# MOBILISATION BEYOND THE MOVEMENT: CONTENTION, AFFINITIES AND CONVERGENCE IN NEW YORK, CAIRO AND PARIS

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## Abstract

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Amid the 2011 Arab Revolts, and the subsequent worldwide Occupy movement, social movement scholars faced sudden, powerful mass mobilisations without easily identifiable resources, networks, or forms of organisation underlying them. These instances of mobilisation beyond the scope of what we traditionally consider 'the movement' have stretched existing theories of social movements to their limits, defying both conventional theoretical frameworks and existing approaches. This work undertakes a novel analysis of mobilisation which accounts for these new, disruptive cases. It advances the concept of Affinity: a predisposition to participate in certain causes based on social or psychological traits. Alongside this concept, it outlines conditions of Convergence: emergent situations, frames and spaces which encourage those with such Affinity to temporarily participate in mass mobilisations. These two concepts are advanced and developed through a study of the 2011 Egyptian Revolt and Occupy Wall Street movement, alongside the classic case of the 1789 French Revolution. These cases are analysed in comparative perspective to develop a powerful analytical tool with which scholars can augment conventional analyses: The Affinity-Convergence Model of Mobilisation.

## Preface

### **Declaration:**

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the Preface and specified in the text.

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for my Degree Committee.

For my sisters, Zoe and Alice.

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## Introduction

The arrival of the new year in 2011 marked an upsurge in contention across the globe. Tunisians overthrew President Ben Ali in the early days of January, and Egyptians began their own revolution later that month. Furthermore, protests had erupted in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. This Arab Spring was met with a Spanish Summer, during which the 15M 'Indignados' movement took the country by storm. Later that year, this trajectory culminated in an 'American Autumn' in the form of the Occupy Movement, a movement which would eventually come to spread around the world. It had been, as TIME Magazine declared, 'The Year of the Protester'<sup>1</sup>. "No one could have known that when a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire in a public square, it would incite protests that would topple dictators and start a global wave of dissent," the article's lead began, "In 2011, protesters didn't just voice their complaints; they changed the world."

The Year of the Protester marked a seismic shift which disquieted commentators and social scientists worldwide. Social change was not supposed to be made by protesters, but by movements: the networks, organisations and networks of organisations which traditionally underpinned contentious politics. Consequently, those of us studying social movements and revolutions moved to investigate these new cases in the hope of finding something which might confirm or conform to existing models. Early investigations were not particularly fruitful. The Arab Spring was found to have occurred in a context where movements were either passive, weak or disorganised (Kinele, 2012, Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos, 2012; Berman, 2013). Similarly, the 2011 social movements were similarly 'non-affiliated and non-programmatic' (Tormey, 2012), as well as 'disorganised'(Borosage, 2011; Maskovsky, 2013; Min, 2015; Welty, 2014). In other words: the cases didn't fit the theory.

Contention in 2011 problematised our understanding of social movements as reliant upon cohesive and sustained sets of organisations or networks pursuing particular goals, even in the broadest sense. Instead, the 2011 revolutions and movements came together in the form of short-term episodes, in which the masses converged around particular flashpoints of contention: a situation, a space, or even a frame. These profound mobilisations existed for short periods of time, and involved a great array of individuals and groups not united by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This is from TIME's 2011 review of the year (Andersen, 2011).

clear organisational or network ties. Mobilisation, it seemed, was happening beyond, rather than only within the movement.

It was this problem which prompted the central research question which I investigate in this thesis:

How can we explain the mobilisation of people who are neither members of social movements, nor part of the networks around these movements, during periods of social and political contention?

Addressing this question required appropriate cases. Given that these disorganised, decentralised, non-affiliated mobilisations appeared to span socio-political contexts, and yet retain similar core features, I chose two cases which reflected both the central tendencies and the variety of the 'Year of the Protester' cases: the "Eighteen Days" of revolution in Cairo which felled the Mubarak regime, and the Occupy Wall Street movement in New York, which appeared at the culmination of the 2011 wave. Beyond this, however, I was keen that whatever processes or mechanisms which I uncovered should be tested beyond this purely 'novel' context.

While I envisaged that the 2011 'Year of the Protester' cases would prove to be useful in theorising the process of mass mobilisation beyond movements, I reasoned that the phenomenon itself would not be entirely exclusive to the cases in which it was most clearly exemplified. Though it may have seemed that, as TIME (Andersen, 2011) had put it in their review of the year, this kind of protest "was a global oxymoron until – suddenly, shockingly –starting exactly a year ago, it became the defining trope of our times," I wanted to see if whatever dynamics were at the heart of the 2011 cases could be detected and analysed elsewhere. Accordingly, instead of opting for a third element from the 2011 wave, I decided instead to bring in a classic case in the study of social protest: the French Revolution of 1789.

The French Revolution was particularly pivotal in offering some kind of potential generalisability to the concepts I would cultivate in the 2011 cases. A staple case for theorists of social movements and revolutions for generations, the revolution has always contained "an element of spontaneity that defies a more exact analysis" (Rude, 1959:231). In unpicking this element of spontaneity in the French case, I was able to show that it

contained similar elements to the 2011 cases, which we have posited as 'new', or otherwise underpinned by developments in information and communication technologies (Castells, 2012; Farrell, 2012; Lotan et. al., 2011; Howard and Hussein, 2013; Juris, 2012).

At the outset of my research, I was not entirely sure of the exact means by which the kind of mobilisation I wanted to study was taking place. Accordingly, my initial hypothesis, from which I developed theory was relatively open:

Beyond movements and their networks, contentious episodes also attract participation from individuals who either consciously or unconsciously come to participate under certain conditions which make that participation more favourable.

I was able to refine this hypothesis through what Mann (1986: vii) describes as a "zigzagging" method: pouring over theory, then historical and comparative evidence, then returning to theory again and so on until a satisfactory theory is reached<sup>2</sup>. This was a reflexive process of theorisation and empirical work, which took place until I was able to reach a more specific hypothesis:

Beyond movements and their networks, contentious episodes also attract participation by means of 'affinity', particularly in conditions of 'convergence', in which affinities are more likely to become activated in favour of participation.

**Affinity** describes individuals' predispositions to participate in certain causes based on social or psychological traits (or **affinities**). Conditions of **convergence** describes the emergent situations, frames and spaces which encourage those with affinity to a cause to temporarily participate in mass mobilisations. These are theorised and exemplified at greater length in my first chapter.

Drawing inspiration from the later work of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), as well as that of Emirbayer (1997) and Skocpol (1979), I begin my analysis with the broader contentious episodes, rather than a particular 'movement'. Though such episodes might

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> We could, broadly speaking, call this a form of grounded theory (see Charmaz, 2014).

involve social movements, there are also plenty of dynamics which may extend beyond them. It is critical to capture these dynamics if we wish to explain the full scope of mobilisation, rather than just that explicitly solicited by the sets of organisations and networks affiliated with a given movement.

My analysis uncovered affinity and convergence at work across all of the cases I studied. Within cases, the particular affinities and conditions of convergence which I detected differed somewhat. In the case of Occupy Wall Street, affinities were crucial in the expansion of a relatively small, uncoordinated action into an altogether more momentous phenomenon. The occupation of Wall Street created an exceptional space which activated all manner of subtler, less conscious affinities. Later on, once the occupation became established, a kind of opportune situation emerged, which drew in many with more conscious psychological affinities such as perceived injustices, shared attitudes and progressive identities.

In the Egyptian case, affinity and convergence proved central in sparking the outpouring of protest activity that characterised the Eighteen Days. In the revolution's early days this manifest in the form of social affinities such as class, shared space, and patterns of behaviour. These affinities converged in the mosques and streets of Cairo on January 28<sup>th</sup>. Once an occupation had been established in Tahrir, a different set of affinities came to prominence. These were the same triad seen in the case of Occupy: perceptions, attitudes and identities. These were activated by a combination of intersecting conditions of convergence. First among these was an exceptional space, in the form of Tahrir, in which Egyptians were able to encounter one another in an autonomous and open context, in which the usual social ills of sexual assault and risk of crime were suspended, while the barriers of interaction between social classes seemed also to have been temporarily lifted by the revolutionary aura of the square. This was bolstered by Tahrir's character as a paramount space, a location literally named "Liberation" in the wake of Egypt's 1919 revolution. These spatial characteristics were augmented by an opportune situation prompted by the sudden evaporation of police repression, removing many of the barriers to protest and participation which had previously come about. Finally, there emerged a paramount frame and situation of 'revolution', which inverted the social costs and benefits of participation for those who were interested.

Finally, in the French case, revolutionary mobilisation began in a fashion which drew on a broad array of psychological and social affinities, activated by a sudden frame and time of possibility created by political events such as the convocation of the Estates General. Over time, this configuration changed, and mobilisation came to draw on more specific perceptions and attitudes which had developed over time in an emergent revolutionary public. This latter context of mobilisation centred around distinct spaces of convergence, in which an exceptional state of revolutionary activity - in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Zuccotti or Tahrir – was a permanent presence. Further to this, I found that without the technological apparatus which made networking easy, or a political context which enabled rapid organisation, the use of affinity and convergence in mobilising the masses extended well beyond the brief period in which they were evoked during the Occupy and Egyptian cases.

Drawing these cases together in comparative perspective, I have summarised my findings in the form of a model, in which affinity to a cause leads to participation under the catalysing conditions of convergence. This is expressed below.

## Affinity $\xrightarrow{convergence}$ Participation

#### Figure 1. The Affinity-Convergence Model of Mobilisation

In the first chapter of this manuscript, I discuss the theoretical underpinnings of my approach before articulating my concepts of 'affinity' and 'convergence', and overviewing the research methods I employed. My approach builds on decades of research in social movement studies and contentious politics, more recent innovations in network theory and analysis, and social psychological research on collective action. The second, third, and fourth chapters consist of detailed analyses of the American, Egyptian and French cases in turn. Finally, my conclusion discusses my findings from the previous chapters in an explicitly comparative perspective, and crystallises some key conclusions, including an evaluation of the project, an assessment of its empirical and conceptual contribution, and a sketch for the shape of future inquiry.

## **Chapter 1. Theory and Method**

This chapter develops two concepts in dialogue with existing theory: **affinity**, and **convergence**. The first portion of this chapter discusses and draws together aspects of existing work on social movements and contentious politics, complementing them with advances in network theory and research in social psychology. The second portion moves on to formulate affinity and convergence explicitly, showing their interrelation in the form of a model, which I call '**The Affinity-Convergence Model of Mobilisation'**. The chapter then closes with a discussion of the comparative and historical methods with which I approached my research across three cases: Occupy Wall Street, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and the 1789 French Revolution.

In addition to organisations and networks, I advance that contentious episodes such as revolutions, riots or widespread protests can also attract participation by means of affinity and convergence (the process of Affinity-Convergence mobilisation). Within the context of social protest, affinity is a predisposition, based on a person's social or psychological traits, to participate in causes. Social traits include social status (race, class, gender), places of residence, patterns of activity and other social identifiers. Psychological traits include attitudes (tastes, ideology moral values), perceptions of injustice, social identity, and other individual identifiers. These affinities influence everyday behaviour to some degree. In most contexts, affinities are not strong enough to drive individuals to become political activists by joining movements or networks. However, affinities can be activated during periods of contention, triggered by conditions of convergence, in which new situations, frames and spaces of contention encourage them to temporarily participate due to their opportune, exceptional or paramount characteristics. This definition draws on work within social psychology, most particularly the psychology of 'life paths' (Bandura, 1982) and collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes and Spaces, 2008).

It should be stressed that I conceptualise Affinity-Convergence mobilisation as a fainter means of mobilisation than either movements' mobilising structures (Tarrow, 1998) or their networked supporters. It exists alongside these other dynamics of mobilisation, and is often complemented by them. Potential participants in contention by means of affinity are generally unlikely to prove to be a reliable or dependable element in mobilisations. Conditions of convergence are therefore key in making the prospect of participation more immediate or apparent. Furthermore, such conditions often emerge as a consequence of prior actions of those within the movement or its networks.

### 1.1 Theoretical Influences: Movements, Networks and Psychology

This section is intended to give an overview of the various theoretical influences which this manuscript either draws from or responds to in some way. As the section is quite extensive, it is worth giving a brief overview of its contents.

This section opens with a discussion of classical theory in social movement studies, focusing on the collective behaviour and relative deprivation approaches. These approaches are discussed because they approached a parallel problem to the one which I did in my research: how to explain and understand instances of mobilisation beyond the bounds of movements and networks. It should be noted, however, that though these theories approached a similar problem to my own, they did so as an attempt to understand the totality of mobilisation in the absence of sophisticated work on the role of either organisations or networks. By contrast, I draw upon this early work in order to consider how to extend our account of mobilisation to those beyond the scope of these organisations and networks.

Having discussed classical theory, I then offer a discussion of the dominant theoretical trajectory in social movement studies from the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century until the 2011 protest wave. I explain the general progression of the field, which begins with an organisational turn away from theories of collective behaviour in favour of rational choice and resource mobilisation approaches. I then articulate how the field passed through the structuralist tradition of political process theories and, subsequently, the contentious politics paradigm. Faced with growing evidence that an organisational account of social movements was insufficient, this tendency culminated in a shift to networked approaches to social movements.

As discussed in the introduction, these networked approaches have experienced difficulty in explaining the rapid mass mobilisation we have witnessed in episodes of protest since 2011. We are reaching the explanatory limits of this 'movement-network' approach to mobilisation, in which social movements, alongside their broader networks, are envisaged as actively recruiting participants for protest. Instead, we are faced with cases in which individuals outside of movement-networks demonstrably participate en-masse in mobilisations; often in numbers which dwarf the scope of these much smaller networks. A key theoretical question thus emerges: how can we understand these cases of mobilisation which involve those outside of either movement-organisations or movement-networks? In other words, how do we understand mobilisation beyond the movement? To achieve this, I argue, we must take the scope of mass mobilisation to its limit, and adopt a broader perspective.

This section ends by moving towards this broader perspective, engaging with work in social psychology in order to begin thinking about the individual and collective antecedents of participation in social movements. In considering these factors, I set the stage for the articulation of my master concepts in the next section (**1.2**): affinity and convergence.

#### The Lessons of Classical Theory: Collective Behaviour and Relative Deprivation

The first theoretical elements from which I draw in building my concepts of affinity and convergence come in form of the classical theories of social movements, most particularly theories of collective behaviour and relative deprivation. These perspectives on social movements emerged from a tradition of social movement studies which had held firm in some way or other for the better part of a century. This perspective understood a social movement as "an instinctive effort to get for more men the things that have seemed to be good for some men" (Small, 1897:349-350), characterised by profound popular upsurges. Far from "the inertia of the many slightly disturbed by the few," social movements were understood to arise from the masses themselves. "It is the momentum of the many," Albion W. Small (1897:344) wrote, in one of the first articles of social theory written on social movements "hardly restrained by all the arts that the few can contrive."

Though the use of the term would change over time, social movements were initially understood to take the form of popular mobilisations rather than the structured, organisational ventures stipulated by later theorists. Consequently, much of early social movement theory, once referred to as the "classical models" (e.g. Morris and Herring, 1984), sought to discover how these popular mobilisations took form. These theories drew from work in social psychology, and took the form of three intersecting fields of study: the study of collective behaviour, the study of 'mass societies', and work on relative deprivation. At the core of these approaches was the co-investigation of structural conditions, shared beliefs, and participant psychology. While classical theorists recognised that movements sometimes involved organisational forms or consciously developed strategies in their paths for success, they maintained that these were not their core means of mobilisation. Among these theories, perhaps the two most relevant are theories of the social movement as a form of collective behaviour and the relative deprivation perspective advanced by Ted Gurr (1970).

The first of these perspectives, the collective behaviour approach, pertained to more than just social movements: it described all manner of uprisings, riots, religious movements, and even popular fads. Collective behaviour "is not based on the adherence to common understandings or rules," Herbert Blumer (1951: 171) argued in his landmark article on the topic. Instead, Blumer alleged, moments of collective behaviour emerged in relatively unstructured or undefined conditions. Where the study of social movements was concerned, collective behaviour approaches made claims which would now seem quite radical, rejecting the notion that movements could be studied as "stable groups or established institutions." (Killian, 1964: 427) Instead, movements were sets of "groups and institutions in the process of becoming" (Killian, 1964: 427), able to construct emergent norms, values, and ideas of their own. As Turner and Killian (1957:29) put it in their volume on the topic, far from being managed by established organisations, "collective behaviour occurs when the established organisation ceases." If stable groups were to play a role, it was only to provide a point of contact and coordination around which these more spontaneous mass mobilisations could rally (Lang and Lang, 1961).

Though their research was seldom empirically interrogated, and often only loosely theorised, the work of classical theorists offered some useful starting points for thinking about the problem I was addressing: how mass mobilisation might occur beyond the scope of movements and their networks. Not least, these theories offer us with two conceptual halves to the problem of mobilisation outside of an organisational context. Not only were there particular kinds of conditions under which those with these predispositions might come together, but that this coming-together was a consequence of individuals' underlying predispositions.

The first of these conceptual halves - the process by which these crowds, masses and mobs came together - was sometimes referred to as 'convergence', though little work was done to develop this notion. Nonetheless, we can begin to look at some of the conditions for mobilisation which the collective behaviour theorists posited to get a sense of what convergence might look like. These theorists saw mobilisation as taking place in unstructured conditions (Blumer, 1951), in which established norms and rules were suspended or otherwise altered (Killian, 1964), and where established organisations lost grip on individuals (Turner and Killian, 1957) in favour of looser points of contact and coordination (Lang and Lang, 1961). This offers a starting point from which we can begin to consider a more thorough concept of convergence as including some kind of exceptional character, where the capacity to act on a predisposition to protest is somehow enhanced by a change in material, symbolic, or other conditions.

In addition to the briefly expressed notion of convergence, collective behaviour theorists also offered the promising suggestion that there existed some form of 'dispositional vulnerability' to participation in social movement, which was posited to arise from emotional, cognitive or personality traits such as a sense of 'heightened frustration... relative deprivation, alienation, [and] spoiled or stigmatised identities', as well as, in the case of more charismatic causes, an authoritarian personality (Snow and Rohlinger, 2013:1). More than this, these theories even indicated that otherwise unconnected individuals' psychological and social traits could underpin spontaneous participation in collective behaviour without, or even in defiance of formal organisation (Turner and Killian, 1957: 28-29). This early work thus offers some interesting avenues of enquiry with regards to the question of participation from beyond the movement.

Beyond these collective behaviour theories, further promising developments came in the form of the doctoral dissertation of Ted Gurr: *Why Men Rebel* (1970). Gurr was largely concerned with the dynamics of participation in resistant action, and attempted to offer cognitive models of why individuals might come to converge at the point of action in phenomena such as popular riot or revolution. The solution was what Gurr termed the "relative deprivation" approach, one of the variables which other classical theorists had posited as a potential causal motor. This approach focused on the generation of frustration which would manifest as subsequent aggression toward social structures.

Gurr advanced that in order to understand actions of social protest and rebellion there were three general mobilising factors one should investigate: "popular discontent (relative deprivation)," "people's justifications or beliefs about the justifiability and utility of political action" and "the balance between discontented people's capacity to act—that is, the ways in which they are organised—and the government's capacity to repress or channel their anger" (Gurr, 2011). Of these three factors, Gurr's analysis prioritised the role of collective 'relative deprivation' – the perceived discrepancy between "the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled," and "the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping" (1970:23-24). The consequence of this discrepancy was the perception of injustice among the groups in question. Gurr's work offers a first empirical interrogation of mobilisation beyond movements, highlighting the potential of shared frustrations and socio-economic circumstances to manifest in collective action independent of (though conducive to) deliberate provocation.

Though these theories received very little subsequent sociological development, they remained an active topic of discussion among those in the field of social psychology over the subsequent decades. Despite their rather peculiar (in retrospect) characterisation of those who participated in collective action as deviant or disturbed, classical theories advanced two interesting ideas which resonated with my own research. The first of these was the idea that individuals' psychological and social traits in some way underpinned or influenced their participation in protest. The second was simply in giving name to the kind of circumstances in which this took place: 'convergence'.

### Movement-Organisations and Political Opportunities

While many the early theorists of social movements advanced a vision of their participants as somehow disordered or psychologically disturbed, their younger colleagues were actively participating in social movements themselves, and hence were not particularly invested in supporting such aspersions about their comrades (Morris and Herring, 1984). Though Gurr and his fellow theorists of collective action had offered some promising theories, a rising school of economists and other social scientists<sup>1</sup> came to object to these classical models. Attributing social movements to the kinds of mass emotions and actions seen in collective behaviour theories was, they argued, irrational and illogical, particularly in the absence of supporting empirical work.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Morris and Herring's (1984) work for an excellent discussion of this trend, including interviews with key figures such as Olson (1965), McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Oberschall (1973, 1978), as well as a number of the collective behaviour theorists they were responding to.

