor) services to members (instead of democratically organising and empowering them), both RCN and Unison have maintained a remote, uncooperative and unaccountable stance towards their members, which meant that the nurses' concerns about understaffing, degradation of conditions and inadequate healthcare standards at Mid Staffordshire were mostly ignored by both unions, whose officials have often been "more comfortable talking to directors than mobilising members" (Carter and Kline, ibid., 233). Both unions have sought to position themselves as institutional actors that are well-integrated into the (extremely structurally violent) system, and are therefore complicit in its violence towards patients and workers, instead of positioning themselves as the radically democratic tribunes and organisers of healthcare workers and the dissident champions of the highest standards of patient care and of the patients' democratic voice. Consequently, they also haven't sought to position themselves as forces which would help to empower and unify the providers and the recipients of healthcare services – in defiance of the private capitalist and state elites which thrive on the disunity of the oppressed.

The marketisation of healthcare was clearly not inevitable, nor is it irreversible. The further development of community alliances which can strengthen the relationship between healthcare users and healthcare workers is likely to be of great importance in future struggles against the commodification of healthcare[225]. Although struggles against the privatisation and marketisation of healthcare are continuing, campaigners have in some cases managed to limit the

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[224] The decline of collective bargaining and the introduction before 1997 of "New Public Management" in hospitals (with the attendant "fragmentation through founding Trust hospitals, centralisation through target setting, privatisation and marketisation" - Carter and Kline, 2017, 222) were among the prominent factors which facilitated this alignment of trade unions with management. The full time RCN official responsible for the Mid Staffordshire hospital was found to have maintained very close relations with management (Carter and Kline, ibid.), and shortly before the care crisis at Mid Staffordshire RCN's Chief Executive and General Secretary wrote to the Trust's Director of Nursing saying "I have seldom been as impressed with the standard of care as I witnessed at Stafford Hospital" (Carter, *Statement* in Carter and Kline, ibid., 228).

[225] In El Salvador, for example, it was precisely the alliance of health trade unions and civil society groups that enabled to construction of a mass popular campaign which forced the government to abandon its healthcare privatisation plans (Lethbridge, 2009).

employers' assaults on workers' rights and the degradation of healthcare even in the neoliberal policy setting[226].

Class Position as a Predictor of Longevity and of Mortality Levels

Unsurprisingly considering the aforementioned broad social determinants of health, as well as the limited healthcare that is available to those without expensive private health insurance, recent studies on the general relationship between class and health in the United Kingdom confirm that health to a large extent follows wealth and higher social class standing. In fact, summarising the conclusions of numerous studies, Cockerham asserted that "social class or socioeconomic status (SES) is the strongest predictor of health, disease causation, and longevity in medicinal sociology" (2007, 75). Indeed, Wilkinson's (2007) extensive international comparative study discovered a positive correlation between higher levels of social equality and higher levels of health (life expectancy and levels of mortality being among the major criteria)[227]. The Black Report (1980), which was attacked and dismissed by the Conservative administration for exposing the clear class gradient regarding health and for advocating a high level of public expenditure on healthcare (Ginsburg, 1992), found that the mortality rates were lower (and declining) for higher social class groups, and higher the lower a social class group is. The report found that the class gradient was becoming more pronounced, with the mortality ratio stagnating or even becoming worse for people in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations. The Black Report also found that children of unskilled manual workers would die around 7 years earlier than the

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[226] As Lethbridge (ibid.) observed, some (modestly) successful examples of healthcare-related campaigning were provided by East London Communities Organisations (TELCO), which was established in 1997 as a coalition of 37 local community organisations and trade union branches. TELCO noted that most contracted-out healthcare staff in East London were women from black and minority ethnic groups whose pay and conditions were inferior to other workers, which was "inconsistent with the obligation on public bodies to actively promote racial equality under the Race Relation Amendment Act" (TELCO, 2003). Possibly due to the campaigning efforts of TELCO and others, near the end of New Labour's second term in office new agreements establishing minimum pay, sickness and holiday pay and pension provisions were agreed between hospitals, trade unions and cleaning and catering contractors, helping to diminish the division of healthcare workers into a two-tier workforce (Lethbridge, 2009).

Furthermore, although various factors, including the localised character of TELCO's campaigning, limited its abillity to influence national healthcare policies, its support for the East London Strategic Health Authority's campaign for increased funding probably helped to ensure that health authorities in East London receive the largest increases in funding in England (Lethbridge, ibid.).

[227] Accordingly, countries like Sweden and Japan, which are among the most egalitarian globally, are also the healthiest, while the US, as the richest and one of the more unequal countries in the world, also has the lowest life expectancy in the developed world (Wilkinson, 2007).

children of parents in professional occupations[228].

More recently, the Acheson Report (1998) found that health inequalities not only persisted, but that there was even an increasing difference in mortality rates between the top and bottom ends of the class divide. The increased disparities in health and longevity followed wider patterns of increasing wealth inequality (Dorling, 2015). Benzeval et al. (1995) established that the health inequalities between people in manual and non-manual occupations meant that by mid 1990s 42,000 more people aged sixteen to seventy four died each year. Donkin et al. (2002) noted that the gap in life expectancy between social class I (professional) and social class V (unskilled manual) was nine and a half years for men and six and a half for women by the early to mid-1990s, a significant increase in inequality compared to the difference of about five and a half years in male and female life expectancy between social classes I and V in the early 1970s. The gap in life expectancy between people living in richer and poorer areas of the country was declining in the 1960s and early 1970s, but sharply rose in the ensuing decade and a half of neoliberal ascendancy (Dorling and Thomas, 2009). In 2006, average male life expectancy in one lower-class part of Glasgow was just 54. By comparison, it was 67 in post-sanctions, war-torn Iraq and 70 in the Gaza Strip (Gillan, 2006). The London Health Observatory discovered that the life expectancy gap for people living in the affluent and deprived wards of London was nearly 25 years (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2014), while The Equality Trust found that "the gap in life expectancy for those in different UK local authority areas has increased 41 per cent for men and 73 per cent for women in the last 20 years" (ibid.).

As Scambler (2002) noted, the Registrar General's measure of social class, as well as other class schemes used in the Black and Acheson reports, and in the Department of Health's 1999 White Paper, actually concealed the existence of a very small wealthy elite and its extremely privileged health care access. These inequality-perpetuating trends continued and were

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[228] People in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations tend to belong to the lower working class according to my neo-Marxian categorisation. The official (Registrar-General's) classification of "professional occupations" does not consider the Marxian criteria of one's position in relation to the aforementioned "function of capital" that consists of organising the exploitation of others and which supervisory "middle class" wage workers perform, nor does it consider the significant differences in market position and financial and social resources which place some professionals in the middle class and others in the (upper) working class. Furthermore, the true scale of inequality could only be revealed if those who own and control medium and large capital were also taken into account. However, although official statistics obfuscate class divisions and push disparate classes into the same (formalistic and artificial) "class" categories, even there does the ugly reality of major class-based health inequalities emerge.

even exacerbated under the recent Labour administrations. Data in England and Wales from 2002 showed that infant mortality among babies whose fathers were employed in semi-routine occupations was almost three times higher than among babies whose fathers were in higher managerial occupations (Social Trends, 2004). Dorling (2007) pointed out that the gap between infant mortality for "working class" parents (as defined by the Registrar General – lower working class individuals according to my classification) and the population as a whole steadily increased between 1998 and 2006. These sharply rising class-based differentials in lifespan and in mortality levels point to a sharp increase in class-based health-related structural violence[229].

Concluding Thoughts

As I have shown, Conservative governments under Thatcher and Major furthered the commodification of healthcare, including through the weakening of trade unions and health professionals, the introduction of internal markets, the contracting out of public services to private companies and the entrenchment of "new public management" in healthcare, which restricted democratic accountability and limited the potential for democratic participation through the development of unaccountable managerial structures and the privileging of market-based criteria and modes of operation remote from the public and its needs. This restriction of democratic accountability and participation has resulted in the exploitation of the public (particularly through the involvement of private companies) and large-scale violations of the broad population's survival, security and well-being needs, which have been subordinated to neoliberal corporate and state interests. New Labour extended and deepened the processes of the commodification of healthcare, consolidating and extending the use of the internal market in healthcare. This included the introduction of PFIs and the increase of the target for the share of private provision in overall NHS treatment, as well as the introduction of relatively autonomous, managerially governed Foundation Trust hospitals. These marketising developments restricted democratic ac-

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[229] Much further analysis is needed to illuminate how the health status of marginalised and dehumanised members of society is undermined as a result of their victimisation through intersecting forms of cultural and structural violence (class-based as well as racist, sexist, ableist, ageist, etc.).

countability and participation and instead facilitated the exploitation of the public (through the introduction of private profit-making services, exploitative PFI loan repayment rates, etc.). While New Labour also increased funds going to the healthcare system it, as Stuart Hall (2003) pointed out, promoted individualist perspectives on healthcare provision, focused on direct personal gains from healthcare policies (such as shorter NHS waiting lists). A more sociable vantage point allows one to perceive that New Labour's injection of public funds into the marketised healthcare system also helped to facilitate the exploitative transfers of wealth from the public to the private sector. Besides, the increase in funding was far from being sufficient to reverse the chronic underfunding of the NHS (with the resulting lower standards of care, longer NHS waiting lists, hospital bed shortages, etc.) and the associated grave violations of people's well-being, security and survival needs. The failure to sufficiently increase NHS funding is itself an indicator of the restriction of democratic accountability and participation – such chronic healthcare deprivation would be unsustainable in a radically democratic social system that enjoyed a comparable level of material wealth.

Major structurally violent continuities relating to healthcare provision persisted under both the Conservative and New Labour governments. This included the perpetuation of a profit-oriented medical system largely based on exploitative and sub-optimal therapeutic and other medical services largely provided by the private (pharmaceutical and other) companies, which are largely democratically unaccountable and are driven by the perceived need to maximise profits rather than to provide the most health-efficient services. Furthermore, the major sets of sources of class-related health inequalities – including unequal access to personal material resources required to buy better healthcare, unequal levels of cultural capital, as well as class-induced psycho-social deprivation - persisted under New Labour's term in office as well. These persisting inequalities continued to result in severe violations of the broad population's well-being, security and survival needs. These included the increase – both under Conservative and New Labour administrations – in the class differentials in life expectancy.

I have demonstrated that class-based health inequalities are a result of, among other factors, the restriction of democratic accountability and participation with its various attendant forms of deprivation; class-related restrictions of healthcare and welfare provision; social marginalisation (also due to the possession of unequal levels of cultural capital) and educational dep-

rivation, which are the major factors contributing to the inadequate satisfaction of health-related needs of individuals belonging to the subordinate classes. The broad systemic constraints which I have discussed also (to a lesser extent) inhibit the satisfaction of health-related needs of the middle classes and often (considering the skewed budgetary priorities which limit investment in medical research, prevention and treatment) even of the dominant class. In much more egalitarian Finland, not only do the poor live longer than the poor in the UK, but the rich there also live longer than the rich in the UK (Dorling, 2015).

Health data (including on infant mortality and longevity, among many other measurements) indicate that the social determinants of health perpetuated and significantly increased the class gap in health status under successive Conservative governments as well as under New Labour rule. This indicates that the optimal healthcare and public health policies require a transformative socio-political challenge to the capitalist social order and its undemocratic/class distribution of power.

Assessing the extent and degree of the restrictions of democratic accountability and democratic participation in broadly-defined health care requires a bolder, more radically democratic set of benchmarks. A more fully democratised and socialised health care system would entail not just a shift from bureaucratic state management towards the self-management of employees in the healthcare system, but also much greater democratic participation in and control over the healthcare service and over public health policies by the broad public. The optimal, democratically-controlled public health system would require well-informed and democratic public control over extended social reproduction, which would help ensure that social resources are focused on addressing issues of greatest social need rather than being re-oriented in accordance with the policy preferences and the particularistic interests of the private capitalist and state elites. Integral socialisation of health care encompassing democratic public control over public health would facilitate the development of powerful public health interventions. This is because effective public health interventions require the coordinated involvement not just of narrowly-defined health authorities but also of local and higher-level public authorities, local communities, workplaces, the media, etc.[230]

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[230] For a discussion of an integrated, society-wide public health intervention see for example the Institute of Medicine's report (2003).

The Yugoslav (proto-)socialist attempt to advance integral democratic self-government (especially from the mid-1970s) is instructive in these two regards (i.e. from the perspective of the need to democratise more narrowly-defined healthcare and the broader public health system), as it sought to develop an integral system of social self-government, which included systematically transferring the allocation of public resources for a wide array of social services from the level of the federation and the constituent republics to a network of "self-managing" (at least in principle) assemblies and councils. "Self-governing communities of interest" were introduced in the early 1970s as new organisational forms based on assemblies that consisted of delegates who represented service providers (e.g. healthcare employees who were delegates of various health institutions) and, on the other side, the delegates of the recipients of services (e.g. employee delegates from companies and delegates of communities). These assemblies of the self-governing communities of interest determined and controlled the major policies of the given public service on their territory, while the operative management was performed by the executive organs of these "self-governing communities of interest"[231].

The (modified and context-specific) application of such a radically democratic approach to the UK health care system would advance the transcendence of bureaucratic and other special interests that are currently exercising undue influence on the health service and on broader public health policies. This would enable the development of a socialised system of mutual democratic self-regulation of interests of the providers and the recipients of broadly-defined health care. In this authentically democratic system, the basic health care standards would also need to be standardised and co-determined by the key organs of socio-political communities on the level of the democratic republic[232].

A fundamental aspect of a system of truly socialised health care is that it would encompass public health. In a system of enlightened democratic self-government, all entities relevant to the system of public health would be subjected to conscious democratic control of the broad population, rendering organs of self-government at all levels - as well as the various socio-

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[231] For more on this see for example Vratuša et al., 1979; Jakopovich, 2018a.

[232] Such a system of democratic self-government would perhaps be best described as a republic (in the authentic sense of the phrase *res publica*).

political communities, workplaces and enterprises, the system of public communication and other public actors - accountable to the system of public health.

The World Health Organization defines human health in the broader sense as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity" (WHO, 2006). Thus conceived, the achievement of human health also entails the need for social belonging, affection and mutual care. As the Institute of Medicine's report (2003) emphasised, "the need to belong does not stop in infancy, but rather, affiliation and nurturing social relationships are essential for physical and psychological well-being throughout life. Over the past 20 years, 13 large prospective cohort studies in the United States, Scandinavia, and Japan have shown that people who are isolated or disconnected from others are at increased risk of dying prematurely from various causes, including heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, cancer, and respiratory and gastrointestinal conditions (...). Studies of large cohorts of people enrolled in health maintenance organizations or occupational cohorts also report that social integration is critical to survival, although it may not be as critical an influence on the onset of disease"[233]. The democratic socialisation of society would also enable the satisfaction of these and other material and psychological needs and would advance the protection of broadly defined health through the development of a peaceful and cooperative culture and of closely-knit and caring communities based on mutual aid. Only a society organised along such humane and democratic lines can transcend health-related structural violence by adequately protecting and promoting human health.

HOUSING

In this section I will firstly look at the process of the decline and privatisation of council housing, as well as at the structural violence that results from the maintenance of the capitalist housing market, and especially from the emphasis on private home ownership and renting from private landlords. Following this analysis, I will examine "large scale voluntary transfers" and ALMOs as further instances of the creeping privatisation of housing, paying special attention to their democracy-restricting effects. In the concluding segment I will summarise the main features

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[233] See the Institute of Medicine's report (ibid.) to find references for the numerous relevant studies.

of housing policy under successive Conservative and New Labour administrations, and will outline a radically democratic alternative to housing-related structural violence.

Privatisation and Class Inequality in Housing

The system of council housing, which has been a major feature of the British welfare state since WWII, had a significant role in reducing class-based structural violence and satisfying security needs by recognising housing as a human right, by charging relatively low, generally non-exploitative rents which reflected low borrowing costs, as well as by ensuring a degree of democratic accountability through local politicians (Ginsburg, 2005).

The Thatcher government's opposition to council housing and commitment to neoliberal housing reform relied on the revival of consumerist individualism. The privatisation of home ownership turned homes into commodities, negating the earlier, socialist notion of housing as a fundamental human right which takes precedence over profit-making. This was in itself a form of cultural as well as structural violence. It constituted a violation of the human right to ensured housing, along with the other associated forms of structural violence which this section will analyse.

The economic crisis provided the Thatcher government with a seemingly "objective" rationale for council housing sales, and did in fact produce significant short-term revenue for the state: "By 1983 £1.87 billion had been raised from council housing sales" (Sked and Cook, 1993, 349). However, the Thatcher government's support for private home ownership was reliant on state subsidies in the form of mortgage interest tax relief, which was exploitative towards the broad layers of the lower and (to a significantly lesser extent) middle class population which did not benefit from this form of tax relief, and whose interests were in fact damaged by it (especially since it facilitated the restriction of council housing, an important form of welfare provision). Gulliver (2013) noted:

"Between 1979 and 1990, this subsidy rose from £2.5bn to more than £8bn with the number of recipients rising by 66% to 9.7 million at the end of the 1990s. This stoked house prices, which doubled over the decade, and laid the foundations for unsustainable levels of home ownership which contributed to the financial crash in 2008. Almost half of the subsidy went to the already well-paid households with the largest mortgages, therefore subsidising the increasing

inequality between high-income and low-income home owners"[234].

This ushered in a destructive pattern which still characterises the UK housing market: "[Thatcher's] government systematically transferred subsidies from economically productive housebuilding to support mortgages and rents. We live with this legacy today where for every £1 of public subsidy spent on housebuilding, £5 is allocated to support housing costs, compared to a ratio of £1:1 in 1979" (ibid.). This type of exploitation of the public (in which public funds are used to facilitate the enrichment of private rentiers) is another form of housing-related structural violence. It has also facilitated the social marginalisation of individuals belonging to the lower class, the fragmentation of interests between subordinate classes and between various class fractions (in the sense that the interests of house owners and renters are partly antagonistic, especially considering the interest of home owners in the increase in property values), and the ideological implantation of the capitalist agenda into popular consciousness (i.e. the structural violence of penetration and segmentation) through the promotion of narrowly individualist consumerist perspectives, solutions and aspirations in relation to the provision of housing.

Council housing makes local councillors accountable to the public. It is "the only form of housing where tenants elect their landlord" (Defend Council Housing, n.d.). The existence of such significant local democratic control contradicted the Thatcherite state centralist and pro-capitalist agenda. Evincing its preference for private profit and consumerist individualism over social solidarity and a communal, more participatory democratic interpretation of the common good, the incoming Thatcher administration swiftly withdrew council housing subsidies and also forced councils to substantially increase rents, beyond what was needed to cover costs (Malpass, 1990), which constituted the curtailment of welfare provision and of local democratic control. These restrictions of this form of welfare provision, along with the restriction of democratic control, eroded the human right to ensured housing and supported the exploitation of the wide layers of the population that lived in council housing. In conjunction with these forms of suppressing existing social housing, the government's introduction of the "Right to Buy" scheme in 1980, which allowed council tenants to buy the houses they were living in at greatly discounted prices (including discounts of up to 70 per cent of market value – Hodkinson, 2009),

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[234] It should nonetheless be noted that a significant number of people belonging to the lower class also benefited (at least in the immediate sense) from mortgage interest tax relief, and from the sale of council housing more broadly.

"successfully decimated a public housing stock that represented decades of public investment and housed one-third of the population" (Glynn, 2009a, 49-50). In England, the share of homes that were rented from local authorities fell from 29 per cent in 1979 to 14 per cent in 2000 (Ginsburg, 2005). This clearly constituted a restriction of this form of welfare provision, and it was also partly a result of the expropriation of socially produced wealth (which constituted the structural violence of exploitation). Local authorities were specifically forbidden to reinvest the proceeds from these council house sales into new housing (another restriction of local democratic accountability), which left the door wide open to the creation of a speculative and exploitative private housing market sector (Glynn, 2009a). The privatisation of housing stock inaugurated a new age in housing provision, which now exemplifies the practice of prioritising exchange value at the expense of use value of the housing stock, i.e. of putting private interest (profit) over public need, which contributes to the restriction of democratic accountability and of human rights, restriction of welfare provision, violation of security and well-being needs, marginalisation and exploitation of people belonging to the subordinate classes. Concomitant property speculation (which was facilitated by housing privatisation) has had a significant role in regressive and exploitative wealth redistribution in UK society, including the contributory role it has played in the process of financialisation itself (see chapters 5 and 6), which, as I will show, led to various negative externalities and violations of security needs. As Glynn (2009a, 44) pointed out:

"Private renting provides a further method of regressive wealth redistribution, with (generally poorer) tenants who are unable to purchase their own home contributing to the profits of those with property to spare. As in the past, the profit motive demands minimum expenditure on maintenance and maximum flexibility for the investor – most British 'buy-to-let' mortgages actually insist on tenants being given only short-term tenancies. Families suffer the consequences of the resultant insecurity, forced moves and accompanying stress".

These are clear violations of their well-being and security needs. The privatisation of home ownership and the abolition of rent controls and long-term private rent tenancies by Thatcher's government constituted the restriction of this form of welfare provision, facilitating the exploitation of renters by avaricious landlords. These changes meant that the very conception of, and the right to, a stable, secure home was turned into a fantasy for many people.

222

Wetzel (2003, 372) pointed out how late nineteenth century "labor radicals (…) feared that a mortgage would be a ball and a chain, tying workers to the system". The repayment of large mortgages limits the ability of workers to withdraw their labour and risk losing their incomes and homes as a result (Glynn, 2009b). This threat of home repossession is a form of structural violence, especially due to constraining the satisfaction of security needs and due to its restrictive effect on individual agency (e.g. by preventing people from taking risks by looking for more fulfilling jobs). Also, the materialistic, individualistic, market-oriented mindset promoted by home ownership is likely to have strongly curbed social solidarity and political dissidence: "Council estates were seen as enclaves of Labour voters, and the Conservatives reasoned that the opportunity to buy their homes (at discounted prices) might make them more likely to vote Conservative" (Malpass and Rowlands, 2009, 5). The processes of penetration/indoctrination (through the implantation of capitalist consumerist ideology among individuals belonging to the subordinate classes) and fragmentation (through the sharp divisions - between lower and middle class fractions and between lower and middle classes - according to their housing status, housing aspirations and associated antagonistic material interests) therefore appear to have been some of the intended consequences of the "Right to Buy" policy. Indeed, nearly 60 per cent of traditional Labour voters who had bought properties under the Right to Buy scheme voted Conservative in the 1983 general election (Sked and Cook, 1993). This increase in the Conservative Party's popularity is not surprising, especially considering that "many former local authority tenants paid less than £10,000 for homes that would be worth 10 times that a decade later. (…) In the first half of 1988 alone, house prices rose by 30%" (Coman, 2013). The long-term effects of this housing-related social and political realignment have been immense. By 2013, 65.2% of homes in England were still lived in by owner-occupiers, yet this was the lowest level of home ownership since 1987, down from 71% ten years before (Osborne, 2014), which constituted structural violence since it was a restriction of welfare provision and undermined the understanding of housing as a human right. A large constituency of relatively privileged home owners is interested in retaining and increasing the price of housing, further dissuading governments from re-introducing stronger regulation of the housing market. The erosion of council housing and the limited rise of relatively privileged homeowners have contributed to the fragmentation of the lower and upper fractions of the working class and of lower and middle

classes, impeding their potential for united mobilisation to advance democratic change and the concept and reality of housing as a basic human right.

Market relations of supply and demand cannot sufficiently and efficiently address the scarcity of adequate housing, since only those needs backed by financial resources register as "demand" on the capitalist market, and it is in the interest of private landlords and developers to charge extortionately for the lower and middle class population's satisfaction of this basic need[235]. The private renting sector, therefore, in general has an exploitative character, it marginalises poor people and is not democratically accountable and responsive.

The downgrading and gradual reduction in the quantity of social housing has also greatly affected the availability of housing. Council housing waiting lists doubled between 1997 and 2009 (Hodkinson, 2009), which constituted a further limitation of this kind of welfare provision and was another indication of the lack of democratic accountability and responsiveness of the UK housing market. Additionally, the adequacy of housing supply has been compromised through speculative real estate purchasers who – although there were, for instance, more than 75,000 young people who experienced homelessness in the UK in 2006-7 (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, n.d.) – regularly leave new flats unoccupied as it is relatively unprofitable to rent them out before they are resold (Glynn, 2009a). A Guardian investigation (Griffiths, 2010) found that there may have been 450,000 long-term empty homes in the UK, which strongly demonstrated the avoidability of homelessness, of the marginalisation of homeless and other poor people and of the associated violations of the human right to a home and of security and welfare needs. This also further indicated the lack of democratic responsiveness and accountability and it contributes to the violation of security needs and to the marginalisation of individuals belonging to the lower class. Furthermore, the significant political influence of corporate urban and property developers, who are largely represented through the English Home Builders Federation, was demonstrated when construction companies managed to force the UK government to lower environmental building standards for private housing (in contrast to compulsory council housing standards) (Jones and Pleace, 2010). Almost 6 million dwellings in England were estimated to be "non-decent" in 2005, and a 2003 estimate put the number of people in overcrowded housing in England at 665,000 (ibid.). This also confirmed the presence

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[235] It should also be remembered that there are many small landlords who do not belong to the upper class.

of exploitation, restriction of welfare provision and of the lack of democratic accountability and responsiveness, especially in the private housing sector (considering the aforementioned lower building standards). Alongside the class oppression of lower-class people in general, the super-exploitation and social and political marginalisation of lower-class migrant workers has tended to make them particularly vulnerable to highly avaricious and sometimes thoroughly ruthless slum landlords, which has compelled many such workers to live in very poor, crowded and overcrowded conditions in decaying inner-city areas[236].

The lack of democratic social control over private real estate owners is also related to the fact that there has been no rent control for new private tenancies in the UK since 1988 (Walsh, 2012). The increasing disparity between housing demand and supply (partly due to vastly unequal patterns of land ownership – see Cahill, 2001) has further facilitated the soaring of house prices (Guardian, 2013b). House prices rose 211 per cent between 1997 and 2007 (Ingham, 2016). The liberalisation of mortgage lending "enabled house prices to rise out of all proportion to incomes" (Glynn, 2009b, 2). This has constituted a severe limitation of democratic accountability and of welfare provision. It is also exploitative and violates the security needs of poorer segments of the population. Many "regeneration schemes" have long been shown to lead to more profitable forms of "development", "gentrification" and displacement ("social cleansing"), whereby previous lower class residents have been forced to leave "regenerated" areas due to rent increases, not to mention thousands who face compulsory purchase and demolition orders (often aimed at the remaining social housing stock) as a result of "housing market renewal" (Glynn, 2009a). In other words, "regeneration" is often a sanitised concept and a euphemistic phrase for the marginalisation, restriction of individual agency and displacement

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[236] These conditions of deprivation have simultaneously exposed them to further xeno-racist oppression, which included negative portrayals of migrants as deprived undesirables supposedly responsible for the shortage of housing (for an older account of this phenomenon see for example Sivanandan, 1976). This is one major pattern by which some of the most oppressed and marginalised people in British society have been further scapegoated and punished for their misfortune. In this way, racist indoctrination and the resulting fragmentation of the subordinate classes facilitate the privatisation of the fruits of immigrant labour while obscuring the mode in which immigration-related infrastructural and social costs are socialised and, in fact, disproportionately borne by the lower classes. Sivanandan (ibid., 350) powerfully pointed out that this arrangement is "ideal (…) for capital – for it gets labour without the overheads (so to speak), profit without pain, gain without cost. Having already deprived one section of the working class (the indigenous) of its basic needs, it now deprives it further in order to exploit another section (the blacks) even more – but, at the same time, prevents them both from coming to a common consciousness of class by intruding that other consciousness of race. It prevents, in other words, the horizontal conflict of classes through the vertical integration of race – and, in the process, exploits both race and class at once".

of large segments of the lower class population. Glynn (2009b, 62) also pointed out that the authorities had repeatedly exhibited sustained "malign neglect", engaging in a "deliberate running-down of a neighbourhood to a point where it can be argued that the only solution is comprehensive redevelopment". Most notably in the case of the "regeneration" of various areas of London, many working class people, including numerous employees in essential services (such as nurses and firefighters), have been driven out of the inner city to the area of Greater London, and the Halifax report (Lloyds Banking Group, 2009) noted that only one in five towns was calculated as being affordable for key workers. The geographical segregation between the majority of the population (the lower and partly upper working class, as well as the lower middle class) and the upper middle and upper classes is further reinforced by social and material barriers (including security barriers) put up by the gated upper middle and upper-class communities and individuals. Besides, very strong neighbourhood segregation is still a defining feature of urban life in Britain. Further detailed studies are needed to examine the presence and exact character of the structural violence of inter- and intra-class fragmentation in the UK housing system.

In fundamental concord with previous Conservative efforts, the New Labour administration advanced the privatisation of housing stock, the spread of home ownership, de-municipalisation and the partial centralisation of housing policy, which will have contributed to the curtailment of democratic accountability by making decision-making in these matters more remote (Malpass and Rowlands, 2010). The pace of privatisation and semi-privatisation (both through the "Right to Buy" scheme, "large scale voluntary transfers" and "arms length management companies", which I shall discuss presently) significantly increased under New Labour in comparison to the period of John Major's premiership (Ginsburg, 2005). In England, the social rented sector fell from 31 per cent in 1979 to 17 per cent in 2007 (Murie, 2010). In addition to constituting a restriction of welfare provision, this also meant that a higher proportion of renters were subjected to higher, private sector rents (which exploit people who do not own their own homes).

"Large Scale Voluntary Transfers"

Apart from strongly encouraging private home ownership, including through "right to buy" sales of council housing, recent UK administrations have also, since the late 1980s,

conducted "large scale voluntary transfers" (LSVT) which constituted the partial "commodification of public assets through the sale of local authority homes to private, not-for-profit housing associations", although these "Registered Social Landlord" (RSL) companies "receive some public funding and often work closely with local authorities in allocating tenancies" (Ginsburg, 2005, 116). However, LSVT fragment local governance by moving the provision of local services away from councils to these independent housing associations (Malpass and Mullins, 2002). Furthermore, the restriction of local democratic control and of welfare provision as a result of successive (Thatcher and post-Thatcher) governments preventing local councils from borrowing the funds needed for the maintenance, improvement and development of council housing - in the context of council rents rising above inflation, of the government's visible lack of commitment to council housing and strong promotion of the "Right to Buy" scheme - facilitated the demunicipalisation of housing, i.e. the private and quasi-privatised delivery of housing on the basis of exploitative, profit-making private capital finance (Ginsburg, 2005). This reliance on private capital for the maintenance and development of housing from 2001 also extended to the use of the Private Finance Initiative and of "arms length management companies" (ALMOs), although LSVT remained the preferred option, also reliant on private finance, with the associated more direct financial exposure (ibid.). This also constituted a degree of structural violence against security needs.

