

Peace Negotiations and Remaking Political Community in Somalia

Maimuna Sheikh Abdulle Mohamud

Trinity Hall

September 2020

This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the 80,000-word limit for the Politics and International Studies Degree Committee.

Peace Negotiations and Remaking Political Community in Somalia

Maimuna Sheikh Abdulle Mohamud

Abstract

What is the relationship between processes of political community formation and peace-making in Somalia? Drawing primarily on original archival research, extensive interviews and personal memoirs, I trace the ways in which representation modalities in international peace negotiations, such as the “4.5 clan formula”, engender multiple reworked articulations of political community in the aftermath of protracted civil war. Specifically, this thesis puts forward the notion that it has not just been war and state collapse that have moulded the ways in which Somalis think about political belonging and categories of inclusion and participation in the body politic; the Djibouti (2000) and the IGAD-led (2002- 4) peace processes have also had a significant, hitherto underestimated, influence on how political community is to be constituted and (re)imagined. By emphasising the role of civil society, especially clan elders, women and diaspora groups, the thesis rethinks the determinants, membership and the very processes through which political community is produced. In doing so, it shows how identity and political community are altered over time, erasing some inequities and exclusionary practices, while also erecting new barriers and (gendered) expectations. The thesis contributes to the extant literature on peace-building which has been preoccupied with reviving the state and material concerns of who gets what, therefore strongly emphasising the pivotal role of militarised elites and foreign experts. Instead, it highlights the importance of political identity and claims-making in post-conflict reconstruction as well as the agency of non-state, unarmed actors in shaping ideas and practices of belonging.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply indebted to Devon Curtis and Christopher Clapham for their unswerving support and intellectual guidance. I thank them, equally, for their care and kindness throughout the research process.

This project would not have been possible without the generosity of Abdullahi Busuri, who helped me to access rare archival documents and videos while in Djibouti. Abdullahi's dedication, diligence and technical prowess helped to preserve rich archives for future generations of Somali and non-Somali scholars. Thank you.

My mother, Muhubo Mohamed Abdi, has been a pillar and tower of strength. I am forever grateful for her trust, love and sacrifices. The spirit of my late father, Sheikh Abdulle, has guided me throughout this research. He was—and remains—a constant source of reflection and inspiration. My uncle Qassim Mohamed Abdi has been a father figure to me. I am lucky to have had his guidance, and to have grown up with his fascinating tales and undeniable sense of humour. Mama Shukri Aden Ame is a formidable woman and a role model; my cousins Surer and Saredo are talented and inspirational. My love and appreciation go to my uncle, Abdifaid, my aunts Maimuna and Hawa and all my cousins—especially, Ayan Alinor. In loving memory of my aunts Mama Safia Mohamed Abdi and Halima Abdidahir Gurhan.

My little sister Faduma Mohamud and her family, Sharmarke Duale, Minnah and Safia, take a lot of credit for bringing so much cheerfulness to the end of the writing process. Thank you for a wonderful, if unusual, summer. All my brothers and sisters, scattered around the world, provide me with a wonderful transnational network of care and support: Ubah in Toronto, Mohamed and Omar in Buffalo, Abdinasir in Columbus, Zahra (Mulki) in London, Ahmed Hadi in Addis Ababa, Safia in Ankara, Khadija in Istanbul, Abdiaziz in Orlando and Abdiqani in Mogadishu. I thank them, their spouses, children and grandchildren.

My elegant mother-in-law, Miek Somers (Mama Mixie), always brings joyfulness to our conversations, travels and other adventures. Gatherings with my Belgian family are always warm and reinvigorating. Many thanks to Grandma Marie-Louise De Smet, Tante Kris, Nonkel Lus, Dennis and Saskia for always being such delightful hosts and company.

I am lucky to count among my mentors Dr Marieme Lo, who has been a big sister, friend and ally. In Doha, special thanks to Mariya Petkova and Danaïet Teame for their friendship and encouragement. In Oxford, Lula Kinnaird welcomed me into her family. Auntie Lula's advice and affection have been a source of comfort in my life over the past few years. To my dear friend Arjeta Gashi, may you find eternal peace. I miss you.

I also take this opportunity to thank all those who participated in this study and dedicated valuable time to share their views and experiences with me, especially those who met me numerous times in different cities. Their engagement and sustained interest were highly encouraging. Nuur Sheekh has been kind enough to facilitate important introductions, and my conversations with Aden Omar Abdullahi have been insightful. Two remarkable Somali scholars have been champions of this research: I owe much inspiration and admiration to Ladan Affi and Afyare Elmi. On professional and personal levels, my time at the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) in Mogadishu has been deeply formative. Special thanks to my former bosses and colleagues at HIPS, and a note of appreciation to Cindy Horst for her valuable lessons on doing compassionate fieldwork: working with her was illuminating. Aspects of my field research in Somalia between 2014 and 2016 informed parts of the analysis in this thesis. It is with gratitude that I wish to thank the women and men who enriched my study of Somali affairs during that period.

In Cambridge, many thanks to the organisers, funders and supporters of the Cambridge Africa Trust, who supported this endeavour, financially and otherwise. In particular, Pauline Essah has been generous with her time and advice. The brief but extraordinary mentorship of the late Amit Bhasin is deeply appreciated.

Harry Verhoeven, my husband, has been by my side on this years-long journey, sharing the highs and lows of fieldwork, writing...and life. Harry, thank you for loving this project. You are a true scholar. The curiosity, affection and humility with which you approach the region continues to inspire me. I am happy I invited you to Yemen all those years ago!

Our almost four-year-old daughter, Aliya, has grown with this research, from her early days as a baby in Cambridge, to her first voyage to the Horn at eight months when she accompanied me on fieldwork, to her recent interest in becoming an investigator... Aliya, your arrival has made this research even more urgent and

important. This thesis is dedicated to you. May you take care of the world, and may the world take care of you, *waan ku jeclahay*.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|------------|
| CHAPTER 1: Introduction | 3 |
| <i>The Case for Inclusive Peace Negotiations?</i> | 7 |
| <i>Conceptualisations of Political Community</i> | 12 |
| <i>Peace Negotiations and the Remaking of Political Community</i> | 17 |
| <i>Thesis Argument</i> | 21 |
| <i>Methodology</i> | 23 |
| Methods and Sources | 25 |
| Positionality and Reflexivity | 29 |
| <i>Structure of the Thesis</i> | 32 |
| CHAPTER 2: Political Community Formation and Citizenship in Somalia | 34 |
| <i>Making a National Political Community</i> | 34 |
| <i>Reflections on “Clan” in Somali History</i> | 36 |
| <i>The Colonial Heritage and its Formative Impact</i> | 41 |
| <i>“The Balance that Kept the Country Together”: Historicising Balance</i> | 45 |
| <i>State-Led Citizenship Craft and Its Discontents</i> | 48 |
| <i>The Comrade–Citizens: Nation-Building and Its Disillusionments</i> | 50 |
| <i>Conclusion</i> | 56 |
| CHAPTER 3: Peace Processes as Sites for Reshaping the Political Community | 58 |
| <i>The Violent Fragmentation of the Somali Nation</i> | 58 |
| <i>A Brief History of International Peace Interventions in Somalia (1991–1999)</i> | 62 |
| <i>The Somali National Peace Conference (Arta), Djibouti (March–October 2000)</i> | 65 |
| <i>The Somali National Reconciliation Conference (Mbagathi), Kenya (2002–2004)</i> | 72 |
| <i>Conclusion</i> | 77 |
| CHAPTER 4: The 4.5 Clan Formula and Rebuilding the Foundations of Political Community | 79 |
| <i>Introducing the 4.5 Clan Formula</i> | 80 |
| <i>Reshaping Clan Relationships</i> | 86 |
| <i>De-Stigmatising Group/Clan Rights</i> | 92 |
| <i>Discourses of Civil Society and the Supremacy of “Clan Oligarchs”</i> | 95 |
| <i>Armed Factions and the Clan Formula</i> | 103 |
| <i>Conclusion: From an Inclusion Modality to a Shaper of Post-war Political Community</i> | 110 |
| CHAPTER 5: “Separate and Equal”: Gendered Representation and Women as the Sixth Clan | 112 |
| <i>The Gendered Politics of Inclusion</i> | 113 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| <i>The Sixth Clan as Separate and Equal</i> | 118 |
| <i>International Gender Norms and Women's Vision of a Political Community</i> | 124 |
| <i>Conclusion: "No Clan Chooses a Woman over a Man"</i> | 132 |
| CHAPTER 6: "Imagined Constituencies"? Diasporas' Representation and the Transnational Political Community | 134 |
| <i>Diaspora Representation and Inclusion</i> | 135 |
| <i>Narratives of Diaspora Exceptionalism</i> | 141 |
| <i>Imagining a Transnational Political Community</i> | 145 |
| <i>"Our Brethren Abroad": Instrumentalising the Clan Formula</i> | 150 |
| <i>Conclusion: Reinforcing a Transnational Political Community</i> | 154 |
| CHAPTER 7: Nationalism and Islamism as Alternatives to the 4.5 Clan Formula? | 158 |
| <i>Somali Nationalism at the Dawn of the Third Republic</i> | 159 |
| <i>Continued Relevance of the 1960 Constitution</i> | 162 |
| <i>Federalism as a Nationalist Recourse to a Fragmented Body Politic</i> | 166 |
| <i>The Somaliland Question</i> | 170 |
| <i>Imaginations of Mogadishu as Symbol of the "Nation"</i> | 173 |
| <i>Islamist Alternatives and Their Critics</i> | 176 |
| <i>Conclusion</i> | 181 |
| CHAPTER 8: Conclusion | 185 |
| <i>Bring the Clan Back In: Enduring Legacies and Rival Conceptions of Political Community</i> | 186 |
| <i>Remaking Citizenship in Peace Processes in Comparative Perspective</i> | 191 |
| <i>The New Body Politic: Civil Society and the Contestation of Political Community</i> | 195 |
| <i>The Clan Formula between Somali Aspirations, Regional Interests and Global Norms</i> | 200 |
| <i>Final Thoughts</i> | 206 |
| Bibliography | 209 |
| <i>Primary Interviews</i> | 209 |
| <i>Archival Sources by Chapter</i> | 211 |
| <i>UN Reports and Resolutions</i> | 218 |

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

This thesis examines the contested nature of political community set against recent experiences of civil war and the fracturing of a nation state. Specifically, it explores attempts to rebuild peace and how peace-making brings forth, and is moulded by, various articulations of claims-making and political membership. By focusing on Somali actors and debates around inclusion and representation in the early 2000s, I underscore how peace negotiations can be turned into sites that inform and constitute new meanings and discourses of belonging and political community.

In January 1991 the Somali state collapsed amid urban warfare in its capital, Mogadishu. As the ruling president of twenty-two years fled the country, millions of Somalis were displaced and suffered one of Africa's worst famines of the late twentieth century. This was not only a humanitarian tragedy but also a bitter political irony, as what was considered by many scholars to be Africa's most clearly identifiable nation state – one people (Somalis), speaking one language (Somali), practising one faith (Islam), in one state (the Somali Republic) – dissolved into warring clan militias and suffered an attempted secession while quasi-states ruled by warlords emerged across the territory. Since 1991, endless rounds of negotiations have attempted to reconstruct a central state and reconcile the enemies of war. This thesis focuses on the two most remarkable negotiations: the Somalia National Peace Conference in 2000 (also known as the Arta conference) and the Somali National Reconciliation Conference from 2002 to 2004 (henceforth, the Mbagathi conference). Both were radical departures from the way international peace has typically been pursued. The Arta and Mbagathi processes are unique because of their inclusion of ordinary Somalis and a focus on rethinking political community, a theme mostly ignored by other convenings.

Attempts to stage (more) inclusive Somali peace negotiations in the early 2000s were focused centrally on engaging unarmed groups, what Somalis termed “civil society”. This shift was induced by the decade-long failure of the conventional peace-building paradigm that prioritised striking narrow political settlements between Somalia's multiple armed factions. New international and domestic actors entered mediation efforts and advanced different agendas. Somalia's diverse and largely unorganised civil society formulated visions for peace and reconciliation centred on a need for “balance” between Somalia's various clans: this helped to introduce the “4.5 clan formula”, which rearranged power relations between Somalia's clan families while introducing a distinct register for group representation and claims-making. Newly included groups challenged the very foundations of membership and belonging through their

approaches to negotiations. From the vantage point of some Somalis, this created momentum for a “Third Republic”, a radically different way of (doing) politics centred on rekindled understandings of political community.

In the context of post-colonial states such as Somalia, the problem of war and peace is often analysed as a problem of power-sharing between political alliances and social (often ethnic) constituencies. The very diversity of many societies is seen as posing fundamental problems to nation-building, because the concentration of power in the hands of certain ethnic, religious, linguistic or other groups risks antagonising others, possibly causing violent rupture.¹ A huge canon in political science focuses on the links between societal cleavages and modes of government, often arguing that the deepening of the former leads to the growing destabilisation of the latter.² Ethnic politics are treated as especially suspect, causing major conflicts after the end of the Cold War. While this problematisation of various forms of diversity, and its supposedly explosive relationship with institutions, has been strongly contested,³ its effects on policy have been profound. “Power-sharing” between various belligerents has often been the first and only answer of outside mediators, stemming from the belief that it was the underrepresentation of one or more groups that acted as a trigger for war.⁴ The corollary, then, is that their joining of political institutions, and maybe even government, would remove the cause of conflict. Scholars have spent extensive time teasing the conditions under which power-sharing “works”⁵ (usually defined as the absence of renewed, large-scale conflict) and studied the impact of power-sharing on authoritarianism,⁶ elections,⁷ the political geography of insurgency⁸ and other variables.

Yet, if power-sharing remains a popular study object and an obvious strategy for mediators to pursue, observers have long criticised its conservative bias to mostly leave the fundamental problems of a particular polity untouched or to institutionalise them.⁹ Power-sharing has, in many African contexts, been experienced as a deal between rival Big Men¹⁰ – or, at best, large, powerful groups – that leaves out less well-organised groups and the broader population.¹¹ Such discontent has fuelled calls for a more root-and-branch transformation of war-afflicted countries.

¹ Gellner 1983.

² Horowitz 2014; Bates 1974; Connor 1994.

³ Fearon, Laitin 2003; Cederman, Girardin 2007.

⁴ Sisk 1996.

⁵ Hartzell, Hoddie 2003; Werner, Yuen 2005; Brancati 2009.

⁶ Magaloni 2008.

⁷ Vandeginste 2011.

⁸ Srinivasan 2013.

⁹ Jung 2012.

¹⁰ Utas 2012.

¹¹ Mehler 2009; Jarstad 2008.

One especially dominant approach to a wholesale overhaul of state institutions and state–society relations has been motivated by liberal thought. Precepts like decentralisation, civil society engagement and accountability form the basis of many contemporary peace theories that seek to lay the foundation of market-based economies and democratic, electoral politics.¹² Humanitarian activities and human rights frameworks have been embedded within liberal peace-building too.¹³ The creation of access corridors for the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance, as in Somalia in the early 1990s, serves as a rationale for peace-building (and justified a short-lived military intervention at the dawn of US President George H W Bush’s “New World Order”).

Liberal peace theories are centrally concerned with statehood and governance: how to reconstruct a withered state and to render its institutions at least nominally legitimate and functional.¹⁴ These debates escalated at the end of the Cold War, amid an upsurge in violent conflict, displacement and state collapse in the former Soviet Union, Balkans and Africa. In this “New World Order”, liberalism became the ideological blueprint for mediation, intervention and reconstruction across the globe. The perceived universal relevance of the peace-building paradigm (as applicable in Colombia as in Mozambique) draws strength from liberal norms, techniques and practices that can be standardised and applied in diverse settings.¹⁵ However, liberal peace as a wholly constituted project is inherently contentious. In practical terms, I argue that liberal peace does not and cannot function as a coherent construct that can subsequently be injected into post-conflict settings. Instead, depending on the context, aspects of liberal peace-building are prioritised while others are treated as less urgent;¹⁶ Paris, for instance, contends that international actors should take the lead in stabilising state institutions prior to democratisation,¹⁷ while Snyder believes civil society must first be encouraged to counter ethnic divisionism.¹⁸

Uneven priorities are also obvious from the geography of intervention. International peace-builders refrained from directing similar resources to Africa compared to the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Clapham examined the post-Cold-War international system by tracing the bitter experiences of Africans under trusteeships – including Somalia between 1950 and 1960 – and why Africa’s ruling elites

¹² Curtis 2012a, p.10.

¹³ Bell, O’Rourke 2007.

¹⁴ Paris 2010.

¹⁵ Curtis 2012a, p.10.

¹⁶ Also, Curtis 2012b.

¹⁷ Paris 1997, 2010.

¹⁸ Snyder 2000.

remain suspicious of new external trusteeship.¹⁹ Africa has been an outlier in post-1989 international interventions because it is not considered of sufficient strategic importance to justify the resources and political commitments that external governance often requires. The more “radical” features of liberal peace, such as “new protectorates”,²⁰ in the Balkans and, later, in East Timor, were not implemented in Africa. African countries like Somalia were, nonetheless, experimental sites for international peace-building norms and intervention strategies. Two UN operations (UNOSOM I and II) attempted to broker peace between warring Somali factions but abruptly halted activities in 1995 after the highly publicised failure of US-led military intervention in 1993 (in Chapter 3).

The self-declared custodians of liberal peace are a range of international actors whose roles and approaches vary, to an extent. The liberal peace enterprise is still largely driven by Western institutions eager to project a set of norms and values on societies of the Global South. Its proponents emphasise the progressive dimensions of liberalism, channelled through the activities of multilateral institutions and powerful states. They point out that liberal peace-building is concerned with root causes and core grievances of people who have not been heard,²¹ even if this might be perceived of as “empire”.²² Doyle and Sambanis favour a heavy-handed international approach to peace-building and state reconstruction in practice, though not in theory.²³ While not always popular, proponents argue that neo-trusteeship is essential for those concerned with international security, as well as local liberalisation.²⁴

However, Belloni illustrates how liberal peace settlements could reify and pronounce ethnic identities, for instance, heightening conflict and ethnic divisions in Bosnian society.²⁵ The UN’s involvement in Bosnia, as lambasted by Chandler, demonstrates the artificiality of “virtual” post-conflict democratic models that are created, in essence, for the consumption of international audiences.²⁶ Furthermore, opponents of liberal peace-building view it as reinforcing Euro-centrist worldviews and exacerbating unequal relations between those who build peace and others whose peace must be built.²⁷ Autesserre has exposed the universalising tendencies of peace-keeping missions and how they institutionally blind themselves to deeply local, contextualised factors and agents of conflict.²⁸ Mac Ginty has critiqued liberal peace on the

¹⁹ Clapham 2011, p.81.

²⁰ Mayall, de Oliveira 2011.

²¹ Caplan 2005.

²² Ignatieff 2003.

²³ Doyle, Sambanis 2006.

²⁴ Fearon, Laitin 2004.

²⁵ Belloni 2004.

²⁶ Chandler 1999.

²⁷ Sabaratnam 2013.

²⁸ Autesserre 2009.

grounds that it excludes “local” experiences and fails to account for the multidimensional nature of conflicts and ways of building peace.²⁹

Nevertheless, Newman rightly stresses that liberal peace is not monolithic.³⁰ A distinction can be drawn between its radical/emancipatory and orthodox/conservative aspects.³¹ While a “post-colonial” critique of liberal peace is still warranted, normative liberal values are more often than not considered instrumentally useful – and experienced as such – by many in war-affected contexts. As I will demonstrate throughout this thesis, civil society discourse (enthusiastically adopted by Somalis in the Arta and Mbagathi processes) was used as a powerful tool to push for (more) inclusive political processes, even if a nuanced appraisal of civil society’s multiple roles in peace negotiations is sorely needed. Ordinary Somalis have accepted liberal principles as essential to their political processes, albeit with different understandings of how these ideas operate in their distinct environments.

In sum, liberal peace-building in the aftermath of civil war entails a roundly optimistic, “win-win” approach based on assumptions about *new* relationships between the state and its citizens in the form of a rekindled social contract among citizens within the political demarcations of the state. Yet, while liberal peace-building has long been preoccupied with what the state should (not) do, it has neglected the *nation*: the other component of the famously coupled “nation state”. Questions of political identity and political community are downplayed by peace negotiators engrossed with designing neutral ground rules in which “the people” make their own choices. This uneven attention raises important questions: What forms of political identity are implicitly being encouraged and which resisted as part of peace processes? Do international peace-builders have a special obligation to reconstitute nations alongside attempts to resuscitate states? And what form would such projects take? A recent strand of literature devoted to “inclusive peace” – focused on broadening who “the people” are and what they say – is a fruitful direction that could lead to new answers.

The Case for Inclusive Peace Negotiations?

In November 2018 the UN and World Bank jointly published *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, which is likely to become a blueprint for policy-makers in the next few

²⁹ Mac Ginty 2011.

³⁰ Newman 2009.

³¹ Richmond 2005.

years. Based on a systematic review of post-conflict states and the global institutions that support recovery and reconstruction, *Pathways for Peace* posits that conflict resolution necessitates addressing “grievances around exclusion from access to power, opportunity and services”.³² While the report asserts that the state has a special responsibility, the research also enlists civil society, the private sector and external powers as key partners involved in a more inclusive politics of “citizen engagement”.³³

The report’s increased recognition of the role of civil society representation is a welcome change. Contrary to much of the power-sharing literature, which remains focused on bringing together a perilously narrow set of actors and interests,³⁴ the language of inclusive peace seems genuinely committed to insisting on a much broader range of stakeholders (“the people”) being heard. Though a rarity only a few decades ago, inclusive peace-making is on the ascent. In some ways, this is unsurprising: inclusion is closely related to key liberal notions of representation and democratic participation. Yet, this growing interest in inclusion during and after peace processes notwithstanding, conceptual clarity on key issues remains absent. Who should be included in peace negotiations and political settlements, and why? What frameworks can be used for inclusion? What tensions arise from different types of inclusion, and how can competing notions of inclusion be managed, and by whom (with legitimate authority)? The supposed evolution of inclusion from an aspirational norm to a “political fact”³⁵ in international peace-making has not resolved these underlying questions. Creating inclusive peace processes is a messy, complex and expensive endeavour. There is still no agreement on how to ensure inclusion in peace processes and, equally importantly, the precise definition of inclusion.³⁶

Moreover, scholars dispute whether (and what kind of) inclusion leads to legitimate and sustainable political settlements. Stedman famously contended that effective peace negotiations must limit the actors involved to secure bargains.³⁷ Such narrow prescriptions of inclusion (essentially to involve only those directly in conflict with one another – a traditional approach harking back to “power-sharing”) were countered by Nilsson, who, using statistical analysis, found that, in the post-Cold-War order, civil society actors increase the legitimacy of peace processes that may, in turn, contribute to durable peace.³⁸ These findings have spurred the development of frameworks designed to acknowledge the diversity of stakeholders and situate them in peace negotiations. For example, de Waal introduces three “concentric

³² *Pathways for Peace* 2018, p.1.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Tull, Mehler 2005.

³⁵ De Waal 2017.

³⁶ Bell 2019.

³⁷ Stedman 1997, p.11.

³⁸ Nilsson 2012, p.263.

circles” of inclusion.³⁹ The political elite (or government) and their direct challengers (influential opposition or armed groups) comprise the inner “core” circle. The second circle of inclusion includes less powerful belligerents striving to be part of any political settlement. De Waal’s framework also recognises civil society as constituting a third “circle” worthy of inclusion but breaks it into two groups: an “organised” civil society and “politically marginalised groups” brought in through special measures by international mediators. However, de Waal draws on his construct of the “political marketplace” to claim that norms of inclusion play out differently in places where transactional loyalties matter far more than legitimacy; the realities in many post-conflict contexts – and certainly the Horn of Africa – differ from normative approaches conceived by international mediators. Building on these propositions, Bell proposes a similar stratification of diverse actors engaged in peace processes.⁴⁰ Despite their status at the outer margins of this analysis, the inclusion of women and other “marginalised” groups is seen by these researchers as contributing to the public discourse and wider deliberative processes in negotiations.

These frameworks still leave much room for improvement. Non-core “local actors” might lend legitimacy to political settlements that arise from peace-making, but such typologies of inclusion risk reproducing a core–periphery binary and generating new patron–client relations.⁴¹ They reinforce the centrality of the state and the most threatening opposition groups. One reason is that “core groups” remain, indeed, at the core, because of fears that peace negotiations would be unable to stop the violence (still identified as the most pressing goal of peace-making) without them.⁴² Therefore, despite efforts to broaden the scope of inclusion, the emphasis remains on “the real politics”, to quote de Waal’s polemic.⁴³

By contrast, however, the Somali peace conferences spotlighted in this thesis challenge assumptions about which actors constitute the inner core circle, and how their influence is measured. Questioning these circle frameworks is imperative in complex cases, such as Somalia, where the state is virtually non-existent and multiple unorganised but militarised belligerents vie for power. Recent new research suggests that inclusive peace processes can produce long-term social transformation. Although Bell and Pospisil question notions of durable or sustainable peace (or political settlements, for that matter), they propose that peace processes can yield structures in which non-traditional actors can continue to engage after negotiations have formally concluded.⁴⁴ This suggests that civil society groups are central to a

³⁹ De Waal 2017.

⁴⁰ Bell 2019.

⁴¹ Caplan 2005.

⁴² Pospisil, Menocal 2017.

⁴³ De Waal 2015.

⁴⁴ Bell, Pospisil 2017.

transformative project that can address the root causes of violence. Echoing *Pathways to Peace*, including a broad civil society is instrumental to a longer-term “renegotiating [of] a social contract that represents and meets the needs of wider society.”⁴⁵

Within contemporary writing on inclusion and civil society engagement, women’s representation in a multitude of peace-building activities, including peace talks, is of notable importance. Several scholars consider women’s participation in peace talks as a crucial measure of inclusivity.⁴⁶ The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and eight subsequent resolutions make up the cross-cutting Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This agenda is a significant normative framework that seeks to address the gender-specific impacts of conflict on women and girls. Influenced by long-term advocacy by a range of international civil society groups, the Security Council has recognised the “persistent obstacles and challenges to women’s participation and full involvement”;⁴⁷ the “underrepresentation of women at all stages of peace processes”;⁴⁸ and the negative impact of limited WPS implementation on “durable peace, security and reconciliation”.⁴⁹ The Security Council calls for “women’s full and meaningful participation and leadership in all efforts to maintain peace and security, including with regard to preventing conflict, sustaining peace, and responding to new threats” such as violent extremism and mass displacement.⁵⁰ As a broad and non-binding normative framework, WPS remains in flux, as it has diffused across different sites,⁵¹ including within the context of the Somali peace processes since 2000.

In response to the growing prominence of interpretations of inclusive peace as entailing new roles and responsibilities for women, a significant body of work has critiqued how gender, even when discursively at the top of (some) agendas, *actually* operates within peace negotiations. Understanding how agreements specifically impact women, known as “mainstreaming gender”,⁵² has been particularly in focus. Feminist scholars in diverse fields, such as security studies and transitional justice, have challenged global peace-building discourses that synonymise gender with women and that fail to understand how gendered hierarchies affect experiences of marginalisation and violence.⁵³ Moreover, even within narrow understandings of gender/women, a consensus exists that the vast majority of peace negotiations still sideline female participants specifically, and the female population more generally, despite professing the

⁴⁵ Bell, Pospisil 2017, p.578.

⁴⁶ Paffenholz 2014; Porter 2007; de Waal 2017.

⁴⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1820 [2008], Preamble.

⁴⁸ UN Security Council Resolutions 1888, 1889, 1960, Preambles.

⁴⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1889 [2009], Preamble.

⁵⁰ UN Security Council 2017.

⁵¹ Davies, True 2019, p.3.

⁵² Hudson 2012.

⁵³ See, for instance, Carver 1996; Shepherd 2017; Hagen 2016.

contrary. In the Afghan and Burundian peace processes, for example, the struggles of women delegates for greater roles (and for gender equality) continued with ups and downs within negotiations and in structures of power created through the peace processes.⁵⁴ Despite this mixed picture, numerous scholars still see peace talks as a necessary space for reform of gender norms.⁵⁵ In part, this is because inclusive peace-making offers new structures and an internationally influential language through which groups and individuals can articulate specific rights and representation demands. Directly addressing the charge that discourses of women's inclusion are purely Western notions, recent discussions have centred on the importance of combining the international "language" of gender mainstreaming with "local" instruments that advance women's positions in peace processes and the settlements they produce.⁵⁶

Long-standing gender-centred contributions draw our attention to the possibility of developing much more dynamic and radically inclusive understandings of peace and politics. Feminist scholars argue that merely focusing on *more* inclusion (more female delegates, more airtime, more resources for women's initiatives, etc.) in political processes such as peace negotiations is insufficient; what is required is an altogether *different* understanding of inclusion⁵⁷ – in the same way that gender is about so much more than acknowledging the biological difference between men and women. Such a conceptualisation sheds light not only on the exclusionary nature of power-sharing and the usual silencing of subaltern voices, but also on the inherent problems with liberal peace-building's universalising prescriptions: namely, that its abstractions and assumptions fail to capture the particular experiences, interests, needs and aspirations of women and other excluded groups.⁵⁸

This debate is a call to concentrate on the socio-political context and the actual lived experiences of historically marginalised actors in politics rather than on the technical prescriptions of political scientists for inclusion modalities or the impatience of real-world mediators keen to get belligerents to cease fire as soon as possible.⁵⁹ Scholars working in this tradition propose thinking about inclusive peace as being centrally about dialogue and contestation, driven primarily by those most often unheard.⁶⁰ Approaching peace-building through such conversations and confrontations touches not only on abstract constitutional

⁵⁴ Moosa, Rahmani, Webster 2013; Anderson 2010.

⁵⁵ Tripp 2015; Anderson 2010.

⁵⁶ Hudson 2009.

⁵⁷ True, Riveros-Morales 2019.

⁵⁸ Walby 1994; Lister 1997; Skjeie, Siim 2000.

⁵⁹ Lemarchand 2006.

⁶⁰ Paffenholz, Ross 2016, p. 200.

questions but on embodied personal experiences and imaginings of how a multitude of individuals and groups can come together as a collective and act politically.⁶¹

Conceptualisations of Political Community

In order to clarify my the critical approach of my project vis-à-vis an all-too-simplistic (and still exclusionary) understanding of inclusive peace and the wider arguments developed in this thesis, it is crucial to reflect on the theoretical underpinnings of my emphasis on the relationship between broadening peace processes (who, what and how) and the remaking of political community. In this section, I recall not only the high stakes of defining a political community and its potential to unite, and the cause's conflict, but also the various ways in which law and discourse have interacted in recent African history to form different citizenship regimes. This background explains my understanding of vital concepts deployed in this dissertation and why they are of great importance in rethinking peace-building.

The question of what constitutes a political community, what norms should govern it and who is recognised as a full member with requisite roles, duties and rights has been central to political thought since classical antiquity. Aristotle's vision of "Man" as an inherently political animal led him to define political community through citizenship: human potential is only fulfilled by actively participating in social life, of which the highest honour and responsibility is ensuring the well-being of the polis. Aristotle imagined an active citizenry: participation in politics and the capacity to hold political office set the members (citizens) of a political community apart from docile subjects (such as slaves, women, aliens).⁶²

This civic republican notion of political community was developed in the specific context of the Athenian city state 2,500 years ago. Whereas its emphasis on political agency in the form of the right to participate in the formulation of laws was admired by many philosophers, in practice it was of little consequence for many centuries. To the extent that empires, kingdoms, sultanates, ... consciously thought of themselves as political *communities* (that is, entailing a specific, political relationship between members and the polity itself), membership was primarily a matter of legal status: to be a citizen was to be subjected to and protected by the law in ways that out-group members were not. The origins of this legal-liberal model are often situated in the Roman Empire: imperial expansion resulted in citizenship being extended to

⁶¹ Nagle 2016.

⁶² Yack 1993.

conquered peoples, ensuring their protection by Rome (though not their participation in its government).⁶³ What is useful for the purposes of this thesis is how liberal conceptions of citizenship prioritised legal status (rather than political agency) in the functioning of a cosmopolitan political community.

The rise of sovereign states in early-modern Europe, the American and French Revolutions, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century democratisation, led to today's Western representative democracies that combine the rule of law and a governmental monopoly on violence with the notion of a government of the people, by the people and for the people. On the one hand, these democracies are organised on a clearly delineated territory and (at least in theory) recognise each other's sovereignty; however, an individual polity wishes to define the character of its respective political communities (most commonly as a "nation state"). On the other hand, membership of these political communities is primarily conceived as entailing both rights and duties vis-à-vis other citizens: they combine civic and liberal models of citizenship, but also nationalism, and in recent decades multiculturalism, as an ideological story that modern polities tell (about) themselves.⁶⁴

The question of political community and its membership on the continent after the "Scramble for Africa" was heterogeneous and complex, but important common trends and themes can be identified. On the whole, it was a question decided for Africans, not by Africans. During colonial rule, meaningful but limited African political agency was, on most of the continent, restricted to two categories: so-called traditional chiefs, on whom Europeans relied for indirect rule; and so-called *evolués*, who, because they had sufficiently internalised European civilisation, were given limited civil and political rights.⁶⁵ With a few rare exceptions such as Imperial Abyssinia and protectorates such as Basutoland and Swaziland, African polities and peoples were denied sovereignty and thus also the status of political community and citizenship: if European settlers were citizens, then Africans were subjects under the colour bar, while the territories they inhabited became part of transcontinental empires.⁶⁶

This began to change after World War II when the prospect and, later, reality of decolonisation gave Africans the chance to define the nature and membership of their political communities for themselves. Contrary to accounts that see the choice to try to build post-colonial nation states and citizens loyal only to them as inevitable, especially in French Africa, alternatives were intensely contemplated and even

⁶³ Walzer 1989, pp. 211–15.

⁶⁴ Beiner 2003.

⁶⁵ Geschiere 1993.

⁶⁶ Mamdani 1996.

experimented with.⁶⁷ The dominance of the sovereign state was not a given, but rather the result of conscious decisions by the new political elite in the context of the Cold War.

After 1960, the production and assertion of political community came to rest emphatically on juridical sovereignty and associated formulations of membership tied to territory.⁶⁸ African states sought to forge a distinct national identity amid staggering ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious heterogeneity. These attempts required the imposition of a citizenship “regime”, comprising a set of legal instruments (e.g. constitutions) and policy mechanisms (e.g. education) in the hands of the African state. Citizenship regimes aim to create and manage a national political community – mapped onto a sovereign territory with established borders. Such a project formed part of the wider modernising thrust – the legacy of late colonialism (whether French, British, Belgian or Italian) to independent African states.⁶⁹ Encouraged by social scientists, the former colonial power and urban African elites themselves, modernisation entailed roads and schools, as well as parliaments and constitutions, but also a clearly demarcated territory, a national political community and legally formulated definitions of citizenship.

The notion of “the Law” was particularly influential for modernisation theorists and practitioners: a belief that African states could become nation states through top-down initiatives decreeing social change and setting in motion transformations of identity that could lead to a modern political community that superseded tribe, clan and other atavistic categories.⁷⁰ Given the emphasis by would-be African nation-builders on constitutional instruments to shape their post-colony, much of the scholarship reflecting on these experiences has focused on legal codes and the citizenship regimes that they help to define.⁷¹ For instance, Manby⁷² observes that new African states adopted two models of membership of political community, *jus sanguinis* (the principle by which a citizen has one or both parents who are citizens of the state, e.g. in Nigeria and Tunisia) or *jus soli* (citizenship-based birth in the territory, e.g. in Chad, Namibia and Tanzania). The adoption and implementation of either of these was seen as vital for the projection of sovereign power and the arduous task of weaving together new nations from extremely diverse cloth. From this perspective, citizenship “names” membership in a political community; that is, it serves as a prerequisite to political belonging and solidarity.⁷³

⁶⁷ Cooper 2016.

⁶⁸ Clapham 1996.

⁶⁹ Cooper 2015.

⁷⁰ E.g. Singer 1970.

⁷¹ Kuper, Kuper 1965; Joireman 2001; Dorman, Hammett, Nugent 2007.

⁷² Manby 2012.

⁷³ Lazar 2013.

However, this conception of the congruence of political identity and membership with state territory has been fraught and the source of violent conflict. In West Africa, notably in Ghana⁷⁴ and Côte d'Ivoire,⁷⁵ the question of what to do with colonially established patterns of migrant labour and the possible participation of immigrants in the polity has for decades been a point of friction and even civil war. Idi Amin argued that economic control must follow political sovereignty when he expelled the Ugandan Asians in 1972, though his regime's reliance on "foreign" communities such as the "Sudanese" Nubians and Banyarwanda violently deepened divisions around what it meant to be a Ugandan.⁷⁶ In Zaire/Congo,⁷⁷ and even more so in Burundi⁷⁸ and Rwanda,⁷⁹ discourses of autochthony (claiming first settlement of a given territory) and hierarchy (certain social groups as natural rulers of the polity) as key principles to circumscribe the political community have generated genocidal violence. Other examples (Nigeria, Cameroon...) could be cited to underline the same point: the conflicts generated by rigid notions of the nation state and citizenship in the making of political community in Africa attest to the inadequacy of a narrow juridico-political regime.

These discontents have generated extensive criticisms and suggestions for alternative approaches to the connections between political community formation, citizenship and sovereignty.⁸⁰ Peter Ekeh stresses the existence of overlapping and competing frames of political community *within* African states.⁸¹ Official citizenship was determined solely by the state but, in parallel, the "unofficial" or "primordial" realm was defined by "local" communities on the basis of birth and kinship. These two "publics", in Ekeh's terms, have different norms of behaviour. The civic public (the state) is characteristically amoral, "a space in which material gains (rights) are pursued without the need to give anything back".⁸² By contrast, the "primordial" public is defined by Ekeh as a moral space for duties to kin rather than to assertion of rights. Unlike Western conceptions of a reciprocal relationship between rights and duties, in Africa these are partitioned between two separate and rival spheres. In recent work Ekeh interrogates the Hobbesian tradition of how political communities come to underscore why the "primordial" public or sphere still retains influence in Africa. Whereas in the West individuals go to the state in search of protection, in Africa they go to ethnic kinfolk in pursuit of protection *from* the state (or in the case of post-1991 Somalia, where the state is unable to provide protection). As a result, "the bonds of mistrust between

⁷⁴ Kobo 2010.

⁷⁵ MacLean 2010.

⁷⁶ Nayenga 1979.

⁷⁷ Vlassenroot 2002.

⁷⁸ Lemarchand 1996.

⁷⁹ Prunier 1997.

⁸⁰ Ndegwa 1997.

⁸¹ Ekeh 1975, p.92.

⁸² Ibid, p. 106; cited in Hunter 2016, p.6.

states and individuals in Africa are replaced with bonds of moral sentiments binding individuals who share a common ethnicity”.⁸³ History, shared myths and symbols are important for such bonds. In Ancient Greece the stories and representations of citizens and the political community itself were already a crucial part of legitimising the political community and describing its purpose.⁸⁴

If modernisation theories of the mid-twentieth century anticipated a trajectory towards homogenous nation states, Ekeh’s seminal contributions create the possibility of recognising different kinds of political community in which membership is not determined solely by state discourses. As Hunter notes, “the unexpected persistence of subnational identities, particularly ethnic identities, in post-colonial Africa has led scholars to consider how models of citizenship that leave space for difference might be constructed”.⁸⁵ For example, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that ethnic citizenship is the “foundation” of national citizenship in Africa.⁸⁶ He posits that this does not have to threaten anyone (including the state) per se: the ethnic realm, though not necessarily separate from the national polity, can provide legitimate foundations for constructing a political community and durable peace.

How and where “citizens” assert claims highlights patterns of inclusion and exclusion from formal state institutions. The *site* of citizens’ claims-making indicates (preferred) political identity and belonging. When Ekeh posited a distinction between state and vernacular conceptions of citizenship, he also inferred different visions of political community: national and societal. The latter should be understood as inherently pluralistic (i.e. not as a binary with the state, but as a range of perspectives and vernaculars different from, but often in relation to, the national level). This insight is important to a new generation of Africanists and to this thesis: it highlights the fluidity and overlap between different conceptions of political community (and thus of citizenship) and reminds us that primordial identities (ethnic or otherwise) and state-driven discourses (which push for particular nationalist imaginings) are not mutually exclusive. In many ways, it is a call for what Nyamnjoh terms “experiments” with different configurations, as Africans “seek a broader, more flexible regime of citizenship”.⁸⁷ Such an opening is especially useful for contexts like the Somali one, where the state has characteristically been fragile or altogether absent. It paves the way for investigating what political community could be without top-down models of politico-legalism. As will be explored in this thesis, this broadening of our understanding of who the public is and what roles it can play in rethinking political community in the aftermath of war also

⁸³ Ekeh 2004, p.36.

⁸⁴ Thompson 1996.

⁸⁵ Hunter 2016, p.7.

⁸⁶ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.78.

⁸⁷ Nyamnjoh 2007, p.80.

points, in the context of migration and globalisation, to the growing prominence of actors outside the national territory who claim strong allegiance to that polity.⁸⁸

These debates also connect back to the Aristotelian emphasis on the agency of individual citizens – their choices, opinions, discussions – as constitutive of a political community. A variety of scholars are rediscovering the importance of practice in the evolution of political community and citizenship, as opposed to the long-standing focus on law and state discourse.⁸⁹ As already indicated in the previous section, this shift has important consequences for peace-building too. Studying Ethiopia, where controversies over the nature and membership of political community have led to devastating civil wars,⁹⁰ Lahra Smith probes how different ethno-regional groups can birth subnational political communities distinct from the nation-state model as a way of rebuilding a post-conflict society. “Meaningful citizenship”, for her, is about creating space for “certain kinds of claims, such as ethnic and gendered claims by citizens”, and it allows them to be understood as “liberatory and democratising rather than atavistic or primordial”.⁹¹

Peace Negotiations and the Remaking of Political Community

The growing attention paid to the variety of ways in which different social groups in war-affected societies think and talk about political community and peace (and therefore also about peace processes) is a useful departure from the narrow concerns of the power-sharing literature and the sweeping abstractions of liberal peace-builders. Such a shift in focus allows for a fuller grasp of the causes and impacts of conflict. Simultaneously, it also draws our attention to questions of belonging and the ways in which political violence may not only push people apart but also serve to bring diverse individuals and social groups together. This thesis proposes that thinking through inclusive peace opens up space for reflections on an aspect sorely missing from most peace-building discussions: the central importance of political community formation and the reimagining of who belongs to that community.

As discussed earlier, the power-sharing paradigm and liberal peace-building, each in their own way, fail to approach political community formation with the requisite breadth and depth. How citizens relate to their state and to one another, as individuals and as groups, and what narratives they compose around these

⁸⁸ Bernal 2014.

⁸⁹ Russell 2016; Mosselson 2010.

⁹⁰ Abbay 2004.

⁹¹ Smith 2013, p.8.

ties, is regularly taken for granted or downplayed in favour of other priorities. Advocates of liberal post-conflict reconstruction are preoccupied with elections, security sector reform, transparency and other reforms that are meant to check the powerful but profess agnosticism regarding the normative content of the post-conflict political community: the “fair” and “universal” rules of the game, rather than the content of the game itself. Moreover, post-1989 would-be builders of liberal order have displayed an instinctive aversion to anything that suggests nationalism, the most successful form of forging political communities in the last two centuries.⁹² Those taking a more *realpolitik* approach of stabilising war-torn polities through obtaining an agreement between the fighting factions increasingly seek to include some civil society voices. However, those are seldom influential as negotiations focus on how to get belligerents to share power in the country’s executive, parliament and other relevant institutions and how to reorient the national budget and aid flows. Furthermore, power-sharing agreements are usually lowest common denominator documents that sidestep the task of building new narratives of political community, as these issues often produced the conflict in the first place.

On the whole then, international support for how citizens struggle to fundamentally change the ways in which they relate to their state has been rare. No robust global norms have been developed to navigate the role of identity cleavages in questions of citizenship that can arise in peace negotiations. According to the Peace Accords Matrix and Kissane,⁹³ only nine out of thirty-four internationally mediated “comprehensive” peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 explicitly mention “citizenship reforms” (e.g. the 1995 Dayton Accords that protected the political rights of ethnic groups in newly recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement intended to pacify inter-communitarian relations in Northern Ireland). In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement’s mediators appeared relatively unconcerned about “core” questions of political community, which helped to fuel civil war.⁹⁴ Bah notes that the addressing of core problems of citizenship did not come from international mediators, who focused on power-sharing, elections and democratisation; it was the Ivorians themselves who insisted it be prioritised.⁹⁵ It is difficult to imagine real progress in creating effective power-sharing or building democratic institutions without resolving underlying issues of political community, who belongs to it and who gets to decide on who’s in and who’s out.

The intellectual, cultural and political complexities inherent in these latter dilemmas are part of the

⁹² Lieven, *forthcoming*.

⁹³ Kissane 2016.

⁹⁴ Mitchell 2012.

⁹⁵ Bah 2010, p.599.

problem and not to be underestimated. Moreover, to the limited extent that peace-makers and negotiators have dared to tackle these (such as in the 2005 Aceh peace accords, which followed thirty years of insurgency against the Indonesian government), they have often chosen to restrict their initiatives to legal reforms and to do so through closed processes that are more predictable and controllable. Although new laws can be important in their own right in potentially creating new ways of belonging, or at least co-existing, without widespread participation building genuine support for peace processes is difficult. Top-down legal reforms and elite pacts helped to end the war⁹⁶ but have done little to eliminate Acehnese ethno-nationalism or to address the huge inequities that led to the conflict; moreover, despite formal claims to the contrary, Acehnese women – who made up a considerable section of the rebels – were not heard during the peace process; nor did the new laws make much difference to their political and economic marginalisation. Most of the progress they have made in the last fifteen years has been the result of their own struggles, negotiating what remains an often disempowering institutional, cultural and political context.⁹⁷

Furthermore, such legal reformism without seeking to harness grass-roots involvement to create new narratives of how communities can politically come together also carries major risks. For instance, the Dayton Peace Accords explicitly recognised the fracturing of the body politic as a root cause of conflict and set out to “protect” Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats after the 1992–5 war. However, the treaty inscribed ethnic groupings into the constitution as permanent political constellations. This entrenchment of war identities is partly responsible for Bosnia’s continuing “struggle with identity limitations imposed on it by the peace treaty”.⁹⁸ Such reification of identity limits possibilities for new and different political frames. Peace agreements (and structures, as will be explored in this thesis) can problematically lock or cement identity in conflictual terms. Murer and others⁹⁹ warn of the dangers of externally mediated peace-making that takes static narratives of collectivities at face value, rather than recognising the fluid quality of (ethnic) identity.

The task at hand is complex but not hopeless. Peace processes, as Sieder observed in post-peace agreement Guatemala, can enable the “taking into account [of] the multiple appeals to citizenship from different and conflicting social sectors”.¹⁰⁰ The culmination of Guatemala’s “transition processes” in the 1995 accords precipitated a change in the nature of citizenship after four decades of civil war and

⁹⁶ Aspinall 2009.

⁹⁷ Rahmawati, Susilastuti, Mas'ood, Darwin 2018.

⁹⁸ Murer 2010, p.5.

⁹⁹ Keranen 2014.

¹⁰⁰ Sieder 2001, p.204.

genocidal violence. Constitutional amendments and, for the first time, “multicultural perspectives” on national laws extended unprecedented inclusion to indigenous Mayan populations. International mediators and donors encouraged indigenous rights’ recognition and “multicultural” approaches to citizenship rights by drawing on human rights norms and instruments, even if many observers believed these measures fell short of the social justice required for “lasting peace”.¹⁰¹ These reforms were enshrined in the 1995 peace deal with the UN as monitor of the agreement’s implementation.

The Guatemala peace agreement was imperfect and did not resolve huge grievances pertaining to the nature of state–society relations and belonging within the nation.¹⁰² However, it offers a fascinating case study that highlights the importance of an historically contingent perspective on political community and peace-building that can capture the interactive relations between status, descent and territory – claims of which are (re)intensified during transition processes. This points to the importance of investigating the origins of approaches to inclusion, the actors who develop them, and their impacts on post-war discourses and practices of citizenship.

This core interest animates my central research question: How do inclusion and representation modalities in peace processes contest, produce and rekindle understandings of political community, and vice versa? In this thesis I therefore undertake a deeper investigation of the remaking of political community during peace processes in the context of territorial fragmentation and civil war in Somalia. Between 1991 and 1999, dominant international approaches to peace-making in Somalia paid little attention to the nature, or membership, of political community. Indeed, most resulting settlements were silent on citizenry rights, competing assertions of belonging and political representation. However, two unexpected peace conferences reversed this trend and spurred new claims to rights and identity-based politics by groups not previously visible in the pre-war political landscape.

The Somali National Peace Conference (2000) and the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (2002–4) were sites for experimental approaches to inclusion and representation. In the spring of 2000, the Djiboutian government hosted closed-door meetings with prominent exiles and self-declared civil society leaders from various regions in Somalia. Topping the agenda was the question of how to ensure the representation of Somalia’s unarmed social groups: “people who were held captive by warlords”.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Preti 2002.

¹⁰² Burrell 2013.

¹⁰³ Interview with Ismail Goulal Boudine, Djibouti’s representative at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, in Djibouti, December 2018.

It was agreed that clans (understood as Somalia's undisputed/uncontested traditional socio-political constituencies) would be a temporary "formula" to represent civil society groups, including, for the first time, women's associations. These historically overlooked constituencies, not armed actors, were to drive the peace agenda.

Almost immediately after this extraordinary commitment to diversify and the adoption of the clan formula as a basis for inclusion, the so-called "Third Republic" of Somalia was declared. A select group of civil society representatives proclaimed a new dawn in Somali history, of similar significance to the independence and unification of Somalia in 1960 (the First Republic) and the coup led by Siad Barre and his generals in 1969 (the Second Republic). The proclamation placed Somalia's traditional leaders at the heart of a new political community. Set against a decade-long violent civil war and a fragmented nation, the Third Republic prioritised unprecedented inclusiveness as necessary for healing and reconciliation. Almost twenty years later, Somalia's fragile institutions and citizens still struggle with the enactment of inclusive politics, unsure of the contours of their "national" political community. But this does not detract from the potential lessons we can draw from the brazenly inclusive and innovative peace processes in the early 2000s. This study is dedicated to understanding the controversies, ideas and structures of inclusion and representational politics that arose during Somalia's peace negotiations. By doing so, I hope to contribute to more robust theoretical linkages between peace-making and the evolution of political community, as well as chronicling a highly consequential episode in the modern history of the peoples of Somalia.

Thesis Argument

This thesis approaches peace processes as sites of contestation, production and reshaping of political community and the ways in which, in turn, ideas of and struggles over political community shape negotiations. Specifically, I explore the consequences of "inclusion" and the rise of new actors and discourses in peace processes. In the context of efforts to reconstruct a Somali state in the early 2000s, I find that the broadening of political space and agenda of negotiations did not just lead to the usual competition over positions and novel institutions; it also powerfully asserted new and old visions of political community that have remained salient political facts ever since.

This project's two case studies, the Arta (2000) and Mbagathi (2002–4) conferences, pursued different approaches to inclusion. Somalia's neighbours (especially Djibouti and Ethiopia), regional institutions such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as international "partners",

including the UN and Western donors, all had their own evolving interpretations of inclusive peace. The dominant Somali approach was the “4.5 clan formula”: a form of inclusion pioneered by civil society and premised on representing and balancing Somalia’s vast and complex networks of clans through a calculus that mixes social status and political clout. I argue that while this innovation carved out spaces and structures for new players, it also erected new forms of exclusion, as it simultaneously affirmed the relevance of a Somali nation and identified clans as political communities through which the national body politik would henceforth be accessed.

Inclusive peace during the Arta and Mbagathi conferences highlighted that inclusion does not just entail more voices around the table, but it can produce meaningfully different outcomes than power-sharing or liberal peace-building, both of which have historically offered little to remedy Somalis’ long-standing grievance about discussing the nature of political community and its membership. I identify four aspects in which the clan formula that emerged during the peace processes transformed contestations around imaginings of political community. First, the clan formula offered a new language for making claims. The evidence assembled here underscores that demands for and expressions of rights at the conferences became “group” or “clan” based, identifying new pillars to buttress political community in Somalia and introducing clan hierarchy to determine the nature of membership. This signalled a departure from pre-war liberal constitutional principles of Somali citizenship based on individuals as the constituents of the nation. This new framework of citizenship would become a lasting feature of post-2000 Somali politics.

Second, the 4.5 formula – in which each of the four major clan groupings counted as one, and other smaller groups together as a half – reshaped prior relationships and the power balance between clans and sub-clans. The most dramatic manifestation of this was the production of “majority” and “minority” clans, with implications for access to sources of political and economic influence. The clan formula ignited intense struggles for power between clans, as well as the level of sub-clans.

Third, the rapid “institutionalisation” of the clan formula during peace negotiations posed distinct threats to groups who were neither fully nor adequately represented by the formula and had different understandings regarding the referent political community and its members. Specifically, women and Somalis in the diaspora had little recourse to meaningful inclusion in the talks outside rigidly defined clan frameworks. Their struggles and modes of organising shed light on gendered and diasporic/transnational dimensions of political belonging as women and diasporas strive to see their identities reflected in a post-war political community.

Fourth, the introduction of the clan formula produced counter-narratives and strategies to subvert perceived clan “hegemony” in claims-making within a rekindled Somali polity. The ascent of clans as the cornerstone of the political community led to the resurgence of nationalist discourse to check the clan formula and clan politics. The thesis illustrates how Somali nationalism and Islamism, which offer alternative articulations of political community and its membership, challenged the polarising effects of clan-framed citizenship.

These four clusters of discussions constitute the core of my argument and are discussed sequentially in the dissertation, in Chapters 4 to 7.

Methodology

This thesis tackles an understudied subject by documenting the struggles and successes of historically marginalised groups in accessing meaningful spaces in international peace negotiations. As evident from the literature review conducted above, there is growing animus in scholarly circles and among practitioners to explore methodologically what it means to challenge the epistemological privilege of the elite or “core” peace actors (in the Somali context, “warlords”). I was drawn, on normative and analytical grounds,¹⁰⁴ to prioritise knowledge(s) and experiences articulated by actors who have long been peripheral in decision-making. This thesis dissects ubiquitous and uncritically applied categories and assumptions in the peace processes as it endeavours to centre subaltern perspectives. Thus, I hope to help amplify voices historically at the margin of peace structures and recognise the different forms of agency available to heterogeneous peace delegates.

Central to this study is a critical examination of the roles played by women, “minorities”, diaspora-based Somalis and, to a lesser extent, traditional elders. They constitute the diverse, “unarmed” groups who were often lumped together under the label “civil society” at the Arta and Mbagathi conferences and came to shape these in ways that many ordinary Somalis remember as qualitatively different from previous rounds of peace negotiations. My focus on these actors can help to capture and structure a range of fluctuating identities, views and positions expressed by supposedly peripheral actors as they experimented with different configurations of political community. This involves examining how the presumed citizens of the so-called Third Republic, in the diaspora and the Somali territories, are placed (and place themselves) vis-à-vis hegemonic paradigms; processes and outcomes of peace negotiations; and broader domestic and

¹⁰⁴ Ackerly 2008, pp.41-2.

international political structures. Though peace-making endeavours tend to be extremely hierarchal and perpetuate different types of oppression, they may nonetheless offer emancipatory potential; I investigate both sides of that proverbial coin in this thesis and the conditions under which change may occur.

My concern for non-armed actors and their participation in peace-making and political community formation means this thesis is focused less on establishing an “objective” history of the Arta and Mbagathi peace processes and more on exploring the subjective experiences of all kinds of Somali citizens. I highlight the agency of participant–subjects involved in peace processes as they (re)claimed spaces in international negotiations. My approach offers distinct insights into meaning-making processes of citizenship, rights and belonging in peace arenas, and the alliances, confrontations and ideas that shape them.¹⁰⁵

Such efforts link up with the methodological openings of scholars resolutely embracing subjectivity and positionality in rethinking traditional understandings of security,¹⁰⁶ peace-building,¹⁰⁷ nation-building¹⁰⁸ and political identity,¹⁰⁹ which are neither evenly experienced nor evenly implemented (let alone equitably and inclusively defined). Of particular importance here is deconstructing the overlapping forms of exclusion that different individuals and social groups have often faced in Somali politics: for example, as women; as belonging to the lineage of a “minority clan”; and as (relative) youngsters in a society that listens more, and more attentively, to elders. The interconnected nature of categories and categorisations (“intersectionality”¹¹⁰) calls for particular attention in research methodology regarding the interplay between these, both in terms of how oppression and exclusion might continue to manifest themselves and how people and communities develop strategies to break out of these. To do so in this project, I have drawn inspiration from several quarters. For instance, Stern’s work on Guatemala underscores the multiplicity of women’s identities in indigenous Mayan claims to political identity and security arrangements that can respond to the real needs of “bodies”.¹¹¹ Through a similar exploration of (male) identities and masculinities in the context of post-war Somalia, El-Bushra and Gardner undertake extensive inter-generational interviews to examine shifts in gender relations.¹¹² This approach can also entail rethinking our geographical lens regarding changing political identities and citizenship in cyber

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Björkdahl, Mannergren Selimovic 2016.

¹⁰⁶ Robinson 2011; Tripp, Ferree, Ewig 2013.

¹⁰⁷ Hudson 2009; Hudson 2016; Pankhurst 2003.

¹⁰⁸ Eriksen 2002; Gutiérrez 1999.

¹⁰⁹ Handrahan 2004.

¹¹⁰ Ni Aolain 2016; El-Bushra, Gardner 2016.

¹¹¹ Stern 2005.

¹¹² El-Bushra, Gardner 2016.

space; Bernal draws attention to online forums as sites that illuminate “diasporic citizen” relations with African polities such as Eritrea that are unbound by traditional territorial confinements of the nation states.¹¹³ These path-breaking studies highlight diverse methodological approaches to conducting illuminating research on identity shifts and relations within the body politic after great social and political upheaval.

My methodological approach aims to enrich understandings of peace processes in three ways: (1) to pinpoint unarmed actors’ agency, influence and legitimacy, and how they are acquired, lost and reclaimed; (2) to highlight the intersectionality of experiences and multiple identities, including the extent to which deliberative processes in peace conferences (and their outcomes) are gendered and made transnational; and (3) to chart how political identities are forged and the consequences of this on expanding the remit of claims-making, representational politics and, ultimately, imaginings of political community.

Methods and Sources

This thesis is an exercise in contemporary historical research that emphasises crucial continuities and traces key ruptures in discussions about inclusive peace and conceptions of political community. As I analyse narratives around inclusion, claims-making and political community by taking subjects’ lived experiences as a “standpoint”,¹¹⁴ this thesis draws on a range of qualitative methods. I translate critical approaches to knowledge production – that assert situatedness – into ethnographic techniques that underpin my assemblage of different narratives and memories.¹¹⁵ This also corresponds to the growing trend in peace studies to embrace ethnography as a way of capturing hitherto overlooked local and/or intimate intricacies of peace-building;¹¹⁶ Millar¹¹⁷ recently called for field-based peace research agendas to be participatory, including and reflecting research “subjects”, the very people who are ultimately affected by peace negotiations and interventions. An emancipatory agenda for peace research broadens spheres of policy-guided or high-theory categories to allow a fuller range of identities and perspectives to emerge. Thus, in order to situate and centre identities and subjectivities in researching the deliberative processes in peace talks, I focus on letters, oral testimonies, video material, diplomatic correspondence and written histories. These new sources illuminate links between political community formation and

¹¹³ Bernal 2014.

¹¹⁴ Harding 1986, 2004.

¹¹⁵ Feely 2020.

¹¹⁶ Autesserre 2009.

¹¹⁷ Miller 2018.

peace-building of far greater complexity and nuance than those in dominant analyses that privilege a few (armed) men.

This endeavour has been made possible by original archival research that I conducted in Djibouti between 2017 and 2019. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Headquarters and the Djiboutian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hold a veritable treasure trove of documents hitherto virtually unexplored by scholars. The archives contained a wealth of official statements, detailed information about the proceedings of the conferences, press releases and budgets, as well as correspondence among the organisers and between the hosts and (prospective/self-inviting) participants. As most of these texts had been digitised, I had access to a great deal of available documentation after my fieldwork, allowing me to trace the presences and silences in the archives of the Arta and Mbagathi peace conferences. This is the first doctoral study, to my knowledge, that extensively uses these archives, thus contributing significantly to the body of empirical evidence on key junctures in recent Somali and regional history.

This thesis is cognisant that no collection is politically neutral and that the politics of archives are central to how the past is (re)shaped: the ways in which they construct teleologies and path dependencies and help write official histories of “peace-makers” and “aggressors”, winners and losers.¹¹⁸ Archives almost inevitably privilege the construction of sovereignty by some and ignore alternative pathways that might, at some moment in the recent past, actually have been more likely or gained greater traction among significant swathes of a population, only to be pushed to the background or erased by those seeking to strengthen power.¹¹⁹ A robust literature highlights the dangers and pitfalls of such selective memorialisation and recording, especially in Africa where so much of recent history remains underdocumented or told only through the lenses of incumbent governments, men with guns or outsiders.¹²⁰ Furthermore, in the context of protracted political violence, engaging with the (official) past and seeking to balance it with other sources leads to profound ethical dilemmas, especially for the researcher.¹²¹

The enormous volume of letters, position papers and media clips found in the archives of IGAD and Djibouti’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs collectively reveal a heterogeneous set of narratives, experiences and claims of ordinary Somali participants and observers in Arta and Mbagathi. My arguments in this

¹¹⁸ Schwartz, Cook 2002.

¹¹⁹ Bsheer 2020.

¹²⁰ Shepherd 2002; Harris 2002.

¹²¹ Subotić 2020.

thesis are grounded in analysis of dozens of these pieces of correspondence and manifestos written by Somalis (addressed to the wider Somali community, as well as external conference organisers). They showcase a range of views by various unarmed actors, which until now have not been systematically studied and have generally been dismissed as unimportant to the “real politics” of the region. For instance, many “communities” – a complicated concept in Somalia historically – attempted to document their pre-colonial histories to bolster what they considered to be rightful claims to better representation in the re-emerging state architecture under formation at the conferences. Such efforts were highly revealing of processes of social change in war-torn Somalia in the 1990s but were also politically consequential in structuring how the peace negotiations would proceed, and who could speak on behalf of whom. Such narratives are rich signifiers of the *zeitgeist* and were accompanied by a very different set of texts that proved equally revealing of the who, how, what and why of particular histories deployed. For example, my acquisition of rare official Djiboutian documents (not least internal government correspondence) uncovered detailed lists of Arta participants organised into clan and sub-clan. These lists documented names, professions, locations (many resided outside Somalia) and other biographical details, including mothers’ lineage. For anyone familiar with post-independence projects of Somali nation-building that sought to eviscerate clan consciousness, this is highly unexpected and therefore significant material: it shows participants pushing for the reconstitution of the Somali state, but with fundamentally different building-blocks.

These written accounts underscore the Somali experience(s) and narratives foundational to this project. They enrich the thesis by centring Somalis’ agency and political subjectivities in all their promises and contradictions. To piece together an intelligible overview of the peace processes for the reader, I have sought to integrate, complement and contrast “official” and “unofficial” histories of Arta and Mbagathi. Triangulation between official sources that establish basic facts about the conference events, subjective narratives in letters and memoranda, and the rich memories unearthed during drawn-out conversations has been crucial to my evolving understanding of efforts to remake the Somali political community in the quest for peace. Primary interviews that I conducted held key Somali informants accountable for their views, while also revealing how the passage of time and the political context since had changed their views and memories (or not).¹²²

Based on the transnational nature of the peace processes and the global Somali diaspora, this research was inevitably multi-sited.¹²³ I conducted extensive personal interviews and informal discussions over several

¹²² Cf. Roessler, Verhoeven 2016, pp.419–27.

¹²³ Horst 2018.

years, both in the Horn – Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya – and outside the region in the UK (London, Norwich and Oxford), Canada (Toronto) and Qatar (Doha).¹²⁴ Interviewees (both male and female) were selected through snowballing techniques based on their roles in the peace processes. Life histories interviews with prominent Somali women, conducted in Somalia and in diaspora locations, between 2014 and 2015, supported arguments found in Chapter 5. A team, of which I was an integral part, collected and analysed such life histories as part of the Gender in Politics in Somalia (GENSOM) project funded by the Research Council of Norway. A broader set of interviews with protagonists were subsequently conducted with prominent regional and international officials representing – in the past but also contemporarily – institutions like the UN, IGAD and governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. The perspectives that emerge from these different interviews, although diverse in their discourses on citizenship, peace-building and inclusion, represent only a slice of Somali life.