Rational choice research presented a new focus on how movements were able to engage and motivate rational agents in concerted forms of predetermined action. One early contribution, Olson's (1965) 'Rational Action' approach, stumbled over a 'free rider problem', in which Olson was unable to explain why individuals would participate in mass mobilisations where they could retain the benefit of the mobilisation without bearing the risk of participation. The problem was resolved by the organisational sociologists John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, who offered a model of movements as resource-mobilising organisations (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

McCarthy and Zald's work would spark the beginning of a new dominant approach to the study of social movements, grounded in ideas about resource mobilisation and organisational capacity<sup>2</sup> which they crystallised in their own 'Resource Mobilisation Theory'. Resource Mobilisation Theory took stock of rational choice approaches to studying individual behaviour, with the core pretext that individuals' rational actions and exchanges were the fabric of social life. Their approach considered how movements utilise their resources (such as money, tools, and supporters) and organisational structures to achieve their goals. For McCarthy and Zald, social movements constituted "a set of opinions and beliefs [representing] preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society," empowered by a clearly defined 'Social Movement Organisation' [SMO] which constituted "a complex, or formal, organisation which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1218).

In many ways McCarthy and Zald's work served as the core structure for the entire series of research on social movements which would follow it. In this regard, it had a rather regrettable impact on the study of social movements by redefining them chiefly as organisational activities, around which a concretely affiliated collective would congregate. In many ways, their analysis had stripped the notion of a social movement of its social component and reframed movements as merely a set of goals pursued by an organised interest group. Indeed, the allegation that McCarthy and Zald's theory was little more than a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> These included: Lipsky's (1968) analysis of protest as a political resource; Gamson's 1968 *Power and Discontent* and 1975 *The Strategy of Protest*; Oberschall's 1973 *Social Conflict and Social Movements*; Downs' (1972) study of 'issue attention cycles' and McCarthy and Zald's (1977) analysis of professionalisation and resource mobilisation.

theory of interest groups was definitively advanced by contemporary sociologists such as Oberschall (Morris and Herring, 1984)<sup>3</sup>, who alleged that many of the 'movement organisations' which McCarthy and Zald's theory depicts describes as Social Movement Organisations "are actually interest groups." Indeed, McCarthy and Zald's examples of movement organisations generally orbited around sectional causes with sectional demands, such as the AFL-CIO's lobbying wing, and the National Council for Senior Citizens. By contrast they paid comparatively less attention to the enormous popular movements of oppressed and disadvantaged Americans, oriented around racial justice and civil rights, which were taking the United States by storm at that very moment.

While it was McCarthy and Zald's Resource Mobilisation Theory which would find an enduring place in the future study of social movements, their theory had a substantial challenger in the form of Piven and Cloward's (1977) *Poor Peoples' Movements*. Rather than the "purposive efforts of leaders and organisers," Piven and Cloward (1977:37) argued, it was the underlying institutional conditions of a given society that gave shape (and gave rise) to contemporary protest movements. In particular, Piven and Cloward evoked strands reminiscent of earlier 'collective behaviour' literature: relative deprivation (which they attribute to a cast of Marxist figures rather than to Gurr), and what they call "location", or "institutional context" (18-25). "Opportunities for defiance are structured by the general features of institutional life," Piven and Cloward (1977:21-23) stressed, with these features "shap[ing] mass movements by shaping the collectivity out of which protest can arise." For Piven and Cloward, this was evidenced by the distinction between the context of factory work, which furnished labourers with common experiences, and casual labouring, which gave workers had no such common experiences to draw on.

Though they conceded that "disruption itself is not necessarily spontaneous", Piven and Cloward's (1977:26-7) vision of disruption along class lines was wholeheartedly inspired by Rosa Luxemburg's notion of the mass strike. Citing Luxemburg (in Dick, 1971:231-245) at length, they likened poor peoples' movements to Luxemburg's mass strike: "not artificially 'made'... but rather it is an historical phenomenon...with historical necessity". Piven and Cloward in a great sense 'spontaneists': followers of Luxemburg's contention that the core of revolutionary upsurge came from below. Accordingly, unlike much of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This quote is drawn from an interview conducted by Morris and Herring (1984).

academic literature with which they were in dialogue, Piven and Cloward's (1977) work was an intervention in revolutionary theory as much as it was an intervention in social theory.<sup>4</sup>

At the core of Piven and Cloward's work was the contention that social conditions alone could create the conditions for unrest, a contention which they furnished with a considerable degree of evidence, considering four cases in notable detail. Nonetheless, their work was also criticised for its selective ignorance of the role of organisers in the accounts of each case. One particularly important review by Gamson and Schmeidler (1984:578) highlighted the deep inaccuracies of Piven and Cloward's "implied lack of organisation" in events such as the Montgomery Bus Boycott, with organisations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) confined to the side-lines or neglected entirely, despite the palpable and important role which they had played. Piven and Cloward's were guilty of "badly overstating their argument", Gamson and Schmeilder (1984:583-4) concluded, offering more of an "anti-organisational philippic" than a workable general theory. Such criticisms were not solitary in nature, with a great many reviews of Poor Peoples' Movements offering similar lines of concern, much to the chagrin of its authors (Piven and Cloward, 1979:ix-xi). Though criticised harshly at the time, it would be judicious to not reject Piven and Cloward's work entirely. As Lefkowitz's(2003) retrospective on Poor Peoples' Movements noted, many elements of Piven and Cloward's theoretical model were returned to in later work in the tradition.

The major attempt to extend and rehabilitate McCarthy and Zald's work on resource mobilisation, came in the form of political process theories, many of which incorporated the notion of institutional context present in Piven and Cloward's work, but with a more notably organisational focus . In an attempt to address a number of difficulties which resource-mobilisation oriented theories had experienced in explaining non-professional, less rigorous instances of social movements involving an array or set of organisations,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The pair had only ten years prior advocated for the necessity of "crisis strategy" in markedly Luxemburgish terms. Rather than relying on concrete organisation and collective bargaining, Piven and Cloward argued, the American left should focus on the creation of a "dramatic political crisis," culminating in a collection of overwhelming "spontaneous disruptions... defined by its participants:" the poor (Cloward and Piven, 1966).

political process theories were advanced in a variety of evolving forms by Oberschall (1978), Gamson (1980), Tilly (1978, 1984, 1995), McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1998). The approach grounded resource-mobilisation discourses in the analysis of political opportunity structures: the political and institutional context of social change. This structuralist turn in social movement studies offered a vision of social movements as "a sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation," involving "publicly visible demands.... with public demonstrations of support" (Tilly, 1984: 306).

These political process theories constituted a move to a broader understanding of social movements, in which diverse sets of organisations, with varying structures and capacities were able to mobilise in coalition around a particular political opportunity. The approach offered a notable improvement on McCarthy and Zald's vision of a single monolithic movement-organisation as the sole mobilising force of a social movement. Nonetheless, while breaking free of the 'interest group' model of social movement organisations, political process theories largely retained the notion of a movement embodied principally by formal organisations, albeit networked with one another and drawing upon a broader cohort of supporters with which they had connections. These movements utilised 'mobilising structures'– sets of resources or capacities which they could deploy in order to "bring people together in the field, shape coalitions, confront opponents, and assure their own future after the exhilaration of the peak of mobilisation has passed" (Tarrow, 1998:123).

Political process theorists conceived of movements as coming to prominence at a given moment of 'political opportunity', a period of time in which social movements were able to mobilise and contend more effectively or more easily, such as after a drop-in repression, extension in franchise, elite vulnerability, or any other such moment which organisers might capitalise upon. There were, however, a number of issues with this approach, not least that the notion of 'political opportunity' was so incredibly expansive that it in effect served as "a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment" (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:275). Likewise, even the theory's former proponents have argued that political opportunities are a too heavily structured, organiser-centric concept. Tarrow, in his 1998 volume *Power in Movement*, advocated a shift from conventional political opportunity theories to the broader consideration of the "not necessarily formal or permanent... dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in

contentious politics" (1998:19). Tarrow's proposition is an interesting one in that it offers the possibility to take an understanding of 'opportunity' beyond the purely political, movement-centric perspective, and refocus it on the process of contention more generally. What might these opportunities look like on a more decentralised basis? Just as sociopolitical contexts can play a role in accelerating the mobilisation of those connected to or integrated with movement organisations, we might expect the same kinds of circumstances to impact on those outside of movements, enhancing the chance that they will mobilise. I will develop this notion later in the chapter.

#### <u>The Movement-Network Approach and the Question of Identity</u>

By the mid-1980s, the dominant strand of research on social movements had come to focus squarely on movements as clearly defined groups, pursuing clearly defined goals. Even though the development of resource mobilisation theories into political process approaches meant that social movement organisations were not always considered as the formalised and sophisticated operations which McCarthy and Zald (1977) had advanced, the core notion of a social movement remained organisational in scope, with a notion of some form of 'membership' used to determine whether one was part of a movement theorists, and was reflected by early work in the political process school of thought, it was not without its critics. Indeed, almost as soon as the more organisational approach to social movement studies (advanced by political process theories) cemented itself as the dominant paradigm of social movement research, many social movement scholars were preparing to move beyond it (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999: 28).

"Too often, movement scholars write as if persons are unambiguously in or out of a movement... like the difference between members and non-members in formal organisations," Doug McAdam bemoaned in a (1986:66) article which would lay the foundations for McAdam's favoured 'Dynamics of Contention' (2001) paradigm, drawn together fifteen years later, in cooperation with Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly. Instead, McAdam advanced the notion that when carrying out particular acts of protest, movements drew from 'supportive networks' which did not necessarily consist of formal members, but were nonetheless clearly involved with, and possibly even occasional participants in movement activities. Of course, even McCarthy and Zald's (1977) Resource Mobilisation Theory had acknowledged that these supportive networks existed, but the notion that they might in fact rival organisations as the core unit of analysis was a rather different claim indeed. The work of theorists such McAdam in the wake of the social movements of the '60s and '70s formed part of a new network-centric approach to studying social movements. This approach contended that movement-networks, rather than being merely avenues for procuring resources, were the means by which we could understand how movements were able to mobilise on a scale far greater than their clearly defined members. To understand the movement – they argued – we must study the network.

Beyond this call for a more networked approach, a more general call for innovation in social movement studies was underway. The limited scope of Political Process Theory, it was argued, rendered it "tautological, trivial, inadequate...[and] just plain wrong" (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999:28). To the backdrop of such critiques came the suggestion by European sociologists that a series of 'new social movements' had emerged in the post-industrial era which characterised the late 1960s and 70s in Europe and the United States. Scholars of these 'new social movements', often called 'collective identity theorists', advanced the notion that these new movements had shattered previously all-encompassing analytical paradigms such as resource mobilisation and political process theories. Collective identity theorists argued that these new movements demonstrated that organisational dynamics were no longer sufficient as an analytical focus. Instead, these movements took the form of networks of diverse individuals and organisations, connected by a common cause.

In place of previous paradigms, the collective identity approach of the new social movement theorists offered a diverse set of perspectives oriented around the notion of movements as concerned with the creation, formation and recognition of collective identities, rather than straightforward matters of distributive justice. These new, "post-industrial" (Touraine, 1971) forms of collective action served to resist social control, rather than alter material conditions, by raising questions of identity. Social control, for the new social movement theorists, constituted the enforcement of autonomous conformity with pre-existing normative and cultural codes (Melucci, 1996). Accordingly, collective identity theories defined the new, modern social movement as one which comes to contest the political realm by creating recognition for identities with a different set of normative behaviours (e.g. LGBT, Environmentalist, Pacifist, Feminist, etc.). Accordingly, collective identity theorists argued that the questions of these new social movements could be answered by identifying the networked character of modern society (see: Castells, 1997) and, in turn, studying the networks which formed around these movements.

Alongside these various theoretical developments, the paradigm of social movement studies was gradually extended to re-include revolutions within its analytical frame. Beginning with McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's observation that "revolutionary situations resemble extreme cases of social movement cycles" (1996:24), Jack Goldstone (1998:128) took the first steps in reintroducing a theory of "revolutionary movements" to the political process paradigm. A revolutionary movement, Goldstone argued, was an alternative form of traditionally conceived social movements, in which initial social and political goals are either stated as, or evolve into, a more general aspiration to overthrow the state. The concept of revolutionary movements from 1945-91, which stressed the liminality between social movements and revolutionary social movements. Goodwin's (2001: 10-11) analysis found that, depending on circumstance, "social movements may become revolutionary, and revolutionary movements may become social." Even measures of radicalism were an inadequate means to reliably distinguish between each type of movement.

### **Relation, Contention, and Fragmentation**

In parallel with the development of new social movement theories, forward-thinking political process theorists also began to embrace a notion of contention which did not centre around concrete organisations. They also offered deep suspicion about the novelty of mobilisation around collective identity, pointing to the inherently identitarian components of previous movements. This was spearheaded in many ways by a 'relational' school of social movement studies, which would emerge in the 1990s. In defiance of the notion of uniquely networked 'new social movements', the relational school of social movement studies instead advanced that not only were social movements, by their very nature, inherently networked phenomena, but that social reality itself was 'relationally constituted' (Emirbayer, 1997; Tilly, 1995b). The early champions of this approach were Charles Tilly, Jeff Goodwin and Mustafa Emirbayer, who crystallised the core of their new approach in a 1995 symposium on "The Relational Turn in Macrosociology," hosted at the

New School.<sup>5</sup> From this symposium there emerged two separate perspectives, Tilly's 'relational realism' and Emirbayer's 'transactional approach.'

Emirbayer's contribution would offer a theoretical underpinning for subsequent relational studies of social movements and their networks. Instead of conceiving of society "as consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static things," Emirbayer's 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology' (1997: 281) advanced a vision of "dynamic unfolding relations... [in] continuous and processual terms." The Manifesto was explicitly designed to provide only the "essential features" of a relational approach, and accordingly, advanced an ontologically focused perspective (Emirbayer, 1997: 281-282). Beginning with the rejection of "the notion that one can posit discrete, pre-given units such as the individual, or society as ultimate starting points of sociological analysis," Emirbayer (1997: 287) drew from Marx, Simmel, Dewey and Durkheim in his development of a transactional model of relational sociology, which "sees relations between terms or units as... unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substances," with these transactions producing novel actors, entities and relations through the modification of previous forms.

Emirbayer's work would prove the touchstone for a more relational approach to social movements, informing a school of researchers working on the intersection of social movements and networks. Meanwhile, Tilly's (1995b) 'relational realism', would go on to form the basis of a similarly important sociological development, the collaborative project known as the 'contentious politics project' (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001). The project, run by Tilly alongside Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow would bring together a coalition of social movement theorists, such as "Ron Aminzade, Jack Goldstone, Elisabeth Perry [and] William Sewell Jr" (McAdam and Tarrow, 2011: 7). Its mission was to explain not only the dynamics of all social movements, but the essential dynamics of contention itself.

The project's proponents advanced that a key ontological mistake underlying rational choice analysis was still penetrating social movement studies. This mistake led to social movement theorists "considering individual minds as the basic, or even the unique sites of social reality and action," and accordingly focusing on "crucial decisions and their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For a more detailed account of the intellectual development of the relational sociology of the New York School see Ann Mische's chapter "Relational Sociology, Culture and Agency" in the SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis (2011).

rationales." By contrast, the ethos of the 'contentious politics project' advanced that "social transactions have an efficacious reality that is irreducible to individual mental events," (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 22). In turn, they proposed, studying contention required that we pay attention to the "webs of interaction among social sites." This constituted a change of focus from actors to their networks.

Though there had been a series of attempts to propose unified frameworks through which we could study social movements new and old (for example Diani, 1992), it was not until McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's (2001) Dynamics of Contention that a fully totalising theoretical perspective could be established. These authors not only attempted to synthesise decades of research on social movements, resistant action, and revolutions, but also to create a new field of 'contentious politics', which would cover research on 'transgressive' phenomena including "industrial conflict [and] war" as well as the contained contention of "interest group politics, nationalism, democratisation" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 6). Such a project was, as McAdam and Tarrow (2011: 5) put it in their ten-year retrospective analysis of Dynamics of Contention, "intentionally overambitious." Indeed, their framework was widely considered rather too totalising, and was dubbed "imperialistic" by supporters and critics alike (McAdam and Tarrow, 2011: 1). In retrospect, McAdam and Tarrow considered their theoretical arguments to be: unnecessarily state-centric, too broad and difficult to measure, and both conceptually and empirically undeveloped with respect to the notion of causal mechanisms. Nonetheless, despite the sense in which Dynamics of Contention could be considered to have stopped short of achieving a number of the objectives its authors had set out to meet, the work has served to establish a dominant paradigm for modern social movement research in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

As well as establishing 'contentious politics' as a field of academic enquiry, *Dynamics of Contention* made a number of other very important contributions to the study of social movements and revolutions. One of these, as mentioned above, was the creation of a framework which wholeheartedly integrated and went to some extent beyond the traditional analytical foci of social movement studies, with special effort given to resolving conflicts between the particularly divergent cultural and structural traditions. What emerged was a framework which adopted the notions of 'causal mechanisms, 'causal processes'<sup>6</sup> and 'contentious episodes'. The last of these concepts, that of 'contentious episodes' offered an alternative framework for studying contention.

For McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, contentious episodes constituted "bounded sequences of continuous interaction" which did not necessarily constitute a single, clearly delimited social movement and could instead pertain to any broader process of contention. Rather than studying a single entire movement, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly advanced; we can instead study specific episodes of contention, which might involve differential actors, protagonists and antagonists to a movement as a whole in order to gain particular insight into the concepts we wish to uncover. These "continuous streams of contention including collective claims-making that bears on other parties' interests," were the proposed format for case studies which researchers of contentious politics might adhere" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 28). In the case of this study, we could speak of Occupy Wall Street, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and the revolts of the early French Revolution as 'contentious episodes'.

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's notion of 'causal mechanisms', also offer substantial theoretical utility, defined as "a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 24). The causal mechanism, was for McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, the most basic unit of analysis for scholars of contentious politics, seated within a broader process. Such mechanisms included 'environmental mechanisms', "externally generated conditions affecting social life" such as "resource depletion or enhancement"; 'cognitive mechanisms', "alterations of individual and collective perception" such as "commitment…in which persons who individually would prefer not to take the risks of collective action find themselves unable to withdraw without hurting others whose solidarity they value"; and finally 'relational mechanisms' which "alter connections among people, groups and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> McAdam Tarrow and Tilly's 'causal processes' were concentrated interactions of causal mechanisms which were observable within and across contentious episodes (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 23). These were understood to be "frequently recurring causal chains, sequences and combinations" of causal mechanisms which produced "similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations" in identical or very similar fashions across cases (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 24, 27). These processes included phenomena such as "revolution, democratisation and nationalism" at their broadest, and "mobilisation… political identity formation… and repression, diffusion and radicalisation" at their narrower (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 27-28).

interpersonal networks" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 25). The sole mechanism which they advanced as 'relational' was that of "brokerage... the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 26). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly conceived of brokerage as some form of network bridging, a concept developed by social network theorists to explain how individuals and groups with overlapping networks could form new ties.

But might there be other relational mechanisms occurring in episodes of contention? Though brokerage offers an interesting explanation of how networks can be leveraged to connect new participants to social movements and acts of protests, the concept offers us little help with the question of how unconnected 'social sites' become linked together without recourse to networked brokers. It appears that there might be some kind of relational mechanism underpinning the encounters which many first-time participants, far away from conventional protest networks, had with Occupy Wall Street or the Egyptian Revolution. Though McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly do not appear to have considered this eventuality, I will later advance that affinity and convergence might fill such a role in allowing us to understand this kind of mobilisation.

Dynamics of Contention had constructed a wide-reaching discipline focused on the study of contentious politics, and decidedly moved structurally inclined studies of social movements and revolutions beyond rational choice theory (as elaborated in McAdam and Tarrow, 2011: 6). Despite this, the relational paradigm advanced by McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, as well as the many subsequent analysts of 'contentious politics', has received a mixed response from the adherents of the long-surviving cultural paradigm of social movement research. Many of these researchers challenged the cultural credentials of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's work on a number of counts (see, for example, Barker, 2003; Jasper, 2010; Koopmans, 2003; Taylor, 2003). Causal mechanisms were, it was argued, too structural, too complex and did an injustice to individuals' subjective experiences, by casting "a structural spell over our thinking" (Jasper, 2010: 968).

Indeed, as McAdam and Tarrow(2011: 6) admit, the serious consideration of cultural and psychological factors remained issues which Tilly had hoped to "burrow under." In their attempts to burrow under such factors, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's attempted synthesis

exhibits a continual preoccupation with the problems of why and how actors, or groups of actors act in a given context. Unfortunately, they pay correspondingly little attention to how such a context, or any particular social phenomenon might actually take form and thereby become enacted: the dynamics of mobilisation are still understood merely through preexisting connections. The question of how actors, structures and networks are themselves constituted is never addressed, and a consistent underlying essentialism can be found throughout their work: social movements' networks are generally understood to already be laden with resources and potential participants, with no consideration as to how initial encounters with those existing beyond the movement and its network might arise.