The decision whether to conduct large-scale housing stock transfers was made through tenant ballots that were based on uneven funding options and associated threats and blackmail which restricted democratic control: council tenants were told new investment in housing stock maintenance was dependent on them agreeing to housing stock transfer from councils to housing associations (Ginsburg, ibid.). The housing stock transfers therefore tended to lead to new, relatively modest investment, and they appeared to lead to some tentative gains in terms of the introduction of tenant representation on housing association management boards and consultation bodies, although the business secrecy of housing associations hindered their democratic accountability and participation (ibid.). Furthermore, as Ginsburg (ibid., 124 and 126) noted, "the extent and effectiveness of tenant representation in the longer term varied substantially across the associations surveyed", and it is highly questionable whether tenant representation on these bodies led to tenants being able to "exert any more collective influence

than they did within local electoral politics". Tenant participation and democratic accountability also appear to have been hindered by the processes of externalisation (including disaggregation and private finance) and managerialisation (including the introduction of business criteria and managerialist, business-style practices) which the development of housing associations entailed (Walker, 2001; Ginsburg, 2005; Glynn, 2009c)[237]. A House of Commons Committee (HoC, 2004, 46) reported that it was "not convinced that (…) stock transfer RSLs necessarily lead to better tenant participation and satisfaction". The government-commissioned evaluation of housing stock transfers (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions/DETR, 2000) was also critical of the tenant participation and consultation processes in housing associations, among other reasons due to overly long, technical and formally written consultation documents. A degree of tenants' marginalisation and exclusion from the stock transfer process, including the subsequent management of housing associations, is also indicated by the fact that LSVT tenants commonly were not even aware that councils were no longer their landlord years after the stock transfer had taken place (Ginsburg, 2005). This also restricted the democratic accountability of housing associations, as did the fact that they are "regulated by the Housing Corporation and are run in accordance with a business plan by boards of directors who, unless they are tenant board members or councillors, have no democratic constituency" (ibid., 128). The DETR evaluation

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[237] There is also evidence that LSVT fragmented the (previously local authority) workers and damaged their democratic agential power. RSL managements everywhere created two-tier workforces by giving different terms and conditions to new post-transfer staff (which included the loss of annual incremental pay increases and the removal of formal negotiation rights for new staff), in addition to carrying out organisational restructuring which in some cases resulted in compulsory redundancies (Ginsburg, 2005). This change seemed to be at least partly driven by increased exposure of RSLs to financial risk as a result of the reliance of LSVT on private capital finance, which also stimulated the management's tendency to emulate private sector practices and to cultivate a radicalised version of New Public Management (Glennerster et al., 2000; Walker, 2001; Ginsburg, 2005). Furthermore, as Ginsburg (ibid.) noted, Naidoo (2001, in Ginsburg, 2005) found in a study of 32 RSLs that a quarter of them had no officially recognised trade union presence, and that the trade unions in other RSLs were less influential post-transfer, so that there were no collective bargaining agreements in over a third of the transfers. However, the notion that existing council housing, with its own bureaucratic and unequal employment relations, is "the best of all possible worlds" is challenged by the findings of Pawson and Fancy (2003, viii). In their survey of LSVT staff experiences they found that the staff generally had a favourable view of the new work regime, which they saw as valuing staff more highly and "replacing a bureaucratic, hierarchical work environment with one that is more egalitarian, inclusive and encouraging of initiative". However, a survey of RSL employees carried out on behalf of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM, 2003a) found that around half of the employees thought that the transfer was not well managed. The survey also found that LSVT RSLs were less likely to have trade union recognition agreements (a third said they did not, and 56 per cent of pre-1995 LSVT RSLs did not formally recognise a trade union), which is very likely to have greatly limited their ability to democratically participate in decision-making and to keep their employers accountable.

(DETR, 2000) also reported findings of tenant surveys that satisfaction with transfer RSLs, despite all the government support for stock transfers and denial of support for council housing, was only around 6 per cent higher than satisfaction with local authorities as landlords (85 vs. 79 per cent respectively). Tenants in some housing associations were especially dissatisfied with significantly increased rents post-transfer (Mullins et al., 1995), and this kind of restriction of welfare provision and violation of tenant's security needs (through higher rents) continued thereafter. Costs to the taxpayers through housing benefit were also generally higher than in the case of council housing (Hodgkinson, 2009). Some housing associations also started to engage in exploitative, for-profit market rent landlordism (Hodkinson, 2009). There are further indications that the government's bias against council housing and in favour of housing associations led to increased exploitation and the restriction of welfare provision (in the broad sense of the term). The National Audit Office (2003) calculated that the transfers were possibly up to 30 per cent more expensive than housing stock retention and renovation by councils would have been. Additionally, a survey by Shelter found that "25 per cent of transfer authorities reported that discharging housing register and homelessness duties had become less easy since transfer, and this was more likely to be the case for transfers since 1996" (Mullins and Simmons, 2001, 28).

Housing associations are allowed to charge market rents and build private housing, yet welfare costs of housing through housing associations are generally higher than in the case of council housing (Ginsburg, 2005). The emergence and spread of housing associations which, as previous discussion has indicated, tend to operate on democratically unaccountable lines, to restrict welfare provision and facilitate exploitation (perhaps especially through the ability to charge market rents without adequate public scrutiny, as well as to build private housing), seems to have led to the increase in the level of structural violence in the housing sector.

By the time Gordon Brown was beginning his premiership, New Labour had already transferred 860,000 British council homes to housing associations and 400,000 to former tenants (Hodkinson, 2009). Looking at the UK as a whole, the number of dwellings owned by local authorities fell from 4 million 368 thousand in 1996 to 2 million 605 thousand in 2006, while the number of dwellings owned by housing associations increased from 1 million 78 thousand in 1996 to 2 million 168 thousand in 2006 (Wilcox, 2007). The introduction of LSVTs was, however, successfully opposed in many cases. With the help of the Defend Council Housing

campaign, tenants voted against transfers in around a quarter of all large-scale voluntary stock transfer proposals in England, thus retaining their more accountable and secure council tenancies (Smyth, 2018).

"Arms Length Management Organisations"

It seems to have been in response to Defend Council Housing's campaigning successes that New Labour developed Arms Length Management Organisations/ALMOs (ibid.), apparently as a stratagem which was to serve as a new form of piecemeal (partial) dispossession of commonly owned property. This new layer of managerial bureaucracy apparently "introduces another stage in the privatisation process, but the direction of travel remains the same" (Glynn, 2009b, 52). ALMOs are "eroding service accountability to tenants and elected councillors" (Hodkinson, 2009, 104) through their adherence to corporate patterns of behaviour and company law, contributing to the curtailment of democratic accountability. In addition to this, ALMOs have sought to deepen housing privatisation and wrest control over housing away from local authorities (National Federation of ALMOs, 2005). Second-stage, full privatisation has indeed occurred in some cases (Defend Council Housing, n.d.).

Furthermore, the methods by which the transfer of housing ownership from councils to ALMOs was carried out were quite undemocratic. As Glynn (2009b, 62) noted: "When it came to the transfer of British council housing to housing associations (which needed the vote of existing tenants), bullying was an overt and central part of the process. Vote for transfer, and your much-neglected homes will be brought up to modern standards; vote against, and there will be no money for improvements". Yet despite these government and local authority attempts to restrict democratic accountability, Defend Council Housing managed to persuade the local population not to vote in favour of transferring to ALMOs in around a quarter of cases by 2009 (Glynn, 2009d).

Similarly to strategies employed for other public services (like the NHS for instance), the consistent strategy of successive administrations has been to enlarge the very expensive and well paid managerial bureaucracy (Defend Council Housing, n.d.), contributing to the exploitation of the public and thus driving a wedge between privileged managerial and professional layers and the public interest. The participation of tenants on housing boards has been criticised as a

nominal and deceptive way of misrepresenting the actual workings of ALMOs (ibid.). A survey found that, in contrast to the common New Labour rhetoric about "community empowerment", the shift towards ALMOs left very little scope for democratic tenant control due to the introduction of domineering senior management teams, and the adoption of centrally-defined targets (Weaver, 2004).

There has been an increasing "residualisation" of most remaining social housing, i.e. it has increasingly been transformed into "housing of last resort (…) starved of funds and deprived of all but minimal repair and maintenance", which helps to reinforce neoliberal propaganda linking "failed estates" with council housing in general (Glynn, 2009a, 45 and 47). The (relatively informal) housing segregation helps to perpetuate wider social exclusion and marginalisation, as well as anti-communitarian policies which contribute to the fragmentation of lower class populations. The decline of diversity in social housing and the highly differential nature of the home ownership sector (Forrest et al., 1990), as well as the trend of setting council housing aside for the "underclass" (Paris, 2010), have also contributed to the marginalisation of council housing and to the fragmentation of the subordinate classes. Even council housing appeared to be partially geared towards boosting private corporate profit, so that most new council housing in England is constructed through public-private partnerships and private finance initiatives (Glynn, 2009a), which have been found to be exploitative financing models (see the section on health care).

Not until 2004 did the Labour government publicly rediscover lack of housing supply as an important issue (Bramley, 2010). Even at a later stage, despite passing the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 which was intended to increase housing supply (Murie, 2010), it refused to powerfully challenge and begin rolling back the neoliberal reforms of the housing sector, which appear to have been founded on private profit-making as their *ultima ratio*. The Labour administration failed to rectify major affordability and supply problems, tending to support a further increase in private renting and home ownership, and rejecting calls to ensure that the private rented sector is forced to meet the decent homes standard (Murie, 2010), thus also failing to rectify some limitations of welfare provision as a result of poor housing standards, especially in the private sector.

The social and economic costs of the unregulated, private profit-driven housing market

have been immense. These state-driven neoliberal changes, especially the government's promotion of a profit-driven housing market, result in various negative externalities, including the burden placed on public expenditure through a variety of additional social and health problems which are partially caused by insufficiently democratically accountable and exploitative private housing provision: "Housing conditions in the private rented sector are the worst of any type of housing. Poor housing is intimately linked with poor physical and mental health. It also comes with a heavy social cost, including an estimated bill of £600m a year for the NHS" (Pennycook, 2011). These poor housing conditions are themselves largely a result of the restriction of democratic accountability (a housing sector under stricter democratic control would pay greater attention to housing quality). Another negative externality which is made possible by weak democratic control is the housing benefit for private renting, whose cost to the taxpayer rose to £23bn in 2013 (Kober, 2013) as landlords exploited a market in short supply by raising the rents the housing benefit pays for (and which the housing benefit helps to perpetuate at the expense of the general public). Around a third of working tenants in social housing and around a tenth of working households in the private rented sector received housing benefit at the end of New Labour's rule (Kelly, 2014). This is not so surprising when one considers the unregulated private renting market's exploitative insensitivity to public need: the average house price rose from £11,500 in 1976 to £182,000 in 2007 (The Guardian, 2013b).

The speculative housing "bubble" (and, consequently, "subprime" mortgages/high-risk loans to people on low incomes) in the UK has also had a role in the creation of the economic crisis (Stiglitz, 2010; Hutton, 2010). The economic crisis that erupted in 2007 and 2008 to a large degree impeded mortgage lending, further lowering the output of new residential properties (Malpass and Rowlands, 2010), which also constituted a significant negative externality of the behaviour of private capital which (as chapters 6 and 7 will show) was largely responsible for the financial crisis. Current neoliberal housing policies and processes of privatisation, marketisation and segregation have led to various very significant forms of structural violence. They export social costs onto other social services, and onto society as a whole. They negate housing as a fundamental human right, restrict individual and democratic agency and accountability, limit welfare provision, lead to exploitation, the violation of security and well-being needs, expulsion and marginalisation, as well as penetration and fragmentation of the subordinate social classes.

They increase social inequality, personal and social misery.

One extremely important yet commonly neglected set of issues in relation to housing concerns the appalling housing situations into which the most marginalised and dehumanised people in society (including rough sleepers and other homeless people, prisoners, some psychiatric patients, and asylum seekers) are placed. People who live in conditions of poverty, extreme social and economic marginality are *ipso facto* on the lowest rungs of the lower class. I am not able to discuss here the specific housing patterns relating to these social categories, except to remind the reader of the dramatic expansion of the carceral system and to note the intensification of structural violence against asylum seekers, which has entailed severe violations of their need for and right to decent housing. As I mentioned earlier, the Major government's 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act stripped asylum seekers of their rights to housing and to financial support. Under the National Assistance Act 1945 and the Children Act 1989, local authorities had a statutory obligation to provide housing and food for the destitute. London local authorities (around 90 per cent of asylum seekers were based in London), most of which were Labour, "decided to get round their responsibility by unofficially 'dispersing' asylum seekers into cheaper temporary accommodation outside London, in 'bed and breakfasts' in seaside 'resorts' on the south coast" (Fekete, 2001, 30). Among other forms of structural violence which it entails, this dispersal of asylum seekers contributes to their fragmentation, which impedes their ability to democratically participate in public life and to hold the government to account (i.e. to effectively struggle against xeno-racist marginalisation, including against their placement into a decidedly subordinate class position). Furthermore, New Labour introduced the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act which, among other discriminatory xeno-racist measures and as part of a broader system of immigration deterrence, surveillance and control, "modernised" the older Conservative system of incarcerating undocumented immigrants – including those who have not even been charged for a specific criminal offence - in existing prisons ("often for extremely long periods of time" - Fekete, 2001, 36) by introducing a separate system of detention centres – i.e. "a separate prison complex for asylum seekers" (Fekete, 2001, 37)[238]. Those asylum seekers who are not

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[238] The New Labour government also continued the practice of detaining many asylum seekers in ordinary prisons (Fekete, 2011). Displaying extremist authoritarian zeal, the Home Office in 2001 "announced that it would double the number of asylum seekers and immigrants it detains and more than double the number it removes from the country" (ibid., 36). The numerous hunger strikes in immigrant detention centres, are an indication of the asylum

imprisoned also experience extreme objectification[239]. The dismantling of this entire hideous system of racist oppression should be considered as an urgent priority by all those seeking to create positive social peace.

Concluding Thoughts

Under Thatcher's rule, the suppression of existing council housing through the "Right to Buy" scheme, which enabled council tenants to buy their homes at massive discounts, led to the exploitative privatisation of public housing stock that was created and maintained through decades of public investment. By facilitating the privatisation of home ownership the Thatcher government powerfully undermined the system of council housing and it weakened democratic accountability by largely transferring the responsibility for housing provision from local government to much less accountable private landlords. Thatcher's government also abolished rent controls and long-term private tenancies, which constituted the restriction of this form of welfare provision and facilitated the exploitation of tenants by landlords.

New Labour's emphasis on social assistance to cover housing costs (rather than on ensuring affordable housing) supported the sustainability of exploitation of the population by various types of rentier capitalists. It also facilitated the marginalisation of individuals belonging to the lower class, as well as the fragmentation of class interests on the basis of one's position as a house owner (who benefits from the increase in property values) or a renter (who loses). This

seekers' social marginality – as is the general media silence about these dramatic acts of defiance and despair. The deportation process itself, whose various frequently disastrous personal and familial consequences I cannot discuss here, is also an extremist act of devastating violence.

[239] The aforementioned NASS scheme in particular stripped asylum seekers of housing rights including security of tenure (it enabled landlords to evict them with just seven days notice) and right of legal redress in response to landlord harassment (Fekete, ibid.). Liz Fekete (ibid., 33) powerfully depicted some general features of their plight in relation to housing:

"The state's policy of denying basic civil rights to asylum seekers is well understood in the twilight zones of the unregulated private housing sector where, huddled in bedsits, shared houses, overcrowded hostels and bed and breakfasts, they face private landlords who see in them a lucrative business opportunity. According to Shelter, new landlords are entering the market to take advantage of profitable contracts providing accommodation for asylum seekers, who are actually preferred to other groups precisely because of their rightlessness and their inability to complain effectively. Asylum seekers have now become the 'new exploited homeless'. Some of the worst examples of abuse come from the large hostels where hundreds of asylum seekers are herded into dormitory conditions. Under New Labour's 'deterrent' regime, food is often inedible, sanitation and hygiene deplorable, heating insufficient and health and safety regulations ignored. (…) Nor is there any privacy in the meagre living space, which can be searched at a moment's notice by police and immigration officials (…) And private landlords, too, assume similar rights".

fragmentation of class interests and perspectives impeded the development of a unified class consciousness, social and political unity, which reduced the democratic agential power of the subordinate classes, limiting their ability to ensure the system's democratic accountability and to participate as effective agents in public life.

Under both Conservative and New Labour rule, the fragmentation of classes and class fractions was furthered by the ideological implantation of the marketising capitalist agenda into popular consciousness (through the promotion of narrowly individualist consumerist perspectives, "solutions" and aspirations in relation to the provision of housing), which constituted the structural violence of penetration and segmentation. The marketisation of housing is based on and supportive of the practice of prioritising exchange value at the expense of use value of the housing stock. This prioritisation of private interest (profit) over public need contributes to the restriction of democratic accountability and of human rights, restriction of welfare provision, violation of security and well-being needs, marginalisation and exploitation of people belonging to the subordinate classes. New Labour enabled the continuation and intensification of these forms of structural violence through, among other mechanisms, the failure to introduce rent controls, the failure to reverse the trend of the decline in council housing (the social rented sector in England declined from 31 per cent in 1979 to 17 per cent in 2007 and council housing waiting lists doubled between 1997 and 2009), the failure to rectify major affordability and supply problems and to challenge housing-related market speculation and unequal patterns of land ownership (which led to an increase in house prices by 211 per cent between 1997 and 2007), as well as the rejection of calls to ensure that private sector developers meet the decent homes standard, etc. These are some of the major indications of the system's lack of democratic accountability in relation to people's housing needs. New Labour also continued the practice of the demunicipalisation and partial centralisation of housing policy, thus curtailing democratic accountability by increasing the distance between the decision-makers and the broad public. Furthermore, New Labour greatly increased the speed at which the privatisation and semi-privatisation (both through the "Right to Buy" scheme, "large scale voluntary transfers/LSVT" and "arms length management companies/ALMOs") of housing was advanced, going beyond the neoliberal housing measures and processes which took place under John Major's premiership. These processes had the effect of creating two-tier workforces, inducing

de-unionisation and weakening the influence of trade unions where they were still present. It is very likely that these changes greatly limited the ability of employees to democratically participate in decision-making and to hold their employers to account.

In addition to causing other forms of structural violence which I have already noted, privatisation and semi-privatisation of housing (including through the "Right to Buy" scheme and through New Labour's typical creeping privatisation tactic in the form of introducing "large scale voluntary transfers" and "arms length management companies") increased market-based exploitation and weakened the capacity for tenant control. My discussion has shown that violations of the human right to (decent or any kind of) housing, with the accompanying violations of security, well-being and survival needs, to a large degree stem from the structural violence of marginalisation, restriction of democratic accountability and participation, which particularly severely affect the lower class (the working and unemployed poor) and some ethnic minorities.

Instead of housing policy being dominated by neoliberal state elites, private housing "developers", landlords and landowners, it should be democratised and developed in the interests of the broad population. The experience of the Yugoslav attempt to construct a system of social self-government (whose broad conceptualisation was far more impressive than its inadequate implementation) provides a useful general model for the democratisation of housing policy and of other areas of social reproduction. In addition to the broad nascent system of council democracy which I have discussed in earlier chapters, from the 1970s Yugoslavia also introduced a system of citizens' self-contributions, through which the citizens of a municipality or an entire region frequently participated in referenda concerning communal infrastructural projects. These referenda were means of deciding whether to build (i.e. whether to financially support the construction of) schools, nurseries, hospitals, various cultural centres, etc., in addition to the contributions citizens were already making from their own salaries for the satisfaction of a variety of social needs and communal expenses, including social housing, cultural and welfare programmes (Kirn, 2014)[240]. Such a system of self-contributions, which can democratise housing

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[240] The site-specific system of self-contributions on the basis of direct democratic decision-making may not be solidaristic. Wealthier municipalities, regions and republics are able to invest in better-quality infrastructure (see Kirn, ibid.). Social funds for the development of underdeveloped municipalities, regions and countries, as well as the

236

policy and thus to a large degree transcend housing-related structural violence, accentuates the vital importance of developing the broad population's high cultural aspirations and responsible, solidaristic modes of thought and conduct.

EDUCATION

This section will firstly examine the role of the education system as an ideological apparatus for the reproduction of capitalist social relations. The following segment will provide an initial analysis in light of the theory of structural violence of the processes of the commodification of education, as well as of the generally authoritarian and uncaring character of most education, which severely impedes the development of a higher social system based on democratic accountability and participation. Finally, having made some concluding remarks concerning education-related structural violence, I will outline how it could largely be overcome through a radically democratic and peacemaking transformation of the education system.

The Education System as an Ideological Apparatus

One of the basic functions of the UK education system (not unlike education systems in other countries) has been to reproduce labour power, the class structure and the hegemonic (pro-capitalist) ideology, i.e. to reproduce the existing economic, social and political relations of class domination and subordination. Bowles and Gintis (1976) identified a "correspondence principle" between the world of education and the world of work, which puts the education system under the control of the economic elites, in accordance with their interests. An important aspect of this is the "hidden curriculum" (Illich, 1973), which is embedded in the very experience of schooling rather than just the official educational content. This hidden curriculum covers two main areas.

Firstly, as Bowles and Gintis found, obedience and deference to authority are highly rewarded by the educational system, anticipating the hierarchical class politics of the workplace

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decision-making integration of self-governing units into a broader polity based on integral social self-government, are necessary to address and work to eliminate these kinds of inequalities.

and of the wider economic and political system[241]. As the Department of Education and Science explicated in its 1985 White Paper "Better Schools": "It is vital that schools should always remember that the preparation for working life is one of their primary functions" (Department of Education and Science, 1985, para. 46). A major purpose of schools is to accustom pupils to docility and obedience, to the existence of hierarchical authority and disciplinary control where pupils' democratic rights, active participation, individual agential power and choice (e.g. of educational methods and aims) are generally marginal. Further studies are needed to explore the extent and the nature of the contribution of the correspondence principle and of the hidden curriculum to the structural violence of penetration/indoctrination and segmentation.

The second main mechanism by which the correspondence principle functions is the organisation of schooling which gives preference to alienated labour, where the concept of work as a source of intrinsic pleasure and of higher forms of self-actualisation is eschewed in favour of an understanding of work which puts external incentives first. The dominant emphasis on external rewards and external criteria prepares pupils for a life of unsatisfying, intrinsically unfulfilling work experiences (Bowles and Gintis, 1976) which lead to the restriction of individual agency and the alienation of meaning. The pursuit of money and status to a significant extent replaces the quest for free, truly meaningful existence oriented towards achieving personal self-actualisation.

A central ideological function of the education system in a class society is generally to reproduce dominant cultural norms imposed by the dominant classes (Bourdieu, 1974), to justify the hierarchical organisation of society, privilege and wealth. Although the education system has

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[241] The existence of a working class "lads' " counterculture to (some aspects of) educational norms and the educational regimen (Willis, 1977; Reay, 2002; Archer et al., 2007) does not truly detract from the correspondence argument. Willis himself granted that the "aimless air of insubordination" (Willis, 1977, 13) created by such pupils is often largely an unambitious coping mechanism designed to deal with disempowering school experiences. Such ritualistic, superficial means for venting frustrations do not present a coherent, sensible opposition to their deprivation and oppression. By communicating "careless" bravado in the face of social defeat, such pupils may to a large extent be engaging in a specific form of acquiescent adaptation to social inequalities. However, Reay (2004, 2007) warned against monolithic and stereotypical interpretations of working class school experience, and she noted the capability of some marginalised pupils to subject to authentic critique the fixed, agency-denying position they were given and the disempowering educational and social processes they are subjected to. Hegemonic representations of children from marginal backgrounds who attend lower status inner-city comprehensive schools (primarily children belonging to the lower classes and ethnic minorities) support the processes of polarisation and demonisation, portraying them as the delinquent and incompetent "refuse" of society (as Reay, 2004 found), and in these ways contribute to the structural violence of fragmentation, marginalisation and the violation of these childrens' needs for dignity, status, and well-being more generally.

in recent decades enjoyed relative (but, as I will show, declining) autonomy from the state and from large capital, it is not allowed to fundamentally challenge capitalist interests (Giroux, 1984; Jones, 2016). The capitalist state will not support an anti-capitalist education system, nor even a curriculum which is mildly critical of capitalism and of its main assumptions. A relatively liberal education agenda in the post-WWII period was eroded since the 1970s in favour of an indoctrinating approach focused on socialisation which prepares pupils for the world of work (Apple, 2003; Hill, 1989, 1990; Department of Educational Employment, 1998; Jones, 2016). The education authorities in recent decades generally sought to indoctrinate new generations with a traditionalist family-centric, nationalist, culturally quite homogenous and somewhat ethnocentric ideological perspective, especially in England and under Conservative governments (Jones, 2016). It appears that this feature of the UK education system was strengthened by the introduction of a centralised National Curriculum (for state schools but not fee-paying ones) in 1988, as well as of national tests and more target-based state inspections[242]. The introduction of the national curriculum and its foreclosure of debate about the main purposes and processes of education, along with the broader patterns of new managerialism and its varied forms of localised operational management combined with detailed centralised regulation and control (Clarke and Newman, 2009; Jones, 2016), negatively affected teachers' agential power (Reay, 1998b; Jones, 2016)[243]. However, the centralisation of schooling has not stifled the autonomy of progressive educators altogether (Rikowski, 2005; Jones, 2016). Teachers are still not entirely prevented from expressing real agency and advancing the pupils' creative and critical faculties. The national curriculum, and the associated broader shift to a "new vocationalism" (Whiteside et al., 1992; Tomlinson, 2005; Chitty, 2009), supported the strengthening of the correspondence principle, bringing the education system more in line with employers' needs and interests and

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[242] As Ball (1993) showed, John Major's government in many ways even furthered and intensified the Thatcherite agenda of entrenching a conservative/restorationist curriculum, authoritarian pedagogic traditionalism and an emphasis on hierarchical differentiation through assessment and rigid performance indicators based on "publishable, measurement-based, competitive, pencil and paper, externally-set tests and examinations" (ibid., 205).

[243] Teachers' involvement in trade unions, and the influence of teachers' trade unions on educational change, also declined under Conservative and New Labour rule (Edwards, 2008). However, progressive teachers and other progressive actors were still able to significantly influence at least some aspects of the educational agenda. For example, progressive teachers were, along with Labour left local authorities and other curriculum activists, relatively effective in combating some aspects of the traditionalist, patriarchal and ethno-centrist Thatcherite educational agenda, although the Thatcher government's restriction of the power and policy independence of local authorities severely limited their scope to develop and support progressive educational initiatives (Jones, 2016).

also reducing teachers' autonomy[244]. The emphasis on vocational over academic tracks for working-class education also entrenches the class-based hierarchical segregation of students (Reay, 2011; Edwards and Canaan, 2015), facilitating the structural violence of fragmentation, educational deprivation and the marginalisation of some students belonging to the lower class. As a result of these changes, the relative autonomy of the education system has sometimes been better preserved in independent and private schools (Tomlinson, 2005), although not necessarily with progressive results.

New Labour's education policy, which accepted many of the changes in education policy imposed by the Conservatives, including market competition and the emphasis on vocational education, has even been characterised as a further subordination of education to (neoliberal) economic objectives (Tomlinson, 2005). The Blair and Brown governments retained the Conservative emphasis on testing and league tables, and they retained the SATs assessment system which the Conservatives had introduced (Jones, 2016). Its active promotion of "specialization, selection, streaming and setting by ability" (ibid., 162) supported the structural violence of marginalisation of poorly achieving pupils (who are more likely to be lower class) and the competitive fragmentation of pupils and of their families, to a significant extent along class lines. The reductionist discourse about "achievement according to ability and hard work", which has seriously underplayed the extent to which class-based and other inequalities lead to differences in results (Jones, 2016), also constituted the structural violence of penetration/indoctrination and segmentation (by obscuring how class inequalities affect perceived ability and life chances, and by presenting competition as an innate rule of social life rather than an ideological and practical choice instead of which society could prioritise mutual aid, care and cooperation). Another way in which New Labour promoted and supported an alienating conception of education which risked subordinating broader educational goals to private business interests was by exhorting universities "both to respond to business needs and to involve employers in the design and delivery of their programmes, which should become demand-driven" (Jones, 2016, 151). However, rigid acceptance of these educational principles continued to be moderated by more broad-minded practices. For example, even the Department

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[244] Studies are needed regarding the influence of these trends relating to the correspondence principle on the levels and character of the structural violence of segmentation, penetration, fragmentation and the alienation of meaning.

for Education and Skills (2003a) under New Labour also encouraged a degree of cross-curricular and arts-based primary school education, partly at least in order to stimulate the development of "creative industries". Still, it certainly seems hard to negate that the main trends in the UK education system in the period of neoliberal consolidation were antithetical to Tomlinson's humanistic pedagogic vision: "Critiques of the narrowing of education to economic ends want to reclaim education as a humanizing, liberalizing, democratizing force, directed, as the UN (1948) *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* put it, to 'the full development of the human personality and a strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'. Education must also help people make sense of the impact of global changes, combat resurgent xenophobic nationalism, recreate the idea of the common good and move beyond a tawdry subservience to market forces" (Tomlinson, 2005, 223). The concept of education as an emancipatory and collective activity has been traduced and negated by the dominant, instrumentalised and individualist form of education in Britain, which has sometimes appeared as little more than a form of dressage. Especially since Thatcher's government came to power, economically-driven capitalist instrumentalism increasingly led to an objectified treatment even of primary school children (Woods and Jeffrey, 2002; Jones, 2016), which limited the development of their individual agency and neglected their need to be primarily treated not as "workers-in-waiting" but as full human beings with individual desires and aspirations. This approach violates their need for dignity. Galtung (1996) characterised forms of socialisation of children and young people which negate freedom of choice as a type of structural violence[245].

As I have already noted, the education system helps to legitimise inequalities in the distribution of power and wealth, although the effects of social inequality systematically break the link between people's innate ability and their educational attainment. The ideological construct of wealth and power as a just reward for educational attainment conceals the fact that educational attainment apparently follows wealth more than intellectual ability, as we shall see below. The notion of neutrality and equality of opportunity, which the political and media elites

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[245] More research could help to illuminate how the dominant instrumentalising and relatively authoritarian mode of education (at least in comparison to some educational methods, e.g. the Montessori method and various other critical pedagogic approaches to education) contributes to the structurally violent and indoctrinating character of contemporary socialisation, especially from the perspective of reproducing class patterns of competition, antagonisation, domination and subordination.

routinely strive to advance, serves to normalise the existence of extreme social inequalities which hide behind the illusion that society operates according to open, meritocratic principles. These meritocratic notions deflect from the criticism of class privilege and class disadvantage in favour of individualised blame of those who did not succeed in the education system (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). Instilling feelings of inferiority among the dominated classes and of superiority among the dominant classes, as well as the belief in the curative value of vertical social mobility in relation to systemic class inequalities (that are clearly not resolved by the fact that some people from lower class backgrounds manage to become rich and powerful) – which is supportive of the structural violence of penetration and fragmentation – are common ways in which ideological apparatuses legitimise and mystify class inequalities. These phenomena are inseparable from the standardised functioning of the education system. The "elimination" effect is achieved both through examination failure and self-elimination by those unwilling, unable (or believing to be unable) to satisfy the operative educational and cultural criteria (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). The increasingly segregated system of education in Britain has resulted in children from the lower class (as well as from other marginalised groups such as some ethnic minorities) misguidedly internalising "a sense of failure and worthlessness" (Reay, 2015), which has led to the violation of their well-being, dignity and status needs.

The mystification of class relations (i.e. the normalisation of class inequality) through the education system is all the more startling considering the continued, unabashed existence of vastly privileged forms of schooling, in particular the public school system, which includes certain fee-paying schools (such as Eton, Winchester, Westminster, Harrow, Rugby etc.) which are quite explicitly designed to prepare the future elites, and are almost completely inaccessible to everyone but the financially wealthy. In higher education, despite some progress in recent decades, Oxbridge (whose graduates continue to dominate the highest levels of social life) remains far more accessible to the upper classes, and the former polytechnics (which continued to experience inferior funding – Jones, 2016) are mostly occupied by students from the lower class (Stanworth, 2006). This educational segregation facilitates selfish individualist competitiveness which erodes social solidarity and supports the fragmentation of people into classes as well as the fragmentation of the subordinate classes, especially on the lines of division between the working class and the generally more educationally acquisitive and more

successfully adapted middle class individuals and families (who tend to be better at "working the system" and gaining access to higher status comprehensive, as well as fee-paying, schools – Ball, 2003; Reay, 2008, 2014)[246]. Educational segregation also leads to the marginalisation (and often also educational deprivation) of the subordinate classes (particularly the lower class)[247].