This process of in-depth dialogue with actors at the heart of peace-building, and those situated more peripherally, was aided by my official permission to use the visual archives held by the Qatar-based Aljazeera Arabic network and the Djibouti state agency La Radiodiffusion Télévision de Djibouti. These archives included artistic performances, debates among conference participants, interviews given to international media and foreign leaders' speeches. Particularly notable were the recorded deliberations of the Arta Arbitration Committee that announced, for the first time, its decision about power-sharing according to the 4.5 clan formula. Analysis of such visual materials proved vital in conjunction with written material.

The layering of narratives about alliances and opportunities during the peace processes exposed how gender, clan identity, ethnicity and other identities sometimes acted in concert, at other times clashed, and in other moments ran parallel to one another during “the founding” of the Third Somali Republic. My methodological approach had both normative and instrumental value, as drawing on this broad range of research methods yielded exciting results in revealing a variegated tapestry of perspectives and unexpected alignments. This brought me back to my initial theoretical intuition: that striving to include a variety of unarmed and historically marginalised actors is a meaningful practice, one that is neither symbolic nor tokenistic and one that should ultimately benefit the communities with whom the research has been developed.

¹²⁴ I also draw on my earlier fieldwork in Somalia between 2014 and 2016, particularly for discussions in Chapters 5 and 6. These interviews, footnoted in this thesis as “unpublished”, were collected during my tenure as researcher with the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies in Mogadishu, with permission to use.

The stance set out above on knowledge production – its subjective character, its role as a determinant of how power is exercised and the need for research to relate to and ultimately benefit its core subjects – compels critical reflections on my own positionality. Critical qualitative inquiry challenges traditional notions of the pursuit of strict objectivity in social scientific research as its highest aspiration: it recognises the subjectivity of the researcher (as opposed to the subjectivity of the actors, structures and discourses under study) and values empathy and emotional connection with research subjects as an integral part of the project design.¹²⁵ It also means tracing back how the encounter with various types of empirical evidence impacted my own analytical thinking and emotional state of mind. As someone whose own family history is deeply marked by the events studied in this thesis, I found it both unnerving and exciting to piece together assumptions and conclusions emerging from textured accounts of the war that tore apart Africa's supposedly most obvious nation state and the efforts to put it back together following the worst years of violence. My own upbringing emphasised the virtues of Somali nationalism and Islam, and adopted, early on, a sense of cosmopolitanism commonly held by urban, well-educated Somalis. My interest in how to bring different Somalis – and different experiences of being Somali – together and to explore continuity and change in ideas and practices of citizenship has had a long gestation period.

The narratives I encountered were often contradictory, confusing and emotionally daunting for the speakers/writers, as well as for me, their interlocutor. The testimonies of people not previously considered central and influential subjects with regards to knowledge production in post-1991 Somalia comprise the bulk of the new material. Many did not speak or write with scholarly audiences in mind, and certainly did not expect their testimonies, pleas and emotions to one day be part of an archive or PhD thesis – an important fact that rendered their words more authentic, but also intimate and vulnerable in my hands, as a researcher (at once an insider and an outsider).¹²⁶ For that reason, I found representing and analysing the narratives surrounding the peace processes simultaneously highly challenging and exciting.

In the archives and the interviews, the notion of clan identity was a particularly emotionally laden topic for the core actors of this study and for me. As a female Somali researcher interested in exploring the situatedness and various perspectives expressed in the peace processes, researching and writing about (clan) identity and belonging unearthed personal memories, dilemmas and hopes. During the course of my research, I discovered family members who had been engaged in Arta and Mbagathi conferences as

¹²⁵ Yanow, Schwartz-Shea 2006, p.22; Thomson, Ansoms, Murison 2012.

¹²⁶ Carling, Erdal, Ezzati 2014.

“civil society” participants. My late father, for instance, was invited to the pre-Arta meetings in March 2000. He travelled from Cairo to Djibouti to attend a meeting with “wise men” (mostly former politicians) but left, I discovered, because he fiercely disagreed with clan as a basis for participation. My aunt also travelled from Toronto to Arta as part of a group of national cultural icons to use her art – poetry – to encourage unity and reconciliation. My cousin, a former minister of health, travelled from Turin in Italy to Kenya to participate in the IGAD-hosted conference. While reviewing the long lists of participants found in the Djiboutian and IGAD archival records, I came across several others who were either family relations or acquaintances. Moreover, my family lineage and history allowed me to gain access, especially to high-ranking Djiboutian officials who personally knew my paternal uncle, the first Somali ambassador to newly independent Djibouti. These instances underscore my close proximity to this project, leading me to ponder complex questions about researcher objectivity and insider/outsider roles in social science knowledge production. These remain as valid and important as when this doctoral research began – I continue to reflect on them, and my constant awareness of them has hopefully strengthened the nuanced arguments and conclusions I put forward here.

This is evident in how I tackle the concept of clan, which occupies an outsized space in matters of identity, political discourse and contemporary Somali imaginaries.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, over-emphasising the centrality of clan risks essentialising Somali people and their world-views. Therefore, I am cognisant of how I write about clans. My Somali identity means I am embedded in clan structures with which I engage, both personally and intellectually; clan identity connects me to my ancestral lineage, as well as the wider Somali community. Though my clan identity garnered trust and facilitated meetings, the violent politicisation of clans – my family had been targeted and displaced from its homes in Somalia because of it – also casts a long shadow over this project. I have experienced the unifying aspects of clan identity and how it engenders solidarity, but also witnessed its darkest, violent manifestations during civil war. These experiences made me especially interested in exploring how other Somali citizens have reflected on and sought to express different identities.

The array of perspectives captured in archival texts and interviews indicate that clan identity is not the only mode of self-identification that mattered for claims-making and forging distinct political agendas. I chose to highlight clan – while balancing it with alternative (sometimes overlapping and sometimes contrasting/antagonistic) narratives – partly because of personal experience. I left Mogadishu as a child amid clan violence in 1991. In 2014 I returned to the city as a professional researcher after more than two

¹²⁷ Luling 2006.

decades of exile. I became (and was seen as) part of a polyglot circle of young, Western-educated Somali women and men, many of whom had felt the need to “return” to contribute to society. To my surprise, clan identity seldom arose during my interactions in Mogadishu. When it did, clan symbolised a form of oppression and a challenge to social healing that had to be overcome; I was struck by how clan was trumped by other, more “cosmopolitan” forms of identity stemming from displacement experiences. The very social construct that had driven the nation apart was now, in a sense, fuelling a new sense of togetherness, belonging and – dare I say – Somali unity. This contrasts starkly with so much of the literature and online discourse that often identifies the clan (and only the clan) as the key wedge generating divisions in Somali politics and society.

At Arta and Mbagathi, clan identity was central too, but its many manifestations included forms that directly contradict facile interpretations of it as a great divider or generator of conflict. I have approached the clan at these conferences as much through my own close experience of the social realities in Somalia as through applying the highest scholarly standards. Being inundated with clan language by conference participants and outside scholars alike presented a dilemma – I have laid out the evidence as I found it and simultaneously moved the analysis away from essentialist claims that cast the clan as the only possible category of analysis. A singular focus on clans cannot account for the complexity of interactions at the Arta and Mbagathi conferences, as in other crucial moments of Somali political (or personal) life. I paid special attention to voices expressing other ideas and questioned dominant clan structures, tracing their interactions (sometimes confrontation, sometimes pragmatic cooperation) with them, illustrating that non-clan-based ideas and values are both historically crucial and contemporarily valuable.

The intersecting themes of identity, political belonging and peace-building, and my relationship with these themes, guided me to focus on understanding the processes through which certain frames and discourses not only become dominant in political discussions but are, in turn, sometimes reified to the extent that modern political life becomes unimaginable without them. In what follows, Somali clans (and other forms of social and political expression) emerge as often slippery and unstable: as political and social identities of the marginalised but also as an instrument of power both affirmed and completely reworked over the course of the Arta and Mbagathi conferences. Somalis (participants and non-participants alike) arrived at such new institutional arrangements via intense debates in the formal halls of Arta and Mbagathi, and informally under acacia trees. These dynamic processes continue to be the lifeblood of Somali political identity, compelling me to structure this thesis around questions of how political community and its membership are *(re)made*, rather than a static definition of what they are.

Structure of the Thesis

The next chapter begins with a dissection of recent Somali political history through the lens of citizenship and political community production and contestation. The chapter presents competing narratives about *the* political community in post-independence Somalia and its members, and illustrates how they have continuously shaped Somali politics. I place discussions about the “4.5 clan formula” within longer historical trajectories by laying out multi-layered and contentious narratives around political community. The circumstances that led delegates at Arta and Mbagathi to articulate inclusion in terms of clans, and not another identity or category, can only be grasped fully by revisiting the modern history (and historiography) of Somali citizenship and nationhood.

Though the “4.5 clan formula” was characterised as a Somali response to achieve “balance” and inclusion, the formula was also a product of regional and global thinking: external actors came to believe that the route to greater legitimacy of external efforts to reconstruct the Somali state lay in including “traditional” authorities. Chapter 3 positions the Arta and Mbagathi peace processes within the context of international peace-making, showing how the novel proposal to include Somali civil society put the rekindling of political community and its constituent concerns, such as “balance”, citizenship, clan rights and representational politics, at the core of peace negotiations.

Chapter 4 examines why the 4.5 clan formula had such tremendous appeal to Somalis alongside growing external desires for “traditional mechanisms” to bring peace. I illustrate how the formula redrew relations of power within Somali communities and reshaped discourses and practices of post-war Somali citizenship. First, the transformation created by the clan formula, which produced “majority” and “minority” clans, amounts to a post-war “social contract” between Somali communities. Second, Chapter 4 draws on new empirical material to demonstrate the emergence of a new language of clan rights, foregrounding an understanding of the 4.5 clan formula at the intersection of broader discussions about inclusive peace and shifting ideas about political community. By showing how the clan formula altered relationships between Somali communities and legitimised clan claims-making in public political discourse, I argue that the formula had a powerful and lasting impact: the clan became an officially recognised form of political community in its own right and the way through which citizens access the politics and institutions of the Somali nation. The chapter also investigates how civil society and “warlords” (perceived as antagonists) enforced and entrenched the formula.

Chapters 5 and 6 explore how women and diaspora groups engage with inclusion modalities, such as the clan formula, and how these groups generate new ideas of political community tied to representation. These two chapters represent smaller “case studies” on women (Chapter 5) and diaspora groups (Chapter 6), which offer an overview of the plethora of strategies developed by these groups to assert their inclusion in the peace processes as women and diaspora groups perceived the clan formula to be inadequate to represent their interests fully. These strategies range from women’s invention of an entirely new “Sixth Clan”, to instrumentally using nationalist discourses, or through engagement with the 4.5 formula itself. Often, these groups resorted to several of these simultaneously to participate in peace talks and to be included in political settlements. While these responses highlight gendered and transnational/diasporic dimensions of the representation debate, they also contribute to a well-rounded view of citizenship struggles as framed in terms of inclusion in post-war political processes and structures.

Narratives about the centrality of the Somali “nation” and “*ummah*” in imaginings of self and community are replete in my interviews and also present in the writings of Somali delegates and observers to the conferences. Somali nationalism and Islamism remained crucial as alternative templates for political community formation. Chapter 7 investigates the resurgence of pan-Somali nationalist discourse and the intensification of Islamist politics as counter-narratives to the most restrictive interpretations of the clan formula. I examine the instrumental uses of nationalist ideologies to challenge perceived polarisation and “clan hegemony” associated with the 4.5 formula. The very notion of clan rights stoked fear about the future of Somalis as a “united” nation. Like the civil war itself, the formula symbolised a drastically different revisioning of the way Somalis saw and identified themselves. The notion that participants could acquire legitimacy through the clan formula alone was seen as a dangerous and hasty overhaul of prior ideas of the national political community.

In the concluding chapter, I revisit the central research question and arguments and assess their wider significance by placing them in comparative perspective. The politics surrounding the Arta and Mbagathi peace processes indicate that inclusion projects have value beyond reorganising power relations and constitutional arrangements: they galvanised reflection among Somali participants about the foundations and contours of political community and nationhood. I argue that to ignore these developments is to miss the lifeblood of the Third Republic and what many ordinary people understand by peace-building.

CHAPTER 2: Political Community Formation and Citizenship in Somalia

What is the Somali body politic? Is *Somalinimo* just a social identity – rooted in a (real or imagined) shared descent from a common ancestor and the *Af Soomaali* language – or should cultural similarities lead to a specific form of political organisation? What kind of legal citizenship status and set of rights and responsibilities should come with being Somali? Who is allowed to define who belongs and who does not? And how are identity, statehood and territory linked in the Somali context? The introduction to this thesis identified that evolving conceptualisations of political community and citizenship have been significantly under-studied as determinants (and consequences) of peace-building. This chapter re-examines recent Somali political history through the lens of political community formation and its intersections with various ideas of citizenship. Rethinking how Somali citizenship took shape during the independence struggle and in the post-1960 era – including the period of socialist revolution – paves the way to understanding why quests for peace and state reconstruction in the 1990s and early 2000s became intertwined with attempts to achieve “balance”: the notion that Somalis should enjoy equal and full participation in politics. Dissecting the long history of struggles and meta-narratives about Somali political community provides the necessary context for why so many Somalis who sought to build a new political order in the wake of state collapse in 1991 identified the 4.5 clan formula as a means to address their experiences of unequal citizenship and to construct a more durable peace.

Making a National Political Community

Modern Somali history is replete with attempts to forge and project a sense of cohesive Somali identity.¹²⁸ Cassanelli notes that “if modern Somali nationalism is the product of unique events and ideologies of the twentieth century, surely it draws its strength from the common traditions and shared experiences of the precolonial past”.¹²⁹ This makes it imperative to approach contemporary politics through studying the interactions between the assumed cultural bases of membership and legal citizenship status, as well as the interplays between state discourses and modern historiographies on Somali nationhood.

¹²⁸ Ahmed 1995.

¹²⁹ Cassanelli 1982, p.7.

The construction of a Somali “nation”, and its equation with a robust (homogenous) political community, first materialised in response to the threat posed by European powers in the late nineteenth century. Around 1900, a letter from the Islamic scholar and future nation-builder Sayyid Abdulle Hassan travelled across the pastoralist heartland to the coastal town of Merka, the seat of the Sultanate of Biyamaal. The document, inscribed in Arabic and known as *Risala lil Biyamaal* (Letter to the Biyamaal), commended the Sultan for his resistance against the encroaching Italians on the Indian Ocean coast, expressing the need for united resistance.¹³⁰ This invasion, in Sayyid Abdulle’s terms, represented an existential threat to Somalis scattered in different polities. By then, British colonial troops were already present in what is now north-western Somalia and the Somali-inhabited territories of (northern) Kenya. This letter is one of the earliest-known written accounts urging political entities across the Somali Peninsula to resist the ascent of colonialism. As British documents and Somali oral histories testify, Sayyid Abdulle Hassan waged a decades-long armed struggle against both British colonisation and Abyssinian imperial expansion in the Haud, now the Somali region of Ethiopia.¹³¹ He succeeded in uniting pastoralist sub-clans who were historically bitter rivals engaged in wars to gain control over water and grazing rights. In the early 1900s, in the face of similar threats in southern Somalia, the Biyamaal Sultan himself led the Merka Revolt against the Italian naval forces set on dominating major port towns and their adjacent hinterlands.¹³²

By relying on his sophisticated rhetoric and status as an *imam*, Sayyid Abdulle’s pact with the Sultan of Biyamaal highlights two important points. First, Somalis were not yet constituted as a nation, contrary to influential ethnographic writings by British anthropologist I M Lewis.¹³³ Nationhood, and whatever Somali “consciousness” underpinned it, had to be constructed – and the experience of war was crucial to that construction. Colonial aggressions propelled the crafting of Somali nationhood from culturally and politically different groups. Cultural and linguistic commonalities that united pastoralist Somalis of the hinterlands were distinct from the cultures, geographies and political economy of coastal inhabitants. Similarly, coastal political systems differed from those of the pastoralists. Unlike sedentary groups along the Indian Ocean, constant migration constituted a primary mode of survival and, therefore, informed the political systems governing pastoralists.¹³⁴ Resistance to colonial domination provided urgency to an encounter – or created the opportunity for a shared political understanding – between diverse inhabitants of the Somali Peninsula. This was enabled by Sayyid Abdulle’s articulation of anti-colonialism in religious terms. Framing Islam as one obvious commonality, the imam mobilised diverse communities under the

¹³⁰ Samatar 1992, p.66.

¹³¹ Laitin 1979, Sheik-Abdi 1993.

¹³² Abbink 2003.

¹³³ Lewis 1965.

¹³⁴ Lewis 1961.

banner of holy resistance¹³⁵ (as Somali Islamists would do a century later), paralleling the contemporaneous anti-Egyptian and anti-British revolt of the Mahdi in Sudan and the creation of the Mahdiyya state, with its capital in Omdurman.¹³⁶ In addition to sowing the seeds of Somali nationhood, imperial projects in the Horn would later give birth to a distinct imagining of Somali community and unity under a perpetual existential threat. What is important to this thesis is how recently that sense of *political* identity was constructed.

Historiographies of nationhood and processes of nation-formation in the Horn may be partly responsible for how we have arrived at modern-day ideas about a homogenous Somali national political community.¹³⁷ For half a century, scholarly writing about Somalia tended to highlight cultural, linguistic and religious homogeneity above difference – a primordialism that dovetails with age-old ideas of Somali identity. These studies shared their identification of a common “national” identity prior to the birth of the Somali state in 1960.¹³⁸ The highly influential work of Lewis exemplifies this approach in its focus on “Somali consciousness” – an intangible but omnipresent force presumed to have united nomadic pastoralist clans before the colonial period.¹³⁹ The underlying assumption is a projection of Somali pastoralists’ experiences and common traditions onto an entire nation. It amplifies a sense of exceptionalism in Somali society in relation to other African societies¹⁴⁰ that was presumed to ease the arduous task of creating a nation state despite the artificial borders inherited from colonisation by people in the Somali Peninsula. One unintended consequence of such historiography has been to relegate Somalis who did/do not conform to “mainstream” clans to marginal “sub-cultures”, a process with lethal consequences in post-independence Somalia. This culturalist reading of history and politics is also of major importance to understanding the experiments with different notions of political community at the peace conferences of Arta and Mbagathi in the early 2000s.

Reflections on “Clan” in Somali History

The introduction of the “4.5 clan formula” in 2000, as well as its ubiquitous usage since, drew upon the well-established, if controversial, Somali kinship system. Since I M Lewis’s 1961 classic on pastoralist social organisation, Somali society has usually been described in academic and popular literature (and

¹³⁵ Martin 1976.

¹³⁶ Warburg 2009.

¹³⁷ cf. Baar 2010 for similar processes in East-Central Europe.

¹³⁸ See Touval 1963.

¹³⁹ Lewis 1965.

¹⁴⁰ Ahmed 1995.

imaginings by Somalis themselves) as an egalitarian and ethnically homogenous population of nomadic pastoralists who share an overarching genealogical system and a common language, culture and religion. Lewis described Somali society as consisting of six patrilineal clan families and charted their geographical distribution and historical origins, although genealogical accounts of some Somali clans as descendants of Arab migrants who settled in the Horn complicate any authoritative claims to autochthony.¹⁴¹ In the contemporary period, four clan families dominate political discourse: the Dir, the Darood, the Hawiye and the Rahawayne (or the Digil and Mirifle). Historical narratives suggest these clans trace their origins to a patriarchal founding father named “Samaale”, considered by many Somalis to be of “pure” lineage. On the other hand, the Sab, seen as distinct from the Samaale, are noted for being “held in contempt for their lowly origins”.¹⁴² Seen as “low caste”, they have historically encompassed three main groups of Somalis: the Tumaal, the Yibir and the Midgaan.¹⁴³ In his descriptions of the pitting of the Sab as inferior and low-caste against the Samaale, of noble, pure lineage, Lewis has captured the deep stigma that members of the Sab group have endured throughout modern history.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, political alliances have historically tied some “low-caste” groups to dominant Somali clans.

A powerful contribution of Lewis has been to argue that kinship in pastoralist communities is vital to understanding their politics.¹⁴⁵ Each clan family encompassed a set of patrilineally related clans, sub-clans, sub-sub-clans and lineages. Ecology is a key defining feature in social organisation, and political contracts between clan families are commonly known as the *xeer*. Historically, political activity usually occurred at the level of lineages (or groups of lineages tied together by *xeer*), who collectively paid diya, or blood compensation, for wrongdoings committed by any group member. While clan families (broadly speaking) seldom acted as a unit,¹⁴⁶ diya-paying groups and lineages often forged alliances at higher levels against other groups for warfare and payment of diya. Pastoralist Somalis have relied on long-distance migration to access water and grazing pastures, upon which their herds depend in a harsh climate. Resultant conflicts between clans, within clans and within sub-clans have usually drawn upon the *xeer* as a legal framework for solving disputes. Clan elders have been entrusted with mediating and enforcing the *xeer*.

This classification pioneered by Lewis is referred to as a segmentary lineage structure and has been

¹⁴¹ For comparable analyses on autochthony in West Africa, see Geschiere 2009.

¹⁴² Lewis 1961, p.31.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p.51.

¹⁴⁴ Besteman 1999.

¹⁴⁵ Lewis 1961.

¹⁴⁶ Besteman 1999, p.5.

reflected in the writings of numerous Somali scholars.¹⁴⁷ It lends clans an essentialist, trans-historical quality, which for many is an important attraction and for others is a major bone of contention that overlooks other aspects and identities of Somali social life that are often ignored in the focus on “primordialist clan sentiment”.¹⁴⁸ As this thesis underlines, there are significant overlaps between the dominant classification of Somali kinship systems, as first depicted by Lewis, and the 4.5 clan formula (first “institutionalised” at the Arta conference). Specifically, I argue that the segmentary lineage model and its classification of clan families informed, and has been subsequently reinforced by, the formula. For example, the formula reproduced four out of six clan families as “majority” clans, each entitled to equal and “balanced” shares of power. Although the peace talks also proposed a formulaic approach to internal clan families’ contests for representation in the peace talks, the clan formula ignited intense disagreements that exposed complicated histories and the evolution of intra-clan-family relationships, alliances and hierarchies at the levels of sub- and sub-sub-clan and lineages. This, in itself, is a revealing facet of Somali kinship structures, operating not in times past or in contexts of social and political breakdown but in forums for peace that illuminate how Somalis think about their “traditional” structures as intersecting with modern modalities of power-sharing.

The contemporary 4.5 clan formula also replicates the exclusionary nature of the segmentary lineage model in casting all Somalis outside the kinship system (i.e. “major” clan families) as “minority clans”. As this thesis will demonstrate, the formula established “minority” as encompassing a range of social groups who fell outside the perceived natural Somali kinship order. This new category, however, merely reflected historical oppression and enslavement of sections of society. According to Besteman, significant numbers of Somali citizens were not members of any clan; people of Arab and Persian heritage have lived along the coastal cities for centuries.¹⁴⁹ Besteman focuses on Somali-speaking people of “slavery heritage” who lived in the river valleys for generations, as well as Somali-speaking people of non-Somali ancestry who were considered “clients” to prestigious lineages along the Shabelle River for centuries. Moreover, Somali society also contained “out-caste” groups identified by their ancestry and/or occupation, only some of which were associated with particular clans, while others lived outside the clan system altogether.

The purpose of this dissertation is not to seek to definitively resolve long-standing historical–anthropological debates about the clan, but rather to draw from its main insights to underscore that the

¹⁴⁷ For nuanced and critical Somali perspectives, see Mukhtar 1995; Samatar 1992; Kusow 1995; Mohamed 2007.

¹⁴⁸ Besteman 1999, p.20.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

Somali “nation” has historically been constructed from powerful cultural imaginaries. I highlight that such constructions have shifted over time, as has the political utility of narratives of citizenship and membership of (and exclusion from) the Somali political community. Competing discourses about autochthony especially have informed evolving constructions of the Somali nation and its constituents. Different “myths” still abound today about the origins of these narratives before the arrival of European imperialists. Membership of the Somali nation, cast in modern history as the overarching political community, is, and remains, characteristically hierarchical and linked to notions of “noble descent”. Nomadic pastoralists and their lifestyles have become defining features of the Somali state and society, but this was neither a misstep nor a historical accident. Pastoralist Somalis, who trace their ancestry to a small group of clan families through patrilineal lineage, populate vast territories in north-eastern Africa. Defining Somalis and Somalia in the image of the pastoralist nomad (whose livelihood and survival depended on mobility) since the late nineteenth century has served to highlight the status of some and to exclude or marginalise others. The peace processes reinforced this by manufacturing many pastoralist Somali clans as “majority” clans. As I highlight in Chapter 4, binary distinctions between settler/migrants and “indigenous”/noble Somalis intensified during the Arta and Mbagathi peace processes: this, in part, informed the “majority” and “minority” clan classification, which was more about hierarchal power relations than demographics or population size.

It is therefore important to highlight the (ab)use of history in the creation of political community early on in this thesis. Claims to indigeneity, especially by those who cast pastoralist Somalis as autochthonous and all “others” as settlers, have been deliberately contrasted with the migration of groups to the fertile lands in central and southern Somalia as part of historical but ongoing processes of exclusion of such sedentary “settlers” from equal access to power-sharing. Yet, agriculturalist and agro-pastoralist groups constitute a significant part of the population. The most prominent were sedentary communities who traditionally cultivated the fertile areas between the Jubba and Shabelle rivers, in what is now southern Somalia.¹⁵⁰ Small settlements sprung up as centres for trade and exchange – as did encounters between mobile and sedentary Somalis.¹⁵¹ There are multiple, contested accounts – especially in oral traditions – about the “nativeness” of these communities in southern Somalia.¹⁵² Those whose ancestors have primarily relied on cultivation and farming for their livelihood are portrayed in contemporary classifications as Digil and Mirifle clan families who have their own dialect of *af maay* (of the same

¹⁵⁰ Cassanelli 1982.

¹⁵¹ Luling 1986, 1994.

¹⁵² Helander 2003.

language family as the *af maxaa*, spoken by the predominant pastoralist groups).¹⁵³ Further complicating this social landscape has been the legacy of the Arab slave trade and European practices of forced labour, particularly in fertile delta areas in central Somalia. Nineteenth-century accounts of the slave trade are substantiated by the collective memory of *Jareer* communities who now identify as “Somali Bantus”.¹⁵⁴ Anthropological accounts of their distinctiveness, in language and culture, are well documented: their ways of life have been referred to by some, including several of my interviewees, as “sub-cultures”.¹⁵⁵ Somali Bantus, who endured forced relocation and displacement, are now classified as a substantial “minority” group. They have long suffered from stigmatisation: their land and agricultural labour were exploited first by the state throughout the post-independence period, and oppression continued at the hands of warlords during the civil war in the 1990s.¹⁵⁶

Nowhere is the native versus migrant dichotomy more manifest than in depictions of the so-called Arab-Somali, Ashraaf, Banadiri, Tunni and other communities who traditionally lived along the long coastline as distinctly non-natives. The extraordinarily diverse communities that have inhabited areas along the Indian Ocean coast for centuries are often referred to as Banadiris, or *Reer Xamar*. This group lived in substantial numbers in the ancient quarters of Mogadishu’s Xamar Weyne and Shangani districts (dating to the sixteenth century).¹⁵⁷ Other coastal communities in Brava, Merka and Kismayo are linguistically diverse and some trace their ancestry to Arab, Persian, Swahili and Indian settlers.¹⁵⁸ Importantly, these groups are seen as predominantly city dwellers with no clan connections beyond urban centres.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, prominent city states, like the Biyamaal and Ajuraan, consolidated territories that incorporated coastal areas and inter-riverine regions in the seventeenth century, and briefly brought together diverse communities under one centralised political system.¹⁶⁰ Outside south-central Somalia and the Indian Ocean coast, the pastoralist culture and lifestyle dominates. This vast area encompasses northern Somalia, Issa-inhabited regions of what is now Djibouti, northern Kenya, and what is today Ethiopia’s Somali region. In these predominantly arid landscapes, pastoralists continue to move freely across “borders” as in centuries before. The cultural–linguistic similarity of these nomads, and their

¹⁵³ Helander 1996.

¹⁵⁴ Cassanelli 1995, pp.21-2, historicises the term Somali Bantu as “historically applied to individuals presumed to have come from east Africa, and connote[s] slave origins and low status. More recently the term has acquired a more positive political content, as it has been taken up by Bantu Somalis who have formed their own political organisation—Somali African Muki Organization, or SAMO—to press for international recognition. Somali Bantu leaders also use the term ‘Jareer,’ to mark their identity as part of a conscious political movement”.

¹⁵⁵ Interviews with anonymised sources in Mogadishu, July 2014.

¹⁵⁶ Cassanelli 1995; Luling 1994.

¹⁵⁷ Hoehne 2015.

¹⁵⁸ Abbink 2009; Kapteijns 2009.

¹⁵⁹ Discussion with Abdullahi Busuri in Djibouti, March 2018.

¹⁶⁰ Cassanelli 1982; Luling 2002.

dominance in those regions, has fuelled an imagining of a “nation” that lived under different rules and rulers historically.

Revisiting the dominant historiography can help to accommodate the Banadiri, agro-pastoralist and so-called Bantu experiences as I draw attention to the multitude of historical experiences of Somalis. Scholarly analyses of citizenship and nation-making in Africa still consider Somalia to be a unique case of an already constituted “nation in search of a state”.¹⁶¹ The above exploration of Somalia’s main social groups in terms of their origins, histories and alliances underscores the contestation within Somali society of who belongs to this nation. Power relations between and within social groups and political communities prior to the onset of competing colonialisms in the Somali territories were fluid, and struggles were waged over social hierarchies and their political implications. The claim that the “partition” of Somali-inhabited territories in north-eastern Africa was complete by 1897¹⁶² is inaccurate, as the frontiers of modern Somalia have remained stubbornly resistant to consolidation. Moreover, Islam, as an ultimate binding force, must not be taken for granted either, as conflicting sentiments about and between Somali Islamists in today’s politics demonstrate. As subsequent chapters show, the peace processes in the early 2000s offer ample evidence that a variety of classifications and relations (whether religious, geographic, clan-based, or otherwise) are as sensitive and argued about as at any other point in history. My goal in revisiting the standard homogenising narrative is to underscore the differential nature of membership and belonging to the Somali political community and the dangers associated with mapping Somalia’s clans and their relationships – even if they may appear to some as a benign academic exercise.¹⁶³

The Colonial Heritage and its Formative Impact

Colonial experiences were fundamental to Somali productions of a *national* political community and would have a lasting legacy on ideas of citizenship and the irredentist project of nationalists throughout the twentieth century. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, territories inhabited by Somalis were conquered by Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and successive Abyssinian emperors. These regional imperialisms co-existed alongside European expansionism that focused on the Somali coast as part of the global competition over power. Following Aden’s establishment as a colony in 1839 (administered from Bombay), and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the British established a

¹⁶¹ Laitin, Samatar 1987.

¹⁶² Lewis 2008 [1965].

¹⁶³ Luling 2006.

protectorate in north-western Somalia to monitor seaborne trade from both sides of the Gulf of Aden.¹⁶⁴ While the British Empire also claimed the Swahili Coast, thus ensuring that pastoralist Somalis were controlled by Her Majesty's Government in what was known as the Northern Frontier District, Italy's colonisation began with seizing possessions such as Barava and Merka along the Indian Ocean coast as Rome sought to join the "Scramble" as a relative latecomer. By 1890, Italy had commercial interests in the fertile delta between the Jubba and Shabelle rivers, with the hope of turning it into a plantation-style economy.¹⁶⁵ Under Benito Mussolini, Italy expanded its territories in 1936 to form *Africa Orientale Italiana*, which included Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia.¹⁶⁶ The French Somaliland colony was established between 1883 and 1887 following a series of agreements between the French and Afar and Somali communities.¹⁶⁷

By the end of the nineteenth century, Somali "subjects" lived under four imperial powers: Abyssinian, British, Italian and French rule. These conquerors were acutely aware of the strong cultural sense of identity that existed among Somalis and feared its translation into growing sentiments of political unity. And this was indeed what early Somali nationalists stressed, namely, that geopolitics had caused the fragmentation and loss of the nation,¹⁶⁸ even if a unified Somali state had never existed before in history. This sentiment moulded an emergent nationalism that sought to "liberate" the political community; Somali nationalist doctrine drew upon a narrative of trauma and subjugation. In the lead-up to independence in the form of the unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960, the transformation from colonial subjects to citizens of a Somali republic further stimulated thinking about the fate of Somali populations in territories still under foreign domination. In the imagination of Somalia's post-colonial political elite, the "nation" unconditionally included Somalis in what is now Djibouti (formerly French Somaliland), eastern Ethiopia (commonly known as the Ogaden) and northern Kenya (referred to as the Northern Frontier District).¹⁶⁹ The anti-colonial movement in *La Côte française des Somalis* was centrally concerned about the territory's relationship with Somalia. Disagreements among ethnic Somalis (and between Somalis and the Afar) primarily revolved around the political future of what, from 1977 onwards, would become Djibouti. Somali nationalists, like Mohammed Harbi, articulated a plan to join "Greater Somalia".¹⁷⁰ Others favoured a closer connection with Paris, followed by a future as an independent state distinct from Somalia. A referendum was staged by France in 1967, following a

¹⁶⁴ Hamilton 1967.

¹⁶⁵ Tripodi 1999a.

¹⁶⁶ Tripodi 1999b.

¹⁶⁷ Thompson, Adloff 1968.

¹⁶⁸ Sheik-Abdi 1977.

¹⁶⁹ Touval 1963.

¹⁷⁰ Discussion with Aden Omar Abdullahi in Djibouti, March 2018.

period of rioting and protests in the territory, which resulted in maintaining Djibouti as a French colony for another ten years.¹⁷¹ Key dissenting voices were exiled when they accused France of using force to sway the referendum in favour of those rejecting Somali overtures. Mohammed Harbi spent the rest of his life exiled in Mogadishu, where he was a key proponent of pan-Somali ideology.

Today, Somalis are recognised as a separate “nation”, with their own state in the eastern region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. For decades, the Somali Regional State, as it is known today, was a battleground of competing nationalisms. Abyssinian approaches to the Somali “question” were driven by the exigencies of imperial rule and resistance to them in the eastern lowlands, especially the Ogaden. In contrast to historical narratives of primordial antagonism on religious grounds (Christian highlander monarchs versus Muslim lowlander clan chiefs), Ethiopian–Somali relations were complex and a function of economic considerations, as well as Abyssinian fears of being invaded again by European imperialists through Somali territories.¹⁷² Agreements between the British and Ethiopian rulers about grazing rights in the Haud region (partially in eastern Ethiopia today) were aimed at governing pastoralist Somalis living in those regions but were inflammatory to Somalis and exacerbated already tense relations between Ogadeni Somalis and Ethiopian rulers.¹⁷³ Somalis in the Haud united in opposing the dual subjugation they experienced at the hands of the British, as well as Ethiopian, rulers.

Feelings of resentment and alienation by Somalis were rooted in how little the colonial state – whether Abyssinian, British, French or Italian – cared for its subject populations. European administrators ordered basic investments in roads and ports, and several schools trained “native” Somalis in the colonial civil service. Yet, on the whole, both British and Italian administrators made few attempts to overhaul local social and political structures.¹⁷⁴ Pacts between clan and sub-clan families regulated conflicts and ensured the lasting power of the clan as a *primus* political force among Somalis. However, numerous accounts, especially in southern Somalia, suggest that Italian administrators favoured particular clan and sub-clan families.¹⁷⁵ This trend became especially evident when Italians conducted a demographic census of six regions under their control in the 1950s.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ Shehim, Seating 1980.

¹⁷² Pankhurst 1951.

¹⁷³ Braine 1958; Latham Brown 1956.

¹⁷⁴ Millman 2013.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, January 2018.

¹⁷⁶ Interviews with Mohamed Dahir Afrax and Abdurahman Abdullahi Baadiyow in Djibouti, March 2018.

Somali nomads across the Haud grievously faced multiple legal codes and colonial administrations, partly because of their seasonal migration patterns. Anglo-Ethiopian and Italo–Ethiopian protocols and treaties established overlapping spheres of influence over Somali-inhabited territories.¹⁷⁷ The unification of British and Italian Somaliland in 1960 forced the post-independent state to deal with the legacies and lived realities of multiple, overlapping legal traditions. Until 1975, for example, the Indian Penal Code still dominated local courts in former British Somaliland,¹⁷⁸ while in southern Somalia aspects of Italian commercial laws were largely preserved. Some legal and administrative legacies were too complicated to undo or settle between post-independence leaders, spelling future trouble for the union between British and Italian Somaliland.

This presented Somali nationalists with a dilemma that they have struggled to resolve. Competing imperialisms, on the one hand, created a series of economic, cultural and political grievances, but in order to forge a unified “Greater Somalia” some elements of the colonial heritage would pragmatically have to be preserved. Nationalists have mostly focused their attention on the former, setting up future conflict around questions related to the latter. Terms like “partition” and representations of ethnic Somalis as “spilling” over artificial boundaries became the basis for ardent claims to reunite Somalis under one pan-Somali state. This, however, was regarded by neighbouring states as a purely irredentist project demonstrating that Somalis were, above all, interested in territorial accumulation in the name of nationhood. The fervour that underpinned the Greater Somalia project would have a significant impact on the trajectory of citizenship craft. Nationalist leaders propagated a moral claim to unify all territories in which Somalis lived. Anti-colonial struggles were a platform for articulating both the right to self-determination and the right to “reunite” peoples who belonged to the wider Somali nation, all of whom were considered (future) citizens. As early as the 1940s, nationalist elements in French Somaliland expressed aspirations to unite the territories of the Issa with “Greater Somalia”. In what is now northern Kenya, the Shifta Wars in the 1950s mirrored similar intersections between aspirations for independence from Britain and “unification” with Somalia.¹⁷⁹ In eastern Ethiopia, precursors to the Ogaden National Liberation Forces (ONLF), a rebel movement that remains active, drew on pan-Somali ideology to “liberate” the Ogaden of Ethiopian domination.

¹⁷⁷ Silberman 1961.

¹⁷⁸ Battera, Campo 2001.

¹⁷⁹ Weitzberg 2017.

“The Balance that Kept the Country Together”: Historicising Balance

The end of World War II brought much-anticipated change. In November 1949 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 389 decreeing that the former Italian colony of Somaliland should become an independent sovereign state ten years after the adoption of the Trusteeship Agreement.¹⁸⁰ Under the international trusteeship system, Italy became the administering authority, in agreement with the United Kingdom, cooperating with an Advisory Council comprising representatives from Colombia, Egypt and the Philippines. As early as 1949, UN documents reveal that the “Government of Ethiopia requested that it should be permitted to take part in the discussions of the Council as a ‘State directly concerned’”,¹⁸¹ a move that legalised the involvement of Ethiopia in Somali affairs. The Council subsequently invited the Ethiopian representative to participate in discussions but withheld Ethiopia’s right to vote, much to the frustration of Abyssinians.¹⁸²

Colonialism, followed by trusteeship, resulted in two developments that would shape later notions of citizenship. First, the UN trusteeship oversaw the drafting of the Somali Republic’s founding constitution. The constitution, which was adopted through a national referendum in both former British and Italian Somaliland,¹⁸³ posits a distinctly liberal definition of citizenship in the image of Western democratic societies. It also reflects the post-WWII shift in the international system, which ushered in the United Nations and universal human rights. While the constitution, and, in particular, Citizenship Law No. 28 of 1962, emphasised the rights and duties of the individual, the definition of a Somali citizen was based on kinship rather than territory; thus, in practice, the national political community spilled over the territorial demarcation of the new state: “Any Somali who is part of the Somali nation is a citizen.”¹⁸⁴

Second, the trusteeship period laid the foundation of the post-independence polity, including establishing political institutions in anticipation of imminent unification. These included political parties, which from the onset would incorporate the notion of “clan balance” into their operations. In 1948 young urban Somalis, mostly former civil servants in colonial administration and businessmen, formed the Mogadishu-based Somali Youth Club (SYC). The SYC predominantly comprised men from the Darood and Hawiye clan families and saw itself as resolutely nationalist.¹⁸⁵ Women were granted membership of the SYC,

¹⁸⁰ The Trusteeship Agreement was approved on 27 January 1950.

¹⁸¹ Special Report of the Trusteeship Council, 1950, pp.3-4.

¹⁸² Pankhurst 1951, pp.355-67.

¹⁸³ According to several interviewees; also see letter by Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed to Mbagathi’s IGAD Facilitation Committee, 31 January 2003, IGAD archives.

¹⁸⁴ Somali Citizenship Law No. 28 of 1962.

¹⁸⁵ Barnes 2007.

though their public roles were restricted to mobilisation, recruitment of new members and fundraising.¹⁸⁶ By the mid-1950s, the organisation had changed its name to the Somali Youth League (SYL), acquiring far-reaching popularity among Somalis as far as Harar (eastern Ethiopia) and Kenya's northern regions, still under British control. The SYL consciously adopted "balanced" clan representation.¹⁸⁷

In Mogadishu and other towns in south-central Somalia, more than a dozen political parties were formed under UN trusteeship, including the Digil and Mirifle Somali Political Party (DMSPP), which openly used clan-specific interests as a foundation for its manifesto of reversing Rahaweyne marginalisation. As political parties multiplied and independence drew closer, clans became a divisive tool: several movements split as a result of disagreements about political platforms, because of power struggles between clans and sub-clans, but also because of (not so) subtle manipulations by British and Italian administrators.¹⁸⁸ To circumvent this growing obstacle to the modern state-building project, nationalist Somali leaders resorted to the calculated selection of party leadership and membership to signal representation of Somalia's main clan and sub-clan families.

As early as the 1950s, clashing claims based on "balance" and inclusion/exclusion were already in full swing. This mattered not only within Italian Somaliland, where clan "diversity" was a key source of contestations over representation in Mogadishu's early party politics.¹⁸⁹ It also applied to how unification with British Somaliland – prioritised by SYL's pan-Somali ideology as the first step in uniting the Somali-inhabited territories within a "Greater Somalia" – would be arranged and should be reflected in the unified republic's new institutions. Elections in British Somaliland were initiated in 1958, resulting in the selection of 19 council members.¹⁹⁰ These council members, mainly from the Dir and Darood sub-clans of British Somaliland, were set to join their "brothers" in Mogadishu upon independence in 1960 and to become members of the newly established parliament. Some Somali historians argue that (early) signs of trouble began when "northern" MPs, specifically representatives of Dir clans, contested the apparently unfavourable allocation of seats in the national assembly said to have been based on proportional representation.¹⁹¹ Still, pan-Somalism was further fanned by what was hoped to be the first of several unifications of previously colonially divided territories.

¹⁸⁶ Ingiriis, Hoehne 2013.

¹⁸⁷ Sheik-Abdi 1977; Turton 1972.

¹⁸⁸ Tripodi 1999b, pp.55–60.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

¹⁹⁰ Millman 2013, p.272.

¹⁹¹ Aden, Petrucci 1994; Trunji 2015.

Thus, the trusteeship period prior to the departure of colonial powers constituted a significant juncture in modern Somali history.¹⁹² The decision to unify two important parts of the “nation” gave further impetus to the pan-Somali ideology. However, nationalist sentiments could not veil divisive questions about who had the right to lead this (soon-to-be-united) Somalia. The union required not just streamlining different legacies of colonial administrative systems but agreeing on the sharing of political power and national wealth among competing communities. In order to confront this challenge, the founding “fathers” engaged in elite accommodation by including ministers from various clans and sub-clans and by appointing Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal – the head of government of the Republic of Somaliland (which existed for four days before it joined Somalia) and member of a powerful Dir family – as defence minister. In 1967 the first presidential elections triggered a transition of power from Aden Abdulle Osman Daar to Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, who, acknowledging the importance of strengthening his alliances with groups in north-western Somalia, appointed Egal prime minister. While such attempts at elite accommodation through clan balancing characterised Somalia’s experiment with democracy,¹⁹³ they failed to stop early grievances accumulating. For instance, Northern Isaaq MPs felt outnumbered when their Darood counterparts from former British Somaliland allied with fellow Daroods from the South.¹⁹⁴

Struggles for political influence along regional lines also brought other communal claims to the forefront. The Digil and Mirifle contested Rahaweyne marginalisation. Urban women raised gender as a key fault-line and mechanism of exclusion. The 1950s and 1960s were a time when urban male elites from pastoralist backgrounds dominated party politics. Women were increasingly shunned, even though they were members of political parties such as the SYL and had contributed much to anti-colonial struggles. The nationalist architects of modern Somalia debated whether to extend the right to vote to women.¹⁹⁵ It was ultimately some outspoken women, and the increasingly influential UN instruments, that coerced the new Somali state into granting and incorporating universal suffrage into its founding constitution in 1960.¹⁹⁶

Group or clan-framed identity and political participation played a key role in the making of a national political community after independence-cum-unification. It was an unwritten cardinal rule of Somali politics that clan representation in the new government mattered and indeed needed special management by the state. Official and non-official narratives suggest that the idea of “balance” is significant to

¹⁹² Braine 1958; Mukhtar 1989.

¹⁹³ Samatar 2016.

¹⁹⁴ Interviews with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) and Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

¹⁹⁵ Alim, Jibril 2008.

¹⁹⁶ Aidid 2010, 2020.

understanding the nature and complexities surrounding the social contract and how it operates in deeply egalitarian Somali society. Since the 1950s, the Somali contract between citizens – or communities – and state agents, though often marred by nationalist overtures, builds upon traditional structures, or “pastoral democracy” – to use I M Lewis’ description. Whereas the nascent Somali state was regarded as having a responsibility to ensure a balance between clans in government and broader political structures, it was incumbent upon Somali communities to hold the state accountable for this task.

State-Led Citizenship Craft and Its Discontents

Though clan balance featured prominently in the trusteeship, and indeed in post-independence, day-to-day politics, the Somali state resolutely portrayed national cohesion upon independence. The newly unified Somali Republic issued a bulletin defining the new citizenship that was circulated to Somalis on independence day on 1 July 1960. The Somali constitution was adopted through a national referendum alongside the pivotal Law No. 28, passed on 22 December 1962. Under a legal definition derived from a political and emotional attachment to the fundamentally cultural basis of being Somali, Article 3 broadly defines a Somali as “any person who by origin, language or tradition belongs to the Somali nation”. This vague legal definition, in conjunction with the omission of references to territoriality, served a deliberate purpose. Citizens of the newly formed Republic were imagined to be intrinsically tied to Somali subjects still living under British and French colonial administrations and still claimed as part of the Ethiopian empire. Pan-Somali doctrine identified Somalis across the Horn as legitimate citizens of Somalia, with rights and duties and supposed protection under the Somali state. The contested relevance of the Westphalian construct of statehood and international borders, which held little meaning for Somalis, further justified this official view.

Although pan-Somali discourse was premised on an imagined homogenous and supra-national identity, it also simultaneously excluded several Somali communities. While the republic was focused on the grand project of forming Greater Somalia by unifying territories inhabited by ethnic Somalis, it neglected the crucial task of improving the union between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Moreover, by focusing externally, the state also failed to address (and indeed sharpened) the social stigma that many “low-caste” Somalis experienced and which affected their access to decision-making. The crucial connection between these two apparently contradictory moves of expansionism and exclusion has often been underestimated in scholarly literature. I argue that it is vital to establish the paradoxical relationship between the two

narratives to account for how the state was responsible for a central contradiction that compounded feelings of exclusion and eroding citizenry rights among many groups.

From independence to the 1991 civil war, this expansionism–exclusion paradox was the result of state behaviour, which, like elsewhere in Africa, played a crucial role in crafting the formal citizenship regime and discourse. Significant resources were directed towards the Greater Somalia project. The post-independence elite took for granted the need to create citizens and to foster a national identity domestically that incorporated diversity into Somali society. Instead, internal heterogeneity was overlooked, leaving important sections of the population to wonder why the Somali state should be concerned with citizens *outside* its borders while many of its citizens *inside* experienced marginalisation and were effectively disenfranchised.¹⁹⁷

In theory, the founding constitution had ensured universal suffrage and guaranteed a set of rights to Somali citizens. In reality, only a segment of the population benefited from limited available resources and access to the political space, and the national self-image – as discussed earlier – was very much that of the pastoralist nomad belonging to the dominant clans. The majority of Somalia’s population remained overwhelmingly rural and poor in the decades following independence. The state had little presence in much of the country. The modest services that were provided, such as education and health care, were concentrated in growing cosmopolitan cities, such as Beledweyne and Baidoa, and above all Mogadishu, which appeared a world apart from much of the rest of the country. Little documentation exists about the lives of citizens – often nomads – outside Mogadishu at this time; it is assumed, however, that rural Somalis maintained their “traditional” modes of political and social organisation managed by the *xeer*.

For Somali women, who would reinvent themselves as Somalia’s “largest clan” during the Arta peace negotiations, the early post-independence promises of equal citizenship conflicted with patriarchal cultural forces and gender norms. In theory, the republic was predicated on a gender-neutral articulation of universal citizenship, including male and female members of the Somali nation, by virtue of ethnic identification and irrespective of territorial presence. In reality, however, the rhetoric and actions of (male) architects of the Somali state offered a contradictory view of women’s citizenship and associated socio-political practices. On the one hand, womanhood/motherhood became a significant part of state discourse around Somali nationalism and belonging.¹⁹⁸ On the other hand, the overrepresentation of men in political parties, formed during the pre-independent trusteeship period, serves as an early example of women’s

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

¹⁹⁸ Kapteijns 2009; also, Joseph 2000 for a comparative analysis of gender and nationalist politics in the Middle East.

marginalisation. Despite women's notable contributions in anti-colonial struggles,¹⁹⁹ (male) doubts about the need to enfranchise women ignited a heated debate in early parliamentary meetings.

Women's struggles after independence are encapsulated in the poetry of Hawa Jibril, a prominent anti-colonial figure (who, at an advanced age, travelled from Toronto to Arta to participate in the conference). According to Jibril, coalitions of women were fundamental to resisting the duality of oppression they experienced: colonialism and Somali patriarchal traditions.²⁰⁰ As was true elsewhere in Africa at the time,²⁰¹ their exclusion was also manifest in the composition of the first Somali government, preoccupied with striking a "balance" between diverse clan constituencies, not with women's rights or representation. Despite such exclusion, the new nation state remained a site of strategic importance to Somali women. A handful of elite activists, mostly based in Mogadishu, took to the helm of an urban movement and presumed to speak on behalf of all Somali women.²⁰² Their priorities included tackling high illiteracy rates among women and other issues that prevented them from accessing the labour force. With a firm focus on policies such as those intended to safeguard women's rights after divorce,²⁰³ many activists favoured incremental change.²⁰⁴ Between the late 1960s and the 1980s, key figures in the Mogadishu-centred movement worked alongside the state to improve women's social and economic conditions.

Somalia's brief experiment with democracy, mostly defined by a rearticulation of party and clan politics, ended with the assassination of President Ali Sharmarke in 1969. Shortly afterwards, in the early hours of 21 October 1969, Brigadier-General Mohamed Siad Barre led the Revolutionary Supreme Council (RSC) to take over Radio Mogadishu and announce the overthrow of the civilian government. The RSC, which would also apply the principle of clan "balance", declared a state of emergency and dissolved all political parties and parliamentary elections. The RSC insisted on describing the coup as a "bloodless revolution" and promised to rid the youthful country of nepotism and rampant corruption. Its chief objective was to pull the Somali nation into political modernity.

The Comrade–Citizens: Nation-Building and Its Disillusionments

¹⁹⁹ Aidid 2010.

²⁰⁰ Alim, Jibril 2008.

²⁰¹ Tripp 2015.

²⁰² Aidid 2020; Mohamed 2014.

²⁰³ Unpublished interview with Faduma Isaaq Bihi in Ohio, US, May 2014.

²⁰⁴ Unpublished interview with Maryan Hagi Elmi in Mogadishu, June 2014.

Siad Barre's interest in Greater Somalia represented continuity from earlier (civilian) administrations. He also imagined ethnic Somalis in neighbouring states to be full citizens of Somalia. Yet, as this section explores, Barre's government also sought dramatic ruptures to ideas of pan-Somalism²⁰⁵ that continue to resonate in struggles over political community to this day.

Somalia declared itself a socialist state in 1970. Prior to this, Somalia had no history of class conflict in a Marxist sense. However, the RSC equated tribalism with class: Barre saw a society struggling to liberate itself from hierarchies and disunity imposed by kinship politics.²⁰⁶ Barre's ideology consisted of three pillars: the principle of self-reliance, a form of socialism based on Marxist principles, and Islam. All three were subsumed under "scientific socialism", though Somalia's version varied from the Soviet and Chinese models that the RSC frequently mentioned.²⁰⁷ Sensing the problems that atheistic Marxism might pose for a religious society, Barre was pragmatic and insisted that "socialism is not a religion; it is a political principle" to organize government and manage production.²⁰⁸ Therefore, state ideology carefully combined aspects of the Quran with the influences of Marx, Lenin and Mao. The country's economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union was a convenient rationale of a "revolution" introduced through a coup that had deposed a Western-oriented parliamentary democracy.²⁰⁹

In theory, the socialist regime abhorred open displays of clans in public life. Similar to how ethnic identities were seen in other African societies,²¹⁰ clans were viewed as a relic of pre-modern times. The official abolition of the clan system from the public and private realms was a key moment that would later be sharply juxtaposed with the ubiquity of the clan rights discourse during the civil war and subsequent peace conferences in Arta and Mbagathi. Public spectacles symbolically buried the clan, and private references to one's clan were criminalised. Even references to *ina abti* or *ina adeer* (to indicate kinship ties), which are common in everyday language, were replaced with *jalle* (comrade). Barre, using Marxist language, equated the clan with false consciousness and basked in immense personal power as the revolution appeared unassailable in the 1970s. The "blue-and-white book" articulated his social and political visions for Somalia, in which he had synthesised Marx with Islam, thereby setting out a uniquely Somali path to socialist modernity.²¹¹

²⁰⁵ Pestalozza 1973.

²⁰⁶ Ahmed 1995.

²⁰⁷ Yordanov 2020.

²⁰⁸ In Metz 1992.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Berman 1998.

²¹¹ Yordanov 2020.

Modernist rhetoric notwithstanding, mounting disappointments due to unkept promises exposed Siad Barre's cynical instrumentalisation of clan politics. The government became known as "MOD", which stood for **Mareehaan** (Siad Barre's clan), **Ogaden** (the clan of Siad Barre's mother) and **Dulbahante** (the clan of Siad Barre's son-in-law, Colonel Ahmad Sulaymaan Abdullah, who headed the National Security Service). Representatives of these groups formed an inner circle. In 1975, for example, ten of the twenty members of the SRC were from the Darood clan family, of which the Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante were a part; the sedentary Rahanweyne inter-riverine clan families were unrepresented. Land policies introduced by Barre were, in reality, land-grabbing attempts to pay off regime loyalists. Barre's later years in power were characterised by severe restrictions in civil liberties and the excessive use of force to quell dissent.²¹²

Although struggling to take root, Somalia's brand of socialism endeavoured to turn citizens into "comrades" and "cadres". A generation of educated, urban Somalis, many of whom studied abroad on government bursaries, have memories of an individual-centred citizenship characterised by a sense of duty to the nation. Asha Hagi Elmi, a key informant in this study, describes herself as "a child of the Revolution", defining herself in relation to the wider nation.²¹³ A medical doctor and prominent Somali society activist, Hawa Abdi, described a national revival in Mogadishu upon her return from studying medicine in the Soviet Union.²¹⁴ Abdi felt that a seminal moment in her life was when she was treated as equal to men by highlighting expectations that she would contribute to national development. In Barre's republic, comrades and cadres included men *and* women.

The socialist era is remembered as a great equaliser, especially between genders. The celebrated Family Law of 1976 gave women equal inheritance rights. The president's vision of nationalist and socialist modernity targeted women whose advancements were equated with symbols of progress and change. The regime courted activists (insofar as they were willing to reciprocate), such as the Somali Women's Democratic Organization (SWDO), previously an advocacy group formed in 1967. SWDO's close government ties led it to be dubbed the women's wing of the party. Regime-sponsored activism produced tangible progress in the form of formal equality under the law, which boosted perceptions of "meaningful" citizenship for women. The period remains significant for women's *memory* of being citizens, especially when juxtaposed with civil war and state collapse from the late 1980s onwards.

²¹² Compagnon 1992.

²¹³ Unpublished interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Nairobi, July 2014.

²¹⁴ Unpublished interview with Hawa Abdi in Nairobi, July 2014.

The regime applied the same top-down approach to cementing a sense of national identity based largely on the dominant pastoralist culture (even if sedentarisation and urbanisation were encouraged to crush tribalism).²¹⁵ Arts and cultural expression – especially oral poetry and song – flourished under its patronage, and the Somali language adopted a standardised script in 1977, followed by sweeping literacy campaigns. While the expansion of education and other classic nation-building strategies created a nationally minded citizenry that appeared to celebrate its newfound cosmopolitanism, individual rights and political freedoms diminished.

Furthermore, while the government trumpeted its progressive credentials, significant sub-populations experienced rampant inequality and marginalisation. Barre's land policies affected "minority" groups disproportionately, both in Mogadishu and in the fertile agricultural lands of south-central Somalia. For groups who would later be labelled "minority" and "others", access to decision-making and formal political space was particularly restricted. Groups portrayed as non-indigenous migrants to Somali territories, such as Arabs, "Bantus" and the Rahanweyne (sedentary agriculturalists who speak the *Af Maay* dialect) and Sab (low-caste groups), were denied distinct cultural and linguistic rights.

Whether in the agricultural heartland of Somalia or rapidly growing Mogadishu, state-driven reforms became instruments for oppressing farmers and agriculturalist communities who historically lived in the inter-riverine arable lands,²¹⁶ as land use in the Banaadir region was manipulated systematically to shore up the regime's patronage networks. Redrawing district boundaries and land policies could not be disentangled from questions of citizenship: owning and using land went hand in hand with Barre's assimilationist and exclusionary cultural policies.

Though Siad Barre increasingly walked a tightrope domestically, the external aspects of his nationalism spelled the beginning of the end for the regime. The Somali government radicalised earlier calls for the reunification of all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa after 1969 and used the Cold War to change facts on the ground.²¹⁷ The Ogaden in Eastern Ethiopia had been a site for resistance. The borderlands, mainly inhabited by Somali nomads, were the cradle of Sayyid Abdulle Hassan's war against the British and Abyssinian empires. Drawing on Soviet aid to build up a formidable army, and seizing on the rhetoric of pan-Somalism to articulate a moral right to reunite all Somali territories, Barre greenlighted an invasion of Ethiopia, which was at war with itself in Eritrea and in Addis Ababa ("Red Terror"). The

²¹⁵ Haakonsen 1984.

²¹⁶ Besteman, Cassanelli 2000.

²¹⁷ Yordanov 2016.

offensive backfired badly as the Soviet Union switched to supporting the military junta in Ethiopia; Somali forces were crushed in the 1977–8 war. The humiliation of defeat, the conflict's staggering financial cost and the international loss of face exposed a desperate domestic situation.²¹⁸

The 1980s was a decade marked by a worsening humanitarian situation, partly caused by Somalia's deep dependence on external aid and the growing failure of scientific socialism. Mounting internal discontent with the suppression of rights and authoritarianism contributed to the rise of oppositional factions. Some armed factions supported by regional players, such as Ethiopia, sought to capitalise on cracks in the image that Barre had projected as a "victorious leader". The president attempted a crackdown, but even youngsters in urban centres clamoured for meaningful democratic reform by pushing back through media activism and civil society mobilisation.²¹⁹ Prominent women activists also protested against the increasing brutality of Barre's regime and left the ranks of the SWDO. The President was particularly shocked by the publication of "The Manifesto": a letter addressed to the Somali government and people calling for bloodless regime change, signed in mid-1990 by 110 prominent politicians, Islamic *ulama*, professionals and business groups. In response, Siad Barre retaliated by placing forty-six of the signatories in detention and ordering a military court to charge them with treason.²²⁰

Peaceful protests in Mogadishu were accompanied by a series of armed struggles across the territory from 1980 onwards. Insurgents called for greater representation and opening of the political space, but each of the rebel factions resorted to recruitment along clan lines. While this prevented them from forming a united front to overthrow the hated regime, this form of organisation was itself a foreseeable response to Barre's abandonment of Somalia's political tradition of clan balance²²¹ and his duplicity in promoting assimilationist nation-building (not so) secretly favouring his "MOD" inner circle. Insurgent resolve was only strengthened by Barre's brutal counter-insurgency that meted out collective punishment along clan lines.²²²

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was founded in 1978 by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and drew explicitly on the grievances of the Majerteen sub-clan. Similarly, General Mohamed Farah Aidiid founded the United Somali Congress (USC) in the late 1980s, relying on the Habar Gidir sub-clan of the Hawiye clan family and capitalising on resentment in south-central Somalia following

²¹⁸ Sheik-Abdi 1981.

²¹⁹ Discussion with Abdullahi Busuri in Djibouti, March 2018.

²²⁰ Ingiriis 2012.

²²¹ Adam 1992.

²²² Kapteijns 2013.

land reforms and the perceived favouring of Darood economic interests. He denounced Barre's gender and citizenship reforms as "false propaganda...his dirty Revolution"²²³ and presented himself as a conservative (true) nationalist, even while engaging in ruthless incitement. The general's vision of Mogadishu was that of an occupied city where "everything beautiful was owned by a Darood".²²⁴ The final key opposition faction was founded in London as the Somali National Movement (SNM), which, after its initial leftist promise of seeking to restructure the whole country, moved towards a very different trajectory: the SNM came to be identified as the defenders of the Isaaq sub-clans in formerly British Somaliland. Their radicalisation and growing instrumentalisation of the clan was a direct response to the collective targeting of Isaaq communities by the Mogadishu regime, including a murderous campaign of aerial bombardment. As Barre was increasingly unable to pit the different armed and unarmed opposition factions against one another, the regime ultimately collapsed in January 1991 under the very clan contradictions it had so actively encouraged.

The regime change did not lead to a fresh start for Somalia, instead ushering in the darkest chapter of its history.²²⁵ Aidiid's USC and other armed groups battled over Mogadishu, destroying much of the city in the process. Warfare between rival factions accompanied the "cleansing" of the capital of ordinary Darood, who were singled out for harassment, expropriation, rape or worse – hundreds of thousands fled as the state collapsed. Around the country, militias sprang up to defend specific clans and sub-clans: it is difficult to imagine a more damning indictment of the Barre regime and its erstwhile nationalist assimilation that denounced clans as "false consciousness".²²⁶ The civil war and famine death toll is impossible to estimate. Equally disastrous, the violent war ruptured the country and its people. The SNM-controlled Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia, and in the north-east Abdullahi Yusuf and his SSDF worked towards establishing Puntland as an autonomous region protecting itself from the chaos further south.

Much has been written about the Somali civil war and the widespread discontent that led to it.²²⁷ While various local, regional and global variables undoubtedly contributed to the catastrophe, this dissertation draws attention to the underlying "crisis of citizenship"²²⁸ as a root cause of conflict. This crisis is not only visible in the manifest failure of the nation-building project, the unresolved question of the Somali-

²²³ Aidid, Ruhela 1994, p.138

²²⁴ Interview with Abdirahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow), Nairobi, January 2018.

²²⁵ Samatar 1992.

²²⁶ Besteman 1996.

²²⁷ For influential works that explore the underlying causes and triggers of civil war in Somalia, see Menkhaus 2007; Adam 1992; Besteman 1996; Kapteijns 2010.

²²⁸ Keller 2014.

speaking populations outside Somalia and the internecine clan violence of recent decades. It is also reflected in how dilemmas over framing and operationalising citizenship have continued to dominate peace conferences and state reconstruction efforts, despite the fact that the conflict(s) have further fractured understandings of who should be included in Somalia's political community and how it should organise itself.

Conclusion

“The meaning of the word tribe in the Somali context is different from that applicable in Kenya or Nigeria... The Somali people constitute one single tribe [as against] the situation in the rest of the African continent.”

The revolutionary intellectuals on tribalism, Mogadishu, 1971.²²⁹

The idea that African nation states like Somalia are rare has long informed external scholarly interest in the country and was eagerly encouraged by nationalist propaganda.²³⁰ During its democratic first decade after independence and under military rule, the state undertook great efforts to foster a Somali political identity and national cohesion within its borders. Every administration prioritised the Greater Somalia project but also excluded many of the citizens within its borders. This political community, the Somali nation, was taken for granted, crowded out by pan-Somali discourses, which, because of their external focus, depicted citizenship attainment and enjoyment in Somalia as unproblematic and uncontested.