An emergent cultural school of social movement and revolution studies crystallised in their opposition to the contentious politics project. Nonetheless, even before the emergence of *Dynamics of Contention*, more culturally oriented theorists of social movements had offered alternative approaches. The most notable of these was the social constructionist approach. This perspective sought to draw attention to the ways in which social movements seek to engage with and reframe social reality, thereby contesting commonly held conceptions of social identity (Benford and Snow, 2000; Polletta and Jasper, 2001). This approach placed an emphasis on framing – "an active processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction" (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614). Social constructionist perspectives considered how social movements organised themselves around a constructed problem to be solved or idea to be actualised. For framing theorists, social movements were understood as strongly independent entities comprised of "signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning," in an arena also populated by "the media, local governments, and the state" (Benford and Snow, 2000: 611).

In the wake of Dynamics of Contention, a number of further elaborations have also developed with a more decidedly cultural emphasis. These cultural analyses have argued that the structural theories of which Dynamics of Contention formed a part have not properly addressed four key questions about social movements: how movements actually emerge, the motivations underpinning involvement in movements, how movements make strategic choices in a non-instrumental fashion, and the cultural impact or effects of social movements (Polletta and Jasper, 2001:284; Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2000). With these four questions left unresolved, the need for conceptual innovation is notably apparent

should we wish to escape from the regrettable process of "fragmentation [that] is well underway" which Jasper (2010: 974) attributes to Dynamics of Contention.

What was needed, Jasper (2010: 965) noted, was a theory which considered "the [individual] microfoundations of social and political action," in a way which related it to the broader scope which these actions took (in the form of movements and protest). The theoretical framework which I develop in this manuscript addresses precisely this lacuna in the pursuit of a similarly pressing matter: the question of why and how people who are beyond the structured reach of social movements can swell the ranks of protest during episodes of contention.

#### Networked Theories of Mobilisation

The study of networks was not limited to the practice of explicitly 'relational sociologists' following the work of Emirbayer and others, with a relational ethos appearing at the core of much of the newer, network-driven analyses of social movements. Indeed, as Mische (2011) notes, the paradigm underpinning network analysis "takes relations- rather than individuals, groups, attributes, or categories - as the fundamental unit of social analysis." This marked the beginning of a shift from presentations of movement-networks as metaphors for bundles of contending groups to substantive representations as structures of contention (Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988). These network theorists of social movements have claimed that their approach provides "a more complete explanation of the entire process of individual participation" (Passy, 2003:22) in social protest, as well as the means by which large organisations become involved in particular contentious episodes. In many regards, network theories have successfully empowered those studying social movements to understand how activists and organisers mobilise those to whom they are connected. As Gould (2003) notes, network theory has established that "if there are obstacles standing between sympathising and participating, or between feeling neutral and sympathising, a social relationship with someone who is already a participant helps to overcome them." Likewise, as Osa (2003) highlights, in contexts where "civic organisations are subject to severe constraints" network analysis offers us a means to understand how resources are acquired and utilised during protest. Equally advantageous is the capacity, as shown by Putnam (1995) and Mische (2003) to examine how networks inculcate perspectives and

practices, ranging from repertoires to collective identities even when movements may not be mobilised.

Despite the advantages of a networked approach to mobilisation, there are evidently pathways to participation which do not rely on network ties, and network theorists are acutely aware of this (Diani, 2003; Luker 1984; Mullins 1987). Passy (2003:34), in her analysis of two environmental social movements, the Bern Declaration and the World Wildlife Fund, found that only "about 59% of the Bern Declaration members and 49% of the WWF members were connected to the organisation" by any form of social tie. When these criteria were tightened only to formal networks, figures fell to 5% and 23% respectively. Further to this, mass mobilisations since 2011 have seriously called into question the notion that networks can provide a complete or even representative account of how groups or individuals become involved in social protest.

Organisational approaches to social movements have shown how movements are able to use formal organisational structures in order to mobilise their own members, and movement-network perspectives have demonstrated how affiliated individuals or groups in a movement-network can converge around particular protests or episodes. But what about those who are not a part of any clearly defined movement-network? What of the Egyptian protesters who ranged from young to old, elite to impoverished, and city-dweller to desert villager? What of the Occupiers of Zuccotti who involved apolitical painters, curious residents, visitors from across the world, and participants from political ideologies across the spectrum?

More recently, some branches of network theorists studying social movements have attempted to designate enormous social 'networks of networks' (Dutton, 2009; Castells, 1996: 62), particularly online networks such as Facebook and Twitter, as the source of this participation, but have been unable to show how exactly these networks have served to actually mobilise people in the same way as the tighter, more easily defined movement-networks of activists and allies. These theories have posited that larger social networks carry out activist recruitment efforts by means of 'indirect ties' between activists, movements, and other individuals in an enormous, interconnected network of networks (e.g. Castells, 2012).

The central concept of an 'indirect tie' has always been rather straightforward. As the name implies, rather than two individuals being directly connected within a network, an indirect tie is where the connection between individuals passes through one or more other 'nodes'. The conventional example of an indirect tie is usually 'friends of friends'. Nonetheless, new network approaches to social movements have gone considerably beyond the notion of one or two degrees of separation. Instead, they have advanced that indirect ties would link individuals "in the same subcultures or counter-cultures," examples of which included LGBT and rave cultures (Diani, 2003b: 3). Recently, these network theorists have even begun to advance that "exposure to the same media, whether traditional (including television) or computer-based" (Diani, 2003b:8) could be meaningfully described as 'indirect ties'.

While advocates of the role of 'indirect ties' in explaining these new mobilisations are keen to suggest that these ties might extend across tens or hundreds of individuals, the preponderance of evidence indicates precisely the contrary. These 'indirect ties' are considered by mainstream network analysts to have distinctly diminishing influence on others' awareness after passing through one node, almost none after passing through two, and all but infinitesimal influence beyond that (Zuo et. al, 2015) While factors such as one's media consumption tendencies and cultural preferences are undoubtedly important variables in the analysis of social protest, to suggest that these shared consumption patterns or cultural interests could constitute 'indirect ties' in a networked sense is to stretch such a concept beyond its original utility. Instead, we might better term them as various aspects of individuals' affinities.

To a great degree, modern social life is well represented by the analogy of these deeply interconnected massive social networks of networks, in which almost everyone is somehow indirectly connected. However, the notion that these kinds of networks exist tells us more about opportunity than it does about choices, influence, or exposures. Thus, we are left with very little information about the paths which individuals take through such webs of ties. Indeed, if we consider recent research by Bhagat and colleagues (2016), which indicates that the average degree of separation between any two given Facebook users is only 3.57 people, it might be fair to say that we are so incredibly networked that almost any array of encounters becomes possible. Nonetheless, we usually find that these millions of potential connections go unrealised, except in quite peculiar situations. Two individuals being "networked" in itself, tells us very little about the potential for actual connection or

interaction between them. Instead, the question of the means to the right 'route' through a network becomes at least as important as the question of which connections are present.

Instead of asking how distantly connected two given 'nodes' are, we can instead ask: what might prompt one person to introduce someone to another? What might allow an individual to become aware of an existing connection, and then to act on it? How might a series of individuals come together in a particular context? Networks do not give us the explanation to such questions, in part because though they are a useful analogy for social life, they are by necessity a reductive one. Indeed, as Emirbayer (1997: 305) stresses, network analysis, "has the greatest difficulty in analysing... the dynamic processes that transform [networks] in some fashion," or indeed cause them to take form. Likewise, Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994:1446-7) have noted that "network analysis gains its purchase upon social structure only at the considerable cost of losing its conceptual grasp upon culture, agency, and process."

Unlike the fixed nodal networks often presented by network analysts , our own bonds are constantly reconfiguring, with connections forging, breaking, and varying in strength. As individuals, we constantly navigate our own social networks, not one node at a time, but through varying means and in manifold directions at once, with hundreds of different paths being taken through, or outside of, networks every single day. As Goodwin and Emirbayer (1994:1446) advanced in their review of the field, though network theory "provides a useful set of tools for investigating the patterned relationships among historical actors, these tools... fail ultimately to make sense of the mechanisms by which these relationships are reproduced or reconfigured over time." The quandary, then, becomes what drives our navigation of the social world, or 'network of networks' in this analogy. How do we get from point A to point B, and why? Put otherwise: on what basis might the substantive 'ties', which we might represent as networks, come into being, and what are the principal means by which an individual could come to encounter a movement, protest, or action during a contentious episode? This problem of participation beyond the movement was precisely what I wished to address.

In order to understand mobilisation beyond the movement we have to bridge the structural and historical character of a given contentious episode with the agentic qualities of the individuals who participate in them, ranging from their social conditions to their psychological attributes, and generate, as Jasper (2010:965) puts it, some kind of "theory of action." With this pursuit in mind, we have to begin by untangling ourselves from the "winding, snarling vine" of the present trajectory in social movement studies (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999), and yet attempt to retain the utility of past contributions while doing so. In this regard, it is worth revisiting both earlier work in the field (as discussed earlier in the chapter), and newer work in companion-fields which addresses the question of action more directly. Though the psychologically underpinned classical theories of collective behaviour may have been little more than armchair theorising in the 1950s, largely disjointing our theories of contention from social psychology for the better part of a century may have been something of an oversight. In taking the first steps to understand the processes which individuals or groups undergo en-route to a form of participation that does not rely on network ties, we can once again turn to social psychology.

## The Social Psychological Perspective: Bringing the Masses Back In

Contemporaneously with developments in the rest of the social sciences, there has been considerable work done within social psychology which provides an important complement to the theorising attitude with which sociologists often conduct their work with regards to collective action and activism. This section discusses the distinction between 'activists' and other participants in collective action followed by some of the newer integrative models and cutting edge research of particular relevance to the study of social movements today.

In the almost fifty years since psychologically grounded approaches to social movements fell out of favour, social psychologists have not only provided substantial tests of classic theories<sup>7</sup>, but have developed further theories and findings of their own, grounded in decades of natural and controlled experimental research. Some of the limitations of classical collective action models are partially addressed in the psychological study of activism. Specifically, this work reveals a divergence between those participating in protest without prior organisational and network ties to a particular movement and those with more clearly established activist ties. This resolves what social psychologists have termed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Of these, the strongest hold-over is Gurr's (1970) theory of relative deprivation, which was considerably developed and extended by social psychologists.

the "paradox of persistent participation," in which models of collective action fell short of explaining why highly mobilised individuals continued to participate in collective actions or protest behaviours even though they might not fulfil the general criteria for participation.

Drawing together the vast psychological literature on participation and social protest, Curtin and McGarty (2016:229) note that earlier work within the psychological study of social protest had found that "political activists tend to come from middle- or upper-class families... be well educated... and more civically engaged," whereas more recent work examined factors such as recruitment, commitment, retention, ally-ship in any exhaustive fashion. Studying these elements of activism, they argue, allows us to understand how agents of social change come to exist. This helps address questions around previously understudied factors. It also permits us to distinguish between activist members of movement organisations or networks and more disconnected participants without such social ties.

Psychological research has indicated that protest behaviour of those in activist networks differs from that of disconnected individuals. The embedded and enhanced social ties of activist networks make networked individuals more likely to engage in future collective action (Drury and Reicher, 2005; Drury et. al., 2005). Likewise, these social ties in activist networks appear to promote cross-domain activism as well (Louis et. al. 2016), leading activists to shift their focus as a consequence of their connections to others with different passions. Furthermore, identification with one group of activists (for example, one's own network) strongly predicts one's participation in a variety of forms of collective action in cases where confidence in that group's ability to achieve its goals (perceived efficacy) was high (Blackwood and Louis, 2012).

Turning to present day research on collective action, perhaps the key distinction between psychological and 'networked' approaches to social movements and mobilisation is that psychological theories do not rest on the assumption that individuals should be somehow concretely connected to a given movement or protest in order to participate or mobilise. Instead, the means by which one encounters an act of protest is left definitively open-ended.

The first of the major current psychological approaches to collective action is the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA), advanced by van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008). SIMCA is a largely descriptive model, engineered to synthesise three prior waves in

the psychological study of collective action: the perceived injustice approach (Walker and Smith, 2002), the perceived [group] efficacy approach<sup>8</sup> (e.g. Klandermans, 1984, Schrager, 1985, Drury and Reicher, 2005), and the social identity approach (e.g. Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Reicher 1996). For van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, social identity constituted the "key predictor of collective action," directly influencing it as a means by which one emotionally connects with a given group. Nonetheless, in an attempt to resolve the opposition between the two prior approaches, their model also advanced that social identity was mediated by "group-based emotions that bridge the gap between the perception of injustice and action." In order for either perceived injustice or efficacy to be at their most powerful and influential, it was argued, they should operate in relation to social identity, which, when politicised, would "motivate collective action by channelling broad social identities into more specific protest organisation."

In response to SIMCA, Abrams and Grant (2012) have offered the Social-Identity Relative Deprivation, Collective Efficacy (SIRDE) model (see also: Grant, Abrams, Robertson, and Garay, 2015; Grant, Bennett and Abrams, 2017), the second major approach to collective action. SIRDE, unlike SIMCA, is oriented around expanding collective action models to explain "collective protest and other socio-political schisms, such as...more recently Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya" (Abrams and Grant, 2012:687). SIRDE re-emphasises relative deprivation (perceived injustice) as a component of mobilisation, but as a dual process, occurring at the level of the individual (egoistic) and the group. In Abrams and Grant's empirical research, individual level deprivation was found to be unrelated to social change, and instead was identified as a pathway for demotivation. By contrast, group-based relative deprivation proved a vector for participation. When collective relative deprivation coincides with high-level identification with the particular collective (e.g. being Scottish and poor), Abrams and Grant (2012) argue, a 'social change belief structure' (e.g. Scottish independence) emerges, which mobilises support for existing movements pursuing those aims (e.g. supporting the Scottish National Party, or going to an independence protest).

Abrams and Grant re-centre the psychological study of collective action on the matters of contentions politics (rather than qualitatively different collective actions which do not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This approach evolved in competition to Relative Deprivation Theory, and, parallel to resource mobilisation theory, attempted to explain the rationalisations underlying actors' decision to participate.

coincide with social movements, much less revolutions). However, in common with other psychological approaches, the SIRDE model conceives of efficacy as purely a psychological variable. Thus, it is assumed that high collective efficacy positively interacts with other factors to motivate participation. As Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010) note in their review of the field, psychological analysis is ripe for combination with a (more sociological) analysis of the role of socio-political contexts in initial decisions to participate in collective struggles, an endeavour which the Affinity-Convergence model which I develop includes.

How can we sociologists draw on psychological work in the field of social protest? One way is to investigate the potential causal mechanisms underlying the relationships psychologists uncover. Understanding the processes undergone by individuals involved in activism or social protest serves as a means to ground our empirical investigations. Perhaps most important to consider is the trio of factors around which psychological studies have crystallised, but which do not figure prominently in sociological and political work on social movements: efficacy, injustice, and identity. Where we could talk of efficacy and injustice, we come to discuss rational choices, or political opportunity. Where we could talk about identity, we prefer to limit our analytical lens to collective action frames (as detailed in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2004; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2000)<sup>9</sup>. Instead, it may be valuable for sociologists to offer analytical consideration to these three factors, integrating our more sophisticated understanding of the repertoires and dynamics of contention with a renewed examination of efficacy, injustice and identity.<sup>10</sup>

Some research of particular relevance to how individuals' initial engagement with or participation in acts of protest might develop o comes from the work of Albert Bandura, most particularly his 1982 article: *The Psychology of Chance Encounters and Life Paths*. As Bandura (1982) highlights, the trajectories by which we come to encounter the groups or mobilisations of which we become a part often involve chance encounters rather than

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> There is a re-emerging literature on emotions, identity and culture in social movements, though at this stage there is relatively little broader theory on the topic, as noted by Jasper (2010). One volume of note, which I found influential but is rather too specific in its orientation to delve into here is Stryker, Owens and White's (2000) *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Castells' (2012) call that we pay attention to the role of 'networks of outrage and hope' certainly serves as a promising step toward reconsidering notions of perceived injustice and relative deprivation, as well as to some extent questions of collective efficacy in a fashion integrative with current sociology.

explicit recruitment or organised points of engagement. "After people acquire certain preferences and standards of behaviour," Bandura (1982:747) observed, "they tend to select activities and associates who share similar value systems, thereby mutually reinforcing pre-existing bents. Through their actions people create as well as select environments. By constructing their own circumstances, they achieve some regularity in behaviour." Alongside individuals' drives, preferences and value-systems, Bandura observed that "differential interests and skills" also played a role in the social milieus in which individuals would engage.

Bandura's observations not only borne out in my work on Occupy and Egypt, but also in my own personal experiences while on research. While on fieldwork I had four entirely unplanned encounters with acquaintances from my undergraduate degree who I had not kept in touch with, while walking the streets of various cities in the United States. When considering these encounters, I came to understand that though they seemed peculiar they were actually, in some sense, tightly conditioned. We seemed to be foreigners who knew one another encountering each other by chance while both briefly in an entirely different place. Actually, we shared much more than that: we were all well-educated, progressive, academically inclined individuals from an elite institution with global links, and sufficient financial support to travel internationally, but poor enough to need to use the metro system. We, being either tourists, visiting students, or working in creative industries, all had time during the day to walk the streets and, sharing common tastes cultivated in a similar setting to one another, gravitated to similar attractions in the city. Where, upon reflection, had I met these people? It had always been a short distance from major metro stations in trendy young areas, or in tourist hubs, a little while after lunch on a weekday. It is no wonder I had not had the same experience in Cairo.

#### **1.2** Mobilisation Beyond the Movement – The Affinity-Convergence Model.

How do we understand the mobilisation of those who are neither members of social movements, nor of the broader networks surrounding these movements? We can begin to develop an understanding of how these instances of collective action might come into being by drawing from the rich tapestry of social movement theory, alongside advances in the field of social psychology. Early work on collective behaviour offered the notion that there might be certain social and psychological traits which could predispose individuals or groups to participation without the need for organisational (or, indeed, networked) recruitment (Blumer, 1951; Killian, 1964; Turner and Killian, 1957; Lang and Lang, 1961), in a moment of 'convergence'. What remained untheorised was how this convergence took place, and what exactly the role of these social and psychological traits was.

I split apart this problem, first tackling the issue of predisposition (affinity), and then tackling the problem of what conditions might actually activate this predisposition in favour of participation (convergence). This relationship is neatly expressed in what I call the Affinity-Convergence Model of Mobilisation.

# Affinity $\xrightarrow{convergence}$ Participation

#### Figure 1. The Affinity-Convergence Model of Mobilisation

This model is designed to account for episodes of mobilisation which do not rely on social movements' organisational or network ties by positing a sufficient mechanism for mass mobilisation in such cases. Within the model, Affinity is advanced as a necessary precondition of individual participation in a cause, with convergence acting as a necessary catalyst for participation on the basis of affinities to occur en-masse. Though grounded in the analysis of individual participation, the Affinity-Convergence model is designed to account for participation at a mass level by drawing out the common factors in individual trajectories.

When applied to single individuals, some considerable caveats should be added to the model. First, it should be noted that convergence is conceived of as a catalyst and thereby is not always necessary for participation in the case of a single individual. In rare cases, some may find their way to protest on the basis of affinity alone. On the other hand, though the co-presence of affinity and convergence is posited as predictive at the mass-level, it is not


always a sufficient condition for participation at the individual level, owing to the possibility for highly individuated impediments to protest.

I continue this section by discussing affinity, before subsequently explaining the impact of convergence. My goal here is to theorise these concepts indicatively, examining the areas where my research findings, in addition to previous research and theory, offer a useful exposition later in the text. I do not consider this an all-encompassing theorisation of either concept: there are undoubtedly affinities I will have missed, and conditions of convergence which I will have neglected. These might be grounded in different historical conditions than the ones I studied, or in different research and theory which I have not examined here<sup>11</sup>. Though the concepts I discuss are designed to offer an accurate theorisation of a means of mobilisation which is possible across diverse historical cases, I do not anticipate all potential avenues of mobilisation by means of Affinity-Convergence to be fully accounted for.

### <u>Affinity</u>

I have suggested that an awareness of affinity can help complete our understanding of mobilisation beyond the bounds of the movement and its networks. The place of affinity in this arrangement can be illustrated using a simple Venn-diagram, my own representation of which can be found overleaf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This is particularly true of social affinities, which, as I highlight later are likely to be more contextually contingent depending on the particular struggle: being black would be less likely to motivate participation in the context of a 2011 LGBT rights movement than in a 1960s voting rights protest. Nonetheless, the broader categories which I propose were found to be of relatively consistent relevance across cases.



#### Figure 2. A Concentric Representation of Mobilisation

This diagram depicts the organised core of participants in a contentious episode - such as the classic social movement organisation [SMO] - in black. On the outskirts of this organised core, the gray circle represents the network around the movement: those who might be recruited to participate in contention in some form or other, but are not a part of the core element. Finally, the outer circle represents those participants who, despite being neither members of the organised core, nor of supporting networks, possess the predisposition to participation which I call affinity<sup>12</sup>.

Networked theories of social movements, though not necessarily opposed to the idea of such a situation, have tended to envisage the interplay between concrete ties and distinct 'recruiters' as the means by which new participation could be explained. As research in this field demonstrates, these formal network ties tend to only account for only a very small proportion of participation, while even a more liberal conception of 'informal' and extended ties can be traced to approximately 50% of mobilisation among relatively conventional social movements (Diani, 2003; Luker 1984; Mullins 1987). Extending our framework to include participation in contention driven by affinity (and convergence) offers us a chance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Just as members of a movement's organised core will also be a part of its supporting networks, affinity is not confined exclusively to participants beyond the movement. Rather, it is generally (though not necessarily always) superseded by a different form of connection in the context of mobilisation.

to reach the remaining portion of those mobilised in contentious episodes. This final component of mobilisation is underpinned by the meeting between these structures of 'convergence' and the affinities of individual participants. Affinities determine the field of those who could become mobilised, while convergence substitutes for the role of a fleeting 'recruiter' to temporary participation in protest.