Already in 1979, the Conservative government began to roll back the development of the comprehensive school system (i.e. schools recruiting from across the range of academic aptitude and achievement), rejecting the recommendation of the Macfarlane Committee to bring working class and middle class students together in the same educational institution (by combining FE colleges and sixth forms – see Fisher and Simmons, 2012), in addition to giving back local education authorities the right to select children for secondary education at 11 (Jones, 2016). In line with the wider inequality patterns in society, the fee-paying school sector began to rise again after a century of decline, increasing its share from 5.8 per cent to 6.7 per cent of the British student population (ibid.). Almost all students who attended fee-paying schools went on to enter universities, while only a quarter of state school students did the same in the mid-1990s (Wilby, 1997; Jones, 2016). The disparity in examination success rates between secondary schools in poor and rich areas even increased during Conservative rule (Smith et al., 1997).

Various authors have elucidated the importance of material inequalities and of their interaction with inequalities regarding the possession of social and cultural capital in the creation of the class gap in educational attainment (e.g. Ball et al., 1994; Sullivan, 2001; Reay et al., 2005). In their analyses of the effect of material inequality on educational attainment, Smith and Noble (1995) and Reay et al. (2005) noted factors including the greater incidence of health problems among poorer children, the inability to afford private tuition and private education, the

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[246] Reay (2008) showed how Blair's emphasis on educational "choice" served to privilege the middle classes and to advance a misleading perspective about the openness of the educational system to all classes, depending on parents' "correct choices". The delegation of responsibility for pupils' educational success or failure from the school to the parent and the misrepresentation of disadvantage as primarily a consequence of parental bad choice constitute penetration/indoctrination and help to entrench the structural violence of fragmentation, marginalisation and educational deprivation by "naturalising" the individualist, consumerist approach to education and by legitimising class-based educational segregation by blaming the lower class victims of the class-riven educational system for their subordinate position.

[247] As in numerous other cases, structural violence can also create a backlash and unintended counter-effects. The educational segregation between public and state schools, between state schools in more affluent areas and state schools in the inner cities and "sink estates", as well as between elite and non-elite universities, is (in certain cases) likely to also help to preserve a certain level of (at least elementary) class consciousness – a general sense of "us" and "them" – among the subordinate classes.

negative effects of the marketisation of schools on the resources obtained by schools in less affluent areas, advantages enjoyed by students of wealthier parents who tend to live closer to better-performing schools, lack of adequate study facilities and materials, student debt aversion and term-time working by students from subordinate classes as important factors which limit educational opportunities and attainment of pupils and students from poorer families. They have thus contributed to class-based educational deprivation and marginalisation of students belonging to the subordinate (especially lower) classes. Children from upper class families have been treated by the educational system as far more important than the children and other young people from lower-class backgrounds. The fact that the latter have been subjected to the structural violence of marginalisation and educational deprivation is also made evident from the education funding per child. Although public spending on education grew by more than 5 per cent a year between 2000 and 2010 (Jones, 2016), at the end of New Labour rule, 23 per cent of school educational spending in Britain went on the 7 per cent of pupils who were privately educated (OECD, 2009). Perhaps the starkest example of this inequality has to do with the cost of the leading public schools. Entry into more prestigious private fee-paying schools - especially the elite ones - is largely restricted to the children of the wealthy. Similarly, various financial costs restrict the accessibility of universities to working class students, while universities which are more accessible to them, especially the former polytechnics (as already mentioned), experience inferior funding (Jones, 2016).

There is substantial evidence that class differences in educational attainment have also been closely related to different levels of access to cultural and social capital, which sustain the educational deprivation and marginalisation of lower class students. This is especially notable in relation to differences between the lower working class and the upper working class, the middle and upper classes, although it is quite possible that a relatively steady class-based gradient in cultural capital exists across the class structure. Cultural capital of UK pupils has been found to be strongly correlated with parental educational qualifications and their social class (Sullivan, 2001). Various authors claim that crucial class disparities in cultural capital (e.g. regarding linguistic ability, abstract reasoning and "educationally appropriate" forms of social intelligence) are generally created in early childhood (Bernstein, 1970; Bourdieu, 1974; Feinstein, 2003). The deployment of greater cultural and social capital is advantageous for exercising "choice" and

gaining entry into more prestigious schools and universities (Gewirtz et al., 1995; Jones, 2016).

As a result of these and other class-related education inequalities, it has been found that children of upper-class parents are much more likely to obtain higher educational qualifications than their lower-class peers, quite irrespective of their natural abilities (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Blackburn and Marsh, 1991)[248]. Privileged backgrounds help to perpetuate privilege, and disadvantage tends to reproduce disadvantage, marginalisation and exclusion. In many cases, it has been unlikely that even quite talented children would break out of severely disadvantaged backgrounds and marginalised social positions by achieving significant educational success, considering that the classification of children into different educational and occupational paths begins very early in the UK, sometimes already at 11 years old, when pupils in some parts of England take the Eleven Plus exam (and sometimes even earlier, when junior school age children go to private schools or 'prep' schools, prior to entering public schools). Still, there was some progress at the turn of the century in the educational attainment among pupils from poor backgrounds, although this positive trend slowed down after 1999, and quite drastic inequalities remained (see Palmer et al., 2005).

The Commodification of Education

Conservative policies and practices, which increased wealth inequality, stimulated the development of fee-paying and independent schools (that is, schools that are administratively independent from local authorities rather than necessarily being independent of central government and private capital). This to a significant extent eroded the locally-controlled comprehensive school system, so that by 1997 the number of fully comprehensive schools in

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[248] The education system should also challenge the socially normalised patterns of ableist discrimination against people who do not satisfy the operative, narrowly conceived social criteria and who therefore suffer severe violations of their various needs, including their need for social status and dignity. Ableist discrimination which is functionally non-essential for the satisfaction of basic social needs is a major mechanism through which hierarchical capitalist values and practices are legitimated and reproduced. A humanitarian socialist society would operate according to different guiding principles. As I wrote elsewhere with regard to higher education (Jakopovich, 2018c, forthcoming, 44), "the optimal, radical solution would be to abolish the *numerus clausus* (exams for university entry) altogether – in an advanced civilisation high-quality university education would be considered a basic human right, a public, universally accessible good. The student's aptitude for university study can be ascertained in the course of study. More fundamentally, an advanced society would promote everybody's personal and civic dignity, and would seek to avoid hierarchical ranking wherever possible. A humane education system would prepare people for public life in which everybody would be treated as a somebody".

England and Wales was reduced to just 40 per cent of the total number of schools (Fitz et al., 1997). The trends towards the commercialisation and partial privatisation of the education sector, conceived as the introduction of competition in the nascent educational market-place, were forcefully introduced by the Conservative government in the Education Reform Act of 1988 (directly pertaining to England, Wales and Northern Ireland), which simultaneously led to the greater centralisation of education policy (especially through the introduction of the National Curriculum) and the concomitant erosion of local authority powers in relation to education (Tomlinson, 2005; Chitty, 2009; Jones, 2016). Apart from the National Curriculum, the Act included the setting-up of grant-maintained schools funded by the state but managed independently, the establishment of "city technology colleges" financed by the government and the private sector and the introduction of open enrolment (right of parental choice), among other measures (Whitty et al., 1993; Ball et al., 1994). Ball et al. (op.cit.) established that the publication of school league tables motivated schools to attract what they saw as academically promising students, while shunning others. As a result, there was "a shift of emphasis from student needs to student performance: from what the school can do for the students to what the students can do for the school" (ibid.). Researchers including Gewirtz et al. (1995) and Jones (op. cit.) identified a deep shift in England from comprehensive educational, more inclusive, pupil-oriented and cooperative values to competitive, neoliberal market principles. The Conservative government initiated a shift in the 1980s away from the government's traditional partners and collaborators in education-related policy-making, especially by introducing a more impositional style of centralised government as well as by empowering a set of elite think tanks aligned with key members of Thatcher's administration (Ball and Exley, 2010). The restructuring of the policy milieu was especially pronounced in England. Local education authorities retained a much stronger role in Wales and Scotland, which also had far fewer grant-maintained schools, retained more egalitarian educational goals and more inclusively designed curriculum and assessment systems (Jones, 2016). According to OECD (2007, 34), Scottish locally-controlled, more socially integrated and community-based comprehensive schooling system "contained levels of social inequality", simultaneously "supporting higher overall levels of attainment".

While the different educational trajectories in England and other parts of the country during Thatcher's administration can partly be explained with reference to more general

differences in economic circumstances and social and political cultures (especially in Scotland, where the alternative approach to education policy was also conceived as part of a "national struggle against a government hostile to Scottish institutions and traditions" - Jones, 2016, 134), they were also to some extent the outcomes of divergent political and class conflicts. In England and Wales from 1985 to 1987 teachers conducted a pay campaign which included strike action as well as refusal to provide cover for absent colleagues (Jones, 2016). The teachers, who were now facing a government strengthened and emboldened by the defeat of the miners' strike, were fragmented into three unions: beside the NUT (the National Union of Teachers), NAS/UWT (the National Association of Schoolmasters/ Union of Women Teachers) and AMMA (the Assistant Masters and Mistresses Association) emerged in the early 1970s. NAS/UWT was characterised by a narrow approach which emphasised teachers' sectional interests and neglected educational policy, while AMMA, which was formerly a union specifically for teachers in grammar schools and public schools, had opened its doors to teachers dissatisfied with the increased militancy of the other teachers' unions and associations. The advantages of industrial unionism, or at least of unified craft unions, were once again confirmed as the three unions simultaneously fought the government as well as each other due to tactical differences and competition over recruitment. Weakened in this way, teachers' resistance was losing public support, and the government presented the industrial action it as further evidence of the abandonment of professionalism by militant public sector workers, and of the need to subject organised labour to strict policing (Jones, 2016). A major aspect of this approach in relation to the teachers' was the imposition of the 1987 Teachers' Pay and Conditions Act, which abolished national negotiations over pay and replaced them with a review body which excluded union voices, in addition to providing detailed specifications of the duties of a teacher and stipulating that providing cover for absent colleagues was compulsory (Pietrasik, 1987). The defeat of the teachers' struggle for better pay and conditions resulted in the establishment of a more elaborate and explicit system of control over the teachers' labour process (Sinclair et al., 1996; Jones, 2016).

By contrast, Scottish teachers, who were organised in a relatively strong, single union (the Education Institute of Scotland), gained widespread public support during their prolonged engagement in militant industrial action over pay and conditions (in 1985-6). Unified resistance combined with a more general public dissatisfaction with a hostile, alien government in London

resulted in significant gains for the teachers. They preserved their negotiating rights, and union influence on policy remained relatively strong, which helped the Scottish educational system to retain a significant degree of autonomy from the Thatcherite educational programme. Consequently, no national curriculum was introduced in Scotland, and attempts to introduce universal testing of primary school pupils in ways which would have enabled the construction of school performance league tables were also defeated (Jones, ibid.).

Research by Gewirtz et al. (ibid.) also established that the anti-egalitarian neoliberal approach to education, which was particularly characteristic of the education system in England, benefited advantaged children and harmed the disadvantaged. Apart from the negative teaching implications of this approach in relation to disadvantaged children, the reproduction of patterns of advantage and disadvantage largely occurred because the degree of choice in selecting schools was limited by their territorial availability and by the parents' ability to choose the best schools. These factors contribute to the marginalisation of lower class pupils. The most skilled and strongly motivated parental choosers are likely to be upper or middle class, and lower working class parents are likely to be the least socially and culturally skilled and motivated (Hyman, 1967; Gewirtz et al., 1995). Children from lower working-class families are seen as relatively "expendable" in this sense, which is why this radical discrimination encounters little resistance. Conservative and Labour policies supposedly aimed at increasing "consumer choice" (as the official explanation went) in many cases actually supported the marginalisation of lower class students. Tomlinson established that "the application of market principles to education proved extraordinarily effective in reintroducing a complex system of selection, passing as 'diversity' in which, as intended, the greatest beneficiaries were the middle classes" (Tomlinson, 2005, 218-19).

While the New Labour administration abolished the grant-maintained status of 17 per cent of secondary schools in England, in the main it did accept the diversity of schools which the Conservatives had energetically introduced, especially in secondary education (Branigan and White, 2002; Jones, 2016). The promotion of school diversity was one of the cornerstones of the Major government's education policy. This agenda centred on furthering the privatisation of educational provision, often by blurring the lines between public and private provision of education. The 1992 White Paper announced the establishment of a network of "technology

colleges" (secondary schools set up with business sponsorship) while the 1993 Education Act sought to increase the number of grant-maintained schools (Chitty, 2009). New Labour governments under Blair and Brown also supported the setting up of faith schools, in addition to introducing more autonomous state-maintained "foundation" schools and less autonomous "community" schools, which maintained an inequality of status and therefore entailed "significant opportunities to perpetuate traditional patterns of segregation" (Whitty, 2001, 14), i.e. fragmentation (along class and other lines). In 2000, New Labour established academies (akin to the older Conservative city technology colleges), which were mostly funded by the government but also received funding from industry, finance, as well as the Anglican Church. In spite of government funding, academies were taken out of the local authority system and sponsors were given control over them, including control over asset management and over selection criteria (Jones, 2016). The New Labour government also pursued a continued, deepening commodification of education (which included the use of state schooling for private profit-making and the regressive distribution of wealth) through the state's increasing use of PFI (Private Finance Initiative) contracts and the sub-contracting of school functions to private providers, who are able to make significant profits by running these functions below the contract price (Rikowski, 2002; 2005; Chitty, 2009). Through the promotion of academies and in other ways, New Labour facilitated greater private business involvement in the provision of education and in the development of educational policies. This private involvement included finance companies (HSBC, Goldman Sachs, Barclays Capital, Credit Suisse and others) as well as new charities and "edubusinesses". New Labour also strengthened the oligarchic control over education policy by facilitating the close collaboration between government and proliferating neoliberal policy organisations, advisors and "educational entrepreneurs" (Jones, 2016; Ball and Exley, 2010).

The fragmentation of education into thousands of competing schools with individual responsibility for their own admissions policy impedes the regulation and implementation of educational standards. The academies' freedom to set their own policies on admissions and exclusions may increase the burden on other neighbouring schools, alongside a reduction in the resources that are available to Local Education Authorities to provide additional support for those who need it, e.g. to those who have special educational needs. The exemption of academies

from having to follow the National Curriculum has also led to some of them teaching creationism alongside evolutionary theory as a result of being owned by "born again Christian" for-profit education management organisations (Trade Union Co-ordinating Group, 2013).

Furthermore, academies are free to decide on staff pay outside of national bargaining agreements. Teachers who have been transferred over to academies are supposed to have their pay and conditions protected to some degree under TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings) regulations, but this did not apply to new entrants, which facilitated the development of a two-tier workforce and led to a pressure to also bring down pay and conditions of "upper tier" workers to the lower level (Trade Union Co-ordinating Group, 2014). Furthermore, "the fragmentation of schools into competing units weakens the power of teachers to stand up for each other's pay and conditions and, in some academies at least, the management has sought to keep unions out, denying their ability to organise and recruit onsite or enter into collective bargaining agreements" (ibid., 11). The teachers' fragmentation limits their ability to introduce democratic participation and to establish democratic accountability at their workplaces and in their profession as a whole. However, organised resistance by the teachers and the broader public has proven capable of preventing negative trends, including the introduction of academies. Local campaigns by the Anti-Academies Alliance, the education unions, concerned teachers and parents have managed to stop a number of academy conversions, while in other places, due to minimal consultation being required by law, schools were converted to academy status without parents even finding out about it (Smith, 2010).

A high level of private finance has also been introduced in higher education. "By 2011/12 less than half the revenue of British universities came directly from public sources", which raises important questions regarding universities' academic independence from private interests. Private finance appears to undermine transparency and democratic accountability, at least in some circumstances. For example, "the University of Nottingham provoked academic resignations by accepting £3.8 million from British American Tobacco for a centre on corporate responsibility", Oxford opened a new building for its business school partly through donations by arms manufacturers, and LSE was given the sobriquet "Libyan School of Economics" on account of its strong links with and large donations from the Gaddafi family (ibid., 177; see also Fellowship of Reconciliation and Campaign Against Arms Trade, 2007; Langley et al., 2007). A

similar alienation of meaning in relation to the purpose of university education and research is likely to have been increased through the weakening of the position of university senates, of senior academic staff and of academic and wider social concerns in favour of funding councils, of management teams and of academic managerial practices that are guided by an economic logic which advances the model of a "business university" (Radice, 2013; Jones, 2016). While in the 1960s and 1970s both students and academics advanced more progressive conceptions about the meaning of education and struggled for more democratic models of university governance through a series of fairly militant university occupations and confrontations (at Essex, Warick, Liverpool and at many other universities), academic resistance to the managerialist turn in the 1980s was much less organised and much more muted (Jones, 2016). The largely commodified universities under New Labour were also in stark contrast with the more rebellious university climates of the 1960s and the 1970s (Faulkner, 2011). Lack of a sufficiently organised and resolute resistance from the academic community to these managerialist and commodifying processes strengthened the power of corporate elites and weakened the capacity of wider democratic social forces to keep them in check and to build a more autonomous, more independent and more critical higher education system[249]. The critical democratic role of academia appears to have been weakened under several decades of neoliberal restructuring of higher education, partly through the increase in the insecurity of employment and the

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[249] Noam Chomsky's (2016) observation that intellectuals tend to side with the upper-class dominators (at least to some degree) also holds true for many university academics, especially after several decades of neoliberal cultural and structural habituation and subordination of most segments of the population to certain capitalist ideological tenets (e.g. about the inevitability of patterns of hierarchical social domination and the primacy of individual competition over collective solidarity, mutual aid and cooperation). Authentic transformative intellectuals are distinguished by their commitment to helping to universalise critical intellectuality and, in so doing, to pursue their own self-abolition as members of a privileged social category (for a classical study of the intellectuals' tendency to pursue particularistic class interests, although with a focus on "state socialist" countries, see Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979). For "scholars within bourgeois educational institutions" this also requires that, before claiming that their work is "radical", they "consider [their] own complicity in the commodification of knowledge and the proliferation of bourgeois values" (Flecha, 2008, 15; also see Drew and Taylor, 2014). As a set of hierarchical institutions and structures functional for capitalism, the academia tends to reproduce competitive, objectifying and domineering social relationships, and stands in sharp opposition to the nonviolent, libertarian socialist conception of education. Drawing from Paolo Freire's (1972) critical pedagogy, Drew and Taylor (2014, 170) pointed out that "a dialogical approach insists that everyone involved in the conversation participates as equal and co-learners. In other words, everyone in this process becomes a co-creator of knowledge, which is the essence of activist and social justice methodologies". A dialectic of anti-authoritarian instruction and egalitarian dialogical exchange is required to foster critical intellectuality and democratic social relationships. The current university, which reproduces authoritarian social relations and "individualistic knowledge-as-commodity", marginalises those challenging its underlying principles and modes of operation (Grubbs and Loadenthal, 2014, 179).

intensification and increased regimentation of work conducted by academics (see De Angelis and Harvie, 2009), which impeded the satisfaction of their needs for security, well-being, and often dignity as well. Numerous studies (including Archer, 2008; Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2010; Ogbonna and Harris, 2004) found that "by 2009, 34 per cent of British academics worked on some kind of temporary contract" and there were wider trends leading to "higher work-loads, longer hours and more intrusive styles of management" (Jones, 2016, 179). However, during New Labour's second term in office the ability of university employees to protect their livelihoods, as well as their capacity to resist further privatisation measures, were strengthened by the creation in 2006 and subsequent growth of the University and College Union (UCU), largely as a result of a merger between the AUT union (which gathered employees in the "old" universities) and NATFHE (which mostly represented the post-1992 university sector, i.e. the old polytechnics). As a result of making a substantial pay claim and going on strike in 2006, UCU members won a 15 per cent pay increase between 2006 and 2009 (Freedman, 2011), confirming that strengthened organisation and willingness to engage in industrial action can still increase workers' democratic agential power and effectively hinder structural violence against workers' well-being needs. Strengthening the unity of university workers by breaking down sectional barriers (both between different academics, between academics and students and between academics and support staff on campuses), as well as the cultivation of direct democratic decision-making and greater involvement of university employees in the life of the wider community and in social movements, could begin to shift much more decisively the balance of power between the forces of capital and labour in higher education (the importance of these basic principles of radically democratic, industrial, general and social movement unionism applies to other types of educational institutions and other spheres of economic and social life as well).

As I have already indicated, the Blair and Brown governments solidified and increased the role of the private and voluntary sectors and of corporate-style practices in the provision of schooling, a move already initiated by the preceding Conservative governments (Chitty, 2009). Already in 1990, Benn (1990) noted the various forms of central and local government promotion of private educational institutions to the detriment of the public sector. In a thorough statistical analysis, Benn found that direct and indirect subsidies for non-public sector schools were up to £1.3bn (ibid.). Public financial support for privileged private sector schooling

amounts to exploitation of the broad middle and lower-class population. Moreover, as already noted, successive governments increased business links between schools and companies (particularly through corporate sponsorship of academies), and the preservation of competitive market principles with schools following "consumer demand". They also appear to have furthered the privatisation of education by "impoverishing the maintained sector to such an extent that anxious parents with adequate means felt more or less obliged to select some form of private education for their children" (Chitty, 2009, 93). By encouraging the use of private education, this marginalisation of state education therefore supports the exploitative and regressive redistribution of wealth. The New Labour government also left unchallenged the Major government's approach of pupil selection through specialisation at the secondary level (Chitty, 2009), which helped to entrench class divisions and the intellectually impoverishing vocational approach, furthering the educational deprivation and marginalisation of lower class students, who were consequently also deprived of access to and participation in large areas of culture (since the vocational approach is particularly neglectful of literature, art, etc.). Educational segregation was less extreme in Scotland and Wales, where there was more political will to contain the divide between academic and vocational educational tracks, as well as to limit the role of the private sector in the provision of education (Jones, 2016). The unified assessment and qualifications system in Scotland enabled a combination of academic and vocational learning, as well as more flexible pathways of educational progression with "flexible entry and exit points" (ibid., 2016, 167; see also Raffe et al., 2005).

However, the Labour government also introduced several schemes whose aim was to diminish the worst aspects of educational inequality and marginalisation. Firstly, this included the Excellence in Cities programme, intended to improve educational results among poorer children, with limited results (McKnight et al., 2005). Secondly, Labour introduced the "Sure Start" programme targeting toddlers and their families, designed to improve their health and education prospects. The initial results for this programme were disappointing (Anning, 2006). A third major programme introduced by Labour in 2004 was the Education Maintenance Allowance, which (according to pilot studies) increased further education staying-on rates of 16-19 year-olds by six per cent (McKnight et al., 2005). The Labour government also provided learning mentors for disadvantaged students, developed schemes to increase university

attendance among disadvantaged social groups and developed adult literacy programmes (Jones, 2016). Indubitably, however, educational adjustments alone cannot compensate for the wider and deep-seated social inequalities (see Trowler, 2003). They did not change the general pattern of entrance to elite universities being dominated by pupils from fee-paying schools (Harrison, 2011; Sutton Trust, 2011). Besides, as already noted, New Labour's targeted spending on poorer pupils and the most deprived schools (Brook, 2008) failed to transform the inequitable pattern of much greater funding going to wealthier schools and students. However, the target-based managerial approach to school performance, which the New Labour government also retained, did bring some narrowly-defined improvements to educational results: primary school-leavers obtained rising standards of literacy and numeracy, and GCSE results also improved (Lupton and Obolenskaya, 2013).

Post-compulsory, medium-level and higher education began to soar in the post-war period, a trend which strengthened under the Thatcher government and reached its height during the New Labour government, which partly based its approach to mass higher education on modernising notions about the globalised "knowledge economy" which requires higher skills (Jones, 2016). The number of students in further education grew from 2,23 million in 1990/1 up to 5,05 million in 2004/5, and the number of students in higher education grew from 748,000 full-time students in 1990/1 to 1,456,000 in 2004/5 (*Social Trends*, 2007). In addition to lowering employment levels by shifting adults into the education system and away from the labour market (simultaneously promoting, in conjunction with tuition fees and student loans, the casualisation of the workforce through part-time student jobs), this explosion in the number of people with higher education qualifications helps to create a surplus of highly qualified workers. The competition for jobs among highly qualified workers puts a downward pressure on wages and conditions (Bowles and Gintis, 1976), which is likely to increase the degree of exploitation.

Even though the expansion in university attendance helped to open up the higher education system to the lower working class (thus potentially reducing the structural violence of marginalisation), it was the lower-status (and often lower quality) new universities which absorbed most of the intake of new working class students, so this university expansion actually reproduced the existing hierarchical polarisation of higher education (Reay, 2011). Several other developments helped to reproduce the broad patterns of marginalisation of individuals belonging

to the lower class. The shift from grants to student loans instigated by the Conservatives, as well as the introduction of tuition fees by Labour in 1998, restricted the accessibility of higher education to the lower class. The class gap in university participation rates actually increased between 1991 and 2001. The gap in university participation rates between the top and the bottom classes (according to the official NS-SEC class scheme) rose from 49 percentage points in 1991 to 64 points ten years later (Department for Education and Skills, 2003b)[250]. Lower class background is consistently correlated with lower participation rates in higher education (ibid.). The number of students from professional backgrounds in higher education rose from 55 per cent in 2005 to 79 per cent in 2001, while the number of students from unskilled manual families in higher education rose by just 9 percentage points, from 6 per cent in 1991 to 15 per cent in 2001 (Galindo-Rueda et al., 2004). Besides, increases in tuition fees in England (from a maximum of £1000 in 1998 to £3000 in 2004 and £9000 in 2011) may eventually offset these positive trends for the lower working class.

It is clear that, had the student movement been stronger during New Labour rule, the introduction of tuition fees in the first place could have been averted. As Kumar (2011, 135) pointed out:

"During more than a decade of New Labour-led austerity, (…) every increase in tuition fees was met with the bare minimum of NUS [National Union of Students] tokenistic resistance. (…) The NUS has seven million members, but it also has a deep cultural inability to engage or mobilise its membership into something tangible. At best, it postures a ritual of outrage, before admitting defeat".

The NUS largely adopted the "modernising" discourse of New Labour, introduced a more corporate model with the inclusion of external trustees (often top business and managerial university figures) in some of the central union bodies, and developed an internal culture hostile to grassroots organisation, focused on lobbying at the national level and maintaining local unions as undemocratic service providers to passive student members/consumers. In some cases, the local unions even ceased having general meetings. Under New Labour, the NUS leadership

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[250] Considering the aforementioned problems with this official stratification scheme, it is of only limited use for comparative analyses of educational selection and attainment of students from different class backgrounds in the Marxian sense. In particular, this scheme's failure to account for the position of the capitalist class makes it largely useless for the purpose of ascertaining the position of students from capitalist families.

eschewed mass national mobilisations, but it had to respond more energetically when the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government announced it was going to allow universities to raise tuition fees to a maximum of £9000 (Kumar, 2011). With the help of UCU (Ismail, 2011), it participated in the organisation of several demonstrations in which tens of thousands of people participated, although it again failed to adequately coordinate this nascent movement, and the NUS's president even condemned university occupations by students. Other organisations, including the Coalition of Resistance, the National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts and the Education Activist Network, helped to provide impetus and leadership to the movement once the NUS began to withdraw from the movement, and they helped to provide links between the student movement and other sections of society, including pensioners and trade unions. Across the country, around 130,000 students marched out of further education colleges (Kumar, ibid.), and student occupations took place in (by most accounts) 46 universities across the country at the end of 2010 (Ismail, 2011). While the movement did not manage to stop the tuition fees increase, it dramatised the injustice of the fees and of their increase, which had the immediate and long-term effect of greatly weakening the pseudo-progressive Liberal Democrats (Rees, 2011).

The introduction of tuition fees became one of the seminal events in the commercialisation and commodification of higher education (especially in England, as tuition fees remained lower in Wales and were abolished in Scotland in 2008 – Jones, 2016), which increasingly became a form of individual financial investment, a consumer product instead of being a universal right and a collective, social investment. This concept of higher education erodes the concept of the human right to education. It may also lead to penetration (by implanting a capitalist perspective on the purpose of higher education) and it may facilitate the marginalisation and educational deprivation of individuals from the subordinate classes. The analysis of the social impact of university tuition fees should, of course, also entail the examination of their impact on these types of structural violence.

When Labour left office, intergenerational income mobility was "low and declining" (Brook, 2008 in Jones, 2016, 182). An international comparison of mobility rates found that egalitarian Sweden was the most meritocratic among analysed countries, while the highly unequal UK was found to be the least meritocratic (Breen, 2004). Lack of meritocracy produces marginalisation and the reduction of individual agency among individuals belonging to the

subordinate classes. Although detailed analyses of educational outcomes are required to more fully illuminate the scale and character of class-based educational deprivation in Britain, the presented evidence has demonstrated that various major aspects of the current, neoliberal approach to education policy in the UK contribute to the exclusion, marginalisation and educational deprivation of the most disadvantaged and are enormously wasteful of human talent and intellectual, economic and cultural potential.

Humane Education against Cultural and Structural Violence

Authoritarian treatment of pupils in the education system intersects with and is complemented by authoritarian and ageist intra-familial relations between parents and children. Rather than being a school of democracy which would optimally equip and empower pupils for democratic citizenship, the education system socialises children into submission. It rears them for docility and obedience for many years in the most formative period of their personal and social development, thus violating their dignity and stifling their autonomous and critical faculties, which is in accordance with the needs of class rule.

The largely authoritarian domination of the young by the old essentially transects all existing social structures[251]. Despite their various valuable contributions to democratic public life, the teaching unions have also failed to pose a radical challenge to the relatively authoritarian (and to some extent ageist) subordination of school pupils and (to a much lesser extent) of university students, further examination of which is required. Trade unions in the education sector have failed to sufficiently struggle for the development of the institutions of primary, secondary and higher education as the authentic schools of advanced, participatory democracy. This, among various other factors, reflects the teachers' typically impoverished pedagogy which is insufficiently counter-cultural and counter-hegemonic to end interpersonal, cultural and structural violence towards children and young people. The education system under capitalism, in accordance with the system's ruling ideology and "culture" of ruthlessness, neglects humane education and

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[251] The continued legality of parental corporal punishment of children is one significant indicator of this relationship of age-based domination and subordination. Children therefore remain the only category of people who can be legally hit on a regular basis in order "to discipline and to punish". A 2017 YouGov survey of 4283 UK adults (weighted to be more representative of the British population) found that 59 per cent were opposed to a ban on smacking children (YouGov, 2017).

its core values of kindness and compassion, an ethic of care towards all (with special attention given to the weakest and the most vulnerable), which very probably helps to condition children to accept the underlying concept of class society that "might is right". Education under capitalism rarely powerfully challenges this "ethics" based on violence, domination and cruelty of the strong towards the weak. As Flecha (2008) also emphasised, the current educational system is based on heartless institutions, which critical educators have to resolutely challenge. Class-based and other forms of cultural and structural violence can only be consistently challenged through an anti-authoritarian and caring pedagogy.