That (conscious and subconscious) neglect is reflected in the meagre scholarly literature too. Struggles for citizenship are among the most contested but understudied features of contemporary Somali society. As this chapter has shown, even prior to the eruption of civil war, concerns proliferated about how state policies affected belonging to, and the cohesion of, the political community. Somalia might be unique for its degree of common cultural identity, especially compared to the spectacular diversity of Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. However, rereading Somalia's recent political history through the lens of political community formation, as I have in this chapter, challenges a simplistic understanding of Somali nationhood and draws attention to clashing interests and competing perspectives that included as much as they excluded. Beyond the facade of a unique nation state (a reputation Somalia boasted about to its African peers, as evident from the quote above), Somali citizens grappled with the denial of basic rights and freedoms. Key among

²²⁹ Op.cit., Pestalozza 1971, p.317.

²³⁰ Laitin 1976; Touval 1963.

them were representation and participation in government, restrictions on land ownership (for urban and agriculturalist communities alike), freedom of association (as in the case with Somalia's outlawed Islamists) and freedom of expression (e.g. language rights for *Af Maay* speakers). As this chapter highlighted the main processes through which nationhood was substantively assembled and projected, it identified a paradox: the Greater Somalia project required vast resources, thereby financially and politically occluding the imperative of recognising internal heterogeneity and building an inclusive political community. Especially in the later years of Siad Barre's presidency, withholding the citizenry rights of increasing numbers of Somalis was a strategy to stabilise a waning regime. The outcome was peaceful contestation and escalating armed struggle. In a supreme act of irony, as Somalia went to war to "reunite" territories under Ethiopian control, the state excluded and marginalised citizens within its own borders, and even its own capital; this contradiction ultimately brought the war home.

Building on the foundations laid here, the collage of historical data and testimonies presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 proposes a different understanding of political community and citizenship construction in highly violent environments. First, however, the next chapter examines how the civil war presented new, albeit painful, opportunities to seek recognition and protection in the wake of anarchy and state collapse. I now turn to the "national" and international peace conferences of the 1990s and how they attempted to reshape the Somali political community.

CHAPTER 3: Peace Processes as Sites for Reshaping the Political Community

For over three decades, a sweeping narrative of ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic uniformity dominated conceptions of citizenship in post-independence Somalia. The assumption of homogeneity, shared by Somalis and reinforced by scholars,²³¹ suggested that shared characteristics could mitigate the thorny issues of citizenry-creation and nation-making that confronted, and indeed tore apart (“the curse of the nation state”²³²), other African societies emerging from colonial rule. The brutal civil war and “clan cleansing”²³³ burst this illusion and triggered a decade of externally guided peace-building attempts as the nation and its territory became fragmented. Following a brief exploration of the impacts of conflict, the chapter juxtaposes international efforts to stabilise Somalia in the 1990s and early 2000s, with distinct Somali approaches to peace-making and reconciliation centred on broadening negotiations to encompass a newly empowered “civil society”: new custodians who would bring fresh approaches to old dilemmas of citizenship.

The Violent Fragmentation of the Somali Nation

The many faces of the Somali civil war – from the 1980s to the 2000s²³⁴ – transformed how Somalis thought about territoriality and belonging and exposed the feeble union between British and Italian Somaliland. Conflict impacted the presumed uniformity and supremacy of the national political community in several notable ways, including the resurgence of so-called traditional political authorities, the flourishing of civil society, the advent of ancestral “homelands” as the foundation for (re-)emerging political identities, and the rapid political rise of Islamists with their own conceptions of a national *ummah*.

The most direct assault on the concept of a unified Somali nation was its fratricidal character. The mass flight from cosmopolitan Mogadishu, home to Somalis of all backgrounds and the nucleus of the nation-building project, resulted from a deliberate strategy to “cleanse” the city of its inhabitants, to use

²³¹ Ahmed 1995.

²³² Davidson 1992.

²³³ Kapteijns 2013, pp.131–91. Kapteijns’s term denotes collective, non-individualised punishment of people associated with certain identity-markers, most notably clan membership, whether self-described or perceived. Clan affiliation, according to Kapteijns, is a “technology” of violence, most notably instrumentalised during the civil war.

²³⁴ Bradbury, Healy 2010.

Kaptein's term. This displacement led to the (re)discovery of "ancestral territories". These quasi-states highlighted alternative, traditional forms of governance and politics as displaced Mogadishians sought safety in territories where they could trace their ancestry or clan linkages. In this way, the emergence of new forms of political identity rooted in (competing) ideas of ancestral homelands became key to post-war understandings of political community, in which territoriality became more important because it was equated with relative safety. Barnes and Cassanelli both write about the shifting nature of territory and how it maps onto (clan) identity in their description of "hosts" and "guests",²³⁵ which this thesis develops further by showing how such ideas intersect with emergent notions of political community after the civil war (Chapter 7). Groups without clan connections outside the capital, such as the Reer Hamar, were subjected to horrendous acts of killing, rape and property looting.²³⁶ Communities living in the inter-riverine delta similarly endured extreme violence, and many were forced from their lands: later labelled "minority" clans, the people of the Gosha valley, with limited access to resources and arms, were particularly vulnerable.²³⁷

The collapse of the state and destruction of institutions providing protections to citizens led, therefore, to the development of new self-governing mechanisms.²³⁸ These carved out new political and social roles for traditional clan elders, primarily to mitigate conflict and ensure the protection of life and property. The customary law, the *xeer*, has historically regulated conduct during conflict and set out compensation and mediation frameworks. Although the *xeer* was not conceived to deal with the scale and brutality of the civil war, it provided a measure of order. Traditional leadership, broadly conceived as clan elders and religious figures, once again became instrumental in public life against the backdrop of state collapse.²³⁹

Altering notions of national political community and territoriality were further accelerated by changing international ideas about how to create a new Somalia. UN and international donor agencies (especially the European Commission) encouraged a deepening of sub-national identities through their aid policies. The "building-block" strategy (using islands of stability to reconstruct statehood gradually) proved popular, as evident from the much discussed and influential *Menu of Options*, a report by anthropologist I M Lewis, which favoured federalism over a unitary, centralised state. The building-block approach mirrored transformations on the political map. Throughout the 1990s, numerous political "administrations" came into existence – both a cause for aid to be donated to and a consequence of the

²³⁵ Barnes 2006; Cassanelli 2015.

²³⁶ Unpublished interview with Faduma Isaaq Bihi in Ohio, US, May 2014.

²³⁷ Besteman 1999.

²³⁸ Bakonyi 2013.

²³⁹ Walls 2009.

incentives created by external actors. Fiefdoms appeared intermittently, often with a brief shelf-life, and varied in their claims, alliances and financiers – a phenomenon also visible in Liberia, Sierra Leone and other collapsing African states.²⁴⁰ The creation of new regional polities (and, in the case of Somaliland, self-declaration as a separate sovereign entity) fundamentally undercut the notion of one Somali nation with a distinct citizenry. The SNM's declaration of a new republic, with all the functions of a state, had the objective of creating a *different* nation.²⁴¹ Following the example of Somaliland, but without ambitions of secession, Puntland was established as a semi-autonomous state in 1998, with the aim of becoming part of a future federal Somalia²⁴² – an idea radically different from the unitary nationalism circulating in the Somali territories since the 1940s.

These processes of fragmentation of statehood and sovereignty were mirrored and, indeed, encouraged by experiences of displacement and the formation of a global diaspora. Many of those displaced not only maintained vital financial and social connections to the motherland but actually *increased* their political participation in Somalia, whether as financiers of quasi-states, lobbyists of Western governments or diaspora returnees (temporarily) assuming prominent offices across the Somali territories, including Somaliland.²⁴³ These politicians held dual nationalities and maintained property, commercial contacts and political affiliations in multiple states. As I explore in Chapter 6, this raises questions about not only the meaning of early twenty-first-century sovereignty but also emergent Somali transnational citizenship and modes of political belonging.²⁴⁴

The blossoming of civil society initiatives that have stepped into the physical, economic and political vacuum left by war and displacement has been the entry point for many diaspora groups. The proliferation of civil society activities has brought together both displaced and “local” Somalis, and should, therefore, be considered a catalyst for shaping post-war discourses of national community and Somali identity – whether as individuals or through group membership. Early on in the 1990s, civil society was perceived to consist of leaders of grass-roots organisations and professional associations but *not* clan leadership. (The inclusion of traditional clan elders in civil society delegations would be a consequence of the Arta conference.) Civil society received a boost when the war-induced famine of 1992–3 captured widespread international attention and triggered alarm bells about delivering vital resources and services to

²⁴⁰ Reno 1999.

²⁴¹ Omaar 1994.

²⁴² Puntland Constitutional Charter, 1998. Accessed through the IGAD archives in November 2017.

²⁴³ Hammond 2012.

²⁴⁴ Al-Sharmani, Horst 2016; Hammond 2010, 2013a.

populations remaining in the country.²⁴⁵ The UN hosted a 1993 conference in Addis Ababa, along with international agencies and non-governmental organisations, to discuss strategies for the delivery of much-needed assistance through safe corridors. Local NGOs, many founded and led by Somali women, gradually filled a void of service provision. Though many were dependent on international funding, resourceful Somalis based in Europe and North America have gradually become financiers of these organisations.²⁴⁶ Civil society, in the Somali context, is a phenomenon that was largely created by the civil war.²⁴⁷ Its roles in pre-1991 Somalia were historically limited, although a nascent activism attempted to push for reforms and regime change in 1990.²⁴⁸ During the civil war they no longer had to combat a Leviathan and instead operated in weak, or even non-existent, state structures. This unique position enabled civil society groups to influence peace negotiations directly – and even to define new norms and structures such as the 4.5 clan formula (dissected in Chapter 4). Some critics of these developments thus observe that the civil war created not only losers but also a class who owe their prominence, jobs and international connections to the violence.²⁴⁹

The war presented a significant opportunity for women to engage in newly created civil society structures. Without minimising suffering and the breakdown of progressive state discourse and gender policies, the war facilitated women's acquisition of social capital in ways not possible under the Barre regime or other post-independence governments. Although primarily driven by a small group of urban women, these pioneers facilitated the access of new female entrants to civil society and focused on it as a strategic site in contrast to a state that grew progressively weaker and more brutal. The rise in internal conflicts expanded women's grass-roots community-based work. Women-led organisations formed around the country: from the Mogadishu-Afgoye corridor and Kismayo to Galkayo, Bossaso and Garowe. Women with a track record of "civic" work before the war provided assistance, shelter and protection to vulnerable people. Thus, even if the fragmentation of a united women's movement was a consequence of the disappearance of a central state apparatus, women who were now located in different Somali regions maintained (loose) connections. Prominent activist Hawa Aden Ame described unexpected changes to the Somali women's "movement": "The war helped to get us away from Mogadishu; women founded organisations in places like Bossaaso, Garowe and Kismayo for the first time."²⁵⁰ Moreover, women

²⁴⁵ Omaar, de Waal 1994.

²⁴⁶ Menkhaus 2009.

²⁴⁷ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in January 2018.

²⁴⁸ See Kapteijns 2013, pp.108–20 for a nuanced discussion of the "Manifesto Group", which consisted of dozens of "senior statesmen" and civil society members who organised to resist Siad Barre's rule in 1990.

²⁴⁹ Ahmed 2015.

²⁵⁰ Discussion with Hawa Aden Ame in Nairobi, January 2018.

formed inter-regional umbrella groups such as We Are Women Activists (WAWA) in Puntland and Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) in Mogadishu.²⁵¹

This evolution in women's activism reflected broader social and political changes. An earlier focus on state policies to address cultural factors preventing women from accessing the labour market and education evolved amid war and humanitarian crisis. If initially a cohort of women collectively prioritised providing assistance that was seen as vital for surviving with dignity, their roles in civil society became gradually more explicitly political. Women activists pressed a multitude of issues, including disarmament, rule of law and providing security to women and girls across Somalia.²⁵² Some women activists also advocated strengthening traditional mechanisms such as the *xeer* that could, in the absence of the state, provide much-needed protection.²⁵³

Though women and civil society's growing visibility – especially women *in* civil society – was one major consequence of the war, the breakdown of the Somali state catapulted one socio-political group to even greater prominence. Previously shunned under a nationalist/socialist regime highly intolerant of political Islam, Somalia's Islamists gained in power in the aftermath of state collapse, to the extent that virtually all of Mogadishu's political and commercial class now represents some shade of Islamism.²⁵⁴ The central appeal of various Islamist groups has been the constitution of an *ummah* in the Somali territories to unify a political community out of warring and divided clan factions.²⁵⁵ Reformist political parties, such as Islah and Dam al-Jadeed, have promised a non-violent Islamic solution to fragmentation and chaos. Even more consequentially have been Islamists as armed actors, including the militias and tribunals that became the Union of Islamic Courts (briefly reuniting south-central Somalia in 2006²⁵⁶) and jihadists, with some foreign support, such as Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyyah in the 1990s,²⁵⁷ Al-Shabab since 2006–7 and, after 2016, the Somali chapter of Daesh, linked to the (failed) caliphate ruled from Al-Raqqah in Syria.

A Brief History of International Peace Interventions in Somalia (1991–1999)

²⁵¹ Unpublished interview with Asha Gelle in Mogadishu, June 2014.

²⁵² Unpublished interview with Asha Gelle in Mogadishu, June 2014.

²⁵³ Mohamud 2016.

²⁵⁴ Discussion with Roland Marchal in Doha, September 2018. See also Marchal, Sheikh 2015.

²⁵⁵ Elmi 2010.

²⁵⁶ Hassan, Barnes 2007.

²⁵⁷ Menkhaus 2007a, 2007b, 2015.

Over the last three decades Somalia has been a site for a plethora of interventions, with varied ambitions, means and approaches to conflict resolution. These external initiatives, albeit diverse, shared two core problems: misreading the root causes of Somalia's conflicts and, relatedly, repeatedly engaging the wrong actors to bring about a solution. Reductive analyses identified the Somali conflict as the offspring of perpetual clan struggles for control of resources. Such economistic explanations of the catastrophic violence of the 1990s missed the fundamental crisis of citizenship that underlay it; the conflicts reflected a social contract crisis between Somalia's variant communities and the state and, indeed, among communities. If the civil war revolved around how Somalia's diverse peoples related to each other and the state, the players absent from the endless peace conferences become apparent: representatives of this diversity. By failing to engage broader segments of Somali society, international actors repeated, time and again, the same "mistake" of focusing on armed factions.

The UN played a particularly prominent role. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established to facilitate humanitarian aid to Somalis starving in one of the worst famines of the late-twentieth century. However, it also had political objectives and was clearly seen as such by US President George H W Bush, the genitor of liberal "New World Order" discourse. UNOSOM gradually developed into a broad, multilateral attempt to stop the conflict and reconstitute basic state institutions. The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 746 in January 1992, imposing an arms embargo on Somalia.²⁵⁸ In April the Security Council greenlighted the deployment of fifty unarmed UN military observers to engage in peace consultations in Mogadishu.

Led and supported by the United States, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) launched Operation Restore Hope in 1992–3. UNITAF achieved initial success in creating a secure environment in southern Somalia for humanitarian assistance. However, as such interventionism limited financial and arms flows to militias in Mogadishu, in particular,²⁵⁹ forces loyal to USC's Mohamed Farah Aidiid challenged UNITAF, resulting in highly publicised casualties of scores of Pakistani and American troops between June and October 1993. The withdrawal of US forces was instrumental in replacing UNITAF with the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Aidiid's offences continued, and in March 1995 the UN officially withdrew from Somalia, small-scale UN humanitarian efforts notwithstanding. By the time Aidiid was killed in 1996, the UN's role as a broker of peace had collapsed.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 746.

²⁵⁹ Thakur 1994.

²⁶⁰ Interview with David Stephen in Cambridge, October 2018.

At regional level, there was a long and sustained engagement with Somalia, albeit marked by distrust given the turbulent history of direct and proxy conflict between Somalia and its neighbours. Early diplomatic efforts in the months following the collapse of Siad Barre's regime were led by Djibouti and Kenya. Interviews with Djiboutian and Kenyan diplomats reveal that the primary objective of these talks was to avoid total destruction of Somalia's political institutions.²⁶¹ Kenyan president, Daniel Arap Moi, invited Aidiid to Nairobi in what has been described by a senior Kenyan official as "back-channel, quiet diplomacy".²⁶² Moi's intervention was aimed at creating incentives for Aidiid to cede power to Ali Mahdi, who declared himself president immediately after Siad Barre fled Mogadishu. Similarly, Djiboutian president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, attempted to take advantage while institutions were "still standing" to negotiate a deal that was acceptable to Aidiid and Ali Mahdi. The Djiboutians were particularly worried about the secession of Somaliland.²⁶³ To maintain Somalia's integrity, Aptidon hoped to dissuade the SNM from breaking away from Mogadishu.²⁶⁴ These early unilateral efforts were unsuccessful, however, in crafting a settlement that could avert total state collapse.

By the mid-1990s, it was clear that peace-making in Somalia had become a battleground for regional domination, notably between Ethiopia and Egypt. In the words of Ismail Taani, the Djiboutian president's chief of staff, "Egypt and Ethiopia were always watching each other".²⁶⁵ Two conferences illustrate the impact of such rivalries on the peace enterprise in Somalia. The first was a 1996 meeting hosted in Sodere, 120km south-east of Addis Ababa. Sodere convened some of Somalia's most powerful faction leaders and political movements; security-minded Ethiopian interlocutors hoped to negotiate a settlement between these armed groups that controlled large territories in central and southern Somalia. The Sodere Agreement, finalised in 1997, was signed by twenty-six factions and resulted in the formation of the National Salvation Council (NSC), composed of forty-one members selected from twenty-six clans represented at the conference. The NSC was tasked with preparing a transitional central authority. Significantly, however, it excluded one of the most powerful actors at the time. Though Hussein Farah Aidiid, son of General Aidiid, and his successor, boycotted Sodere, the conference made significant progress, particularly in developing the basis for power-sharing among Somalia's major clan families.

Months after Sodere, Egypt invited warlords excluded from the Ethiopian initiative to a separate meeting. Egypt asserted a special mandate from the League of Arab States to broker peace in Somalia, seeking to

²⁶¹ Interviews with Mohamed Guyo and Ismail Taani in Nairobi, January 2018.

²⁶² Interview with Mohamed Guyo in Nairobi, January 2018.

²⁶³ Interview with Ismail Taani in Nairobi, January 2018.

²⁶⁴ Interview with Ismail Taani in Nairobi, January 2018.

²⁶⁵ Interview with Ismail Taani in Nairobi, January 2018.

counter Addis' influence.²⁶⁶ Twenty-eight heads of faction groups, including Hussein Aidiid and Ali Mahdi, promised to convene a National Reconciliation Conference in Baidoa, and to establish a body to oversee the establishment of a national assembly and charter with powers to form a government in Mogadishu. Naturally, factions aligned with Ethiopia refused to accept any proposal by Hussein Aidiid and his allies. Thus, prospects for peace were undermined tragically by the competition between two "camps" legitimated by influential regional players.²⁶⁷ Both Ethiopian and Egyptian approaches to peace-making shared similar views of who was central to Somalia's political future. Despite the rising importance of civil society leaders (and Islamists), neither country grasped the significance of unarmed groups to peace deals. The Djiboutians, however, understood that the warlords' power and legitimacy were based on shaky ground and noticed the untapped influence of traditional clan leadership. The two international conferences following Soderre and Cairo challenged extant approaches to inclusion in peace-making: they invited civil society actors into the core of dialogue and political settlement. The Djibouti-supported conference, in particular, broke the warlords' dominance in politics and was instrumental in broadening the peace process to include women, less powerful (and unarmed) clans, Islamists and diaspora groups for the first time in the history of international peace negotiations regarding Somalia. I argue that these starkly different approaches to inclusion had a lasting impact on post-civil-war debates about the nature and future of the Somali political community.

The Somali National Peace Conference (Arta), Djibouti (March–October 2000)

Djibouti's newly elected president, Ismael Omar Guelleh, addressed the UN General Assembly in September 1999, declaring his intentions to organise a new conference on Somalia. Seeking a robust start to his tenure, as well as international support (both morally and financially), international responses to Guelleh were diplomatic, faintly echoing a need to address the decade-long Somali conflict without any commitment. Somalia "fatigue" trailed Omar Guelleh and his entourage in their meetings with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Security Council and, most significantly, the Americans, who did not conceal their lack of interest in another likely disastrous involvement in Somalia. Annan, however, expressed an interest in restoring confidence in the UN's role in Somalia. He sent Briton David Stephen as an envoy to the Djiboutian initiative. Stephen captured the initial mood going into the conference: "The Djiboutians were diligent and hardworking from the start, but extremely secretive about which Somali

²⁶⁶ Interview with David Stephen in Norwich, February 2018.

²⁶⁷ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, June 2018.

groups they wanted to invite.”²⁶⁸ Kenyan diplomat Mohamed Guyo expanded on why the Djiboutian mediation would be welcomed by many Somalis who felt “abandoned” by the international community: “The Djiboutians understood that Arta was about restoring the dignity of Somalis.”²⁶⁹

In the Horn scepticism about Djibouti’s ability to address Somalia’s problems ran high. Ethiopia, with its outsized regional stature, faced enormous difficulties bringing peace to Somalia. Ethiopian tactics focused on intermittent support of clan factions (often at war with one another) and securing its volatile border with Somalia as a necessary response to “living with a failed state” next door.²⁷⁰ Yet, after the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war in May 1998, Addis’ security focus shifted to its northern border, allowing Guelleh to “quietly” launch his peace initiative. Sally Healy, who was with the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the time, explained that “Arta wouldn’t have been able to happen in the way it did if it weren’t for [the fact that] the regional power, Ethiopia, was caught napping”.²⁷¹ International funding for the Arta conference was limited “to keep international pressure at bay”; “the Djiboutian government and people paid for the conference”, confirmed UN representative David Stephen.²⁷² Guelleh’s first task was to assemble a small team of trusted confidantes to oversee the Somalia file. Three men briefed the president daily for the next ten months: Roble Olhaye, ambassador to the UN and the United States; Ismail Taani, Guelleh’s chief of staff; and Abdi Ali Farah, Minister of Foreign Affairs. In an internal report, the Djiboutians asked themselves, “How does Djibouti understand its role in this conference?” The answer was revealing: “We see ourselves as an observer, facilitator and a neutral entity that wants to convey positive neutrality with the help of [Somali] civil society, wise men, and others.”²⁷³

Geeddi Socodka Nabadda iyo Dib u Heshiisiinta Somaaliyeed ee Jabuuti (the “Djibouti-hosted Somali Peace Conference”) was the official (Somali) name given to the conference. Among most Somalis, the conference is commonly known as Arta. Led by Foreign Minister Farah, *La Commission pour la Paix* (the “Commission for Peace”) was charged with crafting the conference agendas and coordinating with a Technical Committee composed of six Somali civil society leaders from different locations. The president’s office developed the grand vision of the conference but also kept a tight rein on the closely guarded lists of participants and crafted a sophisticated media strategy to manage the conference image. Despite being selective about which “warlords” the Djiboutians invited, participation was “open” to

²⁶⁸ Interview with David Stephen in Norwich, February 2018.

²⁶⁹ Interview with Mohamed Guyo in Nairobi, January 2018.

²⁷⁰ Mesfin, Beyene 2018.

²⁷¹ Interview with Sally Healy in London, February 2018.

²⁷² Interviews with Ismail Taani in Nairobi, January 2018, and David Stephen in Cambridge, October 2018.

²⁷³ Report by the Commission for Peace, 18 May 2000, Djiboutian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives.

diverse groups of unarmed actors. Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow), one of the six members of the Technical Committee, noted that “there were no official invitations to Somali who identified as civil society, [and] no one who travelled to Djibouti for this meeting was turned away”.²⁷⁴

For the first time, Somalia’s numerous armed factions did not play a major role in the conference. Ismail Goulal Boudine, former Djiboutian ambassador to Somalia, asserted that “we were certainly trying to get away from unelected warlords. Every other conference before [Arta] was for the warlords and we wanted to put power back into the hands of Somali people”,²⁷⁵ an attempt at broad participation that preceding convenings had shunned in favour of focusing on men with guns. From the start, Djiboutian officials clarified that they were exploring structures that could “check the powers” of armed groups. The early days were filled with an undeniable sense of a Djiboutian dislike for Somalia’s powerful warlords. The obvious explanation was a genuine belief that the warlords had been terrorising and holding the Somali people hostage, weakening the reconstitution of the Somali Republic: the only way to control the warlords was to strip them of any semblance of legitimacy. By not considering them central actors in their forthcoming conference, Djibouti communicated its policy that, contrary to the Ethiopians, Guelleh believed that support of the warlords must be conditional on their willingness to renounce violence and be accommodated within political processes/structures. Ambassador Goulal said: “We invited some warlords, but we were set against giving them total power in the agenda and outcome of the conference.”²⁷⁶ Narrow settlements struck between armed groups – whether Egyptian or Ethiopian mediated – missed a central point: they did not build legitimate foundations from which a future state could govern. As supported by numerous officials’ statements, including Guelleh, the Arta conference strove to form a “legitimate foundation in the form of a national assembly” comprising Somalia’s “traditional authorities and representatives”²⁷⁷ before putting together a government or naming a president.

Yet not all “warlords” were labelled as brute spoilers of peace; some were significant to the process. The Djiboutian government courted leaders of the Rahaweyne Resistance Army, a clan-based militia that emerged soon after state collapse, with “protections” from Ethiopia to “liberate” their lands of mostly Hawiye “occupiers”.²⁷⁸ To ensure the success of the conferences, the Djiboutians had to win over the RRA and Digil and Mirifle sub-clans that it represented. Moreover, Djibouti also selectively invited some prominent armed leaders, including Hussein Aidiid, who initially accepted the offer but declined at the

²⁷⁴ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, January 2018.

²⁷⁵ Interview with Ismail Goulal Boudine in Djibouti, December 2018.

²⁷⁶ Interview with Ismail Goulal Boudine in Djibouti, December 2018.

²⁷⁷ Preamble, Arta’s Transitional National Charter, 7 July 2000. Djiboutian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives.

²⁷⁸ Report by the Commission for Peace, 13 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

last minute.²⁷⁹ Such manoeuvres underscore that Djiboutian approaches to inclusion were indeed critical of warlordism but remained sufficiently pragmatic to seek to incorporate highly influential warlords. Contrary to the Djiboutian branding of Arta, several armed faction leaders were therefore *not* excluded from the conference. However, most warlords who effectively controlled Mogadishu and central Somalia refused to attend without having any “real powers”. The two political blocs of armed factions created through the Sodere and Cairo conferences both rejected Djibouti’s invitation to participate because they argued that civil society actors did not hold any meaningful power.

Similarly, Puntland’s leader at the time, the enigmatic Abdullahi Yusuf, divided the Djiboutian camp: some recognised him as a *de facto* president who achieved authority through a traditional process in his home region, while others saw him as a chieftain dangerously infatuated with power. Yusuf received a half-hearted invitation and was encouraged by his Ethiopian backers to participate. Djibouti’s ambivalent approach to Yusuf (it was not clear whether the Djiboutians actually wanted him to say yes) would manifest itself in Guelleh’s stormy personal correspondence with Somaliland leader Mohamed Egal.

Pre-conference meetings were held in Djibouti between March and May 2000 with around one hundred traditional clan leaders and members of “civil society”, essentially prominent personalities from different Somali regions and exile. These meetings explored the various modalities for participation. Diagnosing the “failure” of past conferences as rooted in their exclusion of unarmed and ordinary Somali “communities”,²⁸⁰ the central objective was exploring how to best represent these groups. The pre-conference meetings resulted in representation through clan and sub-clan families, along what would generally become known as the “4.5 clan formula” (discussed in Chapter 4).

It was decided that Arta, a small town 40km outside the capital, would be a secluded (and safe) location for the conference, which ran from May to August 2000. Recruiting participants was a complex and sensitive operation, as the Somali Technical Committee was initially tasked with identifying “legitimate” representatives among traditional clan elders and civil society actors from different Somali regions. Representatives from Somaliland and Puntland were also recruited, although without official backing from these administrations who rejected the Djiboutian initiative. The participation of traditional clan elders and civil society leaders from Somaliland and Puntland was crucial to the legitimacy of Arta.

²⁷⁹ Interviews with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018, and Ismail Goulal Boudine in Djibouti, December 2018.

²⁸⁰ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, January 2018.

The self-exclusion of Somaliland and Puntland created pressures for Djiboutian and Somali organisers, who sought to turn Arta into a national platform. In the case of Somaliland, and to some extent Puntland, participation in “national” conferences was considered costly to their successful strides towards autonomy and peace.²⁸¹ Moreover, they feared that any resulting “national” governments were, in their view, likely to repeat the historical mistakes of centralising power in Mogadishu at the hands of politicians viewed by many as “remnants of the Siad Barre regime”.²⁸² Djibouti’s focus on recruiting civil society groups from these two political entities, each fixed on asserting its supremacy as a de facto state, was a deliberate strategy to circumvent official boycotts by Hargeisa and Garowe.²⁸³ Measures to include clan and other civil society representatives led to internal friction in these regions.²⁸⁴

The Technical Committee in Arta was composed of Somalis who hailed from across Somalia. The composition was deliberate, as each member was expected to lobby, mobilise local support and recruit participants to the conference. Interviews with Kofi Annan’s representative, David Stephen, and Mohamed Dahir Afrax, Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) and Asha Hagi Elmi described the result of such outreach in detail. Ordinary Somalis from Puntland and Somaliland were reported to have undertaken perilous journeys (and faced detention and assault) to participate in the Arta conference without official approval from the authorities; both regions entered into an agreement to “close their borders” in order to “stop the movement of people to Djibouti”.²⁸⁵ Ultimately, some traditional leaders from prominent clan families in Somaliland and Puntland participated in Arta, despite such obstructionism. As the chairman of the Technical Committee said, “ordinary Somalis wanted peace and an end to hostilities”.²⁸⁶ Somaliland and Puntland’s severe measures, which resulted in the death of one “peace traveller”,²⁸⁷ bolstered the Djiboutians’ resolve to go on with their “national” Somali conference. The introduction of the 4.5 clan formula underpinned the claim that Dir and Darood clan families of Somaliland and Puntland were well represented in their clan formula – thereby ensuring the “national” character of the peace processes.

The Arta process’ repeated iterations about the need for inclusion galvanised wide support, both in the home country and abroad. The conferences attracted “thousands of civilian Somalis”, most of whom had

²⁸¹ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Doha, October 2017.

²⁸² Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

²⁸³ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, January 2018.

²⁸⁴ Interview with David Stephen in Norwich, February 2018.

²⁸⁵ Official statement titled “Denial of the Rights of Somali Citizens” addressed to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 18 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives; Official statement after the “unlawful” detention of Assemblyman Abshir Saalah Mohamed (of Laascaanood) in Berbera, 6 September 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

²⁸⁶ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

²⁸⁷ Interview with Ismail Goulal Boudine in Djibouti, December 2018.

been sorted into delegations broken down by clan families, sub-clan and sub-sub-clan. Abdirahman Hirabi, a diplomat in the Somali embassy in Djibouti, noted: “No one was outside the 4.5 clan framework.”²⁸⁸ The clan formula allotted an equal number of forty-four places to each of the four “major” Somali clan families: Digil and Mirifle (also known as Rahawayne), Dir, Hawiye and Darood, with half a place (twenty-two places) allotted to “minorities”. The minority clans were joined together despite their diversity because they were perceived to fall outside the dominant, segmentary Somali kinship system. The 4.5 clan formula determined the composition and size of delegations of the five clan families but left internal allocation and distribution of delegate numbers to the discretion of each clan family. For example, the Arta archives include videotaped decisions by the Arbitration Committee (comprising forty-four Somali elders selected on the basis of the clan formula), which was tasked with resolving intra-clan disputes that arose within Darood and Hawiye delegations with regards to their sub-clan “quotas”. In rare footage of the proceedings on 5 and 7 August acquired from the Djiboutian state-media conglomerate RTD, the Arbitration Committee announced decisions pertaining to the sub-clan quotas after “intense disagreements within the communities” of Darood and Hawiye. According to the Arbitration Committee, for example, the Harti-sub-clan of Darood would be entitled to twenty-four quotas, and, in a separate decision, the Arbitration Committee resolved internal Hawiye disputes by allocating the Habar Gidir sub-clan nine quotas. The momentous decision would lay the foundations for later clan claims for greater representation throughout the conferences.²⁸⁹ At Arta, tense processes of intra-clan distribution of “power” went on for weeks and often required Djiboutian intervention, as the following excerpt from an internal report demonstrates: “There is a handful of Gadubursi [sub-clan] who insist on more seats, but Guelleh told the Gadubursi Sultan that this decision was final and irrecoverable.”²⁹⁰

Once there was a consensus on intra-clan-family seats (although Arta’s formulation would remain contested), the delegations and organisers laboured on composing a transitional national assembly. The clan formula would also become the basis of the new body: 245 members, chosen in accordance with the formula, were selected to become the nation’s most diverse parliament since independence.²⁹¹ The newly established assembly relocated to Somalia in October 2000, first to Baidoa (because of insecurity in the former capital) and then to Mogadishu. It included twenty-five women assembly members, also selected in accordance with clan balance, with one woman representing each of the five clan families.

²⁸⁸ Interview with Abdirahman Hirabi in Djibouti, November 2017.

²⁸⁹ Recording of Arbitration Committee, 5 and 7 August 2000, RTD archives.

²⁹⁰ Report by the Commission for Peace, 9 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives.

²⁹¹ Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

Arta created processes and structures through which to achieve three main goals. The first was to galvanise wide support from Somali society to create a new national assembly, seen by the Djiboutians as legitimate foundations for a new state. The Declaration of National Commitment (“the Arta Declaration”) was published on 5 May 2000 and summarised key outcomes of the debates on clan-based representation and approaches to state rebuilding. The Arta Declaration established that “representation in the Conference and in the Transitional National Assembly shall be on the basis of local constituencies”, defining these as a “mix between clan and regional [affiliation]”.²⁹² Although the clan formula, in practice, dominated most activities in the conference (especially implementing “balanced” representation between and among Somalia’s clan families), Arta’s delegates powerfully called for a careful way of applying the clan formula that could mitigate its more polarising aspects:

It must be stressed that representation based on clan affiliation and the assumed strength or importance of one clan (such as the presumed size of a clan or claims to belong to certain clans or territories) would only succeed in perpetuating or reinforcing the division of the nation. This division has its genesis in the divide and conquer tactics of the past regime, pitting one clan against another, or elevating one or some over others. The widespread injustices of the 1980s triggered the mayhem and civil strife of the 1990s, accentuating clan struggle in its most egregious sense. Surely, using the clan as the criterion for representation in the conference, or even in the national assembly, would be tantamount to institutionalising the cause of Somalia’s woes...[caution] must be exercised not to pursue it in an arbitrary and contrived [way].²⁹³

The second achievement of Arta was its reconciliation of communities through the 4.5 clan formula, which the Djiboutians believed they were well positioned to facilitate. Notwithstanding the recognition of “clan struggle”, the formula was seen as addressing a set of political and moral imperatives necessary for serious healing. In addition to inter-clan reconciliatory meetings, six “Reconciliation Committees” explored wide-ranging issues, such as drafting a “national” charter, the disarmament and demobilisation of warlords, restitution of public and private properties, and establishing structures for a new transitional government. Clan leaderships heavily influenced the selection of representatives on these committees. Arta’s third success was to reach a broad consensus on a mode of power-sharing that Somalis viewed as legitimate. Although the Djiboutian organisers and Somali-led Technical Committee insisted that civil society representatives played a major role in the conference, much emphasis was placed on clan leaders

²⁹² Declaration of National Commitment (“Arta Declaration”), 5 May 2000.

²⁹³ Arta Declaration, 5 May 2000.

who, through the practice of “balance”, effectively shared, and were seen to share, authority. A select cohort of traditional figures, clan and sub-clan elders held significant power in constituting delegations and who was selected for the transitional parliament.

The Somali National Reconciliation Conference (Mbagathi), Kenya (2002–2004)

Despite the ubiquity of clan, Arta was prized by many participants for being an unexpected but enthusiastically welcomed deliberative process that addressed underlying questions of representation and inclusivity. The empowerment of unarmed civil society groups had been partly responsible for an expansion of political discourse in peace negotiations. Less than two years after Arta ended, however, the ensuing IGAD conference, referred to in this thesis as Mbagathi, would create serious setbacks for most civil society groups, including clan elders. Critics like the chairman of Arta’s Technical Committee, Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), underscored that “Mbagathi disbanded our civil society and replaced it with their own brand”.²⁹⁴ Such a commonly held view would fuel perceptions that the IGAD initiative was staged “to undermined the Arta process”, where Somalis and civil society were “masters”.²⁹⁵

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which had been revamped in 1996, was and is the Horn’s premier regional organisation; Somalia had been a founding member of its predecessor, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). IGAD made an unexpected and bold bid to organise the fourteenth peace conference on Somalia immediately after the conclusion of Arta in August 2000. IGAD’s decision to oversee the Somali National Reconciliation Conference was all the more surprising given its lack of engagement for much of the 1990s, when it was mostly preoccupied with the Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). Only as a new Executive Secretary, Attallah al-Bashir, assumed the reins in 1997, did IGAD pursue a new mandate to reinvent its regional role.²⁹⁶ Remarkably, IGAD ran two formidably difficult peace processes between 2002 and 2004/5: Somalia and Sudan. For the Somali process, hosted in Kenya, IGAD relied almost exclusively on the Technical Committee, largely comprising special envoys from Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, dubbed “Frontline States”, which effectively ran both the grand strategy and the day-to-day organisation of the conference.

²⁹⁴ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

²⁹⁵ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, June 2018.

²⁹⁶ Healy 2009.

The decision to concentrate on Somalia through IGAD was a direct result of the formation of the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) at the end of Arta. Concerns about the TNG's inability to consolidate power in Mogadishu and a failure to engage Somaliland and Puntland were discussed at the 2002 ministerial IGAD summit in Khartoum;²⁹⁷ with less than a year to the end of the transitional period (which expired in 2003), the TNG president, Abdiqassim Salaad Hassan, was nowhere near the goals set out at Arta. IGAD's meeting bore the marks of growing international concerns about the threat posed by "ungoverned spaces" in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Abdiqassim Salaad was perceived to have ties to Islamists, particularly the Al-Islah party.²⁹⁸ IGAD states discussed a proposal for a new conference that (officially) sought to reconcile the TNG and faction leaders excluded from Arta. Mohamed Abdi Affey, former Kenyan ambassador to Somalia and chief negotiator who represented Kenya in the Frontline States, noted Ethiopian anxieties about having Islamists in Mogadishu: "Within six months, the Ethiopian strategy was to stress the incompleteness of Arta since the warlords were absent."²⁹⁹ Another aim was to engage the Puntland leadership and to bring Somaliland into the fold of negotiations. The new IGAD-sponsored conference was controversially proposed to take place in Kenya *before* the end of the TNG's three-year transitional mandate.³⁰⁰

The Somali National Reconciliation Conference was doused in controversy even before it had commenced. The Frontline States, composed of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, diverged in their views of inclusion. Both the Frontline States and the overarching Facilitation Committee of the conference, led by Kenyan diplomat Bethuel Kiplagat, finally agreed to begin a new process to "complete" the effort that began in Arta. The official justification was a pressing sense to reconcile armed groups and the Arta-produced transitional government.³⁰¹ The Kenyan conference sent a clear signal to Somalis: to the regional community, except Djiboutians, the armed factions were "core" political actors even when, domestically, the vast majority of Somalis punctured that myth.³⁰² Arta itself was an example of how warlords were rapidly losing power and legitimacy internally in the face of rising momentum behind Islamist and 4.5 clan politics. The Mbagathi process, however, ignored these changes on the ground and fell back, to some extent, into the patterns of mediations characteristic of post-Cold-War peace-making. Inclusion, in the most ironic sense, was a tool used to restrict political space, reducing the negotiations to

²⁹⁷ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

²⁹⁸ Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) recalled the US suspicion of President Abdiqassim's Islamist links in a conversation with the US Ambassador to Djibouti in summer 2000.

²⁹⁹ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

³⁰⁰ Civil Society Position Paper, 18 December 2002. IGAD archives.

³⁰¹ Healy 2011.

³⁰² Webersik 2014.

a contest between warlords who had been pre-approved to vie for power. No realistic peace could be achieved without their engagement.

For many Somali observers, especially those who had participated in Arta, the new Kenyan process deliberately undermined the Djibouti conference's achievements.³⁰³ While Arta focused on inviting unarmed, civil society – chiefly the traditional clan leaders and “intellectuals” or professionals – Mbagathi reversed this by insisting on bringing the warlords “back to the table”.³⁰⁴ Beginning in October 2002 in the city of Eldoret, the IGAD conference started with a Declaration on the Cessation of All Hostilities signed by four of the major political factions (read: armed groups) in Somalia. Asha Hagi Elmi's status as the fifth signatory of the Declaration brought to the fore the uneasy confinement of female delegates to the domain of civil society. The Eldoret Declaration (presumed to be a binding agreement) also introduced a federal framework for Somalia, which became the nucleus of a year-long disagreement before federalism was finally adopted on 15 September 2003. Mbagathi had three “phases”. The signing ceremony of the Eldoret Declaration concluded the first and ushered in the second phase of the conference. Between November 2002 and (roughly) November 2003, dozens of Somali participants, selected on the basis of the clan formula, were engaged in six committees, which, similar to Arta's, addressed issues of state reconstruction, as well as reconciliation among Somalis: federalism and provisional charter; land and property rights; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; economic recovery and institutional building; regional and international relations; and conflict resolution and reconciliation. Each committee drafted (and “harmonised”) reports based on committees' debates, many of which were characterised by “rising tempers and emotions”, in the words of one Kenyan official.³⁰⁵ Significantly, the conference organisers enlisted foreign experts to guide the committees, a point of grievance among Somalia's “intellectuals” (many of whom had been prominent in Arta). In one illustrative view, “members of the committees, most of whom have not been exposed to any civic education – crucial for their informed participation – will be rendered totally reliant upon [foreign] experts without the capacity to offer a second, and perhaps, most suitable opinion.”³⁰⁶

If Arta's international engagement was minimal, Mbagathi was openly sustained by a plethora of Western governments (US, UK), regional actors (Sudan, Eritrea³⁰⁷ and Egypt, in addition to the Frontline States), and regional and multilateral organisations (the UN – under David Stephen's successor, Liberian Winston

³⁰³ Interviews with Sally Healy in London, February 2018, and David Stephen in Norwich, February 2018.

³⁰⁴ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

³⁰⁵ Meeting minutes of Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter, 19 December 2002, IGAD archives.

³⁰⁶ Civil Society Position Paper, 18 December 2002, IGAD archives.

³⁰⁷ Internal brief by the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 2004, IGAD archives.

Tubman, the African Union and the EU). These external actors, referred to as “partners”, influenced several mediation efforts involving scores of warlords-turned-political leaders who sought to exert control over sub-clan delegations. The complex relationships between traditional clan leaders and “political leaders” would become most manifest in Mbagathi’s third and final phase, which also witnessed heavy-handed international intervention. According to an internal Kenyan briefing of August 2004, the British, US, European Union and the Arab League made their preference for armed group settlements clear, because “they feel that since they are the major financiers of the process they would like to have a power-sharing arrangement between the faction leaders rather than the ongoing clan approach. However, this may cause damage to the peace process.”³⁰⁸

The period between autumn 2003 and the conclusion of Mbagathi in late 2004 was highly contentious and politically consequential. There was little consensus (judging by the countless rounds of revisions) to Mbagathi’s proposed Transitional Charter, which was meant to clarify the composition of parliament (Article 29), the modality for appointing MPs (Article 30) and the duration of the transitional period (Article 32). With significant regional and international pressures, in July 2004, the Somali delegates finally agreed on a five-year transitional period for a federal parliament composed of 275 MPs, of which “at least 12 per cent shall be women” at the sub-sub-clan level and selected “in a transparent manner by political leaders and traditional [clan] leaders”. In what seemed to be a stark departure from Arta, “having ensured full endorsement of the traditional leaders”, nominations for parliamentary positions were to be “submitted to the IGAD Facilitation Committee” for approval.³⁰⁹

Unlike in Arta, the IGAD Technical and Facilitation Committees tightly controlled the representation of civil society groups, which it balanced with newly incorporated delegations of armed groups. Around twenty-five armed factions were invited to form delegations, though many would splinter during the course of the Mbagathi conference. The Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC), an organisation created in 2001 in Ethiopia by several warlords who opposed Arta, would be represented in Mbagathi by several of Mogadishu’s main “warlords”: Hussein Farah Aideed, Musse Suudi Yalahow and Hilowle Imam Omar. Others, also from the divided capital, like Mohamed Qanyare Afrah and Omar Mohamoud (Finish), broke away from the SRRC in the course of the negotiations; Mohamed Qanyare Afah entered into a coalition with the Arta-produced TNG and formed the “Group of 8” alliance, which temporarily brought together some warlords with the central state. The warlords were labelled as political “parties” or “movements”, and, in addition to the SRRC, included the Rahaweyne Resistance Army

³⁰⁸ Internal report by Kenyan officials, 20 August 2004. IGAD archives.

³⁰⁹ Articles 29, 30, 31 of the Transitional Federal Charter, IGAD archives.

(Hassan Mohamed Nur Shaatigaduud), the Somali Patriotic Movement (Mohamed Hersi Morgan), the Somali African Muki Organization (Mowlid Ma'ane Mohamoud), the Somali National Front (Abdirizak Isaaq Biihi) and the Somali Southern National Movement (Abdulaziz Sheikh Yousuf). Each of these maintained tense relations with sub-clan delegations (formed on the basis of the clan formula), to which the armed faction leaders were tied by virtue of clan affiliation.

The more restrictive approaches to Somali peace negotiations, however, did not prevent a spectacular display of civil society politics in Kenya. In a “position paper” written by one of several civil society delegations to Mbagathi, “whereas the Technical Committee sent no more than 350 formal invitations to Somali participants, about one thousand had voluntarily converged to participate in the conference by October 2002”.³¹⁰ Unlike Arta, however, the IGAD Technical Committee kept tight control over all official invitations, vetting future delegates (including traditional elders) through what was known as “an accreditation” process. In addition to approving the bona fide status and “genuineness” of traditional clan elders, the Accreditation Committee applied the 4.5 clan formula to ensure balanced delegations in terms of size and composition. While taking Arta’s popular modality, the IGAD Facilitation Committee slightly modified the shares, raising them from forty-four to sixty-six for each major clan family and from twenty-two to thirty-three to be divided among minority clans.

Ironically, the Djiboutians, who helped usher the clan formula into Somali political discourse, disliked how other regional players implemented the clan formula. Mohamed Ziad Duale was part of the Djiboutian delegation to Mbagathi when he cautioned against IGAD’s approach, calling it a “disastrous formula”. Ziad Duale wrote on 20 October 2002 that “the Kenyan special envoy, Mr Mwangale, has unilaterally proposed the distribution of delegates according to the clan formula at the instigation of the European Union. Particularly upsetting, this unilateral intervention came exactly when we were about to resolve the issue of the numbers. There is a significant risk that this proposition could lead to the failure of all talks.” Ziad Duale, in the same letter, warned against manipulating by “those who don’t have discipline”.³¹¹ Tensions grew between members of the Frontline States – both Ethiopia and Djibouti “walked out” of the processes but returned after international intervention.³¹² As Ismail Taani noted, “we, as Djibouti, had a good relationship with Ethiopia – the only thing we disagreed on was the Somali issue”.³¹³ Moreover, the Djiboutians were dissatisfied with Mbagathi’s progress and were particularly

³¹⁰ Civil Society Position Paper, 18 December 2002, IGAD archives.

³¹¹ Report by Mohamed Ziad Duale, 20 October 2002.

³¹² Report by Anne Marie Madsen (Denmark) to Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, 1 July 2004, IGAD archives.

³¹³ Interview with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018.

sensitive to regional efforts to undermine Arta's legacy. On 13 December 2002, Ziad Duale judged, "this conference can now be compared to a drunken ship, somewhat an odd expression used by a Somali woman because its direction isn't clear. The conference seems to be moving in different ways. To me, it is because Somalis themselves have become more passive. Somalis have to take the lead themselves."³¹⁴

Such Djiboutian evaluations, while accurate in some regards, are overly harsh in casting Mbagathi as the moment when Somali agency in the peace processes was lost. The conference, despite its restrictions, was another space for unarmed, civil society groups to deal with intensely political questions, chief among them the 4.5 clan formula. In fact, since then, ordinary Somalis have not stopped debating the issues at the heart of what it means to be a political community. These controversies, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, are still not resolved, as one observer poignantly noted: "In the past twenty years, every government comes to power with intentions to replace the 4.5 clan formula, only to postpone it."³¹⁵ The legacy of Arta and Mbagathi is, for better or worse, very much alive.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed a decade of myriad global, regional and domestic efforts to end Somalia's long-running civil war. From the disastrous UN interventions to feed the hungry and disarm the warlords, to the Egyptian and Ethiopian attempted deal-making (solely) with armed groups, to the Arta and Mbagathi conferences that celebrated broad-based participation through the clan formula, I highlighted that each of these forays was underpinned by a specific set of assumptions about the causes of violence and the actors necessary for any durable peace to be forged. Not only did these assumptions significantly impact the success (or more often: tragic failure) of these interventions, I concluded that they also implicitly or explicitly reflected variegated understandings of the Somali political community and its foundations.

The Arta and Mbagathi peace negotiations did so most directly by including historically underrepresented segments of Somali society, who, in turn, prioritised balanced and inclusive participation at the meetings, and in the resultant institutions, as part of their overall expectations of peace-making. Their contributions underlined the deep-seated problems of how citizenship had been understood and practised for over three decades in Somalia. As illustrious Somali scholar Afyare Elmi observed, amid the boisterous exchanges it became clear that, since the civil war, Somalis' basic conceptions of citizenship have tilted more heavily

³¹⁴ Report by Mohamed Ziad Duale, 13 December 2002.

³¹⁵ Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

towards the notion of descent and rights and become less anchored in the sense of national duty that typified the (rather liberal) founding constitution.³¹⁶

The Arta and Mbagathi conferences, as I will further demonstrate, de-stigmatised group and clan claims-making to political rights. Peace-making at Arta and Mbagathi showed that non-state actors can be catalysts for changing conceptions of political community, and who and how to belong to it. The next chapter takes a closer look at the representation modality that dramatically reshaped modern Somali understandings and became widely acknowledged as a prerequisite and determinant of political community membership: the 4.5 clan formula.

³¹⁶ Elmi 2016, pp.13–18.

CHAPTER 4: The 4.5 Clan Formula and Rebuilding the Foundations of Political Community

This chapter introduces the “4.5 clan formula”, tracing its evolution from a mechanism for representation, and participation of unarmed civil society groups, to its rise as a major determinant of citizenship in post-war Somalia. The first part of the chapter details the formula, unpacks controversies surrounding its origins and interrogates assumptions underpinning this dominant approach to inclusion within the Arta and Mbagathi peace negotiations.

Following this contextual background, I analyse how the clan formula shaped notions of the post-state-collapse political community in two prominent ways. First, it reordered relations between clans and sub-clans. In doing so, it arguably opened up significant space to renegotiate a Somali social contract between groups and with (re-)emerging national structures. Historical relations (including intra-clan relationships) were re-examined and transformed under the clan formula. At the 2000 Arta peace conference, clans gained significant traction as the building block of politics, resulting in new hierarchies. Categories such as “minority” and “majority” clans became the basis for the distribution of power. Although diverse groups contested the clan formula, its “institutionalisation”³¹⁷ remains salient today.

A second consequence of the formula was a popular tolerance and even embrace of clan language of claims-making predicated upon the reconfiguration of inter- and intra-clan relationships. The formula led to a reimagining of clans as potent *political* communities. As earlier chapters clarified, clan-framed claims-making is certainly not new in modern Somali politics. However, the adoption of the clan formula in the peace processes de-stigmatised the language of clan rights. This chapter demonstrates the ubiquitous nature of clan discourse in claims-making, lifting the veil on group rights and communal demands framed primarily (though not exclusively) along clan lines.

The second part of the chapter examines the complex relationship between civil society and armed factions. Discourses pitting civil society and warlords against each other led directly to the adoption of clan representation in the peace negotiations. Elements of civil society constituted the machinery behind processes of legitimisation: both traditional clan elders and so-called intellectuals joined forces to sell the

³¹⁷ Arta Declaration, 5 May 2000.

clan formula as the “will of the Somali people” and their desire for a more civil politics. Yet, as I show, the relationship between warlords and these “representatives of the Somali people” was in practice more ambivalent than antagonistic discourses suggest.

Introducing the 4.5 Clan Formula

The rise of the 4.5 clan formula at Arta and Mbagathi corresponded with an extraordinary shift in Somali peace negotiations in 2000. Djibouti predicated its mediation on putting “power back into the hands of the people”.³¹⁸ In concrete terms, this novel approach sought to invite diverse civil society groups to the Arta talks. Prior to Arta, most negotiations dealt exclusively with leaders and representatives of armed factions. The Djiboutian initiative assumed a widely accepted binary: civil society as inherently good for peace and armed factions (or warlords) as spoilers. The Djiboutian president described the “failure” of twelve preceding conferences, which compelled the creation of an innovative strategy: (unarmed) actors as new custodians of peace.³¹⁹ However, a dilemma emerged from trying to empower ordinary Somalis as the power of armed groups was curbed: how to manage new actors’ participation and achieve equitable representation of a highly diverse civil society encompassing (though not limited to) traditional elders, women, professionals, youth, businesspeople, former elites, diaspora groups and Islamists.

Before the official start of the Arta conference, preparatory meetings between March and May 2000 soon turned into a contested arena. A total of six consultative meetings with former politicians, civil servants, professionals, Islamic scholars and business leaders underscored the uncertainties of how to recruit participants to the conference.³²⁰ Although several options were on the table, all ruled out giving “warlords” veto powers at the conference. Two proposals were potentially viable. The first was to recruit participants through regions and districts. For example, administrative regions like Banaadir, Bari and Woqooyi Galbeed (based on a pre-1991 political map of Somalia) would each send *their* civil society representatives to the conference. This proposal was supported by Abdulqaadir Aden Abdulle Daar (son of Somalia’s first president) and others on the grounds that it was not bound to ascriptive characteristics. This proposal, however, was soon dismissed by the Somali Technical Committee (composed of six civil society leaders, one being a woman) and the Djiboutian organisers. According to Arta’s Technical Committee members, Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) and Mohamed

³¹⁸ Interview with Ismail Goulal Boudine, Djibouti, December 2018.

³¹⁹ Speech by Omar Guelleh at Arta’s opening ceremony, 2 May 2000, RTD archives; Report by Arta’s Somali Technical Committee, 2 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³²⁰ Women representatives from civil society organisations were excluded from these early consultations.

Dahir Afrax, resorting to regions and districts as modalities for representation was potentially politically explosive too: Siad Barre's overhaul of the administrative map during the 1970s was deeply contentious in the pre-Arta deliberations and unfair to some communities.³²¹ Rehashing territorial contestations threatened to generate new conflicts about territorial claims.

The second proposal, rooted in prior power-sharing agreements between armed factions, appealed to the supposed "indisputable" marker of Somali society: clan affiliation. Somali and Djiboutian organisers both posited that clan identity was indigenous to Somali society, so attempts to conceal the centrality of the clan were unproductive. The proposal suggested that all of Somalia's various clans would, by default, be invited to the conference. Each clan (and sub-clan and sub-sub-clan) would constitute a delegation led by its traditional elders (also understood to be part of civil society). As heads of delegations, traditional elders would then determine the other civil society members of each delegation. Advocates of the clan formula, including the Djiboutian mediators, argued that in the absence of legitimate state representatives, this proposition rerouted the question of political leadership to a consensus-based, authentic and traditional form of community representation. This line of argument viewed the clan as a form of political representation existing prior to the post-independence state project. Ismail Taani, Djiboutian president's chief of staff, still stands by the clan formula and its philosophical merits. Guelleh's and Taani's understanding of clans as the building-blocks of sovereignty explains their sympathetic views: "In the absence of political parties, clan delegations had legitimacy to create a new government."³²² Dissenting voices who argued that the clan was an easily manipulated essentialist cleavage were dismissed largely because the clan formula was seen to simplify contentious issues around legitimate representation. "Traditional" forms of social and political organising were viewed with a renewed sense of legitimacy in light of the Somali state's erosion.

Many supported clan-based representation, but the pre-Arta meetings were also marked by serious disagreements about the use of the 4.5 formula. The formula opponents' attempts to bypass clan frameworks faltered, which caused some prominent Somalis to leave Djibouti prematurely. The proposal to achieve diverse representation along regional and district lines added to an already tense and volatile situation: pre-war processes of regional and district demarcation, initially drawn by colonial powers and later revamped by Siad Barre's government, were conflict-laden legacies of colonialism and dictatorship.

It is important to recall therefore that getting the clan adopted as *the* representation modality was not a pre-

³²¹ Interviews with Abdurhaman Abdullahi Baadiyow and Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

³²² Interview with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018.

determined outcome; Somalis at the conferences did not see clans as a *natural*, default mode for self-organising and representation. The 4.5 clan formula was a contentious proposition from the moment of inception. Somali elites who participated in pre-Arta meetings arrived at the formula by way of intense debates and disagreements that led prominent figures to boycott the conference. Participants and organisers carefully weighed which proposals could appeal to the largest possible segment of Somali society and resonate with ordinary people. Just before the official start of the Arta conference, the clan formula was victorious. It would subsequently be constructed as the consensus choice of Somalis and win the official endorsement of the Djiboutian organisers, who eagerly packaged the 4.5 clan formula as the will of the Somali people.³²³

The genesis of the formula remains contested, as do its initiators. Most accounts trace its development to a point before the pre-Arta meetings. The main inspirers behind its adoption offer different narratives about its origins. Civil society leaders Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow), Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), and Asha Hagi Elmi participated in Arta's Somali Technical Committee and sought to distance the Arta conference (and themselves) from the clan formula. They maintain that the formula's foundations were laid at the (failed, Ethiopian-mediated) 1996 conference in Sodere. My interviewees, many of whom were part of the Technical Committee, were almost unanimous in attributing the clan modality operational in Arta to Sodere. Hence, a notion of clan-based power-sharing was born out of consensus between faction leaders through Ethiopian interlocutors. Key Ethiopian officials involved in the mediation, however, contest this attribution. Abdeta Beyene, Ethiopia's pre-eminent Somalia analyst of the last two decades and a diplomat in its embassy in Djibouti during Arta, asserted that the clan formula was a Somali conception born out of a settlement between major political blocs.³²⁴

Though the truth is difficult to ascertain twenty-five years later, the answer to this debate lies somewhere in the middle: while the Sodere meeting did indeed use clan categories and power-sharing formulations (between armed groups), the Arta meeting publicised and articulated these categories further. However, there was one crucial difference: "minority clans" were accommodated, and civil society played a much larger role at Arta, unlike at Sodere. Despite resorting to the "unjust" and potentially divisive 4.5 clan formula, with its roots in the warlords' vision of power-sharing, the Somali Technical Committee in Arta and Djiboutian counterparts hoped the mechanism would be a "temporary fix" to the complex problem of inclusivity. In hindsight, many feel uncomfortable having affirmed the armed groups' approach to

³²³The Djiboutian Government, with the Issa sub-clans (that belong to the Dir) dominating ruling elites, were specially attuned to clan discussions at the peace process.

³²⁴ Interview with Abdeta Beyene in Addis Ababa, October 2017.

power-sharing. This discomfort is evident in Mohamed Dahir Afrax's narrative of the clan formula, as constituted in Sodere instead of Arta – a dissociation that suggests a continued unease of Somalia's civil society elites with the formula.

Qabiil qaran ma dhiso [clan can't build a nation]. We weren't entirely happy with the 4.5 system but winds blew in that direction. The clan elders favoured a clan formula and there was a push from the Djiboutian organisers, who were clearly supportive of it. What we wanted was civil society supremacy in the conference.³²⁵

To address contemporary criticism of the clan formula, many of its key advocates, including the chairman of the Technical Committee, Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), say the formula was intended to be a “one-time-use” framework at the peace conferences until an agreement was reached on a viable alternative.³²⁶ No one could predict how the clan formula's popularity would reshape the language and discourses around clan rights.

With a semblance of consensus on the clan formula in place, preparations before the Arta conference commenced with a series of missions to localities across Somalia. Members of the Technical Committee in Arta underlined the importance of travelling through Somali towns and cities to personally inform communities for the upcoming Djiboutian-led talks. However, the key objective of these missions was to scout for influential clan elders and civil society personalities. Clan identity played a factor in determining who was sent to which communities, as Mohamed Dahir Afrax and Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) implied. Given the sensitivity of representation and inclusion, visits by members of the Technical Committee were not only practical in taking stock of would-be participant communities, but also reflected the seriousness and openness of Djiboutian efforts and were an early example of commitment to (clan) diversity as a basis for legitimate, emancipatory and inclusive peace talks.

The official start of the Arta conference in May 2000 further operationalised the 4.5 clan formula. At Arta, and later at Mbagathi, the formula was the primary framework guiding the allocation of quotas for individual representatives of clans, sub-clans and sub-sub-clans. Specifically, each clan, sub-clan and sub-sub-clan's delegation size, membership of various “Reconciliation Committees” and corresponding numbers (or quotas) to the resulting transitional parliaments were determined accordingly. These were the product of intricate negotiations by traditional clan elders in Arta, resulting in forty-four quota shares for

³²⁵ Interview with Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

³²⁶ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

each of the major clan families (Darood, Dir, Digil and Mirifle, and Hawiye) and twenty-two for all minorities. Two years later, the Mbagathi process raised these numbers to sixty-six for each of the majority clans, and thirty-three to be shared among minorities. Both conferences sought to enforce strict applications of the formula and the clan quotas it inspired. There was a general consensus on this distribution and its underlying spirit of “balance” or equality – at least among majority clans. Nevertheless, Hawiye and Darood elders vocalised their dissatisfaction about being treated as equals to the historically less powerful Digil and Mirifle (or Rahanweyne).³²⁷ While the formula drew new relationships between the main clan groups, it left the decision to share these seats open and at the discretion of each clan, igniting frequent disagreement and claims from numerous sub-clans and sub-sub-clans in a complex and fiercely egalitarian society. According to an internal memo by Arta’s Commission for Peace, most clans faced difficulties in sub-clan quota distributions. However, the Djiboutian mediators lauded the Dir sub-clans (known to be spread across vast territories in northern and southern Somalia) for their quick resolution: “The Dir, with the notable exception of the Isaaq, made a very quick allocation of parliamentary seats between the North and South. A small exception to this was a handful of Gadabursi who wanted more seats. But [President] Guelleh told the Gadabursi Sultan that this decision was final and irrecoverable.”³²⁸

In practical terms, the clan formula determined representation not on an individual level but based on *beelaha* – (sub-)clans. Individual delegates were selected solely on the basis of their membership of clans, sub-clans and sub-sub-clans. This logic also permeated group (or communities) selections, which had to fit neatly within already prescribed quotas defined by the clan formula. While the Djiboutian initiative was “open to all Somalis”³²⁹ – as the narrative went – it was effectively only open to individuals endorsed by their traditional clan leaders to represent the collective. The Mbagathi conference, also based on the clan formula, seemed to offer little room for negotiating the composition of delegations except for the slight modifications to the original formula to reflect newly incorporated leaders of armed groups. Throughout the conferences, implementation at the levels of sub- and sub-sub-clans was often contested. Despite its formulaic facade denoting inflexibility, applying clan balance required intense (re)negotiations, especially at micro level.³³⁰

Today, the 4.5 clan formula is widely understood as a proportional representation framework for Somali clans. Menkhaus et al. recently defined it as a “power-sharing agreement that allots an equal number of

³²⁷ Interview with Abdirahman Hirabe in Djibouti, November 2017.

³²⁸ Report by the Commission for Peace, 9 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³²⁹ Interview with Aburahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, June 2018.