## Lay Concepts of Affinity

I have drawn-together the theoretical underpinnings of 'affinity' in dialogue with a diverse array of sources, many of which come from everyday activist and organisational practices. My belief was that developing a concept which is already used by organisers and activists is better than requiring the reader to entertain some novel abstraction entirely of my own making. Indeed, activists themselves have demonstrated an historical awareness of affinities and have incorporated them into their everyday praxis.

The first historical examples of an activist notion of 'affinity' in organising came at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Spain, and later during the Spanish Civil War. During this period, anarchist groups elaborated on the popular tradition of *tertulias* – local meetings of likeminded literary, religious, or political groups in houses, cafés and private enclosures (de Armas, 1874:130). These early affinity groups, like the *tertulias*, would be composed of individuals sharing ideological, social, and geographical traits for the organising of actions. Rather than organising purely around pre-existing social ties, affinity groups organised around shared characteristics. Commonly, these associations have taken place on the basis of a shared attitudes (such as ideology or concern for a particular issue), interests, and identities.

More recently, affinity groups have been known to have formed on the basis of locality, activities and capacities. The core tenet of an affinity group was that activists should have "have something in common other than the issue that is bringing you all together" (s11-AWOL, 2000), with the understanding that these commonalities would give space for more fruitful collaboration than simply sharing a common project. Some examples, drawn from accounts of the 1991 Australian International Defence Exhibition (AIDEX) protest, included groups such as "Alcoholics Against the Bomb" (an affinity group of alcoholics), the "Perseverance Affinity Group" (who, conversely, had all met at the same local pub), "Screaming Trees" (an affinity group of environmentalists) and the aboriginal "Bukra-

bendinni Action Tribe" (detailed in McIntyre, 2008). Beyond this specific example, affinity groups tend to be comprised of those who share other social attributes in addition to their ideological convictions on the particular issue they are organising around, such as students who attend the same high-school, or university

A lay notion of affinity has also spread from activist organising circles to the business world, where managers have supported the growth of 'affinity networks', through which employees are encouraged to associate with others with whom they share commonalities. A plethora of companies, from Motorola to McDonalds support internal affinity networks around affinities of identity or social status, such as: race/ethnicity, gender/sexuality, age, skills, disability, seniority, parents/families, military veterancy, living-area, and religion (Meadows and Tapia 2009). Accordingly, it can be said that affinity is already something which we deploy in our everyday patterns of organising, in corporate life as much as in activism. Nonetheless, much of our popular understanding of affinity regards the enhancing of connections between already networked individuals. What of the capacity of affinities *without* already-constructed network connections?

There have also been some early efforts to investigate the form which affinity networks take when the affinities are implicit attributes rather than explicit associations such as those in the 'affinity networks' formed within organisations. In these contexts, early studies have observed that individuals encounter one another and form bonds according to the principle of homophily. This has come, rather surprisingly, from the field of computer science. Addressing such a query, Matthew Scott Smith and colleagues (2006), created a small online community in which participants could give information on various attributes they possessed, ranging from handedness, to profession, research interests, restaurant choices, and even their preferred pizza toppings, among a total of 21 attributes. Smith and colleagues (2006) wanted to focus on affinity as "the overlapping of attribute-values for any common attribute," and deployed an overall 'affinity score' for the extent to which individuals shared commonalities across attributes.

After a one-year trial of their community, Smith and colleagues modelled the extent to which diversely associated participants in the study with shared attributes formed new social bonds on the basis of these affinities. These models were used to create what they called 'implicit affinity networks', or IANs. "Although they clearly exist, affinities among individuals are not all easily identified." Smith (2006) and colleagues noted after conducting their original experiment, "yet they offer unique opportunities to discover new social networks, strengthen ties among individuals, and provide recommendations." For Smith (2007), "an implicit affinity [network] connects individuals together based on loosely defined affinities, or inherent similarities, such as shared interests, hobbies, political views, preferences, etc. We call these implicit because individuals may not be aware of the similarities in attitudes and behaviours that exist among them." Since their original experiment in 2006, more natural 'implicit affinity networks' have emerged for Smith and colleagues to study, including many popular social networks such as Twitter. Though Smith's work lacks sociological theorising of its own, it is nonetheless informative and interesting for our understanding of affinities as a sociological concept, and demonstrates that affinities have a key role in influencing the ways in which individuals navigate their social networks, and make contact with others with whom they were not previously associated.

In a more general context, following Bandura (1982) we could say that these kinds of affinities could exist between anything, constituting the congruencies underpinned and produced by one's given life situation, shared experiences, social space, beliefs, or all manner of other things. In this interpretation, all entities in the social world have varying affinities with one-another, some stronger or differently constituted than others. These arrays of congruencies can tend to mutually predispose us to encounters and connections in diverse circumstances over the course of one's life. In everyday life, this might manifest as making a new friend at a party, bumping into a celebrity on the street, or even a chance encounter with an old friend in a new place.

#### Conceptualising Affinity in the Context of Contention

So how might we draw together these diverse insights to develop a concept of affinity in the context of contention? In the case of participation in contentious episodes, we can study the specific affinity between participants and a given instance of protest. In this context, affinities can be defined in a narrower fashion, as we are only interested in the outcome of participation in contention, rather than a general array of other encounters and connections. Put simply: **affinity constitutes a predisposition to participate in certain causes based on the array of psychological and social traits which I discuss here.** 

My understanding of affinity first emerged through conversations with activists in New York, during which they would use the term to describe the sense of a connection or congruency between individuals and causes. The more I consulted the dynamics of the mass mobilisations I studied, the more I became convinced that something akin to the 'affinity' they described might have a role. This led to my extending the concept into a theoretical tool. I began by looking at what most closely resembled affinity as I had come to understand it, which drew me to think about the proscriptions of the collective behaviour theorists such as Blumer (1951), Turner and Killian (1957), and Lang and Lang (1961), as well as Gurr's (1970) work on relative deprivation. It soon became apparent that though these theorists had aptly noted that predispositions could suddenly be translated into protest behaviour, they had envisaged it to be a mobilisation of the furious and deranged, rather than the more everyday people who swelled the ranks of protests in the cases of Egypt and Occupy. After passing through social movement theory, I turned to more recent social psychological research on social movements.

Consulting the social psychological literature illustrated that individuals and groups can come to participate in protest without prior contact with the recruiting agents, activist networks, or organisations which structural theorists have so far prioritised. Some instances of this participation are highly deliberate, conscious decisions to participate in a form of contention, be it a movement, action, revolt or riot. These are underpinned by factors such as social identity, perceived injustice, and affective and ideological attitudes. Others are somewhat less conscious, and can manifest on the basis of certain social conditions, such as patterns of activity, needs and obligations, or social status). Accordingly, we can distinguish particular affinities according to two basic categories: psychological and social, with various subcategories. The table overleaf details the affinities which I observed through my research, or for which evidence already exists, and gives some sense of these subcategories.

Affinities	Subcategory	Examples		
Psychological	Identity	Identifying as: gay, radical, an 'ally', Egyptian, the 99%		
	Perceptions	Sense of social injustice or relative deprivation		
	Attitudes	Tastes; Ideology; Moral values		
	Drives	Interests; Passions; Ambitions and Dreams		
	Personality <sup>13</sup>	Openness; Extraversion		
Social	Patterns of Activity	Jobs; Pastimes; Religious duties; Place of residence		
	Status	Race; Class; Gender		
	Resources	Physical capacity; Access to information, wealth,		
		transport		
	Needs/Obligations	Dependents to feed; Rent to pay		

Table 1. Categories and Examples of Affinities

Psychological affinities refer to internal cognitive frames and processes, including matters such as: identity, perceptions, attitudes and drives. The first three among these (identity, perceptions, and attitudes) were the most prevalent affinities across my three cases, which I refer to as 'core' affinities in the later chapters. Identity and perceptions refer to aspects of social psychological models such as SIMCA and SIRDE: social identity and perceptions of injustice. Attitudes refer to the combination of affective and ideological factors, which have been passingly referred to in earlier studies as 'alignment' (Snow, Zurcher, Ekland-Olson, 1980); attitudinal or ideological 'affinity' (McAdam, 1988: 62-5) or simply just 'affinity' (Vela-McConnell, 1999: 8). Finally, drives refer to the aspirations and desires of a given individual, including their interests, passions and dreams (Bandura, 1982).

In contrast to psychological affinities, social affinities refer to an individual or group's conditions in the social world: their patterns of activity, social status, resources, needs, and obligations. While we are likely to see a degree of regularity among psychological affinities, the role of a particular kind of social affinity may be more contingent or contextually dependent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Though I do not directly examine personality in my research, I have included it here as it has already been established as a low-level predictive variable for participation in protest. See, for example, Opp and Brandstätter's work on this (2010; Brandstätter and Opp, 2014).

Patterns of activity concern the structure of the everyday lives of participants, constituting how and where they live, work, or elect to spend their time. This affinity was what determined the gathering of many of Egypt's unwitting potential revolutionaries at Friday prayer sessions in advance of protests, or the disproportionate exposure of those whose daily commutes took them across Paris' Pont Neuf bridge to revolutionary agitation. Social status, meanwhile, constitutes the common structural experiences which an individual or group of individuals may share, and is reminiscent of what Piven and Cloward (1977) describe in *Poor Peoples Movements* as the 'institutional context' of participants. While for Piven and Cloward, this principally determined the kinds of protests which might emerge (one might now call this the 'repertoires' of protest), following Bandura (1982), we might also see these commonalities as determining structurally ensured predispositions for social action. The condition of a peasant in the French Revolution, or status as part of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011 revolution furnished participants with specific sets of incentives (and some disincentives) to protest which contrasted to those with different social status.

Resources determine the capacity of potential participants to access, encounter or otherwise participate in instances of protest. For example, having satellite television meant that potential participants in Egypt's revolution could discover more about the situation in Tahrir Square. In the case of Occupy Wall Street, being able to afford travel to New York City meant that those from elsewhere in the country could visit New York and 'check out' the protests. In contrast to resources, needs and obligations are the material or immaterial checkpoints which potential participants must pass through, and can provide a powerful impetus to potential participation when catered for or appealed to by a cause: the free food handed out in Tahrir Square and Zuccotti Park brought the homeless and starving to protest, and the concerned masses of protest were adequately motivated by the prospect of alleviating their need for bread<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> To some extent, aspects of affinity pertain somewhat to the notion of 'biographical availability', pioneered by McAdam (1986). For McAdam (1986:70) biographical availability constituted the "absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family responsibilities" Where the notion of 'biographical availability' presented biographical factors as barriers to entry into social protest, my approach allows them to be considered as potential avenues by which one might eventually become involved in such action.

While affinities can influence everyday behaviour (as Bandura's research on life-paths indicates), in most contexts, merely having affinity to a given movement or cause is not enough to actually drive individuals to become political activists or participants. There are, however, conditions in which these predispositions can be activated during periods of contention: conditions of convergence, in which new situations, frames and spaces of contention encourage individuals with affinity to a cause to participate in some form.

#### **Convergence**

We might expect affinities to have some kind of latent or gradual 'coaxing' property toward participation in social movements or collective action, similar to the role of predispositions which Bandura (1982) identified with the gradual convergence of certain individuals in cults or countercultural groups. Nonetheless, in cases of contention these convergences are not nearly as gradual as we might expect. They often occur in sudden moments of coalescence around a single action or brief periods of contention lasting only weeks or months, despite the persistent presence of a plethora of social movements beyond these contexts. This raises the question of how affinities could be 'activated' in contentious episodes, manifesting in moments of seemingly spontaneous participation.

In considering what triggers these conditions, we can refer to more structural theories of social movements, most particularly political opportunities: the notion that there might be some kind of contextual developments or a set of social conditions which are more conducive to contention (Tilly, 1978; 1984; 1995). If this is true for organisations, then why not for individuals? We can envisage, for example, an opportune situation for contention, in which it is materially easier for individuals to participate. Alternatively, we could point to moments where collective emotions can shift in response to political events (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2000). Still further, as framing theorists such as Benford and Snow (2000) have advanced, a shift in how an act of contention is perceived might be conducive to new or different kinds of participation. Likewise, as Snow and Moss (2004:1136) noted in their invitation to theory on the topic of spontaneous protest, there might be "ecological and spatial contexts and constraints" which alter the conditions of participation in emergent mobilisations.

In thinking about how these kinds of changes in conditions can affect participation, I devised a new concept of Convergence, used to describe the conditions in the social world which trigger or accelerate participation from those with an affinity to a cause. In thinking about Convergence, I made two key distinctions. First among these was the **context** in which participation was being encouraged. In the cases I studied, I saw convergence occur due to periods of structural instability, the emergence or transformation of cognitive frames, or actual material spaces and their features. Accordingly, I divide convergence according to its context: **structural situations<sup>15</sup>, cognitive frames or material spaces.** Later in this subsection, I develop these contextual distinctions substantially.

Alongside a contextual distinction, I draw a division between **subtypes** of convergence. Was what was happening an opportune instance, in which new alternatives or achievements were possible; a more exceptional instance of freedom or autonomy, where conventional forms of social action could be disrupted; or was it a more paramount kind of phenomenon, activating participation as a consequence of its sheer importance? From the analysis of my cases, there appeared to be three distinguishable subtypes: **opportune**, **exceptional**, and **paramount**, each with distinct qualities.

Convergence with an **opportune** component had the effect of making contention become, in some sense, more possible or less effortful. This could take the form of reduced state repression, an emergent belief that change itself was achievable (a 'social change belief structure', as Abrams and Grant's SIRDE model puts it), or a particular location with strategic or protective properties.

Convergence with an **exceptional** component had the effect of making contentious actions more available to potential participants. On a structural level, this could take the form of a collapse of the everyday social structures which guided or controlled individual activity in a predictable manner. Alternatively, at the level of cognitive frames, a breakdown of the established norms and rules of social conduct could give way to such permissiveness. Finally, in material terms, particular spaces of protest might take shape with a free or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> I consider 'structural' as referring to the socio-political structures of control, rather than enduring physical arrangements. This is in line with the literature on political processes and subsequent theory in social movement studies across a broad range of authors (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Gould, 2003; McAdam, 1982, Tilly, 1984, 1995).

autonomous character, making protest more inviting to those with some affinity to the cause, but perhaps lacking strong identification with it.

Finally, convergence with a **paramount** component was found in situations where incentive structures were overcome or overridden. This could take the form of a particular situation which made participation more palatable on the basis of different structural incentives, or a cognitive frame highlighting the importance of participation in an 'historical moment' (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001). Alternatively, this component could manifest in material spaces which were of distinct cultural, historical or otherwise symbolic import.

		Opportune	Exceptional	Paramount	
	Structural	Breakdown of	A retreat in	A moment	
Context	Situation	repressive apparatus or	social control and limiting	where structural	
		regime cohesion.	structures.	incentives are reshaped or inverted.	
	Cognitive	Sense that an	Normative	A sense of	
	Frame	alternative is possible, a 'social change belief structure'	breakdown – state of exception	obligation, or compulsion. An 'historical moment'	
	Material	Safe, or	'Free spaces'	A location of	
	Space	strategically advantageous	and 'Autonomous	great historical or cultural	
		locations.	zones'	importance	

Subtype

Table 2. Taxonomy of Convergence by Subtype and Context, with Examples

With the model of convergence presented herein, I have essayed to point toward the kinds of conditions which were most particularly drawn out in my analysis. Beyond the subtypes and contexts which I explore here, there may well be further conditions yielded by further, or future analysis.

## Structural Situations

It seems that, just as social movements have capitalised upon 'political opportunity', group or individual affinity for a particular cause or act of protest might become activated by the emergence of times of 'convergence' in which the opportunity for contention becomes more appealing or apparent. These situations share some elements with 'political opportunities' and 'revolutionary situations' (Tilly, 1977) such as: a breakdown of state or elite cohesion, a suspension or decline in social control or surveillance, a relaxation of the penalties or decline in the cost of participating in social protest, or a crisis or dissolution of legitimate authority. These kinds of **opportune situations** were exemplified in the cases I studied, including times such as the ousting of state security forces from the streets during Egypt's Eighteen Days, or the weakness of French state structures during the 1789 revolution.

Other periods share some elements with the loosely theorised notion of 'convergence' which appears in classical work on social movements: such as the collapse or alteration of established norms (Snow and Moss, 2014), rules (Killian, 1964), and organisations (Turner and Killian, 1957). We might generalise such a situation as a time where the conventional rules or expectations are suspended and experiments in contention become more possible and attractive. Activists in the United States sometimes call these **exceptional situations** 'movement moments', characterised by the coming-together of a great many new participants which holds the potential for the formation of a great many social movements.

We might also envisage a moment so powerful that rather than being only a 'movement moment' it becomes a **paramount situation**, during which the impetus for participation is somehow inverted. Gunning and Baron (2014:234) have suggested that in such moments of historical or cultural importance, "fear of shame, a sense of social responsibility and a desire to be part of history trumps fear of police abuse." Both the Occupiers and Egyptian revolutionaries participating at the later stages of each case described their participation in such a fashion.

#### **Cognitive Frames**

Drawing from Abrams and Grant's (2012; Grant et. al, 2015; 2017) SIRDE model, we can also consider cognitive conditions, or **opportune frames.** Such conditions are characterised by an emergent sense of collective efficacy, or a "social change belief structure": the perception that an alternative is possible or achievable among those with an affinity for a particular cause. In some cases, a sense of collective efficacy or social change belief structure might emerge in response to domestic or world events, though they can also be consciously presented as motivational collective action frames by organised agitators (Benford and Snow, 2000:615-7). The "We Can" movements, such as United Farm Workers ('Si Se Puede'), Obama's 2008 presidential campaign ('Yes We Can') and the later stages of the 15M movement ('Podemos') offer clear empirical cases of movements with well-articulated social change belief structures centred around a notion of collective efficacy. These movements were able to mobilise a great many individuals who were by no means integrated into union, party, or activist networks.

The cognitive conditions of society can radically change the kinds of groups or individuals who might be drawn to protest (see: Benford and Snow, 2000). One key driver of cognitive convergence is the shift in the framing of norms and rules in a given society. Contentious actions might be framed or reframed in the public consciousness to present dissent as normative, or the appeal of conformity could be undermined in some way, allowing those who did not hold strong activist identities, or consider participation in contention as particularly appropriate conduct, to more easily participate. These **exceptional frames** often co-occurred with other conditions of convergence, and had particular prominence in the Occupy and Egyptian cases.

At other times, **paramount frames** can emerge as a consequence of other historical or cultural conditions rather than conscious efforts. Tunisia's revolution was a trigger for the emergence of such a belief structure in Egypt, offering a sense of destiny and direction to the growing and emboldened acts of protest which had happened over the past decade. For participants in Occupy Wall Street, excitement about Egypt's revolution, and the 'Tahrir moment' which many early occupiers wanted to imitate on their own 'US Day of Rage'. In France, likewise, some of the most momentous revolutionary victories such as the storming of the Bastille emboldened future less structured mobilisations. Likewise, in their study of emotions and social movements, Goodwin and Pfaff (2001: 293-4) described how identifying the 'historical importance' of a moment appeared to reduce participants fears about becoming involved.

#### Material Spaces

In material terms, conditions of convergence can take form in particular **opportune spaces**, in which material conditions (physical sites, their features, and the people which fill them)

might offer enhanced potential for contention by insulating participants from the risks or disincentives related to mobilisation. Such a phenomenon was evidently present in Tahrir Square after the withdrawal of security forces from the streets. Indeed, many of the participants I spoke to even advanced that the felt safer in Tahrir than they did at home or in the streets. The private ownership of Paris's *Palais Royale*, a gathering space identified with much early agitation in the French Revolution, offered similar insulation from oppressive intervention.

Just as we can anticipate convergence appearing during exceptional situations or frames, convergence can also occur materially within **exceptional spaces**, with the unstructured character which Blumer (1951) noted. In these kinds of exceptional spaces those with affinity for a given cause feel more able to freely participate in protest enacted outside of their own networks or groups. In their study of democratic social movements in the United States, Evans and Boyte (1986) have labelled such physical contexts as 'free spaces'<sup>16</sup>, while Hakim Bey (1991) alluded to some elements of this in his conception of an 'autonomous zone'.

In the context of this study, these kinds of exceptional spaces are exemplified by Zuccotti Park or Tahrir Square, in which dominant social norms and rules were lessened in favour of a more liberating environment. These spaces permitted a broader array of repertoires of contention, allowing potential participants' passions or interests to take on a newly politicised or contentious character. This thereby made participation more immediate, attractive and rewarding. In the case of Occupy this took the form of the politicisation of daily life: as part of the occupation it became possible to draw, paint, sing, cook, clean and even to disagree politically in a fashion which still constituted participation in the movement.