On this basis, the education system should also cultivate altruism and ethical universalism, on whose development the success of the struggle against cultural and structural violence depends. This, in addition to education that is anti-racist, anti-sexist etc., includes a need for a humane education focused on cultivating children's kindness to animals (on this type of education see for example Humane Society of the United States, 1974; Unti and DeRosa, 2003; Fabio, 2007), which is essential both in order to challenge and prevent cruelty to animals and in order to take into account the co-evolutionary character of the human objectification and enslavement of animals. This co-evolutionary process entails a dialectical interplay between human treatment of animals and the impediments placed before human cultural evolution. Human objectification of non-human sentient beings has provided a template for the objectification (dehumanisation) of vulnerable and marginalised human beings. Costello and Hodson (2010; 2014a) conducted several experiments through which they obtained empirical evidence that the human-animal divide to a great extent drives the dehumanisation of human outgroups: the devaluing of non-human animals in relation to humans also generates the dehumanisation of other humans. Accordingly, they established that the reduction in the conceptual divide between humans and animals significantly contributes to the humanisation of human outgroups. Hodson and Costello (2012) noted: "In several experiments, we found framing animals as similar to humans (elevating animals "up" to the human level) stops dehumanisation in its tracks, significantly reduces prejudice and extends moral concern to marginalised groups". Hodson, MacInnis and Costello, (2014, 98 and 104) concluded:

"Importantly, rather than challenging ideologies about human intergroup relations, this intervention reduced outgroup prejudice by tackling a principal root of dehumanization. (…)

Laypeople almost completely fail to see the human-animal divide as a cause of dehumanization or prejudice, and resist its manipulation as an intervention (Costello & Hodson, in press b [Costello and Hodson, 2014b]). Yet a meta-analytic integration of existing research demonstrates that the relation between the human-animal divide and outgroup prejudice (an effect explained by increased outgroup dehumanization) represents a relation larger than many in social psychology, larger than relations between stereotyping and prejudice or contact and prejudice (see Costello & Hodson, in press b [ibid.]). At its core, the interspecies model is predicated on the notion that greater perceived value of humans over animals fuels outgroup dehumanization and prejudice, meaning that any effort to narrow or eliminate the human-animal divide should decrease the value in representing others as "less human". (…) Overvaluing humans, relative to nonhumans, lies at the heart of problems not only for animals but also for other humans".

Similarly, in their assessment of the impact of classroom-based humane education towards animals on children, Ascione (1992) and Ascione and Weber (1996) identified a significant generalisation effect from animal-related humane attitudes to compassion directed at humans. In other words, children who were taught humane attitudes towards animals also developed more humane attitudes towards humans. In their comprehensive analysis of a humane education programme for school children, O'Hare and Montminy-Danna (2001) also confirmed the presence of this generalisation effect: the development of humane attitudes towards animals increased the likelihood of more compassionate interpersonal attitudes and more amiable peer relations (also see Unti and DeRosa, 2003).

The rootedness of dehumanisation in speciesism (among various other relevant factors which I cannot examine here) means that the brutality towards animals also diminishes humans, stifles human cultural evolution and impedes the struggle for human liberation from oppression. The dominator paradigm is a central cause and dynamic of the various systems of oppression, very much including largely class-based forms of cultural and structural violence. The enslavement of non-human sentient beings and systematic violence towards these weakest and most defenceless of sentient beings have helped the dominator paradigm to take root and to be reproduced through the socialisation of every new generation. The habitual, casual violation of the weak entrenches the structures and the ideologies according to which might makes right. Humane education focused on the development of non-objectifying, humane values, attitudes and

behaviours in children, the cultivation of kindness and compassion towards all sentient beings, is one of the indispensable strategies by which cultural and structural violence in society can be seriously addressed[252]. A radically intersectional humane education and critical pedagogy of praxis within the education system and in other spheres of life are certainly required in order for liberation from all systems of domination to take place.

Concluding Thoughts

As I have discussed in this section, the education system in Britain has, in common with other capitalist societies, fostered pupil docility and obedience to hierarchical authority and its disciplinary control, which restricted pupils' democratic rights, participation and individual agential power, helping to reproduce dominant cultural norms and authoritarian social relationships.

The education system has been focused on the indoctrinating socialisation of pupils, which serves to prepare them for the world of work and integration into the existing social system. Especially in England under Thatcher's rule, the education authorities sought to indoctrinate young people with a traditionalist nationalist, largely ethnocentric, family-centric, culturally homogenous ideological perspective. The introduction of a centralised National Curriculum for state schools, as well as of national tests and more target-based state inspections, appears to have helped to entrench this indoctrinating feature of the UK education system, which constituted educational deprivation from the point of view of the need to develop culturally evolved human beings who would be adequately equipped for full democratic citizenship.

The Thatcher government in the 1980s moved away from a more accountable and collaborative approach to policy-making in education, which included the voices of the government's traditional partners (including to an extent the trade unions in education), in favour of a

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[252] Rosa Luxemburg (1918b) acknowledged the ethico-political importance of developing humaneness for the prospects of developing a higher, far more peaceful type of society: "Revolutionary activity and profound humanitarianism – they alone are the true breath of socialism. A world must be turned upside down. But each tear that flows, when it could have been spared, is an accusation, and he commits a crime who with brutal inadvertence crushes a poor earthworm". While she also displayed uncommon sensitivity to non-human animals and their suffering in some of her writings (see Luxemburg, [1916-1918] 1974), this specific statement forms a part of her argument against the death penalty. Yet the general principle is applicable to the valorisation of humane education for kindness to animals as well.

more impositional centralised approach in alliance with elite think-tanks that were aligned with some of the key members of Thatcher's administration.

The Conservatives under Thatcher and Major (whose government largely focused on implementing changes that were brought in under Thatcher) strongly advanced policies and practices which, especially in England, stimulated the development of fee-paying and independent schools (independent from local government rather than necessarily being independent from capital and central government). This significantly eroded the locally-controlled comprehensive school system, and by 1997 the number of fully comprehensive schools in England and Wales was reduced to just 40 per cent of the total number of schools. The move towards the marketisation of education was additionally advanced through the establishment of grant-maintained schools funded by the state but managed independently, the creation of "city technology colleges" financed by the government and the private sector, the introduction of open enrolment (right of parental choice) and of school league tables, which induced schools to attract students that they found academically promising while marginalising others and thus contributing to their educational deprivation. This competitive, marketising approach extended the scope for exploitative private profit-making and for the competitive fragmentation of the students, teachers and of the wider society. From a humanitarian socialist perspective, this hyper-competitive education system also constitutes the alienation of meaning, since education should aim to create a unified, cooperative and solidaristic society rather than a competitive agglomeration of self-centred individuals.

The perpetuation of class inequalities in education was also supported through an emphasis on vocational over academic educational tracks for working-class pupils, which reinforced class-based hierarchical segregation and thus constituted the structural violence of fragmentation, educational deprivation and marginalisation of lower-class pupils. This class-based educational segregation and relative educational deprivation was greatly augmented as a result of the persistence of vastly privileged forms of schooling (especially the "public school" system) – under both Conservative and New Labour administrations.

The Blair and Brown governments adopted the key features of the Conservative marketising approach to education policy. It largely accepted the diversity of schools which Conservative administrations had promoted (although it abolished the grant-maintained status of 17 per cent of

secondary schools in England). New Labour also facilitated the setting up of faith schools and introduced more autonomous state-maintained "foundation" schools and less autonomous "community" schools, which may have supported the segregation/fragmentation of students along traditional (especially class) lines due to their unequal status. Additionally, New Labour also deepened the process of commodification of education by facilitating greater private business involvement in the provision of education and in the development of educational policies. One major aspect of this approach was the establishment of academies, which were introduced by Blair's government in 2000. They receive funding by the government but also from private capital, which restricts their democratic accountability as they are consequently also strongly driven by private interests. Furthermore, the introduction of academies contributed to the development of a two-tier workforce and to the pressures to reduce the pay and conditions of better-positioned workers to the level of the "lower-tier" workers. The competitive fragmentation of individual schools also increased the fragmentation of workers, impeding the ability of workers in different schools to unite in defence of their rights, to hold management to account and to democratically participate in workplaces and in educational policy-making. The exclusion of trade unions from the policy-making process in education (which also started under Thatcher's rule and continued under subsequent administrations) led to the abolition of national pay negotiations, alongside a worsening of the conditions of work as a result of the reduction in teachers' personal agential power and the weakening of their control over the labour process.

In addition to the increase in the diversity of schools and their reliance on private capital, another major development of the marketising agenda by New Labour was the increasing use of PFI's, which turned even state schooling into exploitative opportunities for private profit-making and the regressive distribution of wealth. In various other ways, New Labour supported the increased role of the private and voluntary sectors and of managerialist practices into the provision of schooling, which obscured and complicated the decision-making process, reducing the scope for democratic control of education.

These and other types of exploitative marketising approaches which restrict democratic accountability were also introduced into higher education. This included a very large expansion of the role of private finance in universities, the introduction of accountability-restricting managerialist practices, as well as the intense commodification of the work of academic staff, the in-

crease in the insecurity of employment and the intensification and increased regimentation of work conducted by academics, which have resulted in the violations of their security, well-being and dignity needs.

Furthermore, New Labour's adoption of Conservative education policy included the emphasis on the promotion of specialisation (which encompassed the promotion of vocational education) and selection (hence the emphasis on testing and league tables). These contributed to the structural violence of marginalisation of lower-class pupils (who are more likely to be poorly achieving), as well as to the competitive (individualist) fragmentation of students and of their families, which is also supportive of class divisions in society and of the individualist fragmentation within the subordinate classes themselves. Successive governments thus, on the whole, promoted education policies which entrenched class-based and other inequalities in educational attainment, which enabled those from privileged backgrounds (in terms of both economic and operative cultural capital) to perpetuate their privilege, while the disadvantage of those from lower class backgrounds tended to reproduce their typically lower educational attainment and social marginalisation.

The emphasis on testing and the associated simplistic discourse and ideology of achievement according to ability and effort have helped to obscure the role of class-related and other inequalities in educational attainment, thus constituting the structural violence of penetration/indoctrination and segmentation. These types of violence are also perpetrated through the normalisation (reification) of competition, instead of which cooperative, caring values and relationships could be prioritised. Furthermore, instilling feelings of failure and inferiority has severely violates the well-being, dignity and status needs of children from the lower classes and other marginalised groups.

New Labour also introduced several schemes designed to moderate the worst aspects of educational deprivation and marginalisation (including the "Sure Start" programme, the Education Maintenance Allowance, additional support for some disadvantaged students, adult literacy programmes, etc.), while simultaneously advancing the inequality-facilitating processes of the marketisation of education at all levels, which encompassed the introduction of academies, the increased use of PFIs, the introduction of university tuition fees, etc.

One important indicator of the marginalisation and educational deprivation of children and other young people is that while public spending on education per child grew significantly between 2000 and 2010 (and the New Labour government partly targeted spending on poorer pupils and the most deprived schools), at the end of New Labour's rule 23 per cent of school educational spending in Britain went to the 7 per cent of pupils who receiving private education. Although there was some progress in the educational attainment of pupils from poorer backgrounds at the turn of the century (which soon slowed down), poorer students under New Labour continued to experience drastic educational deprivation (poorer educational opportunities and attainment) as a result of a variety factors, including the negative effects of the marketisation of schools on the allocation of resources to schools in less affluent areas, the inability to afford tuition and private education, lack of adequate study materials and facilities, student debt aversion and term-time working by students from the subordinate classes, in addition to poorer students frequent lack of required cultural capital, etc. Studies have also shown that the cultural capital of UK students tends to be strongly correlated with parental educational qualifications and class position.

While the number of students in higher education grew substantially in the period between 1990 and 2005, university expansion ended up reproducing the existing hierarchical polarisation of higher education, with lower-status and generally lower-quality new universities absorbing most of the intake of new working-class students and entrance to elite universities continuing to be dominated by students from fee-paying schools. New Labour's introduction of tuition fees in 1998 probably partly accounts for the increase in the class gap in university participation rates between 1991 and 2001.

The persistence of class-based inequalities in educational attainment – as well as the educational deprivation which all students face in relation to education for enlightened democratic citizenship – are rooted in the hierarchical and authoritarian distribution of power in society, which has as one of its consequences the dominance of political and social forces which perpetuate educational inequalities and educational deprivation. In alliance with the broadly-conceived political elite (which also encompasses powerful figures in the mass media, in the related policy institutes, etc.), the forces of private capital have constructed an education system which is largely oriented towards the perpetuation of their privilege and power, rather than aiming to de-

velop the people's capacity for enlightened democratic self-government and, more broadly, their capacity to lead culturally evolved and fulfilling lives.

Somewhat akin to the Yugoslav attempt to establish social self-government through the development of self-managing communities of interest (encompassing assemblies for science, health, education, culture etc. – I briefly discuss this mode of social governance in chapters 4 and 5), the radical democratisation of the education system in Britain would also require the replacement of the bureaucratic state apparatus with a democratic self-governing system of determining education policy and harmonising social interests. In this thoroughly democratised system of education provision, the remaining permanent administration responsible for the functioning of the education system would need to implement the policies and policy directions determined by the organs of social self-government. Even in cases where the permanent administration may need to determine certain educational policies, various educational bodies consisting of democratic delegates and educational experts, as well as regular open public discussions and consultations would need to be held in order to help determine these specific policies and policy agendas. Classical state administration, which is one of the major perpetrators of bureaucratic structural violence, needs to be replaced by a self-governing public administration and the wider system of integral social self-government encompassing the totality of social reproduction.

As in other areas of life, the establishment of genuine democratic accountability would require more participatory democratic forms of enlightened control over the education system by the broad public and by the students themselves. The development of such *enlightened* democratic control would necessitate what Rosa Luxemburg (1918c) referred to as a "spiritual transformation" of the broad public, including the development of its critical faculties and its acquisition of a democratically protagonistic, libertarian and egalitarian disposition. Only thus transformed could the broad population support and build a radical pedagogic challenge to the structural violence of the extant education system, which radically objectifies students for the purpose of reproducing existing hierarchical and otherwise dehumanising social relationships. A culturally and structurally nonviolent education system would be based on the affirmation of an anti-authoritarian pedagogy of care[253].

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[253] Bertrand Russell ([1916] 2010, 94) beautifully expressed the principle of nonviolent education in relation to school children:

Chapter 6

THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND FINANCIALISATION

It is impossible to fully comprehend the resurgence of capitalist class power and the accompanying evolving forms of structural violence without an understanding of the role of finance in the contemporary British economy. In this chapter I will explore the main structurally violent aspects of this financial restructuring. In line with my exploratory cartographic approach, I will only note the broad contours of these processes, which might serve as the basis for more detailed future investigations. The ensuing discussion of financialisation also serves as an analytical basis for the exploration (in the following chapter) of the economic crisis and the structural violence it has caused.

The international Bretton Woods system of the early post-WWII war decades, which Keynes had helped design, was based on international coordination, a semi-fixed exchange-rate regime and tight control over international capital flows (Skidelsky, 2010; Shaxson, 2011). This system of financial services regulation has been systematically restructured since the 1970s, largely through state support for financial services, mainly in the form of financial deregulation, reduced taxation and the flexibilisation of the labour market (Gamble, 2009; Harvey, 2010). As various authors (Helleiner, 1994; Gowan, 1999; Auger, 2009; Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Krippner, 2011; Ingham, 2016) had noted, the expansion of the role of finance capital was consciously advanced by US and UK governments which sought to enhance the influence and profitability of US- and UK-based finance capital. Deregulation of the UK financial sector was already well under way in 1971, when the banks acquired greater legal freedom to borrow and lend (Hutton, 2010). The floating and rapidly fluctuating post-Bretton Woods exchange rates introduced "both

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"The man who has reverence will not think it is his duty to 'mould' the young. He feels in all that lives (…), and most of all in children, something sacred, indefinable, unlimited, something individual and strangely precious, the growing principle of life, an embodied fragment of the dumb striving of the world. In the presence of a child he feels an unaccountable humility - a humility not easily defensible on any rational ground, and yet somehow nearer to wisdom than the easy self-confidence of many parents and teachers. (…) All this gives him a longing to help the child in its own battle: he would equip and strengthen it, not for some outside end proposed by the State or by any other impersonal authority, but for the ends which the child's own spirit is obscurely seeking. The man who feels this can wield the authority of an educator without infringing the principle of liberty".

the need for hedging [i.e. for the adoption of investment practices used to manage risk by offseting the potential negative consequences of other investments] and the opportunity for speculation" (Ingham, 2016, 164). Furthermore, developments in computerised information processing and communication technology facilitated the use and development of risk management and speculative practices (ibid.). Especially following Thatcher's rise to power, a battery of state measures increased private capitalist prerogatives in the financial sector. One of the early policies of Margaret Thatcher's first Conservative government was to deregulate the financial sector by abolishing exchange and capital controls, and ending the requirement that banks need to hold a proportion of their liabilities in cash at the Bank of England (Hutton, 2010). Numerous restrictions on the type of banks that were allowed to operate in the City of London, and on their working practices, were removed in the deregulatory "Big Bang" of 1986 (Gamble, 2009). New Labour went even further than Thatcher and Major had gone, conferring autonomy and the setting of interest rates onto the Bank of England. Partly as a result of this move (and in line with the general privatising tendencies in the financial infrastructure) there was a sharp decrease in the scope of the Bank of England's regulatory responsibilities (Sampson, 2005; Watson, 2009), which was to have profound repercussions, as this chapter will demonstrate. Indeed, Labour passed on (with considerable alacrity, it should be noted) the supervision of the banks to the light-touch and ineffectual Financial Services Authority in 1997, as the designate sole regulator (Watson, 2009). These forms of government deregulation limited democratic control. They also enabled financial expansion and facilitated existing and new forms of exploitation, which I will soon discuss.

As I have just noted, the Thatcher government and its successors actively sought to attract powerful – and transnationally mobile - finance capital and to support the financial sector in its ascension to the summit of the British economy. In particular, deregulation facilitated the inflow of finance capital and stimulated the expansion of finance (Watson, 2009). Within the following two decades it became a significant source of UK employment and the greatest contributor to UK GDP, about a quarter of the country's GDP (Gamble, 2009; Watson, 2009)[254]. The

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[254] Britain's net export income from financial services rose threefold between 1992 and 2002, and this income partially offset the UK trade deficit (Watson, 2009). In fact, "among large economies, none rivalled Britain for the relative size of its financial sector. It (...) gave Britain the largest trade surplus in financial services in the world. (In

experience of export-oriented, industrialist and rather state-interventionist countries such as China and Germany reveals that there was a credible alternative to the finance capital's partial "takeover" of the UK economy, with the attendant debt-oriented asset price "bubbles". The UK retained a high exchange rate over a period of around thirty years, which produced a relatively unfavourable environment for British exporters, and partially led to the UK's position as an importer of other countries' products (Coutts and Rowthorn, 2009), with often negative consequences for the UK manufacturing industry but also various partially positive effects (e.g. relatively cheap imports and cheap international travel)[255]. Future research should explore the effects of the UK's high exchange rate on the character and level of structural violence.

Restoring the domineering position it held in the nineteenth century, the lightly regulated City of London is now to a large extent focused on trading in speculative financial derivatives and securitisation (Gamble, 2009; Skidelsky, 2010)[256], which have been major aspects of the astonishing expansion of the financial system[257]. The City is a towering segment of the contemporary British economy, and holds the position of a leading global financial centre. In 1979, the year of Thatcher's ascent to power, "bank assets were one and a half times Britain's annual output; over the subsequent thirty years that proportion more than trebled" (Hutton, 2010, 32).

2003 it totalled $25.3 billion, more than twice as much as the next largest surplus, that of Switzerland)" (Gamble, 2009, 16).

[255] It should also be borne in mind that the importance of Germany's exporting industries for the broader German economy also increased the country's vulnerability during the recent global economic crisis and the associated decline in international trade (Callinicos, 2010).

[256] A derivative is "a tradable security whose value is derived from the actual or expected price of some underlying asset, which may be a commodity, a security, or a currency" (Black et al., 2012, 106). Securitisation is the "packaging of several non-marketable assets, such as mortgage loans, into bundles which are marketable" (ibid., 366). The packaging of several assets is supposed to reduce their riskiness and thus increase their marketability (ibid.). Furthermore, "the fact that mortgages are made marketable may enable them to be financed at lower interest rates" (ibid., 366). Securitisation encouraged the view that debts could simply be sold on to others rather than paid.

[257] "Thirty years ago the global value of derivatives trades was less than $10 million, but by the early twenty-first century trading on these markets was estimated to be over $400 trillion and to be growing at 30 per cent per annum" (Ingham, 2016, 163).

Changes in Banking Structure and Culture, and the Process of Financialisation

The structural and cultural changes within the City of London in the decades following the Second World War were immense. One of the central banking developments, the rise in investment banking, to a significant extent took place out of public view. This development was to a significant extent precipitated by an influx of new finance capital and the intense restructuring and cultural change which this incursion helped to set in motion (Watson, 2009).

Since the 1960s, US financiers in particular sought refuge from domestic laws and regulations by moving *en masse* to the City of London. The traditional culture of the City of London, founded on a cohesive network of personal relations and organisational codes, was exposed to international competition and replaced by new, more competitive and dynamic business practices, which this and the following chapter will explore. This was to a large extent a result of the "invasion" of the City of London by foreign, and in particular US, investment banks such as the giant Goldman Sachs (Sampson, 2005; Watson, 2009; Shaxson, 2011). The established British banks which entered this emerging capital market often could not compete successfully, and some of them, including the previous oligopolist Barings Bank and the Barclays Bank's investment banking subsidiary BZW, collapsed by overextending themselves in efforts to cope with the highly competitive business environment (Evanoff and Kaufman, 2005).

New emerging forms of banking were already visible during the formation of the lightly regulated Euro-currency financial market based in London, starting in the late 1950s (Kynaston, 2002; Watson, 2009)[258]. These new developments were probably made more likely by the fact that the post-war nationalisation of the Bank of England was only partial, and the government still could not dismiss the bank's governor, nor could it control the bank's various more or less covert internal operations, which included resolute support for deregulation[259] (Burn, 2006;

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[258] "Euro-currency refers to currency deposited in and loaned from a bank operating outside the country from which the currency originates" (Watson, 2009, 173).

[259] A memo from 1959 revealed the Bank of England's energetic stance in favour of the banks against the state it was officially supposed to support: "The Bank has on a number of occasions in the past strongly resisted the Treasury's attempts to obtain fuller information. The Deputy Governor refused to allow details of the authorised bank's positions to be divulged to HM Treasury" (Burn, 2006, 122-3).

Shaxson, 2011). Democratic accountability and national sovereignty were also being diminished due to the political and economic leverage acquired by the developing Euromarket, which made "the pursuit of an independent monetary policy in any one country far more difficult" (Burn, 2006, 97). This strengthened the perception of inexorable deregulation, further undermining the prospects for democratic control.

The 1986 "Big Bang" of radical financial deregulation codified the new state of affairs which opened the UK financial markets to the global, to a large extent US-based, investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns: "Their New York and London offices had become interdependent arms operating a financial axis that, for all practical purposes, was one market" (Hutton, 2010, 150). The effects of this financial explosion on the UK domestic economy have been problematic for a number of reasons. I can only mention some of these in this chapter and in chapter 7.

The new financial edifice of the City of London is in several regards neither entirely British nor really committed to the domestic economy:

"Since 1986 almost all the City's investment banks have been foreign-owned and largely foreign-staffed, and more than half the City's business is done for foreign customers. (...) Even the four big British retail or 'high street' banks, which are headquartered in the City, make most of their money from their international trading and investment activities (for example, 72 per cent of Barclays' total profits of £1.8 billion in 2012-13 came from investment banking), not from lending to companies in Britain. (...) Moreover most shares in UK companies are in managed funds (around half are managed by just 50 fund management groups) whose managers have no interest in preferring British to overseas companies when placing their clients' investments. And in so far as they do invest in UK shares they have no interest in becoming involved in the management of the companies concerned, because the longer-run value of a company's shares is of no interest to the investors they are working for" (Leys, 2014, 122).

The focus on productive domestic investment has frequently been replaced by a focus on rentier capitalist financial practices which lead to the extraction of market surpluses through financial exchange, speculation and trading in various financial assets, interest on loans, etc. The dominance of the financial sector and of financialised practices also facilitates various negative externalities, such as unemployment, considering the capital- rather than labour-intensive nature

of the financial industry (see Leys, 2013; the following chapter will discuss other negative externalities associated with financialisation). It also constitutes the alienation of meaning due to the privileging of private interests and the pursuit of exchange value (profit-making through interest, speculation in relation to financial assets and other forms of capital gains in financial markets) over productive activities, use value and the interests of the broad public. Ingham (2016, 173) noted that "the profitability of pure financial exchange might divert money-capital from the production and sale of goods and thereby deplete the revenues which are necessary to service the debt that finances the production". The focus on financial activities also diverts talent away from socially useful activities (ibid.).

During the recent deregulated *belle époque* the City of London has managed to solidify its leading global role in finance: it "accounted for nearly half of global credit derivatives turnover in 1998 and over a third of the much bigger market in 2006" (Callinicos, 2010, 75). Europe accounted for over a third of global investment banking turnover in 2007, and over a half of this revenue passed through the City (Augar, 2009). Indeed, "while it is not as big a financial centre as New York in terms of total market equity, more investment funds are managed in the City, and more foreign shares are traded there, than in New York or anywhere else in the world" (Leys, 2013, 122). In 2011, £39 billion of the UK's £76 billion trade surplus in services was produced by the "financial services" industry (Leys, 2013). Yet, despite the conception that the City of London is a major source of UK employment, "banking and financial services jobs in the City of London and at Canary Wharf total about 100,000 out of a total UK workforce of 31 million" (ibid., 122). This explosion in the volume of trade was accompanied by an increase in the velocity of business innovation. New Labour actively stimulated the "cutting-edge" adventurism of the sector, and its Financial Services and Markets Act of 2001 prescribed that the Financial Services Authority was "not to discourage the launch of new financial products" and was to refrain from "erecting regulatory barriers" in order to avoid "damaging the UK's competitiveness" (Cohen, 2009). The efflorescing of new financial instruments (on which, to a large extent, this renewed power of the City has rested) included the development of markets in credit derivatives and ever increasing leveraging of all kinds of assets, in the private and public sector alike[260] (Skidelsky, 2010; Gamble, 2009). These new financial practices were partially a

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[260] Gamble summarised what leveraging entailed: "Leveraging meant simply using existing assets and income to

consequence of national and transnational financial deregulation, which also facilitated segmentation (by introducing increased opacity into economic governance), and the curtailment of democratic accountability (by reducing transparency, obscuring and multiplying "lines of command" and therefore reducing the capacity for democratic public control over these economic processes). I will return to these points in the following chapter. The government also failed (or refused) to prevent the continuation of the oligopolisation of finance and banking capital. Numerous factors contributing to this process include the effect of the economies of scale (Samuelson and Marks, 2003), corporate mergers (Hutton, 2010), capital requirements (ibid.), technological superiority (Nicholson et al., 2008), network effects (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001) such as the fact that company size often instils confidence in investors (Hutton, 2010), various other market barriers to access (Dragičević, 1965), political support, government subsidies and favourable regulation (ibid.). These are some of the main factors which reinforce the centripetal, centralising corporate tendencies supportive of the national and transnational development and continuation of financial and banking oligopolies (which are not a new phenomenon – see Braggion et al., 2014). Hutton (2010, 152) noted that "in 1998 the world's five top banks accounted for 8 per cent of global banking assets. By 2008, they accounted for 16 per cent – an astonishing concentration within a decade". In Britain, HBOS merged with Lloyds, NatWest with RBS, the Midland Bank with HSBC (ibid.). A high level of banking concentration which the processes of financialisation have supported can negatively impact borrowers and the economy by leading to socially harmful results/negative externalities including "lower loan sizes granted, alongside higher interest rates and more demands for collateral. The duration of loans (…) is also typically shorter. (…) Increasing concentration is weakly associated with declining employment to population ratios [and] lower tax revenues" (Braggion et al., 2014; see also Augar, 2006 for a discussion of indications that the domination of banking and other corporate oligopolies results in inefficiency in the allocation of capital). Government acceptance of banking concentration risked allowing structurally violent outcomes. Reduction in the size and duration of loans, increased interest rates and lower tax revenues may impede the progressive redistribution of

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borrow in order to invest in other assets which promised a higher return. Applied to individuals and companies this meant taking on ever larger burdens of debt, in relation to what they already owned or earned, to be redeemed against future earnings or, in the case of government organizations, taxes" (Gamble, 2009, 15).

wealth. Private corporate oligopolies also *eo ipso* constitute a restriction of democratic control, since they concentrate immense financial power in the hands of a small capitalist elite.

Furthermore, the concentration of finance capital has helped to facilitate the development of a transnationally interlocked, globally integrated financial market, and has contributed to the very high degree of interconnectedness in finance, which may allow financial actors to diversify risk. However, complex financial interconnections may have in some cases increased systemic vulnerability to economic crisis, e.g. by contributing to a lack of complete information and lack of coordination among market participants (Yellen, 2013). Gai et al. (2010) found that more complex and more concentrated financial networks may result in more frequent and more severe financial contagions. The spread of vulnerability as a consequence of (some forms of) interconnectedness and integration of finance capital may have contributed to the violation of the broad population's security needs.

The dispersal of risk occurred largely through the use of credit derivatives and through other credit-fuelled speculative activities. The spreading of risk rebounded even on those financial actors (such as Deutsche Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland) which had not directly participated in the "subprime" mortgage market but had been involved in the trade with "collateralised debt obligations", through which "credit-default swaps" (instruments conceived as a way "to enable banks to sell the risk of default by a borrower to a speculative investor" – Ingham, 2016, 165) were packaged and dispersed throughout the financial sector (Callinicos, 2010). These patterns of interdependence helped spread and compound economic "toxicity" associated with these financial instruments and practices, impeding the transparent overview and control over debt-driven financial processes, which restricted democratic accountability and violated security needs[261]. The concentration of finance capital and the dispersal of risk which it probably facilitates inspired calls to break up large banks after the financial crash (but this was firmly rejected by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government). Apart from the

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[261] Hutton (2010, 200-203) remarked that "the degree of connectedness in finance was – and is – astonishing. One study has shown that the degree of separation is as low as 1.4: in other words, almost all of the members of the network transact with each other. But at the same time, there has been a fourteen-fold increase in the number of 'nodes' (the constituents of a network, whether individuals or banks), many of whose activities – the payment system, deposits and lending – burrow deeply into the real economy. (...) Making matters worse was the fact that the financial network in 2007 comprised cloned financial institutions that were all doing business and modelling risk in a similar way, with no firewalls or circuit-breakers".

inherent risks associated with banks which combine retail and investment functions, and apart from all the long-term social and economic damage they produce, financial giants do not even seem to be particularly economically efficient (Amel et al., 2004). Yet the size of the banks has made it easier to argue that banks are "too big to fail". The largest banks control over a thousand legal subsidiaries, often fictitious, which create a complex system vital for avoiding tax responsibilities, as well as for avoiding the appraisal by shareholders and regulators (Hutton, 2010; see also the next chapter), thus facilitating exploitation and the curtailment of democratic accountability. Additionally, this complexity and the spread of the banks' influence also make it more difficult for governments to refuse bailing them out in the event of an economic calamity, which helps to further reinforce the restriction of democratic control and exploitative patterns (also by leading to the socialisation of banks' losses).

The concentration of finance capital developed alongside the process of amalgamation of service sector, manufacturing and financial sector capital, which has been one of the key economic developments that can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century at least (Hilferding [1910], 1981). This process gathered particular momentum during and following the neoliberal reforms of the 1970s and 80s (Callinicos, 2010). It has nourished the wide and multifaceted process of financialisation, which Callinicos defined as "the greater autonomy of the financial sector, the proliferation of financial institutions and instruments, and the integration of a broad range of economic actors in financial markets" (ibid., 34). These developments were underpinned by a vast increase in the supply of credit and the development of new financial assets "derived" from a variety of commodities (Ingham, 2016), including housing.