³³⁰ Letter from “the elders of Galgallo minority community” to the Arbitration Committee, 16 July 2003, IGAD archives.

places to each of the four major Somali clan families[,] Rahaweyne (also known as Digil and Mirifle), Dir, Hawiye, and Darood[,] with a half a place allotted to minorities”.³³¹ Menkhaus further describes the government formed by the Mbagathi process – and selected based on the 4.5 formula – as “a government of national unity”.³³² Most scholarly and policy literatures still maintain that precepts of the clan formula, said to enshrine proportional representation, are reflective of Somali consensus. Moreover, contemporary analyses tend to view the clan formula as a power-sharing arrangement with distinct value to state-building projects without much consideration of how the formula reshaped understandings of political community.

I depart from these conceptualisations by revealing how deeply contested the clan formula was at its inception (and first applications) at the Arta and Mbagathi peace talks. The formula’s imperative was to create fuller clan representation in the peace negotiations; in other words, to achieve the “balance” that was necessary to advance peace and reconciliation. According to Mbagathi observer Abdulkadir Malesia, a close source to several Mogadishu warlords:

Certainly the 4.5 clan formula did not begin in Djibouti. At some point in our history, there was *qaraniimo*, a sense of nationalism and unity. But people started to have grievances. There was always a balance, a kind of settlement that was along clan lines. Most people didn’t see it, but this balance kept the country together.³³³

Setting aside its practical value in forging political settlements, I contend that the clan formula was (and remains) closely related to attempts to reconceive the foundations of the national political community: On what basis can a national political community be reconstituted? The formula proposed new determinants for membership to this reworked political community by focusing on clan representation and assertions of clan rights, while attempting to satisfy the age-old quest for “balance” in Somali political life.

The most consequential assumption underpinning the formula was the notion that clans constituted rudimentary building-blocks of Somali society and national community: according to Somali diplomat Abdirahman Hirabe, while every Somali has her or his own particular stories of origin, experiences and sense of belonging, all of these coalesced around a set of shared social structures, customs and modes of organising, which was the clan.³³⁴ Proponents argued, therefore, that clan identity entirely encapsulated

³³¹ Menkhaus et al. 2009, p.917.

³³² Menkhaus 2005, p.73

³³³ Interview with Abdulkadir Malesia in Djibouti, November 2017.

³³⁴ Interview with Abdirahman Hirabe in Djibouti, March 2018.

Somalia's diversity, while providing legitimate traditional structures on which a national community could be rebuilt. The 4.5 clan formula helped to reinforce this assumption. However, Kenya's lead negotiator in Mbagathi, Mohamed Abdi Affey, spoke critically about the formula's outsized place in the Arta and Mbagathi talks. He saw Somali and Djiboutian efforts to push for formulaic clan representation as laudable attempts for "social reconciliation", albeit grossly reductionist. Still, as the following sections demonstrate, the formula established a space for the assertion of rights and political belonging deemed necessary for revamping the shaky foundations of the post-1991 Somali political community.

Reshaping Clan Relationships

The clan formula's ripple effects can be seen in the rethinking of relationships within the Somali body politic. This rethinking transformed established relationships and hierarchies between and within Somali communities, and guided interactions between them and emergent state and government entities.

The roots of the clan formula are steeped in the competition between armed factions: the first conceptions of the formula to translate the relative power balance between clan-based militias into a political arrangement. The 1997 Sodere meeting, which introduced this "balance" into proposals for peace, was criticised for the same ailments that doomed other warlord-dominated negotiations: the lack of representation of Somali actors beyond armed groups.³³⁵ According to the UN, a faint optimism persisted about "negotiating a political settlement entrusting power to a broad-based Government in which all factions would be represented".³³⁶ Parties to Sodere spent long months jockeying for shares, much to the irritation of the Ethiopian government. Ultimately, the outcome of this inter-faction meeting (despite the notable absence of representation from key armed groups, such as the USC of Hussein Aidiid, son of General Aidiid) would be a historical first. The Sodere conference posited the equality of four of Somalia's majority clans (Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Rahaweyne), thereby laying the basis for what later became the 4.5 clan formula. Faction leaders finally agreed that the Darood and Hawiye factions were "equal" in power, after years of clan-based conflict failed to produce a clear victor.³³⁷ Remarkably, the Digil and Mirifle, who were represented by the Rahaweyne Resistance Army (RRA), were also recognised as an equal (despite long-standing social prejudices), because of the RRA's alliance with the Ethiopian security services. In confidential internal documents the Djiboutians contemplated at length their position vis-à-

³³⁵ Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi, Oxford, February 2018.

³³⁶ Yearbook of the United Nations 1996, p.296.

³³⁷ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

vis the Rahaweyne: “We need to ask ourselves, what position should we adopt regarding those living under [clan] occupation. It seems that the Rahaweyne have greater trust in Ethiopian ability to liberate their land than in this initiative.”³³⁸ To instill confidence in the Digil and Mirifle delegation to Arta, the Djiboutians insisted on giving them equal shares of power. The formalisation of power relations was the foundation of the clan formula, modified in Djibouti by adding the Dir and minorities to be fully reflective of the Somali clan map.

This particular account, contested by those who see the formula as a Djiboutian invention, emphasises the extent to which armed groups played a key role in reshaping communal relationships within contexts of peace negotiations and political settlements. Yet, this narrative usefully interrogates assumptions that the clan formula was based simply on the proportional representation of clan population size. The last nationwide census in Somalia was conducted in 1975 by the Siad Barre regime and was seen as inaccurate and politicised. For that reason, among others, the 4.5 clan formula could not be based on precise population figures of clans and sub-clans. Instead, the decision to balance became an act of political imagination. Central to this are memories and imaginaries of historical power relations (shaped to a considerable extent by the civil war) that infused contemporary assessments of clan size and perceived power of the clans.

The consensus to adopt the formula reflected a dire need for a mechanism that could simplify complex claims to power and political rights. As discussed in Chapter 2, the process began with exclusionary post-independence understandings of political community and was followed by Siad Barre’s manipulation of clan dynamics that led to insurgency and counter-insurgency and morphed into full-blown (sub-)clan warfare in the 1990s. Hence, the peace processes heightened the moral and practical imperative of reassessing established ways that clan communities related to one another. The 4.5 clan formula as an overhaul of Somalia’s communal relationships was attractive because it could manage intricate intra-clan and intra-sub-clan processes of contestation of power, representation and legitimacy directly.

While endeavouring to create balanced representation, the formula proposed a politics not predicated on equality between clans. It unleashed a scramble within each of the main clans (and minorities) about quotas, power and entitlements between each sub-clan and sub-sub-clan. To borrow Kapteijns’ term, the formula used the clan as a “technology of power”,³³⁹ by which struggles in the name of the clan solidified the need for the clan formula. The hope that clan contests by less violent means would lead to outcomes

³³⁸ Report by the Commission for Peace, 13 and 18 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³³⁹ Kapteijns 2013.

akin to democratic struggles for power accumulation was already myopic. Intense disagreements between clan delegates during the Mbagathi negotiations in Kenya regularly spilled over into violent clashes between militias inside Somali territories.³⁴⁰

Many took issue with the arbitrary nature of internal clan quota and power distribution, though this was less a question of population size and more about political and psychological dynamics. However, Djiboutian sources maintain that Somali traditional elders, much like in Djibouti, had accurate knowledge of their clan constituencies.³⁴¹ The Djiboutian government consulted Somali traditional clan chiefs at the early stages of the conference about the sizes of their communities in *deegaano* across Somali-inhabited territories.³⁴²

Sub-clan elders produced rough population estimates of their communities, including, not coincidentally given the Greater Somalia history, those who lived in Ethiopia and Kenya. Several instances of contestation of these delegation quotas at the Arta conference were put before an Arbitration Committee comprising forty-four high-ranking clan elders – who were themselves selected in accordance with the clan formula and whose decisions were “final”, according to the chairman of the Somali Technical Committee.³⁴³ Arta’s Arbitration Committee faced the daunting task of resolving disputes related to the allocation of quotas, which arose between various sub-clans in May, June and July 2000. There are contradictory views on who among the five clans had the most arduous task dividing up their shares internally: Technical Committee member Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) suggested that it was Darood sub-clan representatives.³⁴⁴ However, internal Djiboutian correspondence bemoaned the bitter struggles of Hawiye sub-clan delegations in dividing up their forty-four shares.³⁴⁵ To this day, the distributions at Arta remain unclear and contested, suggesting back-door deals and arbitrary decisions similar to when the Djiboutian mediators unilaterally insisted on Digil and Mirifle *equality* despite considerable dissension on the part of Hawiye and Darood delegations.³⁴⁶

Whether or not the representation modality of the clan formula is tantamount to an “institution”, in the words of Kenyan mediator Mohamed Abdi Affey, requires an examination of the structural and cultural

³⁴⁰ Internal brief on “the current status of the peace process” by Kenya MFA, 30 January 2004, IGAD archives.

³⁴¹ Interview with Aden Abdullahi Omar in Djibouti, March 2018.

³⁴² Interview with Ismail Taani in Nairobi, January 2018.

³⁴³ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

³⁴⁴ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, January 2018.

³⁴⁵ Report by the Commission for Peace, 13 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives.

³⁴⁶ Interviews with Abdirahman Hirabi in Djibouti, November 2017, and Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, January 2018.

shifts to which it contributed. The formula produced new categories of majority and minority clans that directly undermined the principles of universality and equality enshrined in the founding constitution and contradicted the formal position adopted by each Somali government until 1991. A conglomeration of Somalia's "minority clans", a category that lumped together disparate groups, was seen to be equal to half the share of one major clan. Furthermore, the assumption that underpinned the construction of minority groups (also referred to as "others") built on prejudices against these communities that had long existed; as discussed in Chapter 2, these turned extremely violent during the civil war (often the people least able to defend themselves against clan cleansing). Without demographic evidence that could definitively determine minority and majority groups, the 4.5 arrangement was viewed by newly constructed minorities as a blatant injustice that legitimised and institutionalised long-standing patterns of discrimination. Leaders of minority clans vocalised a deep discontent with the arbitrary, power-laden nature of the clan formula. In a *baaq* (or official statement) published in 24 May 2000, ten Jareerweyne elders wrote: "We, the Jareerweyne community, are prepared to rebuild the Somali nation...despite our current efforts, we are disheartened by the continued oppression and marginalisation that led to the destruction of our nation. We are not 'others'; we are Somali and we expect justice from the delegates in order to build a better nation."³⁴⁷

The formalisation of majority and minority categories, including in the two transitional parliaments, reflects the extent to which power and deep-seated hierarchies in Somali society have been essential to reorganising relations between Somali clans as part of peace-building. The spirit of the clan formula captured what Somalis had known and practised for decades – unequal clan relations that stigmatised and excluded some groups from decision-making. Arta and Mbagathi were unique because they institutionalised this relationship via the clan formula, making discrimination and exclusion overt and, from the perspective of Abdirahman Hirabe, rampant: the 4.5 clan formula was "*xal ma aha xaq* (an unjust and unfair resolution)".³⁴⁸

The formula's resultant categories and vernaculars are manifest in several terms coined at Arta, and replicated at Mbagathi, to refer to Somalia's diverse "minority clans". Members of minority communities were referred to by simplistic labels that ranged from "point 5", "minorities" and "minority clans", to "Group 5" or "fifth clan" (perceived as more respectful). The minority label also entered *public* discourse as a result of Arta and Mbagathi, even if they reflected long-standing patterns of social stigmatisation that prevented such communities from attaining full citizenship and membership long before the civil war. For

³⁴⁷ Statement by Jareerweyne traditional elders, 24 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³⁴⁸ Interview with Abdirahman Hirabi in Djibouti, November 2017.

most Somali delegates, the so-called minority question remained sensitive; to discuss such issues was tantamount to pressing an old wound that reflected how elites historically crafted a Somali state that excluded different linguistic and ethnic communities in pursuit of a homogenous national identity.

From the standpoint of self-described “oppressed” and “others”, the clan formula was not categorically rejected: their relationship with the formula was complex. While the formula reinforced old stigmas, it also offered crucial spaces for newly labelled minorities to make distinct political claims. For this purpose, the inclusion of a minority clan formulation at the conference reflected a degree of real commitment to represent Somalia’s minorities in the deliberative processes of peace negotiations, something that was simply unavailable on the battlefield or in earlier political conversations. The chairman of the Technical Committee, Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), said: “Arta was a victory for minorities who never had a real role in Somali politics.”³⁴⁹ For minority representatives, the conferences provided a valuable space to challenge historical narratives. A powerful illustration is a letter by Khadijo Suufi Hussein to the Mbagathi conference’s Technical Committee (and significantly to an international audience) during various stages of the Mbagathi conference. On 21 June 2004 this self-described “minority woman leader” described the clan formula as “politically motivated” and drew attention to the diversity of minority clans:

Those who make the loudest noise and claim to be strongest get preference...the criteria of 4.5 was rejected by some sections of Somali society [in Arta]. We were then consoled and told that this will not become a system to be followed. We then see that even in Kenya, the same system is a standard order for power-sharing. Everything is based on 4.5. The result is that wherever Somali people meet, there is a [community] that is being called “.5” or “other” ... The people who happen to be concentrated within “clan .5” are really people who are divergent in many aspects, culturally, ethnically and even in lifestyle and occupation. They have little in common other than the Somali language. So, what brought these groups together is a politically motivated mechanism that was manoeuvred by the heavily armed, so-called strong clans to marginalise these groups. The clan formula should not become a culture or system.”³⁵⁰

Without hesitating to affirm their historical Somaliness and belonging to the Somali body politic, such eloquent writings spoke directly to the question of citizenship and rights, demanding, for instance, that Af Maay be recognised as an official Somali language and that confiscated land and properties be restored. Almost all the letters opened with a reflection of a community’s particular historical grievances and repeated calls for more rights, recognising diversity as intrinsic to the fabric of Somali society. For

³⁴⁹ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

³⁵⁰ Letter by Khadijo Suufi Hussein 21 June 2004, IGAD archives.

example, “The Madhibaan, traditionally also called Midgaan and belonging to the Sab group of people, are an outcast minority of non-Somali origin, having been scattered all over Somalia as true slaves to patron sub-clans [from] major Somali clans. It was only after the downfall of the former government that the plight of the Madhibaan was made known to the outside world.”³⁵¹

Broadening inclusion in the conferences unlocked much wider discussions about identity, political belonging and membership. Many participants were irked by the deliberate homogenisation of so-called minority Somalis, which they vocally challenged throughout the conferences. Indeed, the quest for more *just* representation demanded recognition of the diversity of “the Fifth Clan”. Naming and recognising specific historical injustices (slavery, land-grabbing and systemic sexual violence against minority women) became a deliberate, central strategy, one that could not be disassociated from the demands for a more equal representation. A narrative based on vulnerability and victimhood – groups did not actively partake in clan warfare during the civil war – was transformed into an instrument calling for greater rights.³⁵² As one civil society group noted: “Clans without warlords are neglected and not properly represented.”³⁵³ Simultaneously, the formula constructed other historically marginalised communities, such as the Digil and Mirifle, as equals to the Hawiye, Darood and Dir clans. Despite their own history of marginality and exclusion, the Digil and Mirifle became entitled to an equal share of power and representation in transitional parliaments as other major clans. Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) and others point to the key alliances of Digil and Mirifle with other significant clans as one possible explanation for this success. Other interviewees noted the prowess of the Rahanwayne Resistance Army, a powerful armed faction allied with the Ethiopian security services.³⁵⁴

Evocations of clan identity not only manifested in entitlements and contests for political rights, but they also unearthed a host of unforeseen broader issues about belonging and membership to Somali nationhood, which was still seen by many as their fundamental entry point for citizenry rights. Numerous claims of autochthony were made in the name of clans and sub-clans, acting as a precursor to communal formulations of rights. Several “position papers” – as some letters were described by the Mbagathi convenors – drafted by traditional clan elders strongly asserted their clan community as a member of the nation, a tactic particularly important in the case of the newly constructed Fifth Clan. On the whole, repeatedly asserting belonging to the Somali nation was the strategy of aggrieved clans and sub-clan

³⁵¹ Letter by Madhibaan Supreme Council, 16 October 2002, IGAD archives.

³⁵² Statement by Jareerweyne Elders, 24 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³⁵³ Report by Political Vigilantes, 17 December 2003, IGAD archives.

³⁵⁴ Interview with Abdirahman Hirabe in Djibouti, March 2018.

communities, who seemed to measure being recognised as undisputed members of the Somali nation in terms of quotas, delegation size and share in the emergent political structures in the peace talks.

De-Stigmatising Group/Clan Rights

Gentlemen, I am ashamed to mention [my] tribe; all the same I am compelled to use it.³⁵⁵

Powerful in its evocation of a sense of “shame” tied to the overt language of clan identity, the above sentiment draws attention to a second, interrelated effect of the 4.5 clan formula. The formula’s adoption fundamentally reframed the language around claims-making from the individual as the rights-bearer to a group or clan. Another participant in Mbagathi warned of the dangers of openly thinking in terms of clan rights:

Modern societies protect individual rights. Only the individual is sacred and has dignity, not the group or the clan, however defined. Clan rights backed by a false majority remain the obstacle to the resolution of the Somali crisis. The group rights model [will] result in the preservation of the nightmare of clan hegemony, injustice and institutional violence.³⁵⁶

Debates about how to implement the clan formula lifted the veil on group or clan rights. A re-examination of prior relations of power and inter- and intra-clan relationships thus engendered a trend of group claims-making never before seen so openly in Somali political discourse. Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) asked provocatively: “Why stigmatise the clan? We needed to tackle [the] clan in Somali politics openly.”³⁵⁷ The argument of the chairman of the Technical Committee of Arta was echoed by others – given that the clan was ubiquitous, in society generally, and during the atrocities of the war in particular, the Somali nation had more to gain from recognising its salience and openly discussing it than from pretending otherwise. The formula’s most optimistic advocates hoped that opening up the clan for discussion would reassure those still afraid of being targeted and those in need of reconciliation and healing because they had fallen victim to “clan-cleansing”.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁵ Letter by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamud (Dhaladhere), 6 April 2003.

³⁵⁶ Letter by Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed Hussein, 31 January 2003.

³⁵⁷ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

³⁵⁸ Kapteijns 2013; Letter by Amin Mohamed Nur, representative of the Baravane community, 26 January 2003, IGAD archives.

Destigmatising clan rights also shifted earlier narratives and imaginings around the Somali political community and citizenship rights, which were deliberately mute on the notion of clan rights historically. The peace conferences created a crucial space that encouraged clan rights and claims and exposed long-standing complexities in the relationship between historic clan identity and political discourse. Arta and Mbagathi stimulated power-sharing along communal lines, whereby (sub-)clan leaders were assumed to act “on behalf of [the] communal interest”.³⁵⁹ As a result, clan-framed rights to representation and inclusion were acceptable and, indeed, expected. Dozens of written accounts and letters to the organisers of Mbagathi demonstrate that ordinary delegates and their leaders saw clan identity as a legitimate focal point for many of their political claims.

The formula presupposed collectivity as a basic unit for claims-making and rights (instead of the individual citizen, as envisaged in the 1960 constitution), subsequently also producing new norms, categories and structures designed with the group, not the individual, in mind. This is captured in a redolent statement by Somali diplomat Abdirahman Hirabe, who was closely involved in Arta: “No one was outside the clan framework.”³⁶⁰ The organisers and participants of the peace conferences may thus be considered the architects of a new communal politics, championing group-rights discourse within the 4.5 clan formula framework. Throughout the two conferences, participants grew increasingly comfortable using the language and logic of clan *community* in terms of representation. They encouraged drawing on clan communities as vehicles for the legitimate contestation of power and for the articulation of rights. The roles of representatives, particularly the traditional clan leadership, were constituted by specific commitments to *their* constituents, explicitly understood as *clan* constituencies. The following excerpts of letters underscore this:

We, the Baravense community, who [had] come to Kenya, are the inhabitants of the ancient town of Brava, some 200km south of Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The Bravanese are among the communities who suffered most by the bloody and merciless eleven years of inter-clan wars. All [our] human rights were violated and [we were] subjected to... torture, killings and rape of women and girls in the presence of their family. We have been deprived of our rights and subjected to injustice in the Djibouti conference by unscrupulous and selfish elements who represented us there without our approval or consent. We are afraid the same may happen again [in Kenya]. Your Excellency, no one except us can claim to represent the Bravanese community. As such, I want to be recognised and the rights of my community preserved,

³⁵⁹ Interview with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018.

³⁶⁰ Interview with Abdirahman Hirabe in Djibouti, November 2017.

respected and restored.³⁶¹

We, as [the] Dhulbahante sub-clan, do not accept lists presented by Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the Puntland Administration. Though we are all fellow Harti sub-clans, we contest his list as an outsider. The Dhulbahante are of [the] Harti, Darood clan. We [belong] to both the North and the South within the Somali Republic. [The] Dhulbahante, in the colonial period, were [occupied] by the British; you can find our history in Kenyan libraries. We are the sub-clan that is known for resisting British colonial rule for twenty years between 1901 and 1920. Nobody can abuse us; nobody can ignore us clearly. The Dhulbahante sub-clan has nominated its own traditional leaders for 500 years; the descendent of those leaders is the traditional leader representing us [today]. We will recognise only our traditional power in sharing seats among the Dhulbahante and not Abdullahi Yusuf. Our sub-clan is divided in six sub, sub-clans, who are the only rightful owners of the Dhulbahante slot.³⁶²

According to this new logic, most disputes put to the Arbitration Committees of the two conferences unsurprisingly dealt exclusively with communal claims. The peace processes created a new norm: no individual could speak legitimately on her/his own behalf. Moreover, the community also became the bridge linking the individual and the broader Somali political community: the nation. This fostered the view that the Somali nation was not imagined by individuals sharing a common history, language and culture, as previously held, but rather as a collective of communities subscribing to a common Somali historical narrative repeatedly negotiated over the course of Arta and Mbagathi.

Though clan has long been a central cleavage in Somali politics, post-independence political discourse exudes uneasiness in grappling with an overt display of clan identity partly because the very notion of clan communities undermined the project of making and propagating *Somalinimo* and *qaranimo* (belonging to the Somali nation) that trumped what were seen as parochial identities (see Chapter 2). In the peace processes, this suppression was identified as a root cause of grievances and indeed conflict. The oppressive experience of most Somalis at the hands of the dictatorship and civil war made destigmatising clan identity a moral imperative. This imperative serves as one plausible explanation for the popularity and proliferation of clan-based demands.

The ascendancy of the 4.5 clan formula also reflected the uncertainty of the time. The myth of equality among Somalia's citizenry and the supremacy of the Somali national political community was debunked by the violence that characterised state collapse. The Arta and Mbagathi peace talks lent urgency to

³⁶¹ Letter by Amin Mohamed Nur, 26 January 2003, IGAD archives.

³⁶² Letter by Mohamed Hersi and signed by five others, 24 August 2004, IGAD archives.

recognising clan identity and clan-based claims-making in reconciliation, peace and state rebuilding, sentiments shared even among Somalia's cosmopolitan, professional and intellectual classes.

Speaking in the name of (sub)clans and advocating for the interest of the clan gradually became the default position of delegates, or, more aptly, the *representatives*, in the two negotiations. External mediators, like IGAD and UN officials, also imbibed the clan discourse. Mohamed Guyo, a Kenyan official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: "Even external actors were trapped by the clan way of thinking. Interest groups [in Mbagathi] were defined in terms of clan groups."³⁶³ International actors readily accepted the clan formula as a Somali norm. Notable civil society advocate Hawa Aden Ame, who turned down participation in the peace conferences, felt outraged at being asked about her clan by foreigners. She attributed this reductive view to being the disastrous outcome of the clan formula:

When [international] donors ask me about my clan, I get really uncomfortable. Why would you want to know my clan? I can understand if you want to ask me which region I come from or about where I was born; I will tell you that I am from Puntland or I was born in Garowe. But to ask me directly about my clan...this is new to me. And it is insulting. I am Somali, that's my response to them.³⁶⁴

Discourses of Civil Society and the Supremacy of "Clan Oligarchs"

The clan formula was a product of a major shift in approach in the Somali peace mediations around 2000, as participation in the negotiations was dramatically broadened by engaging a mosaic of unarmed groups under the banner of civil society.³⁶⁵ This volte-face emerged from discontent with the international and regional approaches to Somali peace negotiations that prevailed in the 1990s. These negotiations focused exclusively on a dizzying array of armed factions across Somali territories. Both Arta and Mbagathi are highly distinctive because they, unlike earlier peace initiatives, carved out a space for unarmed actors from Somali society, and recognised their significance in the search for durable and lasting arrangements necessary for inclusive nation-rebuilding efforts.

Prior to Arta, the Banaadir conference held in Mogadishu in 1999 underlined the rise of civil society in Somali politics. Its ascendant role in that meeting captured the interest of Djibouti, where the founding

³⁶³ Interview with Mohamed Guyo in Nairobi, January 2018.

³⁶⁴ Discussion with Hawa Aden Ame in Nairobi, January 2018.

³⁶⁵ Omar Guelleh's speech at Arta's opening ceremony in a report by Somali Technical Committee, 2 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, had been replaced by his nephew and chef-de-cabinet, Ismael Omar Guelleh. In the early months of 2000, the new president invited Somali personalities, mostly politicians and civil society actors, to participate in a symposium in Djibouti. In a departure from the norm of previous conferences, this invitation came before any official invitations to the armed groups. David Stephen, head of the United Nations Office for Somalia during the Arta conference, recalled that Guelleh and his advisors wanted to steer clear of “unelected” warlords, whose claims to legitimate leadership were dubious.³⁶⁶ From Bossasso to Kismayo, leaders of heavily armed factions, accustomed to playing central roles in negotiations, were quick to show dissatisfaction with this Djiboutian tactic.³⁶⁷

The allure of “civil society” to many Somalis was its role as a site of resistance to warlord domination in politics and peace-making. As discussed earlier, civil society manifested itself in unprecedented ways during the 1990s in direct response to the civil war (Chapter 3). Initially, the Somali version of civil society consisted of self-funded community-based organisations that assisted displaced populations and NGOs with ties to international agencies. Over time, leaders of private institutions, especially universities, business associations and professional associations, with activities in Somalia and diaspora locations, became part of civil society. At a time when armed factions resorted to brute violence to control territories and peoples, civil society was seen to provide some measure of normalcy, particularly in Mogadishu.³⁶⁸ Despite inhospitable circumstances, at the 1999 Banaadir conference prominent leaders of professional associations, private universities and women’s advocacy groups projected the power of civil society that stood against violence, symbolically and materially.

Later in the Arta and Mbagathi conferences, civil society discourse was predicated upon its function and legitimacy to act as representatives of ordinary Somalis. Civil society actors were defined as people with a “special mandate”.³⁶⁹ The Somali term *bulshada rayidka ah* captures the distinctive communal and participatory qualities of civil society, and the extent to which the discourse of civil society was representing the “will of the Somali people” was central to the justification of the clan formula.³⁷⁰ However, civil society and its mandate to represent diverse segments of society were never clearly defined. Numerous interpretations circulated in the peace processes – a (sweeping) vagueness that was revealing in itself. Organisers and Somali citizens alike were fixated on the question of who, precisely, constituted civil society. Sally Healy, a Horn of Africa expert at the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth

³⁶⁶ Interview with David Stephen in Norwich, February 2018.

³⁶⁷ Report by the Commission for Peace, 18 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³⁶⁸ Interview with Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

³⁶⁹ Interview with Ismail Goulal Boudine in Djibouti, December 2018.

³⁷⁰ Civil Society Position Paper, 18 December 2002, IGAD archives.

Office during Mbagathi, noted a distinctly expansive approach to civil society, as “any actor or group that was not armed”.³⁷¹ Such a broad understanding was potentially maximally inclusive of groups and individuals who believed in civic politics and that the future of Somalia should not be decided on the battlefield. For many new Somali actors, the category of civil society served as a crucial entry point into the conferences, previously limited to a militarised few. Moreover, the idea of civil society powerfully symbolised a democratic and emancipatory space through which different political claims could be channelled. A position paper written by civil society delegates in Mbagathi expressed the spirit of representing ordinary Somalis:

The Somali people themselves – the educated and the illiterate, the modern and the traditional, unblemished by other notions, must draw the blueprint of the new Somali state... The exclusion of Somali people from the centre points of [conference] deliberations will deprive any emergent document of the history, feelings and dreams of the Somali people regarding a new state and systems of governance.³⁷²

A related discourse about civil society blossomed at the start of Arta and also reverberated in Mbagathi: civil society was not only antagonistic to warlord domination, it was also a legitimate representative of the millions of ordinary people suffering in Somali territories and nearby refugee camps.³⁷³ In contrast to faction leaders, civil society actors became synonymous with being “capable”, “patriotic” and putting the nation’s interests before clan or personal interests.³⁷⁴ Moreover, Sharif Salah Mohamed Ali, chairman of one of several civil society bodies in Mbagathi, wrote in support of a narrative equating civil society with the national political community:

The Somali civil society at [Mbagathi] is representing the general public of Somalia at large, including politicians, academics, professions, [the] business community, traditional leaders, religious groups, women’s organisations, youth organisations and peace campaigners. These groups were invited by the IGAD Frontline States as a fundamental component of the conference, and on an equal footing with other participating categories. The ongoing conference is not meant as a partial reconciliation exercise for faction leaders and regional administrations, but it was conceived as a reconciliation endeavour for all Somalis of every walk of life.³⁷⁵

As a shrewd discursive manoeuvre, civil society was constructed as a category able to accommodate

³⁷¹ Interview with Sally Healy in London, February 2018.

³⁷² Civil Society Position Paper, 18 December 2002, IGAD archives.

³⁷³ Internal brief by Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 February 2004, IGAD archives.

³⁷⁴ As per interviews with several Arta Technical Committee members; Speech by Ali Abdi Farah (then Djiboutian minister of foreign affairs) in report by the Technical Committee, 3 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³⁷⁵ Letter by Sharif Salah Mohamed Ali, 6 January 2003, IGAD archives.

difference within Somali society and as a medium through which the meaningful inclusion of women, diasporas and minorities could be guaranteed. Yet, women in particular were at the margins of decision-making processes at Arta and Mbagathi conferences, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. Except for some notable cases, other actors outside the remit of traditional clan leaderships, like minority civil society actors and diaspora representatives, could only act within a limited space in civil society. This presented a paradox. While civil society was constructed as a democratic and inclusive space, it gradually became an inflexible context, without which some of Somalia's marginalised social groups had no legitimate voice.

Therefore, civil society was not entirely inclusive, much like the clan formula itself. Far from it. In contrast to the imagining of civil society as an instrument of a utopian peace project, much of what passed for civil society actually served the interests of a few powerful clan leaders. There were in-group and out-group members; in time, the hierarchies embedded within civil society rapidly became evident. Civil society "elites" mostly referred to traditional clan elders and a cohort of Somali "intellectuals", a label for prominent Somali personalities, professionals and the elites prior to and from the Siad Barre era.³⁷⁶ The disjointed and contradictory realities of civil society would become particularly problematic for groups offered merely nominal representation, like women and diaspora-based Somalis, but whose inclusion was rhetorically portrayed as essential. The empirical record at Arta and Mbagathi points to the potential of civil society to be a restrictive space in which symbolic nods to diversity serve to entrench hierarchies.

During the Arta process, civil society transformed itself to reflect new political demands: it morphed into a highly politicised category, deployed in the peace processes as an "institution" in its own right. Once the Mbagathi conference began in 2002, civil society had become the norm (enthusiastically adopted by international and regional mediators) with instrumental value to different actors, including armed factions, whose resistance had been the founding goal of civil society inclusion. This inevitably meant its embeddedness in the dominant language of the conference and the new Somali politics: the conception of the 4.5 clan formula effectively paved the way for civil society to become an exclusive club dominated by – though not exclusively – traditional clan elders. The development of, and discourses about, civil society are key to understanding how the formula gained a hold in the deliberative processes and outcomes of Arta and Mbagathi. Traditional clan leaders, who were regularly (though not always) categorised as civil society actors, played a critical role in deepening ideas about clans as a *community* in the name of civility and the clan formula. Although traditional clan elders did not have a monopoly on emergent notions of clans as community, they lent them legitimacy, which will be contrasted with other civil society

³⁷⁶ My interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi), in Nairobi, June 2018, was especially useful in critiquing the role of Somali "intellectuals" in Arta.

actors like women and diaspora groups in the subsequent chapters.

As the twentieth century came to a close, new political roles for customary authorities in various parts of Somali territories garnered wide support. New constitutional roles for Somaliland's *Guurti* and Puntland's *Isimada* were backed by ruling elites, former rebel groups and (other) civil society actors.³⁷⁷ They reflected a socio-historical change in outlook in which elites and the population no longer seemed insistent on a formal (though artificial) separation between clan and state, and rethought what authority and leadership in a future, post-civil-war Somalia might look like. These trends influenced the Arta and Mbagathi conferences, where adoption of the clan formula would ensure a central position for the clans in Somali politics ever since.

Ushering traditional clan elders into the core of peace negotiations had several important discursive and practical functions. First, elders were seen as authority figures with legitimate power to drive the process of power-sharing in accordance with the 4.5 clan formula. With the warlords effectively shunned from Arta, the chief intent of the Djiboutian hosts shifted to social reconciliation among the clans: a paramount prerequisite for the clan formula and manifest in the formulaic approach to power-sharing. Djiboutian interlocutors approved of placing traditional leadership in key positions in the peace processes.³⁷⁸ No durable power-sharing agreement could exist without reconciliation between the various clans, many with grievances related to legacies of violence and exclusion. The process also highlighted the traditional role clan elders played in mediating conflicts between communities, contributing to perceptions of them as arbiters and mediators with moral stature, not as more ambiguous, agenda-driven actors.³⁷⁹

Although conceived as a collective entity antagonistic towards warlords, politically the Arta conference inadvertently created a hierarchy within civil society by introducing the 4.5 clan formula: it placed clan leaders at the helm and relegated “other” civil society actors to secondary positions in terms of decision-making responsibilities in the conference. These influential figures continued their “customary” roles within their social groups of overseeing reconciliation efforts (*gogol dhig*), resolving disputes, “naming and shaming” and condemning injustices and acts of violence; however, their proposed reworked responsibilities as enforcers of the formula took precedence over these customary roles. Clan “oligarchies” assumed the task of identifying and selecting (sub-)clan nominees to delegations to Arta and Mbagathi

³⁷⁷ Battera 2003; Clapham 2012; Statement on the Puntland Constitutional Conference 1998, IGAD archives.

³⁷⁸ Interview with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018; Speech by Ali Abdi Farah (then Djiboutian minister of foreign affairs) in report by the Technical Committee, 3 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³⁷⁹ Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

and, importantly, the selection of members of the transitional parliaments resulting from Arta and Mbagathi. Conceptions that traditional elders, also referred to as “wise men”, were apolitical actors fell short of adequately reflecting how traditional clan leadership, thanks to the 4.5 formula, had become an integral part of communal power play and contestation in and through the peace conferences. The moral and practical tasks assigned to clan elders were so great that they inevitably became indispensable to implementing inclusivity and balance. For example, President Guelleh, at the outset of Arta, stressed clan elders’ role in building “the foundation and base” of political structures.³⁸⁰ At no other time in modern Somali politics have clan leaders been so directly involved in the composition of the legislative branch: even today, elders have the final say in determining MPs. In the words of Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi), Arta “represented an experiment which in many ways is still ongoing”.³⁸¹

The introduction and implementation of the clan formula were contested; yet, by most accounts, its linkages with civil society, especially clan leadership, helped to mitigate its most contentious facets. Discourses about civil society stamped the formula as an inclusion modality with popular consent. The promotion of civil society, like the clan formula, was intended to ensure the broadest possible representation of Somalis in the peace talks. Traditional clan elders, representatives of communal interests *and* celebrated as core civil society voices, formed the symbolic bridge connecting both legs of the same inclusion project, at least in theory. Their endorsement of the clan formula as an appropriate and traditional form of power-sharing and representation in political life was obviously self-interested, as they would be the primary beneficiaries. This, however, made it no less effective as a discursive strategy vis-à-vis external partners and donors. This highly successful manoeuvring underscores the significant, underestimated power of unarmed Somalis in shaping the peace talks and the institutions that emerged from them. For all the complications that came with it, the pivotal role bestowed on traditional clan elders helped to position civil society at the core of debate and as a driver of ideas of inclusion and representation, while legitimising a radically different conceptualisation of citizenship and political community. Somali civil society, once seen as the new (and for some “youthful”) custodian(s) of peace, became increasingly associated with its role as enforcer of the clan formula.

Despite (or because of) the clan elders’ responsibilities in the peace processes, the authenticity of traditional clan leaders was contested and frequently subjected to verification and peer approval. For example, the clan “lists” at Arta and Mbagathi were updated periodically in response to disputes about the

³⁸⁰ Video of Omar Guelleh’s speech at Arta’s opening ceremony, RTD archives; Omar Guelleh’s speech at Arta’s opening ceremony in report by Somali Technical Committee, 2 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³⁸¹ Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

legitimacy, capacity or character of clan elders. It took at least five rounds of “verification” to agree on a final version of the “genuine traditional leaders” list at Mbagathi. At both conferences, the clan establishment included several representatives who corresponded with known clan hierarchies – Malaq, Sultan, Ugas and Aaqil – all positions that can only (with extremely notable exceptions) be filled by male members of clans. But approval of most other elders required many more hurdles. The Mbagathi conference, in particular, was rocked by controversies when the “authentication” of clan leaders was verified, first, by an Arbitration Committee (composed, in part, of high-ranking clan leaders) who testified to the “genuine” status of a clan elder. Final approval, however, came from the IGAD Frontline States, comprising representatives of three neighbouring states: Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

This level of contestation within the same clan, even down to sub-clan levels, emphasised the stakes associated with the newly acquired political power of clan leadership at the conferences. The above-mentioned Political Leaders Committee, tasked with the selection of MPs, equated clan elders – at least in theory – with the influential faction leaders at the Mbagathi conference. Inter-clan contestations for power undercut clan elders’ perceived role of “balancing out” the power of warlords. With these developments, the clan institution emerged as the most politically relevant of all civil society actors.

Regional mediators endorsed the inclusion of traditional clan elders as part of a wider norm about civil society participation. The Djiboutian mediators, by virtue of their cultural and historical connections to Somalis, had a uniquely nuanced understanding of Somalia’s clan system, customary codes and the role of clans in political culture. International observers and so-called partners, in turn, preferred traditional clan elders’ inclusion for their own reasons – one of which was simply cognitive, given their desire for categories and labels as a method of *understanding* which kind of Somali groups were represented in the conferences. Traditional clan leaders, women, civil society and political actors were all classifications designated to help make sense of the complexity and enormity of the Somali political and social scene. While Somali participants ostensibly accepted these labels, in reality they navigated and challenged such categories, rendering them much more fluid.

Of various ranks and levels of experience, clan leaders were brought in from different parts of Somalia and abroad;³⁸² clan leadership (known by different names in different clans) constituted a complex but elite group. They drew legitimacy and tremendous political capital from a perceived Somali-wide consensus that the clan is a customary identity-marker for all Somalis and the basis for undisputed

³⁸² According to my survey of Arta and Mbagathi participant lists found in Djibouti MFA and IGAD archives.

traditional authority. The brutal events of the war helped to reinforce this perception but also contributed to some hesitation about enhancing clan power, not least because a few traditional elders condoned inter-communal violence and were implicated in atrocities committed in the name of the clan. Reservations about clan elders drew attention to the volatile nature of the clan as a political “institution” rather than a cultural identity. As a modality of representation in the peace processes, observers worried that emphasis on the formula reproduced misguided notions that the Somali conflict was between clans. As Kenya’s chief negotiator, Mohamed Affey, noted, this reductive approach drove Arta’s push for a clan-centred approach to power-sharing when Somalia’s predicaments were, in fact, more complex.³⁸³

Setting aside the “traditional” basis of clan legitimacy and authority, specifics about clan leaders’ mandate and questions of who, in practice, they “naturally” represented, remained a major point of disagreement – a less straightforward point than it might appear. One remarkable example of a revolt against a prominent sub-clan leader occurred during the final stages of the Mbagathi conference when the traditional elder of the Marehan sub-clan (who live in different territories) was contested as a representative following his disagreement with the militarised wing of the sub-clan. As Mohamed Abdi Affey, who tried to mediate these disputes, said, “the [sub]clans don’t think of themselves as the same. Not all Daroods are the same.”³⁸⁴ This episode illustrates that salient representations of traditional (clan) forms of authority are not a given; instead, traditional authority and mandates are often acquired through ferocious contest, as well as processes of consensus-making.

Clan leaderships on the whole propagated a narrow view of who their constituencies are. In particular, empowering clan leaders meant women’s effective exclusion through the enforcement of patriarchal norms that fiercely disapproved of their putative public political roles. The new powers of clan oligarchies, disproportionate to elders’ standing in pre-war politics, were somewhat tempered by faction leaders’ influence. Still, clan elders’ roles exceeded the narrow tasks of (symbolically) representing delegations, as was initially intended.

Within the broader framework of the 4.5 clan formula, clan elders had significant leverage in negotiating the distribution of power at sub-clan and sub-sub-clan levels. This byzantine exercise entailed an internal assessment (and imagining) of population size and relationships between various (sub-)sub-clans and their power relations historically. Not all of the five main clan groups experienced this process similarly. Such negotiations were extraordinarily difficult for Darood and Hawiye clan representatives, partly because of

³⁸³ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

³⁸⁴ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

the enormity and complexity of these two clan families.³⁸⁵ Setting aside the onerous task of arbitrating power-sharing internally, clan elders often dealt with even more complex issues of passing judgement about which sub-clan and sub-sub-clans belonged, and which did not. Controversially, elders' estimation of *their* communities' size was mistakenly considered accurate and authoritative. As the last official census in Somalia had been in 1975, no one had accurate population estimates, especially given the dramatic changes of war, famine and large-scale displacement. Many disputes were taken to an Arbitration Committee composed of clan elders with sweeping powers, including the power to adjudicate cases brought by individuals against their own clan communities, especially from women and members of the so-called "Fifth Clan". In some instances, the Arbitration Committee of Mbagathi had to rule on communities' claims to a territory or whether a particular community was indigenous to Somalia.³⁸⁶

So-called "traditional representation" also helped to circumvent sensitive "geopolitical" issues. Clan leadership representation from Somaliland and Puntland at the Arta conference was all the more necessary given the fraught relationships between Djibouti and the ruling elites from these administrations. Even in Mbagathi, a similar logic was used: tenacious appeals for the inclusion of clan and other civil society representatives from Somaliland and Puntland reflected a widely shared concern for the need to legitimise the conferences as a "national" forum. Such clever manoeuvring helped the advocates of the clan formula to purport that it had Somalia-wide applicability. Even more provocatively, it was claimed that all ethnic Somalis, even those outside the internationally recognised boundaries, were encompassed by the formula. For its proponents, there was no contradiction between the clan formula and the national political community, even when understood through a traditional "Greater Somalia" prism.

Armed Factions and the Clan Formula

The construction of a dichotomy between warlords and civil society delegations was essential to the development of the clan formula. Yet warlords' relationship with the clan formula is complex and sometimes contradictory. On the one hand, the formula was a culturally rooted representation framework that could legitimately bypass the supremacy of armed factions in peace mediations, which was disrupted by the involvement of unarmed civil society at Arta. On the other hand, narratives about the clan formula's origins point to the role played by "warlords" in devising what had been understood as the inspiration for

³⁸⁵ Report by the Commission for Peace, 9 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

³⁸⁶ For example, disputes "resolved" by Mbagathi's Arbitration Committee included the Saransoor (13 April 2003) and the Badi Adde sub-clans (31 May 2003), IGAD archives.

the new formula; armed factions quickly further entrenched the logic of clan rights, proving themselves to be unlikely allies to the formula's civilian advocates. The warlords, all of whom had openly instrumentalised clan discourses during the conflict, would become key, though unanticipated, beneficiaries of the 4.5 clan formula.³⁸⁷

Throughout the 1990s, dozens of factions competed for control over people and territory in Mogadishu and central and southern Somalia. Regional mediators supported the creation of political blocks, which brought together armed groups with common interests, but international efforts to negotiate political settlements that spanned all factions proved futile. As discussed, the Sodere and Cairo conferences ironically *deepened* disagreements and furthered the polarisation of armed factions, with detrimental consequences inside Somalia. The cynically opportunistic making and unmaking of alliances (or *jabhado*) between various warlords added to their unpopularity among ordinary Somalis.³⁸⁸

The question of the inclusion of armed groups consistently generated sharp divisions throughout the Arta and Mbagathi processes. Concerns were driven equally by emotion and a calculated pragmatism about the nature (and durability) of peace outcomes: Should the peace deliberations accommodate both aggressors and victims? Delegate Osman Haji Omar (Falco) wrote to the chairman of Mbagathi, "If the term 'politician' is reserved for only those who represent warring factions, then we do not belong to an entity of that type. Instead, we hate those who enjoy killing innocent people for personal ambition or egoism."³⁸⁹ The conferences adopted starkly different positions on armed groups: Arta favoured a minimalist role, while Mbagathi notably saw them as key political actors.³⁹⁰ These divergent attitudes pitted the conferences as rivals: Mbagathi "undermined the Arta process".³⁹¹ Such a characterisation, however, should not overshadow the continuities between Arta and Mbagathi, namely, the prominent role of civil society and the 4.5 clan formula as a dominant approach to representation and inclusion.

Despite their domestic unpopularity, Somalia's armed factions were included in the Mbagathi process because of regional and international pressure, as part of a wider strategy to keep Somalia's Islamists at bay.³⁹² The latter had briefly been prominent in the mid-1990s and made a comeback through various groupings (armed and unarmed) in the early 2000s. While this reflected very local developments of

³⁸⁷ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

³⁸⁸ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, January 2018.

³⁸⁹ Letter by Osman Haji Omar (Falco), 25 September 2003, IGAD archives.

³⁹⁰ Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

³⁹¹ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Djibouti, March 2018.

³⁹² Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

limited geopolitical importance, trends and categories such as these were seen by outsiders through the lens of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror.³⁹³ Just when resentment of the warlords by the population and Mogadishu's powerful business community³⁹⁴ seemed to reach new heights, external pressures turned the warlords into legitimate political actors and a potential buffer against the rising Islamist tide.

The "civilian-led" Arta initiative,³⁹⁵ which explicitly curbed factions' control of its agendas and outcomes, was critiqued for being too naïve to deliver a serious solution to conflict and displacement.³⁹⁶ Some militias controlled important territories, including the capital. Arta's failure to include such powerful actors led the conference's detractors to portray it as symbolic politics rather than a substantive push for state reconstruction. The symbolism, however, was important. Arta's "civil" nature tried to minimise the privileged position extended to armed factions to negotiate openly on behalf of clans in previous peace processes.³⁹⁷ The idea of holding an international conference without the main parties to the conflict in Somalia ("those with real powers") was controversial and puzzling, yet quite revolutionary.

The de facto exclusion of faction leaders from Arta created a space for clan leaders and other civil society actors to begin a process of "social reconciliation" between the clans, mostly envisaged in the 4.5 clan formula. However, the warlords' recourse to violent politics continued to cast a shadow over Arta's outcomes. The IGAD organisers at Mbagathi suggested that both clan elders and warlords had an equal share of responsibility in applying the controversial formula. The new proximity of warlords to the formula made it even less appealing to Somali civil society actors, who were exhausted by the predatory behaviour of armed groups.

The bloody history of warlordism dominated the Arta proceedings, as they were fundamental to the reconciliation objectives of the Djiboutian initiative. Although total disassociation from armed factions was difficult to achieve, Arta became known as a unique experiment in beginning people-to-people healing, with minimal interference from those most often identified as the spoilers of peace. Many informants acknowledged the momentous steps that Arta took in facilitating inter-communal and inter-clan reconciliation, the first of its kind in an international context. Several makeshift camps were

³⁹³ Verhoeven 2009.

³⁹⁴ IGAD Frontline States' high-level dialogue with the Somali business community, 21-22 July 2004; Djibouti's consultative meetings with Somali business leaders, 8-11 April 2000.

³⁹⁵ "Civilian" was a term used by the Technical Committee chairman Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) and several other interviewees like Asha Hagi Elmi.

³⁹⁶ Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

³⁹⁷ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

constructed at Arta to house each of the participating clans.³⁹⁸ Over the course of the conference, parallel meetings between clans and sub-clans occurred simultaneously to discuss grievances and acknowledge atrocities committed during the war, some of which continued to unfold during the conference. In particular, meetings between Hawiye and Digil and Mirifle clan elders were important and laudable steps towards inter-clan reconciliation.³⁹⁹ The Djiboutian government highlighted the “successes” of communal reconciliation, which signalled attempts by traditional elders to distance themselves from *their* warlords:

Imam Mohamud reminded others in the meeting of the destruction of Mogadishu and turned to other communities in the meeting to seek their forgiveness. Mohamed Farah Jimale, another participant in the meeting, declared that the Hawiye community is committed to the [conference’s] decisions and is prepared to defend it; the community, he said, doesn’t want to go back to previous years of war and destruction.⁴⁰⁰

Described as taking place “under the acacia tree” (signifying the cultural context within which the meeting took place), issues of “land occupation” were discussed, which the Digil and Mirifle representatives underscored as an ongoing problem.⁴⁰¹ My review of internal documents demonstrates that Djiboutian officials were particularly wary of land and property “occupation”, for which armed faction leaders were directly responsible.⁴⁰² Throughout Arta, Djiboutian support for the Digil and Mirifle community, through the repeated denunciation of land occupation by “warlords”, served to quell the anxieties of their leaders who had sought protection from Ethiopia in the past.⁴⁰³

While presenting strong arguments for insisting on not giving militia leaders “veto powers”, Arta organisers (both Djiboutian and members of the Somali Technical Committee) still tried to engage some prominent warlords from Mogadishu, Kismayo and the central regions, where the Rahaweyne Resistance Army was in control. Some of these factions categorically rejected participation on the grounds that it undermined their authority, but delegates in Arta still expressed a desire for a holistic reconciliation that could indeed lead to the disarmament of militias. At some point during the proceedings, false rumours circulated that Hussein Aidiid, then head of the USC, was on his way to Djibouti. According to Asha Hagi Elmi, his impending arrival was thwarted by an Egyptian intervention, though this version of events was contradicted by others, who characterised the Arta conference as having considerable support from

³⁹⁸ Interview with David Stephen in Norwich, February 2018.

³⁹⁹ Report by the Commission for Peace, 8, 9 and 13 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁴⁰⁰ Report by the Commission for Peace, 9 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁴⁰¹ Interviews with Abdirahman Hirabe in Djibouti, March 2018, and Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

⁴⁰² Report by the Commission for Peace, 9, 13 and 18 May 2000.

⁴⁰³ Memo by Ziad Duale in 18 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

Cairo.⁴⁰⁴ Omar Guelleh strove to selectively engage leaders of powerful factions. According to Djiboutian official documents, two powerful Rahaweyne leaders, “Shaati Gaduud” and “Mohamed Dheere”, agreed to participate in Arta after repeated outreach and offers of Djiboutian incentives, but they soon left after they realised they had “no prominent role in Arta”.⁴⁰⁵

The exclusion of most armed factions from Arta, however, haunted the Transitional National Government (TNG) created under the leadership of President Abdiqassim Salaad. In March 2001, after the conference’s conclusion, numerous faction leaders convened in Awassa, Ethiopia. They formed the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) under the leadership of Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidiid. This fed into Somali suspicions of Ethiopia’s historical support of warlordism as a ploy to undermine the successes of Arta by keeping Somalis “divided”.⁴⁰⁶ Once back in Mogadishu, the TNG failed to disarm faction leaders and to consolidate government control. In their 2002 Khartoum meeting, IGAD member states argued successfully that a new conference to reconcile the TNG and faction leaders was necessary. The IGAD-sponsored Mbagathi conference was seen to intentionally undermine the “civil society-driven process” in Arta.⁴⁰⁷ Defending their interventions, IGAD officials underscored that a new conference could broaden inclusivity through participation of the SRRC and the autonomous region of Puntland.

Naturally, not all factions were powerful.⁴⁰⁸ On the whole, their influence was measured by a distorted and inflated sense of territorial control, according to Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow). Warlords primarily engaged in extortion and acts of banditry that kept the local populations fearful, rather than providing public goods of any kind. The failure of the UN arms embargo on Somalia, coupled with the collapse of the state and its monopoly over violence, produced far too many men with access to weapons but with little meaningful power. The manufacturing of warlords as political leaders in Mbagathi rekindled how the clan formula would be operationalised and concerned the majority of delegates, who were keenly aware of Ethiopia’s consistent (though shifting) support for Somalia’s armed factions.

The resulting Eldoret (later Mbagathi) conference challenged Arta’s casting of warlords as spoilers. The discursive shift in Mbagathi was demonstrated most clearly in referring to these armed faction leaders as

⁴⁰⁴ Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

⁴⁰⁵ According to an interview with Ismail Goulal Boudine in Djibouti, December 2018; Report by Commission for Peace, 13 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

⁴⁰⁷ Interviews with David Stephen in Norwich, February 2018, and Sally Healy in London, February 2018.

⁴⁰⁸ Report by IGAD, April 2002, IGAD archives.

“political leaders”. Months before the conference’s official start, an IGAD-led mapping mission toured Somalia to identify key participants. The Somali-Kenyan official who was designated as IGAD Special Envoy for Somalia, Mohamed Abdi Affey, led the mission, which identified faction leaders in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Beledweyne, among other cities.⁴⁰⁹ The mission was criticised by Mbagathi participants for legitimising powerless militias while simultaneously underestimating the growing powers of the Islamic Courts, particularly in Mogadishu. In addition to several other civic associations that were formed during the IGAD conference, forty Mbagathi participants who called themselves “political vigilantes” – and represented “women, political leaders and intellectuals” – expressed anger about such mischaracterisations of warlords. Asha Ahmed Abdalla and Qassim Hersi Farah of the “political vigilantes” wrote: “The international community has no clear picture of the real position of warlords in Somali society. They are considered as men with political clout, but this is far from reality.”⁴¹⁰ Moreover, legitimising faction leaders as political actors deepened misguided perceptions about the supposed ties between the armed factions and the sub-clan communities they were seen to represent. Many participants decried the notion that warlords had a legitimate mandate to represent Somalis.

Nonetheless, as a result of the IGAD peace process, “chieftains awash in blood were reborn as legitimate political actors”.⁴¹¹ According to Mbagathi participant Abdulkadir Malesia, businessmen such as himself were vital to that makeover: “We worked extremely hard to make the [warlords] presentable to internationals and to Somalis as political leaders.”⁴¹² In conjunction with traditional clan elders, they now constituted the leaderships of sub-clan and sub-sub-clan communities. Mohamed Abdi Affey recognised this metamorphosis: “The warlords became heroes and defenders of the clan communities that were first created in Arta.”⁴¹³ However, faction leaders’ tainted image put the traditional elders in a bind. The factions purported ties to certain sub-clans and drew legitimacy from the clan formula – especially useful at a time of pressure on them, from civil society at the conferences and the Islamists in Mogadishu. In the Mbagathi process, elders were expected to collaborate with “political leaders” in matters concerning the selection of delegates and nominees to send to parliament. Thus, sub-clan delegations became both “traditional” (vested in clan elders) and “political” (because represented by warlords-turned-political leaders).

Mbagathi tilted the balance of power unmistakably. Its reconfiguration of relationships exemplifies the

⁴⁰⁹ Visit to Somalia by a mission of the IGAD Technical Committee on the Somalia National Reconciliation Process (17-20 April 2002) in a report to the IGAD Frontline States on August 2002, IGAD archives.

⁴¹⁰ Report, Asha Ahmed Abdalla and Qassim Hersi Farah, 17 December 2003, IGAD archives.

⁴¹¹ Interview with Ismail Goulal Boudine in Djibouti, December 2018.

⁴¹² Interview with Abdulkadir Malesia in Djibouti, November 2017.

⁴¹³ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

potential of the clan formula's original ideals (to bypass warlords' influence) to return like a boomerang. The warlords exploited their clan "base" to maximise their personal gain⁴¹⁴ and could do so because the Frontline States (the committee of regional states that oversaw Mbagathi) saw them as "political actors" whose relationship with their clans was one of mutual benefit. When Phase 3 of the IGAD-led conference began in autumn 2003, special "(sub)clan caucuses" were staged in Mbagathi and Nairobi. The caucuses, encompassing traditional clan elders *and* leaders from Somalia's notable factions, selected and approved members of the transitional parliament in accordance with the 4.5 clan criteria. Over time, tensions between the traditional and political "arms" of sub-clan delegations surfaced. Placing the clans' fate at the mercy of armed factions caused a considerable backlash, not only from some elders (who vocally opposed the tactics of faction leaders) but also from outspoken civil society representatives.

The clan formula's underlying principle was that traditional clan leaderships had undisputed privilege and mandate to represent diverse members of their clan constituencies, which, in theory, also encompassed warlords. However, the Mbagathi process endorsed an interplay between clan elders and their armed *sons*,⁴¹⁵ labelled by some as "violent aggressors",⁴¹⁶ to be in charge of quota distribution and power-sharing. Whereas the Arta deliberations entrusted this task exclusively to clan elders, Mbagathi challenged their dominance by coercing them to make decisions in consultation with warlords. The warlords initially scoffed at real cooperation, as they found this premise unreflective of realities on the ground. They argued that clan leaderships who usually occupied customary (and ceremonial) roles had no business in politics and little "real" power over territories and populations.⁴¹⁷ Khadijo Suufi Hussein, whose illuminating letter is cited above, underlines the shift in representational politics in sub-clan delegations to Mbagathi: "While the .5 clans have many national leaders, politicians and women activists [to represent them], only two now see themselves as the only leaders of this group. These leaders are Mohamed Osman Maye and Moalid Ma'ane, who are used as tools to discredit and marginalise the .5 clans. They have failed to unite even their own sub-clans."⁴¹⁸

The shift in the regional calculus seen in Mbagathi's overall approach to inclusion and representation therefore meant, in practice, a diminished role for clan leaders in their exclusive power to implement the clan formula. Struggles for power (especially the selection of clan delegates to the new parliament) were

⁴¹⁴ Record of a meeting between the Technical Committee and the Somali Leaders Committee (composed mostly of faction leaders), 12 November 2002, IGAD archives.

⁴¹⁵ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

⁴¹⁶ Report by Asha Ahmed Abdalla, Qassim Hersi Farah, 17 December 2003, IGAD archives; Internal brief by Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (p. 4), 6 January 2004, IGAD archives.

⁴¹⁷ Internal brief by Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (p. 11), 9 February 2004, IGAD archives.

⁴¹⁸ Letter by Khadijo Suufi Hussein, 21 June 2004, IGAD archives.

reignited within sub-clan and sub-sub-clan communities. In this manner, Mbagathi accomplished little by way of reconciliation and failed to turn the warlords into prospective peace-builders.

Conclusion: From an Inclusion Modality to a Shaper of Post-war Political Community

Within a few years after its introduction, the clan formula evolved into the norm, with broad-based consensus among Somalis at home and abroad. Notwithstanding its controversial aspects, the speed with which the formula gained apparent popular approval was a demonstration of its ability to be a mechanism to channel and regulate clan contestation and the scramble for power. The formula became a modern embodiment of Somalis' long-standing interest in balance among Somalia's clans in political life. This context allows us to make sense of how a rethinking of the Somali political community was predicated upon a formulaic representation of Somalia's clans and the preponderance of group rights.

The clan formula resonated with present-day needs, historical memories and yearnings of much of the Somali population; it has reverberated far beyond specific concerns of representation in peace talks. When it debuted, the framework was an expression of aspirations to enshrine equality and challenge the historical unevenness of participation in political life and citizenship. These yearnings, dating back to the pre-independence era, became entangled with the goals of peace and reconciliation at both Arta and Mbagathi. The formula filled the vacuum of legitimate authority after the collapse of the Somali central state. I emphasised the evolution of the clan formula, from its origins as a modality for civil society participation to a vessel through which Somalis could pursue political rights and be recognised as part of the body politic. In that process, the formula also became a site where the old principle of "balance" was asserted and contested. Underlying assumptions about clan identity and legitimate representation would not go unchallenged, as many Somalis saw themselves as neither adequately represented nor unproblematically incorporated into the formula.

From its origins as a framework to broaden, and indeed organise, civil society participation, the clan formula rapidly reshaped communal relations, presenting an opportunity to contest rights, claim belonging and channel new claims. This sharp turn of events was a surprise to the Somalis, who endorsed the formula, despite its controversial elements. The clan formula appealed to those who had been aggrieved, as well as potent "majority" clans who found their powers recognised. The clan formula turned into a technology of power, through which powerful (and armed) clans and sub-clans would assert their dominance at the peace talks. On the whole, the framework delivered on its promise to achieve wider

representation and managed to garner broad endorsement. This chapter underscored two immediate impacts: reassessing established norms associated with forms of Somali social contract and destigmatising the communal/group language of rights and claims-making, particularly those framed in terms of clans.

Several factors solidified the 4.5 clan formula as a remarkably durable feature of the so-called Third Somali Republic. First, responding to salient narratives about the historical unevenness in membership of Somali national political community, the formula promised to rectify mistakes that had contributed to conflict. Second, the culmination of subtle and overt grievances into the brutal violence of the civil war meant that many believed the formula could help to address clan violence. Third, the clan formula could be branded as traditional and uniquely Somali solutions, rather than an externally imposed and/or culturally alien intervention. These combined factors made the formula a central feature of Somali nation-making processes in the peace conferences and beyond.

The following chapters demonstrate the contested nature and limitations of the clan formula's logic. It proved particularly inadequate in dealing with multiple overlapping identities. The intersections of gender, diaspora and class prompted new strategies to resist the clan formula and its controversial assumptions. These contestations were premised on an existential need to incorporate forms of politics outside the clan and helped to construct new (and, at times, similar) ideas of belonging and solidarity among Somali citizens.

CHAPTER 5: “Separate and Equal”: Gendered Representation and Women as the Sixth Clan

The 4.5 clan formula shifted Somali notions of political community: its introduction led to the reworking of inter- and intra-communal relations and elevated group rights as core to politics and belonging in Somalia. By treating clans as foundational to not only Somali society but also political institutions, the Arta and Mbagathi peace processes advanced clan representation as a logical step towards securing political rights. But the formula had far-reaching implications for groups beyond clans.

Central to the formula was the belief that all Somalis, irrespective of other markers such as gender, class, diaspora status or ideological persuasion, were constituent members identifying primarily (or even exclusively) with *their* (sub)clans. All Somalis were expected to retain allegiance to their immediate political communities and, in turn, reap rewards associated with clan membership: participation in influential committees, entering spaces of power where crucial topics were deliberated and, perhaps most significantly, securing nominations for parliament. Moreover, clan representatives – traditional elders – were presumed to be “speaking on behalf of all members of their community” and articulating agendas that benefited communal interests.

Many Somali women at the peace talks saw the clan formula as highly problematic. These women delegates were among its earliest critics, as the formula handed traditional clan elders significant powers to determine sub-delegation size and composition, as well as sub-clans’ selection to parliaments. Female participants asserted that traditional clan structures favoured men’s membership over women. A cohort of Somali women called into question the patriarchal nature of clan institutions, a point that spilled into debates around the 4.5 formula. Women predicted that putting traditional clan elders, patriarchs par excellence, at the helm of new formalised political structures would guarantee women’s marginalisation.

This chapter examines the gendered nature of representation in the Arta and Mbagathi peace processes and their implications for how women thought of, and went about reshaping, the political community. I outline two main ways in which women participants responded to their exclusion in decision-making under the rubric of the clan formula. First, they promoted “the Sixth Clan” as a community exclusively for and led by women united across (sub-)clans on the basis of gender. Second, they seized on emergent regional and global norms around women’s inclusion in various aspects of peace-building to further their

resistance. These two strategies, among others, reflected serious efforts by female participants not only to enter the peace talks but also to ensure they would be embedded within the wider structures of post-conference political processes. I argue that women's struggles to be included are, in essence, a struggle for citizenship: their organising was not only about ensuring their inclusion in ad hoc procedures but also about their recognition as a fundamental part of the Somali political community.

The Gendered Politics of Inclusion

Somali women's participation in the Arta and Mbagathi processes was historic. The two conferences were unique in bringing women, of diverse socio-economic backgrounds and clan ties, into the fold of peace mediations as formal actors. Though still few in number, women delegates broadly spoke through three main channels. First, a select number of women were invited initially because of their roles in civil society. Second, they participated, controversially, as *prima facie* members of clan delegations. The third channel was through direct involvement as regional and international mediators.