Alternatively, a space of convergence could take the form of a common or uninscribed space, where participating in collective action is not contingent on a particular identity, ideology, or form of social eligibility, such as the boring, 'administrative', undefined character of Zuccotti Park allowing participation in its occupation to be a lower-risk, lower-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> I prefer the term exceptional, as these spaces are not always truly 'free', just differently influenced.

cost, and arguably less political act. These more permissive spaces might serve as looser points of contact and coordination (Lang and Lang, 1961).

In contrast to exceptional spaces, material conditions of convergence might also take the form of **paramount spaces**, featuring explicitly ideological or pre-defined sites with an unique cultural or historical character. This might take the form of distinct spaces, strongly associated with a particular ideological, cultural or historical notion with which a great many people strongly identify (such as the Palace of Versailles, or Egypt's Tahrir Square).

#### 1.3 Methods: Studying Contention Comparatively and Historically

When formulating the concepts of affinity and convergence I engaged with, challenged, and drew from a broad body of existing and ongoing research in the social sciences. Though this theoretical element was undoubtedly important, the principal means by which these concepts were refined was in dialogue with my cases. I adopted what Mann (1987: vii) describes as a 'zigzagging' approach to enquiry, in which "we select our data, see whether they confirm or reject our theoretical hunches, refine the latter, collect more data, and continue zigzagging between theory and data until we have a plausible account." In this section, I discuss the comparative and historical methods with which I approached my research, first detailing the elements of case selection and comparison, before moving to discuss the historical methods which I employed within cases.

#### **Case Selection and Comparison**

The generation of broad, general concepts or models is an ambitious and often risky business. Though I have tried to expound affinity and convergence in broader conceptual strokes, I have only been able to do this because of the means by which I selected my three cases: Occupy Wall Street, the 2011 Egyptian revolution, and the French Revolution of 1789. The cases I studied cut across three principal types of state structure with which those of us studying contention concern ourselves: democratic republics, neo-patrimonial republics, and late-feudal regimes.

Within each case, the historical and socio-political context was pivotal to the particular conditions of convergence which emerged and the kinds of affinities which were activated. Indeed, though there were some general tendencies across cases, I found that the social, political and historical context of each case was tightly interlinked with the kinds of affinities which were activated, and the particular conditions of convergence which activated them. My task was to create a framework which allowed the analysis and consideration of affinity and convergence across such diverse cultural and structural contexts. This is one of the benefits of a comparative and historical approach. Indeed, as Skocpol (1979:42) notes: "Given the flexibility and the historical sensitivity of the comparative method, attention can also be paid to the particular features," these "variations on the shared causal patterns," which underlie processual differences.

Incorporating the French case was particularly pivotal to a successful comparison. As a classic case study in the literature on social and revolutionary movements, the 1789 French Revolution offers vital comparative contrast between the 'new' contentious episodes of 2011 and a more traditional case of contention. Fusing the analysis of contemporary cases with a more historical one<sup>17</sup> made it possible to ascertain the extent to which affinities, unlike the 'social networks' mediated by platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, are indeed an enduring concept, offering an explanatory power for classic cases as well as novel phenomena. Indeed, as Lachmann (2013:7) puts it, this kind of "comparison over time and across place," enables us "to distinguish mere novelties," from more distinct social dynamics. Working on this kind of a broad scale, Mann (1986:514) notes, allows us to "stand back outside our own era, in we take such things... for granted," and instead "situate them within a wider historical and theoretical framework."

It is also useful to outline the shape of the comparative framework deployed in my analysis. After all, comparative work in sociology can serve an enormous variety of purposes and be conducted in an enormous variety of ways. Among the most common (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003) is the use of comparative efforts a means of quasi-replication of a given experiment. Selecting a large number of similar cases, properly controlled for, might enable a researcher to verify the functioning of a given causal variable, with tight control over other variables bringing these cases a little closer to a natural experiment. This sort of approach proves useful when interrogating the functioning of a specific causal mechanism across cases, in order to verify tendencies identified by prior research. While there are valuable elements to this kind of comparative approach, it was not suitable for the research I was undertaking.

By contrast, my approach was one of comparative macro-causal enquiry: more exploratory research with the aim of advancing novel and broader theory. In such a context, sociological researchers have consistently opted to study a smaller array of more diverse cases (Flyvberg, 2006:226-227). Examples from which I draw inspiration include Skocpol's (1979) States and Social Revolutions, as well as Moore's (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. In these contexts, rather than attempting to verify a single

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Both Ragin & Becker (1992) and Amneta (2009) offer a detailed explanation of the combination of historical cases and contemporary case studies.

micro-hypothesis about a given variable, macro-causal enquiry deploys a separate approach to generalisation, grounded in falsification, in order to demand maximal applicability from the new concepts such studies develop.

As Skocpol (1979:6) puts it, we seek to discover "the generalisable logic at work in the entire set of revolutions [and, in this case, social movements] under discussion." The set of cases should share "certain basic features" in the form of "a pattern calling for a coherent causal explanation" (Skocpol, 1979:40-41), but should not be so similar as to undercut the value of comparison. In this context, the use of dissimilar cases is vital: in order to reliably ascertain the full breadth of a novel concept or process, the test-cases must be sufficiently varied. Likewise, sufficiently varied cases lessen the chance of accidentally formulating general principles from congruences only present because of the similar specific conditions shared by the cases.<sup>18</sup>

Rather than trying to aim for tightly similar cases, we can subject our theoretical apparatus to the demands of cases which, despite sharing the pattern we wish to examine, also differ from one another. Though in some sense our attempts at sociological theorising only ever present liberating fictions by which we can attempt to master the social world, we should at least attempt to maximise the extent to which they liberate, and minimise the extent to which they are fictional. This means that the best treatment, when trying to develop contributions to broader theory, is not to present comfortable cases to affirm pre-existing suspicions, but to instead treat your concepts with suspicion and hostility. If they should bear such a test, then they are worthwhile concepts indeed.

### **Historical Sociology**

Having considered the matter of comparison and case selection, the final component of my method to discuss is its historical component. In the context of novel concepts and diverse cases, historical sociology proves a particularly useful within-case method.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For example, had Egypt, Tunisia and Libya been compared in this study, it would have been possible to accidentally generalise about the importance of a set of phenomena made more prominent by the context of the Arab Spring, rather than applying across cases.

Historical sociology can be characterised by its position at a methodological intersection between each of its constituent disciplines: it is the study of an historical process from a sociological perspective. In other words, it is in the process of applying sociological analysis to historical inquiry that we are able to do 'historical sociology'. Accordingly, historical sociology does not require exactly the same methodological apparatus as conventional work within the discipline of 'history', or accordance to the tradition of historical argument and practice. With a sociological imagination, we can move beyond the interrogation of an array of already uncovered 'sources', and actively uncover new sources of data through methods such as interviews and ethnographic work. In this regard, we might follow Lachmann (2013:6) and Calhoun (2003:383) in deducing that historical sociology consists principally in unpicking the dynamics and processes of social change, rather than the exclusive subordination of sociology to the strictures of historical tradition.

In order to unpick these complex dynamics, it is vital to capture a process from a sufficiently varied array of points of view, at the intersection of social action and social structure. By interrogating varied sources until sufficient saturation is reached, we can gradually reconstruct the general tendencies of these intersections accurately and meaningfully. Such an effort is reminiscent of Mann's approach to historical sociology, seeking "the feel of a pattern, a process, or a series of accidents or contingencies," (Mann, 1986:503).

How, then, do we conduct an historical sociology of the dynamics of mobilisation which stretch beyond the movement? Though these dynamics can, to some extent, be uncovered by analysing broader social conditions, an analysis of their operation requires that we draw our attention to the way "social action and social structure create and contain one another" (Abrams, 1982:108). Affinity in particular can be very slight and difficult to detect at an abstract, or 'birds-eye' level. In order to uncover the range of affinities in any given case, thorough qualitative examination and an array of differing perspectives on a given process may be necessary.

Accordingly, rather than relying exclusively on the kinds of secondary sources upon which most historical sociology of social movements has conventionally depended, I had to uncover new data, gathered by supplementary inquiry. This ranged from highly extensive in-depth interviews and ethnographic observations to the interrogation of public and private archives. I investigated these sources in considerable depth, and yet much of their utility was in the clarity which they offered collectively, rather than in their role as singular sources of information. It was through my engagement with these sources that I was able to gain a greater sense of how individuals, structures, and processes intersected.

Given my selection of both historical and contemporary contexts, I decided that it would be unfruitful to apply exactly the same methods of data-collection across cases. The most historically distant of these cases, the French Revolution, was best served by conventional historical methods: the analysis of historians' accounts and other secondary materials in combination witharchival and other primary sources. The latter of these were examined during two months of archival research in Paris.

There were a variety of pre-existing historical accounts and narratives for each case, though in all but the French case they were rather limited in character, particularly at the outset of my research. In the Egyptian and Occupy cases, traditional historical methods were supplemented with additional data collection strategies. Such additional strategies were used to further develop an understanding of aspects of each case which had proved elusive or demanded more attention. In addition to work with secondary sources, I undertook three months of ethnography, interviewing and archival work in the United States, and two months of ethnography and interviewing in Cairo.

Interviews proved by far the most useful in this pursuit. One benefit was the opportunity to pursue specific questions which were not available in the existing historical literature or publicly accessible sources. There was also considerable worth in the experiences my interviewees had as participant-observers during the contentious episodes in which they partook, which were often very illuminating. Beyond this, I was also able to use interviews as an opportunity to understand the historical data more precisely. In the case of Occupy, for example, I was able to triangulate my methods, undertaking an in-depth interview of the curator of a privately held archive she had compiled during the protests, alternating between her own reflections, the archival material she had compiled, and her own personal diary entries at the time. I conducted a total of 34 interviews with Occupy participants, and 26 interviews with those involved in Egypt's revolution, some of which lasted as long as eight hours in total. These were conducted under conditions of anonymity to protect individuals involved. Accordingly, they have been given pseudonyms when their interviews are referred to.

It should be noted that the interviews which I conducted with participants in the Occupy and Egyptian cases were chiefly retrospective in nature. Though many of the struggles of 2011 still lived on in contemporary politics and activism, the events on which my analysis was focussing were as much as four years in the past. This raised an interesting challenge: what if my interviewees' retrospective reconstructions of events had been made unreliable by the passage of time, the emergence of popular narratives, or the pressures of current events?

In keeping with such concerns, one could be forgiven for asking why we should trust what people tell us about contentious events that occurred several years prior. A better question, however, is that of *how* we should trust these accounts as compared with a 'prospective' account which takes place as a case unfolds. Indeed, though they invite additional concerns, conducting retrospective interviews also has many advantages when compared with prospective ones, and these can often be leveraged to improve their reliability. There were a number of measures which my interviewees and I took to collaboratively improve the quality of our interviews<sup>19</sup>.

For my own part, to resituate our discussion in the context of the past, rather than the present, I made a concerted effort to encourage my interviewees to reconstruct their experiences sequentially, and in considerable detail. Each interview would generally begin with the question about what an interviewee had been doing prior to their own involvement in the contentious episode, discussing aspects of their own personal situation at the time in considerable depth. Rather than begin by asking direct questions about their involvement: 'why did you become involved in Occupy', or 'What was it that caused you to go to Tahrir', I asked for a sequential account of events as they experienced them, from this point until the end of the contentious episode. I would ensure that interviewees had considerable time to talk through events in as small detail as they wished. Though this meant that interviews often took several hours, the calibre of recall which we achieved was very impressive.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Throughout this process, in order to avoid biasing my interviewees, I was careful to refrain from disclosing key hypotheses or ideas until the interviewee had given their account, reducing the risk that they might reshape their account of events to fit my theoretical hunches.

I also invited my interviewees to assist in the endeavour to ensure that their accounts were grounded primarily in the past, rather than the present, suggesting that they consult their own artefacts from the contentious episodes in question. This took the form of re-reading old emails, consulting diaries and calendars, browsing through personal effects, asking friends or loved ones about their recollection, or interviewees simply taking additional time to think about their experiences. Sometimes, this would also involve interviewees bringing their own documentation to interviews and referring to it where necessary.

In the chapters which follow, I will detail each of these cases in considerable depth, before offering an analysis of the role of affinities and convergence in each. While my approach differs considerably from Mann's in that I do not delve into the middle-spectrum of world-historical events between 1789 and 2011, I have nevertheless tried to keep in mind his suggestion that "comparative analysis should also be *historical.*" "Each case *develops* temporally," Mann notes, "and this dynamic must itself be part of our explanation of its structure" (Mann, 1986:174). I have tried to offer something of this temporality in my explanation of the cases as best I can, paying attention to how the dynamics of affinity and convergence corresponded to the temporal progression of events and historical contexts in each case.

## **Chapter 2. Occupy Wall Street**

"Our goal on September 17<sup>th</sup> was to have a General Assembly on Wall Street.... We're going to gather these people together, and we're going to take space on Wall Street, which should be literally impossible. And then we're going to have a conversation about how fucked up everything is. And that was it. " – Larry

In 2011 America's activists were exhausted. Obama's promise of hope and change did not seem to have materialised. Meanwhile, American protest since 9/11 had consistently achieved little, and been met with harsh police repression. "I was tired of it," Larry, one of the first activists to get involved in Occupy, told me on our morning phone-call, "I had seen how it was worthless." The conventional tactic of mass marches and rallies that had predominated among organisers in the United States since the 1960s had worn thin. Larry described how such events, often involving people in the tens of thousands had failed to make any tangible impact, "You look at it and you can't even understand what's going on," he explained, "it's just a mishmash of colours and all these different voices, and no real idea." Such events were just as uninteresting for activists as they were for their intended audience. Larry had put this to me quite forcefully: "I go to these events, and people yell at me about shit I already fucking know, *because I'm here*. I came here *because* I knew this shit already... So, it was really frustrating because there was no point."

In New York's activist community, a sentiment similar to the one Larry had expressed was particularly palpable. Three major groups had long dominated the city's leftist organising: The International Socialist Organisation, the Revolutionary Communist Party, and, most prominently, the Workers World Party, mediated through a plethora of front organisations. After the financial crash, these organisations' anti-war mobilisation had shifted in favour of questions of social justice and inequality. Their central repertoires involved enforcing a rigorously hierarchical structure, and routinely reiterating traditional leftist tactics: a march, a stage, a link-up with alternative news organisations such as Russia Today or PressTV for some additional reportage<sup>1</sup>. There was often little support given to those who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Sometimes, these reporters would simultaneously be under contract with the Iranian or Russian state news organisation, and be active members of these leftist parties.

would be arrested, and no scope for action outside of the preordained trajectory.<sup>2</sup> Beyond these organisations, there were the activities of various trade unions, Democratic Party affiliated organisations, and political action committees. When these organisations did engage in disruptive action (and this was rare), a little more attention was paid to protesters' wellbeing, but they were similarly constrained in their agendas and hierarchical in character (CNN, 2010; NJ.com, 2010).

Against this backdrop, nobody could have expected Occupy Wall Street to succeed in New York, let alone inspire a global movement. In many ways, its genesis was a series of failures: a failure by its initiators (Adbusters) to adequately organise around their own call to action, a failure by New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts to seize the initiative, a failure by Worker's World to cooperate and agree on a form of action, and then a failure to successfully occupy Wall Street itself on September 17<sup>th</sup>. Instead, a dedicated group of hard-core activists, with the support of those who had marched on September 17<sup>th</sup>, occupied Zuccotti Park after failing to reach either Wall Street, or their back-up target of the nearby Chase Plaza. Zuccotti Park was named for John Zuccotti, the then CEO of Brookfield Office Properties. Brookfield maintained the park as a "privately owned public space" as part of their obligations as the owner of a nearby office building "One Liberty Plaza," which had served as a temporary morgue during the 9/11 attacks. Far from seizing Wall Street, the Occupiers had made camp steps away from Ground Zero, less than a week after the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the World Trade Center attacks.

So how, in the wrong place, without widespread support, and against all odds, did an occupation blossom, thrive and finally disperse as something altogether more momentous? Occupy's early organisers had eschewed established leftist organisations, unions, and even

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> I spent some time with these front organisations upon my arrival in NYC, those controlled by Worker's World in particular. Their members were incredibly kind and polite, coming from all manner of different backgrounds, with a genuine desire to improve the lot of their neighbours. Many were unaware of the extent to which the organisation they had joined was affiliated to Workers World, imagining it to be a collaboration or cooperative effort rather than a top-down structure. I was lucky enough to interview Stephen, a rising member of the Workers World Party who led one of these front organisations. He talked honestly and openly with me about the nature of these front organisations, and how they functioned, his own understanding of what he was doing, and how it connected to broader Maoist politics. My reading of these is a consequence of the combined findings from my interview with him, encounters with primary sources online and those archived at the Maldon Institute.

other well established social movements in favour of a radical anarchist framework: to "create a space," "take a space," "eliminate all rules for a second... and then decide what rules should really govern us as humans when we're interacting together" (Interview: Larry)<sup>3</sup>. Nonetheless, such a space persisted for almost two months: an autonomous enclave in one of the most heavily policed cities of the world, and remained active in the city as decentralised movement. It inspired successful "Occupy" movements across the United States and across the globe, and it has continued to persist in American politics until the present day, with the bonds and identities forged during Occupy Wall Street re-emerging to propel the movement for black lives, US presidential campaigns, and global struggles for environmental justice. Occupy Wall Street was neither just a movement, nor just a moment: it was the epochal event of a social process which is still unfolding in the United States today.

The first part of this chapter outlines the character and development of Occupy Wall Street, detailing how it emerged, sustained and transformed over time. It tells the story of Occupy Wall Street, illustrating the difficulties with understanding Occupy as a single, clearly defined 'social movement', and suggests an alternative understanding of Occupy as a key contentious episode within a broader social process involving a diverse set of differently associated actors. The second part offers an analysis of how people were mobilised to participate in Occupy, detailing how underlying affinities offered routes to involvement with Occupy in ways which extend beyond our conventional understanding of 'networked' social movements and explaining how Occupy offered certain key conditions of convergence for potential new participants.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This was also explicitly corroborated in my interviews with Annie, David, Matt and Violet – all of whom had been involved in Occupy early on. Furthermore, Bray (2013) and Schneider (2013) deal with this topic at length in their books on Occupy.

#### 2.1 Understanding Occupy Wall Street

"Occupy Wall Street- it's hard to talk about it as an organisation.... The action of Occupy Wall Street transformed into this never-ending, many-headed beast of a thing. But it wasn't really an organisation, and it wasn't really a movement, and it wasn't really a moment, it wasn't any of these things. And so, it became really complicated." – Annie

## **Background to an Occupation**

Founded by anarchist and autonomist rebels defying a decade of dominant organising logic, Occupy Wall Street was understandably unique in New York City's organising landscape. Some compared it to 'Bloombergville', an action by a group known as "New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts" in June 2011, during which a small number of protesters chose to sleep on the sidewalk (Sledge, 2011; Wheeler, 2011). Others compared it to the two-week occupation of the State Capitol building during the momentous protests in Wisconsin between February and June 2011, which Bloombergville itself had sought, and failed, to emulate (Schwartz, 2011). Still others compared it to the Arab Spring, particularly events in Egypt, and the 15M 'Indignados' movement in Spain (Tharoor,2011; Welty, 2014). These comparisons were all in some regard apt, and indeed, in the early calls to occupy Wall Street issued by a Canadian culture-jamming collective known as 'Adbusters', readers were explicitly asked: 'Are you ready for a Tahrir moment?'.

These calls by Adbusters, beginning on July 13<sup>th</sup> 2011, and reiterated in various forms over the summer, were met with both excitement and confusion by the city's organisers (Adbusters, 2011; Komlik, 2014). "There was a kind of strange dynamic," Michael, a veteran New York autonomist, recalled, "because Adbusters made this call to occupy Wall Street and picked a day, but they didn't really participate at all in what that would look like or how that would happen, so then people totally separate, with no affiliation whatsoever, had to figure out what to actually do with this day." An initial meeting in August was organised by activists working with New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts, who had been carrying out overnight protests at City Hall, which they had dubbed 'Bloombergville' in mock-honour of the city's Mayor, Michael Bloomberg. The advertised programme was for those interested in organising around the call to occupy Wall Street to meet at the Charging Bull in Downtown New York's Bowling Green, a short distance from Wall Street itself, in order to discuss the shape of the action to come.

When the meeting began, it was immediately apparent that the occasion had been co-opted by one particular faction of New York's political struggle, the influential Maoist group known as the Workers World Party, which had played a substantial part in Bloombergville. "What was advertised as an open assembly began like a rally," the Anarchist writer Nathan Schneider recalled, "with Workers World Party members and others making speeches over a portable P.A. system to the hundred or so people there" (Schneider, 2012:50). As my own contacts recounted, "people were not very happy about this" (Interview: Annie). "Anarchists started to heckle socialists, socialists heckled back, and the meeting melted down." Workers World, unable to control the crowd they had drawn, withdrew from the scene while a newly proclaimed New York City General Assembly (NYCGA) held its first meeting without PA systems, stages, or hierarchies, but instead sat cross-legged in a circle, deep in discussion for hours on end about the shape of things to come.