As I have just noted, financialisation has entailed the close involvement of various capitalist actors with finance capital and the spread of financial practices into different economic sectors, particularly through the transformation of commodities and services into financial assets. In many cases, large capital based in the "real economy" increasingly turned to the financial sector (internal finance, bank lending, speculation in the capital markets etc.) in order to acquire financial resources required to satisfy its appetites for expansion, mergers and takeovers, or to supplement its other activities (Blackburn, 2006; Harvey, 2010). This transformation has often represented a more fundamental reorientation to financial speculation (in relation to various financial assets, including stocks and shares, bonds, securities etc. – Ingham, 2016) as the most

efficient way of satisfying the competitive capitalist need for accumulation (Harvey, 2010), leading to an alienation of meaning (considering the prioritising of exchange over use value and, consequently, of profit-making over socially useful and productive economic activity).

The relationship between different sectors may often be symbiotic (Phillips, 2002), but it is rarely conducted from a position of equality. Manufacturing capital could not contend with the boom in financial services, which became the dominant sector and the pillar of the British economy[262]. In fact, at least since the 1980s, there were numerous non-financial companies which acquired more profit from financial operations than from their other activities, and the famed "energy firm" Enron was actually mostly trading in derivatives when it went bankrupt in 2002 (Harvey, 2010; Ingham, 2016). As financial assets gained increasing economic prominence, the companies' activities related to the "real economy" - and its workers - became more disposable, while outsourcing and subcontracting became more prevalent (Blackburn, 2006). This led to the limitation of democratic accountability since productive economic activity and the workers became more expendable, which also contributed to the violation of their security needs.

The expansion of the role of finance extends to the role of credit rating agencies (e.g. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Standard and Poor's/S&P, Moody's and Fitch Ratings) which, together with banks, determine the credit-worthiness of companies and entire countries, strongly influencing capital flows, corporate strategies and government policies (Sinclair, 2008; Kruck, 2011). They contribute to the restriction of democratic control because the maintenance of "creditworthiness" often takes precedence over democratic concerns and the wider public good, which is similar to the anti-democratic influence of global currency and bond markets that pressurise states to commit to " 'sound money' policies of balanced or low-deficit budgets and the control of inflation" (Ingham, 2016, 250). Credit agencies constrain government policies by helping to determine the general "investment climate" and because "plans that the experts employed by these agencies dislike, whether or not they affect public spending, have an automatic negative effect on interest rates" (Leys, 2003, 22). One of the reasons behind the successive governments' reluctance to increase taxation or increase the budget deficit (especially if it would require more public borrowing), in addition to other economic and political obstacles

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[262] Some large, traditionally industrial UK firms, such as ICI and Marconi, were even ruined to a large extent as a result of their finance-oriented restructuring (Sampson, 2005).

to the introduction of such policies, has been the increase in interest rates as a usual consequence (Leys, 2003). Garrett's study of fifteen countries between 1967 and 1990 (i.e. even before the neoliberal pattern was in full swing) established that "the financial markets always attached interest rate premia to the power of the left and organized labor" (Garrett, 1996, 95). Credit rating agencies wield considerable influence on national and international policies by ranking states in accordance with currently fashionable, standardised monetarist criteria of "creditworthiness" (Sinclair, 2005), which is likely to have also led to the structural violence of penetration and segmentation (since these monetarist criteria "naturalise" narrow neoliberal economic concerns and obstruct a fuller view of how the economy functions)[263], as well as to the restriction of democratic control, since the maintenance of "creditworthiness" often takes precedence over democratic concerns and the wider public good[264].

In addition to penetrating the manufacturing industry and influencing corporate and government strategies, financialisation pervades everyday life, and has incorporated a widening range of financial products involved in the commodification of the life course, including student debt, private pensions, numerous forms of insurance, credit cards and mortgage arrangements (Blackburn, 2006). As the analyses by Blackburn and others (e.g. Lazzarato, 2015) have indicated, these commodification processes have tended to be exploitative (as I have already discussed in relation to mortgages), they restrict individual agency in various ways (e.g. by constraining life choices due to mortgage arrangements) and they may contribute to the structural violence of penetration (since they may implant capitalist relationships, behavioural and often also cognitive patterns into ways of organising personal life). This included, already from the 1960s, the addition of complex and risky credit derivatives and other forms of speculative financial activity to the running of pension funds (Ghilarducci, 1992; Blackburn, 2003).

Financialisation also facilitated the tendency of the exploitative upward redistribution of

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[263] Despite the neoliberal *mythopoeia* about the supposedly objective, even scientific, character and credentials of these leading ratings agencies, "in the run-up to 2008, a staggering proportion of mortgage-based debts were rated AAA, when in fact they were junk. The same goes for groups such as Enron, Lehman Brothers and AIG. Days before they went bust, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch all still rated these failing companies as safe investments. Shockingly, more than half of all corporate debt ever rated AAA by S&P has been downgraded within seven years" (Kingsley, 2012).
[264] Transnational companies are also able to evade unfavourable credit policies by borrowing on the international capital markets (O'Brien and Williams, 2010).

wealth (e.g. Callinicos, 2010; Galbraith, 2011), through the vastly increased declared and undeclared profits. Financialisation and the rise of the financial sector have helped support the growth in income and wealth inequality by propelling various neoliberal economic and political developments discussed elsewhere in this work (e.g. the development of the speculative housing "bubble"). Financialisation and the development of new financial markets in derivatives deepened capitalist exploitation through the eased pursuit of exchange value aimed at rentier capitalist profit-making, including through interest on loans, the purchase of shares in order to gain dividends (i.e. a share of the surplus value realised by a company), and the trading and speculation in financial assets. This financial trading is a particular form of redividing existing surplus value (which ultimately originates in real production and services), and the "fictitious capital" which is a result of this trading also, on entering the rest of the economy, participates in the creation of new surplus value. Another form of profit-making in the financial system is based on the extraction of market surpluses (through interest and service fees) by financiers who operate the credit system (Harvey, 2010; for more on this and other forms of exploitation in financial activities, see Lapavitsas, 2013). Lapavitsas (2009, 8) used the phrase "financial expropriation" to describe this process by which finance capital "extracts profits directly and systematically out of wages and salaries". There are also various forms of intra-class exploitation in the financial markets, e.g. due to the oligopolists' ability to use their superior market position and privileged access to market information in order to engage in "insider trading" (which can be considered to be a form of exploitation of less well positioned investors – see Augar, 2006 and Ingham, 2016), but these issues relating to intra-class structural violence are largely beyond the scope of this thesis.

The unproductive character of profit-making is perhaps most pronounced in the case of financial activities, where means such as leveraged buyouts, trading in financial assets, interest and other forms of economic rent lead to the accrual of "fictitious" capital which does not have any function in the creation of use value (e.g. Lapavitsas, 2013), i.e. of "money that is thrown into circulation as capital without any material basis in commodities or productive activity" – Harvey, 2006, 95). As I have shown, these economic patterns contribute to the alienation of meaning as well as to exploitation.

Concluding Thoughts

The Thatcher government brought in a range of deregulation measures which increased capitalist prerogatives in the financial sector. These included the abolition of exchange and capital controls and the ending of the requirement for banks to hold a proportion of their liabilities in cash at the Bank of England. Thatcher's administration also presided over the removal of numerous restrictions on the type of banks that were allowed to operate in Britain. These changes facilitated the inflow of finance capital, stimulated the expansion of finance and opened the UK financial markets to global (to a large extent US-based) investment banks. This reorientation of the UK economy – the refocusing on rentier capitalist financial practices (the extraction of market surpluses primarily through financial exchange, speculation and trading in various financial assets and interest on loans) – constituted alienation of meaning as it privileged private interests and the pursuit of exchange value over use value.

New Labour went even further than the Conservative governments had gone in facilitating the financialisation of the economy (i.e. the increase in the autonomy and power of the financial sector and of finance capital more generally, which was accompanied by the integration of large segments of the economy in financial markets). The Blair government conferred autonomy and the setting of interest rates onto the Bank of England, in addition to swiftly passing on the supervision of the banks to the light-touch Financial Services Authority (FSA). These deregulatory changes, which supported the existing forms of financial exploitation and the development of new forms, sharply restricted the democratic accountability of the financial sector and of the financialised economy. New Labour prescribed in law that the FSA was "not to discourage the launch of new financial products" and was to refrain from "erecting regulatory barriers". This facilitated the efflorescing of hazardous new financial instruments, derivatives and of securitisation, which supported the structural violence of segmentation (by making economic governance far more complex and opaque) and the curtailment of democratic accountability (by reducing transparency, obscuring "lines of command" and causing their proliferation, thereby reducing the capacity for democratic public control over these economic processes). Democratic control was also restricted as a result of successive (Conservative and New Labour) governments' failure/refusal to seriously challenge the oligopolisation of finance

and banking capital, which increased the power of unaccountable private economic actors engaged in reckless profit-making. Financialisation also entailed the strengthening of the position of unaccountable, deregulation-promoting credit agencies which restrict democratic control as they constrain government policies by co-determining the "investment climate" and influencing interest rates. Furthermore, financialisation supported the commodification of the life course (e.g. through student debt, private pensions, various types of insurance, credit cards and mortgage arrangements), which constituted exploitation, frequently restricted individual agency by constraining life choices and is likely to have contributed to penetration by helping to "naturalise" and implant the capitalist logic into the broad population's perspectives and aspirations. Through this and a number of other forms of rentier capitalist profit-making (including the aforementioned development of new markets in derivatives), the process of financialisation supported the exploitative upward redistribution of wealth. The following chapter, which discusses the economic crisis, will further expand on the diverse kinds of structural violence that financialisation has resulted in. The underlying mechanism of this private profit-seeking violence, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, is the restriction of democratic control over the economy as a result of the economic, social and political hegemony of the dominant class and the deregulatory measures that were instituted after Thatcher came to power in 1979. The following chapter will also outline how the financial system could be democratised.

Chapter 7

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The Structural Causes of the Economic Crisis

In this chapter I shall examine the major structural and agential factors that induced the recent economic crisis, as well as the major forms of structural violence which it has engendered. My emphasis will be on outlining the major ways in which the main crisis-inducing tendencies contribute (or, in some cases, appear to contribute) to structural violence.

According to a study cited by Woolf (2009), there were 139 financial crises in the period between 1973 and 1997. There were only 38 financial crises between 1945 and 1971, a period which was characterised by more financial regulation. Even the portentous economic events preceding the 2007-8 "credit crunch" and global economic recession, such as the collapse of the leading hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1997 and the bursting of the dot.com "bubble" in 2000, did not stall the development of financial practices which were instrumental in creating both these events and the current crisis. The recent global crisis, which was triggered in 2007 by defaults in the US "sub-prime" mortgage market (Ingham, 2008; see also below), is only the last in a long series of capitalist crises, which appear to have historically been mainly driven by cycles of overaccumulation and cycles of credit expansion and contraction (Kindleberger, 1978; Ingham, 2016; Harvey, 2010; Foster and McChesney, 2012). Harvey gave a useful summation of the structural capitalist crises which he saw as being largely rooted in the capitalist dynamics of competitive accumulation:

"In the absence of any limits or barriers, the need to reinvest in order to remain a capitalist propels capitalism to expand at a compound rate. This then creates a perpetual need to find new fields of activity to absorb the reinvested capital: hence 'the capital surplus absorption problem' " (Harvey, 2010, 45). Any of a number of "potential barriers to the circulation of capital" can produce a crisis by stopping growth and creating "an excess or overaccumulation of capital relative to the opportunities to use that capital profitably" (ibid., 45).

The recent global and UK economic crisis was not simply the result of recent dysfunctions and "deviations" in the financial sector, and of personal and policy failings, although the financial markets "attract more than [their] fair share of the ethically challenged" (Stiglitz, 2010, xix). Perhaps the most insightful perspective on the recent economic crisis – aside from the undisputed claim that it was based on a cycle of credit expansion and contraction - is that the underlying condition which largely drove the credit expansion, risky financialisation processes and, concomitantly, the debt crisis, has been the long-term tendency of overaccumulation (Arrighi, 2009; Harvey, 2010; Foster and McChesney, 2012; Stiglitz, 2010 and 2011 also appears to have noticed the significance of this problem, although he did this in a slightly more circumspect way, by referring to "excess liquidity" as a significant source of crisis-inducing instability in the global markets). It is the centrality of competitive accumulation in capitalism (Marx, 1967a; Harvey, 2010)[265], the focus on the competitive process of overcoming obstacles to the maximisation of profit rather than the production and perfection of use value, which has, it would appear, propelled the processes of overaccumulation. In view of this deduction about the effects of the imperative of unrelenting competitive accumulation, and of the historical experience of persistent capitalist crises, it seems that (as Marx, [1894] 1967b claimed) the tendency towards economic crises has been, *ab initio*, an enduring feature of capitalism's existence. More generally, the structural constraint of the drive towards continuous competitive accumulation within capitalist economy contributes to the reification of accumulation and the intense focus on exchange over use value (i.e. on the competitive pursuit of "market effectiveness", "share value" and profit-making to the detriment of social utility) as a necessity at least partly outside of human control. This implies the alienation of meaning (considering that the primary purpose of human labour should be to satisfy certain basic physical and historical cultural needs through the creation of products and services which have some use value, while exchange value in capitalism, and especially in financialised capitalism, becomes a major reified goal rather than just a means of allocating products and services from the producer and/or service provider to the consumer/client). Furthermore, this constitutes a restriction of democratic agential power, i.e. it erodes the possibility for real democratic participation and accountability,

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[265] In the less deterministic spirit of contemporary political economy, Harvey (2006) wrote about overaccumulation only as a tendential law of capitalism.

since it denies the existence of choice about whether to pursue this or fundamentally different patterns of economic activity (at least without having to challenge the existing capitalist structural framework)[266].

With all their specificities and partially culpable individual and institutional actors, capitalist economic crises tend to share some of the basic dynamics (including the contraction of credit, problems with the realisation of profits due to the weakening of demand and the negative effects of the lack of investment on the economy's productive capacities). They may be immanent to the logic of the current mode of production, distribution and exchange, the structural contradictions present both in finance and the "real" economy, as their continuous repetition seems to indicate. The "credit crunch" and the rest of the recent financial and economic crisis were only the apogee and consequence of several sets of long-term crisis-inducing tendencies.

Developed capitalist economies experienced relatively low levels of profitability since the late 1960s, a developing crisis of profitability (Glynn and Sutcliffe, 1972) which was partially augmented by the fact that the labour movement and the socialist left were quite energetically advancing radical economic and political demands (as I have already noted). The "solution" to lowered profitability was (in addition to capital-saving innovations, the opening up of new product lines, creation and penetration of new markets etc.) an assault on the broad layers of wage labourers and on organised labour, which facilitated the exploitation of labour (Westergaard, 1995; Harvey, 2006; TUC, 2012; McNally, 2012). The decline in trade union influence and working class political and bargaining power enabled the increase in the rates of exploitation of labour. The increase in unemployment and inactivity rates (O'Mahony, 2009; Lansley, 2011) is likely to have been another consequence of this neoliberal offensive, and is likely to have been an important facilitator of increased exploitation (since high unemployment tends to weaken the bargaining power of workers).

Over three decades of neoliberal rule, the falling proportion of national output that goes

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[266] The privileging of exchange over use value as the basis of "market effectiveness" leads to varied instances of structural violence, which are made invisible by their ubiquity and which require further detailed analyses. One related question which such analyses may explore is how and to what extent might the pursuit of "share value" impact internal company organisation and limit democratic control and participation.

on wages (Westergaard, 1995; Seymour, 2011[267]; TUC, 2012: McNally, 2012) - which is indicative of rising exploitation (especially in the context of wages for the majority of workers rising far more slowly than the incomes of the wealthiest segment of the population – e.g. Lansley, 2011[268]) - limited the improvement of living standards of many middle and lower class households. The subordinate classes have (on the whole) not significantly shared in the gains from rising productivity and have instead experienced three decades of strong wage repression (Lansley, 2010; TUC, 2012; McNally, 2012). The repression of workers' wages (to a large degree due to rising capitalist profits – see ibid.), along with the soaring of economic inactivity rates, to a significant extent as a result of the Thatcher government policies of neoliberal restructuring (O'Mahony, 2009), severely impacted consumer spending power and therefore demand (Lansley, 2010; see also Stiglitz, 2013). The "critical imbalance of supply and demand, between capital and labour" (Turner, 2008, 15)[269] presented a significant obstacle to capital accumulation. In this way, capitalist exploitation appears to have driven instability-causing tendencies which resulted in violations of security needs. The wage squeeze meant that workers were not able to absorb the increasing output in goods and services, which played a critical role in driving risky forms of economic stimuli, especially the expansion of credit and the associated speculative asset price "bubbles", which ultimately resulted in the recession (ibid., Lansley, 2010; Stiglitz, 2013; Ingham, 2016)[270].

The creation and maintenance of numerous service sector jobs that replaced the lost jobs in manufacturing (in the decades following Thatcher's rise to power) were also based on the growth of the financial sector and the credit "bubble" (Gamble, 2009; Lansley, 2010). The profits

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[267] Seymour (2011) noted that the share of UK wages in GDP fell from 64 to 54 per cent between 1974 and 2010, despite the increase in productivity. Using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Rauch (2000) noted that the equivalent to the productivity of a 23-hour long working week in 2000 was a 40-hour working week in 1975.

[268] Even without taking into account the profits hidden through complex tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes.

[269] Summarising the insight of the Monthly Review school of political economy (including Baran and Sweezy, 1966 and Sweezy and Magdoff, 1972), Foster and McChesney (2012, 11-12) noted the following about the overaccumulation tendencies in contemporary capitalist societies: "The very conditions of exploitation (...) meant both that inequality in society increased and that more and more surplus capital tended to accumulate actually and potentially within the giant firms and in the hands of wealthy investors, who were unable to find profitable investment outlets sufficient to absorb all of the investment-seeking surplus. Hence, the economy became increasingly dependent on external stimuli such as higher government spending (particularly on the military), a rising sales effort, and financial expansion to maintain growth". Foster and McChesney therefore also support the view that the high rate of exploitation exerts a damaging effect on wider economic stability.

[270] Subsequent discussion will further reveal the severe, structurally violent economic consequences of this wage repression and limitation of workers' spending power.

accrued by companies through outsourcing manufacturing jobs mostly were not transferred onto the society and the state, which began to increasingly rely on credit to pay for record imports (Kitson, 2009). This was an additional negative externality of the existing neoliberal economic model. As Turner (2008, 73) noted: "It was hard to see how shedding over a million manufacturing jobs had strengthened the UK economy. It had (…) undermined the country's external accounts, and saddled future generations with huge debts". Net income in UK financial services rose to a record £27.5 billion in the year to Q3 2007, out of a total surplus on services of £36.0 billion, but this was far less than the amount needed to cover the deficit in goods (Turner, 2008).

The neoliberal economic model supported the creation of additional negative externalities and the violation of security needs in some other ways as well. The enrichment of the wealthy (including through the amassing of "dead capital" in tax havens) appears not to have been able to adequately compensate for the attendant fall in effective demand, as the wealthy mostly "prefer to invest in asset values (…) including stocks, property, resources, oil and other commodity futures, as well as the art market" instead of investing in production (Harvey, 2010, 21), while capitalist personal consumption is a "very weak source of effective demand" (ibid., 110). I have already noted the role of weak consumer demand in the creation of economic crises.

The reliance on precarious forms of economic stimuli, including debt-based consumption, which was highlighted by the *Monthly Review* school and various other economists (e.g. Stiglitz, 2010; Foster and McChesney, 2012; Duménil and Lévy, 2013; Varoufakis, 2015), was among the key crisis-inducing factors. The deep crisis-inducing systemic dynamics entailed the expansion of credit, i.e. the addiction to "credit/debt as a long-term stimulus to counter stagnation" (Foster and McChesney, 2012, 14). The limiting effects of the neoliberal regime on economic growth, and the imbalance in supply and demand which to a large degree causes these effects, have been addressed through the expansion of markets and development of new products and industries, large government spending and government deficits, possibly also the use of wars and of the military expenditure more generally (see Harvey, 2010; Jakopovich, 2014c), the explosion of consumer debt and of the speculative financial sector (Magdoff and Sweezy, 1987; Foster and McChesney, 2012; Varoufakis, 2015). The expansion of credit and the increased reliance on asset "bubbles" developed in order to sustain capital accumulation and economic growth (Callinicos,

2010; Stiglitz, 2010; Harvey, 2010; Foster and McChesney, 2012). In Britain more than in many other countries, economic growth, which accompanied almost the entire period of New Labour's rule, largely rested on the unstable foundation of constantly rising debt, consumption and property prices (Hutton, 2010; Stiglitz, 2011; Varoufakis, 2015).

Financial and speculative solutions were sought even though "the use of credit tends to make matters worse in the long run because it can deal only with problems that arise in exchange and never with those in production" (Harvey, 2006, 286). Sweezy and Magdoff (2012, 133) recognised that "finance acts as an accelerator of the business cycle, pushing it farther and faster along on the way up and steepening the decline on the way down". This model of economic growth, advanced through massive debt and the expansion of financial markets, originated from the enthronement of the anti-Keynesian doctrine of monetarism and the accompanying neoliberal supply-side economics, which are based on the theory that the increase of the money supply and other supply-side measures are the best ways of attaining sustainable economic growth.

Credit-based growth and development of consumerism and effective demand have been seen as crucial to the (at least short- or medium-term) sustainability of the system (Harvey, 2010). As a consequence of the reliance on borrowing to sustain growth, profits and consumer needs and habits, every "economically developed" country had acquired a large total private debt by 2008, which is when the crisis broke out (Hutton, 2010). Of all the developed countries, the UK had the highest total private debt in relation to GDP: it was 328 per cent of its GDP in 2008 (Hutton, 2010). The UK's aggregate indebtedness, i.e. "the sum of household debts, company debts, government debts and private debts" was 481 per cent of the GDP in 2008 (Peston, 2011).

The debt to disposable income ratio especially exploded during New Labour rule: while it rose by 49.8 per cent during 18 years of the Conservative administration, it increased by 71.5 percent in the first ten years of Labour rule (Turner, 2008). Net external debt rose nine-fold to £318.9 billion in the decade since New Labour came to power in 1997 (Turner, 2008). Public debt, on the other hand, constituted 47 per cent of UK GDP in 2008, much less than it was in the US, Germany and France, let alone Italy or Japan (CIA, 2008). As I have just indicated, private citizens also compensated for the wage stagnation by increased borrowing to maintain their living standards and consumer needs and aspirations. Instead of addressing the structural inequalities and wage stagnation, the UK government supported the rise in private consumer debt

(Hutton, 2010; Gamble, 2014), and the financial institutions began to exploitatively debt-finance even those people who had no steady sources of income (Harvey, 2010; Stiglitz, 2010). Consumers were actively seduced into taking out loans and attaining more credit, regardless of their actual ability to pay (Gamble, 2009).

House price inflation and speculation in the housing market through a housing "bubble" was seen as one of the main opportunities for the absorption of surplus capital (Harvey, 2010). The financial sector controlled both supply (property developers' construction projects) and consumer demand (via mortgages) through debt-financing (Harvey, 2010). This speculative housing boom was buoyed up by the use of financial innovations like the securitisation of mortgage debt and the wide sharing of investment risks through the development of credit derivative markets (ibid.): "Surplus fictitious capital created within the banking sector was absorbing the surplus" (Harvey, 2010, 30). Turner (2008, 191) pointed out that "governments needed housing bubbles, as they were wedded to a free trade model that was inviting wage destruction for the masses amidst an unsustainable drive to cut labour costs". The housing "bubble" was partly a way of addressing the crisis of living standards (with its negative economic consequences) without upsetting the *status quo* and the dominant class interests focused on marketisation, commodification and profit-making. The exploitative, rentier capitalist approach to housing provision (i.e. intense profit-making based on capitalist control over property, as well as on the alienating treatment of this basic use value as a financial asset, an "exchange value" – Ingham, 2016) thus supported exploitation in the workplace.

As already indicated, the immediate cause of the recent crisis was the sharp increase in defaults in the "sub-prime" (highly insecure) mortgage market in 2007 (Gamble, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010; Ingham, 2016), i.e. the bursting of the asset price housing "bubble" based on high-risk loans given to applicants with unfavourable or non-existent credit histories. Debt-financed house purchases were pushed beyond the level at which borrowers were able to repay their mortgage loans. This resulted in the "credit crunch", a severe contraction of credit by banks (even of inter-bank credit) in the context of a crisis of market confidence. The withdrawal of credit led to a near-paralysis of the financial system.

The exploitative boom in house prices (a cost rise of 211 per cent between 1997 and 2007 – Ingham, 2016; see also the section on housing in chapter 5) was accompanied by a

proliferation of insecure mortgage schemes (which ensure rentier capitalist profit-making from peoples' attempts to satisfy an important human need for a home), the downgrading of credit-worthiness terms and standards. The research firm Data Monitor suggested that "7 per cent of mortgages just before the crash went to people with a poor credit history, and another 5-6 per cent required no proof of income" (Hutton, 2010, 186). The Financial Services Authority (2009, 9) stated: "Residential mortgage debt in the UK amounts to around £1.23 trillion, accounting for approximately 70% of all credit extended by lenders in the UK". As a consequence of these factors, the housing boom was a "bubble" that, eventually and predictably, burst. The securitised financial assets that were based on the mortgage debts experienced a rapid depreciation and loss of liquidity, eventually spreading this financial contagion to all financial assets (Ingham, 2016). Prominently, the UK bank Northern Rock lost buyers of its mortgage-backed securities upon which its business strategy rested, and had to be nationalised (Hutton, 2010; Harvey, 2010). A major consequence of these financial strains and of the accompanying climate of uncertainty was that the financial system severely restricted the provision of loans, which strongly undermined existing production and consumption patterns. The banks' reluctance to lend was augmented due to the very high degree of interconnectedness of financial actors (already discussed in the previous chapter), which meant that it was unclear whether the potential borrower held insecure credit derivatives and securitised mortgages (Ingham, 2016).

As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, various new financial institutions and instruments focused on the pursuit of profit-making. The "shadow banking" system (including hedge funds and private equity firms, structured investment vehicles, various derivatives, securities, credit default swaps etc. – for an overview see Valdez, 2003) developed in conjunction and often in coordination with the expansion of credit. Many of these rapidly emerging institutions and financial instruments largely focused on borrowing in order to trade assets for short-term massive profit, massively augmenting the credit "bubble" in the process. These complex new developments also increased segmentation (by preventing the transparent view of and scrutiny over these practices) and, consequently (by restricting transparency), restricted the democratic accountability of the financial sector. A volatile currency exchange system arose after the fixed exchange rate system broke down in 1973, and by the end of the 1980s the practice of hedging (placing bets on currency futures) gained ground as a way of offsetting the volatility

(Harvey, 2010)[271]. The share of surplus capital absorbed in production had been persistently declining worldwide due to falling global profit margins, in favour of speculation on asset values, which is often vastly more profitable (Harvey, 2010). Apart from leading to the alienation of meaning (considering their neglect of use value), currency and asset speculation relies on highly exploitative, rentier modes of profit-making, and it has led to negative externalities including the violation of security needs (perhaps most infamously when George Soros' speculation with the pound prompted the Treasury into spending £3.4 billion to sustain the value of the currency – Johnston, 2012). Intensive speculation can increase currency and price volatility and also may (partly as a result of these forms of volatiliy) in various ways distort the commodities' markets. Moreover, hedging and speculation are financed through credit, which carries the risk of default (Ingham, 2016). As already indicated, the volumes of capital involved in risky financial transactions have been tremendous. Credit, securities and credit derivatives were "worth many times the world's GDP" (Hutton, 2010, 151), in line with the policy preference for credit-based growth (Gamble, 2009; Foster and McChesney, 2012). As a result, a "casino" model of finance, which transgressed the principles of prudent behaviour in a highly volatile financial market, was established. The new financial actors, such as the money market funds, hedge funds, and even some investment banks, often lacked deposit insurance and the backing of a central bank as a lender of last resort. The 2004 Basel prudential banking rules actually ascribed to the banks the responsibility for assessing their own financial exposure, and the responsibility for determining their capital ratio – as a result of which Northern Rock increased its dividend in 2007 despite massive leverage, which ultimately led to its collapse (Hutton, 2010). Reckless and exploitative profit-making was enabled by a lack of democratic accountability, which resulted in the violation of the broad population's security needs. These three subtypes of structural violence were regularly incorporated in financial activities. The banks engaged in excessive hedging of risk and used "higher levels of financial borrowing on ever-lower capital to leverage upwards their target rate of return and thus their own executives' bonuses" (Hutton, 2010, 6). Ever greater share value was relentlessly pursued (Gamble, 2009). Largely due to this shared interest, the shareholders

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[271] The wide-ranging futures markets exploded "from almost nothing in 1990 to circulating nearly $250 trillion by 2005 (total global output was then only $45 trillion) and then maybe as much as $600 trillion by 2008" (Harvey, 2010, 21).

failed to control bank behaviour and prevent overly risky financial policies (Hutton, 2010). Immense profits were passed on to shareholders instead of being used to strengthen reserves in order to reduce increased bank and company vulnerability to defaults and the contraction of credit (Ingham, 2016).

Other Structural Failures of the Deregulated Market

The new financial products and practices created opportunities for the profitable investment of a growing amount of capital surplus. Unlike other partially productive areas of business expansion, such as the information technology boom at the turn of the century, the ascendancy of finance capital was essentially unproductive. In effect, much of the expansion of financial services did not even have anything to do with material undertakings (such as the development of housing), and constituted the departure of (most of) finance from the productive economy on a cloud of speculative frenzy preoccupied with the accumulation of "fictitious" capital. As the duration of the economic growth increased, and the *laissez faire* ideology and practice became increasingly habitual, an "irrational exuberance" (Greenspan, 1996) contributed to the reduction of the financial sector's risk aversion[272], despite the inability of financial markets to acquire correct and timely information (Hutton, 2010; Weeks, 2014) and to adequately process it (Chang, 2010). In a highly competitive financial market, the pursuit of ever higher yields is an overarching goal, along with much of the recklessness this entails in the context of an under-regulated market. The threat of hostile takeovers and various other forms of destruction or subordination by more successful competitors helps to reveal why the laws of the competitive market could be described as coercive, and why the adherence to the principles of intense market competition is economically rational from the perspective of capitalist actors. The structural constraints of the competitive market steer capitalists to behave in ways which lead to negative externalities, including the violation of security needs of the broad population (which I have already noted).

The principle of the self-regulating market was made particularly problematic in the case

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[272] Prominently, credit worthiness terms became relaxed. Business and consumer confidence strengthened the longer the boom had lasted and asset prices had been increasing, making it harder to envisage that the financial edifice might tumble down. At the height of this euphoria, Gordon Brown even proclaimed that he has presided over the end of "boom and bust" (Summers, 2008). In this climate of business exuberance, to join in the swift and exhilarating profit-making seems to have approximated a psychological "necessity". In Kindleberger's (2005, 19) words: "There is nothing as disturbing to one's well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich".

of the financial markets, which acts as the "blood circulation system" of capital accumulation but is fragmented and operates according to particularistic economic interests. The most evident problems arising from this state of affairs have been the massive negative externalities which private profit-making in the markets has entailed, as well as the (repeatedly confirmed) inability of the financial markets to adequately identify, regulate and correct their own systemic vulnerabilities. As Ingham (2016, 285) observed, the recent economic crisis "was triggered by the collapse of markets in assets that were considered to be instruments for 'risk management' – options, credit-default swaps (CDSs), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and so on". Instead of enabling the adequate regulation of risk in the financial markets, the use of a broad arsenal of opaque financial instruments and processes made it more difficult to subject financial processes to rational (let alone democratic and transparent) human control[273]. These opaque financial assets, instruments and methods undermine the potential for the equal and transparent sharing of market information[274], causing segmentation and the restriction of democratic accountability (due to this lack of transparency and controllability). One of the major instances of this was the banks' practice of holding "securitised" assets outside of their main accounts in "structured investment vehicles" (SIVs, which were legally separate entities). This practice "enabled the banks further to evade the already diluted regulatory requirements on the adequacy of capital to back the risks of defaults. Furthermore, SIVs were typically registered in offshore financial centres such as the Cayman Islands and the Channel Islands, which were outside the jurisdiction of the US and UK authorities. Finally, the assets were traded directly between buyers and sellers in 'over the counter' transactions rather than in formally organized markets, which made them difficult to identify, quantify and regulate" (Ingham, 2016, 235). In these major ways, financial actors restricted the scope for democratic accountability and control. As Mejorado and Roman (2013) showed, the rewards accrued from unproductive, avaricious economic activities of much of the financialised economy now tend to far exceed the rewards of much productive entrepreneurship

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[273] Ingham (ibid., 148) noted: "The expansion of the financial sector has been accompanied by a bewilderingly arcane complexity. Even participants struggle to comprehend the astonishing proliferation of specialized markets by which money is mutated, by what is known as 'financial engineering', into a complex array of ever-changing tradable financial assets and instruments".