The first channel grew from women's vital work in communities during the war years (see Chapter 3). Somali women's engagement raised their profile and served to justify their participation. Notable civil society leaders, especially those who led community-based organisations in southern and north-eastern Somalia, were included in the initial mapping for participation in Arta. In fact, most of the women invited to Djibouti were sent initially as representatives of NGOs and umbrella groups, like the Mogadishu-based Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC). Starting with Arta, and continuing at Mbagathi, the idea of women's involvement in the peace talks was premised (at least initially) on the notion that they had made tangible contributions on which a reconstructed state could build. Because Arta was branded as a conference that celebrated those with positive roles in civil society, women's inclusion was initially greeted with openness by a critical mass of Somalis and non-Somalis. Many women delegates at Arta were invited back to the Mbagathi conference, including a handful who became part of the Transitional National Government and Assembly after Arta. The combination of such factors created a favourable environment, though as my interviews and records of the peace conferences reveal, women's historic inclusion also came with considerable challenges.

The tension that would come to characterise women's relationship with the main civil society delegations started when women were excluded from the critical pre-Arta consultative meetings that achieved a

consensus on the adoption of the 4.5 clan formula.⁴¹⁹ Women delegates quickly realised that they were at the margins of decision-making processes, even within civil society groups, which misleadingly purported to be democratic. Women delegates faced enormous barriers in accessing decision-making roles. Well-known civil society leaders like Hawa Aden Ame describe women's position in the conferences' civil society delegations as largely symbolic.⁴²⁰ On 4 December 2003 Rukiya Sheikh Osman wrote a letter to the IGAD organisers of Mbagathi that encapsulated this critique:

We, as Somali women, [feel] betrayed. Women stand for ideals that will be the salvation of Somali people. Representation always revolves around the so-called civil society Executive Committee, but it excludes us and fails to bring any change.⁴²¹

Women had a visible role in several civil society delegations in both peace processes;⁴²² yet, their actions outside the confines of this category complicated their positions. Dilemmas associated with restricting women's inclusion in the civil society category were manifest when women were repeatedly barred from entering plenary sessions in Mbagathi in November 2003, which were supposedly open to all civil society delegates.⁴²³ This led to a remarkable paradox: the astounding association of women with civil society, while being excluded from effectively participating in it. Women, as was commonly held by virtually everyone at the conferences (including international interlocutors), could only belong to the civil society category as a result of their inability to be political representatives of the clans. While male delegates, especially traditional clan leaders, could easily navigate between labels of "civil society actors" and "political actors", restrictions imposed on women made it almost impossible for them to do the same.

The second channel of women's participation in the peace talks was through a multitude of sub-clan delegations. While inclusion at Arta was meant to be through civil society groups, the situation soon changed: women were to be selected on the basis of their communal membership in clan delegations, constituted in strict accordance with the 4.5 clan formula. Asha Hagi Elmi remembers:

As soon as we heard that the Djiboutians endorsed the clan formula, and that traditional elders were in charge of composing delegations, we knew that women and minorities were

⁴¹⁹ Interviews with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Djibouti, March 2018, and Abdirahman Hirabe in Djibouti, November 2017.

⁴²⁰ Discussion with Hawa Aden Ame in Nairobi, January 2018.

⁴²¹ Letter by Rakia Sheikh Osman, 4 December 2003, IGAD archives.

⁴²² There had been several civil society delegations in the Mbagathi peace conference. For example, new delegations in Mbagathi (e.g. armed factions) had civil society "representatives". The Executive Committee on Civil Society was one attempt to streamline a plethora of civil society actors.

⁴²³ Letter by Horn of Africa Relief and Development Organization, November 2003, IGAD archives.

in trouble. We had no place in the clan formula.⁴²⁴

The formula bears a striking resemblance to traditional kinship structures, the basis on which it was founded and acquired legitimacy. As such, the clan formula privileged representation by men over women. Somali clan doctrines have historically reinforced the unequal membership between women and men based on perceived gender roles.⁴²⁵ In the context of the peace processes, this did not mean women's categorical exclusion from clan delegations; nor did it suggest that women had zero space within the clan formula. Patrilineal bloodlines seemed to guarantee women's natural representation in conference delegations. Women could be, and were, included within their sub-clan delegations. Questions about women's effective representation arose when traditional clan elders were entrusted as *de facto* representatives of women, as well as men: the clan formula accorded traditional elders with a legitimate mandate to speak on behalf of women in their clan constituencies acting as "guardians" of their interests. Key decision-making roles, including being part of clan selection processes for parliament, were often restricted to male members. In other words, for many Somalis women's participation in the conferences was seen as largely superficial. Women delegates agreed that the clan formula reinforced women's insignificance to clan-framed representation in the conferences. One activist in Hargeisa sees institutionalised clan politics and patriarchy as interconnected:

Qabyalad [clannism] in politics and patriarchal Somali culture is the same.⁴²⁶

Mediators neither outwardly nor internally contested Somali women's inclusion in their sub-clans on the basis of patrilineal lineage. When pressed, a senior official at the Somali Embassy in Djibouti Abdirahman Hirabe responded, "Aren't women part of their clans?"⁴²⁷ This deceptively simple answer spoke to a perceived *natural* association between women and their clan delegations; in the context of the peace talks, this was perpetuated largely by the clan framework. The said inability of women was predicated upon a shared belief that it was culturally challenging and politically risky for women to be representatives of their sub-clans. Several clan elders were openly hostile to women's public engagement and did not conceal their disapproval of placing women at the helm of sub-clan representation. As notable Arta actor

⁴²⁴ Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

⁴²⁵ Scott 1999, pp.42–4, views gender as "a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes", and "a primary way of signifying relationships of power" (p.42). Particularly relevant is Scott's observation that "gender is constructed through kinship, but not exclusively; it is constructed as well in the economy and the polity", (p.44) though in Somali society these may not operate independently of kinship structures.

⁴²⁶ Unpublished interview with Sadia Alin in Hargeisa, September 2014.

⁴²⁷ Interview with Abdirahman Hirabe in Djibouti, November 2017.

Asha Hagi Elmi suggests, “the only issue clan leaders agreed on is not to include women”.⁴²⁸

Given the reality of men’s membership in the Somali clan mattering far more, rejecting women as representatives was justified based on the preservation of cultural codes and moral behaviour. David Stephen, the head of the UN Political Office for Somalia between 1997 and 2002, observed that “the elders claimed that involving women in the peace conferences was against their religion”.⁴²⁹ However, other political calculations were also at play. Where power-sharing and distribution were highly contested, no rational clan leader wanted to “waste” a placement on a woman (presumed to be a weak, poorly regarded delegate by most). Only in rare cases did sub-clans willingly select a woman, often following intense international pressure. Allowing women to be in charge of a clan’s fate was seen as contradictory to the community’s interests. Leaders across clan and communal lines agreed unanimously on this issue at both conferences. From the vantage point of women delegates, this dual cultural and political justification translated into a backlash among women, who wanted to be more than symbolic figures in the negotiations. Only a few weeks into the Arta process, such tensions set the stage for rethinking women’s position in the negotiations, as women delegates were increasingly at odds with the various clan leaderships.

The clan formula closed the [political] system to us. No clan elder chooses a woman over a man.⁴³⁰

Still, as women were technically incorporated in clan delegations, they attempted to lobby *their* clan representatives for a greater role in the negotiations but yielded few results. Frustrated, several women appeared in different media to express their disappointment, accusing the organisers of treating women as “ornaments without real intentions to include them in the conference”.⁴³¹ To diffuse the situation, the UN’s David Stephen had difficult discussions with various clan elders, who vehemently opposed women’s participation in Arta: “The UN had a commitment to women’s participation. The elders were clever, they knew that a game had to be played and that international funding depended on women being included in the talks.”⁴³²

⁴²⁸ Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

⁴²⁹ Interview with David Stephen in Cambridge, October 2018.

⁴³⁰ Unpublished interview with Faduma Abdi Hersi in Garowe, September 2014.

⁴³¹ Unpublished interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Nairobi, July 2014.

⁴³² Interview with David Stephen in Cambridge, October 2018.

Thus, global norms constituted the third channel whereby women gained access to the conferences. When prospects for meaningful inclusion in civil society or the (sub)clan delegations seemed slim, many women turned to international support. This move was a double-edged proposition, which, as I discuss further below, had somewhat undesirable consequences in the longer term. An intervention by (Djiboutian) President Guelleh proved impactful in resolving women's participation dilemmas in Arta. He implored the (male) Somali guests in his house to reserve a special quota for women, which guaranteed the participation of 100 Somali women in the Arta proceedings, and later 25 reserved seats in the Transitional National Assembly created in October 2000.⁴³³ At Mbagathi, too, international donors were eager to support women delegates, as per strengthening global norms about women's participation in peace-building. The European Commission served as a financial and "moral" patron by supporting twenty-one women as delegates and observers to the conference.⁴³⁴ The Mbagathi conference also created a "Gender Desk", through which support of Somali women delegates came in the form of "capacity-building" workshops. Somali women would learn an early lesson at both conferences: that international backing (seemed) to bear the most direct result in terms of real inclusion.

However, such a high level of normative international support created a dilemma for women delegates. It heightened an already tense relationship with civil society groups, as well as the various clan delegations. International patronage came at a high domestic cost: clan elders saw women's clamouring to be included in political structures as a Western project, inimical to Somali cultural norms. Global pressures for inclusion bolstered the view that women were a vulnerable, cohesive social group in need of continuous protection, rather than agentic political actors. As a result, women's visibility in the conferences was seen through a performative prism staged to appease international donors.⁴³⁵ This made it more difficult for women to embed themselves within emergent power networks and "local" structures of the conferences.

These entry points into Arta, as well as Mbagathi, reveal the gendered nature of representation, while providing a snapshot of women's uneasy positions in emerging clan communities. Women delegates relied on several sources to gain legitimate participation in the Arta and Mbagathi processes. Separately, each of the channels I discussed was insufficient to be truly effective. These predicaments, however, did not detract from the fact that they were a step up: one that could take women's priorities seriously and ensure, at the very least, application of the gender quota in the composition of transitional political structures that emerged through the negotiations. For the first time, women delegates could use the peace

⁴³³ Article 17.2 of the Transitional National Charter, 16 July 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁴³⁴ See the Somali National Reconciliation Conference's (Mbagathi) "lists of women delegates", IGAD archives.

⁴³⁵ For example, women participants and observers in Mbagathi were commonly referred to as the "EU list", IGAD archives.

processes as platforms for new demands, such as the recognition of their political rights through implementation of gender quotas, in addition to some of the first-ever attempts to “mainstream gender” into the conference agreements, declarations and charters of peace processes.

Neither women delegates’ relationships with representational politics nor their understanding of the value of assertively implanting themselves within emergent structures were unique. Political acumen and awareness of wider developments at the conferences (including leveraging the growing salience of international gender norms in the early 2000s) led to a realisation that there could be different paths to inclusion. Women delegates, like other social groups, sought to maximise representation and spend all available social capital to ensure they were not left behind. This inevitably meant engagement with the very frameworks that undermined their presence at the conferences, such as the 4.5 clan formula, and which threatened to undercut the (limited) recent gains. As they pondered their confrontation with the formula, women delegates found it essential to draw on the surge in group discourses at the peace talks, as I discuss in the next section.

The Sixth Clan as Separate and Equal

The 4.5 clan formula purported to be gender-blind, to the extent that its proponents were interested in gender at all. In its foundational logic, the formula celebrated clan leaders as legitimate authorities and representatives of their communities, advocating on behalf of women and men alike. Yet, in its gender-indifferent attitude, it reinforced perceptions of women as passive agents in need of representation by elders speaking on their behalf. Women’s symbolic participation informed a search for meaningful involvement outside the gender-exclusive clan formula and seemingly vacuous civil society rhetoric. Underlying the pervasive nature of inconsistencies (or, in most cases, a complete disregard) of women’s representation (and later gender quotas) was the problematic relationship that so many female delegates had with the dominant framing of clan rights, which was rapidly gaining popularity in the conferences. Pondering the classic “exit, voice or loyalty” dilemma of individuals facing a dysfunctional organisational structure,⁴³⁶ a courageous group of Somali women decided to neither quit politics nor simply accept tokenistic roles. Instead, to access their political rights they devised an ingenious strategy that was both highly pragmatic and radically subversive at once: to form their own, independent “sixth” clan as a way of deploying a new collective identity to construct a distinct political community.

⁴³⁶ Hirschman 1970.

Women's unique search for a separate and equal *community* was shaped by their recent experiences of conflict and the unfavourable social position to which they were relegated in war-afflicted Somalia. These two factors provide insights into women's understandings of the central goal of inclusivity in peace negotiations: the right to sit at the negotiation table and be endowed with the opportunities such positions might offer. This would serve both as recognition of the sacrifices that women made to Somali society in its most troubled time *and* as a future pathway for women's rights and peace-building more generally. Unsurprisingly, one common concern among most women delegates at the two conferences became the expansion of women's political rights specifically framed in terms of gender quotas: the Arta conference achieved a milestone by setting aside a small quota for women *outside* sub-clan quotas. Women were not alone in their preoccupation with increasing their numbers in transitional parliaments; other groups were also preoccupied with representation and "voice". In that sense, women's demands were neither unique nor dissonant, even if they were constructed as such. In calling for rights that were quintessentially "political", they asserted themselves as full and legitimate citizens and as indispensable members of the Somali nation.

To further these agendas in a highly creative manner, enter the formation of a "women's clan" – or a "Sixth Clan". Such framing intentionally linked gender identity and the ubiquity of genealogy and clan, and served as a potent instrument through which women could make political demands. The women's clan-making project reflected a level of confidence that Somali women could construct a powerful interest group of their own outside established clan categories. For prominent attorney Maryam Moalim, placing the gender quota outside the sub-clans was necessary to avoid a violent backlash against women's political engagement:

We were promised a special quota conditional on women being nominated by their respective clan leaders. When women went back to their clans for endorsements, they were intimidated, physically attacked or, in one extreme case, killed. So, we lobbied for the quota to be reserved outside the clans – that was initially accepted in Arta, but in Mbagathi, which was dominated by the warlords, this was scrapped.⁴³⁷

Effectively shunned from engaging within their communities, Somali women flipped the discourse of clan-based representation and used it against its male protagonists. Not all of Arta's female representatives approved of the Sixth Clan, but the initiative symbolised a new strategically crafty assertiveness in which women presented themselves (and were seen) discursively as a cohesive political community.

⁴³⁷ Unpublished interview with Maryam Moalim in Mogadishu, June 2014.

Provocatively, women actors asserted that the Sixth Clan was the most powerful “clan”, arguing that it represented “half of Somalia’s entire population”.⁴³⁸

The chief objective was to highlight gender identity and shared experiences of Somali womanhood as a new basis for political representation inclusive of women. This women’s clan was a direct response to the 4.5 clan formula and the threat of renewed marginalisation at the Arta talks. The Sixth Clan comprised delegates across clan and class lines and included, initially, women from the diaspora and domestically within Somalia. One of the key architects of the Sixth Clan, Asha Hagi Elmi, described its origins:

On the first day I took part in the conference representing the Sixth Clan, there were five men each from the five traditional clans. No woman was among them in the delegates. I was asked to be a member in the Hawiye clan... When I refused, Hassan Abshir, the chairman, said, “Fine, you can bring five women” – each one would be in the clans. He forgot that just an hour before, we [Somali women] became an official clan that joined the conference. We had recognition that we were equal to the other clans... I said “No, Mr Chairman, it will not be five women. We have our own clan.” We argued for about two hours. I was surprised that they couldn’t understand that our [women’s] clan has equal rights with Hawiye and Darood... They shouted, “Are you mad, how can you be a clan?” I responded that was yesterday; today we have our own clan. It was legal and the conference approved it... Having our clan was a right.⁴³⁹

The circumstances leading to the Sixth Clan may have been specific to the peace negotiations: a collective experience of feeling and being marginal at the Arta conference. However, the Sixth Clan advanced a broader critique of women’s position in post-1991 Somali society that was increasingly tolerant of an exclusionary clan discourse. Proponents of the Sixth Clan argued that all Somali women shared intrinsic experiences of womanhood in a resolutely patriarchal society that treated women as marginal members of newly celebrated clan blocs. These were conditions exacerbated by the fragmentation of Somali society due to the civil war.

The initial euphoria shared by diverse women delegates soon turned into frustration, with clan leaders whom they saw as unanimous in their view that women could not adequately represent their delegations’ interest at the conferences. Across various sub-clans, women also wrestled with acquiring cultural authority and a mandate to legitimately advance their agendas in the negotiations (e.g. support of livelihoods and protection against physical and sexual violence).⁴⁴⁰ The Sixth Clan managed to galvanise

⁴³⁸ Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

⁴³⁹ Unpublished interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Nairobi, July 2014.

⁴⁴⁰ As per IGAD’s consultations with women delegates, 26-28 March 2003, IGAD archives.

delegates who hoped to address the plight of women in Somalia's new body politic.

Stressing how women's shared experiences, from Kismayo in the deep South, to Saylac in the North, could form the basis of joint political action, the minds behind the Sixth Clan sought to erase other identity-markers (socio-economic, diaspora status and clan affiliations). A woman's clan appealed to many Somali women, who found it instrumental to act in unison and under one "clan" banner. A young informant made the eloquent observation:

Women's loyalty is divided between her husband's kin and her father's kin that she was born into. She can't belong fully to either. Each side believes that a woman belongs to the other. Women have no separate identity in Somali society.⁴⁴¹

Another informant, who wished to remain anonymous, declared: "My identity as a woman... no one can take that away from me."⁴⁴² The Sixth Clan's primary goal was to present Somali women as a political community in its own right – equal to the four "major" clans of Somalia – and to rebuff the patriarchal overtones of the implementation of the clan formula by positing womanhood as an identity even more fundamental than the clan, as understood by most men. Somalia's Sixth Clan purposefully glossed over important differences between Somali women for the benefit of a collective and cohesive political agenda. That agenda was understood as tackling the complexity of women's representation and meaningful inclusion in structures of peace.

Our priority, as the Sixth Clan, was to be part of drafting the Constitutional Charter. Because if you don't institutionalise rights in laws they won't exist.⁴⁴³

The success of the Sixth Clan was determined by the extent to which women accepted this idea of a "woman's clan", and whether women could forego other important identity-markers (e.g. lineage) to put women's collective interest and their claims ahead of communal and clan interests. The erasure of other important identities – clan identity, most significantly – displeased some women delegates. They felt that, beyond the notable contribution to lobbying for meaningful inclusion and the symbolic ringing of alarm bells about the plight of Somali women, the Sixth Clan offered little in terms of alternative and more radical proposals for peace-building at the Arta conference. This is precisely why contestations of the Sixth Clan initiative arose, not least because what was supposedly a collective movement that spoke on behalf

⁴⁴¹ Unpublished interview with Sadia Alin in Hargeisa, September 2014.

⁴⁴² Anonymised interview in Nairobi, January 2018.

⁴⁴³ Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

of all Somali women remained conspicuously silent about how inter-communal reconciliation issues intersected with sexual and gender-based violence, forced marriages and the looting of private property during the civil war. Already in 1997, the illustrious environmental activist Fadumo Jibril noted that Somali women's positionality vis-à-vis the war was radically heterogeneous and that peace would entail very different things for each of them: "Let us not pretend innocence... Women have empowered and encouraged their husbands, their leaders and their militia to victimise their fellow countrymen."⁴⁴⁴ Women who hailed from newly constructed minority groups ("Fifth Clan") insisted that their chronic oppression stemmed from their inferior social status and that their quotidian experiences were not shaped by gender inequality alone. Arta delegate Khadija Dirie, a vocal member of a sub-clan recently classified as a minority at the time of the conference, believed that historical patterns of marginalisation and the stigma her community continued to experience were more pressing than challenges to her identity as a woman in general: "How can I fight for gender equality when I am seen to be inferior to women-dominant clans?"⁴⁴⁵ Such experiences continued to haunt the lives of some women, especially those who were members of "minority" clans, with lasting implications for how they view representation and their political alliances. Khadija Dirie broke with the Sixth Clan and focused her activism within her sub-clan, ultimately securing the nomination in 2004 to represent her community in the Mbagathi-formed transitional parliament.

Paradoxically therefore, the Sixth Clan intentionally underplayed the differences between, and identities of, Somalia's female population, thereby neglecting the very issues that so many women identified as their top priority at the conferences. From the time of its inception, the Sixth Clan's underlying narrative constructed a discourse in which *all* Somali women were the same, irrespective of socio-economic status, class, education and diasporic experiences. The specifics of this shared experience, then, necessitated a strategy by which women had to create an alliance to speak with one voice at the conference.

This choice had the advantage of clarity but came at a heavy cost. Growing disagreement among women delegates on how to maximise their impact and defend their multifaceted interests eventually halted the Sixth Clan's momentum. Some delegates contested representation through the Sixth Clan, asking clan elders and political leaders to break the deadlock:

We as women delegates participating in the conference have no trust or confidence in our leadership. We

⁴⁴⁴ Cited in Bryden, Steiner 1998.

⁴⁴⁵ Unpublished interview with Khadija Dirie in Mogadishu, June 2014.

ask for the guidance of political and traditional leaders to resolve the dispute among women.⁴⁴⁶

According to Arta documents and my interviews, members of the Sixth Clan changed course and agreed to distribute twenty-five seats to women equally among clan groups: five women from each of the main clan groups and five from all those considered a minority.⁴⁴⁷ While based on a consensus from most women delegates to Arta, this decision undermined the founding spirit of the Sixth Clan. Abdurahman Baadiyow of Arta's Technical Committee recalled:

In Arta, the women disagreed on how to share the twenty-five seats until there was a solution that [there would be] five seats for each of the four major clans and five for women from minority clans. So, you see, there is no difference in the way women thought about power and politics. They had a chance to distribute these twenty-five seats among themselves in any other way, but they went back to the clan formula just like the men.⁴⁴⁸

Maryam Cariif, who participated in Mbagathi as a delegate of the Transitional National Assembly, remembers:

Many women were against Asha [Hagi Elmi] representing us. We had formed a women's caucus [in Mbagathi] and Asha was our leader. Instead of returning to the clans, we wanted Asha to take the lead and sign [conference] documents on behalf of all women separately outside the clan formula. But some of the women didn't want Asha to sign any agreements on our behalf because of jealousy.⁴⁴⁹

Ultimately, however, its demise, as key representational modality outside the 4.5 clan formula, was the product of rethinking women's inclusion triggered by the IGAD-led Mbagathi conference. Women's quotas in the Mbagathi-formed transitional parliament, set at 10 per cent, were left at the discretion of clan elders and leaders of the armed factions. With the exception of very few sub-clans, women delegates faced a herculean struggle to secure nominations as MPs. The IGAD archives contain dozens of disputes lodged by women with the conference's Arbitration and Facilitation Committees. All the disputes share grievances expressed by women from across sub-clans about their exclusion at the hands of the clan caucuses. Anab Jama Geesod (Lelkase sub-clan) and Halimo Jama Afrah (Marehan sub-clan) wrote letters on 15 and 25 August 2004, respectively, asking for an intervention from the "international community" to represent their sub-clans:

⁴⁴⁶ Letter signed by "women delegates" to the Arbitration Committee, 14 November 2003, IGAD archives.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview with Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

⁴⁴⁸ Interview with Abdurahman Baadiyow in Djibouti, March 2018.

⁴⁴⁹ Unpublished interview with Maryam Cariif in Mogadishu, May 2014.

My clan did not give me my rightful nomination to become an MP. I am the only woman qualified for this position. But I was denied my right as a woman... I request your good offices to intervene.⁴⁵⁰

Despite essentialising Somali womanhood (by only recognising gender identity), the discursive and practical utility of the Sixth Clan must nonetheless not go unnoticed. For many Somali women in Arta and in Somalia, as well as those in diaspora communities, the Sixth Clan was fundamental to the creation of a new (political) community at the intersection of peace-making and post-1991 women's activism for gender equality, especially in terms of getting a seat at the table. The efforts of the Sixth Clan sparked a much-needed understanding of coalition-building and community-making that transcended clan blocs.

Ultimately, women's clan-making at the peace conferences became the basis of multiform alliance-making beyond women delegates to include other communities and groups. Women formed partnerships with a range of actors at the two conferences, moving away from the idea that women delegates only built coalitions with other women. They aligned themselves with their clan communities, with numerous grass-roots movements springing up at the peace conferences, and even with armed faction leaders.⁴⁵¹ As they diversified their political allies, women did so to maximise their gains, ensuring the greatest possible support for their political participation and (cautiously) trying to build a shared, gender-inclusive vision of peace. This richness of women's political activity at the peace conferences was undermined by focusing solely on alliances with other women. It was one of several paradoxes furthered, in part, by international donors and the incentives they created during the peace conferences.

International Gender Norms and Women's Vision of a Political Community

The Sixth Clan drew attention from influential international audiences. This interest directly reflected the rise of international discourses around women's participation in peace-building such as the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS). These emergent global norms in the early 2000s were somewhat beneficial in providing Somali women with spaces to address thorny questions of representation and an opportunity to create a community based on (gender) identity politics. At the same time, these norms fell short of sustaining the momentum of the Sixth Clan, especially in overlooking the links between gender, inclusion and articulation of political community in the structures of peace negotiations.

⁴⁵⁰ Letter by Anab Jama Geesod, 15 August 2004, IGAD archives.

⁴⁵¹ For example, the Somali Political Vigilantes group which held a three-day meeting, 15-17 November 2003 and the Peace Tree and Somali Good Hope Alliance meeting, 1-7 May 2003, IGAD archives.

The development and proliferation of global discourses and practices regarding women in peace-building could, at first glance, not have been timelier. The end of the Arta conference in August 2000 virtually coincided with the historic adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in October of that year, consolidating international efforts to engage women in various aspects of peace-building, including peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Much of Somali women's politics was viewed by multilateral organisations and bilateral donors like the UN and EU through the prism of Resolution 1325. The Mbagathi conference, which occurred between 2002 and 2004, was most directly influenced by the increasingly influential WPS Agenda. However, Arta also witnessed outside interference based on this agenda, specifically on the question of women's participation in the conference and the share of women in the resulting transitional parliament. The United Nations' position regarding women's formal participation in the form of female delegates in Djibouti foreshadowed international concerns that were adopted by consensus a few months later in New York.

As global discussions around forming a WPS Agenda intensified,⁴⁵² local activists in the Somali context fought their own battles to foreground the links between gender identity and representation, and to advance the cause of the woman's clan. The Arta process witnessed the inclusion of women as part of a civil society body and the active resistance of clan delegations to the inclusion of women in their delegations. It was also at Arta that the first attempt occurred to organise women around a collective gender identity (and to shed other identities correspondingly) to lobby for agendas that were considered central to legitimising their presence. For high-ranking UN official David Stephen, "the UN had a commitment to women's participation in the talks", an imperative he conveyed to clan leaders. Implicitly, international instruments, such as the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, helped to make a compelling case for the inclusion of women in the Arta negotiations. However, no special funding mechanism was set up to support women's activities at the conference.

Several prominent women delegates who formed the Sixth Clan took to local and international media outlets to attract attention to the precarious situation of women delegates in the peace process. Djiboutian and Somali television networks broadcast live proceedings as they happened in Arta. Interviews with delegates such as Asha Hagi Elmi were used as a strategy to transmit to a wider (and global) audience women's particular need for more meaningful participation in the peace process, and more broadly in politics. The Sixth Clan's media strategy focused on reaching Somalis in Somalia and the diaspora alike,

⁴⁵² Horst 2017.

who were sympathetic to the cause of women's inclusion. As members of the women's clan continued to lobby conference organisers for separate and equal representation, a decisive intervention by Omar Guelleh pushed developments in an unexpected direction; as mentioned earlier, Guelleh seized on his influence as meeting convener to twist the arm of key elders to ensure that a quota for women in the transitional parliament would be reserved – a measurable success for female participants at Arta.

As evidenced above, the work of the Sixth Clan was most noticeable during the Arta proceedings. However, the idea of a women's clan continued to resonate at the IGAD-led conference two years later. However, by then, a substantial shift had occurred, which put women's political fate in the hands of clan caucuses dominated by traditional elders and newly included armed factions. This underlined how the Sixth Clan had not grown into the political force its proponents wanted it to be. While an enormous effort was made to map a common agenda for women at the Mbagathi conference, a women-only coalition with the same visibility as the Sixth Clan was difficult to replicate. Part of the explanation lies in the unsustainable nature of rigid approaches to gender identity as singular; fundamentally, the IGAD peace talks treated the question of women's representation, identity-based politics and demands differently than many female activists had hoped. These setbacks notwithstanding, in discourse and practice, the Sixth Clan remained intact in the eyes of external "partners", garnering admiration and support from IGAD, as well as international donors: "One of the most important lessons learned from the [Arta] conference was that women were able to put aside their political and clan differences to work together and develop a common agenda for women in the Somali peace process".⁴⁵³ International audiences – both conference organisers and international actors like the European Commission – carved out separate lists for women mostly outside (sub)clan delegations,⁴⁵⁴ thereby bolstering the discourse of a woman's political community.

The evolution of international policies and support for women is vital to this story: the relatively hands-off approach in Arta – concentrated on a mostly symbolic mandate of the UN's main representative, David Stephen (before the adoption of Resolution 1325) – became a forward-leaning role in reinforcing women's separateness in the Mbagathi process. This more holistic and proactive project included skill- and capacity-building for women; streamlining women's agendas (to find a common interest); gender mainstreaming of conference outcomes; and numerous burdensome internationally sponsored meetings between delegates/activists and international "gender experts" that required women to spend time outside

⁴⁵³ Report of a joint IGAD-UNIFEM seminar in October 2002, p.19, IGAD archives.

⁴⁵⁴ The "EU list", IGAD archives.

daily conference meetings.⁴⁵⁵ Thus, the Mbagathi conference reinforced the initial fervour that drove the Sixth Clan by focusing on women as a separate community. Amina Harun, a young activist, illuminates why it was essential for the Sixth Clan to gain international allies: “The Sixth Clan was our best chance to free ourselves from the shackles of clan hegemony.”⁴⁵⁶ The movement born in Arta, she argues, had to be revived in order to strengthen fading alliances between women across clans. Judging by women’s desire to focus on representational politics rather than symbolic participation or capacity-building, IGAD and its international partners focused on issues that had not been defined as key by women themselves.

The first ministerial-level meeting between IGAD states articulated a commitment to increasing women’s role in the Mbagathi conference even prior to its official start. Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, expressed that “Somali women show a greater capacity for empathy, forgiveness, and objectivity. They have the courage to question taboos pertaining to traditional attitudes of the clan system, and they advocate the need to look at the long-term interests of society as a whole.”⁴⁵⁷ Moreover, a month after the conference’s kick-off, Mbagathi conference organisers hosted a seminar for the women delegates, which featured high-ranking African women leaders from Liberia and South Africa sharing their experiences from countries that had “successfully” transitioned from conflict.⁴⁵⁸ This flurry of internationalised attention contrasted with the, until then, most prominent initiative led by Somali women themselves; the Sixth Clan had practically dissolved by the end of the Arta conference. The rise and fall of the Sixth Clan demonstrated the weak foundations upon which the community was based – a point many women themselves made repeatedly. Attorney Maryan Moalim noted, “In the end, it was [women’s] divisions and differences that tore the movement apart.”⁴⁵⁹ Nonetheless, almost all external actors propagated the view that Somali women did, and should, homogenise their agendas and activities to speak with one voice.

The IGAD Gender Desk⁴⁶⁰ at Mbagathi was forthcoming in prioritising key representational issues to make women’s participation in the meeting sufficiently impactful, as women had clamoured for them. The Gender Desk offered technical assistance and direct support to female delegates. Throughout 2003, it organised workshops and seminars for Somali women geared towards formulating a common

⁴⁵⁵ For example, a “sharing forum” with Somali women delegates on governance, 16 April 2003 and capacity building seminars by IGAD (financially supported by UNIFEM), 6 April 2003, IGAD archives.

⁴⁵⁶ Conversation with Amina Harun in Nairobi, January 2018.

⁴⁵⁷ Letter by Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of the UN, July 2004, IGAD archives.

⁴⁵⁸ IGAD held additional forums exclusively for women on 19 May and 2-6 June 2003, letter by Wanjiku Mukabi Kabira, 12 June 2003, IGAD archives.

⁴⁵⁹ Unpublished interview with Maryan Moalim in Mogadishu, June 2014.

⁴⁶⁰ The Gender Desk was created in early 2003 as a body under Mbagathi’s Technical Committee, which consisted of the Frontline States of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

agenda.⁴⁶¹ The central assumption remained that demands articulated by women would be different from those of male actors – an assumption many female activist-participants strongly contested, as discussed above. Instead of ironing out disagreements within the women’s clan (as it purportedly resolved to do), the Gender Desk focused on activities of international interest: “engendering” the conference’s outcomes like the Eldoret Declaration, and subsequent agreements including, most importantly, the federal transitional charter.⁴⁶²

Although IGAD’s gender initiatives mainly revolved around “gender-mainstreaming”, they failed to consider the complexities of women’s representation in a context dominated by patriarchal clan structures and arrangements. At a basic level, this meant that the conference’s premier entity, tasked with women’s participation, superficially sought to apply women’s “perspective” in most Mbagathi activities. As an African regional body, IGAD’s priorities did not differ from international approaches in general. IGAD initiatives for women’s participation replicated existing international norms and frameworks that did not necessarily align with women’s central demand: how to buttress and help solve women’s representational dilemma, a question that was so vigorously, if imperfectly, tackled by the Sixth Clan.

IGAD sought to project itself as a modern institution with the ability to mediate regional conflicts in accordance with global standards. The IGAD Partners Forum was founded to ensure that IGAD, as an institution composed of Somalia’s neighbours, was accountable to its international partners. It was vital to ensure that IGAD applied international normative instruments that pertained to women’s rights, including UNSCR 1325. The “gender” priorities of IGAD and its partners included having women represented at the plenary sessions, comprising mostly “traditional leaders”, and in each of the six committees devoted to transitional constitutional issues, land, disarmament, refugee questions and access to justice mechanisms that could respond to gender-based violence. Yet, these international priorities limited most women’s proposals for a separate political community, as indicated above.

Reflecting a growing international interest in gender and peace-building, considerable support for IGAD’s efforts came from Italy and the Netherlands, and multilateral organisations like the European Commission, UN agencies such as UNIFEM (now UN Women) and international NGOs such as Oxfam NOVIB. Together, Oxfam NOVIB and the Commission compiled a special list of twenty-one women

⁴⁶¹ Seminar by the IGAD Gender Desk and UNIFEM held in Eldoret, 20 and 21 October 2002; Press statement by 42 women delegates who attend the seminar, 21 October 2002; Report titled “Facilitation of Women Delegates”, UNIFEM regional office for Horn and Eastern Africa 2003, IGAD archives.

⁴⁶² Press statement by women delegates after an IGAD-facilitated seminar, 21 October 2002, IGAD archives.

“observers” whom they took under their patronage, often in the form of financial support and “capacity-building” programmes. This list was created carefully to include women from various clans and sub-clans to ensure balance, although at times it was dismissively referred to as the “EU list” – an indication that international support for women’s community was a foreign project.

With such high-level normative and financial support, Somali women delegates attracted attention that other actors seldom received. While this offered an opportunity to bring their issues to a global audience, there was a real risk that the women’s activities were seen as primarily externally driven. International approaches to women’s inclusion in peace processes operated on an assumption that women delegates constituted a distinct interest group with a common identity and a streamlined agenda. This assumption was co-created by Somali women themselves through the Sixth Clan. After all, it was the female delegates at Arta who believed in using women’s identity to construct a women-only clan, undermining other forms of identity – including clan identity. As noted previously, however, the Arta conference witnessed a shift in the Sixth Clan shortly before its conclusion, when the salience of clan identity for women was implicitly, if cautiously, recognised.

At times, Somali women’s articulations of a distinct political community aligned with regional and global outlooks. The infusion of international discourses at the conferences created a key outlet for women’s grievances about their exclusion by the 4.5 clan formula. Mbagathi delegate Zainab Hassan articulated this in a letter to the Facilitation Committee and the Mbagathi chairman:

Our [traditional] leaders and politicians neglected women’s share in clan-allocated parliamentary seats. I request the Arbitration Committee and all relevant parties of the Conference to give back my rights from what you call leaders and politicians who consist only of men. There is not a single woman in that group.⁴⁶³

External assistance provided financial and psychological assistance but could only accomplish so much in the face of entrenched resistance to a fundamental change in women’s position at the talks and in broader politics. This triggered a rethink, at least among some female delegates. The communal logic that reproduced women as homogenous members of a distinct community remained valuable to their goals without formal ways to represent themselves outside salient clan structures. As the Sixth Clan initiative lost momentum and international discourses continued to have an ambivalent impact, some women

⁴⁶³ Letter by Zainab Ali Hassan, 25 August 2004, IGAD archives.

“returned” to their sub-clan delegations to further their objectives – different means to the same end.

A common thread running through the Arta and Mbagathi peace talks was an alignment between Somali and international players in how they perceived women’s participation in the conferences. In general, women delegates managed to be seen as a “united” community with a common political agenda – a prospect that scared many (mostly male) Somalis and thrilled external donors. Women delegates sometimes appropriated the clan logic via the Sixth Clan to conform to narratives about the uniformity of their identity, experiences and political claims. Equally importantly, though, women also broke away from the imposition of the community as a strategy to maximise gains through, for instance, forging alliances with *their* sub-clan delegations.

One of the key figures behind the Sixth Clan, Asha Haji Elmi, was also the first Somali woman to sign a peace agreement between armed actors in Eldoret in 2002. A year later, in December 2003, she was ousted from her leadership position by female delegates of her own Hawiye clan. That clan delegates had the power to unseat a leader of a prominent committee alluded to complex issues of legitimacy, representation and authority. Women representatives, it seemed, also drew legitimacy from clan bases:

We, Hawiye women in the peace talks, reject Asha Haji Elmi as our representative in the Civil Society Executive Committee, with a majority of seven persons out of ten. She can’t represent us until we [agree] on her replacement.⁴⁶⁴

The notion of “Hawiye women” is an interesting development given that three years earlier the Sixth Clan had been founded on the idea of reducing clan influence, especially in matters concerning women’s representation at the conferences. As Asha Haji Elmi herself underlined, “the internal divisions between Somali women manifested itself along clan lines”, thereby fracturing the Sixth Clan “movement”. Resistance came from women delegates who felt it was more impactful to advocate within their sub-clans, undercutting the idea of the Sixth Clan.

In turn, clan oligarchies – especially those closely intertwined with armed factions – found involving women to be useful for boosting their image, to project some measure of modernity, or for financial gain – objectives certainly related to external pressures. Interviews conducted for this research signal that

⁴⁶⁴ Letter signed by seven “Hawiye women delegates”, 10 December 2003, IGAD archives.

warlords used the Mbagathi conference as an opportunity to “rehabilitate” their image”.⁴⁶⁵ One of the numerous ways such armed faction leaders sought to enhance their legitimacy was to include women as part of their delegation and to select women as their official nominees to the transitional federal parliament. A letter by Colonel Abdi Rashid Aden Gebiyow (SPM/SRRC) and Mohamed Aden Wayeel (SPM/Nakuru), dated 20 August 2003, demonstrated their support for women leaders in their clan delegations:

We, the political leaders...would like to inform you that Ms Fatuma Elmi Muse was nominated to be chairwoman of the Absame civil society. In light of this, Fatuma Elmi Muse is the sole representative of Absame civil society in all [its] movements.⁴⁶⁶

The reorienting of women’s political activism to the sub-clan had been an outcome of Mbagathi’s resistance to set aside quotas for women outside the main clan framework. This evolution changed the dynamics of women’s earlier clan-making project. New women actors, with obscure track records in wartime civil society work or other grass-roots activities, entered into alliances with armed political factions of their sub-clans to occupy what seemed to be self-imposed gender quotas from within. Unsurprisingly, these women owed their ultimate allegiance to the delegations of which they were part. Manoeuvring at sub-clan level occurred most visibly at the Mbagathi conference because the armed faction leaders yielded significant influence in overriding traditional leaders in the decision to include women. Furthermore, when it was in the interest of an armed faction to appear modern, liberal and statesman-like, their instrumental use of women’s inclusion was an expedient method that cost little in terms of conceding power. Warlords’ advocacy to uphold women’s quota is illustrated by a letter from Mowlid Ma’ane Mohamoud, leader of the Jarerweyne community, who lobbied his (“minority”) clan base for two parliamentary seats to be reserved for women:

Please be fair and just. Women’s [parliamentary] seats must be honoured and reserved for those ladies who deserve them and have the capability and knowledge to represent us at the newly constituted Somali Federal Parliament.⁴⁶⁷

Opportunism and cynical performances aside, discourses about women’s rights retained their value even when women delegates engaged their sub-clan leaders to lobby for greater recognition and political rights. While yielding some results, women’s arrangements with factions and sub-clan delegations remained at

⁴⁶⁵ Interview with Abdulkadir Malesia in Djibouti, November 2017.

⁴⁶⁶ Letter from Abdi Rashid Aden Gebiyow and Mohamed Aden Wayeel, 20 August 2003, IGAD archives.

⁴⁶⁷ Letter from Mowlid Ma’ane Mohamoud, 18 March 2004, IGAD archives.

the discretion of clan leadership. In fact, when women became dissatisfied with the outcome (for instance, when they were excluded from consideration for MP positions), they fell back on the discourse of women's rights and inserted their own exclusion within a much broader injustice framework that befell *all* Somali women, irrespective of their identity.

Conclusion: "No Clan Chooses a Woman over a Man"

In the aftermath of a brutal decade for Somali women marked by displacement, famine and systemic sexual and gender-based violence, the new century began with a rare note of optimism. The inclusion of women as formal actors at Arta and Mbagathi was a historic event. Soon, however, that participation became covered in controversy, as women's representation was restricted by the adoption of the 4.5 clan formula. Contrary to its proponents' claims, women expressed an early concern that the formula had neither the capacity nor willingness to represent them adequately. This predicament highlighted a central paradox of the formula as the basis for inclusive clan community: though it purported to encompass and speak on behalf of all, the formula was deeply exclusionary – especially in its consideration of gender relations.

This chapter presented an overview of several strategies to promote greater recognition of women as a political community and as agents, both in the structures of peace and in Somali political life more generally. The "Sixth Clan" emerged as an imaginative example of the use of clan discourse to channel an alternative vision of a (woman's) political community. Its members were women from across clans, one of several responses to new forms of exclusion and inclusion during the peace processes. Women delegates' strategies were subject to frequent changes to accommodate hegemonic forces in the form of clan-dominated representational politics in the peace talks, which occurred under the watchful gaze of international benefactors.

The Sixth Clan's attempts to construct a women-only political community were valuable but flawed. Its dilemma lay in its inability to reconcile tensions between gender identity and other salient identity-markers, such as clan and class. For the Sixth Clan to work, gender identity had to be privileged. However, in an arena dominated largely by clan-based politics, women's self-essentialisation as the basis for political rights became untenable. By the conclusion of the Arta conference, the Sixth Clan had lost its dynamism. Nonetheless, the discourse of women as a political community endured. The glue that kept women together was the international attention they received to consider Somali women as a cohesive,

unproblematic identity category with similar political goals and aspirations.

Irrespective of *how* women expressed those claims, women's distinct (though varying) goals and modes of organising addressed a more significant issue. Ubiquitous demands for inclusion and (separate) representation successfully drew attention to women's status as citizens and their rightful position as members of a (trans)national community. As Anderson and Tripp both highlight, peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction create valuable opportunities to spotlight women's particular concerns.⁴⁶⁸ In the context of the Somali negotiations in the early 2000s, a foremost concern for many women delegates was how to reflect gender identity in the face of salient clan structures that erode women's political rights. How could women be remade into equal citizens at the inception of the so-called "Third Republic", amid a dizzying array of rival claims and (clan) identity politics? Although this question was never resolved, the proposal in Arta to break away from burgeoning clan communities laid the foundations for women's claims to greater political rights.

The experiences in the Arta and Mbagathi processes illuminate linkages between women's political participation, gendered representation and remaking of political community set against a backdrop of civil war. Somali women's attempts in the peace negotiations, while far from being uniform, echo feminist insights about processes of nation-formation and citizenship: for women, these struggles are continuous and ongoing (and straddle rigid divides between moments of war, peace and transition).⁴⁶⁹ By interpreting women delegates' strategies as a "right" to be included at the peace talks within larger social and political developments, I underlined their significance as part of wider political community remaking projects. Women's strategies are not distinct from other communal politics: they are integral to them.

That insight also applies to another interest group seeking recognition and a voice during the peace processes: Somalis who found themselves outside Somalia by virtue of colonialism or the violence of the 1990s. In the next chapter I explore Somali diaspora intersections with the clan formula and their challenges to the supremacy of clan politics. By advancing their own visions of political community as transnational and unburdened by (contested) territorial confines, diaspora groups sought to solidify their claims on the homeland.

⁴⁶⁸ Anderson 2010; Tripp 2015.

⁴⁶⁹ Confortini 2006.

CHAPTER 6: “Imagined Constituencies”? Diasporas’ Representation and the Transnational Political Community

This chapter explores visions of a transnational Somali political community articulated in the Arta and Mbagathi peace processes. In particular, it problematises assertions that the 4.5 clan formula was ostensibly a legitimate and viable framework to represent a host of diverse claims made by Somalis, including those living outside Somali territories. As demonstrated in the previous chapter on Somali women’s complex relationship with the clan formula, there were challenges associated with this grandiose, essentialising claim. This chapter unpacks the role of new diasporic identity through an analysis of variant diaspora responses to the formula. The debates at Arta and Mbagathi foregrounded political consciousness far beyond the Horn, and, in the process, expanded formulations about the Somali transnational political community and belonging, reinforcing Somali citizenship as de-territorial in discourse and practice.⁴⁷⁰

Although migration and mobility have long been considered a central feature of pastoralist Somali political economy and culture, the formation of a transnational diaspora is a recent phenomenon resulting from civil war and the ensuing famine. From the 1990s onwards, the upsurge in transnational mobility of Somalis and their relationships with the homeland have inspired a growing body of literature in development, migration and peace-building. The creation of a large and globalised Somali diaspora, especially in Western societies, the Middle East and elsewhere in Africa, occurred at a dizzying rate: essentially within one decade.⁴⁷¹ The traumatic circumstances under which this diaspora formed led the idea of home to take on a more pressing nature; affinal relations became central to the identities of displaced Somalis. By 2000, it was evident that Somalis in the diaspora had sustained a deep connection with the homeland. These connections were manifest principally in everyday interactions with relatives in various parts of Somalia, and in extraordinary levels of remittances sent by the diaspora. The United Nations Development Program estimated the remittance flows at two billion dollars annually,⁴⁷² surpassing all humanitarian and development aid to Somalia. Forms of non-monetary “social” remittances are also increasingly counted as diaspora contributions to communities in Somalia.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷⁰ As mentioned in Chapter 2, legally Somalis born outside the Somali Republic were still considered to be formal citizens of Somalia.

⁴⁷¹ Abdi 2015; Lindley 2010.

⁴⁷² Hammond et al. 2011.

⁴⁷³ Levitt, Lamba-Nieves 2011.

Given this history and the ongoing resonance of “homeland” within newly created diasporic circles,⁴⁷⁴ it is unsurprising that Somalis living abroad articulated a desire to be included in the peace processes in more than one way. However, little is known about the finer details of diaspora participation in formal negotiations, including the operation of socio-political networks, the articulation of clan interests and diasporic approaches to thorny questions like legitimate representation and political community. Also missing from conventional theorising about the Somali diaspora is the use of new identities and how these were operationalised in the context of peace processes, which were already crowded fields with a multitude of actors, competing claims and contrasting political visions. In such contexts, can we make sense of how diaspora Somalis appropriated communal logic? What were the opportunities and perils of diasporas’ interplay with inclusion and representation in the Arta and Mbagathi processes? How did diaspora strategies intersect with other networks, and was a single transnational political community ever a sustainable proposition?

The widening of participation, and adoption of dual inclusion modalities, such as civil society engagement and the 4.5 clan formula, reaffirmed a burgeoning transnational and diasporic political consciousness. The new inclusion modalities provided opportunities to express diaspora identity in new ways. They also created a paradox: the same arrangements that created space for diaspora Somalis (as groups) to participate politically in an unprecedented fashion simultaneously limited the extent to which diasporas could express a full range of demands, leaving them (and many Somalis back “home”) frustrated. Therefore, the formation of diasporic political consciousness is most usefully studied through the examination of various modes of claims-making and the demands of representation.

Diaspora Representation and Inclusion

Pastoralist migrations in the arid hinterlands of the Somali Peninsula and the Horn of Africa were well documented, first by colonial administrators, and later in the writings of anthropologists like I M Lewis.⁴⁷⁵ Access to water and fresh grazing lands provided an impetus for seasonal mobility across the Horn. Pilgrimages and religious scholarship also induced longer-term migration for a select few Somalis to Mecca and Medina and to Harar (in modern-day Ethiopia).⁴⁷⁶ Under British rule, Somalis served as

⁴⁷⁴ See Tsuda 2009.

⁴⁷⁵ Lewis 1961.

⁴⁷⁶ Lewis 1998.

sailors in the maritime trade (colloquially referred to as “seamen”), taking them to far-flung port cities in Cardiff, Bristol and Bombay.⁴⁷⁷ After independence, Somalis’ migration patterns concentrated on state-sponsored bursaries in the 1960s and 1970s, which took young generations of students both to the East (Soviet Union) and the West (Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States).⁴⁷⁸ In the 1970s and 1980s, oil-rich states across the Gulf of Aden also attracted Somali migrant labourers (women and men), who sent a steady stream of remittances back to Somalia.

By the end of the twentieth century, however, the speed and scale of dispersal of refugees and migrants were unmatched by any other period in modern Somali history. Beginning with Siad Barre’s campaign against citizens in north-western Somalia, the displacement of large segments of Somali society was induced by chaotic violence precipitated by state collapse in 1991, and later recurring waves of famines. In the late 1980s, assaults on Hargeisa and Burao drove many Somali refugees into eastern Ethiopia.⁴⁷⁹ Meanwhile, elites began fleeing Mogadishu as the situation grew tenser (and, in part, to underline their dissatisfaction with the regime). Clarke and Gosende painted a particularly grim picture, documenting that already after the defeat in the Somali–Ethiopian war, “foreign embassies in Mogadishu were overwhelmed with requests for visas to travel abroad”.⁴⁸⁰ The largest wave of displacement in Somali history, however, followed the collapse of the Barre regime. In addition to their large numbers as refugees in the Horn, Somalis would constitute large diaspora communities in the West and the Middle East within the next decade.

Recently, the term “diaspora” in the Somali context has generated intense disagreement about its definition. In 2014 group discussions in Hargeisa, Mogadishu and Garowe revealed three “local” conceptualisations vis-à-vis Somalis living abroad.⁴⁸¹ A key characteristic of diaspora, many have suggested, is the attainment of a prized Western nationality.⁴⁸² Following this line of thinking, Somalis entrapped in nearby refugee camps did not live up to such expectations. Others insisted on educational qualifications to define diasporic status and added that maintaining connections to the homeland was another consideration in the modern constitution of Somali diasporas. Yet, a third and essential definition invoked an age-old descent argument: any Somali who was a member of the diaspora was conceived to be intrinsically tied to the homeland by virtue of her/his lineage.

⁴⁷⁷ For a personal portrait of this type of migration, see Mohamed 2010.

⁴⁷⁸ Unpublished interview with Hawa Abdi in Nairobi, July 2014.

⁴⁷⁹ Hammond 2013b, p.58.

⁴⁸⁰ Clarke, Gosende 2004, pp.139–140.

⁴⁸¹ Unpublished focus group discussions with Somalis in Garowe, Hargeisa, Mogadishu, 2014; Horst 2016.

⁴⁸² Also, Hansen 2008; Affi 2014.

The Arta and Mbagathi peace processes pondered these contested contemporary classifications of Somali diasporas too, including their relationships to the political community in the Horn. Ambiguities surrounding who was a diaspora member permeated the peace processes. Similar to women delegates, diaspora members gained formal access in the conferences through two main channels: through invitations to participate in the large group called civil society, and through the clan formula, which facilitated their entrance into various sub-clan delegations. In each case, these channels were predicated upon assumptions that diaspora communities were (and remain) a *natural* extension of Somali society. Thus, the lines that demarcated “local” and diaspora were often (intentionally) blurred.

At Arta, diaspora actors were initially subsumed under the label of civil society, albeit without an official category designated to these actors. The Arta archival documents feature scant formal references to diaspora(s). Still, diaspora actors dominated the civil society channel. Four of the six Somali Technical Committee members held other passports. Elite Somalis (professionals, businessmen and religious leaders) travelled from London, Cairo, Toronto, Washington and Stockholm to Djibouti for the pre-conference consultation meetings.⁴⁸³ The IGAD-hosted conference in Kenya, however, changed this approach. With the notable involvement of several international actors, Mbagathi created a sub-category for diaspora actors within civil society. A detailed donor report for the European Commission in December 2003 makes an explicit reference to diaspora members as distinct civil society actors. This shift aside, in Arta, as later in Mbagathi, diaspora actors spilled into disparate groups and categories like intellectuals, minorities, women’s “lists” and even traditional clan elders. The category of “political leaders” or warlords – seen as the opposite of civil society – also featured a high number of diaspora Somalis.⁴⁸⁴ Thus, the peace conferences were replete with members who were brought “back” from the diaspora: new nationals of other countries.

The history of diaspora participation in Somali peace-making predates Arta and Mbagathi. Some of the earliest attempts to strike negotiated settlements involved key individuals who held dual nationalities. For example, at the Cairo Conference in 1997, Hussein Aidiid was an American citizen when he was negotiating in the Egyptian capital. After his return to Mogadishu circa 1996 (after the death of his father), Hussein Aidiid’s inheritance of the leadership of the militia met little resistance. His allegiance to his “constituents” was simply not questioned. Though diaspora return was mostly undertaken by individual

⁴⁸³ My analysis of several lists of Arta participants, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁴⁸⁴ Letter signed by several SRRC leaders, 7 November 2002. IGAD archives.

elites to occupy positions in politics and peace mediations in the 1990s, the Arta and Mbagathi conferences offered a more systematic approach to the recruitment of wider groups of diaspora-based Somalis.

The second channel of participation, the 4.5 clan formula, provided a sure way to engage Somalis from far and wide in the representational politics of Arta and Mbagathi. Much like women were seen to be integrated into the formula, assumptions prevailed that Somalis, irrespective of their location, were embedded in the dominant approach used to ensure inclusivity in the negotiations. Recall, for example, Somali diplomat Abdirahman Hirabe's illustrative quote: "All Somalis were included in the 4.5 clan formula." A participant in Mbagathi, Abdulkadir Malesia, himself a member of the Somali–American diaspora, noted that "our lineage is stronger than any other identity".⁴⁸⁵ With its unwavering assumptions about Somali political identity, the clan formula seemed to advocate that diaspora delegates could (and should) be represented, unproblematically, by various clan delegations.

By the time Arta was underway, diaspora delegates had commanded representation in several core groups at the conference. This is perhaps demonstrated best by the composition of traditional clan elders in Arta, as well as Mbagathi, many of whom were "brought back" from outside Somalia to represent their sub-clans within the conferences. My analysis of dozens of lists of traditional elders revealed that a large number of elders were based outside Somalia.⁴⁸⁶ Although notions of authority and "genuineness" of traditional clan leadership were deeply contested and had to undergo processes of verification (see Chapter 4), the status of diaspora returnees seldom provoked controversy.

One explanation for this apparently seamless integration of diasporas across clan delegations at the highest levels corresponds to the transnational quality of the clan formula. Clan identity did not dissolve or erode because of displacement and migration experiences. On the contrary, the peace conferences suggest the opposite: exile seemed to strengthen ethnic, tribal and/or clan identities and ties.⁴⁸⁷ It is indeed remarkable that Somalis in the diaspora left their families in newly adopted homes to participate in the meetings, often at great material and emotional costs. Roble Olhaye, the Djiboutian ambassador to Washington, called this a "sacrifice".⁴⁸⁸ Chief Kenyan negotiator Mohamed Affey noted that "hotels in Nairobi were full of Somalis who travelled far to attend their clan [deliberations]".⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁵ Interview with Abdulkadir Malesia in Djibouti, November 2017.

⁴⁸⁶ Djiboutian and IGAD archives.

⁴⁸⁷ Clifford 1994; Shuval 2000.

⁴⁸⁸ Yearbook of the United Nations 2000, p.215.

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

The triangle between home, the “local” and diaspora was further strengthened by the transnational nature of decision-making processes in relation to the formation of clan delegations. An interview I conducted with Khadija Mohamed Dirie, the current (2020) Minister of Youth and Sport, underscores how her invitation to be part of her sub-clan delegation at Arta was a transnational decision-making process:

I was living in Jawhar when the conference in Arta began. My aunt who lived in Ohio [US] since the early 1990s initially suggested another relative in Yemen to represent our clan in the negotiations. When he couldn’t travel to Djibouti, my aunt insisted that I go. I hesitated for a while, but in the end, I was convinced that it was my duty to represent our clan.⁴⁹⁰

Khadija Mohamed Dirie was not alone – similar sentiments were expressed by others. Abdirizak Mohamed Dirie, chairman of an organisation called Save Somali Youth, wrote to the IGAD Technical Committee requesting immediate representation in the peace talks. To strengthen his bid, the letter noted that “Somali youth, in the country and the diaspora, created a national umbrella” that allows the youth to participate in the peace conference.⁴⁹¹ Such cases of diaspora inclusion highlight how decisions around representation were transnationalised involving networks spread across the world. Representation and legitimacy were recurring themes throughout the conferences. The personal narrative of Khadija Mohamed Dirie, in particular, emphasises how these were concerns outside Somalia as much as they were tackled fiercely within Somalia.

Similar to the same core problems vocalised by women delegates, the formula identified the clan as the *only* category through which diasporas could enter the negotiations and, even more importantly, ensure representation within emergent structures such as transitional legislative bodies. As such, the clan formula limited diasporas’ ability to articulate a full range of priorities and visions that could accommodate their new realities (and identities). For instance, diaspora delegates’ aspirations to act as a collective (and under a new identity banner) were seen as a political dead end. Armed groups and their sympathisers from the civil society delegate body were especially suspicious of diaspora engagement in the talks. According to chief Kenyan negotiator Mohamed Affey, warlords and their allies questioned diaspora loyalties.⁴⁹² The inability of the clan formula to channel the full range of diaspora demands inevitably complicated what was perceived to be a straightforward relationship between the formula and Somalis scattered across the globe in the early 2000s. Inspired by its essence and transformative qualities (both positive and negative),

⁴⁹⁰ Unpublished interview with Khadija Mohamed Dirie in Mogadishu, July 2014.

⁴⁹¹ Letter by Abdirizak Mohamed Dirie, 28 May 2003, IGAD archives.

⁴⁹² Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

diaspora Somalis adopted a communal language for distinct agendas and diaspora identity claims that went beyond the clan.

One of the earliest examples of the formation of a distinct diaspora political identity occurred in response to the rigidity of representational politics that unfolded in the two processes. Diaspora-based Somalis insisted they could play important roles in the development and rebuilding activities in Somalia. I found this to be clearly manifested in a proliferation of appeals, letters, and so forth, to participate in peace talks, most of which were directed at the conference organisers. The claim that diasporas have a rightful space in the “national” negotiations and reconciliation efforts is predicated upon pragmatic calculations (diasporas having greater financial resources and professional skills) and moral obligations (to give back to less fortunate brethren). While it is difficult to point to the exact moment when this form of transnational and politicised identity was born, I argue that Arta and Mbagathi reveal how diasporic belonging operated in fields of negotiations and, centrally, the kinds of diaspora politics it shaped. Principal to my understanding of how peace-making can propel a reimagining of a political community is how claims for inclusion and representation, including by diasporas, can discursively be translated from being an international norm into ultimately being demanded as a political right by Somalis. This shift, as I argue throughout the thesis, reasserts, expands membership and, in the process, rethinks the very contours of Somali community.

As I demonstrate below, requests to be (better) represented and included in the peace conferences came from all corners of the world. On the whole, the demands articulated by diaspora groups, though varying, did not differ from the rest of the delegate body. The parallels between diaspora claims and those articulated by women are especially striking. There was a steady progression in the importance and, gradually, sense of urgency attached to diaspora claims as time went by. Sensing the supremacy of the clan formula and the high stakes associated with engaging with dominant conference structures, diasporas were determined to articulate participation rights by any means deemed necessary, including being part of warlord delegations. By the time the IGAD talks began in the autumn of 2002, Somali communities in cities like London, Stockholm, Toronto, Minneapolis, Jeddah and Dubai had organised meetings to discuss developments in Kenya but also to formulate priorities and determine their selection of representatives to the IGAD conference.⁴⁹³

Two key narratives stand out concerning diaspora representation in the peace talks: those willing to be

⁴⁹³ Letter by Ugas Esse Ugas Abdulle in support of the nomination of Mohamed Duale (from the UK), 2 December 2002, IGAD archives.

embedded within existing structures (especially the clan frameworks); and others who sought other mechanisms that could accommodate new forms of identities cultivated through experiences of displacement and living in new societies. Many diaspora representatives aimed to take full advantage of intersecting identities, which are often acquired by way of exile while sustaining relationships with relatives in the homeland. Each of these narratives peddled unique views of the Somali body politik. Whether corresponding to the clan basis of political community or not, diverse diaspora delegates reproduced older imaginings that saw the Somali political community as inherently transnational.

Narratives of Diaspora Exceptionalism

Diasporas took advantage of unfolding debates about the nature of community triggered by the ascendancy of the 4.5 clan formula. In doing so, they foregrounded a unique understanding of transnational engagement in the peace processes. Specifically, diaspora delegates looking to engage outside clan structures found alternative language for their inclusion based on international and Somali-produced discourses of diaspora exceptionalism – the notion that Somalis based in the West, in particular, were more resourceful, apolitical or beyond violent clan politics.

Regional mediators were instrumental in propagating ideas that fed into a narrative of diaspora exceptionalism. These discourses were founded on perceived diaspora values and roles within the peace negotiations. Consider, for example, the following quote on the Somali diaspora by one of the main Djiboutian actors in the Arta conference, the Ambassador to the United States and United Nations, Roble Olhaye:

[T]he Arta Peace Conference and the subsequent formation of the Transitional National Government attracted hundreds of qualified, talented and highly experienced Somali professionals from all parts of the world, particularly from Europe and North America. These individuals left behind their families, careers, well-paid jobs and secure and comfortable lifestyles in order to meet the challenges and to nurture the nascent government in its crucial task of nation-building.⁴⁹⁴

While material goals could be seen in the usefulness of diaspora as a catalyst for institution-rebuilding, on

⁴⁹⁴ Yearbook of the United Nations 2000, p.215.

a philosophical level diasporas were considered important in the reconstitution of Somali nationhood, presumed to have been unmade by civil war. Djiboutian mediators argued that the rebuilding of Somalis was incomplete without the inclusion of significant populations scattered globally.

As one of three influential advisors to the Djiboutian president, Ambassador Olhaye also applauded the spontaneous nature of diaspora “attraction” to the conference, presenting such a commitment as “sacrificial”. Similar sentiments were repeated by Ismail Taani, chief of staff for Ismael Omar Guelleh. Taani captured the global enthusiasm for Arta, which surprised even the hosts: “We didn’t have any lists of participants, people just came.”⁴⁹⁵ More practically, Taani had a vision that the Somali diaspora could ensure the self-sufficiency of the transitional government: “We hoped Somalis would support the new administration to be independent and self-sufficient. If every Somali sent 10 dollars every month, especially those in the diaspora, the government wouldn’t rely so much on international funding.”⁴⁹⁶ These views express the usefulness of diaspora engagement in peace-building activities, focusing on the resourcefulness of the diaspora.

At the Arta conference Djiboutian officials created a sophisticated media strategy to ensure that a well-crafted message reached international audiences, including Somalis across the Horn and abroad. According to Taani, “we wanted Somalis all over the world to see what was happening here, so the debates were broadcast live. There were misconceptions about Djibouti’s motivation to carry out this process, so we wanted Somalis to see for themselves.”⁴⁹⁷ The strategy included daily coverage of live conference proceedings, interviews with participants and cultural performances of prominent Djiboutian and Somali artists meant to entertain as much as transmit *dardaaran* – wisdom and advice – which in the context of peace-making were about healing, forgiveness and the primacy of the nation’s well-being. Somali artists at Arta were considered to be “national symbols”,⁴⁹⁸ transcending communal/clan divides: such performances embodied the nation-building process and helped imagine a reconstituting and reconciling Somalia.

Technological advances meant that increasing numbers of diaspora Somalis were able to access debates at the conferences. In the words of a Kenyan official, such international interest solidified the peace

⁴⁹⁵ Interview with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018.

⁴⁹⁶ Interview with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018.

⁴⁹⁷ Report by the Commission for Peace, 18 May 2000.