The early Assembly was formed around three core principles: it would be horizontal, participatory, and autonomous – diametrically opposed to the hierarchical 'rally' format common to urban activism at the time. Weekly meetings were planned, every Saturday, in the first instance at the city's Irish Hunger Memorial, and then regularly at Tompkins Square Park in the East Village. Alumni of the Global Justice movement, now evangelical 'horizontalists'<sup>4</sup> were on hand to facilitate meetings, drawing both from past experience and new conceptual approaches (Schneider, 2011). These meetings in Tompkin's Square Park would bring together the breakaway Bloombergville protesters with activists who had spent time in Tahrir, Spanish Indignados, and an assortment of radicals from across the United States and around the globe.

Each early meeting of the pre-occupation General Assembly came with its own revelations, disagreements, and occasional progress. Gradually, the assemblies in Tompkins Square Park

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> These included: the anarchist anthropologist David Graeber; the filmmaker Marisa Holmes; and horizontalist writer Marina Sitrin.

drew together some idea of what the action on September 17<sup>th</sup> (or S17, as it became known) would look like. Working groups were formed, managing matters ranging from outreach and tactical manoeuvres to those such as food, art, and web design<sup>5</sup>. Anything between thirty and one hundred people attended these meetings on any given weekend, most of whom were drawn from New York's community of radical intellectuals and agitators in the autonomist and anarchist traditions, though with a sprinkling of socialists, libertarians, and relative political newbies between them. As September 17<sup>th</sup> drew near, the NYCGA had carried out pilot studies, organised legal observers, medical training, and consummate food and drink for the day. This was a sincere effort, even with its incredibly ad-hoc method of organisation (Interviews: Annie, Violet, Larry).

In this early planning stage, the accumulation of trust between activists in the loose network which had formed around planning for September 17<sup>th</sup> substituted for strong organisational ties often present between activists in established movements. Consequently, meetings became considerably more successful over time. Initially, "the way people related individually, or politically, or organisationally couldn't work within the context," Michael mused when I asked him about these early meetings, "it was an interesting dynamic... or lack of dynamic between them." One of the meeting's early facilitators, Annie, concurred when I asked her about the same matter: "a lot of us were meeting each other for the first time," she explained, "even though we had been in similar circles." Week by week, however, conversations and projects in pursuit of their shared mission created a situation where this initial stiltedness gave way to collaboration and connection. "We got to know each other really well through the planning process," Annie explained, "so by the time September 17<sup>th</sup> happened there were really strong bonds and trust." <sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> A full list of (more or less loosely formed) pre-occupation working groups formed comprises:

Arts and Culture Working Group, Facilitation Group, Food Committee, Internet Working Group, Legal Group, Media Group, Outreach Group, Student Outreach Group, Tactical Group

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In part, these bonds were also developed outside of the larger 'assembly' meetings: each of the working groups formed during the planning process would also meet and work together on particular projects in advance of the 17<sup>th</sup>.

Despite the considerable effort put in to planning September 17<sup>th</sup>, there was no expectation that such an operation would succeed. As Larry recalled: "My perception of what was gonna happen was that the police were gonna come and just like beat the shit out of everybody and throw them out of the square and it'd be over - I was so sure of this." Nonetheless, the events of the day took a considerably different path. A momentous 'snake march' had been organised, taking a train of about 1,000 protesters (a rather disappointing turnout) around the Financial District in search of an occupation site (Interview: Michael). As anticipated, Wall Street itself was blocked off, as was Chase Plaza, the primary back-up target envisaged to play host to a potential occupation. Eventually, Zuccotti Park, one of the more undesirable back-up locations on the edge of the Financial District, was proclaimed as a new target. The march made its way over, snaking through the streets towards its destination, flanked by hastily reconfiguring NYPD motorcycle brigades. Cardboard signs and home-made banners were displayed in place of the carefully prepared, ideologically curated posters that had characterised the Bloombergville protests. A number of protesters could be seen carrying sleeping bags and other camping equipment.<sup>7</sup>

By the time the march had settled at Zuccotti numbers had thinned to around 200. "There was nothing really happening, nothing to do yet," Michael recalled. "People were just sitting around, people were breaking off into little like, not necessarily working groups, but maybe discussion groups or assemblies." These assemblies, as another early Occupier (Interview: Annie) put it to me, "were various breakout groups... talking about the world that we wanted to live in, the world we currently lived in, with the [financial] crisis, and how we would get from one to the other: the question of transition." These discussions continued late into the night, until 4am by some accounts, with a considerable proportion of those involved electing to sleep overnight in the park.

Despite the prior certainty of eviction, the NYPD seemed mysteriously repelled by the perimeter of the park. A plethora of peculiar theories were offered for why the occupation had been able to remain, ranging from legalistic explanations to theories of complex disputes among the city's ruling element. What was more readily apparent, however, was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See, for example, the footage by ReporterWorldNews (2011).

that Occupy's early agitators had succeeded: for the time being, an occupation was underway.

## **Occupying Wall Street**

From the very beginning, a need for constant adaptation became a hallmark feature of Occupy Wall Street. Michael Gould-Wartofsky (2015:69), then a student at NYU, recalled that initially, "in the absence of an infrastructure, life in the park was a continual improvisation." The loosely associated group who had planned the march to Occupy Wall Street on September 17<sup>th</sup> had succeeded in their general goal: they had marched, and they had occupied a location in the Financial District. There had been no expectation that they would be allowed to remain. Alongside the few who had participated in early planning meetings came a plethora of new 'hard-ground' occupiers<sup>8</sup>, regular visitors, and even everyday sympathisers. There were no membership criteria, and no real notion of a goal or mission statement, except that the occupation itself was worth sustaining (Schneider, 2011; NYCGA, 2011). Occupy Wall Street at this point existed not as a formal organisation, or as a movement, but as an action, sustained by an undefined and unbounded community. As Annie mused later, "the action of Occupy Wall Street transformed into this never-ending, many-headed beast of a thing," without the structure of either an organisation, or a movement, but involving many organisations, and touching an array of different movements.

In the absence of a clear leadership, or any new organising structures, the occupation in Zuccotti came to operate in a similar fashion to the meetings leading up to it. The 'facilitation working group' who had served to organise the General Assemblies which planned the action on September 17<sup>th</sup> continued to facilitate assembly meetings, this time on a daily basis. A now much larger 'New York City General Assembly (NYCGA)' of whoever was willing to participate served as the manifest means of collaborative decision making, and would decide upon the occupation's most important matters by consensus. There was, however, a considerable difference between the General Assembly which had planned Occupy, and the new Assembly in Zuccotti: scale. Meetings prior to Occupy Wall Street had only involved fifty active participants at their peak, with about half of those who had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> A term used to refer to those who would stay overnight in the park.

showed up electing to speak. Even this had already proved unfamiliar for facilitators. "I had used consensus in different collectives and organising spaces," one of the principal facilitators of the pre-Zuccotti Assemblies (Interview: Annie) noted, "I was pretty familiar with facilitation, although the size of the groups that we were working with was definitely something new for me... so we had to adapt as things went along."

While the facilitation-experts on hand had experience working with consensus, it had been in contexts involving generally fewer than even thirty people. By contrast, the new General Assembly in Zuccotti Park (or Liberty Plaza as some were now calling it) would eventually run into the thousands. Though there had been consensus-based mass-assemblies before, such as in the Spanish Indignados protests of 2011, few had actually been used for the purposes of concrete, everyday decision-making, instead fulfilling the purpose of discursive hubs for a particular topic, often themed around matters such as education, or the economy, while much smaller assemblies tended to confirm or refuse relatively uncontroversial, general proposals (Castañeda, 2012). A consequence of the unmanageability of such a process was that General Assembly meetings were frequently decried by both their proponents and detractors as a chaotic or ineffective means of decision making, a problem which only intensified as the occupation grew.

Nonetheless, much of Occupy's substantive work barely interfaced with these assemblies, taking place in smaller 'working groups'. These groups would conduct the everyday practices of the occupation, and ranged from crucially instrumental jobs such as operating the kitchen, facilitating meetings, or managing financial resources to non-essential elements such as roundtable 'Think Tank' discussions. The activities of Occupy's plethora of working groups offered opportunities for participation to almost anyone who was sufficiently interested or motivated to get involved. From planning protests to constructing complicated technological apparatuses, to chopping onions and sorting clothes, all manner of activities were constantly underway in and around the park, conducted by the autonomous working groups affiliated to the General Assembly. Some working groups, such as the 'Lightsource' group operated as progressive, low-profit start-ups, while others took the form of destructive and disruptive parodies of the entire process such as a 'Thieves Working Group' nominally dedicated to stealing items from others in the park (NYCGA 2011b; 2011c). These working groups ranged from those lasting only a matter of days to others which would

persist well beyond the NYCGA itself. They would operate in a particularly autonomous fashion, without any clear central coordination except for the occasional request made to a General Assembly. One occupier, Kevin, was involved in a particularly large number of working groups. "It was really hard to tell what was happening in a Working Group if you weren't in it," he explained. "I almost had no idea who any of these people were... [and] no one knew what I was doing really, except a few people."

Throughout mid-September, Occupy Wall Street remained a rather unexpected, but ultimately low-profile disturbance in American public life. A good number of those who had already been aware of Adbusters' call, and were plugged in to activist communities and networks possessed some awareness of the occupation, but the broader public in the United States, and worldwide were almost entirely unaware of the disturbance in Zuccotti. Though the occupation's Media Working Group had built an incredibly impressive network of well-resourced photographers, live streamers, bloggers, and twitter-warriors, with support from the technologically sophisticated GlobalRevolution collective, very little material was making its way into the daily newshole (Captain, 2011)<sup>9</sup>. Though the occupiers had the capacity to create stories, they were unable to capture the media's imagination. Fortunately for Occupy Wall Street, the New York City Police Department could.

On September 24<sup>th</sup>, in the process of policing a small-scale protest by Occupy Wall Street, Detective Inspector Anthony Bologna (one of the senior officials on the scene, known as 'white shirts') unleashed a can of pepper spray on a small crowd of peaceful protesters, standing inside a police corral on the sidewalk - almost all of them young women. This was the trigger for the first serious media coverage Occupy Wall Street had received, with a recording of the incident made by members of the Media Working Group not only being shared online, but aired on progressive outlets such as MSNBC and the Daily Show, as well as prompting articles in major local, national, and international newspapers (USLaw.com, 2011).

On the anniversary of the attack, the New York Times, one of the papers which had covered it initially, surmised: "We're not saying that Occupy would never have taken off without

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This is a journalistic term, referring to the amount of space available for news on any given day.

Inspector Bologna. But he gave it a mighty jump start last Sept. 24." That week, Occupy Wall Street would consist of 2% of all US news coverage (Sartor, 2011), and won an array of new allies. A handful of small occupations were even attempted in other cities, as major unions, including the Transport Workers Union (or TWU, representing 38,000 workers in New York alone, with 200,000 US-wide), and United Auto Workers (UAW) threw their weight behind the occupation, while progressive icon Michael Moore personally offered to fundraise for the movement from his publication royalties. "We plan to be down there from now on." John Samuelsen, the president of the local TWU chapter had explained, "Previously there were individual rank and filers, but now there will be a coordinated presence from the Transport Union; we'll be joining the protest, standing in agreement and solidarity" (Doll, 2011).

By the end of the week, an even greater blessing had been offered to Occupy Wall Street by the NYPD. On October 1<sup>st</sup>, two weeks into the occupation, the first major mobilisation had been planned in the form of a march across the Brooklyn Bridge, demonstrating solidarity between the two boroughs. Spurred by the Bologna incident, and bolstered by the support of some of the city's most prominent unions, and other members of the New York labour community, Occupiers were going to make this a big one, with thousands of protesters arriving for the day (Al Jazeera, 2011; FoxNews, 201;1 Rawlings, 2011). Emboldened by the showing, a substantial contingent of the protesters spilled off the pedestrian path, and onto the Bridge's main roadway below, resulting in a head-to-head confrontation with the NYPD. Michael Gould Wartofsky (2015:89-90), who found himself amidst the protesters on the roadway that day, recalled "a diverse mix of day 1 occupiers, first-time protesters and longtime militants from the city's students and labour movements... complete with pacers to keep time and legal observers to keep watch... blocking one, then two, then all three lanes of east-bound traffic," swiftly joined by others who poured onto the bridge in support. Within minutes, they were "eight hundred strong, spanning one half the breadth of the bridge." This was the point at which the NYPD began to engage. A police kettle was drawn up, and though a few were able to escape, almost every single protester, over 700 in total, were trapped in a police cordon, handcuffed, and arrested (Doyle and Schapiro, 2011; NPR, 2011).

The Brooklyn Bridge march would prove to be one of the largest mass-arrests of peaceful protesters in American history, with the NYPD drafting in civilian busses in order to cope with the numbers. Such was the spectacle that the American news media reported on the event in droves. Further questions were asked: who were these people, what did they want, and why was their cause spreading? With the American media searching for answers, Occupy Wall Street would account for 10% of all news coverage in the United States (Sartor, 2011).

This new media coverage and attention, as well as the public outrage coupled with it, substantially empowered the hitherto siloed occupiers. In his own account, Wartofsky (2015:82) concurred. "As the news media spotlight cast its glare over Liberty Square, the occupiers found a screen onto which they could project their message to millions.... from the front pages of the dailies to the lead stories on the nightly news, participants were deftly translating the anti-politics and anti-capitalism of OWS into a new language, one that could be comprehended, copied, and ultimately co-opted by almost anyone." In the wake of the mass arrest, and the national attention it had drawn, a plethora of new allies flocked to Occupy's side, with a meeting between fifteen different labour unions arranged in Zuccotti Park two days later. Major new supporters included the 600,000-strong New York State United Teachers (the state's largest union), the AFL-CIO (the largest federation of trade unions in the United States), the Service Employees International Union (representing 2.1 million workers across the US and over 400,000 members locally), and the (over one million-strong) Teamsters. Big labour had thrown its weight behind a small occupation (Doll, 2011).

## Occupy in its Prime

With its fully-fledged entry into the mainstream of American consciousness, Occupy Wall Street became a focal point of national attention, and the cause célèbre among American activists. In Zuccotti, the previously quiet park was swiftly inundated with new visitors, both within the city, and from far afield. Many even moved to New York, temporarily or permanently. Others, rather than travelling to this emergent anti-capitalist Mecca, began to organise in their own communities to emulate it. A plethora of new occupations, modelled on Occupy Wall Street began to crop up. As the FBI noted in a then confidential report, by the weekend after the October 1<sup>st</sup> protest "Occupy Wall Street protests have spread to about

half of all states in the US, [and] over a dozen European and Asian cities" (Federal Bureau of Investigation<sup>10</sup>, 2012:61).

The spread of occupations across America was only the start of Occupy's expansion. Many of those inspired by Occupy across the United States and around the world were planning for a global day of action on October 15<sup>th</sup>. This action, initially organised by the 15M movement in Europe was now additionally energised by the success of Occupy Wall Street. By the 15<sup>th</sup> of October, Occupy had not just gone national, it was going global: protests were staged in over 900 cities (Elliott, 2011), with major occupations being attempted in almost every major city on the globe, and self-identified Occupy groups (of dramatically varying sizes and impact) eventually formed in 2,771 municipalities (Occupy Together, 2012). Occupy Wall Street on the East Coast was now mirrored by a similarly momentous occupation in Oakland, California on the West coast, as well as a major occupation in London. Also of note in the United States were major occupations in Boston, Portland, Chicago, Seattle, Phoenix, and Washington DC each drawing between five and ten thousand protesters at their peak.

Occupy had drawn in a considerable range of new participants and allies in the 20 days between September 24<sup>th</sup> and October 15<sup>th</sup>. This was exemplified by the profound success of efforts to prevent an attempt by the owners of the park, Brookfield Office Properties, to evict the occupation shortly after a swelling in numbers in early October. Brookfield had argued, on the grounds of public health, that they needed to evict the occupiers in order to clean and conduct repairs on an apparently unsanitary and dangerous Zuccotti Park. A letter was officially delivered to the NYPD on October 11<sup>th</sup>, and within moments an eviction of the occupation had been agreed between the two parties: it would take place on the morning of Friday the 14<sup>th</sup>, alongside a new set of rules for any protests in the park which effectively prohibited any kind of overnight sleeping (Brookfield,2011). By Thursday evening, a massive cleaning operation had already been organised, with more than three thousand occupiers showing up to participate in an extensive cleaning session, which even lasted overnight. Meanwhile, a petition was delivered to City Hall that same evening,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Henceforth: FBI

defending the occupation and objecting to the new measures. It carried an astonishing 175,000 signatures with it (Wolfe, 2011).

As Occupy Wall Street grew in size, following a swelling in numbers over the course of October, work began to amend the General Assembly model to include a 'Spokes Council', named for its structural similarity to the spokes of a wheel. The Spokes Council (NYCGA, 2011d), an attempted remedy for the unwieldiness of General Assembly meetings, was adapted from the organising traditions of the global justice movement as well as the anarchist 'Direct Action Network'<sup>11</sup>, and brought together spokespeople<sup>12</sup> from Occupy's varying working groups as well as 'caucuses' of traditionally marginalised groups. Each group would nominate a rotating spokesperson for any particular meeting, resulting in a meeting consisting of 20-30 spokespeople rather than the hundreds, or occasionally thousands, attending general assemblies. While much of the General Assembly would remain the sole forum for the substantial political and strategic matters pertaining to Occupy Wall Street, the Spokes Council would control the approval of budgets and capital expenditures, as well as the ratification of working groups and caucuses rights to representation on that council. These new meetings were to be held away from the park, in indoor spaces around the city, and would be focused on the regular business and administration of Occupy Wall Street itself (Chen, 2011).

Furthermore, the previously banal physical space of Zuccotti swiftly took on a new, invigorated character as an environment for new associations, activities, and the free exchange of ideas. Debates, cultural events, art exhibits, lectures and musical performances by celebrity guests were a regular feature of the occupation, making the park a constantly bustling and vibrant environment. Zuccotti and its working groups also served more basic needs, with the occupation acting as an access point for anyone in need of clothing, food or basic medical care. A consequence of this multi-faceted space was a frequent array of new

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Which had, in turn, drawn its version of the "Spokes" model from anarchist modes of organising during the Spanish Civil War.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> It is worth noting here that these spokespeople were intended only to communicate the decisions already reached within their respective groups, rather than making decisions on their behalf.

encounters between ordinary New Yorkers and the occupation itself.<sup>13</sup> Be it attracted by Occupy's cultural side, material necessity, or a curiosity about this mysterious park, a great many occasional visitors came to engage with the Occupy ecosystem. Initially, the park also maintained a healthy periphery of occasional visitors, ranging from tourists and commuters to journalists and visiting celebrities. Some of these would later become involved in the occupation in their own right. As the harsh New York winter drew closer, a substantial proportion of the neighbouring homeless population found themselves spending more time in the camp, and even becoming acquainted with radical politics. As many new visitors and participants found themselves drawn to Zuccotti, the park shortly became packed on a daily basis.

Though many who encountered Occupy would only pass through, or make occasional contact, others would be drawn into more protracted participation. Be it in confrontational protest, or simply working together in the park, the everyday work of social movements offered a plethora of chances to plug-in. "You had thousands and thousands of people who would come in and out" Joe, a journalist covering the movement, had explained to me. "The complete absence of any barrier to entry," he noted, "was one of the things that.... really drew people in. They knew that they didn't have to show up all the time, and if they went even a couple of times they'd probably start to see familiar faces" What was particularly intriguing, however, was that the most impactful instances people experienced during Occupy were rarely participation in ground-breaking collective successes or resounding victories. They were recounted to me as minute, deeply personal stories of participation such as getting arrested, making a puppet, cleaning the park, or speaking at a meeting. These activities, though minute, offered those who engaged in them it something quintessential: a sense of self-efficacy. For some, as one Occupier put it to me, they were "the most profound experiences many people had ever had in their lives at that point" (Interview: Lana).

Where Occupy Wall Street differed drastically from conventional social movements was the means by which it offered its participants the opportunity to pursue their own personal passions, interests, or fascinations, and for that work to be deemed valuable and important.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> This is discussed further in the next section.

It offered a single space, a broad community, and a platform for any cause one could imagine. Annie had recalled how, "very quickly, in the day to day experience of having to hold down the park and organising things themselves," people came to commit to Occupy. People "didn't necessarily even know that what they were doing was anarchistic," she explained, "they just knew that we had to feed ourselves and that we had to put up tents, to not get hypothermia: there were very practical questions." "I've talked to those people since," she mused, "that experience.... was really defining for them."<sup>14</sup> Ernesto had described this as how the occupation "took people in," and offered them purpose. Someone might be "a single mom, or a bus driver or whatever," who didn't feel as if their skills were valued in society, "[but] now you come to this revolution that everyone's talking about... and you feel valued there, and if you're gonna chop onions, you're gonna chop them with pride and honour." "It kind of validated you a little bit," Kevin, who had participated heavily in sanitation work during the occupation, told me. "It felt good to be part of something that was not just conceptual.... I'm doing this thing and it's important, and you know, it's physical, we're helping take care of each other."