[274] Even in a less financialised capitalist economy, the separation of producers and consumers and the relative disorganisation of "free market" capitalist production, distribution and exchange lead to a delay in market information (Dragičević, 1965). The invisible hand which automatically and effectively harmonises capitalist market flows does not really exist.

(characterised by long-term commitment, socially useful innovation and moderation in risk-taking), discouraging such socially more responsible (or less irresponsible) economic activity[275]. As I have already noted, private equity firms also, for instance, assume a hyper-exploitative, essentially parasitic role in relation to the productive segments of the economy, and are more interested in acquiring and selling assets than in exercising (in a serious, long-term manner) the ownership responsibilities over the companies they have bought. This kind of (narrowly profit-oriented) business perspective now permeates vast areas of "conventional" economic activity, as the share of short-term (often more unproductive and exploitative) *vis-á-vis* long-term investors in share ownership consistently increased (Pierrakis and Westlake, 2009). Restriction of democratic control over the economy due to the dominance of particularistic economic interests leads to a focus on exchange over use value, and consequently also, as I have shown, to exploitation and to the alienation of meaning. Furthermore, as a result of the profit-making success of these practices, many companies imitated the practice of private equity firms by leveraging themselves and overextending their balance sheets in order to avoid hostile takeovers (Chevalier, 1995). The practice and threat of hostile takeovers, as well as the measures employed to prevent them (especially leveraging and the overextending of company balance sheets), appear to have contributed to even deeper financial destabilisation and the violation of the broad population's security needs.

There are several other market failures and forms of market-mediated structural violence which the economic crisis has helped to uncover. The pursuit of risky debt-based and speculative gains, and the selling of risk associated with debtor default to others were quite rational from the narrow perspective of financial speculators and lenders, yet they brought the economy to a point of generalised crisis. Conversely, the evasion of risk by financial capitalists (once the financial crisis erupted) led to an acute contraction of credit and a sharp decline in confidence, underscoring the inherent irrationality of the present mode of economy based on largely uncoordinated and unregulated private capital, which in these major ways led to various negative externalities and violated the security needs of the broad population. Uncoordinated, non-

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[275] Importantly, however, although finance is essentially a rent-seeking occupation, not all financial activity is unproductive, especially when the financial actors are willing to (or compelled to) finance innovations and the "real economy" and to genuinely help their consumers to rationally adapt to the temporal element of business and consumer activities.

cooperative capitalist behaviour in the situation of crisis and the attendant breakdown of trust led to a drastic "credit crunch", i.e. a severe contraction of credit. The financiers seem to have given little thought to the significant negative externalities created by their activities. The pursuit of particularistic capitalist interests and their adaptation to the competitive neoliberal market often contradict the general interests of society, and even of the capitalist class as a whole, leading to the violation of security needs (especially of the subordinate classes).

A central aspect of the unregulated market is that, in order to be financially successful, companies now feel pressure to focus on their share price, to the detriment of other business strategies, the authenticity of market information, and the law itself (as Enron's machinations, to give a prominent US example, have indicated). Although they are frequently characterised by superior economic performance in the longer-term, productive companies that do not yield to this narrow, use value-destroying logic suffer financial losses (Hutton, 2010; Mejorado and Roman, 2013). In fact, organisational and mathematical talent is now to a large extent applied to the creation of "fictitious" financial products and unproductive economic activities that are harmful to broad layers of the population but help amass immense private riches for those able to participate in such financial undertakings. This is not a way of ensuring that the credit and banking systems adhere to the need for public utility.

Some Essential Consequences of the Crisis

The bank bailout was in itself the failure of the supposedly "self-regulating", "free" market. It highlighted neoliberal capitalism's reliance on "external" (state) support as a way of cushioning the effects of the system's internal contradictions. Exploitation and the restriction of welfare provision were (due to the associated reduction of resources for social services and the increased costs to the state budget) major forms of structural violence that the bailout produced (although it is possible that simply letting the banks at risk of default to collapse would have resulted in greater costs to the public). The extent of the extraordinary exploitation which this socialisation of private banks' losses constituted is reflected in the data that at least £1.5 trillion of public money was given out in bank bailouts (Rowley, 2011). Banks such as the Royal Bank of Scotland and Northern Rock were nationalised, though the government refused to exert direct control and opted for less directly accountable "arms-length management" through a newly

formed holding company (United Kingdom Financial Investments) instead, even as banking profits soared in the wake of the crisis (Froud et al., 2010). Following a well-established historical pattern, debt was socialised while profits remained private.

As was already mentioned, the recession created an unpredictable and dangerous cycle in which the crisis in the provision of credit constrained economic growth (Stiglitz, 2010; Hutton, 2010), including through a massive loss of productive capacity and limitations placed on consumption and public services (Ingham, 2016). Using the assumption that economic performance could have remained the same as it was before the crisis commenced, Haldane (2010, 4) calculated that the overall cost of economic recession on the economy was "an output loss equivalent to between $60 trillion and $200 trillion for the world economy and between £1.8 trillion and £7.4 trillion for the UK".

The large, private banks, having engaged in reckless profit-seeking speculation which triggered the global economic crisis, were allowed to engage in free-riding through the state bailout. The socialisation of private banking debts is a strong indication of the monopolisation of politics by corporate elites. Almost no one was prosecuted for the reckless behaviour which led to the great crisis, for Libor rate-fixing, the "misselling" of PPI (payment protection insurance), the "misselling" of bonds to the elderly, interest rate swaps, money laundering (including for the Mexican drug cartels), tax evasion, large bonuses for failed financiers, and for numerous other malpractices and forms of fraud (Tatchell, 2013), which is also indicative of the "two-tier" nature of the UK legal system, which (as I have already discussed in chapter 2) fails to consistently foster democratic accountability. Furthermore, the failure of the UK government to include lending and other requirements (which could have been included as a condition of the state bailout) has had detrimental effects on small and medium businesses, privileging large and oligopolistic companies once again (Treanor, 2013; Froud et al., 2011). A connected aspect of this economic strategy has been the adoption of a programme of drastic cuts to the government budget. This strategy seems to have privileged the interests of the dominant class at the expense of the public at large, and of its most vulnerable members in particular.

The restriction of democratic control and a largely unregulated regime of capitalist exploitation helped to make this possible. These types of structural violence resulted from systemic failure to adequately regulate the financial sector in which the successive neoliberal

governments, state regulators, the shareholders, the credit-rating agencies, as well as the auditors, were strongly implicated (e.g. Callinicos, 2010; Hutton, 2010; Froud et al., 2010). As a complement to the reckless neoliberal world of privatised financial ownership and governance, the regulatory credit-rating and supervisory agencies were also essentially private institutional actors, largely "liberated" from democratic accountability (as already discussed). The lax regulatory regime of the City of London has been instrumental for the growth in its global standing, yet it also failed to prevent a series of mass banking abuses, including Libor and PPI scandals, which may never have been uncovered had US regulators not stepped in (Leys, 2014). The Financial Services Authority (FSA) also, for instance, decided to take HBOS' (Halifax-Bank of Scotland) complacency as a sufficient indication of its financial stability. This cost the public around £11.5 billion of public money which was used to rescue the bank in the midst of the economic crisis (ibid.). This weak regulatory regime, strongly supported by the New Labour government (Leys, 2014; see also chapter 6) failed to prevent the rise of imprudent financial structures and practices, nor did it in any way sanction those responsible for this financial catastrophe[276]. The relative linearity of the processes by which economic crises develop, starting with periods of irrational exuberance and expanding financial "bubbles" which eventually burst and lead to economic collapse, have been understood by different authors for a long time (Marx, [1894] 1967b; Kindleberger, 1978). The FSA and the government, however, evidently did not concern themselves too much with such insights and auguries, considering their failure to strongly address systemic vulnerabilities.

Finance capitalists massively increased their profits and salaries in the midst of the recent economic crisis (Jin et al., 2011). The trillions in bank bailouts throughout the developed economies ensured, as Taleb (2009) pointed out, the "socialisation of losses and privatisation of gains. (...) We have managed to combine the worst of capitalism and socialism. In France in the 1980s, the socialists took over the banks. In the US in the 2000s, the banks took over the government". The situation in the UK could have been described in the same terms, especially as the financial capital's reckless behaviour was effectively made economically rational, from the

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[276] Moreover, "James Crosby, the CEO of HBOS, resigned before the crash, cashed in two-thirds of his HBOS shares (when they still had some value), was knighted, and finally appointed to the board of the regulator (the FSA), even becoming its deputy chairman until 2009" (Leys, 2014, 125).

bankers self-regarding point of view, by the government bail-outs. Only the banks were forgiven their debts (at the expense of the taxpayers). As I have already pointed out, this constituted the exploitation of the subaltern classes. The largest banks profited not just from these offerings from the taxpayer, but also from the elimination of rivals which went bankrupt. Moreover, the state bailouts did not lead to much re-regulation (Froud et al., 2010), which helped to sustain the structural violence of exploitation and restriction of democratic control. A reckless car driver is subjected to criminal prosecution, while reckless financiers, whose activities affected billions of lives across the world, have not even been subjected to criminal investigations in the UK since the crisis erupted in 2008, evincing the legal limitation on the financial sector's democratic accountability. The present political obstacles to the abolition of this *de facto* legal immunity of the financial elite of the capitalist class appear to be immense[277].

Exploitation and the restriction of democratic control were supported in other ways as well. The bank bailouts and partial nationalisations also did not lead to a substantial change in the willingness of banks to reverse severe credit restrictions (Froud et al., 2010), which probably damaged weaker businesses and privileged large companies. Furthermore, the deposit-taking banks use the capital they gather from their depositors to assist their proprietary trading operations, rather than to lend to businesses and consumers (Hutton, 2010), which also helps to sustain the (already mentioned) alienation of meaning. The preservation of this state of affairs even following the massive state (i.e. public) bailouts is a strong indication of a significant level of alignment of the state elite with the banking elite.

These powerful interests have appeared to be keen to disempower and contain efforts to question the basic presumptions about the nature of the economic order. It was partly in reference to the obscuring of inconvenient truths about the capitalist market that Lukács' offered his powerful restatement of the Marxian theory of alienation, reification and commodity fetishism (which produces the structural violence of penetration and the alienation of meaning): "The

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[277] However, in itself this is not the crucial issue. Legality and morality tend to be mainly defined by the dominant class and the state elite: a thorough-going democratisation is necessary. It would not be in the spirit of my critique to vilify individuals caught in the euphoric whirlwind of "high finance". In any case, some of them are, in more or less discreet ways, highly critical of its destructive and corrupt character.

essence of commodity structure has often been pointed out. Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people" (Lukács, 1971, 83). Nowhere has this analysis become more pertinent than when applied to the financial sector and financial activities of contemporary capitalist economies. Behind this facade lies a destructive, exploitative and parasitical form of social relationships founded on the dominance of the rentier, the functionless investor who extracts surplus value on the basis of others' toil and productive industries, as well as of speculation and "fictitious" capital. This relationship of domination radically disempowers the broad population. The financial elite of the capitalist class holds massive resources and powerful levers of economic and political power which limit the scope for democratic control and are largely unaccountable. The vast government bail-outs unaccompanied by strong government control over the financial sector are a testament to the finance capital's immense power, which, as my discussion has shown, routinely functions at the expense of the population's various needs.

Concluding Thoughts

The immediate cause of the recent crisis - the bursting of the asset price housing "bubble" based on high-risk loans given to applicants with unfavourable or non-existent credit histories – was itself the outcome of several related systemic limitations and crisis-inducing tendencies. The repression of workers' wages (in the context of a neoliberal resurgence, the restriction of democratic accountability, the increase in capitalist profits and wealth inequality) as well as the soaring of economic inactivity rates (to a large extent due to the Thatcher administration's neoliberal restructuring of the economy and society) greatly limited consumer spending power and thus weakened effective demand. This imbalance between supply and demand, and the critical deficiency of new investment opportunities that were considered sufficiently lucrative and safe presented a major obstacle to capital accumulation. The inability of workers to absorb the increasing output in goods and services apparently drove hazardous forms of economic stimuli. The expansion of financial markets and the development of new financial products, instruments and practices (i.e. new forms of exploitation/ways of extracting surplus value, especially through the ex-

pansion of credit and the associated asset price "bubbles") provided greatly sought-after opportunities for highly profitable investment of the growing quantity of capital surplus.

This massive speculative boom was thus largely a consequence of oligarchic class rule and of the profit-oriented nature of the capitalist economy, which was systematically deregulated from 1979 under both Conservative and New Labour administrations. Fundamentally, these crisis-inducing tendencies and practices have, as I have shown, been facilitated by the lack of sufficient democratic control. The hazardous economic practices and their causes (especially inequality, wage repression and lack of effective demand in the economy) are direct results of the anti-democratic, private profit-seeking character of the "liberal" market capitalist social order. The deregulation of the economy constituted a severe restriction of democratic accountability in the economy. One major effect of financial deregulation was the proliferation of a broad array of extremely opaque financial instruments and processes, which preclude transparency (thereby causing segmentation) and make real democratic control over the financial system impossible.

The crisis-inducing financial practices also entailed several forms of high-scale structural violence: exploitation (through the appropriation of surplus value); alienation of meaning (since the primary purpose of human labour ought to be to satisfy physical and historical cultural needs through the creation of products and services which have some use value, while exchange value in capitalism - especially in financialised capitalism – is a major reified goal instead of merely being a means of allocating products and services from the producer and/or service provider to the consumer/client); violation of security needs (especially by contributing to wider economic instability) and other negative externalities (e.g. lack of investment in socially useful economic activities due to the recession).

When the economic crisis erupted, its major feature was a "credit crunch", i.e. a severe contraction of credit by the banks due to a crisis of market confidence, alongside a crisis of the banks' liquidity. New Labour gave out at least £1.5 trillion of public money in bank bailouts. This socialisation of private banks' losses constituted an extraordinary exploitation of the broad population. The bailouts also led to the restriction of welfare provision due to the severe reduction of resources for social services and the increased state expenditure as a result of the bailouts. Considering the unpopularity of the banking elite among the broad population, these bailouts were also an indication of the severe restriction of democratic accountability and the effective

absence of democratic participation in decision-making in the British system of government. Lack of accountability and the state elite's privileging of and alignment with large and oligopolistic finance capital were also demonstrated by the fact that the Brown government did not even impose lending and other requirements on the banks as conditions of the bailouts.

Another indication that the negative externalities which the crisis produced have been immense is Haldane's (2010) calculation that the economic recession may have led to an output loss for the UK of between £1.8 and £7.4 trillion. The systemic failure of regulation of the financial system, which was made possible due to the state elite's alignment with finance capital, resulted in a relative immiseration of the British population and in severe restrictions of their security and other well-being needs.

Democratic control over large-scale financial activities is key for combating finance-related structural violence, as the structural violence which the financial sector and the financialised economy inflict on society is fundamentally based on the supremacy of the profit-motive and the lack of democratic accountability in the economy. In order to enable and facilitate a state of genuine positive peace (rather than merely some reduction in the structural violence committed by the financial sector), the financial sector and the financialised economy would have to be subordinated to the organisations of democratic self-government. These organisations ensuring public control over the financial system would need to facilitate adequate cohesion and integration of financial activities - the democratic socialisation of the financial system and efficient systemic management over extended reproduction[278].

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[278] The Yugoslav attempt to transform banks into financial institutions subordinate to "self-managed" enterprises illustrates the danger of insufficient socialisation of the financial sector. Yugoslav enterprises founded banks by pooling funds and they sent delegates to the bank assemblies, which were the banks' highest bodies. Furthermore, local political officials influenced the election of the bank director (Koyana, 2013). This supposedly socialist arrangement was also crisis-inducing, as "self-managed enterprises owed banks a large amount of debt, and local political circles were interested in financing the local self-managed enterprises for the purpose of the development of the regional economy. These facts meant that banks were actually managed by big debtors. (…) Pressures were constantly put on banks to make interest rate as low as possible" (Koyana, 2013, 107). The attendant creation of unsustainable debts and the socialisation of the losses of unsuccessful and imprudent enterprises (Horvat, 1989) demonstrate the negative consequences of parochial, self-regarding forms of cooperativism which do not sufficiently foster cooperation and solidarity with the wider community, with workers in other enterprises and with the broad public. This concept of "group ownership" in some ways resembles the modes of operation and the relatively insular mentality that is characteristic of petit bourgeois associations of small proprietors. The Yugoslav experience indicates that cooperative banking reproduces some forms of structural violence associated with private banking unless it can transcend parochial privatism through democratic social/public ownership and control by the wider community and for the wider community. The labour movement may help to prepare the ground for the development

Chapter 8

POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

This chapter will first examine the major trends in wealth and especially income inequality in Britain, as well as poverty trends and the inequality-producing structural arrangements which lead to poverty. In addition to subjecting these phenomena to an analysis in the light of the theory of structural violence, in the second part of this chapter I outline the greater exposure of some categories of the population to poverty and social exclusion (i.e. to a lower-class position). Finally, I will present evidence that the level of income and wealth inequality is, with exceptional consistency, the key gradient or indicator of various negative social phenomena and forms of structural violence.

It is important to look at various dimensions of poverty-related inequality and forms of disadvantage that push people into poverty and economic and social marginality. They have the effect of lowering the afflicted people's class position as poverty and social exclusion have the effect of placing people into a subordinate position in relation to the means of production, distribution and exchange and the capitalist market. In particular, poverty pushes people into a state of dependency, compelling them to sell their labour power to capitalists or to rely on meagre state benefits for survival.

The focus on how poverty and social exclusion affect various vulnerable social categories helps to reveal the link between lower class position and intersecting forms of structural and cultural violence. These include gender-based, ethno- and xeno-racist patterns of poverty and social exclusion, as well as socially-conditioned hardships more commonly experienced by people with physical and mental illnesses and disabilities, people experiencing more pronounced educational deprivation, people with criminal convictions, segments of the young and the elderly population, etc.

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of such a socialised financial system by helping to develop cooperative worker- and community-controlled credit unions, mutuals, pension funds etc.

The Major Patterns Relating to Poverty and Social Exclusion

Poverty and social exclusion are closely associated with wider patterns of inequality in society, as I have already indicated and will further show in this chapter. The post-WWII period was largely determined by the policies of the "Keynesian consensus" which contributed to a reduction in income and wealth inequality and in levels of absolute poverty (Hills, 1995; Abercombie and Ward, 2007; The Equality Trust, 2011; Johnson, 2009; Jin et al., 2011). Conversely, neoliberal dynamics in Britain since the late 1970s/early 1980s provided the basis for a major increase in income and wealth inequality, poverty and social exclusion (Dorling, 2013; 2015).

Much of the second half of the twentieth century witnessed a trend towards the reduction of UK wealth inequality[279]. The share of (known) personal marketable wealth held by the wealthiest 1 per cent of the population fell from three-fifths in the 1920s to one-fifth by 1979, the "official" end of the Keynesian golden age in the UK (Abercombie and Ward, 2007). In the UK, the share of national income held by the bottom 20 per cent was at its greatest in mid-1970s, after which the egalitarian trends began to be reversed (Hills, 1995). The rapid reversal of the redistributive achievements of the Keynesian era began to take place in earnest during the administrations of Margaret Thatcher. Westergaard (1995) noted that the benefits of economic growth between 1979 and 1992 were mostly transferred onto the richest 30 per cent of the population, whose economic fortunes were increasingly distanced from the rest of the population. This exploitative trend was accompanied by a growing separation between middle and low incomes, as the former grew at a greater pace than the latter (Brewer et al., 2007), furthering the fragmentation between middle and lower classes and between different class fractions[280]. A 2003

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[279] In contrast to the majority of researchers, I shall preface the discussion of data on inequality trends with a very important caveat. All the official figures greatly understate the extent of both income and wealth inequality because they do not account for the hundreds of billions and trillions of pounds of undeclared income and wealth which are hoarded in tax havens (Bain, 2010; Foot, 2009; Tax Justice Network, 2010; Stewart, 2012). This "underbelly" of the UK and global economy is commonly ignored in official government, as well as conventional academic, analyses.

[280] There is a lack of studies of income inequality using Marxian class categories. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that those with low incomes tended to belong to the lower class (as well as, in some cases, the struggling segments of the middle class, especially the petite bourgeoisie which is more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the market as a result of the small businesses' generally disadvantaged market position *vis-à-vis* larger capital and the state's economic entities). By contrast, while some people belonging to the upper working class receive "middle" incomes even though they do not perform the function of capital, those with middle incomes have tended to perform supervisory

analysis of income inequality in fifteen developed Western countries in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s found that the UK had the fastest growing income inequality except for the United States (Luxembourg Income Study, 2003), apparently indicating the scale of exploitation (since capitalist profits are based on the extraction of workers' unpaid surplus labour and of other market surpluses, e.g. through high rents and interest on debt). Figure 2 shows UK income inequality trends as measured by three different measures. The general picture is the same irrespective of measure, except for the period 1992-2009 in the case of the 90/10 ratio (i.e. the ratio of the top ten percent to the bottom 10 per cent of the population). It is of limited value because it only measures the top and the bottom of the income distribution and under-represents top incomes. Still (despite an apparent decline in income inequality between 1994 and 1996, as well as between 2000 and 2005), income inequality was found to have increased by 34-40 per cent between 1979 and 1990 (The Equality Trust, 2011).

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and some managerial functions, which places them among the middle classes according to my neo-Marxian conceptualisation of class.

Source: The Equality Trust (2011), as drawn from Joyce et al. (2010)

Figure 2: Levels of UK income inequality according to three measures between 1960 and 2010

Among the central causes of poverty have been the increased capitalist profit-making (Lansley, 2010; TUC, 2012; McNally, 2012) through downward wage competition in the UK (and other Western countries) that was induced by declining profitability and competitivity (Pradella, 2015). The sharp increase in economic inactivity rates, to a large extent due to neoliberal restructuring which was strongly induced by the Thatcher government (O'Mahony, 2009), accompanied with the oversupply of labour (see also the discussion below) and the associated repression of workers' wages (to a large degree due to recovering rates of capitalist profits – see Lansley, 2010; TUC, 2012; McNally, 2012), by regressive tax changes (see chapter 5), as well as by rising living costs (see for example chapter 4 regarding the rising costs of energy and transport, and especially the section on housing in chapter 5) and declining welfare state provision (see chapter 5 and the discussion below), sharply limited consumer spending power (see Lansley, 2010). The Thatcher government's unemployment-inducing policies emphasised economic restructuring, company downsizing and deindustrialisation (Glyn, 2007;

O'Mahony, 2009) and included the tactic of transferring the unemployed onto a separate register of the "economically inactive" (O'Mahony, 2009). These policies also significantly contributed to the persistence of poverty and social exclusion, as I will also show in this chapter. Numerous studies (including Mack and Lansley, 1985; Gordon and Pantazis, 1997) documented a large increase in poverty and income and wealth inequality (across different segments of the population) over this entire period. As figure 2 shows, available statistics indicate that income inequality experienced a particularly strong increase during Thatcher's administration, and that income inequality oscillated between 1990 and 2010, although the general trend was one of increasing inequality (except, as already mentioned, in the 90/10 ratio). As I have already noted, these statistics should be taken with caution: it is probable that the phenomena of tax evasion and avoidance, as well as the largely concealed extremely high degree of concentration of land ownership in few hands (see Cahill, 2001), are significantly distorting the picture. Also, there is probably a lack of data on the very poor (the homeless, the undocumented migrants living covertly and those working in the black economy).

Measurements of income and wealth inequality which do not even acknowledge their inability to assess the actual wealth and income of the super rich is weakened both in relation to ascertaining the violent output and the violent input of class-based structural violence. The measurement of violent output is clearly hindered by the existing measurements' inability to ascertain the actual scale and character of income inequality. By failing to address and acknowledge the main dimensions of the exploitative redistribution of wealth, conventional measurements are *ipso facto* also weakened in relation to their ability to ascertain the violent input of class-based structural violence. In this sense, prevailing measurements wittingly or (no doubt in many cases) unwittingly contribute to the structural violence of segmentation by obscuring a fuller view of the scale and the character of the distribution of power in society. Furthermore, by helping to conceal the real scale of class-based inequality and the root-causes of this inequality (capitalist property relations), these measurements also support the structural violence of penetration/indoctrination.

Each contemporary class society has a system of collecting and processing statistical and other data about various material and non-material structures and processes, primarily in line with the hegemonic social ideology and according to the needs of the dominant class and the

agencies and organs (the state administration) which it controls. As the purpose of this system is to facilitate governance over the population, official statistics and "class" (stratification) categorisation are constructed in a way which ignores even some of the key causes and indicators of social inequality - especially the ownership over the means of production, distribution and exchange.

For this reason, the researchers of inequality who are reliant on official statistics frequently have to painstakingly find their way through official statistics in an attempt to reach deeper insights. The alternative (realistic) choice they have is to - with meagre resources - engage in direct empirical research of some very circumscribed social phenomena. One of the important aims of future research into structural violence should therefore be to develop a deeper and more comprehensive set of indicators and measurements of material and cultural aspects of structural violence and inequality.

The poverty-inducing government policies coincided with an increase in the use of rhetoric about "personal responsibility" and "individual fault" in the creation and reproduction of poverty (Jones, 2011). While individual choices play a significant role in the experience of poverty in some cases, these choices are not made from a position of equality. It is more important to understand the inequality-producing structural arrangements which make poverty possible in the first place (which is what the preceding chapters analysed and what I also explore in this chapter).

The policies eroding the rights of benefit claimants (see Clark and Dilnot, 2009[281]) were not likely to help improve the situation (especially in the context of the flexibilisation of employment[282] and the lack of job supply[283]) considering the importance of benefits as a social safety net. As I have pointed out in chapter 5, neoliberal change led to the abandonment of

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[281] Ginsburg, 1992 and 2001b also highlighted the cuts in eligibility for social security benefits as well as in their levels, in addition to providing a cross-country comparative analysis of social expenditure trends (see Ginsburg, 2001b).

[282] With regard to recent trends concerning the flexibilisation of employment see Burchell, 2001; Auer and Cazes, 2003; Mason et al., 2008a; Paugam and Zhou, 2009; O'Mahony, 2009; Brown and Marsden, 2011; Pennycook, 2013; Watt, 2013. The flexibilisation of employment is clearly an area which researchers of structural violence should give much attention to.

[283] "In late 2008, the government announced plans to push 3,5 million benefit claimants into jobs. At the same time they estimated that there were only around half a million vacancies" (Jones, 2011, 37).

welfare universalism and its replacement with a significantly less generous, more disciplinary benefit and welfare system. Furthermore, the ruling ideology emphasised that it is almost solely up to benefit claimants to ensure that this (increasingly inadequate) safety net serves as a springboard into a better, independent life rather than into a stupor of degraded dependency (Jones, 2011). It appears very likely that research investigating how the dominant discourse (largely despatched by the government and the elite-controlled mass media – ibid.) has deflected from government responsibility for these negative socio-economic developments would help to corroborate the contribution of this discourse to cultural and structural violence of penetration, segmentation and fragmentation[284]. These forms of violence which routinely inhere in the dominant capitalist discourse are to some extent rooted in the implantation of dominant capitalist ideology (especially regarding the supposedly meritocratic nature of personal life outcomes) and in the obscuring of inequality-perpetuating social processes, which help to fragment the subordinate classes on the basis of perceived merit.

The New Labour government did, however, institute various significant (yet insufficient) measures aimed at reducing or limiting the most drastic forms of poverty and exclusion[285]. These measures (which replaced older statutory forms of low pay protection, that had virtually all been abolished by the time New Labour came to power in 1997 - Mason et al., 2008a) included the introduction of a (low) National Minimum Wage (NMW) in 1999, and the extension of support for the working poor through Working Tax Credits and Child Tax Credits[286]. These contributed to some positive results in addressing adult and child poverty. The bottom third of workers (in terms of wage levels) was found to have experienced an above-median growth in wages following the introduction of the minimum wage (Butcher, 2005), although "the introduction of

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[284] An Ipsos Mori survey from 2013 also strongly indicated that the dominant section of the mass media are distorting public perceptions according to the "divide and rule" stratagem employed in the interests of the neoliberal order and of the dominant class which benefits from it:

"The public think that £24 of every £100 of benefits is fraudulently claimed. Official estimates are that just 70 pence in every £100 is fraudulent – so the public conception is out by a factor of 34. (…) 29 per cent of people think more is spent on Jobseekers' Allowance than pensions. In fact, we spend 15 times more on pensions" (Paige, 2013).

[285] This certainly did not apply to all social categories, such as the increasing numbers of prisoners and asylum seekers, whose generally worsening situation I briefly discussed in chapter 5.

[286] Child Tax Credits are a universal benefit supplemented in some cases with a contribution to childcare costs (Alcock, 2014). This was found to have significantly reduced child poverty levels in contrast to international trends (Waldfogel, 2010), yet the 2010 target for reducing child poverty was not achieved (Alcock, 2014).

the NMW has not succeeded in reducing the proportion of workers in the United Kingdom below the low pay threshold. (...) Many organizations have found ways of complying with minimum wage legislation that effectively reduce the terms and conditions of employment for many low-wage employees" (Mason et al., 2008b, 62). In-work benefits, as I have previously noted, also function as a form of effective subsidy of poverty wages (considering that they allow employers to rely on the state to ensure the simple reproduction of labour power). They are therefore exploitative and lead to negative externalities in the form of additional costs imposed on the taxpaying public. Besides, numerous other processes which took place under New Labour (including the rise in housing prices and often very restricted pensions and the fact that many do not have pensions, issues that have already been briefly mentioned), which contributed to the restriction of welfare provision and the violation of security and well-being needs, had a negative impact on the standard of living of broad layers of the subordinate classes. As already mentioned, there were also some ambiguous "improvements" (partly based on effectively subsidising companies that were paying low wages, as well as on subsidising landlords charging extortionate rents, through housing benefits and Working Tax Credits). The New Labour government concentrated on facilitating ways in which the underprivileged and the excluded would be able to better cope with (constantly rising) inequalities (Payne, 2006), i.e. to facilitate the sustainability of class inequalities instead of seeking to significantly (let alone radically) reduce these inequalities as the root-causes of social exclusion, health problems, etc.

Rather than being a *rara avis,* poverty in contemporary Britain is quite a mainstream phenomenon. It has (with its accompanying forms of structural violence, some of which I explore in this chapter) been increasing in recent decades. On the basis of independent scientific surveys of poverty since 1983, the 2013 Poverty and Social Exclusion report (a collaborative research project of six universities funded by the Economic and Social Research Council) established that "the number of people falling below the minimum standards of the day has doubled since 1983" in Britain (PSE, 2013, 2). The PSE (2014) report on poverty in Britain (also excluding Northern Ireland) found that "the percentage of households who fall below society's minimum standard" (i.e. lacking three or more necessities as defined by a survey of the general public – examples of these necessities will be mentioned presently) more than doubled between

1983 and 2012, from 14 to 33 per cent (see figure 3)[287]. The report also stated that the rise in the percentage of multiply deprived households over this 30-year period was especially significant as 1983 was a year of recession in which over three million people were unemployed, and considering that the size of the economy has doubled between 1983 and 2012.