⁴⁹⁸ Report of “Brainstorming Session” by the Commission for Peace and the Somali Technical Committee, 16 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

conferences’ “global nature and their international reach”.⁴⁹⁹ That something qualitatively different was afoot was already clear prior to Arta, when a conference in Stockholm gathered Somali religious leaders from across Scandinavia and North America to discuss the upcoming conference and to pledge “moral” and financial support for the organisers and participants in Arta.⁵⁰⁰ Such enthusiasm was further galvanised by the decision to broadcast the Arta proceedings live, part of a media strategy to make the process more transparent – an especially important objective given that a handful of armed commanders dominated past meetings.⁵⁰¹ Such attention – and the fact that word of this transnational interest in the proceedings spread back to the venues in Djibouti and Kenya – helped to democratise these conferences, spaces that were previously reserved for a few armed men. Somalis were not just watching the live proceedings; they also had access to websites and discussion forums, where they debated the conference in locations far from Djibouti and Kenya, resulting in a form of accountability (however geographically distant) and pressure to deliver. An understanding of the politics in Arta came within reach for the ordinary diaspora Somali. The use of a conference website, widely circulated press releases via radio and the Internet, and satellite TV broadcasts, and a proliferation of online reports and commentary targeted a global Somali-speaking audience. Such media outlets established a diaspora-based audience increasingly aware of what was at stake at the peace conferences. The level of interest grew, as evidenced by the huge volume of letters (the dominant way of communication from the public to the organisers and regional actors) calling for diaspora participation in the Mbagathi conference.

The state-owned media outlet, Radiodiffusion Télévision de Djibouti, had a special Somali-language programme called *Soomaliyeey Maqal* – “O Somalis, listen”. For a multi-generational audience in Djibouti and Somalia, watching *Soomaliyeey Maqal* became an afternoon ritual because, in addition to dealing with complex political questions, the programme offered entertainment in the form of musical performances and poetry recitals by well-known Somali-speaking artists. The effects, as the Djiboutians hoped, were considerable; many in the diaspora community, whether in the Middle East, East Africa or the West, followed the programmes and felt they had a stake in the processes and outcomes of the conferences. Anecdotal evidence confirms that ordinary people in Somalia and other Horn of Africa localities, in addition to communities such as those in Stockholm and Toronto, recognised the various Somali actors involved. Asha Hagi Elmi recalled her experience after Arta concluded:

⁴⁹⁹ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

⁵⁰⁰ Somali *Ulama*’s Stockholm conference to pledge support to Arta, publicly available via YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FISp9483siI>, accessed October 2017.

⁵⁰¹ Interview with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018.

After Arta, I travelled to Copenhagen, where I met many Somalis from different Scandinavian countries. They recognised me from the coverage of Arta. I think this is why I suddenly become well known. Then I travelled to London; I was shopping at a Somali-owned clothing store that had beautiful things from Dubai. The owner greeted me very warmly, so I pretended I knew who he was. He said, “Asha, you don’t know me, but I know who you are. This is your shop, take whatever you need.” I felt embarrassed and just took the scarf in my hand.⁵⁰²

Complementing this sophisticated global outreach, international mediators, international NGOs like Oxfam Novib and Western governments reinforced a narrative of diaspora exceptionalism in the Mbagathi peace process. The Delegation of the European Commission’s (EC) Somalia Unit, in particular, saw diasporas as an important component of civil society worthy of financial backing. An internal EC “mission report” that I found among the archival materials reveals international donors’ aspirations to support greater roles of diaspora actors as part of civil society: “This group comes from very different backgrounds and places...the EC should check that these participants continue to be present in the conference, as their input is very valuable.”⁵⁰³ Such sentiments planted seeds for a collective diaspora identity as *separate and better* delegates within the contentious peace processes. The cumulative result of these international efforts had been an arguably rather simplistic binary between “troubled” Somalis and others who were constructed as good and “sacrificial”.

Regional and international discourses about diaspora Somalis as resourceful and integral to peace-making activities propagated the notion that all Somalis “from” the diaspora had common characteristics and purposes. It was not inconsequential that diaspora delegates with growing capability to access information and discourses about the conferences also began to see themselves as potential players in peace-building. In fact, demands for diaspora inclusion grew dramatically at Mbagathi (judging by the increased number of claims to participate). While external discourses carried considerable weight in casting diaspora Somalis as constituting a distinct, and better, group of political actors, how diasporas themselves consumed and reacted to information about the peace processes (and their potential power therein) contributed to deepening narratives that the diaspora could indeed constitute a “community” with common interests and objectives. I argue that this reinforced the imagination of a transnational political community willing and able to make sacrifices for the future of the Somali nation.

⁵⁰² Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

⁵⁰³ Report by the European Commission written by Mila Font, 20 December 2002, IGAD archives.

Imagining a Transnational Political Community

Diaspora delegates' resolve to embed themselves within emergent and shifting networks flourished during the conferences. Several groups, including diasporas, rallied around Djibouti's Arta initiative on the premise that it offered a unique space for *all* unarmed actors to participate at a level not seen before – at least in theory. The reality, however, was that only a select few (the clan elders), in addition to a handful of prominent leaders and former politicians, were afforded real opportunities. Yet the assumption that diaspora delegates were an extension of civil society helped to legitimise claims to representation. The overlap between diaspora and other civil society “groups” commonly happened across the two conferences. With this overlapping as an entry point, diaspora Somalis sought transnational alliances to ensure their inclusion in the peace conferences. A poignant example of transnational alliance-making comes from Somali “intellectuals” and professionals, many of whom grew frustrated with the shrinking space available to them in the Mbagathi conference as the clan formula became more entrenched and armed actors reasserted their influence.

Justifications for inclusion were premised on diasporas' perceived positive contributions to peace-making – a narrative related to their grouping together under the umbrella term of civil society. Labelled as agents for peace, the inclusion of diasporas was perceived by Somalis (similar to the views of external actors) as central to enriching peace-building debates. On 27 May 2003 a collective called Somali Civil Society Core Groups in the Diaspora sent “feedback” on a draft report developed by the Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation Committee, one of six committees in Mbagathi.⁵⁰⁴ After all, these actors expected to play a central role in post-conference reconstruction efforts – a mammoth undertaking considering the destruction of Somalia's various institutions. Yet my assessment of the demands made by the diaspora concludes that their claims were not qualitatively different from other groups' claims. The underlying objective of diaspora organisations and individual delegates alike was to carve out a space for representation in the delegations and in the transitional structures that would follow suit. This calls for an assessment of *how* diaspora groups sought to enlarge their roles beyond being mere observers, financial contributors and consumers of news about the conference.

Influenced by external discourses, diaspora Somalis augmented perceptions about their collective experience and aspirations throughout the negotiations. Diaspora delegates believed in the uniqueness of their role and their potency as a distinct community. Upon meeting with Bethuel Kiplagat, Kenyan

⁵⁰⁴ Letter by Khalif Hassan Ahmed, 27 May 2003, IGAD archives.

chairman of Mbagathi, civil society delegate Abdulqadir Sufi reflected enthusiastically about “the full participation of Somalis abroad in the process of nation-building, envisioning, planning and pursuing Somalia’s political well-being”.⁵⁰⁵ In Sufi’s letter “Somalis abroad” made no reference to any other social or political category. Through the reference to their diasporic experience alone, “Somalis abroad” were reified, reinforcing both international and emergent Somali-made narratives about a common shared identity and purpose.

As a precursor to an imagined distinct community,⁵⁰⁶ several diaspora groups demanded their own separate space outside the civil society category. A group that self-identified as Somali Diaspora in Civil Society complained that civil society members rejected the role of the diaspora and that the conference organisers confused diaspora with existing civil society groups. In its memo the group demanded the addition of a committee of ninety individuals seen to be neutral and, therefore, different from other Somali conference participants, as the group suggested that “our ideas are not familiar to the other people in the civil society group”.⁵⁰⁷

A common diaspora identity was cultivated to present diasporas as a collective and to define a thread that could act as a basis for a distinct diasporic aspiration: to be recognised as an inherent extension of Somali society. Somali transnational communities resorted to forming alliances to project political clout and acquire legitimacy. Alliance-building is a vital aspect of community-making through which a variety of claims and stances can be streamlined with the goal of speaking with one voice. The Minnesota-based organisation, Somali Coalition Communities in North America, held several consultations to debate the IGAD-led Mbagathi conference. Their letter, written on 31 July 2002, opened with the statement, “We, Somalis in North America...”:

...have come to the decision to undertake necessary preparations for representation in the [Mbagathi] conference. We would therefore like to kindly request that you extend two invitations to each of our four main clans and two to minorities, the total of which is ten invitations for full participation as delegates in the deliberations of the conference.

Our participation in the conference is purely on a non-tribal basis. Our objectives are solely geared towards the promotion of fruitful cooperation to establish confidence and trust in the IGAD process. Our contribution as representatives of Diaspora communities in North

⁵⁰⁵ Letter by Abdulqadir Sufi (Somalia Diaspora Dialogue Organization), 2002, IGAD archives.

⁵⁰⁶ Anderson 1983.

⁵⁰⁷ Memo by the Somali Diaspora [in] Civil Society, 11 April 2002, IGAD archives.

America will no doubt play an important role in making this conference a complete success.⁵⁰⁸

Assuming the position of representing *all* Somali communities in North America, the letter indicates how the diaspora community-making process unfolded. This “coalition” adopted the clan framework, and it saw itself as an entity that could be clan-inclusive. It clearly applies the 4.5 formula by requesting that invitations be sent along those lines. On closer reading, however, a contradiction appears between how the organisation viewed itself and the image it hoped to project to the organisers. This diaspora organisation aimed to assuage international fears of a further power grab, while presenting itself as an impartial and powerful force that could solve the deadlock of the process. These kinds of contradiction were echoed by numerous other diaspora-based organisations who sought to become legitimate representatives and assets in the peace processes because they were self-described neutral actors. For instance, the London-based Somali Self Help and Welfare Association wrote a similar letter on 5 November 2002, seeking official participation in the conference on roughly the same grounds.⁵⁰⁹

Diaspora groups also sought to critique the dominant representation modality of clan frameworks, preferring instead to highlight regional identities. This alternative thinking was adopted by one US-based organisation in a letter to the conference organisers that began with an extraordinary assertion: “We, the citizens of Sool, Sanaag, Hawd and Waamo...” The letter continues:

No faction or group of factions are in a position to impose their wishes on the Somali body politic. No clan or group of clans can determine the destiny of Somalia to the exclusion of other clans. The tragic history of the last twelve years is a clear testimony to the futility of uncompromising factionalism and myopic warlordism.⁵¹⁰

The letter invokes the importance of regional identity and “citizenship” based on shared histories and ties to a particular territory within Somalia. Such a claim underscores a completely different understanding of representation, one that transcends the narrow 4.5 clan modality. The letter also rejects the twin oppression of clan and warlord domination. In this sense, it is significant in raising the idea that clan delegations should require approval from the diaspora-based communities (in this case, in the United States). Equally important, this organisation situates itself as an advocate for better region-based representation in a broader context where issues of legitimacy were perennially contentious, even in diaspora locations. The letter

⁵⁰⁸ Letter by Somali Coalition Communities in North America, 31 July 2002, IGAD archives.

⁵⁰⁹ Letter by Somali Self Help and Welfare Association, 5 November 2002, IGAD archives.

⁵¹⁰ Letter by the Sool, Sanaag, Hawd and Waamo Diaspora Steering Committee Minnesota, 23 November 2002, IGAD archives.

challenges foremost narratives of diaspora engagement as indistinguishable from those who came (primarily) from Somalia.

This was scarcely the only example of a consensus-generated rejection of the 4.5 formula by Somalis abroad. A letter from the Somali Diaspora Civil Society nominated two members of the diaspora to participate “fully” in the conference without referencing the individuals’ sub-clans.⁵¹¹ Indeed, diaspora identity served as a basis to reject the clan, offering a cosmopolitan form of politics as an alternative at the peace conferences. The idea that a new diaspora identity might trump other cleavages and clan networks was also important in challenging clan-based understandings of membership and political community.

Beyond the (clan) politics of representation, diaspora groups also aspired to bring an alternative to conference politics, while still ensuring adequate representation. For example, in a letter dated 6 November 2002, the Somali Diaspora Dialogue Organization sought to maintain the “natural differences” (i.e. existing kinship structures) but emphasised that these could ultimately be bridged through diasporas’ commitment to dialogue. Their letter, with its characteristically reconciliatory tone (similar to other letters drafted in diaspora locations), encapsulates the sort of narrative that justifies the inclusion of diaspora organisations based on the idea of Somalis abroad (collectively) being natural peace-makers rather than agitators:

We revere the natural differences in the Somali diaspora. We promote tolerance within our organisation and, in a greater sense, our nation. Our strength lies in our ability to bridge different factions and opinions. Recognising the diaspora’s potential is a relevant argument for this conference. This has been true for the last decade or more; highly educated and successful Somali Diasporas yearn for inclusion, while asking little in return. Our mission is to serve all Somalis.⁵¹²

Similar to other *communities* at the peace conferences, diaspora Somalis were preoccupied with legitimate forms of representation – in their case, forms of representation rooted in a common diaspora identity. Several arguments to bolster these claims were cited by other diaspora organisations eagerly waiting to be officially invited. Chief among them was their resourcefulness and value as positive contributors. Such qualities were juxtaposed with assumptions, often held by international actors (Somalia’s neighbours and global players) but sometimes contributed to by diaspora voices themselves: that local Somali actors were inherently unpredictable, somewhat irrational and often spoilers of peace. Such a dichotomy pitting diaspora against local is unhelpful, particularly in instances when diaspora Somalis strongly identified and

⁵¹¹ Memo by Somali Diaspora [in] Civil Society, 11 April 2002, IGAD archives.

⁵¹² Letter by Somali Diaspora Dialogue Organization, 6 November 2002, IGAD archives.

aligned themselves with local actors such as armed factions or sub-clan communities. The Mbagathi process, in particular, saw an increase in the numbers of (official) letters addressed to the Kenyan conference chairman, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, and the Technical Committee, which also included representatives of Djibouti and Ethiopia. While most letters expressed an urgent call for diaspora participation, these letters also often shed light on diasporas' positions in relation to developments at the conference.

For some in the peace processes, diaspora identity was a starting point for challenging the reification of the clan as the basis for political community. Clan representation, like weaponised uses of the clan itself, was singled out as particularly polarising and toxic, given recent histories of violence, displacement and exile. Unsurprisingly, many diaspora voices were vocal in raising grave concerns about "institutionalising" clan-based contests at the peace conferences. Yet, at the same time, diaspora groups drew on existing networks (whether clan or other modes of organising) to gain a foothold at the same peace conferences: sometimes they emphasised similarity ("we're fellow clansmen (or Somalis), and therefore we deserve to be there") and sometimes radical difference ("because we're different by virtue of being in exile, we have a positive role to play"). In spinning such narratives to negotiate entry and voice, they drew on the same ambivalent messaging and shifting alliances as other outsider groups such as women. Such instrumentalisation of diaspora identity was also the basis for rethinking (trans)national political community.

Thus, an important dimension in the story of diaspora inclusion is that regional and international discourses inevitably propelled diasporas to minimise their (clan) diversity of diaspora communities in favour of a unified position to be projected onto the peace-making stage. Diaspora actors strategically reflected the celebrated diaspora identity, finding it a powerful currency to expand an increasingly crowded political space at the conferences. These developments must be contextualised within broader trends about the construction of new identities, and subsequent community-making projects. The diasporic political community, through its claims for representation, successfully suggested that diasporas should be considered an intrinsic part of Somali nationhood; these actors reinforced that Somali citizenship, political belonging and the nation are not confined to being present on a (contested) territory and can thus be unbounded and transnational. Thus, new international narratives about diaspora Somalis, combined with the complexities of clan representational politics, drove how delegates conceived of newly articulated diaspora identity and their distinct claims to membership.

Debates about a rightful space for diaspora claims offer an opportunity to assess the complex nature of

emerging political identities and communities in a distinctly transnational context. As much as the discussion about the various channels to achieving legitimate inclusion is important to an understanding of emerging conceptions of nationhood, the specific case of Somali diaspora engagement also demonstrates some continuities in political belonging. The articulation of a transnational community is not new (see Chapter 2). Historically, Somalis outside Somalia had “automatic” access to citizenship thanks to policies (and politics) animated by pan-Somali ideals. An interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi), a close source to Abdullahi Yusuf, who left Mbagathi as president of the newly created Transitional Federal Government, offered a nuanced perspective: “Our nationalism kept a flexible attitude to Somali citizenship alive. Any Somali can come to Somalia and he automatically has the same rights as citizens.”⁵¹³ Diaspora strategies in the conferences ensured the kind of continuity encapsulated in Garibaldi’s view.

Aspiring diaspora delegates opined that their involvement, as a group, was not only beneficial to the peace talks’ outcome, it was a right to partake in a long-term strategy for the political rebuilding of Somalia. However, diaspora members who engaged in such transnational lobbying were challenged by the presence of other salient identities that complicated their participation on the basis of diaspora identity alone. Pre-eminent among these was clan identity: sub-clan leaders often conceived of their “constituencies” as inherently transnational. One does not shed her/his clan identity by virtue of living abroad. In fact, traditional clan elders were often brought back from Western cities to lead their communities through the peace conferences. Indeed, the clan “caucuses” (see Chapter 4) point to diaspora-based kin as an indisputable part of sub-clan organising.

“Our Brethren Abroad”: Instrumentalising the Clan Formula

Assertions that the 4.5 clan formula was applicable to, and had resonance for, Somalis living abroad were fundamental to early invitations to attend the Arta conference by the Djiboutian government. However, the allocation of participation quotas for diaspora delegates was complex and often inconsistent. While groups based mostly in the West were urged to participate as civil society (especially at Mbagathi), diaspora delegates were embedded regularly within existing delegations without arousing much controversy. This can be seen in the composition of traditional clan leaders’ delegations: some elders who were invited to Arta, and later Mbagathi, were drawn from diaspora locations, showing that one could still

⁵¹³ Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

hold the title of clan elder without residing in Somalia.⁵¹⁴

However, international excitement about diaspora participation did not conceal the criticisms that questioned their involvement in the first place. Despite discourses about the borderless nature of clan representational politics, diaspora engagement during the conference had also been dampened by claims that diasporas were inherently irrelevant and oblivious to new realities on the ground in Somalia. A telling interaction between a committee created on federalism and the transitional charter occurred during the second phase of Mbagathi. The committee, which was selected based on the clan formula, had thirty-eight members and included five women. Soon after its creation the committee splintered into “Group A” and “Group B”. Group B mostly comprised Somali diaspora, opposed to altering the 1960 constitutional definition of a citizen: they sought to (re)cement its universal qualities through maintaining de-territorial, descent-based definition of Somali citizenship. To undermine Group B’s position on citizenship (and other constitutional matters), Group A wrote to the Kenyan chairman of Mbagathi:

Most of our friends in Group B belong to the diaspora community and appear to be unaware of the realities in Somalia... their efforts largely focus on an imaginary constituency that is [disconnected] from the actual situation in the country.⁵¹⁵

Met with this hostility, significant numbers of diaspora actors resorted to engaging directly with the clan structures to bolster their positions and entitlements. The notion of clan “caucusing” with clan constituents lucidly illustrates this unswerving engagement. Clan caucusing was a unique development of the 4.5 clan formula – a process that marked changes to the IGAD-led Mbagathi process, which reincorporated a variety of armed factions. These caucuses that dominated the final phase of Mbagathi consisted of “traditional” and “political” leaders of sub-clan delegations for deliberations on key issues. Toward the end of Mbagathi, caucusing intensified as the highly contentious issue of clan nominations to the transitional parliament was tackled, followed by the selection of MPs. The caucuses attracted many diasporas who travelled to contest parliamentary and other political positions opening up at the end of the Mbagathi process. Ambassador Mohamed Affey observed that the Kenyan capital, especially Eastleigh, was “full of Somalis coming from the diaspora. All the hotels were full, and it seemed that Nairobi swelled. The numbers of Somalis who descended onto Nairobi must have been in the thousands.”⁵¹⁶

These clan “caucuses” were transnational deliberative processes with clan elders at the helm. The current

⁵¹⁴ Djibouti and IGAD archives.

⁵¹⁵ Memo by the Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter, 22 March 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵¹⁶ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

IGAD Envoy to Somalia, Mohamed Guyo, remarked “the Somali political process based on clans can also be democratic; it is based on consensus”.⁵¹⁷ When months of negotiations eventually settled the distribution of quotas along clan, sub-clan and sub-sub-clan lines, it was time for each community to finalise their selections to parliament. The central aim of these caucuses was to regulate internal competition over parliamentary seats. Somalis (of both genders) participated, as did numerous members of the diaspora. Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi), former advisor to (then Puntland, later Somali president) Abdullahi Yusuf, observed that it is difficult to understand the phenomenon of clan caucuses in “Western” terms. Instead, they resembled a traditional form of Somali political contest with its roots in pastoralist forms of democracy. Although Garibaldi saw the clan caucus as an important feature of Somali politics, he was more sceptical about diasporas fully grasping them:

The way clan caucuses happened in Mbagathi was just theatrics. Traditional clan caucuses mostly happen in *miyye* [rural areas] and clan elders play a prominent role in them. Clan gatherings are known for brilliant use of language, oratory and are built on traditional clan codes and customs. This kind of process doesn’t require a PhD from the diaspora.⁵¹⁸

All participants in these caucuses had to be, by default, members of the clan community (tied together through kinship), many of whom were not officially invited to the conferences. Perhaps indirectly, these clan caucuses formalised a notion of clan community, which, for many Somalis, sat uncomfortably with their understandings of a supreme Somali nation.

Thus, the blurring of the local and the diasporic at the Mbagathi conference also played out in the staging of clan “caucuses” that brought together globally scattered members of sub-clan communities. Clan caucuses were transnational encounters that, like the peace conferences, brought notable members of sub-clans “back” to Africa as part of clan-wide political contestation for positions in the transitional parliament. This globalising consultative procedure reveals that traditional elders and other political actors thought of their constituencies in transnational terms; therefore, the task of composing delegations was also a global one. Clan constituencies are not confined to the borders of Somalia. On the contrary, the peace conferences reinforced the elasticity of these borders; they also ultimately showed that the diaspora had an indisputable right to partake in the affairs of the Somali (trans)national community.

The perceived “natural” embeddedness of diaspora Somalis in the formula served as a tool through which

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Mohamed Guyo in Nairobi, January 2018.

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

diasporas participated in the clan structures, such as the clan “democratic” processes. Doing so helped Somalis from the diaspora to legitimise their participation in the peace processes, and Somali politics more broadly (reassuring their recognition as “fully Somali”), and, in turn, helped the formula to legitimise itself by tying another important constituency to the new salience of clan.

Diaspora identities intersect and play upon already salient social cleavages and political networks in Somalia. The 1991 breakaway of Somaliland began a trend of carving out regional administrations during the following decade. Puntland, which boycotted Arta but had veto power in Mbagathi, declared its autonomous status during the Garowe conference in 1998. Jubbaland, Hiraaan Regional Authority and several other political entities sprung up during the 1990s and were recognised by the IGAD Frontline States as “political parties” or “movements”. Both the demarcation and legitimacy of these regions were highly contested: they mostly operated as clan-dominated (and heavily militarised) fiefdoms. Still, the Mbagathi conference offered a glimpse of the complex ways in which clan identities overlapped with a decentralised political map. Several examples from the peace conferences have pointed to the importance of clan and regional identities as an entry point for diaspora actors in the peace processes. The ways in which diasporas dealt with (and supported) the delegations of these regional administrations demonstrate the existing of complex (and multiple) diaspora identities and their community-making processes.

Notions that diasporas are often apolitical agents for peace miss the nuanced ways in which diasporas manifested themselves beyond mere symbolism in the politics of the conferences. The convergence of (sub-)clan and emerging regional political networks became a compelling force to implicate diasporas directly in the formation of sub-national, regional administrations. In other words, even when diaspora groups hoped to articulate clan-blind agendas, changes on the ground pulled diaspora groups in a different direction. One clear illustration comes from how diaspora groups were implicated in rising political disputes related to federalisation, specifically issues related to power-sharing within new federal states such as Jubbaland in southern Somalia. Diaspora groups were not merely mediators or observers. For instance, the chairman of the London-based Somali Self Help and Welfare Association, Abdi Mohamed Nasir (Sarinley), became, *inter alia*, president of Jubbaland and endorsed fourteen sub-sub-clan members of the Marehan delegation for the transitional parliament. Using his “authority” as a diaspora voice *and* a regional powerbroker, he explained to the Mbagathi Technical Committee in a letter that “the above list is based on the sub-sub-clan of Marehan and is genuine. All members are educated and bring experience in medicine, engineering, education, and full knowledge and understanding of the local community.” He warned conference organisers that “if this list is not accepted, the Marehan clan and Jubbaland will

withdraw from the IGAD Somali Peace Conference and there will be no further negotiation”.⁵¹⁹ The conflation between Abdi (Sarinley)’s role as head of the “Jubbaland” and him presiding over the London-based community organisation is a powerful illustration of the blurring of key political roles inside and outside Somalia.

Conclusion: Reinforcing a Transnational Political Community

The clan formula had a global reach beyond Somalia’s disputed boundaries. The (dis)agreements in Somali communities in Europe, the Middle East and North America mirrored those of Somalis at home and across the Horn. Underpinning these conversations was the firm belief that diasporas were an extension of Somali society and an overall uneasiness with the 4.5 formula’s assumption that political claims could only be meaningfully and legitimately represented through clan structures. However, such critiques did not mean a categorical rejection of the formula. In fact, many abroad replicated it to achieve more equitable representation. Nevertheless, by deploying new emergent identities, diasporas questioned simplifications of Somali identity and called to resist the polarising nature of, and inequalities embedded in, the 4.5 clan formula. Some diaspora actors’ positions were framed in grand aspirational terms, calling for a return to idyllic times during which unity, not community polarisation, was celebrated. Others mirrored their local counterparts’ politics of embracing the so-called “natural differences” in Somali society: often, diaspora actors were seamlessly incorporated/integrated into local delegations. For example, armed factions’ routine inclusion of prominent figures in their delegations at Mbagathi, who were new citizens/residents of Western, Middle Eastern and East African countries, did not arouse much controversy.

This chapter traced the first regional attempts to formally bring diaspora Somalis into the fold of peace mediations. Justifying this had been the notion that diasporas have a special calling and obligation in negotiations and resulting political structures. Calls for the systematic inclusion of Somalis abroad in the Arta and Mbagathi processes sought to destabilise rigid distinctions between “local” and “diasporic”. Making these distinctions and reinforcing the diaspora exceptionalism discourse served a political goal: being included in not only the negotiations but also the structures expected to result from the talks. International observers certainly stood in awe of the close affinal connections the diaspora felt for communities in Somalia. This, coupled with a narrative about diaspora exceptionalism, proved a form of

⁵¹⁹ Letter by Abdi Mohamed Nasir (Sarinley), 22 August 2004, IGAD archives.

political capital spent to push for inclusion beyond the clan formula.

A simple yet powerful idea underlay how diaspora Somalis contested and reproduced clan-framed interpretations of political community: no major distinctions exist between Somalis at home and abroad. Guided by this idea, diaspora Somalis asserted a set of rights, which, similar to other Somali actors, centred on greater participation in the political fate of the homeland(s). Such claims are about enlarging the political community beyond rigid political boundaries, which have been contested historically in the Somali context. By insisting on being included, albeit in different ways, diaspora Somalis reiterated a globalised vision of their nation and underlined the transnational character of political belonging.⁵²⁰ Struggles to include Somalis outside Somalia were concrete material steps towards (re)affirming Somali citizenship and nationhood as borderless and de-territorial.

Events in Arta and Mbagathi generated ample reactions from Somali communities abroad. As the clan formula's proponents rightly noted, diaspora identity was not unique in comparison to clan identity; Somalis did not shed their clan as a result of migration and displacement. The clan formula, however, expanded limitations that traditionally bind citizenship and political community to a sovereign territory.⁵²¹ In doing so, the formula reinforced much older cultural beliefs of the Somali political community necessarily encompassing communities across international boundaries. In the context of Arta and Mbagathi, these ideas were encapsulated by most diaspora actors through a (seemingly) straightforward strategy: political belonging would be guaranteed if one could place oneself within an existing, though non-static, constellation of kinship systems, networks and genealogies. Certainly, such intersections between belonging, political culture and mobility are not unique to the peace talks. However, as I argued, the peace processes intensified the nexus between transnational claims-making and Somali political belonging in a globalised age. Thus, while provoking diaspora voices who categorically rejected "clannish" politics, the logic of the 4.5 clan formula unexpectedly resonated with long-standing ethnic-based and territorially indifferent conceptions of Somali political community. This recalls the popular imaginings of a Greater Somalia pursued by disparate Somalis tied together by kinship and beliefs of shared ancestry, histories and cultures, despite living in different states (see Chapter 2). Calls to recognise the membership of highly mobile Somalis with little (or no) physical presence in Somali territories has long been essential to the Somali nationalist imagination. However diaspora Somalis interacted with the clan formula, they contributed to reproducing a founding principle in post-independent Somali discourse on citizenship as a collective force.

⁵²⁰ Cf. Monsutti 2008 for Afghan experiences of displacement and the formation of transnational identities and networks.

⁵²¹ Isin 2012.

The transnational nature of the 4.5 clan formula manifested itself in the recurrent blurring between local and diaspora. In fact, selecting representatives, delegations and parliamentarians in Arta and Mbagathi could be characterised as a borderless decision-making process. The peace processes, by virtue of their embrace of diaspora involvement, reified the narrative of nationhood – and by extension, citizenship – as intrinsically de-territorial and ethnic-based. Expressions that diaspora communities are a natural extension of Somali society are transnational community-making projects. Where Somalis imagine the confines and territorial limits of *their* nation to be, and the kind of politics that fluidity of political belonging engenders, are concerns for growing Somali populations outside Somalia. Imaginings of Somali nationhood historically have a deep disregard for rigid understandings of territorial boundaries; the engagement of diasporas in the peace processes demonstrated, once again, that such views were neither reconciled nor relegated to the confines of history. In the post-independence period and in the early 2000s, they fuelled Somali imaginations, as well as regional anxieties about Somali irredentism. With each historical period, the idea of a Somali nation, questions of how it is constituted, who are the (gate)keepers of Somalinimo and the kind of politics inspired by such provocations are regularly put to the test.

The premise that diasporic political identity was unique guided diasporas at the peace conferences and in the ensuing nation reconstitution. The idea was tailored to interactions with international mediators and donors, as much as it was tailored to representatives and communities in Somalia. Intriguingly, the diaspora identity that was forged often fluctuated within and between the two conferences. The ebb and flow of diaspora claims-making and deployments of identity corresponded to opportunities and constraints presented by the contested clan formula. Diaspora Somalis' ubiquitous calls to be recognised as formal stakeholders in the conferences (and in political life more generally) reinforced a formulation of Somali political community that occurred in mutually constitutive ways through repeated interactions and interplays between "local" Somalis and diasporas abroad. As Nyamnjoh argues, processes of political community formation take place in transitional contexts; migration experiences thus pose problems to traditional nation-state models of citizenship and belonging.⁵²² As events in Arta and Mbagathi demonstrated, the linkages between diaspora and local Somalis are not abstract. They are concrete and intersectional, expressed through several strategies deployed by diaspora actors to exert influence at the peace talks. The result was a unique political space, which, though not accepted by all, became a site for an interplay between local and transnational articulations of the body politic. In doing so, diaspora Somalis have lent to the citizenship debate by way of engaging, reproducing and challenging the 4.5 clan formula.

⁵²² Nyamnjoh 2007.

The next and final empirical chapter moves to an exploration of two significant ideologies with long-standing resonance to Somalis: nationalism and Islamism. The chapter demonstrates how the presence of these ideologies, each with its own distinct view of the political community, constituted resistance to the clan formula and offered viable alternatives to it.

CHAPTER 7: Nationalism and Islamism as Alternatives to the 4.5 Clan Formula?

At the Mbagathi peace conference in 2003, Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), a well-known academic and towering civil society figure at Arta, gave a provocatively titled lecture, “Can Clan Rebuild a State?” urging “representatives” to find an alternative foundation on which a Somali “nation” could be reconstituted.⁵²³ Gandhi delivered an ode to Somali nationalist discourse, arguing that a “cosmopolitan identity” had organically emerged after independence in metropolises like Mogadishu, where diverse urbanites gradually diluted the salience of clan. Even after a decade of fratricide, this identity remained intact as the glue binding Somalia’s urban elites.

The clan formula was clearly a political success given how quickly it became the central organising mechanism at the peace conferences. However, many shared Gandhi’s concern that a reductionist formula might derail the reconstruction of Somalia. Gandhi sought to recognise clan cleavages, especially in the absence of a national state apparatus, but called for a more unifying architecture to rebuild the Somali nation.

I discuss two ideologies in this chapter: Somali nationalism and Islamism. Each lay claim to deep historical currents in Somali society, dating back to the pre-independence era – and much earlier in the case of Islam. This chapter examines how these historical rivals in the Somali context and ideational opposites manifested themselves in the peace talks and how they infused critiques of the clan formula. Against clans as the “building-blocks” of the political community and the departure point for citizenry rights, Somali nationalists maintained that individual citizens constituted the national political community. Somali Islamism(s) articulated the *ummah* as the ultimate political community, with religion unifying clan divides.

This chapter explores the disenchantments with the clan formula and the need to acknowledge identity-based politics and articulations of political community outside clan structures. I dissect how nationalism resurged along four key axes of debate: on the relevance of the 1960 constitution, federalism, the

⁵²³ Lecture, “Can Clan Rebuild a State?” by Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), 3 March 2003. IGAD archives. Notes, translation and compilation by Khalif Ahmed Hassan with Novib Somalia.

Somaliland question and the status of Mogadishu. The second part of the chapter discusses Islamist alternatives to the clan formula. Islamists were categorically excluded from the IGAD-led Mbagathi process but would become Somalia's dominant political opposition and military force from 2005 onwards. Compared to what they saw as a misguided agenda at Arta and Mbagathi, both nationalist and Islamists discourses sought to re-emphasise a different, ultimate political community. Their poignant critiques debunk portrayals of the Somali peace-making projects as ideologically vacuous, driven purely by selfish pursuits and power contests. This chapter underlines the diversity of political thought manifested in the peace processes and multiple visions of political community.

Somali Nationalism at the Dawn of the Third Republic

The rapid elevation of the clan formula in the peace talks generated ample anxiety about the future of the Somali body politic among women and diaspora Somalis, and in many others too. Fears over (renewed) clan polarisation and the institutionalising of inequalities (cf. the production of “minority” and “others” as categories of Somali citizens) were countered by narratives of unity as a precondition to strong nationhood. Somali delegates resisted the notion that the clan was the only legitimate expression of representation and, indeed, framing of political community.

During the peace talks, elements of Somali nationalism and pan-Somali discourses were strategically (re)assembled as reminders of the primacy of the Somali nation, rather than emerging clan constituencies. Such narratives echoed those of the early post-independence period and Siad Barre's rule when pan-Somali nationalism made Somalis into citizens through ambitious policies and proud rhetoric (Chapter 2). In the corridors of Arta and Mbagathi, Somali nationalism was not a hollow rhetorical device. It drove discussions in tangible ways, having ripple effects on wider debates on the shape of political community. This was evident from the way the Somali nationalism of the early 2000s had changed in some respects from its mid-twentieth-century incarnation, as per Ismail Taani's view, who had once been a staunch supporter of the pan-Somali project.⁵²⁴ An offensive strategy to achieve a Greater Somalia was no longer the priority. Instead, the conferences worked to develop a fuller understanding of citizenship and to maintain the territorial “integrity” and “unity” of (old) Somalia, aiming to reverse the breakaway of Somaliland and further fragmentation of the old republic.

⁵²⁴ Interview with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018.

Couched in such objectives, nationalism seemed to provide answers to the dilemmas of identifying the highest expression of political community, how to govern its membership and who belonged to such a community. The instrumental uses of Somali nationalism during the peace talks turned it into a counter-narrative, particularly for groups who found themselves at the margins of the 4.5 clan formula. The utility of self-identifying as nationalist came precisely from the term's complex, frequently deliberately vague or relational use. Labels such as "nationalist", "patriot" and "cosmopolitan" were often used interchangeably. Generally speaking, these labels were mostly self-ascribed for a variety of reasons. For instance, critics of the clan formula used one formulation or another of "nationalist" to signify their opposition. Additionally, for delegates aiming to press claims considered to be national in character, such as insisting on the incorporation of Somaliland into the talks, these labels proved invaluable, as they were difficult to oppose given their persisting popularity. Abdulkadir Malesia, a close advisor to Mogadishu warlord Mohamed Qanyare Afrax, who participated in Mbagathi, shone light on his nationalist upbringing:

My father was a solider. I didn't even know where my qabiil [clan] lived! I grew up in cosmopolitan Mogadishu. My neighbours were my qabiil. I was raised with nationalism.⁵²⁵

Somali nationalism was a discourse open to all actors in the peace negotiations. The question was not about who identified as a pure ideologue; rather, it was about who found this identification useful, and to what end. Diverse actors, including, perhaps counter-intuitively, traditional clan leaders, leaders of armed factions, and even Islamists, regularly drew on nationalist discourse when it suited them. Notwithstanding the flexible character of post-1991 nationalism, this development illustrates the enduring appeal of pan-Somali imaginaries: actors used nationalist vocabulary because it resonated and furthered their political ambitions.

I do not imply that nationalism was only instrumental; many delegates discussed alternative imaginings of political community. For some, a "cosmopolitan" identity suggested the supremacy of belonging to the Somali nation as opposed to the clans only. Nationalism became an ideological force that galvanised participants, who positioned themselves as actively seeking to place the nation's interest above the clan or self-interest. This ideological force was particularly useful for minorities and diaspora-based "intellectuals", who warned against the problems of group rights generally, and clan-framed politics specifically. In a letter Mbagathi observer Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed Hussein wrote: "The Banaadiri people bear the scars of a fifty-year alienation... A future Somali state has a duty to promote a single

⁵²⁵ Interview with Abdulkadir Malesia in Djibouti, November 2017.

national identity and loyalty, [and] at the same time recognise, protect and develop the positive aspects of cultural and linguistic pluralism.”⁵²⁶ In this configuration, perceived differences in clan/ethnic identities were trumped by an affiliation with, and “duty” to, the broadest formulation of the Somali political community: the nation.

In Arta and Mbagathi, Somali nationalism took on an aspirational calling to do what was good for the nation as a whole. As such, it set a normative standard for delegates at the conferences. The *language* of nationalism rationalised certain actions in the name of the Somali nation. Thus, Somali nationalism formed a broad discursive terrain upon which many delegates sought to augment their positions. The brand of pan-Somalism resurrected at the peace conferences inevitably pointed to the fluid nature of nationhood, as unbounded by political boundaries; pre-war formulations of ethnic Somalis in neighbouring states having the same rights and obligations as those within internationally demarcated boundaries of Somalia remained important, as evidenced by the massive involvement of diaspora in the peace processes.

Nationalism was also integral to assuaging Somali fears that the peace processes were driven purely by foreign interests – a sensitive point in a post-colonial nation particularly aggrieved by how the “Scramble for Africa” had divided the Somali people. Neighbouring countries that organised the Arta and Mbagathi conferences encouraged their Somali allies to air nationalist sentiments in order to sell the processes as “Somali-owned”. Djibouti, in particular, while cautious about irredentist tendencies, openly drew on elements of pan-Somali identity to enhance the legitimacy of its mediation efforts. The Djiboutian organisers, for example, tapped into their own historical connections to pan-Somali nationalism. Djibouti tended to frame its approach to the Somali dossier as a “moral responsibility” towards its brethren – clearly intended to contrast with how Egypt and Ethiopia had approached the Somali dossier in the 1990s. On the Somali side, overt Djiboutian references to their Somaliness were received with enthusiasm because it seemed vaguely connected to an earlier era of Somali greatness and the dream of a Greater Somalia. Contrasting Arta with earlier peace efforts, several interviewees, including Asha Hagi Elmi, asserted that “Somalis had a firm grip on the Arta talks, they were Somali-owned and Somali-led”;⁵²⁷ (Djiboutian) President Guelleh clearly succeeded in his objectives to brand Arta as *gogol walaal* (a brotherly initiative) and a Somali project.

A similar logic guided the IGAD Frontline States at Mbagathi. The Djiboutian success in enlisting Somali

⁵²⁶ Letter from Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed, 31 January 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵²⁷ Interview with Asha Hagi Elmi in Oxford, February 2018.

nationalism to its cause, and the prestige and effectiveness it seemed to bring to the small state, triggered a response from the Horn's bigger players. Each of the Frontline States, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, appointed ethnic Somalis as their special envoys in what was clearly a recognition of the potency of nationalist sentiments, and the need for the conference not to appear as an externally manipulated affair. Ambassador Mohamed Affey, an ethnic Somali, represented Kenya as lead envoy in the Mbagathi conference and commented on the trilateral meetings between regional envoys:

The three of us negotiating on behalf of the Frontline States were ethnic Somalis and spoke Somali as our mother tongue. We frequently met for dinners and had our discussions in *af Somaali*. As a Somali Kenyan, I wanted a strong government in Somalia, and I wanted the peace talks to work. We supported Somalis but we couldn't become Somalis or negotiate on their behalf.⁵²⁸

By accommodating symbols of pan-Somalism (language and identity), regional powers sought to reassure that they had Somalis' best interests at heart and to respond to perceptions that the IGAD-led process undermined Somali ownership.⁵²⁹ Regional recognition of the enduring appeal of Somali nationalism aligned with debates at the peace conferences around four issues crucial to rebuilding the state and of enormous practical and symbolic importance to all Somalis, especially nationalists. In what follows, I discuss them sequentially to demonstrate how Somali nationalism challenged those who articulated political community and citizenship primarily in terms of the clan formula.

Continued Relevance of the 1960 Constitution

The founding Somali constitution, officially adopted following independence in 1960, offered a clear politico-legal definition of a Somali citizen. The constitution was liberal in both its language and ethos. It was concerned with the individual and her/his relationship with the new state, though it was guided also by the burgeoning "spirit" of Somali nationalism connecting each citizen to a national political community.

One New Zealand-based observer of Mbagathi who identified as a member of a recently classified minority clan posited that the founding constitution, although requiring "further improvement...had

⁵²⁸ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

⁵²⁹ Memo by Anab Ahmed Isse, Peace Tree and Somali Good Hope Alliance meetings 1-7 May 2003, IGAD archives.

nonetheless produced concrete positive results during the administration of the First Republic (1960–1969).⁵³⁰ He noted that amendments were a necessary step towards the preservation of individual (minority) rights and “the resolution of the question of individual rights versus clan rights”. This observer recommended the inclusion of a “Bill of Rights” that could “protect” Somalis and especially minorities and “prevent dictators, warlords and clan oligarchies from hijacking a nation”.⁵³¹ The need for an updated constitution to reflect contemporary dilemmas (e.g. surging clan rights) lent it much-needed legitimacy, even among “minority” groups such as members of the Banaadiri community.

In both conferences, narratives about the 1960 constitution were spun to mitigate the negative impacts of a clan-based power-sharing arrangement that had so quickly become dominant. Doused in renewed nationalist rhetoric, the rereading of the constitution – and advocating for its continued relevance – emphasised core ideals associated with the establishment of the Somali nation state: the equality of citizens, irrespective of gender, clan background, ethnicity, claims to indigeneity, language or culture. In this reading, Somali citizenship was both universal and expansive (i.e. all ethnic Somalis can be citizens of Somalia) and inclusive of all communities (rather than classifying them as “majorities” or “minorities”).

It is unsurprising that the 1960 constitution would be central to a nationalist counter-force at the conferences. For much of Somalia’s post-independence era, the constitution served to fuel state projects promising to create a pan-Somali polity. During the peace talks (and especially at Mbagathi), Somali delegates found it difficult to argue against a contemporary reinterpretation that maintained that all ethnic Somalis, in neighbouring Horn states and beyond, had a legally sanctioned claim to Somali citizenship and associated rights. Thus, the 1960 constitution had two tasks that found new resonance at the conferences: while it upheld some liberal ideals of universal citizenship, it also served as a foundation for building a state (and a community) that was home to all ethnic Somalis.

In answering the question of citizenship eligibility, several members of the Constitutional Committee in Mbagathi were resolute in their determination to re-establish the ethos of the founding constitution: irrespective of territory, Somalis – in particular highly mobile Somali nomads roaming the borderlands between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya – had a right to citizenship. They disapproved of introducing territoriality as the basis for citizenship – seen to effectively exclude the ethnic Somali populations in nearby states.

⁵³⁰ Letter by Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed, 31 January 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵³¹ Letter by Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed, 31 January 2003, IGAD archives.

Somali citizenship has never been in dispute and the Somali people are one and indivisible. As a nomadic majority, people of Somalia are scattered and are on the move in and around different countries in the Horn at different seasons of the year. They are still Somali nationals and will not [be made] alien to the motherland. To cut them from Somalia would violate the rights of more than half of the Somali population, mainly [affecting] pastoralists. Specific laws will be established to deal with the issue of citizenship.⁵³²

What lent this discourse potency was that the minorities did not contest the 1960 constitution as a national project. Representatives of the historically marginalised Jareerweyne and Banaadiri communities found historical memories of constitutional aspirations to inclusivity especially useful in contesting the unconstitutional grounds on which they would become classified as minorities at the conferences. Jareerweyn (or Bantu) traditional elders forcefully resisted when confronted with the label of “others”, as explored in Chapter 4. Similarly, other minority representatives emphasised their constitutionally guaranteed rights to equal citizenship by pointing to highly politicised population estimates constructing them as minorities, thereby rejecting claims about the dubious legal basis through which they became minorities. One observer noted: “Neither the UN Trusteeship administration in 1950 nor the Somali constitution of 1960 addressed a [group rights] model.”⁵³³ Conjuring the 1960 constitution at the peace conferences allowed them to circumvent the exclusionary character of the 4.5 clan formula introduced in Arta and championed, paradoxically, by civil society actors who self-identified as nationalists. The clan formula unconstitutionally stripped some of Somalia’s citizens of their status and rights to an equal share of political quotas. By holding onto the letter and ethos of the founding constitution in the face of the formula’s institutionalisation of long-existing patterns of discrimination, “minorities” (and women) tried to mitigate their rapidly eroding rights as equal citizens.

As some Arta organisers were put on the defensive by this evocation of nationalism and constitutionalism, they affirmed the continued relevance of the original document: “There were no intentions to replace the constitution, it remained the ultimate law of the land”,⁵³⁴ a sentiment that highlighted a *balanced* equality among all citizens despite the 4.5 arrangement. For many delegates, re-embracing the constitution was pivotal in preventing further fragmentation after a decade of disunity. Notwithstanding all the reassuring words from the proponents of the clan formula, the Arta and Mbagathi conferences produced “transitional charters” whose relationships with the 1960 constitution were ambivalent, even contradictory.

⁵³² Memo by the Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter, 22 March 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵³³ Letter by Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed, 31 January 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵³⁴ Interview with Abdirahman (Hirabe) in Djibouti, November 2017.

One key task for Arta and Mbagathi delegates was to draft documents to serve as legal frameworks for the transitional periods that followed each conference. Constitutional Committees were created in which representation was based on the clan formula. The two resulting “transitional charters” produced constitution-like, though temporary, documents defining citizenship, and established governance structures and stipulations of the duties of, and modalities for, electing a new president, prime minister and parliament. However, both transitional charters were highly ambiguous and deliberately refrained from addressing complex issues deemed outside their immediate mandate.

The details of citizenship were intentionally omitted in both the Arta and Mbagathi charters, as they were to be determined by a future parliament. Archival documents from Arta explicitly defer new citizenship laws “as a task of a future government” garnering a national consensus.⁵³⁵ From the vantage point of a broad set of delegates, these gaps underscored how transitional charters could and should not replace the founding constitution. Moreover, the peace conferences were not designed to be constitution-making projects. There certainly was no mandate for them to assume this role.

Controversy arose, therefore, when some participants promoted replacing the original constitution with the Mbagathi transitional charter. Such suggestions contradicted the objectives of the charter-formation process as a temporary framework created primarily to deal with matters related to the conference and inevitably stirred up controversy. The Federalism and Provisional Committee of Mbagathi split regarding the status of the founding constitution, with some delegates suggesting the constitution was “timeless”, while others maintained it was obsolete in light of Somalia’s contemporary realities.⁵³⁶ These disagreements reflected specific tensions vis-à-vis introducing restrictions on the breadth and universality of Somali citizenship, such as proposals to limit citizenship to those born in Somalia’s internationally recognised boundaries (or whose fathers had been born on Somali territory). Not only was this reformulation impractical – because it didn’t account for the lifestyle of pastoralist Somalis – but it also represented an assault on the founding conception of the Somali nation, begging the question of what alternative imaginary or narrative should replace it.

The 1960 constitution had kept the Somali political community intact, particularly through its references to territorial boundaries, unity and sovereignty; all these concepts were under serious scrutiny in a post-1991 context, however. Specifically, the constitution was still seen as the basis of a legal contract between

⁵³⁵ Arta’s Transitional National Charter, 16 July 2000. Djibouti MFA archives.

⁵³⁶ Letter by General Mohamed Said Morgan and Mowlid Ma’ane Mohamoud coming on the heels of the Political Leaders Committee’s meeting on 19 January 2004, IGAD archives.

British and Italian Somalilands. Simply referred to as the “1960 union”,⁵³⁷ proponents of “unionist” Somalia continued to see the inhabitants of north-western regions (including the elites in Hargeisa) as Somali citizens with the same rights protected by the founding constitution. In light of Somaliland’s insistence on boycotting Arta and Mbagathi, delegates rationalised that the constitution was the only legitimate document reflecting the wishes of the Somaliland people in 1960. Moreover, the delegates refused to treat transitional charters as final without the approval of Somaliland.⁵³⁸

Claims that the original constitution helped to preserve “unity” and “territorial integrity” during the de facto dissolution of the union and subsequent formation of Somaliland in 1991 also shaped debates about federalism. A significant constituency in Arta and Mbagathi, particularly “intellectuals” and clan elders, deployed the founding constitution’s principles of Somali unity and expansive citizenship as a shield from the effects of a rushed adoption of federalism, as I discuss next.

Federalism as a Nationalist Recourse to a Fragmented Body Politic

The 4.5 clan formula was not the only source of rapid change in Somali political discourse in the early 2000s. Like representation and inclusion (and the wider claims they engendered), federalism had been a core unifying theme of Arta and Mbagathi. Both conferences dedicated significant space and political energy to creating a federal political system in Somalia, but they did so in a manner perceived as hasty by many delegates. For critics of the unitary state, the priority was how to overhaul the historical centralisation of power in Mogadishu. Federalism was an expected outcome of the IGAD-led Mbagathi conference, even if opponents at Arta had cautioned against a weak central government unable to control autonomous regions. In the face of such polarisation, I argue that “nationalists” still tried to develop federalism as an instrument to keep Somalia together in the face of fragmentation, thereby balancing the need for decentralisation with a strong sense of national identity.

The violent dissolution of the 1960 union between Italian and British Somaliland in 1991 transformed the political map of Somalia; the trauma of the de facto loss of Somaliland was an emotional and political trigger for many conversations in Somalia and in the diaspora about the future of the nation throughout the 1990s. The fear was that Somaliland might be the first domino to fall as unorganised separatist claims

⁵³⁷ Plenary debate on “the Somaliland case and inviting the Government of Egal,” 24 June 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁵³⁸ According to my review of debates at Arta between May and July 2000, there was a shared belief among participants that all Somalis, including in former British Somaliland, accepted the founding constitution through “national” referendum after independence and unification.

risked cascading. By the time Arta began, proto-states and warlord fiefdoms had mushroomed in the decade following state collapse. The Djiboutian government singled out Somaliland and Puntland – clearly the best-organised polities and therefore potentially the greatest challenges to reunification – for inclusion in the conference. On 5 May 2000 the (Arta) Declaration of National Commitment issued by participating delegates “reaffirm[ed] the unity, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia”.⁵³⁹ When federalism was initially proposed at the meeting, it aroused fears of further fragmentation, despite repeated statements that federalism merely mirrored “realities on the ground”. These “realities” were not limited to the Somaliland secession and the creation of Puntland in 1998. “Regional administrations” in Jubbaland, Hiraan and Jubba Valley emerged ad hoc, without an overall guiding framework. In crude terms, these regions advanced the notion that clans had claims to territories; the clan formula would further embolden these projects. Kenya’s top mediator in Mbagathi, Mohamed Abdi Affey, attributed Somalis’ fears to misunderstanding federalism and devolution: “Somalis didn’t understand what federalism is and they were weary of it. But they needed a Somali-friendly federal arrangement without losing the nationalist character.”⁵⁴⁰

Therefore, federalism was proposed as a possible solution to keeping these territories intact. As outlined above, practical and pressing realities necessitated a new system of governance equipped to address the realities on the ground. Those with nationalist agendas were persuaded by the idea that federalism was one of a few models that could deal with the dissolution of the union between Somaliland and Somalia, and the rise of potential breakaways in Puntland and south-western Somalia. Maintaining “territorial integrity” was envisaged as the vital basis for a compromise that would include the devolution of Mogadishu’s historical grip on political power. One additional persuasive rationale was that a federal structure might anticipate the “return” of Somaliland in the future: the Hargeisa elites might join a federation if they could maintain political autonomy. In this manner, discussions about federalism gradually concentrated on preserving Somalia’s “territorial integrity”.

Proponents of a nationalist approach to federalism advocated keeping a strong core, with Mogadishu as the capital that could “keep Somalia together”. In Arta specifically, many insisted on a “gradual transition”; the rationale was that Somalis needed to first “strengthen the national frameworks” before setting up federal states.⁵⁴¹ This national framework, however, was unclear. For some, it was the negotiation of another constitution (which would require a national referendum) that would clearly

⁵³⁹ Arta Declaration, 5 May 2000, pp.2–3.

⁵⁴⁰ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

⁵⁴¹ Interview with Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

establish the relationship between the capital and future federal states. For others, a national framework was envisaged specifically as an agreement between Somaliland and Somalia, where Somaliland would be expected to negotiate its position before federalism was feasible. Some interviewees classified the Arta approach to federalism as one primarily concerned with the preservation of Somalia's unity. Technical Committee member Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) said that Somalis in Arta explored the notion of federalisation but decided against it because, "there was a real worry that without a national government and framework, we didn't know what would bind the different federal entities together".⁵⁴² Either way, calling for a calculated and "gradual" transition necessitated a national approach to prevent the proliferation of fiefdoms across Somalia in the name of federalism. To this end, a nationalist discourse was deployed to dampen fears that the creation of federal regions could hasten the further fragmentation of the Somali Republic.

However, this nationalist vision of federalism was challenged immediately after the start of the IGAD conference in Kenya. From the outset in October 2002, the Eldoret Declaration (a prelude to the Mbagathi debates) embraced federalism as a governance system in Somalia. On 15 September 2003, the Federal Transitional Charter was adopted despite the notable absence of official Somaliland representatives from the conference. Meanwhile, disagreements lingered between delegates (mostly political actors representing Somalia's faction groups) and some civil society actors, supported by the transitional government formed as a result of Arta. At the core of the debate, again, was not federalism itself but the modalities of implementation and timeline. Continued disagreements led to a six-month stalemate. Tensions on a committee devoted to federalism resulted in a split into two sub-committees: each with different recommendations to approaching federalism. One of the sub-committees advocated for "federalism now", while the other assertively called for a slow-paced approach.⁵⁴³ This deadlock was resolved in early 2004 through the direct interference of Kenyan negotiators, resulting in a bilateral agreement between TNG president, Abdiqassim Salaad, and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, President of Puntland.⁵⁴⁴

Part of the controversy surrounding decentralisation and federalism were the so-called "clan fiefdoms", disparagingly dismissed by many Somali nationalists but formally invited to the IGAD-led Mbagathi process (e.g. the Hiiran Political Authority and the Jubba Valley Authority). Although the trajectories and claims of these political entities differed markedly from those of Somaliland or even Puntland, they shared

⁵⁴² Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Djibouti, March 2018.

⁵⁴³ "Verbatim Report" by Hassan Gilal Dien on Federalism and Provisional Charter, 23 January 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

an interest in self-governance with minimal interference from the central state; regional actors, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, insisted these “realities on the ground” be considered. This predicament made federalism a compelling force in Arta, but even more so at Mbagathi. Suspicions of a future state that would again concentrate power in the capital and that served elites who were “remnants of the Siad Barre regime”⁵⁴⁵ provided the impetus for the adoption of a decentralised political system.

If federalising Somalia seemed to solve one issue, it also created new ones: the challenge of defining which and how many federal states (including border demarcation) would exist and the exact nature of their relationship with the capital. Although differing in their approach to federalism, both conferences exposed the complex relationship between various clan families and their territorial claims. For example, in Arta, a “decentralised system” was understood as “one that brings different political communities under a common government for [a] common purpose, and [establishes] regional governments for the particular needs of each region”.⁵⁴⁶ In Mbagathi, however, the “political communities” were put explicitly in clan terms. The minutes of the Constitution and Provisional Charter Committee meeting on 11 December 2002 proposed the formation of five state governments on the basis of clans: “North-west Somalia, predominately made up of the Dir clan; north-east Somalia, composed mainly of the Darood clan; [the] central region, made up of the Hawiye clan; south-west Somalia, comprising the Digil and Mirifle clan; and [the] southern state, made up of mixed Somali communities.”⁵⁴⁷

Such proposed intersections between the clan and the formation of federal regions were particularly sensitive, as the notion of clan “balance” implicitly guided the basis for new federal territorial demarcations (even if federalism was partly introduced into the peace debates to offset new dilemmas precipitated by surging clan claims). Abdurahman Baadiyow and Mohamed Dahir Afrax confirmed that the clan formula informed federalisation projects in the 2000s, as noted above.⁵⁴⁸ Given the complexity associated with Somali territorial diversity and concepts of *deegaan* (ancestral homelands), there would be “minority” communities in each of these states. Banaadir, the administrative region of which Mogadishu has historically been a part, would have a separate status (see below). I conclude that, although attempts to reframe federalism through a nationalist lens were imaginative, they failed to neutralise the clan formula and its impacts on reworking territorial and other relationships between clan communities. Similarly, linking federalism to the “Somaliland Question” proved equally futile in luring the political elite

⁵⁴⁵ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) and Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

⁵⁴⁶ Arta Declaration, 5 May 2000, p.1.

⁵⁴⁷ Minutes of the Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter, 11 December 2002, IGAD archives.

⁵⁴⁸ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) and Mohamed Dahir Afrax in Djibouti, March 2018.

in Hargeisa back to the Somali Republic.

The Somaliland Question

Somaliland occupies a powerful position in Somali imaginings of a national political community. The “union” between British and Italian Somaliland in 1960 resulted in the formation of the Somali Republic and represented a concrete step towards the actualisation of a Greater Somalia. Its dissolution in 1991 tested the limits of this brand of Somali nationalism. The more Hargeisa’s elites resisted incorporation into the Arta and Mbagathi “national forums”, the more Somalis grew frustrated and ambivalent about the future of the nation. The secession of Somaliland was a unifying concern for the majority of civil society delegates in both conferences: what was at stake for them was maintaining the “territorial integrity” of Somalia, underscored by many participants’ implicit or explicit pan-Somali rhetoric. The need to “salvage” Somaliland and return it to the Union was one of the few points on which most attendees could genuinely agree. As the chairman of the Arta Technical Committee, Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), told me:

We were prepared to do anything to maintain the integrity of Somalia. There were proposals to host the conference in Sheikh [Somaliland] and to offer the presidency to Egal [then president of Somaliland]. We were even willing to relocate the capital to Hargeisa.⁵⁴⁹

Addressing the Somaliland question presupposed persuading Somalilanders to actually attend the proceedings. Hargeisa’s ruling elite rejected participation at Arta and Mbagathi because it would undermine Somaliland’s status as an “independent country”. When “domestic” Somali requests failed to persuade Hargeisa, external actors weighed in. The UN’s representative to Arta, David Stephen, confirmed that Djiboutian organisers made repeated offers to involve (Somaliland’s) President Egal in Arta, as part of an extraordinary proposal to relocate the conference from Djibouti to Somaliland and to instate Egal as interim president of a unified Somali Republic.⁵⁵⁰ Several interviewees suggested that this proposal was received with excitement in Mogadishu.⁵⁵¹ However, Egal rebuffed the Djiboutian overtures. Dahir Riyale Kahin assumed the presidency after Egal’s death in 2002; he similarly rejected repeated IGAD invitations to join the Mbagathi process. On 17 July 2003 Edna Aden, then Somaliland’s minister of foreign affairs, wrote a letter encapsulating Somaliland’s position:

May it be known from the outset that the Government of Somaliland is not a participant in any capacity in

⁵⁴⁹ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Gandhi in Nairobi, June 2018.

⁵⁵⁰ Interview with David Stephen in Cambridge, October 2018.

⁵⁵¹ Interview with Mohamed Nur Garibaldi in Nairobi, June 2018.

this ongoing Peace Conference for Somalia; nor has the Government of Somaliland delegated any person or persons to represent it in this Conference. The Government of Somaliland is ready to take part in a dialogue with Somalia as equal partners, when and if a legitimate, democratically elected government is established in Somalia (former Italian Somalia) with the full support and mandate of its own people. This dialogue will be between two legitimate governments and their two independent states, Somalia and Somaliland, without entertaining the concept that Somaliland will be part of the Federal system that is being contemplated for Somalia in the 14th Peace Conference that is currently taking place in Nairobi.⁵⁵²

Faced with this continuing rejection of participation, the peace talks sought the next best solution: inviting a delegation of clan elders and civil society representatives from Somaliland through the clan formula. Delegates (in both Arta and Mbagathi) insisted on representation from “the north-west regions”, citing that Somaliland’s absence undermined the inclusivity of the talks.⁵⁵³ Targeting civil society as a strategy to circumvent official boycotts had succeeded in the case of Puntland, where Arta’s Organising Committee invited a Puntland delegation consisting of prominent civil society figures, women activists and clan elders. Djiboutian officials believed the same strategy could work for Somaliland by eventually persuading Somaliland officials to join the talks. The 4.5 clan formula, within which the Dir sub-clans living in Somaliland were incorporated, was seen as a key step towards ensuring a measure of inclusion and assuaging fears about the implications of Somaliland’s visible absence. Hence, an appeal to traditional forces and the public was made to circumvent the Hargeisa government’s firm refusal to join the talks.

Somaliland’s conspicuously empty seats at the peace talks amplified a unionist, nationalist discourse. Despite Somaliland officials’ absence at the conferences, their outcomes were presented as if Somaliland *had* been part of the peace talks. For example, the transitional charters and clan formula quotas were written to anticipate a future “return” of Somaliland into the (now federal) union.⁵⁵⁴ The clan formula thus unexpectedly helped to lessen the severity of Somaliland’s separation and repeated refusal to attend the conferences: nationalists and proponents of the clan formula alike claimed that Somaliland’s sub-clans were incorporated in the 4.5 arrangement; therefore, despite an official boycott by Hargeisa, clan representation had the unexpected effect of arguing for a nominal presence of Isaaq clan representatives – though this was highly disputed by Somaliland’s government.

Beyond questions of reunification and representation, sensitive matters pertaining to the union’s history were also tackled at the conferences. The public condemnation of Siad Barre’s indiscriminate counter-

⁵⁵² Official letter by Edna Aden, 17 July 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵⁵³ For example, Arta’s Technical Committee session and statement on Somaliland, 23 March 2000, Djibouti MFA archives; Report of a joint meeting between Elders and Leaders of the Islamic Courts of Mogadishu, 2-5 April 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁵⁵⁴ Interview with Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

insurgency and an acknowledgment of Somaliland's historical grievances were considered first steps towards national healing. At Arta, clan elders and civil society actors tackled the conflict of the late 1980s directly and agreed that the wounds from that era must be addressed through special measures. Diverse delegates at Arta issued unprecedented statements acknowledging the mistreatment of the people of Somaliland:

[While] the Somali nation as a whole was affected by the atrocities committed in the name of the Somali government, citizens living in Somaliland experienced by far the greatest suffering of these events...We, expressing sentiments and feelings shared by all Somalis, recognise the suffering of the people of Somaliland [and] seek their forgiveness. We commit to addressing the wrongs done to the Somali people living in northwestern Somalia (Somaliland) so that we may prevent this history from repeating. We plead to our brothers in Somaliland to join us in this conference to deliberate on the destiny of the Somali nation.⁵⁵⁵

This momentous event marked the first public apology towards, and acknowledgment of, the specific grievances of the people of Somaliland. Official statements from clan elders and other civil society groups at Arta called for the “brothers” in Somaliland to join the conference as a gesture of reconciliation and forgiveness. Arta documents made explicit references to “Somaliland”, symbolically accepting that it behooved a special arrangement given its particular history. In contrast, records from the Mbagathi conference repeatedly used “north-western regions” instead of Somaliland.