While some contributions in Occupy Wall Street often took the form of concrete actions, others were less material in nature. Even everyday conversations in the park could be constructed as contributing to the cause. One occupier, Charlotte, then a PhD student at a university in New York, had told me about how participating in conversations at the occupation's "Think Tank" working group, which held daily discussions in the park, prompted her to decide that she was going to participate for the long haul. "I was actually planning to move back to England..." she explained, "but I came back quite quickly because I found the work that these people were doing really compelling."

To be an 'occupier' connected you not only with participants in Occupy movements in different states, and even countries, but created a firm standpoint from which to maintain and continue the relationships one had formed during Occupy Wall Street. While to some extent this simply emerged from the bonds and trust formed during the occupation, it was also imposed upon many regular visitors to the occupation by external forces. "I think the fact that the Cops treated anyone who was there as fair game... meant that they had to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Bray (2013) describes this as process of "Translating Anarchy," in his book by the same name.

become a part of - they WERE part of - the collective experience, whether they wanted to or not," one of the journalists covering Occupy, Joe, had told me. For Joe, it was his arrest that cemented his identity as an Occupier. "There was just a sort of way in which, even if you attempted not to become a part of the [Occupy] story, for almost all of us that happened at one point or another," he explained, while describing how all but one of the journalists he had met covering Occupy came to identify with the occupation in some way.

Outside of the physical realm, the occupation was also connected worldwide. Occupy Wall Street's global public face offered an audience worldwide the opportunity not only to observe and understand the activities of OWS (and later, other occupations) but an opportunity to participate from afar. This included social media accounts on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube (underpinned by the occupation's media working group), and even several newspapers -the most famous of which was called "The Occupied Wall Street Journal" (Garces, 2012). By far the most participatory element of Occupy's online operation, however, was a regular livestream. "In the beginning we'd have this morning show, which'd be us opening gifts people had sent," Larry (one of the livestream's founders) had told me. Initially, this morning show also served as a means to share information about the occupation with an interested online community. Larry found himself "answering questions to [5-10,000] people in this chat.... constantly providing information," ranging from information about bathroom breaks to complex details of meetings. "I viewed it as a narrative," he explained "I was a narrator in a story when I was livestreaming, so I'd be out and I'd be telling people what was happening around me, interacting with these people."

The livestream's narrative component swiftly expanded to include protest coverage, and to offer counter-narratives about the nature of protests. "When the police are gonna beat somebody up or they're gonna disperse a crowd.... they get rid of all the cameras," Larry explained, "they clear them all out and then they beat everybody up and nobody sees it. So part of the point of the livestream was to... stay with the people who [the police] are with: our community or whatever, and we're gonna film what happens, and regardless of whatever they do or tell us we're not gonna leave and we're willing to be arrested." This became a huge asset in its own right for the occupation, but had a surprising additional benefit which was arguably even more powerful. The livestream had not just offered a narrative, but started a conversation, with the streamer, the crowd and the online

community all exchanging information. "Having the viewers was like having 500 researchers with me," Larry mused. The livestream would map protests routes on the fly, research police movements and vehicles (even calling police stations to find out additional information) and provide a wide array of auxiliary support over the course of the struggle.

In some cases, efforts at connection were more direct, rather than invitational, with the Wall Street occupation establishing formed links with other occupations in what has been subsequently dubbed the global 'Occupy Movement'. Two of the most prominent networking efforts were known as "Occupy Together" and "InterOccupy" (Fuchs, 2014:31-32). While Occupy Together served as a general overarching 'hub' spreading news and information on the activities of the various occupations, as well as integrating with Meetup.com to offer people the chance to plan new occupations, InterOccupy served as a coordinating hub between existing Occupy groups. Initially, InterOccupy was a conference-call planning group, consisting of various working groups at occupations in New York (OWS), Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), Michigan (Kalamazoo) California (Los Angeles) and Oregon (Portland) who had participated in some experimental conference calls held between occupations. Over time, as many occupations lost access to physical space, InterOccupy shifted into the role of technical and communications support for protest actions and collaborative projects, and continues to play an impressive role in post-Occupy work today.

While InterOccupy and Occupy Together offered some opportunities for connection between occupations, neither was particularly well known or understood by ordinary participants in the occupations, and held no resemblance to a formal network, let alone an organisation of occupations. Instead, the vast bulk of coordinating activities during Occupy took place on an individual, or small group level, rather than in formal inter-occupation networks. Accordingly, the spread of occupations throughout the United States was almost memetic in character, with attempts at new occupations emerging from communities of grassroots organisers who attempted to mimic Occupy Wall Street in their own fashion, and inspiring others to join them.

## Occupy without an Occupation

By November 15<sup>th</sup> 2011, almost two months after its emergence, Occupy Wall Street seemed titanic. With hundreds of occupations worldwide, a month of news-cycle dominance, the active support of the United States' major unions and a war-chest of hundreds of thousands of dollars in New York alone, Occupy seemed unstoppable. By this point major marches on the streets of New York were a weekly event, with battles between police and protesters stretching from Wall Street to Times Square. Occupy Wall Street, and other US occupations enjoyed an incredibly supportive online community, and considerable public goodwill. Even the 1% had bent their ear and opened their wallets, with the CEOs of Ben and Jerry's joining occupiers in Zuccotti, with an offer of \$300,000, and plans, alongside a coalition of other CEOs calling themselves Occupy's "Movement Resources Group," to raise \$1.5m more. But while Occupy Wall Street and its affiliates appeared to be getting evermore entrenched, and had carried out a slew of successful actions, it was also becoming more fragmentary. While numbers in the park had swelled, a great deal of the actual activity had moved elsewhere. Some working groups would barely encounter Zuccotti at all, preferring to meet at bars or in other public spaces, while others had become organisations in their own right, with office space donated by major unions, strict proceedings and a tight circle of trust.

Nonetheless, it came as a great surprise to the occupiers that November 15<sup>th</sup> was the day Occupy Wall Street would be evicted. New York's Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, in tandem with mayors in major cities across the United States, and supported by intelligence gathered by the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and several other government agencies (FBI, 2011; Wolf, 2012) who had been surveying occupations across the United States, ordered police to descend on Zuccotti. Under the cover of dark, NYPD officers raided the park, seizing and destroying the resources within it, and ejecting its residents. The area around Zuccotti was then swiftly reoccupied by a semi-permanent police presence for many months afterward. Occupy Wall Street had found itself without an occupation.

The loss of Zuccotti had robbed occupiers of a key hub and, for many, a home. Like the loss of other physical occupations which were evicted across the United States, the eviction gutted the core constitutive action of Occupy around which so many of its participants had converged: the occupation itself. Nonetheless, in the light of the eviction, organising around Occupy did not go away. Occupy's fragmentation had proved to be its strength. Occupy was no longer just an action, it was the network of all of the activists, sympathisers, movements and organisations that had been drawn to, and then sustained that action. This network, forged from the sum total of relations which had constituted the action of Occupy Wall Street, not to mention the many actions OWS had itself spawned, would not go quietly. Two days later more than 30,000 (by NYPD estimates) had taken to New York's streets (Newman, 2011). Furthermore, new occupiers were arriving and becoming involved, even without Zuccotti. Even as the stream of new participants slowed over the winter months, General Assemblies still persisted, and funds were still in-use.

But despite this initially sustained wave of protest, it appeared that the loss of the park had hit harder than many Occupiers were aware. "When I look back at my emails and all the videos I was making, I was just getting started around the time the park got evicted, I was just getting into it, and I didn't have any sense of defeat around that time," Zak, a film-maker with Occupy's Media Working Group recalled. "I felt like they can take the tents out of the park but they're not going to stop this movement, it's still growing, its' all over the world.... but when you look back you can see that it was really the beginning of the end."

Initially, some elements of the network which had formed during Occupy came together to try and recreate an occupation. The first attempt at this came on the three-month anniversary of the initial protests, targeting Trinity Church's LentSpace on December 17<sup>th</sup>, and was swiftly foiled by the NYPD. A second attempt to re-occupy Zuccotti occurred on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, and was again shut down by the NYPD. Another attempt to retake Zuccotti took place nine days later, and was again rapidly curtained.

Finally, on March 17<sup>th</sup>, Occupy's six-month anniversary, another attempted major reoccupation failed to take Zuccotti. With the hope of a new occupation in New York lost, other occupations across the country winding down, and the Presidential electoral cycle now in full-swing, many in the Occupy community began organising around a new, different action: a May 1<sup>st</sup> general strike which they would call "Occupy May Day," planned to occur across 135 cities in the United States. "While American corporate media has focused on yet another stale election between Wall Street-financed candidates, Occupy has been organising something extraordinary: the first truly nationwide General Strike in U.S. history," a rousing

announcement on occupywallst.org proclaimed. "The Occupy Movement has called for A Day Without the 99% on May 1st, 2012. This in and of itself is a tremendous victory. For the first time, workers, students, immigrants, and the unemployed from 135 U.S. cities will stand together for economic justice" (OccupyWallSt, 2012).

As many can recall, there was no general strike on May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012. There was a plethora of reasons for the event's failure: its overambitious, rushed and vague planning; activist fatigue from constant failed "Occupy" themed actions; the impossibility of a general strike without substantial and extensive trade union involvement, and many more. "There was a breakdown of those relationships around mayday in particular," Annie had recalled, speaking of trade unions' dissatisfaction with Occupy around the May Day strike. Moreover, Occupy's memetic quality, granted to it in a great sense by its media coverage and popular excitement, had substantially diminished. The capacity of "Occupy" to compel and mobilise its network seemed less and less effective, and with this final great failure, Occupy Wall Street had finally disappeared from view. "Phase 2, 'after-Occupy', started when May Day hit," one occupier recalled (Interview: Ernesto).

While Occupy Wall Street, and its associated occupations led and supported protests on an incredibly vast array of topics, it would be wrong to describe it as an "intersectional movement." Occupy was plagued with a plethora of disagreements around all manner of issues: race, class, homelessness, gender, were contentious topics at the time. One sentiment raised by many occupiers I talked to was the notion that on these issues, particularly race, Occupy had failed to build consensus. "There was a POC [People of Colour] caucus that was formed" Aaron, a prominent homelessness and racial justice organiser told me, "but they had many issues with the General Assemblies...they felt excluded." One open letter to the movement by a small collective of US-wide Occupiers from diverse backgrounds put this in devastating terms: "OWS spaces prioritised the wants, needs, values, and culture of heterosexual white men first," the letter stated, "Frankly, many of us have encountered this straight-white-man approach to movement-building too many times to count" (Disoccupy, 2012) Even beyond politics of identity, movements within Occupy Wall Street found themselves having to fight for recognition, rather than integration.

The influx of homeless New Yorkers into the park acted as one example of the intermovement conflicts within Occupy. With a plentiful supply of food and blankets, Zuccotti became a brief respite for the city's many homeless people, but they were not initially well received. "It became an issue where [homeless] folks would be pushed out and told 'you're not from here'," Aaron explained. There had been a growing frustration, coupled by rape and theft accusations often directed at the park's new, economically unfortunate, visitors. Nonetheless, the city's homeless won their acceptance in Occupy through participation, and engagement. This was reinforced by a slew of teach-ins organised by homelessness activists, "there was a huge group of homeless folks" who came to pitch in at the park, Aaron recalled "who could clean up, sometimes who were put on Kitchen duty, on first aid duty." In this sense Occupy was not an intersectional movement, but an intersection of movements: from questions of gender, race, sexuality and decolonisation to worker's rights, homelessness, debt police brutality and immigrant worker justice, Occupiers from an array of movements were able to use the action of Occupy as a staging post for their struggles without simply becoming purely "Occupy movement" activists. Individual participants and visitors would frequently find their attention drawn from their initial focus to new horizons, but Occupy Wall Street itself remained without demands, and without an overarching movement structure.

Occupy Wall Street was not a conventional social movement. By almost any standing definition, it would not have been called a social movement at all. Not only were there no demands, but there was no ledger of membership, no clearly defined boundaries of participation, no hierarchy, and later no concrete space associated with it. It operated under a notion of antilegitimacy: decisions were made by those who showed up, none could speak on behalf of the "Occupy," but all could speak as a part of it. Rather than a social movement, Occupy began as a small action, without any movement to guide it, and grew into a social struggle participated in by a vast array of movements, networks and individuals and even unintentionally helpful antagonists. In this regard, it is a socio-historical process strongly analogous to a revolution: a process of social change incorporating a wide array of players, protagonists and antagonists, with multiple issues at stake and in flux. To be "a part" of Occupy was simply to be a protagonist in the series of movements, groups and even ideas that intersected and coalesced in the action of Occupy Wall Street and the nation-wide and worldwide struggles which we have dubbed the "Occupy Movement." Many of these

relational configurations established during Occupy would long outlast the struggle around Occupy Wall Street, and would continue to take form in other movements in the future.

## Beyond Wall Street, Beyond Occupy

"[Occupy] was maybe the best networking event for progressive and radical folk in recent memory; there are now people who know each other because of it who are able to work on projects whether they're called 'Occupy' or not, that are involved in a whole range of issues from economic justice to climate justice to anything else." - Owen

September 17, 2016 was the fifth anniversary of Occupy Wall Street, but what remained? It was with this question in mind that I had taken a trip down to Zuccotti Park that evening. When I arrived, the park was hardly bustling, but held a good number of alternative-looking types in their various uniforms of activism: printed tees, dreadlocks, hand-woven brightly coloured garments, and figures clad all in black made appearances. There were a number of familiar groups in the square, and even some familiar faces – I learned later that I had just missed Rose and Joe. Worker's World had made a modest showing, and the day's activities had been planned to give space to a number of organisations each staking variably dubious claims to the Occupy legacy. One such group, Occu-Evolve, had thrown a lot of energy into the day, and, as with the previous year, continued to be ignored by everyone who showed up. They were assembled by the park steps wearing T-Shirts bearing the slogan "BECAUSE OF OCCUPY" planning a grand march for the day's end, which never materialised.

As I approached the park, an older man in a stars-and-stripes cowboy hat, standing at a table covered in posters and a stack of Guy Fawkes masks, noticed my bewilderment and extended a hand. "Hey!" he said with a grin, "Welcome to Occupy." No sooner than I had thanked him for his welcome, had he diverted his gaze back to an east Asian woman he had been conversing with earlier. "Seven dollars each. These? They're fifteen," I heard him say, "and I'll sign them. We only made five of these, they're collectable- they'll be worth much more in the future." I was unable to ascertain exactly what his role in the production of these posters had been, though my hunch was that he was not their creator: he did not seem to sense any irony in trying to sell Occupy merchandise for its speculative future value. Nonetheless, what I observed in the park that day reflected two more general tendencies which I had observed in the wake of Occupy Wall Street: the appropriation of the Occupy

'brand' on the one hand, and the real reconfigurations of networks formed in Occupy on the other. Since the emergence of Occupy, both conventional leftist organisations and Democratic Party affiliates have attempted to incorporate the language and symbols of Occupy into their work, with varying success. The offerings of the conventional leftist organisations such as the Worker's World Party's "People's Power Assemblies," continue to function entirely unlike anything seen during Occupy, though have attempted to pick-up a horizontal 'feel'. Trade unions, many of which were involved in Occupy, have continued their fruitful association with grassroots activists, and some have begun to incorporate more horizontal practices in their own meetings. Meanwhile those within the Democratic party have tried to incorporate Occupy in a more distinctly political fashion.

"We're in the middle of a fight right now," I remember Stephanie telling me at a bustling iced coffee place in the East Village, "there are a lot of Occupy folks who seem very unhappy that we're doing this Bernie Sanders thing." This 'Bernie Sanders thing' was an organisation known as the People for Bernie, then the foremost grassroots organising movement behind the Bernie Sanders campaign, which had announced his candidacy only days earlier. The bone of contention with her fellow Occupiers was that Stephanie's organisation had implied that, as she put it, "Bernie Sanders gets an historical endorsement from Occupy Wall Street." A letter signed by several prominent Occupy activists and New York leftists was published, and the official Twitter, Facebook, and email feeds of Occupy were strongly backing Sanders too. "If this works y'know [this will be] game-changing," Stephanie told me, "Occupy as a voting bloc."

I asked Stephanie how she was able to bring together such firm support so swiftly, particularly in the context of such a strongly horizontal form of organisation. "There's like eight people on the Twitter, and twenty people on the Facebook, and we all know each other," she explained, "there's an email list that like three people control. These are the digital assets. The digital assets are centralised. That's a very crucial piece of it. They couldn't centralise it then... but now we're centralised and because of this we're going to change the game politically." Occupy Wall Street's digital footprint was firmly under the heel of the Sanders grassroots campaign, and this constituted a peculiar situation for a social movement.

While some very active occupiers had enthusiastically put their names to the letter supporting the Sanders candidacy and devoted many hours to the campaign, an approximately equal number expressed their revulsion at the very notion of Occupy endorsing any political candidate whatsoever. They reiterated that the General Assembly had firmly declared that Occupy was "not and never has been affiliated with any established political party, candidate or organisation, and that those who were in some way "seeking to capitalise on this movement or undermine it by appropriating its message or symbols are not a part of Occupy Wall Street." (NYCGA, 2012). As a public-facing digital operation, Occupy Wall Street did indeed endorse Sanders, but Occupy Wall Street as a participatory democratic collective most certainly had not. The group's two decision-making bodies had not met in years, and only a minute array of those who were involved in Occupy were even informed of the move to support Sanders. Most occupiers had gone elsewhere, and in fact, Occupy had gone everywhere.

So how did it come to pass that Occupy Wall Street– a phenomenon so large, sprawling, and extensive, would simply de-knot itself and stretch across the organising landscape? An initial explanation can be found in the wake of the overambitious May Day protests organised in the spring after the eviction. "The bubble was ready to burst," Ernesto told me in the back-room of his bustling apartment in Brooklyn. May Day had, in a great sense been the trigger. "We're beyond this, we don't need Occupy, we don't need the word, it's not a group, [and] we don't need this shit," he remembered saying to other Occupiers shortly after the action. Many others, over time, concurred. "Everyone went back to their people, and took a little piece of that revolutionary gospel, and sang it to their people," Ernesto explained, "and the best part about that was that we were still connected with these little tiny strings: those relationships that you're talking about? We're still connected. People that we'd never met before, people that I thought I would never meet before... start building those little bubbles back in your community, and in your own groups, and your own interests and your own issues, and little by little, those bubbles get bigger.... those bubbles start overcoming, crashing into each other, and you'll see issues that may have never had

connections before, like food justice with police brutality<sup>15</sup>? How the fuck did that happen? Because [of] those interrelationships!"

The first 'crash' of these bubbles had come in response to the deadly and destructive Hurricane Sandy which had made landfall in New York at the end of October 2012, one year after Occupy had been at its highest point. Countless civilians had been left stranded in their homes, many without food, water, or electricity, and some surrounded by floodwater. Local and national responders, though somewhat prepared for the storm were woefully poor in response, and the situation seemed dire. It was a critical flashpoint, and Occupy had just the network: it was time to Occupy Sandy.

Despite its name, "Occupy Sandy" was not an occupation. Instead, the use of "Occupy" by organisers was a clear statement of identity, and acted as an activation of the affinity, network and organisational ties which had been built during Occupy. Coupled with the social media resources built around Occupy Wall Street, a movement of 60,000 volunteers was assembled within a matter of days, initially consisting of member of Occupy networks, and growing outwards to include new participants as well. By the time it had ceased activity, Occupy Sandy had raised over \$1.36 million, and would lay claim to the title of "the largest civilian-led disaster relief effort in American history" (Occupy Sandy, 2017; Interviews: Stephanie, Kevin). It was so outstanding of an effort that the Department of Homeland Security commissioned a full report into its activities, and how it was able to outperform established disaster relief organisations, NGOs and even FEMA in its activities (Ambinder and Jennings, 2013). The New York Times commented that, since 2011, Occupy had "wandered in a desert of more intellectual, less visible projects, like farming, fighting debt and theorising on banking... it is only with Hurricane Sandy that the times have conspired to deliver an event that fully calls upon the movement's talents and caters to its strengths" (Feuer, 2012).

Since 2012, the networks of activists and actual resources which coalesced during Occupy Wall Street have found themselves involved in a plethora struggles and movements which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Ernesto is referring to the events in Ferguson, MI in 2014 and its crossover with the Food Justice movement.

do not bear its name, but which it has bolstered nonetheless. While discussing contemporary activism in the United States with one Occupier, Owen, he explained to me just how much these movements and organisations were connected to Occupy Wall Street. "There's a huge amount of folks who've been involved in pretty much everything you've mentioned<sup>16</sup>, who were alumni of Occupy Wall Street, and that manifests both in terms of the tactics that are employed and also in terms of the larger systemic analysis that you see," he explained. "There are plenty of people who feel like using the Occupy label now is more trouble than it's worth depending on the project you're involved in, and so while you might not know that there are people who were part of the movement, doing that work, they're still very much there." Another Occupier (Interview: USA/Withheld1)<sup>17</sup> told me how the OWS bail fund had provided support in the wake of shooting of Eric Garner, as well in indigenous rights struggles in South Dakota.