Source: PSE (2014)

Figure 3: Percentage of British households lacking three or more necessities

In terms of income poverty, Glasmeier et al. (2008, 3) noted (on the basis of data from the UK Department of Work and Pensions and using the standard objective measure of relative

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[287] Neither this nor the other studies of poverty in Britain which I shall later mention analyse this phenomenon and how it affects different social groups from a Marxian class perspective. Still, it is clear that the experience of poverty is very predominantly associated with the lower class as a result of its socially and economically inferior position. However, as I shall presently demonstrate, rather than being solely the experience of the unemployed segment of the lower class (who are sometimes controversially classified as the "underclass"), poverty is also common among those in employment. Moreover, the prevalence of the experience of financial insecurity (which I shall note presently) indicates that many people in other classes also suffer from it.

poverty, i.e. households with less than 60 per cent of the median income) that "the number of people in the UK living in poor households (…) doubled between 1979 and 1997, from just over 7 million to over 14 million. The total then fell by 2 million over the subsequent seven years up to 2004-5, but then rose again to 13 million in 2005/6". The mean of 1984, 1994 and 2004 surveys of households' ability to cope with their income in Britain established that, on average, around a fifth of households (21 per cent) found it difficult or very difficult to "get by" on their income (ONS, 2006), which indicates that their need for material security was not adequately met. The pervasiveness of the violations of security needs is also starkly exemplified by the finding of the PSE (2013) survey that almost half of all adults in Britain (24 million people) suffered from financial insecurity due to being unable to pay unexpected costs of £500, to save at least £20 each month, to make regular payments into a pension fund and/or to afford household insurance.

Those in low-paid work are often at risk of becoming trapped in low-paid work. These kinds of jobs frequently offer few opportunities for the accumulation of skills and other forms of "human capital", thus likely restricting individual agential power (e.g. by reducing opportunities for self-actualising work) and helping to perpetuate educational deprivation. Additionally, those who have experienced low pay were found to be more at risk of becoming unemployed (Stewart, 1999), which tended to augment the violation of their security needs, especially considering that unemployed people are at a particularly high risk of poverty (Bailey, 2006). The poor are also more likely to be materially held back by health problems (see below), which further impede the satisfaction of security needs and often also individual agential power. It has been established that mental health is affected by the level and status of employment (Marmot et al., 2001). Debt and new forms of indentured labour, which have assumed an increasingly important role in the experience of poverty in Britain in recent decades, are also a major cause of stress and other mental health problems (Pantazis et al., 2006).

The perspective based on the official definition of poverty (which I have already mentioned) benefits from being expanded by two different measures of poverty. One is based on people's subjective assessment of whether an individual or a household are poor, while the other is based on whether people lack certain "necessities" which are commonly understood to be needed for inclusion in society (Dorling, 2011). At the turn of the millennium, around 5.6 per

cent of UK households appeared poor by all of these measures: by income, subjectively and by expenditure, while 16.3 per cent (a sixth of households) appeared poor on at least two of the measures (Bradshaw and Finch, 2003). Around 20 per cent of households subjectively described themselves as poor, 19 per cent were poor due to having low income (as it is generally understood) and 17 per cent through lack of access to necessities which are generally understood as such by people in the UK (ibid.). Apart from the already mentioned financial insecurity and various other forms of deprivation, "around 4 million children and adults are not properly fed by today's standards, (...) around 2.5 million children live in homes that are damp, (…) around 1.5 million children live in households that cannot afford to heat their home" (PSE, 2013, 2), etc. These data point to large-scale restrictions of welfare provision (in the aforementioned broad sense of the term "welfare") and violations of security and well-being needs.

In 1997 Britain had the worst child poverty rates in the European Union, yet by 2001 it was found to have been in the 10th position out of 15 member states (Hills and Stewart, 2005). After a decade of New Labour rule around half a million fewer children were found to have been in relative poverty (Dickens, 2011). The UNICEF child poverty report commended Britain for its concerted efforts to reduce the country's "exceptionally high child poverty rate" (UNICEF, 2005, 4). However, the pace of initial improvements later slowed down and stalled. In many respects, negative trends regarding social deprivation continued or even got worse. The proportion of children living in a household which could not afford an annual holiday away from home actually rose between 1999 and 2005 from 25 to 32 per cent, and the number of school age children "who had to share their bedroom with an adult or sibling over the age of 10 and of the opposite sex rose from 8% to 15% nationally. (…) The proportion of children who could not afford to pursue a hobby or other leisure activity also rose, from 5% to 7%, and the proportion who could not afford to go on a school trip at least once a term doubled, from 3% to 6%. For children aged below five, the proportion whose parents could not afford to take them to playgroup each week also doubled under the Blair government, from 3% to 6%" (Dorling, 2011, 117-118). Moreover, "among British adults during the Blair years the proportion unable to make regular savings rose from 25% to 27%; the number unable to afford an annual holiday away from home rose from 18% to 24%; and the national proportion who could not afford to insure the contents of their home climbed a percentage point, from 8% to 9% (ibid., 117)". These are just

some of the many examples of the violations of people's security and well-being needs.

Following the eruption of the economic crisis in 2008, wage freezes were imposed on many workers (Jones, 2011) [288]. This probably increased the exploitation of workers (by increasing the gap between workers' output and the wages they received) and was a negative externality of capitalist economic activity considering that it was not the working and middle class public that had caused the economic crisis. Wage freezes (in the context of rising living costs, including housing costs) also violated the security needs of the working and middle classes.

By 2012, with the additional influence of the economic crisis and the "austerity" policies of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government, researchers found that "more children lead impoverished and restricted lives today than in 1999" (Gordon et al., 2013, 2): for example, the percentage of children lacking new properly fitting shoes rose from 2 to 4 per cent, the percentage lacking access to a hobby or leisure activities rose from 3 to 6 per cent, and the percentage of children that did not have or could not afford a school trip at least once a term increased from 2 to 8 per cent (ibid.). By 2012, over half a million children (4 per cent) lived in families which could not afford to feed them three meals a day (ibid.). The aforementioned data indicate that the restriction of welfare provision (in the broader sense which I have indicated) of children intensified in that period. A disproportionate number of poor children came from minority ethnic households, jobless households, lone-parent households, low-income households, and households in the social rented sector (Lloyd, 2006). Poverty was found to have been greatest among households with dependent children and young adult parents (Pantazis and Ruspini, 2006).

Especially in the period of neoliberal ideological hegemony, poverty is accompanied by an "exclusion from the lives, the understanding and the caring of others" (Dorling, 2011, 91). This predicament also appears to strongly apply to children who live in poverty. The fact that "children as a group have tended to suffer higher rates of poverty in Britain than the population as a whole" (Platt, 2006, 300) is indicative of this. Child poverty and general deprivation in particular reduce not just their present standard of living, but also stunt various aspects of their later development, their life opportunities and outcomes (Duncan et al., 1994; Gregg et al., 1999;

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[288] For comparison, another Labour administration, that of the 1960s, was found to have presided over a 29 per cent rise in real income for the poorest 10 per cent (Jones, 2011).

Bradshaw, 2001; Ermish et al., 2001; see also the sections on education, housing and health care in chapter 5). The roots of material, social and intellectual deprivation and degradation can usually be traced back to childhoods that were deprived of the economic and social nutrients important or (in some cases) necessary for people to thrive. The psychological consequences of the education system which is to a large degree segregated on the basis of class, with the class-based inferiority and superiority complexes which it supports and induces, are particularly harmful to those on the bottom of the class hierarchy (as I have already noted in the section on education in chapter 5). These effects are likely to be further strengthened by the hazards of modern lower class youthhood, including rising student debt for those who manage to succeed in the school system and are therefore able to enter university, joblessness, marginal and precarious forms of paid and unpaid hyper-exploitative work (unpaid and poorly paid internships, work for benefits, part-time work, people working below their educational qualifications, etc.). There is a need for detailed studies examining whether and how various forms of structural violence inhere in these phenomena: whether and how all of them may lead to exploitation and affect the satisfaction of security and well-being needs, whether and how these types of internships and working situations may lead to the alienation of meaning and violation of dignity, whether and how they may restrict people's personal agential power, lead to their marginalisation and curtail the scope for democratic control in the economy.

Youths in Britain were highly likely to be in poverty or at risk of poverty at the turn of the century, more so than the older population, which was better included in anti-poverty measures such as the Minimum Wage legislation and Working Tax Credits (Fahmy, 2006). Young British adults are "often locked into work which is low-paid" (Pantazis et al., 2006, 465), in addition to the specific new hazardous positions into which they are placed with the rise in university tuition fees, student debt, as well as through the expansion of highly exploitative working practices (such as unpaid internships) which I have just mentioned. In 2000 20 per cent of young male UK citizens and 23 per cent of young female UK citizens were in relative poverty (i.e. they earned less than 60 per cent of the median income), while among all young EU15 citizens 14 per cent of males and 16 per cent of women were in poverty (CEC, 2003)[289].

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[289] The response of the elite-run media, of the political elite and of elite-driven forms of popular culture to these and other ageist patterns of disadvantage was even more ageist discrimination in the form of the propagation of the

The ameliorative New Labour efforts were, as I have already shown, from the beginning of New Labour rule combined with a battery of policies which facilitated the sharp increase in income and wealth inequality and in inequality of industrial bargaining power (see Smith and Morton, 2008; Coulter, 2014). This was accompanied with a use of "sanctions and a compulsion to pressure 'those who can work' to do so" (Bailey, 2006, 164), which curtailed the individual agential power of individuals belonging to the lower class[290]. The new insecure and marginal forms of work are often unable to provide protection against poverty, social exclusion and mental ill health (Adelman et al., 2000; Payne, 2006). In addition to leading to the violation of security and well-being needs, they also often lead to fragmentation[291] and to negative externalities (e.g. by increasing the burden on the NHS due to, often stress-related, mental and physical illnesses). Insecure and marginal work leads to class-based structural violence, including the violation of well-being needs, whose extent and character require further research.

Lack of sufficient earnings appears to be the most significant cause of poverty (Sutherland et al., 2003), and low pay has been particularly concentrated "among part-time, temporary, and female employees, among younger (age sixteen to twenty-five) and older (sixty or older) groups, and among employees holding low or no vocational qualifications. Over half of all low-paid workers are found in just three sectors (retail, health services and hotels) and in three relatively unskilled occupational groups: personal services, sales and operators (Mason et al., 2008b, 84). Low earnings are (in many and possibly most cases) largely a result of the high rate of exploitation of workers. More generally, one of the defining forms of class-based structural violence in capitalism is exploitation in the form of the capitalist appropriation of unpaid labour on the basis of an unequal property relationship in which members of the subordinate classes, who are excluded/expropriated from the ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, are effectively compelled to sell their labour power - for a wage lower than the total value of their actual work output - to the owners of the means of

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stereotype of "chavs" - hordes of "workshy", "feckless" youth solely or primarily responsible for their own predicament (see Jones, 2011).

[290] There seemed to be no comparable compulsion on the employers (both private and public) to ensure that sufficient and adequate work opportunities were provided.

[291]Doerflinger and Pulignano (2015, 2), for example, noted that "the division of workforces into a core, consisting of regular, high-skilled, and unionized workers with career opportunities, and a periphery, comprising workers who are easily disposable and usually nonunionized, leads to a fracturing of collectivism".

production, distribution and exchange, who are thus able to constrain individual and collective agential power of the workers and make profit by extracting surplus value from the workers (see Marx, 1967a). Although some segments of the working and especially middle classes have in recent decades been experiencing significant degrees of workplace autonomy, wage labourers have generally remained in a clearly subordinate position *vis-à-vis* the employers: they remain severely restricted in their ability to hold their employers democratically accountable, and they remain marginalised and excluded from democratic participation in company and workplace decision-making (for an overview see for example Jakopovich, 2014b). Undemocratic and hierarchical employers' control over employees has, since the inception of capitalism (despite some attenuating arrangements such as the German *Mitbestimmung* and other worker co-determination models in which workers can supervise and participate in decision-making, although not from a position of equality), remained a permanent and fundamental feature of the capitalist economy.

Low wages in the UK have been found to be a more important cause of poverty than unemployment (Lloyd, 2006). They frequently lead to a violation of well-being and security needs, restriction of individual agential power (since low incomes constrain choices available to individuals and families)[292] and, very probably, often also to a violation of workers' dignity and status[293]. Simultaneously with the rise of many living costs (prominently including the costs of housing), the proportion of poorly paid UK employees sharply rose as well since the late 1970s (Mason et al., 2008a), which undermined the satisfaction of their security needs. Some New Labour policies, including the promotion of higher levels of labour force participation, the support for outsourcing and the emphasis on in-work benefits (Mason et al., 2011), as well as the preservation of anti-union legislation introduced under the previous administration (Smith and Morton, 2008), probably contributed to the problem of low wages. In some cases, paid work also results in some forms of exclusion and marginalisation, for instance when it entails long or anti-social working hours (including hours devoted to housework), and/or by leading to the workers' exhaustion and the inability to actively participate in family and community life (Payne, 2006)

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[292] Researchers focusing on structural violence could explore in which concrete ways, to what degree and under which specific circumstances is individual agential power adversely affected by low pay.

[293] Of course, as in the case of other instances of structural violence which I have identified, additional elucidation regarding the existence and character of these potential and likely forms of structural violence is to be welcomed.

and to maintain various social relationships and friendships. Exclusion on these bases from some important spheres of social life is affecting (to different degrees) a large segment of the population (see for example Jakopovich, 2014b). Quantifying the prevalence and intensity of these experiences are important research questions which I cannot deal with here.

Ascertaining which political and labour movement strategies can challenge capitalist exploitation and exclusion of workers is of special importance, since democratic resistance to class-based structural violence is necessary to challenge and eradicate poverty. In fact, democratic labour struggles have managed to significantly improve workers' pay and conditions even in the context of socially and politically hegemonic neoliberalism[294], and various anti-poverty social movements and civil society organisations have indubitably weakened the immiseration trends.

Unemployment and Economic Inactivity

Unemployment may also impede a person's participation in social life (especially if it increases isolation, depending on a variety of factors including mental health and the availability of free or affordable venues for socialising)[295], in addition to frequently undermining the satisfaction of security needs. The increase in unemployment rates in the UK was more marked and more sustained than in competitor countries (just as deindustrialisation was faster and deeper than

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[294] There have been numerous recent examples of relatively successful campaigns to improve wages and conditions of even some extremely marginalised and disenfranchised categories of workers in the UK. In the last decade or so these have, for example, included the Justice for Cleaners campaign, the broader London Living Wage campaigns, as well as the relatively successful IWW drive to organise and empower (very predominantly immigrant) cleaners working in the City of London and for the leading UK retailing company John Lewis (Kirkpatrick, 2014). Challenging the narrative about the inevitable powerlessness of marginalised categories of workers in a neoliberal regime, in the latter case a "scrappy little DIY union organized hundreds of workers into campaigns, saved jobs, and won wage rises while protecting terms and conditions" (ibid., 246).

[295] The various miseries inflicted on over-worked and under-worked members of the population are major harmful consequences of the capitalist system's exploitative and anti-democratic focus on maximising profits and on producing a dependent and servile population through this inflation of labour supply (based on a combination of long working days for those in employment and the maintenance of a pool of unemployed workers). Without the capitalist extraction of surplus labour and the pursuit of narrowly-conceived efficiencies (including through a very high level of selectivity in recruitment, the maintenance of a reserve army of labour and a general refusal to provide well-remunerated part-time employment), work could be shared much better among the population, freeing time for various self-actualising activities and for more significant democratic participation in public affairs. The current arrangement violates people's security and well-being needs and restricts democratic participation.

elsewhere), partly as a result of rising inflation (O'Mahony, 2009). According to the OECD, unemployment increased from around 5 per cent in 1979 to almost 10 per cent in 1982, primarily due to a diminution of aggregate demand and business expectations brought about by rising inflation and rising oil prices, industrial unrest and the fall in the rate of profit (Glyn, 2007). Between 1980-7, unemployment increased far above the OECD average, rising to 12.4 per cent in 1983, which was "the highest level ever recorded by OECD amongst the top seven industrial states" (Ginsburg, 1992, 154). The official unemployment rate fell in the mid-1980s, rose during the recession in the early 1990s (ibid.), but began to decline in the mid- to late 1990s (to rates only slightly higher than in the 1970s), so that by the end of the century unemployment rates were significantly lower than in Germany and France (O'Mahony, 2009). The official unemployment rate stood at 5 per cent by 2005 (Giddens, 2009). This decline in unemployment rates during the 1990s was a result of a variety of factors, including a reduction in trade union power, more "flexible" labour markets and alterations to the benefit administration system (Nickell and van Ours, 2000; Riley and Young, 2001). The fall of unemployment was accompanied by a simultaneous increase in inactivity (non-employment) rates among men. Most of these unemployed men were transferred from the status of unemployment benefit recipients onto disabled or long-term ill lists (Nickell and van Ours, 2000). A strong positive correlation between the number of people on sickness benefits and local unemployment rates was observed (Webster, 2000), "and the areas with the lowest activity rates for men were those where deindustrialization, leading to factory closures and major job loss in local areas, was most severe. Much inactivity therefore flowed from employment decline. In this sense the unemployment rate (for men especially) far underestimated the true extent of joblessness and its increase in the 1980s" (Glyn, 2007, 108). Research (Gregg, 2001; Gregg and Tominey, 2005) has found that, as a result of this economic restructuring, many of the young workers who were made jobless during the 1980s recession experienced substantially longer jobless periods, significantly lower wages, and poorer health right up to and including the beginning of the 21st century. Some authors (e.g. Gregg, 2001) suggest this long-term unemployment and inactivity are a result of psychological scarring which is most common among young people and is itself "due to the long exposure to unemployment itself and the rest due to other factors like poor education, family background or residence in a depressed neighbourhood. For these groups there is a failure to

connect to stable employment and jobs offering experience and training that can lead to higher wages" (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2011, 30). Unemployment is associated with significantly higher levels of poverty and lower levels of support, particularly emotional support (Bailey, 2006). Further research is required to investigate the precise character of the interactions between exclusion from the labour market and other forms of marginalisation, fragmentation and reduction of individual agential power of persons belonging to the lower class.

Already in 2003, before all the government cuts in unemployment benefits and social services implemented following the recent economic recession, the UK unemployed were more likely to be in poverty than elsewhere in Europe, and the gap between the employed and the unemployed was wider in Britain than in any of the other European countries that were studied by Gallie et al. (2003). Gallie (2009, 31) noted: "Britain is the most extreme case of low living standards for the unemployed, with over half the unemployed (54%) at risk of poverty. This is wholly consistent with its very low-level, primarily means-tested, benefits system". The popular stereotype of the unemployed as prosperous "benefit scroungers" was further undermined at the end of New Labour rule by the claim (made by the Citizens Advice Bureau) that around £6.2 billion of tax credits went unpaid every year, "with up to £10.5 billion of means-tested benefits in total unclaimed. (...) This 'benefit evasion' dwarfs the amount lost through benefit fraud - a fact that is completely absent in the debate around cracking down on so-called welfare scroungers" (Jones, 2011, 204). It was estimated that benefit fraud amounted to only 0.8 per cent or £1,2bn of the total benefit expenditure (The Observer, 2013). In contrast to the propaganda about "shirkers", the government's own statistics stated that nearly six out of every ten households experiencing poverty had at least one person in work (Department of Work and Pensions, 2007). Benefits are a mainstream aspect of UK life: "20.3 million families received some kind of benefit (64% of all families)" in 2013 (The Observer, 2013). Furthermore, propaganda by the dominant segment of the media and by other right-wing actors about the benefit system's supposed encouragement of a culture of worklessness and welfare dependency appears to be greatly exaggerated. Research by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation indicated that only about 15,000 households in the UK (under 1 per cent of workless households) "might have two generations who have never worked" (The Observer, 2013). Long-term worklessness is primarily related to long-term ill health and multiple disadvantages in the process of job seeking.

Besides, benefits were neither solely restricted to jobless benefit claimants, nor were they rising primarily due to benefit fraud. Housing benefit in particular, as the fastest growing benefit (The Observer, 2013), has actually been the result of a government decision to support landlords rather than to control rent levels. The largely mythological character of the dominant narrative about welfare dependency is also revealed by the fact that "the number of out-of-work benefits (unemployment benefit, incapacity benefits, and lone parents) peaked in the early 1990s and is now fully a million below that level" (ibid.). I have already shown (in the section on the welfare state in chapter 4) that, by North and West European standards, the UK had quite low growth rates of social expenditure and relatively low (and declining) spending on state transfers and services. According to some European studies, sanctions against jobless benefit claimants appear to have the effect of forcing them into poorly paid jobs, which might force them back onto benefits (ibid.)[296].

It is important to note that unemployment and the threat of unemployment constitute some of the fundamental forms of structural violence, also including the restriction of personal agency of the propertyless members of the subordinate classes who do not have alternative means to ensure their livelihood and are therefore compelled to either sell their labour power for a wage to the capitalists who own the means of production, or to barely subsist on meagre state benefits or some other support which they manage to obtain (e.g. through begging).

Intersecting Dimensions of Poverty and Social Exclusion

While I do not closely examine gender, ethno-racial and other aspects of class inequality in this thesis, it is important to note these are highly significant variables in relation to issues of poverty and exclusion. "Race"/ethnicity especially tends to correlate with an individual's class

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[296] Apart from wasting human potential, the economic system also degrades some people who hold important, yet difficult and unpopular, jobs (e.g. nurses). The New Economics Foundation's (NEF's) 2009 comparison of the social value and wage levels associated with different occupations established that hospital cleaners are mostly on the minimum wage, even though the NEF calculated that these workers generated over £10 in social value for every £1 they were paid by maintaining hygiene standards and contributing to wider health outcomes (New Economics Foundation, 2009 in Jones, 2011). Some in far less socially useful occupations, even those in socially destructive and parasitic occupations (e.g. financial speculators), earned far more: "When the think-tank applied the same model to City bankers - taking into account the damaging effects of the City's financial activities - they estimated that for every £1 they were paid, £7 of social value was destroyed" (Jones, 2011, 159).

position[297.]. The ethnic penalty in the labour market is shared by all ethnic minorities (Roberts, 2011)[298]. Ethno-racist and xeno-racist oppression pushes certain social categories, such as asylum seekers (who are not allowed to get a job and are forced to subsist on extremely meagre state allowances), into almost inescapable poverty[299].

Patterns of poverty in Britain have also been gendered, so that women have been found to be in poverty more often than men[300]. Single mothers are particularly at risk of poverty (Levitas, Head and Finch, 2006), a fact which has acquired greater social significance in recent decades, as

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[297] Being non-white, Afro-Caribbean and Pakistani or Bangladeshi in particular tends to be accompanied with a lower-class position (Platt, 2006; Jones, 2011). This is particularly true of British-born ethnic minorities (Dustmann et al., 2011). Pakistanis and especially Bangladeshis were found to have particularly high levels of poverty defined as having less than 60 per cent of the median income: over 70 per cent of children from Pakistani and Bangladeshi families were in poverty at the turn of the century (Platt, 2006; also see Berthoud, 1997). Among the non-white ethnic minorities, only the incomes of Chinese households were close to the income of whites (Berthoud, ibid.). I have already outlined the basic racist mechanism by which downward wage competition takes place. Further research would help to elucidate the specific role which ethno-racist, xeno-racist and culturally racist oppression of people from these minority ethnic (and predominantly Muslim) backgrounds has in the reproduction of class oppression. Considering the general positive relationship between greater material resources and the potential for greater political efficacy and access to various sources of social power, it is clear that the relative lack of material resources which these ethnic minorities experience also limits their ability to effectively participate in social life and to democratically control social processes. This, in turn, helps to lock them into poverty and social exclusion. Further research should explore the relationship between the poverty and relative lack of democratic agential power among various ethnic minorities in Britain.

[298] In comparison to "indigenous" workers with equal qualifications, skill levels and language competence, people belonging to ethnic minorities have lower career achievements and (except in the case of Indians and the Chinese) higher unemployment (Roberts, 2011; Mason, 2006). As Roberts (ibid.) also remarks, it would be difficult to find a plausible explanation for this other than (ethno-racist and xeno-racist) discrimination. Xeno-racist structuring of inequalities extends to EU migrant workers. Eastern European workers from post-2004 EU member states were found to suffer from under-employment relative to their qualifications and skills, in jobs with longer work hours and lower wages than comparable "indigenous" workers (Anderson et al., 2006). This ethnic and racist fragmentation of the subordinate classes impedes their united resistance to capital and it (as I have already discussed in chapter 1) in some cases stimulates the "race to the bottom" in relation to wages and conditions. This socio-political disunity drastically reduces the democratic agential power of people from various ethnic groups and of the broad population as a whole, entrenching the systemic restrictions of democratic accountability and democratic participation.

[299] This heartless treatment of asylum seekers results in "untold misery: children unable to go to school because the parents don't have the bus fare; old people left without warm clothing for the winter because they live on half of what a UK pensioner has; disabled people who do not enjoy the same benefits as disabled citizens and cannot afford the specialist items they need; mothers of newborn children who have no cash to purchase the essential baby equipment that other parents take for granted" (Fekete, 2001, 35).

[300] At the beginning of the twenty-first century 30 per cent of women were in poverty compared with 24 per cent of men, which appears to be partly related to the fact that they are more often in households with children and that they tend to have lower earnings, partly at least due to being more likely to work part-time (Bailey, 2006), and in some cases also due to anti-egalitarian gender conditioning and ideology (German, 1998). At the end of New Labour rule, over two-thirds of women were in part-time employment, which government officials define as working under 30 hours a week (Roberts, 2011). Working mothers' frequently part-time, flexible and/or lower-income employment patterns are in some cases a consequence of finding it easier to reconcile those types of employment with their domestic roles and responsibilities (German, 1998; Roberts, 2011). These types of factors, including "the fact that many women take time off to have children, (…) badly [affect] their promotion chances" (German, 1998, 101).

the number of single-parent families increased (from 18 to 26 per cent between 1991 and 1998 - Marsh and Perry, 2003)[301]. Despite significant improvements, the gender pay gap continued to persist, so that at the end of New Labour's rule the median hourly wage for women was 21 per cent less than for men, and the median weekly earnings for those working full time were 22 per cent less than for men (Hills et al., 2010).

These and other sexist and racist ideological and behavioural patterns can be effectively challenged through the development of more caring and solidaristic relationships between diverse segments of the population. Grassroots, inclusive and solidaristic labour and community struggles against capitalist exploitation can be particularly suited to building broad social solidarity and non-oppressive mindsets, social ideologies and practices since positive interaction and the deepening of communication diminish negative bias[302], and the commonality of suffering and common interests can best be revealed through the praxis of united resistance. Cohen (2006, 216 and 215) remarked that workplace unionism and the labour movement "more than any other social institution (…) brings together otherwise disparate and conflicting groups" and that "workers who have to act together to organise successfully will be led to prioritise mutual goals over workplace divisions". United resistance can "unite workers across 'identity' lines and promote an awareness of how division over these issues strike at the heart of effective organisation". It is through the praxis of united resistance that the oppressed can often best learn that unity is strength. The neoliberal atomisation of large segments of the population, including the destruction of cohesive working-class identities and convincing progressive alternatives, facilitated the development of racist and otherwise chauvinistic attitudes. Generalised anti-oppressive practice also requires (but, of course, cannot be reduced to) the development of

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[301] The popular media characterisations of poverty and benefit-claiming as a consequence of large families were usefully contextualised by Jones (2011, 11), who noted in 2011 that "just 3.4 per cent of families in long-term receipt of benefits have four children or more".

[302] Research on the social psychology of prejudice (e.g. Oskamp, 2000; Brown et al., 2007) has found that affective distance (lack of sympathy) and interactive social distance (infrequent interactions and interactions of low intensity) are among the major causes of prejudice and bigotry. Confirming the positive effects of cooperative interaction between diverse groups of people, Estlund (2004, 100) found in her research on the social psychology of US workplace relations that ' "co-operative interdependence among gay and straight co-workers tends to reduce prejudice, defy stereotypes, and cultivate affinity and acceptance". Similarly, striking British miners developed a greater acceptance of LGBT sexuality as a result of the support they received from gay and lesbian organisations (Cohen, 2006). The ability of groups of people belonging to the subordinate classes to concentrate forces and pool resources in unified social struggles tends to increase their democratic agential power, on which their ability to advance democratic accountability and participation depends.

working-class organisation and class consciousness[303].

Those on the lower levels of the class hierarchy are particularly exposed to numerous forms of harm. Adult individuals of low social and economic status have been found to be at a significantly higher risk of physical and mental ill health (Payne, 1997; Pantazis and Gordon, 1997a; Shaw et al., 1999; Payne, 2006; Pantazis, 2006), suicide (Drever and Bunting, 1997; Lewis and Sloggett, 1998), fire accidents (ODPM, 2003b)[304], and injury or death while on the road (Roberts and Power, 1996; Pantazis, 2006), for example. As Pantazis (2006, 261) observed: "Social harm (...) increases disproportionately for people in poverty and experiencing different aspects of social exclusion". The association between poverty and mortality and morbidity in Britain is well established (Drever and Whitehead, 1997; Davey Smith et al., 2001; see also the section on health care in chapter 5).

The largest causes of movement into poverty for men recently in Britain were the movement from full-time to part-time or marginal forms of employment, as well as unemployment and illness (Ruspini, 1998, in Pantazis and Ruspini, 2006). People with physical and mental disabilities have been at a high risk of poverty, partly due to meagre benefits given to them by a welfare state in decline (Pantazis et al., 2006). Additionally, "family breakdown may also leave single men highly vulnerable, particularly where they have limited networks of social support" (Pantazis and Ruspini, 2006, 378; Baden, 1999)[305].

Poverty, unemployment and the associated impediments to the satisfaction of security

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[303] Working-class collective identity, class consciousness and working-class organisation provide a barrier to the success of the far right among the working-class population. This is supported by historical evidence which shows that working-class fascists mainly came from non-unionised sections of the labour market (Linehan, 2005). Paxton, 2005, 50) noted that "the relative scarcity of working-class fascists was not due to some proletarian immunity to appeals of nationalism and ethnic cleansing. It is better explained by "immunization" and "confessionalism": those already deeply engaged, from generation to generation, in the rich subculture of socialism, with its clubs, newspapers, unions, and rallies, were simply not available for another loyalty".

[304] Children in the social class V, the lowest official category, are also much more likely to die or suffer injuries in a fire (Pantazis, 2006). The Grenfell Tower fire in 2017 also disproportionately affected children and adults belonging to the lower class, highlighting their reduced ability to hold higher-level and local authorities to account.

[305] There is some evidence that unemployed men are less likely to be able to form or remain in a relationship. In a longitudinal study, Lampard (1994) discovered that, for a man, a move into unemployment was associated with a 70 per cent increase in the probability of his relationship breaking down within a year. This is one important indication that men's gender role as the "main breadwinner" undermines their own security and well-being needs as well. Unemployed women appear to have significantly greater levels of social support than unemployed men (Russell, 1999; Bailey, 2006), which would help to explain why 88 per cent of rough sleepers in England in 2013 were men (Crisis, 2013).

needs often also accompany (and are often, in generational cycles, accompanied by) educational deprivation, at least in the sense of a lack of formal educational qualifications[306]. Those with none of the school qualifications (A levels, O levels, etc.) were found to have an employment rate of just 52 per cent (Bailey, 2006). An additional form of social deprivation and precariousness particularly associated with poverty and unemployment is the risk of financial exclusion and of indebtedness (Kempson and Whyley, 1999; Kempson, 2002), which reinforce social marginalisation and undermine the satisfaction of security needs.