As the impasse in resolving the Somaliland “question” persisted, the mood among delegates evolved from being open and reconciliatory at Arta to resignation and even hostility as the Kenya-hosted negotiations progressed. The Arta-formed Transitional National Government (TNG) had an immensely tense relationship with Hargeisa, which exacerbated Somaliland's unwillingness to attend the Mbagathi conference.⁵⁵⁶ The TNG's president, Abdiqassim Salaad, accused the IGAD organisers of being complacent about the Somaliland issue and not robustly engaging Somaliland in the two-year-long talks. Without representation, even in a nominal sense, Somaliland's absence foretold the “failure” of the Kenya initiative from the perspective of the TNG. A letter from Mogadishu, dated 4 November 2002, articulated Salaad's position on Somaliland: “The absence of [officials] and civil society from north-west Somalia in the Conference is of great concern to most Somalis. For the Somali national reconciliation process to be more inclusive, the presence of the north-west regional administration and the representatives of [its] civil society is considered crucial. We propose [that] the original number of delegates allocated to [the] north-

⁵⁵⁵ Statement on the “Somaliland Case”, 23 May 2000, Djibouti MFA.

⁵⁵⁶ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, June 2018.

west be [reflected] in the delegate distribution chart.”⁵⁵⁷ The TNG blamed IGAD, demanding that a high-level IGAD delegation be sent to Hargeisa to bring back an official delegation.⁵⁵⁸ Implicitly, there were suspicions that IGAD’s silence over this issue concealed (especially Ethiopian) support for Somaliland’s separatist agenda, which contributed to feelings that the conference undermined Somali territorial integrity. In the end, only twenty-six delegates representing traditional leaders and civil society from Somaliland arrived in Kenya in 2003 to partake in the proceedings. These delegates’ credentials and authority were disputed; letters from Hargeisa attacked these Somalilanders as illegitimate, having neither a mandate nor power.⁵⁵⁹

Imaginings of Mogadishu as Symbol of the “Nation”

Since 1991, the core of the Somali conflict has been concentrated in the national capital: control of Mogadishu was, and is, considered a sure path to victory. Dozens of warlords, and later various Islamist factions, have laid waste to the city. Yet, the capital has always been more than a strategic battleground; it has continued to be of great political and symbolic importance in Somali imaginings of the national political community, both by “citizens” inhabiting Mogadishu and Somalis elsewhere, whether inside or outside official national borders. The Arta Declaration encapsulated the thinking about Mogadishu’s status and fate:

...all agree the entire country, including towns and cities, are controlled by various clans, sub-clans or groups of clans. The concept of “nationhood” is so weakened that national institutions are in short supply, with the exception of the national flag and [the] country's name! Mogadishu, since the outbreak of fighting in 1991 has undergone dramatic demographic changes, becoming more and more narrowly identified with a major clan, to the exclusion of other Somalis who worked, lived, owned properties and businesses in the city. If it is to regain the confidence of all Somalis, Mogadishu must become a truly “national” capital city belonging to all, not to a clan or group of clans. The Somali people, given the harrowing experience they have endured over a long time, do not feel safe in a Mogadishu claimed by a clan and occupied by an array of armed factions, all sub-clans of one major clan. This is not an ideal environment for multi-clan, multi-cultural, multi-racial co-existence. Mogadishu could restore its former position, therefore, only by restructuring both its physical jurisdiction and status, in line with this over-riding concern. This cannot be ignored.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁷ Position Paper of the Transitional National Government, 4 November 2002, IGAD archives.

⁵⁵⁸ Position Paper of the Transitional National Government, 4 November 2002, IGAD archives.

⁵⁵⁹ Official letter by Edna Aden, 17 July 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵⁶⁰ Arta Declaration, 5 May 2000, p.7.

The Djiboutian and IGAD initiators at Arta and Mbagathi strove to honour Somalia's diverse capital, recognising its special position as an epicentre of destruction but also as an icon of national unity: whatever happened in Mogadishu was projected onto the rest of the country. The debate about Mogadishu begged the question of what role the "symbol of the nation" would play in a federal future. In theory, the city was exempt from clan representation, as Mogadishu "belonged to all". Its precarious position required a holistic approach to restoring Mogadishu as a "city worthy of the nation". In practical terms, this meant concerted rehabilitation efforts of public assets and the restitution of private properties to their rightful owners. However, questions of who (and which sub-clans) claimed the capital polarised debates; Mogadishu and the surrounding Banaadir region were given "special status" in order to avert further conflicts. A series of delegate meetings in Arta between 21 and 23 June 2000 recommended that Mogadishu be treated as a unique case in the context of a devolution of central powers;⁵⁶¹ the details were left to be negotiated by a future government. In an entirely different approach, the outcome documents at Mbagathi – said to have been dominated by warlords – sought to incorporate Mogadishu's faction leaders into a new government, hoping to compel them to give up their arms.⁵⁶²

Such discussions were complicated by periodic battles erupting in the city while negotiations took place. For example, while the Arta initiative was underway in 2000, violent competition in Mogadishu reaffirmed a pressing need to "liberate" the capital from the warlords. None of Mogadishu's warlords participated in Arta, despite half-hearted official invitations. As earlier peace conferences dominated by the armed factions had seemed to have failed to break the impasse, new Islamist groups had rapidly gained power and popularity among city-dwellers. Leaders of the emergent Islamic Courts in Mogadishu were represented through civil society delegations already at Arta.⁵⁶³

In a unique expression of ideological convergence, debates about Mogadishu at Arta brought together Islamists, clan leaders and those with nationalist leanings (often called the city's "intellectuals") around two urgent, interconnected concerns: the destruction of state institutions in Mogadishu, and the pillaging of its private and public properties (in addition to the status of "minorities" indigenous to Mogadishu). These two concerns were not only critical for state rebuilding but crucial elements for healing inter-clan tensions in the capital. The alignment between groups that seemed so far apart on many other issues highlighted the diversity and uniqueness of Mogadishu as home to "all" Somalis.

⁵⁶¹ Statements on the "Special Status of Mogadishu" on 26 March 2000 and 17 July 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁵⁶² Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, January 2018.

⁵⁶³ Interview with Isamil Taani in Djibouti, December 2018.

In Arta leaders of the Islamic Courts of Mogadishu and traditional elders released a striking joint statement in June 2000 about the “special status” of Mogadishu, calling for the restitution of public and private property, disarmament (of the warlords), and the importance of upholding the rule of law, deemed to be a responsibility shared by all Mogadishu “citizens”.⁵⁶⁴ The leaders of the Islamist Courts, in addition to civil society and traditional elders, declared that the illegal flow of arms contributed to the insecurity of inhabitants of Mogadishu and that this problem threatened the entire Horn. The statement – intended for the Somali “nation” – emphasised the significance of Mogadishu as a national symbol, able to bring together very different groups of people. That concrete cooperation also seems to have paved the way for the Islamic Courts of Mogadishu – which had been successful in resisting warlordism and had a vested interest in further consolidating control in districts across the city – to throw their weight behind the election of a pious former minister of the interior, Abdiqassim Salaad, as the TNG’s president in August 2000 at Arta. The chairman of the Courts, Hassan Sheikh Mohamed Abdi (who participated in Arta and was elected as an MP), promised the Courts’ assistance in facilitating the president’s entry into Mogadishu,⁵⁶⁵ even if critics dismissed Salaad as a pro-Egyptian Islamist and the Courts as Sudanese and/or Arab-world-backed extremists.

This (brief) alliance between secular nationalists, civil society leaders and the Courts is particularly striking in light of the events that ensued after the failure to peacefully re-establish a Somali state and government: the takeover of much of Somalia by the Islamic Courts, the 2006–7 Ethiopian invasion and the rise of the Al-Shabab terrorist organisation. Much of that history clouds a nuanced understanding of the events that took place immediately before. The presence of the Courts at the Arta conference was unsurprising at the time, as they were considered to be powerful constituents in the contested capital.⁵⁶⁶ Civil society elites, many of whom were nationalists, supported their participation as legitimate actors. Islamists were regarded as having a mandate to represent “ordinary citizens” in Mogadishu and its peripheries, a palatable alternative to the ferocious warlords. Bringing Islamists into the political mainstream through pragmatic cooperation around the status of the capital was aborted by the (post-9/11) Mbagathi process, which was intensely critical of any actors who reeked of Islamism.⁵⁶⁷ IGAD sought to dilute the Courts’ influence in Mogadishu by letting the city’s notorious (and numerous) warlords participate alongside the Arta-produced transitional government (theoretically headquartered in Mogadishu), making “representation” of the capital extremely complex.

⁵⁶⁴ Statement on the “Special Status of Mogadishu” on 17 July 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁵⁶⁵ Interview with Hassan Sheikh Mohamed Abdi, <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/q-and/2000/08/25/irin-interview-islamic-courts-chairman-hassan-sheik-mohamed-abdi>

⁵⁶⁶ According to interviews with Ismail Taani in Djibouti, December 2018, and Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

⁵⁶⁷ Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, June 2018.

Underpinning efforts to “save” and “liberate” Mogadishu from the hated militias was a wider imaginary that saw all civil society as a site of resistance to warlordism;⁵⁶⁸ anarchy and quotidian oppression served as grounds for convergences between Islamists, clan leaders and nationalists, though these ideological forces had competed with one another for much of Somalia’s history. The status of Mogadishu, similar to discussions about federalism, inspired ideas of preserving Somali unity and a concrete way of resisting the ferocious carving up of territories in the Republic. A cosmopolitan capital was envisaged as symbolically and materially capable of a centrifugal brand of federalism, one that could legitimately and robustly foster Somali diversity and bring the nation closer together because of its history and diverse make-up. That is, until geopolitics stepped in.

Islamist Alternatives and Their Critics

The Islamic Courts of Mogadishu’s interventions to join the Arta conference as civil society representatives and to forge ties with other participants (including those with a radically different ideology) signalled their growing importance in Somalia – a role that has only increased in the two decades since Arta. Little is known about the doctrines on citizenship held by (non-jihadist) Somali Islamists. It is often presumed that Islamist notions of rights, responsibilities and relationships between the citizenry and an Islamist/Islamic state differ fundamentally from those of other ideologies. At least initially, however, the Courts seemed to be focused primarily on the pragmatics of security and commerce, rather than ideological experimentation. While an Islamic political community, the *ummah*, is a well-formed concept dating back fourteen centuries to the earliest formation of an Islamic state by the Prophet Muhammad himself in Arabia, the first generation of Islamic Courts in Mogadishu contributed little to theoretical citizenship discussions or their practical operationalisation, apart from stressing Islam’s unifying quality in Somalia.

The latter was a historically accurate claim. It is widely acknowledged that Islam in the Somali Peninsula dates back a thousand years, signalling a deep attachment to religion and its entwining with Somali identity.⁵⁶⁹ Somalis adhere to Sunni Islam and follow the *Shaficii* school of jurisprudence. Such surface-level uniformity veils a recent history of contest between a variety of Somali “sects”, dating to the

⁵⁶⁸ Report of a joint meeting by the Elders and Leaders of the Islamic Courts of Mogadishu, 2-5 April 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

⁵⁶⁹ Elmi 2010.

nineteenth century when theological struggles unfolding in Arabia reverberated across the Gulf of Aden. During these struggles, the charismatic imam Sayyid Mohammad Abdulle Hassan targeted the mystic Al-Qadiriya tariqa in an attempt to establish the unchallenged dominance of his Al-Salihiyya brotherhood. Historian B G Martin argues that imminent warfare between different Somali brotherhoods was averted by the arrival of European colonialism in the late nineteenth century, to which the Sayyid turned his attention, becoming an icon of Somali nationalism instead.⁵⁷⁰

In the post-independence period, Islam was clearly an important aspect of sociocultural life but was so omnipresent (the vast majority of Somalis self-described as Sunni Muslims) that the mixing of Islam and politics was only a project at the margins of the constitutional order. Siad Barre was deeply intolerant of any groups that carried a whiff of Islamism and pushed the limits of conservatives with his progressive family laws.⁵⁷¹ Despite such reformism, his socialist revolution did not prevent him from being surrounded by many highly pious advisers, ambassadors and ministers. These included Abdiqassim Salaad Hassan, who was elected at Arta as president of the TNG with support from the Islamic Courts.

As noted earlier, the Islamist presence in Djibouti did not go uncontested, especially by regional actors who feared Islamists' loyalty to foreign sponsors. Djibouti's "invitation" and concurrent growing salience of the Courts in Mogadishu would, in part, lead to the creation of IGAD-sponsored talks in Mbagathi that were, among other objectives, designed to exclude Islamists from the political process altogether and ensure that a new transitional government was formed without their backing. IGAD consistently and categorically excluded any role for Islamists.⁵⁷²

Member states, especially Ethiopia, were much more comfortable dealing with armed factions and clan elders than with Islamic or Islamist leaders of various backgrounds. This policy had the crucial effect of also marginalising Islamist contributions to the national debate on identity and political community. The Courts, for instance, virulently denounced clan politics and the clan formula, arguing that they constituted transgressions against the divine "equality among all men".⁵⁷³ For this reason, they also spurned notions of majority and minority clans, even if the Courts themselves in Mogadishu dealt with clans in a practical sense in their day-to-day functioning. Islamists proposed that the only distinguishing markers between people were piety and upright moral conduct in both public and private realms. While clan identity

⁵⁷⁰ Martin 1976; Sheik-Abdi 1993.

⁵⁷¹ Le Sage 2001, p.473.

⁵⁷² Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Doha, October 2017.

⁵⁷³ Traditional Jareerweyne elders in Arta also invoked Islamic narratives to resist their "othering" within the clan formula. See the statement by Jareerweyne elders, 24 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives.

divided, Islam united Somalis, or so the Islamists claimed.

The *ulama*, traditional Islamic scholars who were distinct from the canny politico-religious operators in the Courts, supported the Arta conference. Djiboutian and Somali organisers cultivated their support and engagement, as the participation of the *ulama* fed into a wider discourse of Somali “ownership” and legitimacy of the conference.⁵⁷⁴ The religious scholars were significant stakeholders in the pre-conference meetings in Djibouti in the early months of 2000 and joined meetings organised by Somali diaspora communities in Sweden to lend further support to the conference. In televised proceedings of these simultaneous conferences, the *ulama* discussed the virtue of peace in Somalia and encouraged traditional leaders and other Somalis to rally for peace, praising Djiboutian efforts to act as brotherly arbitrators.⁵⁷⁵

Though these traditional religious leaders appeared to be welcomed by most participants, the Djiboutian organisers understood that the more political Islamists would represent a problem for the outside world. Sensing that their inclusion would ignite unwanted attention from Ethiopia and the United States (even prior to 11 September 2001), the chairman of the Arta Technical Committee, Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), and the chef-de-cabinet of the Djiboutian president, Ismail Taani, undertook special efforts to underplay Islamist participation. As Mohamed Gandhi testified, the predecessor to the Union of Islamic Courts (emerged between 2004 and 2005) was not viewed as a threat by most Somalis at the time,⁵⁷⁶ except by the armed factions, some women and a few intellectual secularists, who believed a mix between Islam and politics (*wadaad* and *waranle*) foreshadowed the emergence of fundamentalist forces. Among most Somalis, however, there was a widespread perception that the Islamists balanced the hegemony of the warlords who sustained the insecurity in Mogadishu and beyond.

As popular support for moderate Islamists soared, the tangle of domestic expectations and external influences on the peace talks led to a paradoxical outcome. The winning “ideology” at Arta was one that promoted nationalist politics on the surface but actually encouraged clan fragmentation: the newly devised 4.5 clan formula was the conference’s most consequential outcome, a result the Courts and nationalists despised. The institutionalisation of the formula was a disappointment for Islamists who sought a different view of political community, the *ummah*, in post-war Somalia.

Perceptions of an Islamist “victory” at Arta, however, were difficult to shake. The nomination of

⁵⁷⁴ Interview with Abdirahman Hirabe in Djibouti, November 2017.

⁵⁷⁵ Official address at Arta’s opening ceremony, May 2000, RTD, Djibouti.

⁵⁷⁶ Interview with Mohamed Ahmed (Gandhi) in Nairobi, June 2018.

Abdiqassim Salaad and his subsequent instalment as TNG president seemed to confirm suspicions of the religious “undertones” of the conference. In the immediate aftermath of the conference, an encounter between (Ethiopian) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and (Kenyan) President Daniel Arap Moi highlighted anxiety about the outcomes of Arta. Suspecting that Djiboutian officials and the new Somali leadership were “in bed” with Islamists, Meles advised his Kenyan counterpart not to trust Salaad and his allies. According to UN official David Stephen, who was party to this discussion, “the Ethiopians were extremely worried about the outcome. Meles told Moi, don’t trust these boys, they are all in bed with Islamic militants.”⁵⁷⁷ The Americans were also concerned about Salaad’s affiliation with the Islamist party Al Islah.⁵⁷⁸ Although there was no evidence linking the new president to radical Islamist elements or to label the Courts as foreign-backed jihadis, the perception of a rising religious tide provoked deep anxieties in the region.⁵⁷⁹

The intention of launching the IGAD-led Mbagathi process was partly to counter this perceived threat. The various Islamist groups in Somalia were not invited to the talks, with the notable exception of Ahl Al-Sunna Wa Jama’a (AASWJ). A longtime ally of the Ethiopian government, the movement was included to counter the influence of other Islamist parties. Politically and territorially confined in western Somalia, AASWJ played a prominent role in the Kenya conference, although it was marginal on the national political scene. Anyone else who was suspected of entertaining the faintest ties to the Courts or other Islamist groups was shunned, resulting in widespread complaints among participants that the conference was tarnishing the authority of Islamic scholars. Referring to this as an attack on Somali tradition and undermining Somali ownership of the Mbagathi conference, some delegates requested the Facilitation Committee’s intervention.⁵⁸⁰ Such protests mattered little: when the process of selecting MPs to the transitional committees began, anyone perceived to be an Islamist was blocked immediately.⁵⁸¹ Although many Somalis attributed this to Ethiopian interference, in reality it was the armed factions aligned with Ethiopia who would, by proxy, veto the nominations of Islamist candidates, even those that had clan leaders’ support.⁵⁸²

Without the formal inclusion of Islamists in the Mbagathi process, it is difficult to know whether they would have offered an alternative to the clan formula’s configuration or vision of Somali national

⁵⁷⁷ Interview with David Stephen in Cambridge, October 2018.

⁵⁷⁸ Interview with Abdirahman Baadiyow in Nairobi, June 2018.

⁵⁷⁹ Barnes, Hassan 2007.

⁵⁸⁰ See Civil Society Position Paper, 18 December 2002, IGAD archives.

⁵⁸¹ Interviews with Mohamed Abdi Affey and Abdurahman Abdullahi Baadiyow in Nairobi, May and June 2018, respectively.

⁵⁸² Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

community. An “*ummah*” as the basis of inclusive nationhood would probably have been a bridge too far, but some type of alliance with nationalists and civil society members to defeat the warlords and the growing influence of clan blocs might well have emerged. Regional intervention prevented this, however, and seemed to stop the Islamists’ momentum in its tracks.

Thus, when the clan-based Transitional Federal Parliament elected Abdullahi Yusuf as president (replacing the “pro-Islamist” Abdiqassim Salaad) towards the end of 2004, the Mbagathi process appeared more decisive than its Djiboutian predecessor. Well resourced by the wider international community, Mbagathi had been much more visible on the global stage than Arta, leading to perceptions that it was “too big to fail”.⁵⁸³ The alignment of all these factors was expected to ensure its success. In contrast to this perception, the Arta-formed Transitional National Government faced regional isolation, lukewarm reception from internationals and a persistent lack of funding. Despite its comparative advantage, Mbagathi’s solutions would prove illusory, violently backfiring on its main architects.

Because the excluded Islamists surged in popularity at home, a smooth return of Yusuf’s transitional government to Mogadishu was impeded. More than six months after its inauguration, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was still seated in Nairobi, causing the “protocol nightmare of having two sovereign governments share a capital”,⁵⁸⁴ in the words of Kenya’s chief negotiator. Eventually, the TFG would settle on Jowhar, 90km outside Mogadishu, as temporary capital in 2005. Barred from participating in Mbagathi, the Islamists coalesced around the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had no intention of accepting the transitional government. In 2005 Abdullahi Yusuf approached the African Union to send thousands of peace-keeping troops to ensure his government’s security,⁵⁸⁵ a move that proved logistically difficult and further antagonised Mogadishu’s warlords, who were steadfast in their refusal to disarm, as they were faced with the growing UIC. Between 2005 and 2006, the situation deteriorated dramatically as the UIC crushed their warlord enemies militarily and vowed to unite all Somali brothers and sisters through Islam. Within six months, most of the Somali territory was under its control.⁵⁸⁶ The very outcome the warlords and their international backers claimed they wished to avert was now reality: Islamists had become the dominant political force in the country. Mohamed Abdi Affey, who led the pre-Mbagathi IGAD mapping mission of Somali political actors in April 2002 (which excluded the Courts), acknowledged this: “We as Kenya were worried when the Courts took over. It was partly our fault. The

⁵⁸³ Interview with Mohamed Nur Garibaldi in Nairobi, June 2018.

⁵⁸⁴ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Nairobi, May 2018.

⁵⁸⁵ IGAD Communiqué, 2005, IGAD archives.

⁵⁸⁶ Barnes, Hassan 2007.

conference took the warlords and politicians out of Somalia for two years.”⁵⁸⁷

What remained of hopes to politically unify Somalia again was dashed by the December 2006 Ethiopian invasion that aimed to decimate the Courts. US-backed Ethiopian forces’ invasion of Mogadishu was condoned internationally in the name of anti-terrorism; it also represented a type of regional engagement that relied on military interventions in Somalia by its historical rival. Ethiopia’s decision to occupy Mogadishu generated outrage and galvanised jihadist forces to lead the fight against the invaders.⁵⁸⁸ A faction of the once-moderate UIC, Al Shabab, began a ruthless insurgency that killed Ethiopians, other foreign occupiers and Somalis supporting Abdullahi Yusuf’s TFG. Realising the quagmire in which it found itself, the Ethiopian government sought to extract itself by seeking a deal between the Mbagathi-brokered TFG and “moderate” remnants of the UIC. In 2008 another conference held in Djibouti offered a political settlement between the two groups, expanding it to include the TFG with some Islamists so that Ethiopian troops could withdraw from Somalia without losing face.⁵⁸⁹

The 2008 Djibouti meeting reverted back to focusing exclusively on “core” groups: a noticeably secular government and its Islamist opponents. No civil society actors were invited to partake in the new initiative or any other regional conferences beyond Arta and Mbagathi, bringing the “golden age” of civil society participation in Somali peace negotiations to a premature close. Soon after, Abdullahi Yusuf was replaced by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, a former chairman of the UIC, as president of yet another transnational government. Meanwhile, the shrinking space for civil society after 2006 did not lead to the demise of the influential but still controversial clan formula. Exactly twenty years after it was introduced in Arta, the formula maintains an outsized stature in Somali politics and society, particularly in current thinking about rights, and inter- and intra-clan relationships.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed an array of ideas advanced and (sometimes) rejected at the Arta and Mbagathi peace conferences, where the 4.5 clan formula was dominant but not hegemonic. The opening of deliberative spaces to incorporate diverse Somali actors allowed both ideologies whose time seemed to have passed (nationalism) and those on the ascendancy (Islamism) to shape discussions about rights, representation

⁵⁸⁷ Interview with Mohamed Abdi Affey in Doha, October 2017.

⁵⁸⁸ Interview with Abdirahman Mohamed (Baadiyow) in Nairobi, June 2018.

⁵⁸⁹ Interview with Sally Healy in London, February 2018.

and the nature of the political community. Akin to Somali diaspora representatives and women, nationalists and Islamists of various backgrounds sought to reform or sink the clan formula. Overt displays of ideological resistance to clans as the primary political community attested to the utility of nationalist and Islamist arguments for broader sections of Somali society. To many Somalis, these ideas mattered – nuancing and enriching transnational debates on various conceptions of political community, not least when it came to the pivotal questions of Somaliland, federalism, constitutionalism and the status of Mogadishu. Both Islamists and nationalists interacted dynamically and pragmatically with clan realities, but my analysis points to more than just the transactional jockeying and negotiating with which so many analysts equate Somali politics.⁵⁹⁰

Deeply resonant Somali discourses, like nationalism and Islamism(s), lend unique insights to evolving notions of political community. One such lesson is that Arta and Mbagathi were not just about change, but also about continuities in Somali thinking about core questions like citizenship and imaginings of the nation that unambiguously bear the imprint of the modernising paradigm dominant prior to the civil war. Seeing the resurgence of nationalism and the ascendancy of Islamism in this light may help to explain why these peace processes became spaces where those cherished ideas re-emerged in reworked and forceful ways. The introduction of the 4.5 clan formula paved the way for a Somali version of collective political rights and claims-making. Yet, with the spread of the clan as the fundamental basis of state and nation rebuilding came a new use for nationalist discourses and Islamism, both appealing to the ideal of a Third Republic that could transcend clan cleavages.

The developments in Arta and Mbagathi suggest that convergence between these world-views is not only possible but also pragmatic. In the face of unique post-war challenges that overwhelm a society undergoing rapid change, Islamists and nationalists affirmed both the continued relevance of Somalia's historical political culture and the need to build coalitions across the ideological divide. They each, in their own way, provided compelling visions of how to salvage useful old building-blocks from the rubble of the war to rebuild a Somali political community.

Pan-Somali discourses resurfaced in crucial debates in Arta and Mbagathi, specifically Somaliland's retreat from the 1960 union and implementation of the federalist project. Nationalism was viewed as necessary to combat further fragmentation of the pre-1991 Somali nation, which was threatened by institutionalising the clan formula and by the breakaway of Somaliland. The case for bringing back a

⁵⁹⁰ De Waal 2015.

familiar nationalist platform to confront threats of further balkanisation resonated with many delegates at the conferences and with Somalis following them back home and in the diaspora. Moreover, creating a space for nationalist views lent a certain “ownership” to discussions and agendas in the peace talks – important to Somalis, regional mediators and international donors. Islamism also offered an alternative, Somalia-wide vision for state and society within and outside the peace processes despite unapologetic attempts to curb the influence of Somali Islamists at Mbagathi. The Islamic Courts’ position on the status of Mogadishu targeted the armed militias as instigators of fragmentation and violence, which subsequently translated into the Islamic Courts’ alliance with the Arta-formed government.

These perspectives did not merely exist alongside one another. On the surface, the clan formula, Islamism and nationalism appeared to be on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. Each represented a distinct conception of an overarching political community. Adherents of each “camp” made powerful assertions to legitimacy: the nationalists from popular pan-Somali sentiments, the Islamists from the uncontested supremacy of Islam, and proponents of the clan formula from their “traditional” clan bases. Yet neither Arta nor Mbagathi were sites of ideological purity – quite the contrary. The existential and urgent nature of the questions facing delegates required pragmatism. This turned the peace processes into spaces where a cocktail of ideas was tested. With regard to Mogadishu’s status, among other issues an unexpected alliance formed between nationalists and Islamists. Relatedly, some self-described nationalists (“cosmopolitans”, in Gandhi’s terms) saw no contradiction in openly advocating clan rights. Traditional clan elders also routinely drew on nationalist rhetoric to strengthen their claims. Does this apparent instrumentalisation devalue the potency of ideas and ideologies? Perhaps not. The overlapping of ideas is testament to their value and deep historical resonance for Somali society as a whole.

The clan formula emerged as the most enduring in terms of shaping ordinary Somalis’ understanding of inclusive and representative political rights, yet not without making major gestures to nationalist symbols and ideas. Many delegates implicitly assumed that the formula would eventually (have to) assist in remaking the Somali nation predicated on ideas of “balance” between various Somali clan communities. In this view, reconfiguring the relationships between clans through representation, rights and power-sharing on the basis of the clan formula would resolve long-standing grievances and therefore build a firmer foundation for the reconstituted nation. As such, the formula was framed as producing equal citizenship in the long run because communal and ethnic differences were recognised, but such acknowledgments would not diminish a citizen’s ultimate belonging to the nation. Such a synthesis shows how these unique peace conferences brought together various ideological forces, compelling the exchange of ideas, challenging participants to reconcile differences on what constitutes a Somali political

community and charting out who belonged to them. The conclusion chapter will now take stock of my central findings and explore their implications beyond Somalia.

CHAPTER 8: Conclusion

How do inclusion and representation modalities in peace processes reshape understandings of political community, and vice versa? This dissertation has addressed this question by examining how the politics of peace intersect with long-standing struggles over citizenship, claims-making and participation in a conflict-torn polity. Peace-making has traditionally concentrated on crafting political settlements between the main parties of a conflict – stopping the fighting at (almost) any cost. The liberal agenda of the 1990s and early 2000s expanded these ambitions to include elections, economic restructuring and good governance. However, what remained largely out of sight, both as an end-goal of peace-building and as a method, was recrafting understandings of belonging to an overarching political community and the sentiments of affinity that are hugely important to ordinary citizens. What happens when the doors of peace talk venues are swung open and wide segments of civil society volunteer to formulate their own conceptions of individual and collective rights, and (trans)national political identity?

Because of the unprecedented decision to formally involve hundreds of unarmed actors and to broadcast proceedings live, the Arta and Mbagathi processes represent a critical juncture in the history of mediation in the Horn of Africa – and perhaps beyond. Ordinary people took considerable time and energy to discuss numerous subjects. They prioritised new and old understandings of *Somalinimo* as key to rebuilding war-torn Somalia: Somaliness as the basis of political unity. Therefore, one of the central aims of this thesis has been to account for change and continuities in imaginaries of political community in post-independence Somalia through the prism of peace processes, and how these have been shaped by the complex politics of inclusion.

This thesis examined a short but critical period in contemporary Somali history. The 2000–4 onset of the so-called Third Republic was dominated by unexpectedly dynamic peace processes that stimulated the formation of new political identities and brought new players into what became a wider (trans)national debate unique in post-independence history. I have argued that inclusive peace negotiations can emerge as sites for intensified resynthesising of political community. The Djiboutian and IGAD-led initiatives underscore how the membership, content and modes of deliberation of a political community can be altered or, in some respects, explicitly preserved or resuscitated in a bid to create a participatory basis for durable peace.

This conclusion summarises the main findings by focusing on three main elements in the attempt to remake political community: the redefining of its purpose and foundations (*what*); the reorganising of its membership (*who*); and the interplay between local and international actors in the rekindling of political action in accordance with the long-standing Somali tradition of balancing (*how*). In what follows, I put the insights gained from this research project in broader comparative perspective and emphasise the lasting impact of the 4.5 clan formula in practices of citizenship, identity politics and constitutional reimagining in the Somali territories today. I hope that tracing such implications is useful to a wider community of scholars and policy-makers in Africa and beyond.

Bring the Clan Back In: Enduring Legacies and Rival Conceptions of Political Community

On my field visit to Djibouti in November 2017 I encountered a Somali government official visiting the state-owned RTD media conglomerate to consult hundreds of hours of footage covering Arta conference debates. The film archives, which I also analysed as part of this research, are impressive. The official was particularly interested in accessing deliberations by the Somali Arbitration Committee – the influential conference body that applied the 4.5 clan formula. The impetus for this mission was a dispute between two sub-clans in the Banaadir region over parliamentary quotas. To break the deadlock, which threatened to escalate into violent clashes, the federal government consulted the original quotas agreed at Arta. Villa Somalia’s⁵⁹¹ decision is a poignant example of contemporary uses of the clan formula. The formula’s continued saliency in power-sharing, the exercise of collective rights and dispute resolution had been unexpected at Arta; it has morphed from its origins as a framework to manage the participation of civil society actors into the central organising principle of Somali politics.

Today, the 4.5 clan formula is not (yet) a constitutional principle. However, the 2016 parliamentary elections and subsequent presidential elections in 2017 drew on the clan formula in a manner identical to how the Arta national assembly and the Mbagathi federal parliament were composed in the early 2000s. Despite growing international pressures for a “one-person, one-vote” model, Mogadishu today is abuzz with political parties that, while clamouring for elections through universal suffrage, insist on using the formula to bolster their claims of being clan-inclusive to appeal to diverse constituents. For better or worse, the most visible legacy of the Arta and Mbagathi processes remains the broad embrace of the clan formula, as well as the deepening of group rights and a reaffirmation of power hierarchies between clans that came

⁵⁹¹ Official seat of government in Mogadishu since 1960.

with the formula. One observer of the Mbagathi conference noted that mechanisms that privilege clan rights risk “undoing the work of a century of national integration”.⁵⁹² Framed in terms of the concerns of this study, the discourse of clan rights potentially reversed a century of centring the Somali nation as the (pre-eminent or only) political community. Indeed, the thesis pointed to a shrinking space for the individual citizen as a political subject in the face of formidable group claims-making.

As Chapter 2 documented, the question of political community (re)formation is essential to Somali political history – in my reading, perhaps *the* central dynamic of the last 150 years or so. The making and rekindling of Somali political identity was, and continues to be (like in many other places around the world), a drawn-out process in which bottom-up dynamics of affirming social cohesion, cultural affinity and religious identity have sometimes been ruptured and, at other times, reinforced by top-down forces such as imperialist projects, colonial divide-and-rule and nationalist state-building.⁵⁹³ In a highly decentralised society with a stubbornly egalitarian political culture, pan-Somalism is the result of a common language and shared history but also of the irredentist dreams of Greater Somalia and post-independence education policies.⁵⁹⁴ The Arta and Mbagathi processes were, in that sense, recent episodes of longer historical trajectories of nation-making, but they strove to rethink the Somali nation through dialogue and more peaceful contest in the form of proposing the clan as a fundamental building-block of political community.

This articulation of political community was backgrounded by the violent dissolution of the Somali state and the fragmentation of the nation (e.g. the emotive subject of Somaliland’s secession) in the late 1980s. In its early post-independence years, the state had attempted to sustain the cohesion of a Somali political community through expansive nationalism. Yet the apparent inclusion of those outside its borders was mirrored by internal exclusion, as discussed in Chapter 2. A reimagining of the Somali nation could therefore no longer depend on a top-down process led by the state alone. One contribution of this thesis has been to emphasise the pivotal role of highly diverse civil society groups that forced a recognition of the identities of social formations historically considered to be on the margins of the political community.

That a reworked concept of political community would be articulated in terms of the 4.5 clan formula reveals a great deal about the psychological transformations wrought by the collapse of the post-independence nation-building project, with its focus on territorial reunification/expansion and its neglect

⁵⁹² Letter by Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed, 31 January 2003, IGAD archives.

⁵⁹³ Hunter 2016, pp.6–10.

⁵⁹⁴ Zoppi 2015, pp.63–4.

of the internal diversity of the political community – echoing what Keller termed a “crisis of citizenship” in African states.⁵⁹⁵ Initially, few expected that Arta and Mbagathi would alter fundamental understandings of Somali nationhood. Yet, conference participants shared the view that a re-examination of pre-1991 discourses and norms of political community was necessary, so a viable state might be reforged after a decade of violent conflict.

The Somali peace processes illustrate the entanglements between immediate concerns of rebuilding the state and rethinking the cornerstones of nationhood. This thesis found that precepts of inclusion and representation in peace-making are intertwined closely with the struggle over redrawing the foundations of a political community affected by civil war. These processes, as the Somali case demonstrates, can be mutually constitutive and reinforcing. With the participation of diverse civil society through the clan formula, a deepening of inclusion modalities became integral to acquiring political rights. The peace conferences were sites for the construction and contestation of variant articulations of political community – the most significant of which became the “institutionalisation” of clans.

The endurance of this new form of political community-cum-inclusion modality, supposedly a temporary fix through a formulaic approach to traditional clan structures, is astounding. It is especially surprising given the highly volatile nature of Somali politics, which has seen extraordinary turnover in politicians, ideologies and armed factions since 1991. Chapter 3 suggests an explanation: as an approach to reorganising political community and access to power, the 4.5 clan formula carries a distinct Somali imprint, rooted in historical narratives and developed as a balancing response to the long-standing problem of uneven access to political citizenship. It was adopted as a “homegrown” approach to remedy decades-long exclusion and clan grievances that manifested in the civil war of the 1990s. The appeal of the clan formula’s moral mission to rebalance the Somali equilibrium should not be underestimated, despite daily criticisms by Somalis themselves during the Arta and Mbagathi conferences. The clan structure lies at the core of how clans and sub-clans relate (or assumed they *should* relate) to one another in the public and private realm, merging Ekeh’s “two publics”, discussed extensively in the Introduction. The Somali Third Republic seemed like a ripe opportunity to reforge social and political covenants. However, the notion of group rights, while ostensibly introduced to resuscitate the Somali nation state, stoked profound fears about the future of Somali nationhood. Much like events of the war, I have shown that the peace negotiations offered a drastic revisioning of how Somalis saw and identified themselves.

⁵⁹⁵ Keller 2014.

The built-in contradictions in the clan formula as the cornerstone of political community still generate controversy in Somalia today, as they did twenty years ago. The most scathing critique came from Somali women, especially in the Arta conference (Chapter 5). The Sixth Clan project encapsulated women's resistance against structures dictated by clan elders and patriarchs. Yet women delegates did not reject group rights as such, contending that women should be considered their own distinctive *community*. This nuance is vital: sensing the train of clan-framed politics could not be stopped, women decided to jump aboard and obtain political recognition as a separate and equal clan. At the same time, women's efforts within their own sub-clans involved maximising gender quotas. In Chapter 5, I argued that the peace processes in the early 2000s were pivotal moments whereby Somali women, through different strategies, insisted that the reinvented political community had to recognise and support their political agency, or risk being illegitimate.

The discourse of clan as the cornerstone of a revived Somali nation competed with alternative conceptions of political community, as it had done previously in Somali history (Chapter 2). But that competition was more complex than outright juxtaposition: for example, in Chapter 7 I showed how clan-framed claims were not seen by all as being at odds with overarching nationalist and Islamist visions. These frameworks of citizenship and the wider (trans)national political community sometimes collaborated pragmatically but clashed at other intervals. Such complexity suggests there is room for compromise: one can both identify with the broader Somali nation and still ask for rights through clans and other forms of community. Advocating for communal rights does not necessarily undercut Somali nationhood; it merely reconfigures the relationship to correspond to new times and indeed new challenges. Combining both may be a notable feature of Somali political identity in the aftermath of brutal and protracted civil conflicts that gravely tested old ideas of nation and *ummah*.

The clan formula was inadequate in fully addressing the multifaceted and changing nature of Somalia's conflicts. In retrospect, proposals that a clan arrangement alone could solve these needs appear woefully simplistic. Even at Arta, clan formula advocates could not incorporate the full range of interests and visions of women, Islamists or diaspora groups. Thus, despite its ubiquity as a language of peace-making, the 4.5 clan formula became an alternative (somewhat less violent) means for Somali clans to make claims but did not dissolve the ruthless, ongoing contest for power. Contrary to what its architects originally envisioned, the formula did not consolidate wider reconciliation and peace.

However, rethinking the purpose and foundations of political community led a range of unarmed actors to assert themselves in new ways. Civil society participants believed that peace-making should not

primarily involve discussing the dominance of the clan over the nation, or vice versa, but rather concentrate on broadening that very community in order to give it greater grass-roots support. As they fell outside the parameters of dominant clan structures, women, “minorities” and diaspora Somalis endeavoured to broaden the scope of their political rights and the roles they could play in giving shape to a radically inclusive political dispensation. In Chapters 4 and 5, I argued that conference delegates’ highlighting of experiences of political repression, gender exclusion and displacement was instrumental in discursively integrating what were historically outgroups into the reconstituted political community.

Political community and the question of belonging were, and remain, continuously in flux, ever “unfinished projects” in Isin’s reflections on political subjectivity after decolonisation.⁵⁹⁶ The Arta and Mbagathi processes showed that such changes were not limited to an internal reconfiguration of relations within a territorially bound community; the peace negotiations produced new claims of belonging in an age of globalisation. The diaspora’s demands for political rights and a say in the remaking of Somali political community underlines that the latter is not confined to rigid legal demarcations and borders. Chapter 6 highlighted how diaspora Somalis elevated debates about political community to transnational levels. If, according to the 4.5 formula, clan membership overrode other modes of political belonging, then diaspora voices seized on this logic to posit that no Somali is ever outside the clan framework, even if these Somalis are formally citizens of sovereign countries like Ethiopia, Djibouti or Canada.

The fraught question of how to give appropriate voice in peace processes to those outside the territory is not a uniquely Somali puzzle. When four years of negotiations between parties to the Colombian civil war concluded in 2016, the Havana Accord was applauded as inclusive in part because it reached out to Colombians far from the motherland. Diaspora groups like the Truth, Memory and Reconciliation Commission of Colombian Women, with hubs in Barcelona, Stockholm and Brussels, appealed for representation on behalf of war victims in the negotiations. Oppositional groups, however, charged the Commission and other diaspora with “abandoning the country in difficult times and later wanting to participate from the alleged ease provided by living in exile”.⁵⁹⁷ Some of these resentments echo those discussed here. Crucially, the Somali diaspora can claim inclusion because of the transnational nature of clan membership, a form of participation that aligns with how many Somalis view their political community. My thesis findings contribute to debates about how conflict-afflicted societies can redefine themselves and the identity cleavages that proved so destabilising. Given the magnitude of global refugee flows, the question of whether diasporas are mere outsiders, or should keep the states they fled as their

⁵⁹⁶ Isin 2012.

⁵⁹⁷ Jaramillo 2019, p.58.

prime political referent,⁵⁹⁸ will only become more pressing.

Remaking Citizenship in Peace Processes in Comparative Perspective

The central theme of this dissertation has been a political community remoulding its own constitution: who belongs to it and who does not; how those recognised as members are organised; with which rights and responsibilities they are endowed; and how they can act politically. The question of membership and its organisation is, in the modern era, most importantly that of citizenship of sovereign nation states.⁵⁹⁹ The process of creating a citizenry – described in Weber’s illustrious classic *Peasants into Frenchmen*⁶⁰⁰ – is almost always approached as a generation-long, top-down effort by bureaucratic and political elites that generates considerable resistance. As discussed in Chapter 2, the encouragement of a fervent national consciousness and patriotic loyalty were key objectives of the post-independence leaderships in Somalia too, including the military government of Siad Barre and its initiatives to standardise the Somali script, reclaim the Ogaden from Ethiopia and bring urban education to the peasantry. Yet, this thesis has tried to go beyond the well-trodden path of nation-building as violent or assimilationist by default, as so much of the historical literature on the European (or East Asian) experience emphasises.⁶⁰¹ As I have extensively evidenced, the Arta and Mbagathi conferences demonstrated that a nation can rethink its membership in much more organic ways, including by flipping the traditional division of roles: during the peace processes of the early 2000s, Somalis reclaimed their citizenship and began redefining what this entailed themselves. My findings about the Somali peace processes advance current thinking about evolving discourses, norms and practices of membership of political community in Africa and elsewhere.

Africanists are indeed increasingly preoccupied with (re-)examining citizenship. Influenced by a variety of disciplinary and methodological perspectives, the study of African citizenship(s) reveals a mosaic of individual and collective experiences of claims-making.⁶⁰² Conflict prominently features in the scholarship on political community and citizenship in Africa, and with good reason.⁶⁰³ As discussed in Chapter 2 and in the empirical chapters unpacking Somali narratives of the conflict, the civil war in Somalia had many causes, but unequal citizenship was extremely important. Elsewhere in Africa, similar problems have been diagnosed. Famously noting a “citizen deficit”, Adebawo warned of escalating

⁵⁹⁸ Safran 1991.

⁵⁹⁹ Marshall, Bottomore 1992.

⁶⁰⁰ Weber 1976.

⁶⁰¹ Jansen 2002.

⁶⁰² Dorman, Hammett, Nugent 2007.

⁶⁰³ E.g., Vlassenroot 2002; Idris 2012.

contradictions in states like Nigeria over how to reconcile indigenous rights with citizenship rights.⁶⁰⁴ Côte d'Ivoire typifies how distorted historical experiences of citizenship and uneven access to legal status can result in a full-blown civil war.⁶⁰⁵ The connections between insurgency and the citizenship “question” stimulated Reno to ask, “Are Africa’s rebels interested in having their own citizens?” He explores the processes behind liberation struggles in Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of Congo as insurgents engaged in citizen-creation-like projects that foreshadowed how they would advance new concepts of political community once in power.⁶⁰⁶

As interest in violence and the reformulation of communal claims-making grows in African Studies, I find that the citizenship question in conflict constitutes only one side of the coin. To understand how citizenship evolves in African societies dealing with recent or ongoing violence, the other side of the coin is how a redefining of political community and its membership can happen serenely and bring peace to a war-torn society.

Despite growing attention to citizenship struggles, a clear conceptual relationship between peace and norms around the membership of political community in Africa remains under-theorised. This leaves us with the challenge of understanding citizenship in the nebulous *no war; no peace* territory of “transition”. How peace-making influences citizenship in contexts where the state has withered before or during conflict is especially unexplored territory. The weakness, or complete absence, of the Somali state in deliberations about the clan formula and its resultant institutions is therefore even more important. Attempts at (re)making the Somali nation, or at least vigorously questioning the very premise of nationhood, have occurred with the minimal presence of a state – barring the late participation by the Puntland administration and the involvement of a demoralised TNG in Mbagathi.

This Somali experience stands in sharp contrast to how nearby states have focused their scarce resources on the dual task of crafting citizens and forging nationhood. Consider the Eritrean case. Asmara’s virtual obsession with citizen- and nation-creation projects is evident domestically⁶⁰⁷ but extends far beyond its borders. The Eritrean state envelopes *all* Eritreans, including those abroad, in its definition of citizenship and taxes its diaspora as a matter of patriotic duty; the state itself justifies its own existence as serving the self-expression of Eritreans, regardless of the cost. As Bernal explains, Eritrea’s cultivation of “diasporic

⁶⁰⁴ Adebawo 2009.

⁶⁰⁵ Bah 2010.

⁶⁰⁶ Reno 2007.

⁶⁰⁷ Tronvoll 1998.

citizens” has been necessary for the legitimacy and survival of Asmara’s ruling elites.⁶⁰⁸ Post-Arta Somalia is starkly different. Somali contestations of citizenship and nationhood (including its own form of diasporic citizenship) operate without a powerful state; the government is often more of a bystander than an active participant in these processes. The Arta and Mbagathi initiatives pointed to the ability of a wide range of civil society groups to (re)make themselves as the body politic in a new “republic”. Such a bottom-up remaking included an unbounded imagining of nation, of which the Somali diaspora forms an integral part.

Studying the Arta and Mbagathi processes was also instructive because of the insights it yielded regarding the long-standing tensions between citizenship as mediating the relationship between individuals and the state and more collective understandings positing that groups are the primary members of a political community. Post-colonial African states wrestled with the right balance between individual or communal citizenship, but mostly came down in favour of the former in their constitutions. This included Somalia, as discussed in Chapter 2, which joined the resolutely modernist approach to nation-building and ditched all clan language under Siad Barre. Yet, in recent decades the pendulum has been swinging back, with conflict-ridden African states increasingly recognising other forms of authority and belonging and granting considerable communal citizenship rights through (usually) “traditional” sultanates, tribes or indeed clans. In several instances, however, this did not solve conflict but created new ones. Uganda’s turn towards “hybrid governance” in re-empowering traditional kingdoms generated new antagonisms,⁶⁰⁹ and the vaunted return of “Native Administration” in rural Sudan⁶¹⁰ has been politically manipulated to the extent of contributing significantly to the war in Darfur.⁶¹¹

The Somali case discussed here nuances some of these debates. On the one hand, the “Third Republic” generated peaceful change in shifting the basis of membership of the political community. In contrast to the universal, individual-centric constitutional framework of the early post-independence period, the peace negotiations ushered in decidedly culturalist definitions that privilege clans as the gateway to citizenship. Supporters of this group rights approach drew on memories of indigeneity and authenticity as essential components of *Somalinimo* – the clan as the timeless intermediary between individual and nation. Chapter 4 illustrated how several clans made concerted efforts to assemble unique territorial contentions and narratives of origins to reinforce their Somaliness. This particular conceptualisation even

⁶⁰⁸ Bernal 2014.

⁶⁰⁹ Goodfellow, Lindemann 2013.

⁶¹⁰ Elhussein 1989.

⁶¹¹ Bassil 2015.

included the warlords; the clan formula paradoxically reinforced their image as “clan protectors” acting in the interest of newly empowered political communities.

On the other hand, Chapters 3 and 7 explored the continued resonance of the 1960 constitution and its universal notion of citizenship, especially for Somalia’s “minorities”, who had historically remained excluded and feared that the new clan politics would perpetuate their predicament. Their critique rivalled the 4.5 formula and its notions of descent and belonging to clans as the primary means to access citizenship. Nationalists and Islamists too were sceptical about the prospect that being a citizen would only be possible through membership of clan in the “Third Republic”. They dealt with clans pragmatically, but also pushed for a much clearer recognition by the conference documents of the overarching political community, not clans, as supreme in nature.

These struggles – ongoing and difficult, but mostly peaceful and liberating – emphasise that questions of membership of political community should be given greater attention in peace-building efforts. Of course, not all African peace processes (or scholars) are silent on the nexus between citizenship and peace negotiations. In fact, some agreements are explicit in promoting citizenship reforms, recognising their centrality to war and peace.⁶¹² Yet, when this happens, as in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, agreements tend to focus almost exclusively on legal reforms and constitutional mechanisms pertaining to the acquisition of citizenship and corresponding rights.⁶¹³ As such, they tend to be necessary but socially narrow prescriptions that cannot fully take into account multi-layered questions of identity, representation and political belonging loaded with ambiguity and nuance. The Arta and Mbagathi discussions provided an altogether different path, wrestling with citizenship dilemmas in a more holistic, if imperfect, fashion. They show that peace processes can be moments of political creativity, inspiring new meanings of citizenship and new structures that govern access to political rights.

Lahra Smith’s work, as mentioned in the Introduction, has usefully tried to surmount the tensions between individual versus collective bases for citizenship. It has sought to focus on citizenship practice, rather than rigid legalism, as a way of exploring how peace can be built in war-torn African states.⁶¹⁴ Writing about Ethiopia and its introduction of the controversial 1995 constitution, Smith developed the concept of “meaningful citizenship”: she stresses how ethnic and gender-based claims-making can be understood as part of the wider processes of democratisation, empowering both constitutionally recognised communities

⁶¹² Abdulbari 2011.

⁶¹³ Bah 2010.

⁶¹⁴ Smith 2013.

(“nations, nationalities and peoples”, in post-1991 Ethiopian parlance) and individual citizens. Much has changed in Ethiopia since Smith’s study, as a surge in divisions and violence fuelled by ethnic-framed contestations for access to the locus of power since 2015 has caused ancient grievances to intersect with contemporary citizenship conundrums.⁶¹⁵ Yet her underlying argument still stands: the process of citizenship expansion at local level can lead to a reappraisal of new forms of claims-making in ways that studying formal “traditional” institutions cannot.

These insights are useful in re-evaluating relations between states and their citizens in understudied spheres where consequential exchanges take place – whether local villages or, indeed, peace negotiations. Moreover, “meaningful citizenship” was also very much what some of Somalia’s most marginalised people sought at Arta and Mbagathi, both as legal status and political practice, as tackled in Chapters 4 to 7. The evidence assembled underlines the double-edged sword of peace-making. Although a creator of spaces of possibility for some, this thesis lamented how these same processes still restricted the attainment of full political rights for all too many Somalis who were reproduced as “minorities” in the remade political community. The peace agreements in the Balkans of the 1990s showed that inclusion of minority rights is often seen by outsiders as a key step in resolving conflict; yet, such reforms are only beneficial when adequate political and civil society support to relevant institutions is established to implement the provisions. Formal reference to ethnic problems or minority rights alone is insufficient.⁶¹⁶ Future research should further examine how minorities navigate peace negotiations⁶¹⁷ and how citizenship and belonging can indeed be made “meaningful”, legally and practically, in rapidly changing and institutionally fragile contexts such as Somalia’s.

The New Body Politic: Civil Society and the Contestation of Political Community

In early 2000 the pre-Arta conference meetings formed the backdrop to the momentous announcement by unarmed Somalis of various backgrounds that their war-fatigued country was inaugurating its “Third Republic”. That proclamation, to “put peace into the hands of the people”, encapsulated the hopes of ordinary Somalis. As this thesis has shown, who, precisely, constituted “(the) people” was not, and still has not been, fully resolved. However, analysing this question has been incisive in considering how dialogue might lead to a more peaceful redrawing of the political community.

⁶¹⁵ Záhořík 2017.

⁶¹⁶ Reuter 2012; also see Reyntjens 2000, Marsden 2001.

⁶¹⁷ Wise 2018.

Inclusion and representation became the political language that unified claims by disparate sections of Somali society. The objective was to maximise direct access to the peace talks, but also to represent those outside the conference halls. Yet, to provide some structure to what risked becoming a cacophony, delegates were collectively organised: the question of who is a Somali citizen (or who ought to be remade into a citizen of the “Third Republic”) was primarily answered by the groups that succeeded in getting themselves well represented in the negotiations. Thus, group rights became the dominant interpretation of the right to have a say over peace. The clan formula determined which Somali clans and sub-clans entered the negotiations, and what their corresponding rights were, such as delegation size and subsequent quotas in transitional parliaments. These modalities of inclusion underpinned the making and unmaking of citizens: visibility on the (trans)national stages of the peace processes was tantamount to being *recognised* as an integral part of the Somali body politic, a member of the nation.

Central to this process of redefining political community, internally and externally, was “civil society”: an amorphous category that was said to consist of the “rightful representatives” of the nation, including both those connected to Somali tradition (elders, religious leaders, ...) and newly empowered actors (women, diaspora representatives, etc.). At Arta, calls for a return to civility after years of brutal violence helped to turn these “representatives of the people” into prominent players with considerable moral authority. This conception of civil society was tied to the idea that it embodied the popular will, a political alternative to warlord stratagems. Civil society was an all-encompassing category of unarmed Somalis symbolising (the hope for) civility. While such stylised narratives were belied by the alignment of some civil society actors with armed factions, the binary helped to create a distinct image of Arta as “the people’s conference”, able to provide maximum space for “traditional” (and civil) Somali ideas about representation and rights. The newfound influence of Somali civil society in the negotiations drew strength from international tropes about civil society as a peace-maker,⁶¹⁸ but also from the fact that these narratives were placed at the heart of the Arta process by the organisers and still reverberated in the Mbagathi conference two years later.

My interest in understanding how various social groups make sense of their “situated” experiences – to use the feminist dictum – and how they organise, compelled me to investigate how non-state actors positioned themselves during the Arta and Mbagathi conferences (as opposed to the traditional attention lavished on the state’s role⁶¹⁹). My in-depth archival work and extensive interviews demonstrate that it

⁶¹⁸ Kaldor 2013.

⁶¹⁹ Sadiq 2017.

was Somali civil society that was the architect of the 4.5 clan formula, as well as the key legitimising force once adopted. This formula was a monumental structural and cultural change that went beyond the usual, immediate concerns of peace processes. As I have shown, civil society in the Somali context refers to an inchoate and highly heterogeneous set of actors who should not be thought of as peripheral to war and peace. Somali civil society was core to the high politics of Arta and Mbagathi, formally and informally restructuring the political community and the ties that bind the citizenry together.

The thesis highlights how peace-making broadened the field for articulations of new visions of *Somalinimo*, historically the domain of the state. Traditionally marginalised segments of society like women (Chapter 5) and “minorities” were now actively involved in reworking Somali nationhood: they had an unprecedented forum, where they added to a diverse assembly of imaginings of the political community. Women, minorities and diaspora groups (Chapter 6) emphasised their role as integral components of a Somalia being rebuilt in the peace negotiations, contesting the archetypal embodiment of the nation in the form of the male pastoralist nomad. Thus, this thesis illuminates how civil society sometimes challenged prior notions of *Somalinimo*, even if at times it also reproduced and reinforced pre-civil war understandings of Somali nationhood.

As I argued in Chapter 4, Somali civil society is not seen as straightforwardly emancipatory by everyone. It remains a relatively new feature of the political landscape, a product of war and peace-building, and thus is inevitably dynamic, evolving and shaped by many contradictions. Somali civil society is perceived by many as somewhat hierarchical, elite-driven and divisive, perhaps inevitably so. Despite its insistence on participation, not everybody got to speak, and some of those who did speak were able to say more than others. The dominance of clan elders and mostly male “intellectuals” and Islamic scholars compelled me to examine the experiences and strategies of less powerful actors. One major shift has been civil society’s growing transnational character. This was evident in the high numbers of representatives of diaspora-based NGOs who fought tooth and nail to be represented in the peace processes. The incorporation of voices from North America, Europe and the Horn reinforced civil society at the conferences, as it challenged the historic dominance of traditional political elites, foreign “experts” and “violent specialists”⁶²⁰ whose power stemmed from their control of specific territories in pre-Arta peace mediations. The popular (and global diasporic) enthusiasm with which Arta was greeted was intimately related to innovations in who could speak on behalf of Somalis – underlining, once again, that representation matters.⁶²¹ Somalis not present or included at the conferences remained critical of civil

⁶²⁰ Bates, Greif, Singh 2002.

⁶²¹ Chauchard 2017.

society: its remaking of the political community was too radical for conservatives, and for many reformers Somali civil society was too moderate and oriented towards compromise.

Despite divisions over who exactly was to constitute the reshaped political community, outwardly civil society came to be co-terminous with “Somaliness”, an association that generated invaluable political capital. Insistent claims for the inclusion of a diverse range of actors were at the heart of reclaiming Somali “ownership” of the peace processes – a sensitive point for outsiders and insiders alike, which different civil society actors keenly exploited. Dissatisfaction over the (renewed) exclusion of important groups like the Islamists threatened the legitimacy of Mbagathi, undercutting reconciliatory goals in favour of futile attempts to turn warlords into statesmen (Chapters 4 and 7). This proved that it was not just Somalis who were able to leverage the language of inclusion to extract concessions from external actors, but the other way around too. To the dismay of many Somalis, the discourse of civil society was exploited by regional and international players who saw superficial participation as “rehabilitating the image” of the peace processes, in the words of an interviewee.⁶²²

This thesis therefore warns against romanticising civil society in peace negotiations. A key theme in several chapters has been the complex relationship between Somali ownership and the reality of external factors shaping war and peace in Somalia. The discourses underpinning civil society engagement in the conferences matched international norms and discourses about inclusion, and there is no question that (some) foreign funding helped pay for new entrants to Somali politics to participate. Many took advantage of this to fight for a more emancipatory politics, but concurrently Somali civil society replicated exclusionary practices and hierarchal relationships, with external encouragement. This also implies that Somali actors’ occasional succumbing to pressures to conform to international audiences should not be confused with an internalisation of the values that underpin these expectations.

These insights point to the fact that, more often than not, civil society occupies an ambiguous position in international peace-building. On the one hand, the participation of civil society is vital for broadening peace negotiations, and even legitimising them as far as donors are concerned; according to some, the engagement of diverse non-elites is a moral imperative.⁶²³ On the other hand, civil society is still largely considered peripheral, less important than the core actors said to be necessary for political settlements: “the real politics”, in De Waal’s (in)famous phrase.⁶²⁴ Adding civil society to negotiations is an expedient

⁶²² Interview with Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) in Djibouti, March 2018.

⁶²³ Nilsson 2012.

⁶²⁴ De Waal 2015.

tactic to make peace negotiations appear inclusive.

This study told a different story: one that acknowledges the complex role that civil society plays in addressing extraordinary challenges, among them political community-making. Civil society participation is neither merely performative nor inconsequential. Calls for civil society participation in African politics emerged as part of Huntington's "third wave of democratisation" in the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁶²⁵ Concepts and ideas developed in those years impacted how peace-building scholars and practitioners have operationalised it since. The view that civil society was a political realm clearly separate from the state was adapted from its origins in Enlightenment philosophy to Development Studies. The tendency to equate civil society participation with liberal Tocquevillian-like qualities (and thus a factor that would undoubtedly strengthen democratisation) fostered a torrent of research and cooperation programmes that sought to promote this force for "good". However, such simplifications miss the complexity and power hierarchies embedded within civil society, as was manifest at the Somali peace conferences. State-civil society relations were as complex, unpredictable and sometimes antagonistic in the African context as elsewhere.⁶²⁶

The formation of civil society is a feature of the post-1991 landscape in Somalia, its rise a response to the destruction of the central state apparatus; it is not a Madisonian attempt to "check" a Leviathan. Somali civil society filled a vacuum, especially in providing vital services to communities. As far as citizens in several urban centres were concerned, civil society acted as the primary provider of public goods in lieu of a state. Furthermore, I have offered examples throughout this thesis showing civil society groups producing illiberal conceptions of citizenship, departing from an emphasis on the individual's status and rights. The variety of claims in the name of civil society illustrate the complexity of the Arta and Mbagathi negotiations. Traditional clan elders, professionals and so-called "intellectuals" – mostly male – became new elites and presented themselves as vanguards speaking on behalf of the "will of the Somali people". The status of women, minorities and diaspora groups was precarious and often undermined by other unarmed actors; despite their inclusion at the conferences, these groups struggled to be fully accepted by civil society elites. An important part of my analysis was to illustrate the diversity of civil society and to show that it did not act as a cohesive unit. It consisted of heterogenous and often competing actors. The inclusion of civil society in these two Somali conferences therefore revealed the possibilities and limits presented by non-state groups in remaking political community. In view of this complexity, it is vital to position civil society more appropriately: to neither rush into dismissing it as a category of the powerless

⁶²⁵ Huntington 1993.

⁶²⁶ Migdal 1988.

and apolitical, nor to regard it as inherently liberal and inclusive.

The Clan Formula between Somali Aspirations, Regional Interests and Global Norms

A distinctive feature of the Arta and Mbagathi initiatives was their emphatic concern with *what* foundations the revived political community would have and with *who* was to be included in its membership but also *how* the political community and peace were to be rebuilt. The 4.5 clan formula became Somalia's answer, as it reshaped access to the body politic (clans became the cornerstone through which the nation was henceforth to be embodied and represented) and offered a peace-building method. Chapters 2 and 4 pointed out that the formula was simultaneously deeply innovative and embedded in older struggles for inclusion and markers of socio-political identity. As the clan formula paved the way for the unprecedented involvement of civil society, a goal at once moral and practical was pursued: to reflect Somali diversity in political life and to harness it to rebuild the state. The choice to do so via communal claims-making ignited wider discussions about the limitations of group rights (see above) and prompted strategic responses by women and diaspora delegates explored in Chapters 4 and 5. As the turn to inclusive peace intensifies globally, peace-builders everywhere are finding that the language of representation and participation is more easily spoken than equitably implemented. This is evident in the last decade in peace processes in Colombia,⁶²⁷ South Sudan,⁶²⁸ Yemen⁶²⁹ and Zimbabwe,⁶³⁰ where external mediators repeatedly tried to broaden the number of stakeholders heard and tackle deeper questions of reform, but they were largely unsuccessful. The Somali conferences examined here therefore remain unique in their approach to building peace by remaking the political community.

The peace initiatives highlighted the wide appeal of group rights as a politico-legal gateway to participation in the affairs of the political community. As demonstrated, these articulations emerged from the ground up, conveying new meanings and practices of citizenship, in all their promises and (in)coherences. This thesis has emphasised the role of Somali-led efforts to rethink the contours of political community as a cornerstone of building durable peace. This was a matter of both historical urgency – the politics and details of the Arta and Mbagathi conference remain under-documented despite their importance – and of reasserting African agency, a pressing task in a continent where external narratives,

⁶²⁷ Paarlberg-Kvam 2019.

⁶²⁸ De Vries, Schomerus 2017.

⁶²⁹ Elayah, Verkoren 2019.

⁶³⁰ Pring 2017.

flows of money and geopolitical initiatives have such a large footprint.⁶³¹ Yet, as also evident from the existing literature, not all peace processes create (or have an interest in creating) conditions and spaces for debate, reflection and ingenuity (Chapter 3). While I have argued that international peace-building can play a crucial role in propelling a necessary rethinking of political community, the evidence assembled in this dissertation points to the various ways in which international peace-making may seek to curtail or roll back the liberating norms and practices to which many aspire (Chapters 4, 5, and 7).