Being in poverty and debt tends to be correlated with mental health problems, especially as a cause of poor mental health (Gunnell et al., 1995; Weich and Lewis, 1998; ONS, 2000; McKay and Collard, 2006). Similarly, studies using longitudinal data suggested that unemployment usually predates depression rather than *vice versa* (Wilson and Walker, 1993; Dooley et al, 1994; Montgomery et al, 1999; Payne, 2006). The material and social sense of control over one's life appears to be the underlying "mediating factor between the experience of poverty or exclusion and the experience of mental ill health" (Payne, 2006, 306). A survey of 8500 UK individuals found that 38 per cent of those with moderate depression were in arrears, while 45 per cent had borrowed money from family, friends, moneylenders or pawnbrokers (ONS, 2000). Poverty contributes to the vulnerability of the poor and the financially insecure to debt-related exploitation, as they sometimes feel pressured into using high-interest (even usurious) sources of credit, such as moneylenders and pawnbrokers, some of whom are unlicensed and "may use intimidating and sometimes aggressive behaviour to recover the money they are owed" (McKay and Collard, 2006, 202).

The satisfaction of the security needs of the poor and the unemployed may also be impeded due to a degree of territorial/housing segregation, including some relatively decrepit (current or former) council estates with a disproportionate ratio of the economically inactive, the working poor, benefit claimants, etc. Some of these are the present-day "rookeries" (i.e. "slum" criminal quarters) of London (Hirschfield and Bowers, 1996 in Pantazis, 2006). It is well-established that poverty begets (lower-class forms of) criminality (and *vice versa*, on the whole). Inhabitants of poorer areas (including social housing tenants) are exposed to a greater risk of crime (Dodd et al., 2004 in Pantazis, 2006; Pantazis, 2006) – yet another factor which violates

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[306] Of course, there are also many highly educated people who are exposed to poverty and economic insecurity.

their security and well-being needs. Youth belonging to the lower class are also the likeliest victims of crime (Pantazis, 2006) and of anti-social behaviour more generally (SEU, 2000)[307]. People in deprived areas experience a greater fear of crime than others in society (Pantazis and Gordon, 1997b; Pantazis, 2006). In complex ways which require further investigation, poverty "places enormous stress on people's social relationships, especially with children, parents or partners, as well as others such as neighbours and work colleagues" (Pantazis et al., 2006, 463). The poor are, evidently, more likely to engage in violent street unrest as well. All the main London riots in recent decades occurred in deprived areas of London such as Brixton and Tottenham. Riots are an indication of powerlessness and frustration: the inhabitants of Mayfair and Belgravia see no need to engage in this type of destructive behaviour.

Furthermore, poor areas are also relatively deprived of most local public services (such as libraries, public sports facilities, museums and galleries, adult evening classes, childcare, play facilities, home help, etc. – Fisher and Bramley, 2006), many of which are led by demand which is financially registered on the market (rather than just being led by actual need). This contributes to a restriction of welfare provision (under the broad definition of welfare which includes the provision of various public services) and to educational deprivation. Fisher and Bramley (ibid.) established that this trend of declining local services in poor areas intensified during the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the section on housing in chapter 5 I have already noted the erosion of social housing, along with other negative trends in housing availability and affordability, which further limit welfare provision and impede the satisfaction of security needs. The restrictions on the provision of social services and on social benefits weakened the social safety net and contributed to the existence of high levels of poverty and inequality (see chapter 5), contributing to the regressive redistribution of wealth and the violation of the security needs of the subordinate classes. As I have already discussed in chapter 5, the restriction of pension provision for many pensioners significantly contributed to poverty levels among pensioners.

Various forms of deprivation and structural violence (including marginalisation, the

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[307] This is not to say that the legal definition of what constitutes anti-social behaviour is faultless. The official definition of anti-social behaviour sometimes includes, for example, young people congregating on street corners in deprived neighbourhoods. There are few designated spaces for sociability and leisure on many of these estates. Children and youth in poor areas have less access to youth facilities for socialising (Fisher and Bramley, 2006).

restriction of welfare provision, restriction of individual agential power and the violation of security needs) tend to reinforce each other. People with physical and mental disabilities (Pantazis et al., 2006), as well as other vulnerable categories such as asylum seekers and people with criminal convictions (Pantazis and Gordon, 1997b; they are themselves far more likely to have mental health problems - Duggan, 2009) are also more likely to suffer from poverty (i.e. restriction of welfare provision in the broader sense, as well as violations of security and well-being needs), educational deprivation, social exclusion (i.e. marginalisation), stigma and discrimination which violate their human rights and dignity. These may reduce their individual and collective agential power and hence solidify the vicious cycle of marginalisation, lack of education, violation of security needs, restriction of welfare provision and of welfare. Additionally, many pensioners, especially single pensioners, are at a high risk of various forms of material and social deprivation, including social isolation (Patsios, 2006), i.e. marginalisation, which can contribute to the violation of well-being needs and the restriction of individual agency (due to the likely negative effects of marginalisation on levels of social support, and possibly also on levels of financial support). An important set of research questions which require further analysis concerns the various ways in which poverty and social exclusion of various segments of the population depend on, reproduce and strengthen various forms of structural violence.

This structurally violent economy based on vastly unequal and self-centred class relationships produces and perpetuates numerous social ills. It is perhaps not surprising that the more egalitarian advanced societies were and still are superior to more unequal countries in terms of all of the key parameters of social development. Egalitarian societies are better than more unequal societies in minimising and avoiding the violations of health and survival needs, the restrictions of individual and collective democratic agential power, educational deprivation, social distrust and social violence. Comprehensive research reveals that "Anglo-Saxon" "liberal" market economies strongly "lead" (especially in relation to the more egalitarian Nordic countries, Japan, Central Europe etc.) in terms of the prevalence of health problems among the lower class in their countries, in terms of the prevalence of premature deaths among working class men, the length of working time, the level of child mortality, the level of child illiteracy, the level of violence among children, the prevalence of mental illnesses and disorders, the prevalence of drug addiction, the level of distrust among people, the number of prisoners, the severity of judicial

punishment for equivalent offences, the number of murders, etc. (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). Countries which experience greater inequality (such as the US and the UK) have a lower level of overall child well-being according to UNICEF's index, less equality of opportunities in life, a lower level of innovation (i.e. fewer patents *per capita*) and so on (ibid., 2010).

Many of the social problems that are highlighted by neoliberal political forces for the purposes of propaganda are actually to a large extent a product of over three decades of neoliberal policies[308]. Wilkinson's and Pickett's (ibid.) research (which was based on the statistics of mainstream institutions such as the UN, WHO, OECD and the World Bank) demonstrated that the level of income and wealth inequality is, with exceptional consistency, the key gradient or indicator of these varied social phenomena. The enormous structural violence which inequality produces is, however, usually not included in the mainstream economic calculus. All the associated health costs, all the additional cages produced to contain other human beings, all the resources lost on maintaining additional police forces, legal procedures and employees, all the mental illnesses which inequality is correlated with and which it (as this thesis has shown) produces - all of this is cavalierly abstracted. Concrete human suffering has long been marginalised or effectively evicted from neoliberal "cost-benefit" analyses. The potential for civilised and humane social life is impeded as a result of this destructive and structurally violent political economy.

Concluding Thoughts

As the available data which I have presented show, the level of income inequality appears to have grown especially quickly under Thatcher's rule, and rose to a lesser extent under Major's and New Labour administrations. Additionally, the aforementioned data indicate that while levels of relative income poverty rose very sharply under Conservative administrations, they were more

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[308] Teenage pregnancies appear to be one example of this. They are likely to be associated with lower levels of child well-being (in generational cycles). They potentially restrict the individual agential power of young mothers (considering the many obligations and stresses associated with child-rearing) and may lead to their educational deprivation, in addition to various other social costs. Teenage pregnancies are likely to be a significant contributing factor to the perpetuation of poverty, and are themselves largely associated with poor backgrounds and poor living conditions: "Young mothers do not become pregnant because the social security benefits are so wonderful. Teenage pregnancies are highest in those affluent countries where benefit rates are lowest, where inequalities are greatest, where there is less money 'to be made' from having a baby. (...) Teenage pregnancy rates are lowest in the most equal of rich nations, such as Japan, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark (...)" (Dorling, 2011, 152-153).

stable under New Labour administrations. Some of their social welfare policies, including the newly introduced tax credits and the National Minimum Wage, contributed to the containment of poverty levels. These were relatively mild ameliorative interventions, which did not challenge the underlying systemic causes of poverty and income inequality.

Income inequality and poverty are a consequence of unequal class and wider social power. While there are numerous intervening variables which create and support the inequalities in social and class power, the distribution of economic wealth is crucially determined by capitalist property relations which are rooted in anti-democratic authority relations that enable the private capitalist and state elites to expropriate the surplus value created by the employees. This private appropriation of socially produced wealth is dependent on severe restrictions of democratic accountability and democratic participation in the economy and in public life more generally. A cooperative system of democratic self-government would support a far more egalitarian distribution of resources, both through the egalitarian distribution of surplus value created in the worker-controlled economy and through a democratically accountable, participatory democratic and solidaristic system of collective insurance and social assistance according to people's need.

CONCLUSIONS

My broad exploratory application of a nascent theoretical and methodological framework, which has not been properly tested in previous research, helped to explore and develop the general applicability and veracity of this analytical framework[309]. The breadth of this research perspective helped to test and refine the neo-Galtungian and neo-Marxian theoretical and typological approach to class-based structural violence.

The operationalisation of my typology of structural violence served to verify and elucidate on the hypothesis about the existence of extensive and systemic class-based structural violence across several of the key social structures, and it illuminated some of the main causal mechanisms on which this violence is based.

Another advantage of subjecting Galtung's typology to a broad, extensive test across several social structures, sets of social relationships and policy complexes was that it allowed to detect its limitations and to identify the improvements (including through my particular modified application of Amartya Sen's categories of instrumental freedoms) which advance the comprehensiveness and the precision of the analytical apparatus applied in this thesis in relation to the investigation into the character of structural violence.

This work provided accounts of structural change in relation to the analysed policy complexes and social processes, showing how class-based structural violence has changed in the context of the consolidation of "liberal" market capitalism in Britain (between 1979 and 2010), as well as how these structural dynamics of class-based violence contributed to the consolidation of this form of capitalism.

Thus my analysis has elucidated how both the capitalist market and the structures of the elite-driven state in the analysed period operated according to an exclusionary logic in relation to political and economic decision-making and the sharing of resources. This exclusionary political and economic logic has been centrally based on unequal power relationships between the dominant and the subordinate classes. These disparities of class power largely rest on the severe

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[309] The chapters on my theoretical perspective and on my methodology already noted some of the main conclusions I reached concerning the analytical approach I have taken, which is why only a few of my main points in relation to this will be noted here.

restrictions of democratic accountability as well as of democratic participation in the institutions of political and economic governance, and on neoliberal capitalist patterns of dispossession, mainly through privatisation and work- and rent-based exploitation (including in the processes of financialisation). There is consequently a lack of equal concern for all people on account of their unequal class positions.

As the discussion of the British neoliberal state's radical privatisation agenda has shown (especially in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7), the state elite has in recent decades facilitated increasingly more wide-ranging and intense forms of capitalist exploitation. Aligned with large capital, the state elite privatised large swathes of the economy and even of some public services. I have indicated how these developments sustain and strengthen the restriction of democratic accountability and of democratic participation, which are among the key mechanisms through which other forms of structural violence are supported and made possible. Some of these forms of structural violence (including some forms of restriction of welfare provision and violations of human rights and civil liberties, for example) in turn reinforce the restriction of democratic accountability and democratic participation.

The thesis has shown that the system of political rule in Britain, including the character of the British state, ensures that the economically dominant class dominates politically as well, thus reinforcing its wider social domination over the subordinate classes. The oligarchic organisation of the British state excludes the broad population and large segments of civil society from active and effective (let alone egalitarian) participation in public affairs, to a significant extent reducing them to the position of being objects of centralised political rule. Elite political and economic initiative, largely starting with Thatcher's premiership, resulted in a radical shift in the balance of class forces and the decline of economic and political resistance by the subordinate classes. A result and a reflection of these processes has been the diminution of the class-adjudicating role of the state, to a large extent as a result of the very close alignment of state elites with large capital in the neoliberal period. This facilitated the organisation of the state as an instrument and mode of class domination. My analysis has indicated that, rather than just being a passive receptor of (domestic, international and transnational) economic influences which it had no choice but to accept, the state has partly been the orchestrator of structurally violent neoliberal economic and social restructuring, of political, economic and social exploitation and of capitalist class

domination.

This thesis has also shown that the main UK government structures have routinely supported highly centralised and arbitrary forms of rule, partly undermining the democratic principle of the separation of powers and of a system of strong democratic checks and balances. The (routinely non-transparent) strong rule of the state elite and the partitocratic domination over the Parliament, as well as the restricted judiciary, limited the scope for democratic accountability and control. The non-proportional, decidedly anti-pluralist electoral system, and the increasingly anti-pluralist, tightly controlled, bureaucratic centralist party machines tended to further entrench the power of incumbent party-political elites and to marginalise the broad public from the spheres of effective influence over public affairs. This elitist and to a large extent partitocratic model of government (based on the reproduction and partial fusion of existing party and state elites) facilitated the programmatic and policy convergence of the main parties in relation to the examined policy complexes, which tended to marginalise and exclude dissenters and representatives of the interests of the subordinate classes, largely preventing the effective channelling of popular dissatisfaction through the established party-political institutional setting. The multi-party system in recent decades therefore largely functioned in a highly convergent manner, since leading parties all agreed to protect the basic neoliberal (highly structurally violent) *status quo*, including the power of (to a large extent oligopolistic) financial capitalist elites. More fundamentally, the capitalist state and the parliamentary system of "representative" multi-party "democracy" constitute a form of class rule based on the monopolisation of political and social decision-making and control by clusters of alienated power.

Furthermore, the dominant class (which includes the political and state elites) has also tended to occupy a dominant position in many key segments of the wider political infrastructure, such as the processes of political campaigning, as well as in the mass media, therefore tending to exclude anti-systemic political actors, marginalising members of the subordinate classes and further reducing the scope for democratic control over the key political processes.

The privatisations, deregulation measures, Private Finance Initiatives and outsourcing of public services to the private sector (initiated under successive Thatcher, Conservative post-Thatcher and New Labour administrations) facilitated the exploitative capitalist appropriation of socially produced wealth, the expansion of the reach of the capitalist market, the

commodification of various social relationships and hence the increase in capitalist wealth and the extension of capitalist power and control.

An aspect and corollary of this political and economic disenfranchisement of the subordinate classes under neoliberal rule has been the gradual erosion of the welfare state. This erosion of social services and protections has, among other aspects, entailed the degradation of healthcare, educational and housing provision. The broad population belonging to the subordinate classes (and especially the lower class) was thus severely harmed through sharp restrictions of welfare provision and of individual agential power, along with other forms of structural violence including violations of security and well-being needs.

The privatisation and commodification of the housing sector, and the decline of council housing in particular, severely limited the access by subaltern classes to the right to own, or rent on an affordable and long-term basis, an adequate home - or any home at all. Instead, the private housing market has become a major source of speculative, unproductive and economically hazardous profit-making, contributing to the violation of the broad population's security needs along with the restriction of welfare provision (among various other forms of structural violence which my analysis identified).

The commodified system of educational provision (introduced prior to 1979 but increasingly characterised by the involvement of private business and the use of business practices and outlooks even in non-private sectors of the education system) and greatly disparate state and private education sectors embedded and perpetuated radical inequalities in educational qualifications, social mobility and cultural, social and other forms of capital, reproducing existing class relations which perpetuate class patterns of privilege and disadvantage, marginalisation and educational deprivation. The commodification of the education system, along with its instrumentalisation as the ideological and otherwise reproductive apparatus of the *status quo* rather than a progressive, creative enterprise, also restricted the development of educational opportunities and critical faculties required for active, participatory democratic citizenship.

This marketisation of various fundamental aspects of life is to a significant extent associated with the rise of rentier (and now routinely financialised) forms of capital. The systematic and radical deregulation of the financial markets and the financial industry under

successive Conservative and New Labour governments removed the obstacles to the further growth of finance capital and its ascent to the summit, or centre, of economic life. Deregulation also transformed the character of the financial sector. The rise of "shadow banking" in particular greatly strengthened the role of financial speculation. The political support for financial elites also enabled the further concentration of capital and the maintenance of a banking oligopoly. This, along with the rise in the prominence of various financial institutions and financial markets (especially in derivatives), as well as the development of "light-touch" financial regulation and the spread in the use of new speculative activities and new financial "products" and instruments, contributed to the restriction of prospects for democratic control and accountability.

My analysis has shown that the economic crisis was essentially the consequence of increasing economic and political class inequality. The political class inequality fuelled the processes of financial deregulation (including the granting of independence to the Bank of England, the abolition of controls on capital flows, unregulated development of new financial instruments etc.), as well as supporting and inducing the growth of social, economic, income and wealth inequality more generally. This income and wealth inequality, including the consequences of neoliberal economic dislocations and the repression of workers' wages, have been a strong contributor to the lack of effective demand in the economy. The politically and economically acceptable neoliberal solution to the lack of effective demand and to the structural capitalist drive for competitive accumulation has been the expansion of credit (and hence of credit "bubbles") as the guardian of capital accumulation and the stimulus for economic growth. Rising debt levels, unsustainable mortgage arrangements and the spread of toxic assets, associated with the "casino banking" financial model, contributed to the financial instability which resulted in the "credit crunch" and the collapse of the financial markets in 2007-8. The supposed "fixes" for the systemic instabilities strongly contributed to systemic risks and the violation of the broad population's security needs. The "self-regulating" market ultimately needed to be rescued by the government, at enormous expense to the general public. Unlike the financial elites, the impoverished and disenfranchised members of the broad public, as well as many smaller businesses, have not enjoyed similar treatment, which imperilled the satisfaction of their well-being and other needs.

For a variety of reasons (some of which I noted in the course of my analysis), poverty and

income and wealth inequality greatly increased under Thatcher's and Major's Conservative governments. Despite certain measures introduced by New Labour administrations to limit the impoverishment of the subordinate classes (through the National Minimum Wage, Child Tax Credits, Working Tax Credits, etc.), the negative trends relating to social inequality and social exclusion were not fundamentally reversed. In this anti-solidaristic social setting, large sections of the population belonging to the subordinate classes (especially the lower classes) experienced mass-scale structural violence of marginalisation, restriction of welfare provision, violations of security and well-being needs.

The common denominator of different extensions of the reach of commodifying processes and of market power which I have explored has been the destruction of many of the institutional bases of social solidarity and of non-commodified approaches to life more broadly. The privatisation, financialisation and commodification of large swathes of private and social life have frequently entailed severe restrictions of welfare provision and have had deleterious consequences for the satisfaction of security, survival and well-being needs (see especially chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7), strongly contributing to a number of crisis-inducing tendencies, negative externalities and further violations of the broad population's security needs (as shown in chapters 6 and 7 in particular). This has demonstrated the market's inability to provide certain basic products of advanced civilisation necessary for the adequate satisfaction of various survival and well-being needs: decent housing and housing security for all, adequate public health care accessible to all, general accessibility of higher education, etc.

Signposts for Future Research

While this work was not focused on providing a historical comparative analysis, my analysis provided significant arguments and empirical data supportive of the thesis that the British state and economy have become more structurally violent in relation to most of the analysed structures and policy complexes, and that the British state has become more closely and directly aligned with capitalist interests. However, analyses which mitigate structural violence would be required in order to be able to reach firmer conclusions regarding the cumulative impact of neoliberal developments in the examined period on the policy complexes and processes which I have analysed.

While many of the major structurally violent policies (including privatisation and deregulation) were largely initiated during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, most of these major policies continued in some form under New Labour administrations. However, New Labour administrations also placed more emphasis than the preceding (Conservative) governments on policies designed to mitigate or moderate the social costs of class-based structural violence which the full-blown Thatcherite neoliberal agenda had exacerbated.

As Stuart Hall (2003) pointed out, the dominant logic of New Labour rule was characterised by a neoliberal focus on empowering the private corporate economy through the spread of the fundamentalist market ideology which emphasises the primacy of market criteria in very broad areas of social life, as well as by providing concrete government support for the processes of commodification. The New Labour government facilitated an increase in direct private capitalist influence in shaping social agendas, and it also forced the public sector to adopt/internalise a market-driven logic by eroding the distinction between the public and the private sector (most prominently through "public-private partnerships" and Public Finance Initiatives), which also facilitated the "private investment in, and the corporate penetration of, parts of the public sector (the prison service, schools, the NHS)" (Hall, ibid., 14). New Labour thus furthered the creeping privatisation of public services and a close alignment of corporate and state elites in the running of the economy and of society (also through corporate lobbying, the involvement of private capitalists in various policy-making public bodies, etc.).

However, as a nominally social democratic government, New Labour tried to "govern in a neo-liberal direction while maintaining its traditional working-class and public-sector middle-class support, with all the compromises and confusions that entails. It (…) modified the classic anti-statist stance of American-style neo-liberalism by 'a reinvention of active government' " (Hall, ibid., 14). Yet despite associated New Labour measures (including tax credits, the introduction of a National Minimum Wage, injection of public funds into the delivery of public services) which alleviated some of the most drastic cases of poverty and social exclusion, my discussion has shown that these were subordinated to – and in some respects directly facilitative of – the redistribution of power and of wealth into the hands of the owners of capital and of the state elite. Indeed, by seeking "to win enough consent as it goes, and to build subordinate demands back into its dominant logic" (Hall, ibid., 20), New Labour pursued a hegemonic

strategy which helped to entrench and consolidate the neoliberal order. In this agenda, "regulation was often the site of a struggle to resolve the contradiction between an enhanced role for the private sector and the need to demonstrate positive outcomes" (Hall, 2011, 20).

Most of the identified cases of structural violence appeared to directly harm and disadvantage all of the major subordinate classes, and especially the lower class. While the material and status position of the middle classes has on the whole been relatively privileged, they have also suffered (more or less directly, to a greater or lesser extent) from various forms of structural violence associated with the existing neoliberal capitalist regime. They have also tended to enjoy various advantages in relation to access to education and health care, as well as more security, stability and comfort in relation to housing, yet these and other advantages remained very inferior to those enjoyed by the dominant class. I was not able here to examine in much detail the differences in the patterns of structural violence experienced by different subaltern classes and different class fractions[310]. This remains an important issue which should be addressed by further research.

The neo-Galtungian typology of structural violence which I used was an analytical lens and classification which provided a systematic, multi-faceted framework conducive to greater precision, clarity, nuance and focus, easing the processes of identification and verification of the existence of structural violence. The use of my typology also reduced the opacity of structural violence and helped to better communicate the violent character of various social structures and processes. Yet the categorising of various forms of structural violence has entailed several problems. The process of categorisation occasionally risks overly burdening the exposition, which sometimes leads to the need to choose which of the numerous instances of structural violence one will highlight in this way (through categorisation). There was a degree of (to some extent unavoidable) arbitrariness with regard to the choice which instances of structural violence to highlight, considering that some forms of structural violence (such as the restriction of individual agential power) inhere in a great variety of social processes, and are almost ubiquitous.

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[310] As an illustration of the need to also analyse class-based structural violence at the level of different class fractions and individuals' concrete class positions, it should be noted that the situation of individuals belonging to the "new middle class" (whose life experiences and situation significantly diverge from those belonging to the "petite bourgeoisie") is highly contingent on whether they are employed in the public or private sector, on whether they own or rent their homes, etc.

It was therefore impractical to explicitly apply the typology to each case of structural violence which I identified in the course of my research.

The use of a typology of structural violence may not always be necessary or desirable, especially in cases where it may constrain attempts to approach the problem of structural violence from more anthropological analytical perspectives. For example, Farmer (see 2004a, 2004b) has shown that an approach based on the method of exemplification and anthropological witnessing can provide important insights into structural violence, its forms and functions, without needing to resort to the use of a typology of structural violence. A combination of this and other approaches may also be fruitful for certain purposes. My macro- and meta-analytical approach is limited in its ability to illuminate in a more thorough way the individual and subjective lived experience of class-based structural violence. However, ethnographic accounts should still be able to make use of a Galtungian or neo-Galtungian typology of violence. On the other side of the research spectrum, the use of these typologies for the analysis of structural violence may be less relevant for the purpose of quantitative analysis. It could be useful if quantifications and indexes of structural violence were developed.

My initial analysis of class-based structural violence focused on class in relative isolation from other intersecting forms of oppression, to which another layer of analysis was later added to address some intersectional social relationships. In most cases, the intersectional analysis may actually be most fruitfully investigated without the employment of such sequencing procedures. Although I focused on advancing the theory and empirical investigation of class-based structural violence, my work has provided a basis for the future development of a general theory and typology of structural violence. Their development could improve future analyses of multiple and intersecting forms of structural violence. The crucial insight which intersectional analysis can help to bring to critical and emancipatory social research is that the various types of oppression are interdependent, as are the various struggles against oppression. In the words of Emma Lazarus ([1882] 1987, 30): "Until we are all free, we are none of us free."

While my macro-perspective enabled me to uncover some complex relationships which a narrower perspective often may not be able to do to the same degree, it also precluded more detailed analysis which can more thoroughly corroborate and elucidate a more focused research area. However, as an exploratory, initial cartography of class-based structural violence, this thesis also

334

identified numerous signposts for future, more focused research into this topic. The following are some of the important areas and directions for research which my analysis has identified:

1) The differences in the patterns of structural violence experienced by different subordinate classes and different class fractions. Some of these forms of structural violence also negatively affect individuals belonging to the dominant class. This is a topic which also merits further research.

2) The relationships between national and transnational forms of structural violence.

3) The extent and character of factors which mitigate structural violence, which were not the main focus of my work, are of central importance for a fuller understanding of the dynamic and interactive position and role of structural violence in social life. Two important subsets of these mitigating factors concern the reactions to and counter-effects of structural violence.

4) Analyses focused on taking account of the cultural, emotional and psychic factors in the formation and reproduction of class-based structural violence.

5) Future research could also attempt to investigate in a more detailed way which forms of structural violence are functionally central to the operation of the system, assuming of course that dialectical social relationships can be (partially) disentangled in this way. Such further analysis and identification of the main generators of social violence may have important public policy implications, as they would help to provide insight into the required or desirable sequencing of public policy changes (especially in terms of ascertaining which forms of structural violence may need to be tackled first or which policy decisions and implementations should be given particular attention). These kinds of investigations are especially needed because the diverse multiplicity of violence in society greatly complicates political campaigning, advocacy and public policy strategies. Of course, this "Rubik's cube" of policy-making also requires the analysis of the interactions between structural and cultural violence. The dialectical interplay of structural and subjective factors in the processes of policy change and socio-economic transformation mean that the elimination of the major generators of class-based structural violence requires a simultaneous challenge against the (dynamic) forms of cultural

violence which support structural violence and hinder movements and agendas for progressive change.

6) Furthermore, dense discussions and analyses of the interdependencies between the different subtypes of structural violence are needed. Although my initial cartography laid the groundwork for this and also initiated the analysis of (some of) these interdependencies, it was not suited for more thorough and comprehensive investigations of these interactions considering its level of analysis.

7) More focused studies limited to specific subtypes of structural violence and to specific, narrowly circumscribed areas would also be welcome. For example, it may be interesting and useful to have detailed, micro-analytical inquiries into the patterns of structurally-induced fragmentation in the lived experience of the working-class inhabitants of a particular city borough or other area.

8) My elaboration and employment of a synthesis of (broadly) neo-Marxian and neo-Galtungian theoretical and analytical lenses also lays the groundwork for future comparative analyses of different theoretical and analytical perspectives on the problem of class-based structural violence. Attempts to apply different class and stratification theories and approaches might be an interesting addition to this under-explored field of research.

As these possible future lines of inquiry indicate, the issue of class-based structural violence represents a potentially very fruitful area of research. This thesis has also confirmed that a neo-Galtungian typology of structural violence helps to place the analysis of structural violence on a less arbitrary, more precise basis, supporting the validity and the reliability of this kind of research. This research has also confirmed that these typologies can serve as useful "indicators" of structural violence that can be applied to a variety of research areas and can help to identify the commonalities and complementarities of different kinds of structural violence. As I have shown, the relative generality of these categories does not *eo ipso* hinder the investigation of very specific forms of structural violence. Neither does the use of these categories necessarily damage the ability to convey the complexities and the specificities of the forms of structural violence which are in the focus of research.

My thesis has demonstrated the systemic character of class-based structural violence, and it elucidated how this class violence is woven throughout a wide range of social processes and structures. It helped to reveal and elucidate various forms and instances of structural violence and chronic social and individual misery which have been "normalized into invisibility" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgeois, 2004, 9). My work has therefore also shown that social and class analysis based on the core concepts of peace research – structural violence, positive and negative peace – can help to identify the oppressive impediments to the existence of a largely peaceful social order. In so doing, this work contributes to the realisation of Galtung's aim "to provide the foundations for a more defensible public policy" (Jacoby, 2008, 38). The analysis of the causal mechanisms in the creation and reproduction of class-based structural violence has confirmed that this kind of violence is rooted in class disparities in economic, political and social power on the basis of differential access to various economic, political and social resources. This suggests that public policy, if it is truly committed to minimising and removing structural violence, should focus on minimising and, where possible, removing these inequalities, rather than merely seeking to alleviate the more extreme forms of class-based structural violence while leaving intact the underlying structures which are the immense generators of this violence. While there are a number of root causes of disparities in economic, political and social power which result in structural violence, my theoretical approach and examination of concrete areas of social organisation have highlighted the centrality of authority relations for class-based structural violence. My analysis has elucidated the various mechanisms through which the elite-driven economy and the state, based as they are on severe restrictions of democratic accountability and democratic participation, advance particularistic elite interests and inflict structural violence on the broad population. In addition to indicating how restrictions of democracy facilitate structural violence, I have also outlined how a system of democratic self-government could overcome such violence and foster positive peace.

I have shown that the neo-Marxian and neo-Galtungian approach to structural violence can be of great assistance in identifying and elucidating some of the major obstacles on the path to a socially just, egalitarian, inclusive, caring and nonviolent social order. Scholarly work can co-exist with a humanistic engagement which seeks to understand and challenge everyday (and often normalised) class-based forms of oppression and cruelty in favour of a humane

337

Enlightenment vision committed to the creation of a freer, kinder and more civilised society.

The appreciation of the role of popular consent in the perpetuation of the capitalist social order, which I outlined in chapter 2, reveals the historical contingency of our current arrangements, which are built on and steeped in structural violence. In that sense, Howard Zinn's (2007, 13) observation about the provisional power of governments in the final instance applies to the entire capitalist social order:

"There is a basic weakness in governments, however massive their armies, however vast their wealth, however they control images and information, because their power depends on the obedience of citizens, of soldiers, of civil servants, of journalists and writers and teachers. When the citizens begin to suspect that they have been deceived and withdraw their support, government loses its legitimacy and its power".

While it is worth struggling for the improvement of living conditions under the capitalist system, the analysis of the deep-rooted nature of structural violence which I provided in this thesis indicates that the construction of positive peace requires a deep structural and cultural transformation, the development of enlightened democratic self-government. The entire history of the struggle for democracy, as well as the experiences of popular struggles in the period which I have examined, indicate that there is no bureaucratic road to such transformative change. Only an emancipatory pedagogy of praxis can effect the necessary cultural and material changes required for the construction of enlightened democratic self-government by fostering the (ineluctably gradual) development of human intellectual, political and ethical faculties. Revolutionary peacemaking would entail posing a resolute, counter-hegemonic challenge to the entire structurally violent capitalist order through the development of mass critical intellectuality and of broad, consistently anti-oppressive, radically democratic and socially empowering movements, communities and coalitions of resistance. If we are to put an end to class-based structural violence and to other forms of violence, domination and oppression, here is our Rhodes and here we must jump!

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