Indeed, the ability of outsiders to do so was described by countless participants at the conferences interviewed for this project. In the cacophony of storylines, claims and expectations about a rekindled political community, external discourses played a significant role in enabling or disabling “indigenous” ideas. The two peace processes operated within distinct geopolitical and normative contexts. Shifting regional interests and global discourses were critically important to different operationalisations of inclusion and balance. If at times international “friends” severely circumscribed the space for Somalis to reinvent institutions and build new coalitions,⁶³² foreign actors also played a role in reinforcing the creative thrust of the peace conference and strengthened the voices of those usually marginalised at such gatherings. This helps to account for the nature and varying degrees of inclusion at Arta and Mbagathi.

With external endorsement, the clan formula flourished as the dominant solution *and* method. For a host of mediators, the formula was perceived to be the indigenous – or “local”, as the preferred lexicon goes – Somali way of balancing competing interests, thus guaranteeing inclusivity. Djiboutian mediators were confident that the clan framework would ensure broad-based representation, preserve cohesion among Somalis and bring peace by restructuring the nature of negotiations. Furthermore, the formula had another, more radical, mission: it was, as the Djiboutians still believe, significant in curbing the power of warlords. The institutionalisation of clan identities as solution and method were replicated in the IGAD-hosted conference in Mbagathi. Yet Mbagathi’s conception of inclusion, while reinviting civil society and adopting the clan formula, diverted from that of Arta. In a post-9/11 context, the international community brought administrations like Puntland and a plethora of armed factions back into the process: an understanding of balance that many Somalis were not very enthused about, as evident from all empirical chapters.

“The international community” (never an uncontested term) consisted in the first place of Somalia’s immediate neighbours, the “Frontline States” of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Sharp divisions between

⁶³¹ Bayart, Ellis 2000.

⁶³² Webersik 2014.

them permeated the conferences. The IGAD member states never agreed on a unified approach to inclusion, despite attempts to make it seem that way. This was not because Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya disagreed about the risks of inaction. Each of these had a complex and at times hostile relationship with the continuous process of Somalis (re)articulating the boundaries of their political community: pan-Somalism has posed a threat to the territorial integrity of these states (see Chapter 2), and suspicions about divided loyalties of Somali-Ethiopian, Somali-Kenyan or Somali-Djiboutian citizens have long loomed large in Addis Ababa, Djibouti and Nairobi. State failure and the collapse of the Somali nation-building project initially might have seemed welcome news but the instability, especially after the withdrawal of the UN, compelled Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya to interfere in rebuilding some Somali political institutions. Fears of a Somalia under radical nationalist and/or Islamist influence led Nairobi and especially Addis to undermine the Abdiqassim Salaad government that emerged from Arta and to do what they could to marginalise or exclude any Islamist (and sometimes even Islamic) leaders, as documented in Chapters 3 and 7. Dealing with a multitude of warlords often appeared to them preferable to a “raucous” multitude of civil society voices, old elites from the Siad Barre era or the rising Islamic Courts. The affirmation of a Somali political community and citizenship regime extending far outside the formal borders of Somalia explain these policies.

Djiboutian foreign policy vis-à-vis the Somali peace conferences differed from that of other IGAD members, as notably illustrated by the Arta outcomes and Djibouti’s minor role in the Mbagathi process. Omar Guelleh was naturally cautious about a revived Somali state not threatening Djiboutian sovereignty but believed that he could give Djibouti a more prominent role in the Horn by bringing new actors into the peace processes. Guelleh leveraged the fact that Eritrea and Ethiopia seemed preoccupied with their bloody conflict; Arta gave his small country the kind of influence Djibouti rarely enjoys in international affairs. Moreover, as an ethnic Somali himself, the emphasis on cultural diplomacy via the use of song and poetry to rekindle togetherness and dignity among the Somali people made his initiative wildly popular among Somalis – itself a source of leverage that other international actors were surprised (e.g. the UN) or even angered by (e.g. Ethiopia). This forced IGAD to recognise the progress made at Arta and to use a similar conference structure at Mbagathi, including unprecedented civil society participation and the 4.5 clan formula. Even if the IGAD-led process also rolled back some of the more innovative and inclusive aspects of Arta, this thesis has highlighted how the dynamic interaction between a well-placed, agile regional partner and the citizenry of a war-torn society can revive hopes for peace. Importantly, this was not achieved through bribing and cajoling elites (as is often the assumption), but rather by focusing on ideational aspects of peace-making such as political community formation and inclusion of historically marginalised groups.

Beyond Somalis and the Frontline States, a third set of actors who shaped the conditions of political community (re)making were global international players. Their engagement with Somalia was characteristic of how the Western-led international community so often approached African conflicts and humanitarian crises during the “liberal moment” of the 1990s and 2000s.⁶³³ The EU, US and UN were intermittently engaged with Somali actors but did so in a reactive, on-and-off pattern, without much creative initiative and unable to imagine a meaningful role for civil society until Somali elders, women, intellectuals, community representatives, ...burst onto the scene in Arta to break the monopoly of the warlords. This apparent expression of enthusiasm for liberal shibboleths such as participation and gender mainstreaming prodded donor bureaucracies into action, who began funding a series of initiatives. The limits of this animus were laid bare when Western allies such as Kenya and Ethiopia insisted that balance and inclusion meant that the armed factions needed to participate at Mbagathi, while all Islamists and even Islamic leaders should be shunned (Chapter 7). Despite Somali protestations against this usurpation of their method and agenda, international donors did little to reverse such regional pressures and overlooked the more problematic aspects of the clan formula.

Somalia’s global “partners” have approached the Somali predicament as predominantly a security crisis to be contained – “solving” the crisis of statehood was seen as too difficult after the 1993 Black Hawk Down debacle – preferably through regional allies such as Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.⁶³⁴ Yet, because Somalia was seldom perceived as a major threat to international peace, the upshot was that considerable space existed for local and regional players to advance their own designs as long as they did not impact geopolitics. This enabled the Arta peace process, with its highly unusual clan formula and broad societal participation. Having taken European and North American diplomats by surprise, international donors were enthused by the prospect that a new Somali Republic might emerge through bottom-up reconstitution. They lavished financial assistance on the IGAD process at Mbagathi, both strengthening the clan formula and facilitating the participation of many of its critics (see Chapters 5 and 6). However, this should not be cast as liberal peace-building in Africa. To the extent that donors perceived unexpected “green shoots” of liberalism, they encouraged them, but whenever a (potential) conflict between security and inclusion was identified (e.g. the rise of the Islamic Courts), especially after 11 September 2001, realpolitik trumped all other considerations. The international community reverted to politically and financially backing the very warlords held responsible by so many Somalis for the splintering of the political community and the continuation of the war.

⁶³³ Clapham 2011.

⁶³⁴ Verhoeven 2009.

This complex picture is partly explained by the fact that the Somali peace conferences occurred at a time of geopolitical and normative change. “Partners” such as donors, multilateral agencies and international NGOs pushed their own ideas about inclusion and the clan formula even if they remained inchoate: to Somali delegates, it often seemed that internationals were figuring out what exactly “inclusive peace” could (not) amount to. Between emerging norms and strategic concerns about Somalia as a failed state lay instruments and storylines on which a vaguely theorised “local civil society” could seize. For instance, eight “gender-specific” UN Security Council Resolutions adopted between 2000 and 2018 (collectively known as the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS)) proved beneficial to Somali women at Mbagathi, as detailed in Chapter 5. Similar dynamics have been identified as foundational to gender-concerned peace-building practices in a variety of post-conflict settings.⁶³⁵ Yet, concomitant with the findings of other feminists,⁶³⁶ this project also documented significant misapplications that risk disempowering key groups. Questioning the often homogenising WPS discourse, my empirical material challenged the category of “Somali women” and the premise of women as a political community (even if the notion of female collectivity was used as a strategy by Somali women themselves). I underlined how participants interacted with dominant inclusion frameworks, sometimes upholding and sometimes challenging them, as shown in Chapter 6. Many Somali women were acutely aware of the risks that came with relying on international tropes to gain access to peace negotiations: this reliance risked delegitimising their claims by allowing their opponents to dismiss the women’s demands as non-Somali propositions. The double-edged sword of inclusion required a careful weighing of the trade-offs associated with international patronage.

At global level, inclusion now operates as an aspirational norm (the case of involving women and other civil society groups is still treated as such), what some have termed a “participatory peace”⁶³⁷ but others consider a buzz concept lacking empirical depth.⁶³⁸ At regional level, however, inclusion revolves around which neighbouring states’ approaches are prioritised. In the Horn, a region rife with rivalries, discourses about broadening participation offer opportunities for new alliances or backing old proxies. IGAD’s most recent peace initiative has been the 2014–18 South Sudan process hosted under the auspices of the Ethiopian government. The process is the latest on the African continent to test global discourses of civil society participation, though not as “core” players to sensitive negotiations between President Salva Kiir

⁶³⁵ Gizelis 2009; Hudson 2009; El-Bushra 2007.

⁶³⁶ Shepherd 2017.

⁶³⁷ Doyle, Sambanis 2006.

⁶³⁸ Hirblinger, Landau 2020.

and Vice President Riek Machar. It is difficult to predict whether the conditions that made the Somali peace processes inclusive enough to affect change could materialise in contexts like South Sudan. Without meaningful input from its own civil society, potentially transformative debates about representation, citizenship and political community in the new country are, once again, unlikely to happen.

Inclusion (exclusion) is about power: it is meant to emancipate some and curtail the influence of others. Unarmed and non-state actors championed it in the Somali peace processes explicitly against the armed factions that had dominated politics in the decade since state collapse. The Arta and Mbagathi processes furthered genuinely broad-based and creative discussions about inclusive peace-making, but always with an eye on power: who could speak, about which agenda and how to decide whether or not to adopt certain proposals to redraw the political community. Although Somali civil society strove towards a consensus, both the methods through which it did and the divergent outcomes to which different actors aspired created winners and losers. Civil society put forth innovative solutions to old political dilemmas, in which authority and legitimacy would change. I explored several examples whereby women, diaspora associations and leaders of Islamist groups insisted on being heard in their priorities, including redefining the basis for citizenship, addressing sexual violence and the restitution of properties as preconditions for political reconciliation. Being able to table these demands demonstrated that shifting *who* was in the room would also shift *what* was discussed in the room. It centrally posited the connections between peace-building and the remaking of political community in ways that went far beyond the call of international mediators and their preoccupation with some form of state-building and (de-)securitising the Somali regions.

The entry into the political process of so many new actors and issues for discussion represented such a profound shift that its proponents grasped that they also had to emphasise important strands of continuity. The clan formula as an instrument to manage the participation of new civil society groups at the conferences became discursively associated with the long-standing Somali tradition of balance. The adoption of a pragmatic modality to distribute political rights equitably (between traditional political actors and novice ones, and between clans) was an ingenuous strategy that addressed the conundrum of not only the *what* and *who* of the remade political community, but also the *how*. The 4.5 formula tackled quotas, delegation size and positions to be distributed among clans and sub-clans, as well as stressing the importance of political culture: its introduction reflected the deeply entrenched preoccupation with balance – the Somali equivalent of “the common good” – as a moral driving force in reconstituting the nation after a traumatic conflict in which everybody suffered. The flourishing of group rights was hence constructed as both a material and an ideational precondition for state (re-)building. This is reflected in the

ubiquitous use of the formula in Somali politics and society today; elites and many ordinary citizens alike see no contradiction in describing themselves as nationalist while using communal claims-making to structure institutions and decision-making.

This reworked balance in the understanding of the political community did not come about spontaneously but was the result of the push-back following the formula's initial appearance. As the peace processes enabled a normalisation and moralisation of clan claims-making, they also created fears of new social hierarchies (cf. "majority" and "minority" clans) and disintegration. The interviews I conducted are replete with narratives about the centrality of the Somali "nation" in imaginings of self and community and can also be observed in the writings of Somali delegates and observers of the conferences. To be represented *only* legitimately through clan was seen as a dangerous overhaul of prior ideas of the political community. The changing, though undiminished, sway of the "nation state" in the imagination of many Somalis continues to drive articulations of citizenship, sometimes in competition and sometimes in conjunction with the communal politics that surfaced so boldly at Arta and Mbagathi. For many, nationalism provided the most inclusive formulation of citizenship, spurring a search for ways in which the clan formula could help the rebuilding of the nation rather than its further fragmentation. This underlines once more how the peace conferences tested assumptions about the nature of the political community, what bound its constituent parts and the position of those on the national territory but excluded from the body politic (or conversely, those outside the borders but included). It is my belief that the peace processes successfully underscored that both communal and nationalist politics can be accommodated, ushering in more peaceful ways for different elements of society to relate to one another and a re-emerging state.

Final Thoughts

Nowhere in the contemporary world have disagreements about political community been ironed out definitively. In Western liberal societies, where borders are well-defined and well-established constitutional democracies have developed over centuries, their foundations, membership and purposes continue to be contested. The acceleration of migration and globalisation have, for instance, contributed to reassessments of citizenship in several European societies.⁶³⁹ Will rapid demographic shifts and the growth of multicultural societies change the fundamentals of liberal political communities?⁶⁴⁰ The sharp divisions between citizens and non-citizens (and refugees) in today's political vocabulary speak to another

⁶³⁹ Falk 2000.

⁶⁴⁰ Held 1995.

long tradition that is closely associated with the historical developments of citizenship in the liberal West: one's inclusion in a political community requires the exclusion of others.⁶⁴¹ This is an exciting, if somewhat perplexing, time to study the remaking of political community.

Political community is a living concept. This study, through its multidisciplinary approach, has argued that its dynamic and contested nature holds tremendous value for understanding post-colonial societies, especially those ravaged by war. As is the case elsewhere around the globe, many African societies are rekindling their contours and membership against a backdrop of urbanisation and internal strife. While institutions may be crushed by protracted conflicts and state collapse, the idea of citizenship does not necessarily wither. Political community, its membership and foundations, are rethought and remoulded – sometimes violently, but sometimes in remarkably creative and peaceful (if not uncontested) ways that hold the potential to strengthen human dignity considerably. This aligns with recent calls for “human-rights-based peace-building”, a worthwhile agenda for new practice and thought around inclusion and respect for different political, social and cultural identities.⁶⁴²

Political communities are remade through war, institutional breakdown and, as has been the topic of this study, international peace interventions. Membership of them is not purely transactional, an exchange of rights and obligations. Nor does inclusion only concern constitutional reforms during peace processes, though these are important. Central is a recognition of belonging through concrete action. To have the right to be heard and represented is to recognise one's importance to a wider (transnational) network of people sharing those attachments. It also means a right to have a say in who a citizen is and where the political community might be heading. Exactly twenty years after the Arta peace process, these debates are still ongoing in the Somali territories – and they will continue, undoubtedly, for a long time to come.

Attending to how groups and individuals give meaning to reshaped ideas and practices of political community during peace processes helps us to better understand how nations are forged in the twenty-first century. In Somalia the enormity of the task remains overwhelming. For many, daily struggles for citizenship rights are existential: they are about survival and livelihoods. In the early 2000s the proposal to open up the peace talks to more and diverse actors resulted in unexpectedly constructive discussions of reworking the what, who and how of political community in Somalia. Resultant structures like the clan formula are not universally accepted and are replete with contradictions and inequalities as they struggle to deliver durable peace. Nevertheless, they show us how political communities morph over time and

⁶⁴¹ Taylor 1998.

⁶⁴² Bell 2017.

illuminate more than meets the eye about a society in transition.

Bibliography

Primary Interviews

- * **Abdeta Beyene**, formerly with the Ethiopian Embassy in Djibouti, current executive director of the Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC) in Addis Ababa. Interview in Addis, November 2017.
- * **Abdirahman Hirabe**, diplomat, the Somali Embassy in Djibouti since 1999. Interviews in Djibouti, November 2017, March 2018, December 2018.
- * **Abdirahman Abdulle (Shuuke)**, expert on Somali and regional affairs, founder and former head of the Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC) in Puntland, Somalia. Interview in Nairobi, January 2018.
- * **Abdulkadir Malesia**, businessman, and candidate for the position of prime minister during the IGAD-led Mbagathi process. Interview in Djibouti, November 2017.
- * **Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow)**, historian and member of the Somali Technical Committee at the Somali National Peace Conference (Arta). Interviews in Nairobi, September 2017, January 2018, June 2018 and in Djibouti March 2018.
- * **Asha Hagi Elmi**, former Member of Parliament and member of the Somali Technical Committee at the Somali National Peace Conference (Arta). Interview in Oxford, February 2018.
- * **David Stephen**, head of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, 1997-2002. Interviews in Norwich, February 2018 and in Cambridge, October 2018.
- * **Hawa Aden Ame**, humanitarian, founder of the Galkayo Education Center for Peace and Development, Galkayo, Somalia. Interview in Nairobi, January 2018.
- * **Ismail Goulal Boudine**, former Djiboutian Ambassador to Somalia and chief negotiator at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (Mbagathi). Interview in Djibouti, December 2018.
- * **Ismail Taani**, former chief of staff to the president of Djibouti Ismael Omar Guelleh. Interviews in Nairobi, January 2018 and in Djibouti, December 2018.
- * **Mohamed Abdi Affey**, former Kenyan Ambassador to Somalia, chief negotiator at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (Mbagathi). Interviews in Doha, October 2017, in Nairobi, September 2017, January 2018, May 2018.
- * **Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi)**, academic and Member of Parliament, chairman of the Somali Technical Committee at the Somali National Peace Conference (Arta). Interview in Nairobi, June 2018.
- * **Mohamed Dahir Afrax**, Member of Parliament, writer and member of the Technical Committee at the Somali National Peace Conference (Arta). Interview in Djibouti, March 2018.

- * **Mohamed Guyo**, formerly with the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the current IGAD Special Envoy for Somalia. Interview in Nairobi, January 2018.
- * **Mohamed Nur (Garibaldi)**, adviser to President Abdullahi Yusuf (Puntland) and, later, the European Commission. Interview in Nairobi, June 2018.
- * **Patrick Gilkes**, formerly with Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview in Addis, October 2017.
- * **Sally Healy**, Horn of Africa expert, writer, formerly with UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Interview in London, February 2018.

Archival Sources by Chapter

Chapter 3

Internal brief by Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report from Anne Marie Madsen (Denmark) to Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, 1 July 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report by the Commission for Peace, 9 May 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Report by the Commission for Peace, 13 May 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Report by the Commission for Peace, 18 May 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Declaration of National Commitment (“Arta Declaration”), 5 May 2000. Accessed through Peace Agreements Database, PA-X <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1682>

Video recording of decisions by the Somali Arbitration Committee, 5 and 7 August 2000. Djibouti RTD archives. Accessed in December 2018.

Video recording of the opening ceremony of Arta, 2 May 2000. RTD archives. Accessed in December 2018.

Internal report by the Commission for Peace, 9 July 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Meeting minutes of Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter, 11-19 December 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Statement on Denial of Rights of Somali Citizens addressed to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 18 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed March 2018.

Statement following the detention of Abshir Saalah Mohamed, member of Arta’s Transitional National Assembly, in Berbera, 6 September 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed March 2018.

Civil Society Position Paper. 18 December 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Transitional National Charter of the Somali National Peace Conference. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed March 2018.

Internal report by Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 August 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Internal reports by Mohamed Ziad Duale, 20 October 2002 and 13 December 2002. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Chapter 4

Declaration of National Commitment (“Arta Declaration”) 5 May 2000. Accessed through Peace Agreements Database, PA-X <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1682>

Video recording of the opening ceremony of Arta, May 5, 2000. Djibouti RTD archives. Accessed in December 2018.

Speech by President Ismael Omar Guelleh at Arta’s opening ceremony, May 2000. RTD archives

Internal report by the Commission for Peace, May 9, 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Letter by “the Elders of Galgallo minority community” to the Arbitration Committee, 16 July 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in December 2018.

Internal report by the Commission for Peace, May 13 and 18, 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Internal report by the Commission for Peace, May 13, 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Internal report by the Commission for Peace, 9 May 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Internal brief on the current status of the peace process, Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Internal brief on the current status of the peace process, Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 February 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Speech by Ali Abdi Farah (Djibouti Minister of Foreign Affairs) in report by Technical Committee, 3 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives.

Case to the Arbitration Committee by Saransoor sub-clan, 13 April 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Case to the Arbitration Committee by Badi Adde sub-clan, 31 May 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Statement (“Baaq”) by Jareerweyne traditional elders, 24 May 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed March 2018.

Letter from Khadijo Suufi Hussein to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 21 June 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Amin Mohamed Nur, representative of Baravanese community to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 26 January 2003. IGAD archives.

Letter from Madhibaan Supreme Council to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 16 October 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Jareerweyne Elders Position Paper, undated, IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Statement (“Baaq”) by Jareerweyne Elders, 24 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Report by Asha Abdalla and Qassim Hersi Farah (Political Vigilantes), 17 December 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamud (Dhaladhere) to IGAD Facilitation Committee, April 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 31 January 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Amin Mohamed Nur to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 26 January 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Mohamed Hersi to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 24 August 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Video recording of President Ismael Omar Guelleh’s opening speech at Arta, 2 May 2000. Djibouti RTD archives. Accessed in December 2018.

Report of President Ismael Omar Guelleh’s opening speech at Arta by Somali Technical Committee, 2 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Internal report by the Commission for Peace, 18 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed March 2018.

Civil Society Position Paper, 18 December 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Sharif Salah Mohamed Ali to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 6 January 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Osman Haji Omar (Falco) to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 25 September 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Internal report by the Commission for Peace, 8, 9 and 13 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Internal report by Ziad Duale, 18 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Report by IGAD Technical Committee, April 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report of high-level dialogue with Somali business leaders, 21-22 July 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report and statement following consultative meetings with Somali business leaders, 08-11 April 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Report of IGAD Technical Committee's visit to Somalia (17-20 April 2002) to the IGAD Frontline States. August 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Record of a meeting between the Technical Committee and the Somali Leaders Committee, 12 November 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Chapter 5

Letter from Rakia Sheikh Osman to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 4 December 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from the Horn of Africa Relief and Development Organization to IGAD Facilitation Committee, November 2003, IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Transitional National Charter of Arta. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Lists of women delegates and observers. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Reports by the IGAD Gender Desk. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter signed by "women delegates" to IGAD Arbitration Committee, 14 November 2003. IGAD archives.

Letter from "Hawiye women delegates" to IGAD Arbitration Committee, 10 December 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report by Asha Abdalla and Qassim Hersi Farah ("Political Vigilantes"). 17 December 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Anab Jama Geesod to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 15 August 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Halimo Jama Afrah to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 25 August 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Zeinab Hassan to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 23 August 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Introduction letter by Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of the UN, July 2004, IGAD archives. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report of a joint IGAD-UNIFEM seminar in October 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Abdi Rashid Aden Gebiyow and Mohamed Aden Wayeel to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 20 August 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Seminar by the IGAD Gender Desk and UNIFEM held in Eldoret (20 and 21 October 2002). IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report titled "Facilitation of Women Delegates" by UNIFEM Regional Office for the Horn and Eastern Africa, 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Press statement by Mbagathi's women delegates after an IGAD-facilitated seminar, 21 October 2002, IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Mowlid Ma'ane Mohamoud to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 18 March 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Chapter 6:

Letter from Abdirizak Mohamed Dirie to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 28 May 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Internal report by the Commission for Peace, 18 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed March 2018.

Report by European Commission written by Mila Font, 20 December 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report of "Brainstorming Session" by the Commission for Peace and the Somali Technical Committee, 16 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Letter from Khalif Hassan Ahmed to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 27 May 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter signed by SRRC leaders, 7 November 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Ugas Esse Ugas Abdulle in support of the nomination of Mohamed Duale (UK), 2 December 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Somali *Ulama's* Stockholm conference to pledge support for Arta, publicly available via YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FlSp9483siI>, accessed October 2017. Accessed in October 2017.

Letter from Somali Self Help and Welfare to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 5 November 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Abdulqadir Sufi, Somalia Diaspora Dialogue Organization, 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Memo from Somali Diaspora [in] Civil Society, 11 April 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Somali Coalition Communities in North America, 31 July 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Sool, Sanaag, Hawd and Waamo Diaspora Steering Committee Minnesota, 23 November 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Somali Diaspora Dialogue Organization, 6 November 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from the Committee on Federalism and Provisional Constitution (“Group A”) to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 22 March 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Abdi Mohamed Nasir (Sarinley), Somali Self Help and Welfare, to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 22 August 2004. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Chapter 7

Lecture, “Can Clan Rebuild a State?” by Mohamed Abdi (Gandhi), 3 March 2003. IGAD archives. Notes, translation and compilation by Khalif Ahmed Hassan with Novib Somalia. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Abdulaziz Hagi Hussein to Bethuel Kiplagat, 31 January 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Report by Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter, March 22, 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Memo by Anab Ahmed Isse, Peace Tree and Somali Good Hope Alliance meetings (1-7 May 2003), IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Debate session and statement on Somaliland by Arta’s Technical Committee, 23 March 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Report of a joint meeting between Elders and Leaders of the Islamic Courts of Mogadishu (2-5 April 2000), Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Statement on the “Somaliland Case”, 23 May 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Declaration of National Commitment (“Arta Declaration”) 5 May 2000. Accessed through Peace Agreements Database, PA-X <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1682>

Letter from General Mohamed Said Morgan and Mowlid Ma’ane Mohamoud after the Political Leaders Committee’s meeting (19 January 2004), IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Debate on “the Somaliland case and inviting the Government of Egal,” 24 June 2000, Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

“Verbatim Report” by Hassan Gilal Dien about the Federalism and Provisional Charter, 23 January 2003, IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Meeting minutes of Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter, 11 December 2002. IGAD

archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Letter from Edna Aden to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 17 July 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Position paper by the Transitional National Government, 4 November 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Statement on the “Special Status of Mogadishu”, 17 July 2000. Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Statement on the “Special Status of Mogadishu”, 26 March 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Video recording of the opening ceremony of Arta, 5 May 2000. Djibouti RTD archives. Accessed in December 2018.

Interview with Hassan Sheikh Mohamed Abdi, IRIN October 2000.

<http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/q-and/2000/08/25/irin-interview-islamic-courts-chairman-hassan-sheik-mohamed-abdi> Accessed in June 2017.

Report of a joint meeting by the Elders and Leaders of the Islamic Courts of Mogadishu (2-5 April 2000), Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Report of conference events by Mohamed Rashid, 18 June 2000. Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Statement (“Baaq”) by Jareerweyne Elders, 24 May 2000, Djibouti MFA archives. Accessed in March 2018.

Civil Society Position Paper, 18 December 2002. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Video recording of the opening ceremony of Arta, 2 May 2000. Djibouti RTD archives. Accessed in December 2018.

IGAD Communique, 2005, IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

Chapter 8

Letter by Abdulaziz Hagi Mohamed Hussein to IGAD Facilitation Committee, 31 January 2003. IGAD archives. Accessed in November 2017.

UN Reports and Resolutions

UN Secretary-General (UNSG). “Report of the UN Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security.” S/2016/822. New York: United Nations, September 29, 2016.

UN Secretary-General (UNSG). “Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.” S/2017/249. New York: United Nations, April 15, 2017.

UN Security Council (UNSC). “Resolution 1325, S/RES/1325 (2000).” New York: United Nations, October 31, 2000.

UN Security Council (UNSC). “Resolution 1820, S/RES/1820 (2008).” New York: United Nations, June 19, 2008.

UN Security Council (UNSC). “Resolution 1888, S/RES/1888 (2009).” New York: United Nations, September 30, 2009.

UN Security Council (UNSC). “Resolution 1889, S/RES/1889 (2009).” New York: United Nations, October 5, 2009.

UN Security Council (UNSC). “Resolution 1960, S/RES/1960 (2010).” New York: United Nations, December 16, 2010.

UN Security Council. “Letter dated 20 October 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Transmits concept note for the Security Council open debate on the topic ‘Women and peace and security’, to be held on 27 Oct.” S2017/2017/889. New York: United Nations, 23 October 2017.

United Nations. “Yearbook of the United Nations 1996.” New York: United Nations, Accessed

United Nations. “Yearbook of the United Nations 2000.” New York: United Nations, Accessed

United Nations. “Yearbook of the United Nations 2005.” New York: United Nations, Accessed

General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA). “Resolution 389, A/RES/289(IV)A-C (1949).” New York: United Nations, November 21, 1949.

General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA). United Nations Special Report of the Trusteeship Council, Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration, General Assembly, Fifth Session A/12942 1950. (pp. 3-4).

Negotiation and adoption of a draft trusteeship agreement for Italian Somaliland: Draft Trusteeship Agreement for The Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration New York: UN, January 27, 1950

United Nations Trusteeship Council. “Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1957: Report on Somaliland under Italian Administration.” 1958 (Series, Trusteeship Council Official Records Council.) New York: United Nations, 1958. Resolution/Decision T/RES/1906(XXII)

UN Trusteeship Council. "Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration." New York. United Nations, January 27, 1950.

United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations. Chapter XII, Articles 75-85. New York. United Nations.

Works Cited

- Abbay, Alemseged. "Diversity and State-Building in Ethiopia." *African Affairs* 103, no. 413 (2004): 593-614.
- Abbink, Jon. "Dervishes, 'Moryaan' and Freedom Fighters: Cycles of Rebellion and the Fragmentation of Somali Society, 1900-2000." In *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*, edited by J. Abbink, M. de Bruijn and K. van Walraven, 238-365. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
- . "The Islamic Courts Union: The Ebb and Flow of a Somali Islamist Movement." In *Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa*, edited by Stephen Ellis and Van Kessel, 87. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
- Abdi, Cawo M. *Elusive Jannah: The Somali Diaspora and a Borderless Muslim Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015.
- Abdulbari, Nasredeem. "Citizenship Rules in Sudan and Post-Secession Problems." *Journal of African Law* 55, no. 2 (2011): 157-80.
- Ackerly, Brooke A. *Universal Human Rights in a World of Difference*. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Adam, Hussein M. "Somalia: Militarism, Warlordism or Democracy?". *Review of African Political Economy* 19, no. 54 (1992): 11-26.
- Adebanwi, Wale. "Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in Northern Nigeria." *Citizenship Studies* 13, no. 4 (2009): 349-63.
- Aden, Mohamed Sheikh, and Pietro Petrucci. *Arrivederci a Mogadiscio: Somalia L'indipendenza Smarrita*. Rome: Edizioni Associates, 1994.
- Affi, Ladan. "Diaspora and Development in a Fragile State." *Journal of Somali Studies* 1, no. 2 (2014): 39-60.
- . *Excluding Women: The Clanization of Somali Political Institutions*. CMI Chr. Michelsen Institute (2020).
- Ahmad, Aisha. "The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia." *International Security* 39, no. 3 (2015): 89-117.

- Ahmed, Ali J., ed. *The Invention of Somalia*. Lawerenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995.
- Aidid, Mohamed F., and Satya P. Ruhela. *Mohammed Farah Aidid and His Vision of Somalia*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1994.
- Aidid, Safia. "Haweenku Wa Garab (Women Are a Force): Women and the Somali Nationalist Movement, 1943-1960." *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* (2010).
- . "Women in Somalia." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History*, 2020.
- Al-Sharmani, Mulki, and Cindy Horst. "Marginal Actors? Diaspora Somalis Negotiate Their Citizenship." In *Dislocations of Civic Cultural Borderlines*, edited by P. Ahponen, P. Harinen and V. Haverinen, 107-22: Springer, 2016.
- Alim, Faduma A., and Hawa Jibril. *And Then She Said: The Poetry and Times of Hawa Jibril*. Toronto: Jumblies Press, 2008.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.
- Anderson, Miriam J. "Transnational Feminism and Norm Diffusion in Peace Processes: The Cases of Burundi and Northern Ireland." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4, no. 1 (2010): 1-21.
- . *Windows of Opportunity*. Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Aristotle, and Harris Rackham. *Politics*. London: William Heinemann, 1959.
- Aspinall, Edward. "Combatants to Contractors: The Political Economy of Peace in Aceh." *Indonesia*, no. 87 (2009): 1-34.
- Autesserre, Séverine. "Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention." *International Organization* 63, no. 2 (2009): 249-80.
- Baár, Monika. *Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Bah, Abu Bakarr. "Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Cote D'Ivoire." *African Affairs* 109, no. 437 (2010): 597-615.
- Bakonyi, Jutta. "Authority and Administration Beyond the State: Local Governance in Southern Somalia, 1995–2006." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 2 (2013): 272-90.

- Balthasar, Dominik. "In Search of More Than a State: Trajectories of Political Ordering and Identity Plurality in Somalia." *African Identities* 15, no. 2 (2017): 171-86.
- Barnes, Cedric. "U Dhashay—Ku Dhashay: Genealogical and Territorial Discourse in Somali History." *Social Identities* 12, no. 4 (2006): 487-98.
- . "The Somali Youth League, Ethiopian Somalis and the Greater Somalia Idea, C.1946–48." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 1, no. 2 (2007): 277-91.
- Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan. "The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 1, no. 2 (2007): 151-60.
- Bassil, Noah R. *The Post-Colonial State and Civil War in Sudan: The Origins of Conflict in Darfur*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.
- Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. "Organizing Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 5 (2002): 599-628.
- Bates, Robert H. "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 6, no. 4 (1974): 457-84.
- Battera, Federico. "Some Considerations on State Building in Divided Societies and the Role of the 'International Community': Somaliland and Somalia Compared." *Northeast African Studies* 10, no. 3 (2003): 225-47.
- Battera, Federico, and Alessandro Campo. "The Evolution and Integration of Different Legal Systems in the Horn of Africa: The Case of Somaliland." [In English]. *Global Jurist* 1, no. 1 (2001).
- Bayart, Jean-François, and Stephen Ellis. "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion." *African Affairs* 99, no. 395 (2000): 217-67.
- Beiner, Ronald. *Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship: Essays on the Problem of Political Community*. Vancouver: UBC press, 2003.
- Bell, Christine. "Peace Settlements and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Circular History." *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 9, no. 3 (2017): 358-78.
- . *New Inclusion Project: Building Inclusive Peace Settlements*. Conciliation Resources (London: 2019).

- Bell, Christine, and Catherine O'Rourke. "Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1, no. 1 (2007): 23-44.
- Bell, Christine, and Jan Pospisil. "Navigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettling." *Journal of International Development* 29, no. 5 (2017): 576-93.
- Belloni, Roberto. "Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 2 (2004): 334-53.
- Berman, Bruce J. "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism." *African Affairs* 97, no. 388 (1998): 305-41.
- Bernal, Victoria. *Nation as Network: Diaspora, Cyberspace, and Citizenship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.
- Besteman, Catherine. "Public History and Private Knowledge: On Disputed History in Southern Somalia." *Ethnohistory* 40, no. 4 (1993): 563-86.
- . "Representing Violence and "Othering" Somalia." *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 1 (1996): 120-33.
- . "Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence: The Dissolution of the Somali Nation-State." *American Ethnologist* 23, no. 3 (1996): 579-96.
- . "Primordialist Blindness: A Reply to I. M. Lewis." *Cultural Anthropology* 13, no. 1 (1998): 109-20.
- . *Unraveling Somalia: Race, Class, and the Legacy of Slavery*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
- Besteman, Catherine, and Lee Cassanelli, eds. *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. London: HAAN, 2000.
- Björkdahl, Annika, and Johanna Mannergren Selimovic. "A Tale of Three Bridges: Agency and Agonism in Peace Building." *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (2016): 321-35.
- Bradbury, Mark. *Becoming Somaliland*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2008.
- Bradbury, Mark, and Sally Healy. *Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict*. Conciliation Resources (London: 2010).

- Braine, Bernard. "The Somali Question." *African Affairs* 57, no. 228 (1958): 189-99.
- Brancati, Dawn. *Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Bryden, Matt, and Martina I. Steiner. *Somalia between Peace and War: Somali Women on the Eve of the 21st Century*. UNIFEM (Nairobi, Kenya: 1998).
- Bsheer, Rosie. *Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020.
- Burrell, Jennifer L. *Maya after War: Conflict, Power, and Politics in Guatemala*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2013.
- Caplan, Richard. *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction*. Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Carling, Jørgen, Marta Bivand Erdal, and Rojan Ezzati. "Beyond the Insider–Outsider Divide in Migration Research." *Migration Studies* 2, no. 1 (2013): 36-54.
- Carver, Terrell. *Gender Is Not a Synonym for Women*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.
- Cassanelli, Lee. *The Shaping of Somali Society*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982.
- . *Victims and Vulnerable Groups in Southern Somalia*. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board (Ottawa: 1995).
- . *Hosts and Guests: A Historical Interpretation of Land Conflicts in Southern and Central Somalia*. Rift Valley Institute (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2015).
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Luc Girardin. "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies." *The American Political Science Review* 101, no. 1 (2007): 173-85.
- Chandler, David. "The Limits of Peacebuilding: International Regulation and Civil Society Development in Bosnia." *International Peacekeeping* 6, no. 1 (1999): 109-25.
- Chauchard, Simon. *Why Representation Matters: The Meaning of Ethnic Quotas in Rural India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Clapham, Christopher. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

———. "Africa and Trusteeship in the Modern Global Order." In *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*, edited by James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, 67-82. London: Hurst, 2011.

———. "Peacebuilding without a State: The Somali Experience." In *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*, edited by Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, 251-62. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012.

Clarke, Walter, and Robert Gosende. "Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself?". In *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, edited by R Rotberg, 129-58. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

Clifford, James. "Diasporas." *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994): 302-38.

Compagnon, Daniel. "Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to Warlordism." 12, no. 5 (1992): 8-13.

Confortini, Catia C. "Galtung, Violence, and Gender: The Case for a Peace Studies/Feminism Alliance." *Peace & Change* 31, no. 3 (2006): 333-67.

Connor, Walker. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Cooper, Frederick. "Development, Modernization, and the Social Sciences in the Era of Decolonization: The Examples of British and French Africa." In *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015.

———. *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.

Curtis, Devon. "Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa." edited by Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi Dzinesa. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012a.

———. "The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and Post-Conflict Governance in Burundi." *African Affairs* 112, no. 446 (2012b): 72-91.

Davidson, Basil. *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*. London: Currey, 1992.

Davies, Sara E., and Jacqui True. "Women, Peace, and Security: A Transformative Agenda?". In *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*, edited by S.E. Davies and J. True, 3-14. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

De Vries, Lotje, and Mareike Schomerus. "South Sudan's Civil War Will Not End with a Peace Deal." *Peace Review* 29, no. 3 (2017): 333-40.

De Waal, Alex. *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power*. Cambridge: Polity, 2015.

———. "Inclusion in Peacemaking: From Moral Claim to Political Fact." In *The Fabric of Peace in Africa: Looking Beyond the State*, edited by Pamela Aall and Chester Crocker, 165-86. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2017.

De Waal, Alex, and Rakiya Omaar. "Doing Harm by Doing Good? The International Relief Effort in Somalia." *Current History* 92, no. 574 (1993): 198.

Dorman, Sara R., Daniel P. Hammett, and Paul Nugent, eds. *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton University Press, 2006.

Ekeh, Peter P. "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, no. 1 (1975): 91-112.

———. "Individuals' Basic Security Needs and the Limits of Democratization." In *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, edited by Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh and Will Kymlicka, 22-37. Oxford: James Currey, 2004.

El-Bushra, Judy. "Feminism, Gender, and Women's Peace Activism." *Development and Change* 38, no. 1 (2007): 131-47.

El-Bushra, Judy, and Judith Gardner. "The Impact of War on Somali Men: Feminist Analysis of Masculinities and Gender Relations in a Fragile Context." *Gender & Development* 24, no. 3 (2016): 443-58.

Elayah, Moosa, and Willemijn Verkoren. "Civil Society During War: The Case of Yemen." *Peacebuilding* (2019): 1-23.

Elhussein, Ahmed M. "The Revival of 'Native Administration' in the Sudan: A Pragmatic View." *Public Administration and Development* 9, no. 4 (1989): 437-46.

- Elmi, Afyare. *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding*. London: Pluto Press, 2010.
- . "Developing an Inclusive Citizenship in Somalia: Challenges and Opportunities." *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* 16, 7 (2016): 6-20.
- Eriksen, Thomas H. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press, 2002.
- Falk, Richard. "The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization." *Citizenship Studies* 4, no. 1 (2000): 5-17.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.
- . "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States." *International security* 28, no. 4 (2004): 5-43.
- Feely, Michael. "Assemblage Analysis: An Experimental New-Materialist Method for Analysing Narrative Data." *Qualitative Research* 20, no. 2 (2019): 174-93.
- Gardner, Judith, and Judy El-Bushra, eds. *Somalia the Untold Story: The War through the Eyes of Somali Women*. London: Pluto, 2004.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Geschiere, Peter. "Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing Chieftaincy, French and British Style." *Africa* 63, no. 2 (1993): 151-75.
- . *The Perils of Belonging : Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
- Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene. "Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding." *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 4 (2009): 505-23.
- Goodfellow, Tom, and Stefan Lindemann. "The Clash of Institutions: Traditional Authority, Conflict and the Failure of 'Hybridity' in Buganda." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 51, no. 1 (2013): 3-26.
- Gundel, Joakim. "The Migration–Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study." *International Migration* 40, no. 5 (2002): 255-81.

Gutiérrez, Natividad. *Nationalist Myths and Ethnic Identities: Indigenous Intellectuals and the Mexican State*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999.

Haakonsen, Jan. *Scientific Socialism and Self-Reliance. The Case of Somalia's "Instant" Fishermen*. Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen (Bergen: 1984).

Hagen, Jamie J. "Queering Women, Peace and Security." *International Affairs* 92, no. 2 (2016): 313-32.

Hamilton, David. "Imperialism Ancient and Modern: A Study of British Attitudes to the Claims to Sovereignty to the Northern Somali Coastline." *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 5, no. 2 (1967): 9-35.

Hammond, Laura. "Obliged to Give: Remittances and the Maintenance of Transnational Networks between Somalis at Home and Abroad." *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* 10 (2010): 125-51.

———. "The Absent but Active Constituency: The Role of the Somaliland UK Community in Election Politics." In *Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks. Columbia: Hurst*, edited by Peter G. Mandaville and Terrence Lyons, 157-78. London: Hurst, 2012.

———. "Somali Transnational Activism and Integration in the UK: Mutually Supporting Strategies." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39, no. 6 (2013a): 1001-17.

———. "History, Overview, Trends and Issues in Major Somali Refugee Displacements in the near Region (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Yemen)." *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* 13 (2013b): 55-79.

Hammond, Laura, Mustafa Awad, Ali I. Dagane, Peter Hansen, Cindy Horst, Ken Menkhaus, and Lynette Obare. *Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-Building*. UNDP (Nairobi: 2011).

Handrahan, Lori. "Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction." *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 4 (2004): 429-45.

Hansen, Peter. "Circumcising Migration: Gendering Return Migration among Somalilanders." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 7 (2008): 1109-25.

Harding, Sandra G., ed. *Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986.

- , ed. *The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004.
- Harris, Verne. "The Archival Sliver: Power, Memory, and Archives in South Africa." *Archival Science* 2, no. 1 (2002): 63-86.
- Hartzell, Caroline, and Matthew Hoddie. "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (2003): 318-32.
- Healy, Sally. "Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of Igad's Contribution to Regional Security in the Horn of Africa." *Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers Series* 2, no. 59 (2009).
- . "Seeking Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: The Contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development." *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2011): 105-20.
- Helander, Bernhard. "Rahanweyn Sociability: A Model for Other Somalis?". *African Languages and Cultures. Supplement*, no. 3 (1996): 195-204.
- . *The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious Descent among the Hubeer of Southern Somalia*. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2003.
- Held, David. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.
- Hirblinger, Andreas T, and Dana M Landau. "Daring to Differ? Strategies of Inclusion in Peacemaking." *Security Dialogue* 51, no. 4 (2020): 305-22.
- Hirschman, Albert. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Hoehne, Markus V. "Continuities and Changes Regarding Minorities in Somalia." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38, no. 5 (2015): 792-807.
- Horowitz, Donald L. "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems." *Journal of democracy* 25, no. 2 (2014): 5-20.
- Horst, Cindy. "Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda? Somali Debates on Women's Public Roles and Political Participation." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 11, no. 3 (2017): 389-407.

———. "Making a Difference in Mogadishu? Experiences of Multi-Sited Embeddedness among Diaspora Youth." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 8 (2018): 1341-56.

Hudson, Heidi. "A Double-Edged Sword of Peace? Reflections on the Tension between Representation and Protection in Gendering Liberal Peacebuilding." *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 4 (2012): 443-60.

———. "Decolonising Gender and Peacebuilding: Feminist Frontiers and Border Thinking in Africa." *Peacebuilding* 4, no. 2 (2016): 194-209.

Hudson, Natalie Florea. *Gender, Human Security and the United Nations: Security Language as a Political Framework for Women*. Routledge, 2009.

Hunter, Emma, ed. *Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2016.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

Idris, Amir. "Rethinking Identity, Citizenship, and Violence in Sudan." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 2 (2012): 324-26.

Ignatieff, Michael. *Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan*. Random House, 2003.

Ingiriis, Mohamed H. "The Making of the 1990 Manifesto: Somalia's Last Chance for State Survival." *Northeast African Studies* 12, no. 2 (2012): 63-94.

Ingiriis, Mohamed H., and Markus V. Hoehne. "The Impact of Civil War and State Collapse on the Roles of Somali Women: A Blessing in Disguise." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 2 (2013): 314-33.

Isin, Engin F. *Citizens without Frontiers*. London: Bloomsbury 2012.

Jansen, Stef. "The Violence of Memories: Local Narratives of the Past after Ethnic Cleansing in Croatia." *Rethinking History* 6, no. 1 (2002/04/01 2002): 77-93.

Jaramillo, Sergio. *Inclusion and the Colombia Peace Process*. Conciliation Resources (London: 2019).

Jarstad, Anna K. "Power Sharing: Former Enemies in Joint Government." In *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, edited by Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, 105-33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

- Joireman, Sandra F. "Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 4 (2001): 571-96.
- Joseph, Suad. "Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East." In *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East*, edited by Suad Joseph, 3-30. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 2000.
- Jung, Jai Kwan. "Power-Sharing and Democracy Promotion in Post-Civil War Peace-Building." *Democratization* 19, no. 3 (2012): 486-506.
- Kaldor, Mary. *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. Cambridge: Wiley, 2013.
- Kaptein, Lidwien. "I. M. Lewis and Somali Clanship: A Critique." *Northeast African Studies* 11, no. 1 (2004): 1-23.
- . "Discourse on Moral Womanhood in Somali Popular Songs, 1960-1990." *The Journal of African History* 50, no. 1 (2009): 101-22.
- . "Making Memories of Mogadishu in Somali Poetry About the Civil War." In *Mediations of Violence in Africa*, edited by Lidwien Kaptein and Annemiek Richters, 25-74. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- . *Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
- Kaptein, Lidwien, and Maryan M. Boqor. "Memories of a Mogadishu Childhood, 1940-1964: Maryan Muuse Boqor and the Women Who Inspired Her." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 42, no. 1 (2009): 105-16.
- Keller, Edmond J. *Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict in Africa*. Bloomington Indiana University Press, 2014.
- Keranen, Outi. "Building States and Identities in Post-Conflict States: Symbolic Practices in Post-Dayton Bosnia." *Civil Wars* 16, no. 2 (2014): 127-46.
- Kissane, Bill. *Nations Torn Asunder: The Challenge of Civil War* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Kobo, Ousman. "'We Are Citizens Too': The Politics of Citizenship in Independent Ghana." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 48, no. 1 (2010): 67-94.
- Kuper, Hilda, and Leo Kuper, eds. *African Law: Adaptation and Development*. Berkeley, CA: Univ of California Press, 1965.

Kusow, Abdi M. "The Somali Origin: Myth or Reality." In *The Invention of Somalia*, edited by Ali J. Ahmed. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995.

Laitin, David D. "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 3 (1976): 449-68.

———. "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 17, no. 1 (1979): 95-115.

Laitin, David D., and Said S. Samatar, eds. *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.

Latham Brown, D. J. "The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (1956): 245-64.

Lazar, Sian, ed. *The Anthropology of Citizenship: A Reader*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

Le Sage, Andre. "Prospects for Al Itihad & Islamist Radicalism in Somalia." *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 89 (2001): 472-77.

Lemarchand, René. *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

———. "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *African Affairs* 106, no. 422 (2006): 1-20.

Levitt, Peggy, and Deepak Lamba-Nieves. "Social Remittances Revisited." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37, no. 1 (2011): 1-22.

Lewis, Ioan M. *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

———. *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Boulder: Boulder: Westview Press, 1965.

———. *A Menu of Options: Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia*. London School of Economics; European Commission Somalia Unit of the European Union (London: 1996).

———. *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-Based Society*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1998.

- Lieven, Anatol. "The Indian Ocean and Global Patterns of Order and Disorder." In *Beyond Liberal Order: States, Societies and Markets in the Global Indian Ocean*, edited by Harry Verhoeven and Anatol Lieven. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
- Lindley, Anna. *The Early Morning Phone Call: Somali Refugees' Remittances*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010.
- Lister, Ruth. "Citizenship: Towards a Feminist Synthesis." *Feminist Review*, no. 57 (1997): 28-48.
- Luling, Virginia. "The Other Somali- Minority Groups in Traditional Somali Society." Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies, University of Hamburg, Buske, 1983.
- . The Origins of the "Jareer," People of the Shabeelle: The Implications of Some Rituals. 1994.
- . "Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State." *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (1997): 287-302.
- . *Somali Sultanate: The Geledi City-State over 150 Years*. London: HAAN, 2002.
- . "Genealogy as Theory, Genealogy as Tool: Aspects of Somali 'Clanship'." *Social Identities* 12, no. 4 (2006): 471-85.
- Mac Ginty, Roger. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011.
- MacLean, Lauren. *Informal Institutions and Citizenship in Rural Africa: Risk and Reciprocity in Ghana and Côte D'ivoire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4-5 (2008): 715-41.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Manby, Bronwen. *Citizenship in Africa: The Law of Belonging*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012.
- Marchal, Roland, and Zakaria M. Sheikh. "Salafism in Somalia: Coping with Coercion, Civil War and Its Own Contradictions." *Islamic Africa* 6, no. 1-2 (2015): 135.

- Marsden, Peter. *Afghanistan: Minorities, Conflict and the Search for Peace*. Minority Rights Group International (London: 2001).
- Marshall, T. H., and Tom Bottomore. "Citizenship and Social Class." In *Citizenship and Social Class*, 1-52. London: Pluto Press, 1992.
- Martin, B. G. *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth Century Africa* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Maxwell, Daniel G., and Nisar Majid. *Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 2011-12*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Mayall, James, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds. *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*. London: Hurst, 2011.
- Mehler, Andreas. "Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship." *African Affairs* 108, no. 432 (2009): 453-73.
- Menkhaus, Ken. "Somalia in 2005 : No Exit." *Annales d'Éthiopie* 21 (2005): 73-84.
- . "The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts." *African Affairs* 106, no. 424 (2007): 357-90.
- . "Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping." *International Security* 31, no. 3 (2007): 74-106.
- . "The Role and Impact of the Somali Diaspora in Peace-Building, Governance and Development." In *Africa's Finances: The Role of Remittances.*, edited by Raj Bardouille, Muna Ndulo and Margeret Grieco, 187-202. Newcastle: Oxford Scholars Publications, 2009.
- . "State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts." *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97 (2015): 405-22.
- Menkhaus, Ken, Hassan Sheikh, Ali Joqombe, and Pat Johnson. *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988*. Interpeace (Nairobi: 2009).
- Mesfin, Seyoum, and Abdeta Dribssa Beyene. "The Practicalities of Living with Failed States." *Daedalus* 147, no. 1 (2018): 128-40.
- Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1992.

- Migdal, Joel. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Millar, Gearoid "Decentring the Intervention Experts: Ethnographic Peace Research and Policy Engagement." *Cooperation and Conflict* 00, no. 0 (2018): 1-18.
- Millman, Brock. *British Somaliland: An Administrative History, 1920-1960*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.
- Mitchell, Matthew I. "Power-Sharing and Peace in Côte D'ivoire: Past Examples and Future Prospects." *Conflict, Security & Development* 12, no. 2 (2012): 171-91.
- Mohamed, Hamdi. *Gender and the Politics of Nation Building:(Re) Constructing Somali Women's History*. Lambert, 2014.
- Mohamed, Jama. "Kinship and Contract in Somali Politics." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 77, no. 2 (2007): 226-49.
- Mohamed, Nadifa. *Black Mamba Boy*. New York: HarperCollins, 2010.
- Mohamud, Maimuna. "Women, Piety and Political Representation." *Hawwa* 14, no. 2 (2016): 166-186.
- Monsutti, Alessandro. "Afghan Migratory Strategies and the Three Solutions to the Refugee Problem." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2008): 58-73.
- Moosa, Zohra, Maryam Rahmani, and Lee Webster. "From the Private to the Public Sphere: New Research on Women's Participation in Peace-Building." *Gender & Development* 21, no. 3 (2013): 453-72.
- Mosselson, Aidan. "'There Is No Difference between Citizens and Non-Citizens Anymore': Violent Xenophobia, Citizenship and the Politics of Belonging in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 36, no. 3 (2010): 641-55.
- Mukhtar, Mohamed H. "The Emergence and Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Region of Somalia from 1947-1960." *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 17, no. 2 (1989): 75-95.
- . "Islam in Somali History: Fact and Fiction." In *The Invention of Somalia*, edited by Ali J. Ahmed. Lawerenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995.
- Murer, Jeffrey S. "Institutionalizing Enemies: The Consequences of Reifying Projection in Post-Conflict Environments." *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society* 15, no. 1 (2010): 1-19.

- Nagle, John. *Social Movements in Violently Divided Societies: Constructing Conflict and Peacebuilding*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.
- Nayenga, Peter. "Myths and Realities of Idi Amin Dada's Uganda." *African Studies Review* 22, no. 2 (1979): 127-38.
- Newman, Edward. "'Liberal' Peacebuilding Debates." In *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*, edited by Edward Newman, Roland Paris and Oliver P. Richmond, 26-53. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009.
- Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala. "The Relationship of Political Settlement Analysis to Peacebuilding from a Feminist Perspective." *Peacebuilding* 4, no. 2 (2016): 151-65.
- Nilsson, Desirée. "Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace." *International Interactions* 38, no. 2 (2012): 243-66.
- Nyamnjoh, Francis B. "From Bounded to Flexible Citizenship: Lessons from Africa." *Citizenship Studies* 11, no. 1 (2007): 73-82.
- Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. "The Politics of Citizenship in the Democratic Republic of Congo." In *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*, edited by S. Dorman, D. Hammett and P. Nugent, 69-80. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Omaar, Rakiya. "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time." *Current History* 93, no. 583 (1994): 232.
- Paarlberg-Kvam, Kate. "What's to Come Is More Complicated: Feminist Visions of Peace in Colombia." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 21, no. 2 (2019): 194-223.
- Paffenholz, Thania. "Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion Dichotomy." *Negotiation Journal* 30, no. 1 (2014): 69-91.
- Paffenholz, Thania, and Nick Ross. "Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen's National Dialogue." *PRISM* 6, no. 1 (2016): 198-210.
- Pankhurst, Donna. "The 'Sex War' and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist Approach to Peace Building." *Development in Practice* 13, no. 2-3 (2003): 154-77.
- Pankhurst, E. Sylvia. *Ex-Italian Somaliland*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951.
- Paris, Roland. "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 54-89.

———. "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding." *Review of international studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 337-65.

Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. World Bank (Washington, DC: 2018).

Pestalozza, Luigi. *The Somalian Revolution*. Editions Afrique Asie Amérique Latine, 1974.

Phillips, Sarah. "When Less Was More: External Assistance and the Political Settlement in Somaliland." *International Affairs* 92, no. 3 (2016): 629-45.

Porter, Elisabeth. *Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective*. Abingdon Routledge, 2007.

Pospisil, Jan, and Alina Rocha Menocal. "Why Political Settlements Matter: Navigating Inclusion in Processes of Institutional Transformation." *Journal of International Development* 29, no. 5 (2017): 551-58.

Preti, Alessandro. "Guatemala: Violence in Peacetime - a Critical Analysis of the Armed Conflict and the Peace Process." *Disasters* 26, no. 2 (2002): 99-119.

Pring, Jamie. "Including or Excluding Civil Society? The Role of the Mediation Mandate for South Sudan (2013–2015) and Zimbabwe (2008–2009)." *African Security* 10, no. 3-4 (2017): 223-38.

Prunier, Gerard. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Prunier, Gerard, and Barbara Wilson. "A World of Conflict since 9/11: The Cia Coup in Somalia." *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 110 (2006): 749-52.

Rahmawati, Arifah, Dewi H Susilastuti, Mohtar Mas' oed, and Muhadjir Darwin. "The Negotiation of Political Identity and Rise of Social Citizenship: A Study of the Former Female Combatants in Aceh since the Helsinki Peace Accord." *Jurnal Humaniora* 30, no. 3 (2018): 237-47.

Reno, William. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

———. "African Rebels and the Citizenship Question." In *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*, edited by P Nugent, D Hammett and S Dorman. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

- Reuter, Tina K. "Including Minority Rights in Peace Agreements: A Benefit or Obstacle to Peace Processes after Ethnic Conflicts?". *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 19, no. 4 (2012): 359.
- Reyntjens, Filip. *Burundi: Prospects for Peace*. Minority Rights Group International (London: 2000).
- Richmond, Oliver P. *The Transformation of Peace*. Basingstoke: Plagrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Robinson, Fiona. *The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security*. Temple University Press, 2011.
- Roessler, Philip G., and Harry Verhoeven. *Why Comrades Go to War: Liberation Politics and the Outbreak of Africa's Deadliest Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Russell, Aidan. "Burundi, 1960-67: Loyal Subjects and Obedient Citizens." In *Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa : Dialogues between Past and Present*, 101-24. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2016.
- Sabaratnam, Meera. "Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace." *Security Dialogue* 44, no. 3 (2013): 259-78.
- Sadiq, Kamal. "Postcolonial Citizenship." In *The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship*, edited by A. Shachar, R. Bauböck, I. Bloemraad and M. Vink, 178-200. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Safran, William. "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return." *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no. 1 (1991): 83-99.
- Samatar, Abdi I. "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 4 (1992): 625-41.
- . *Africa's First Democrats: Somalia's Aden A. Osman and Abdirazak H. Hussen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016.
- Samatar, Said S., ed. *In the Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa*. Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1992.
- Schwartz, Joan M., and Terry Cook. "Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory." *Archival Science* 2, no. 1 (2002): 1-19.
- Scott, Joan Wallach. *Gender and the Politics of History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

- Shehim, K., and J. Searing. "Djibouti and the Question of Afar Nationalism." *African Affairs* 79, no. 315 (1980): 209-26.
- Sheik-Abdi, Abdi. "Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 15, no. 4 (1977): 657-65.
- . "Ideology and Leadership in Somalia." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 19, no. 1 (1981): 163-72.
- . *Divine Madness: Moḥammed Abdulle Ḥassan (1856-1920)*. London: Zed Books, 1993.
- Shepherd, Laura. *Gender, U.N. Peacebuilding, and the Politics of Space: Locating Legitimacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Shepherd, Nick. "The Politics of Archaeology in Africa." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31, no. 1 (2002): 189-209.
- Shuval, Judith T. "Diaspora Migration: Definitional Ambiguities and a Theoretical Paradigm." *International Migration* 38, no. 5 (2000): 41-56.
- Sieder, Rachel, ed. *Rethinking Citizenship: Reforming the Law in Postwar Guatemala*. Edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*. Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 2001.
- Silberman, Léo. "Why the Haud Was Ceded." *Cahiers d'Études africaines* (1961): 37-83.
- Singer, Norman J. "Modernization of Law in Ethiopia: A Study in Process and Personal Values." *Harvard International Law Journal* 11, no. 1 (1970 1970): 73-125. 125.
- Sisk, Timothy D. *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. Washington, DC.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996.
- Skjeie, Hege, and Birte Siim. "Scandinavian Feminist Debates on Citizenship." *International Political Science Review* 21, no. 4 (2000): 345-60.
- Smith, Lahra. *Making Citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, Gender, and National Identity in Ethiopia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Snyder, Jack. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2000.

Srinivasan, Sharath. "Negotiating Violence: Sudan's Peacemakers and the War in Darfur." *African Affairs* 113, no. 450 (2013): 24-44.

Stedman, Stephen John. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 5-53.

Stern, Maria. *Naming Security-Constructing Identity: 'Mayan-Women' in Guatemala on the Eve of 'Peace'*. Manchester University Press, 2005.

Subotić, Jelena. "Ethics of Archival Research on Political Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* (2020).

Taylor, Charles. "The Dynamics of Democratic Exclusion." *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 4 (1998): 143-56.

Thakur, Ramesh. "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Un Operation in Somalia." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no. 3 (1994): 387-410.

Thompson, Norma. *Herodotus and the Origins of the Political Community: Arion's Leap*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.

Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff. *Djibouti and the Horn of Africa*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Thomson, Susan, An Ansoms, and Jude Murison, eds. *Emotional and Ethical Challenges for Field Research in Africa: The Story Behind the Findings*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012.

Touval, Saadia. *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Tripodi, Paolo. "Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled Independence." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 32, no. 2/3 (1999a): 359-80.

———. *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: From Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999b.

Tripp, Aili Mari. *Women and Power in Post-Conflict Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Tripp, Aili Mari, Myra Marx Ferree, and Christina Ewig, eds. *Gender, Violence, and Human Security: Critical Feminist Perspectives*. New York: NYU Press, 2013.

- Tronvoll, Kjetil. "The Process of Nation-Building in Post-War Eritrea: Created from Below or Directed from Above?". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 3 (1998): 461-82.
- True, Jacqui, and Yolanda Riveros-Morales. "Towards Inclusive Peace: Analysing Gender-Sensitive Peace Agreements 2000–2016." *International Political Science Review* 40, no. 1 (2019): 23-40.
- Trunji, Mohamed I. *Somalia: The Untold History 1941-1969*. Leicester: Looh Press, 2015.
- Tsuda, Takeyuki, ed. *Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return Migration in Comparative Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Tull, Denis M., and Andreas Mehler. "The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa." *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (2005): 375-98.
- Turton, E. R. "Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule and the Development of Somali Political Activity in Kenya 1893–1960." *The Journal of African History* 13, no. 1 (1972): 119-43.
- Utas, Mats ed. *African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks*. London: Zed Books, 2012.
- Vandeginste, Stef. "Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The Costs and Benefits of Burundi's 2010 Elections." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 2 (2011): 315-35.
- Verhoeven, Harry. "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States: Somalia, State Collapse and the Global War on Terror." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 3 (2009): 405-25.
- Vlassenroot, Koen. "Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge." *Review of African Political Economy* 29, no. 93-94 (2002/09/01 2002): 499-516.
- Walby, Sylvia. "Is Citizenship Gendered?". *Sociology* 28, no. 2 (1994): 379-95.
- Walls, Michael. "The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland." *African Affairs* 108, no. 432 (2009): 371-89.
- Walzer, Michael. "Citizenship." In *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, edited by T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson, 211-20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Warburg, Gabriel R. "From Sufism to Fundamentalism: The Mahdiyya and the Wahhabiyya." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 4 (2009): 661-72.

- Ware, Gilbert. "Somalia: From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950-1960." *Phylon* 26, no. 2 (1965): 173-85.
- Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Webersik, Christian. "Bargaining for the Spoils of War: Somalia's Failing Path from War to Peace." *African Security* 7, no. 4 (2014): 277-302.
- Weitzberg, Keren. *We Do Not Have Borders : Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017.
- Werner, Suzanne, and Amy Yuen. "Making and Keeping Peace." *International Organization* 59, no. 2 (2005): 261-92.
- Wise, Laura. "Setting Aside the "Others": Exclusion Amid Inclusion of Non-Dominant Minorities in Peace Agreements." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 24, no. 3 (2018): 311-23.
- Yack, Bernard. *The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.
- Yanow, Dvora, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea. *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.
- Yordanov, Radoslav. *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa During the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016.
- . "Free to Decide Their Destiny? Indigenous Resistance to External Forms of Socialist Modernity in Siad Barre's Somalia." *Third World Quarterly* (2020): 1-17.
- Yousuf, Zahbia, and Sophia Close. "Gendered Political Settlements and Peacebuilding: Mapping Inclusion in Practice." *feminists@law* 9, no. 1 (2019): 1-19.
- Záhořík, Jan. "Reconsidering Ethiopia's Ethnic Politics in the Light of the Addis Ababa Master Plan and Anti-Governmental Protests." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 8, no. 3 (2017): 257-72.
- Zoppi, Marco. "Somalia: Federating Citizens or Clans? Dilemmas in the Quest for Stability." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 36, no. 1 (2018): 54-70.