Occupy's activity and potency has stretched not only well beyond Wall Street, but well beyond Occupy. This spans from the massive reunions of the Occupy network such as Occupy Sandy, to political movements such as the Sanders campaign, to new intersectional ventures around income, race, police brutality, indigenous rights, climate change, and all manner of other matters. Indeed, Occupy Wall Street had played a part in the formation, discourse and praxis of a great many individuals, organisations, and social movements, and this array of diverse entities remained associated and networked with one another long after the worldwide 'Occupy Movement' and Occupy Wall Street itself had wound down. Though Occupy was over, the total array of relations that constituted it have remained in place ready to recombine for a just cause, a common aim, or a critical juncture. While many of these related entities have taken radically different directions from one another, they remain ready to recombine when a fitting cause arises, be it for Sanders, Sandy, or something entirely new.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> We discussed an array of struggles in New York and across the United States, including the People's Climate March, Flood Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, Rising Tide, Occupy the Pipeline, and Fight for 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> This information would be identifying if corroborated by other aspects of our interview which may be referred to in this manuscript or future work, and consequently the interview name is withheld.

### 2.2 Affinities and Convergence in Occupy Wall Street

#### "To open up, then, how did you get involved in Occupy?" - Interview question

This question, generally the opening query of my interviews, produced such incredibly varied responses that it swiftly became clear that there was something special about Occupy. Occupiers came from college campuses, investment banks, trade unions, delicatessens, almost all sections of society<sup>18</sup>. They came from different states, countries and continents. They could be radical anarchists, Democratic Party apparatchiks, Ayn Rand libertarians, or entirely apolitical. Some arrived at Zuccotti for love, some for ideology, some out of pure boredom, and some for a story. These often peculiar and fascinating trajectories were facilitated by the character of organising at Occupy Wall Street. "It was this invitation," Annie recalled of her early visits to the park, "it was like you are invited to be in the struggle and to be in this action." Indeed, it seemed as if those who had found their way to Occupy from outside the movement's own networks converged around the occupation owing to its exceptional qualities, but their pathways to doing so were notably variable.

In this section I outline the underlying affinities which led many to Occupy Wall Street. During Occupy, a wide array of affinities underpinned the pathways which new participants took to reach the point of protest. In addition to a more general discussion of these affinities, I trace the pathways of two particular occupiers: Rose and Ernesto. These two occupiers' pathways to protest are characteristic of two different kinds of affinity-based pathways which Occupy activated. For Rose, and those like her, weak affinities between individuals and Occupy Wall Street culminated in participation through indirect or unintentional pathways, akin to Bandura's (1982) chance encounters. For those like Ernesto, by contrast, stronger affinities of which participants were highly conscious culminated in very direct and intentional decisions to participate.

In tandem with the extensive range of the affinities which drew people to Occupy, I also detail how an occupied Zuccotti park offered a space of convergence which made acting on these affinities radically more attractive to potential new participants. In the case of Occupy,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Though it is important to note, the representation of these demographics among self-identified Occupiers were certainly skewed toward the young, white, and university educated. (Milkman, Luce and Lewis, 2013)

this convergence was largely underpinned by an exceptional space and frame. Zuccotti offered a space in which, at least notionally, the norms and rules of social and political interaction could be suspended in favour of an autonomous, self-organised commune of sorts. Previously known only as one of New York's many banal concrete parks, and thereby not ideologically predefined, an occupied Zuccotti came to possess a remarkably open, participatory and horizontal character in which any form of action could be reframed and reconstituted as a repertoire of contention, offering potential participants with the possibility to engage without judgment or repercussions. Furthermore, the seeming invulnerability of the occupied Zuccotti in the face of police repression made space for it to become a space with opportune characteristics, in which contention could take place without exposure to conventional risks. Furthermore, the convergence of participants in Occupy Wall Street also possessed a structural component. Most particularly after October 1<sup>st</sup>, Occupy appeared to take on the characteristics of an opportune and even paramount situation.

## Affinities of an Occupation

Many of those who became involved in Occupy were in no way concretely connected with or tied to its early organisers, whose personal networks were neither extensive nor particularly effective as a mobilising tool (as could be seen by the relatively poor turnout on September 17<sup>th</sup>). "When Occupy Wall Street came around, suddenly all these people just came out of nowhere," David, a member of these pre-Occupy networks, had told me. In my efforts to understand these people who 'came out of nowhere' I discovered that they had been drawn to Occupy by a variety of affinities. These ranged from their social or economic condition, their creative passions, patterns of behaviour, a sense of identification, and an array of other such ephemeral characteristics. It was from these key affinities that a great many new participants found their way to Occupy Wall Street, culminating in their encounters with the movement.<sup>19</sup> To give one particularly illustrative example, I recall Rose, an artist living in Brooklyn, explaining the initially puzzling route to her own involvement in Occupy Wall Street. Rose told me how a friend of her brother's had been visiting from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Generally, the scope of these encounters was typically quite temporary and fleeting. Some, like Rose, would come to participate in Occupy for much longer. Though the question of how some came to deepen in their involvement after initial participation is an interesting one, I do not trace this process here, as it is beyond the scope of this study.

California, and he had attended an Occupy protest on the Brooklyn Bridge. "I had never done activism before, so I didn't really think it was for me," she explained, "but I'm thinking how can I contribute to this?." Rose considered collecting some donations in her building to support the occupation, and posted a message on the building's bulletin board. This prompted another woman living in the building to tell Rose about a teacher at a nearby school, who had become involved in Occupy and was connected with the famous Vermont puppet theatre "Bread and Puppet." As Rose put it, "the word puppet got in my brain, and I did decide to check out an action, an Occupy action." It was at this action that Rose met the man she had been referred to and, still not having visited Zuccotti Park, she was invited to check out an activist art space associated with Occupy, located on 20 Jay Street. From her early artistic exploration, Rose rapidly became increasingly involved in Occupy, becoming one of its foremost artistic contributors.

I would meet Rose for the first time at that same art space four years later, where she was coordinating a plethora of enthusiastic young activists preparing props for an upcoming climate protest. It was neither Rose's connection with her brother's friend that motivated her to become involved in Occupy, nor any strong tie to the lady she encountered in her building, it was her already existing, but initially unconscious affinity with Occupy Wall Street which mapped a route through a web of looser ties to reach a point of engagement<sup>20</sup>. Though she did not consider herself political at the time, she enjoyed artistic pursuits, was curious about puppetry, and particularly impressed by Bread and Puppet. In a great sense, Rose's narrative illustrates one of the profound vitalities of Occupy: it had something for everyone. Initially, the call to 'Occupy Wall Street', the notion of 'the 99%' and the accompanying rhetoric were somewhat empty signifiers, onto which anyone could project a given desire, cause, or identity. This, in turn, provided the opportunity for the emergence of a community around the occupation with such great diversity that all manner of engagement became possible. An artist could come to paint, a librarian to curate, an intellectual to debate, the homeless to eat, and anyone could affiliate to whatever group, or section of 'Occupy' they felt most drawn. In other words, Occupy Wall Street was an

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> In Rose's case, a 'direct' link to other occupiers through her brother's friend was passed-up in favour of a route passing through: first, the bulletin board of her building, then a single resident of that building, and finally a fellow artist. This was because Rose was not consciously seeking out Occupy (even though she thought it was a good idea) she was seeking out fellow artists.

exceptional space with an exceptional frame, becoming a potential stopping point on the paths its participants, visitors, and associates were taking through their own lives, in order to satisfy their desires, drives, and needs. While some, like Rose, were in the arts, these unusual participants came from all walks of life. Ernesto, a particularly socially active occupier, explained to me how Occupy's participants ranged from "single moms and bus drivers" to "Wall Street people that switched over, lawyers, and doctors that got radicalised by this movement," alongside other "professionals who wanted to dabble, who had read a Gandhi book, or an MLK book."

While some of those drawn to Occupy by affinity found their way to the park and became more actively involved, others took the role of ancillary support. This could involve donating resources, or looking out for activists' welfare. They were seldom the committed leftists that one might expect. I remember Ernesto talking about two such individuals, Mary and Frank, though he, and others, have assured me that there was a plethora of similar people, each with their own reasons for assisting. "For Mary... it was more like 'I wanna take care of you'," Ernesto explained. Mary had appeared one day in search of Occupy's "leader" to donate some spare avocados, and had, on a whim, invited some of the kitchen staff to visit her midtown apartment any time they needed a shower or to do laundry. When they showed up, Ernesto and his fellow occupiers were greeted not only with a shower and a laundry service, but brand new clothes, sweaters, internet access, and a delicious home-cooked meal, and a parting gift of three or four perfectly rolled joints, hidden inside a film canister. Though Mary felt unable to become involved with Occupy on account of her own health issues, she kept a file of newspaper clippings and saved recordings from television shows on the topic, helping in her own small, tangential way.

In contrast with Mary, "for Frank it was more like 'I wanna show you off and I wanna invite my friends over'" Ernesto recalled. Frank was a well-to-do Italian-American with a house in Manhattan, who would invite Ernesto or other occupiers over as 'revolutionary' guests of honour at his fancy dinner parties. At first, Ernesto recalled, "I realised it was an exchange," wherein his presence at a dinner party was to be compensated through small favours and occasional financial support. Over time, though, Frank and other such 'Occu-mamas and Occu-papas' as Ernesto dubbed them, became crucial support to the many young occupiers who became homeless after the eviction of Zuccotti. "He took in these two kids," Ernesto recalled, "one in particular was this seventeen-year-old kid, walking barefoot after the park got evicted, it was raining and Frank's like: you're coming home with me." When I asked if this was common, Ernesto explained, "a lot of those folks, I think, after meeting us, took in a lot of folks that were in trouble, a lot of folks that were like me, or worse off... there's a million stories like that."

While Mary may have simply been looking for somewhere to donate her spare avocados, and Frank might have just been interested in finding a new dinner guest for his intellectual soirees, both become integrated into the struggle around Occupy Wall Street, serving as supportive struts for the movement as a whole. In this context, the exceptional character of Occupy Wall Street – materially, structurally and cognitively - made it a more attractive location for food donations than a food-bank, and a more interesting source of stimulating conversation than a popular café, or university lecture. In this regard, the relatively commonplace resource-based affinities with which Mary and Frank had with Occupy – having food it might have needed, and being interested in conversations Occupiers could have provided were focused more directly on the occupation by this exceptional character. Had Occupy not seemed so exceptional, we can imagine that Mary might have visited a homeless shelter, and Frank might have simply invited someone else to dinner.

A great number of the affinity-based pathways<sup>21</sup> by which people came to encounter Occupy were often tightly individuated and unique, bringing an otherwise unconnected or disinterested person into contact with others involved with Occupy, and then into involvement with Occupy itself. Occupy Wall Street had attracted largely New Yorkers with varied desires and drives met by the occupation itself, serving as a utopian microcosm where such desires and drives could be played out. Over time, affinities of attitude, identity and perception came to function as more direct drivers of interaction, with the occupation's growing status as a cause célèbre of the international Left making Zuccotti Park not only a vital lynchpin of protest, but a pilgrimage site for any who felt affinity to the movement. "People who lived on the other side of the planet or country quit their jobs and hitchhiked to join the occupation," Annie recalled, "And those people were really interesting because they thought that there was some programme or platform or something, they thought that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> That is to say, rather than conventional organisational or network-based participation.

we would already have a model for them, and then at first they were very confused that we weren't going to tell them what to do."

One of the earliest occupiers to follow this trajectory was Ernesto, who had been living in Utah at the time Occupy got started. "I was working at this nursing home," he recalled, "I was washing the tables and there was the news, and there was like a bunch of people in some park... and some guy gets on the TV and says, "Anybody who wants to come, we need help... just come"." For Ernesto, an immigration rights activist with one year's experience, seeking new opportunities for activism, this invitation was all he needed. "Within the next three days I had already made up my mind, I borrowed my sleeping bag from my uncle, I told him, I'm going to NY tomorrow... I got to New York with \$200 in my pocket and I didn't know shit, I didn't know anybody in New York, I didn't know where Wall Street was, I still didn't understand politics." Explaining why he felt so driven, Ernesto mused: "I wasn't here to find myself... I was here because I heard the drums, and I went towards the drums."<sup>22</sup>

Experiences similar to Ernesto's became notably more common following the explosion of attention Occupy Wall Street received in October, shortly after the mass arrests on the Brooklyn Bridge. The 'drums' Ernesto heard when he first came across fleeting news of Occupy Wall Street had been amplified tenfold, in response to both the escalating success of and threats to Occupy Wall Street, and vast swaths of new participants, already aware of or interested in Occupy, chose to either become involved or further escalate their involvement. In addition to the extensive range of affinities which had characterised Occupy in its early phase, a very particular set of affinities had now been amplified: Occupy had become the defacto struggle against the dominant economic and socio-political order in the United States, and soon after, across the globe.

A particular image of an 'Occupier' swiftly established itself, and the movement had become explicitly ideologically identified as a platform for anti-government, anti-police, and anticapitalist rebels. For some, these amplified characteristics would be the necessary preconditions for their own routes to involvement, with this new awareness of Occupy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> In some sense, this is a beautiful metaphor for how affinities to which an individual is highly attuned often function. The more conscious someone is of their affinities, the greater a chance they will consciously engage with or consider the movement or cause.

driving their decision-making. This occurred at both individual and collective levels. The New York Transport Workers Union spokesman Jim Gannon, when explaining why their union had unanimously voted to support Occupy Wall Street in the wake of the Bologna incident, stressed this in no uncertain terms: "It's kind of a natural alliance with the young people and the students," he had told a reporter from the local newspaper, "on many levels, our workers feel an affinity with the kids." (Doll, 2011).

The affinities which drew those such as Rose to involvement in Occupy differed greatly than the ones which drew Ernesto or the transport workers. In Rose's case, her affinity with the occupation was one of which she was initially unaware. She did not self-conceive as having any fundamental compatibility with Occupy, of which she was only marginally aware when she began her pathway to participation. By contrast, Ernesto's affinity with Occupy was one of which he was highly conscious. He had felt some kind of fundamental connection to the occupation, having 'heard the drums', as he put it, and pursued them doggedly, just as many others did once the possibilities which Occupy held had been amplified in the news media. These more consciously felt affinities often gave rise to different pathways than the more latent affinities we encountered in Rose's narrative. They often arose from high self-awareness (or consciousness, one might say), and consequently were connected to identities or strong beliefs, rather than socioeconomic attributes, situations, passions or drives. Consequently, rather than stumbling into connection with Occupy, individuals such as Ernesto, with strongly felt affinities actively sought out connections with Occupy Wall Street, ranging from participation, to emulation, to auxiliary support or engagement.<sup>23</sup>

Strongly felt affinities did not necessarily guarantee the heartfelt pursuit of participation. Kristina, a young magazine editor who visited Occupy only very occasionally, recalled how she had quite consciously sought out Zuccotti from a standpoint of curiosity. "I was interested in seeing what the fuss was about," she told me. "There was a lot of interest in what this young, rag-tag group of people were about to accomplish, there was a real sense

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> This does not necessarily mean that a given individual will become more involved, or participate in a particular way. As we will see in the Egyptian case, a known desire for connection often gives rise to an easier form of connection itself – low effort participation. In cases such as Rose, it was precisely the unknowing encounter that permitted her to contact Occupy in the physical realm as an active participant, rather than as a distant supporter.

of promise down in Zuccotti Park, so I think just one Saturday I went down there and I felt like a bit of a cultural tourist in a really unsavoury way – I was just gonna watch everyone lead the charge and eat popcorn on the side-lines – I didn't know what it was going to be like but I wanted to be present for whatever it was." Though she might have seen herself as on the side-lines, Kristina had actually spent a full afternoon participating in the occupation, and would subsequently return in a similar fashion. Later in our interview, she had further explained this impulse. "I really wanted to see if there was something there that maybe I could be part of on some level," she told me, "something that could be inspiring, that would make sense... I wanted to see it for myself."

For Occupy, affinities offered a means by which an initially marginal and isolated action could gain traction, even with initially very limited resources and no capacity to produce clear demands or distinct ideological propositions<sup>24</sup>. One occupier (Interview: Charlotte) I had interviewed even joked, ""It seemed kind of bizarre that there was momentum about organising around the financial crisis, you know, three years after it had actually hit." But, where it lacked the means which we traditionally associate with social movements, Occupy would offer opportunity, hope and possibility in the most populous city in the United States. Anyone could contribute, anyone could visit, and there were no membership criteria, and no obligation to anything more than you wanted to. Crucially, in persisting for almost two months, Occupy also had the time for these affinities to be activated more gradually. For many who became involved, finding their way to Occupy took time, relying on opportunities, discoveries and chance encounters which are not guaranteed to occur in the same way as contact with one's regular social network. Affinities were powerful for Occupy, particularly because the occupation also had the luxury of time, and initially very few obstacles to its persistence. But what was it about Occupy Wall Street that attracted those with such differing and divergent affinities to converge upon it?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> In fact, the General Assembly routinely refused any proposition of demands or clear ideology of any kind. Eventually, a "declaration" of the occupation was produced, which offered some notional guidance on how Occupy conducted itself, but this was well after Occupy Wall Street had already gained popularity.

## Converging on Wall Street

For those with less conscious affinities to Occupy, who did not identify with the occupation in any substantial way, a key condition of convergence was that Zuccotti itself was a relatively undefined, unimposing material conditions: an exceptional space. Visiting or participating in the occupation was not a disruption of some major urban landmark, nor was it located in a highly politicised place. Instead, Zuccotti's urban banality made the act of participating much less intrusive than other acts of participation, such as attending a meeting at an activist headquarters, marching across highways, or disrupting prominent urban spaces. Parks like Zuccotti were scattered throughout New York City, these 'Privately Owned Public Spaces' (or POPS) existed mainly as corporate obligations, part and parcel with the building of the newer skyscrapers that increasingly littered the city's skyline. To pass by or though Zuccotti came with no particular connotations. It was, as Jon Stewart of the then-popular Daily Show (2011) had described it, "The park no one-, even those of us who live across the street from it- had heard of until the Occupy Wall Street movement." Enlightening his viewers, Stewart offered the following characterisation: "Apparently, it's a park in Lower Manhattan where people from Wall Street would go to smoke around noon."

From this rather neutral grounding, it was possible for potential occupiers across ideological, social and structural divides to interpret and give meaning to the park in their own way. Jonathan Smucker, a 33 year-old small business owner (and participant) at the time of Occupy, later attempted to give voice to this tendency in an article for the Sociological Quarterly (Smucker, 2013:222) "Zuccotti Park was a bastion of expressiveness, wherein participants could collectively (or individually) express emotions, creativity, values, opinions, and visions in countless ways," Smucker surmised, "without every participant having, necessarily, to grasp whether or how these expressions fit together into a strategic framework to achieve instrumental goals." The nature of this space was visibly and evidently apparent to those who were proximate to Zuccotti. I had asked Kristina, the occasional visitor to Zuccotti mentioned earlier, how she had perceived Occupy at the time. "It was very interesting," she had mused, "I could see how it would immediately be galvanising to be a part of that scene and see so much happening around you. It was just people, flurries in every direction and tables overflowing with fliers, and information."

Despite Zuccotti's relative banality, the park's location in the Financial District, when coupled with Occupy's framing around the financial crisis, served as a catalyst for those who had a strongly felt identification with the movement, be it the highly motivated like Ernesto, or the more curious like Kristina. As Zak – the movement film-maker mentioned earlier in this chapter - noted: "For a lot of people the park had become a home: it had become a community for people who didn't' have homes; it became a Mecca for the disenfranchised and the angry; [for the] victims of the 2008 collapse who had come from all over the country." Zuccotti also offered a space in which, at least notionally, the norms and rules of social and political interaction could be suspended in favour of an autonomous, self-organised commune of sorts.

For those who might have been hesitant about their first encounter with the occupation as a form of protest, these hesitations were eased by the occupation's character as an opportune space within the otherwise heavily policed city of New York. Zuccotti offered a space in which state forces (such as the police) would merely stand on the side-lines, powerless to interrupt the largely unregulated, communal environment of the park itself. In particular, fear of arrest or harassment by police (generally a common concern among protesters) was largely alleviated once the occupation's staying power became established. For the scores of punks, homeless, drug-users, undocumented migrants, and members of marginal communities for whom the threat of arrest and fear of police was serious and real, the occupation's role as a space of safety and autonomy allowed them to participate politically without the threat of violence or other negative consequences.

Though many of those who found their way to Occupy Wall Street benefited from the luxury of time – particularly those with less consciously felt affinities - this is not to say that the convergence of participants in Occupy Wall Street lacked a temporal component. Most particularly, once the movement attracted mainstream attention after its first two weeks, Occupy appeared to take on the characteristics of an opportune, even historical, moment. "The [progressive] media was portraying it as these really volatile radicals who were about to do something drastic, and that this was all sort of a prelude," Kristina recalled. Others I talked to concurred: for Zak, this emergent sense of importance had changed both his and others' perspective on Occupy. "I had been involved in protests since college and stuff, and I often felt embarrassed to be a part of it: I was like, oh, look at all these normal people going to and from work, and here we are just a bunch of weirdoes, and they're just looking at us like a distraction or something." It was when considering the prospect of participating in Occupy that "all these feelings of shame and embarrassment from the past came up, and I was feeling this sense that it wasn't legitimate, it wasn't accepted, it was just this weird little bunch of radicals, or bunch of weirdoes. And I knew I was one of them, but I didn't really want to be seen that way."

When the framing of Occupy began to take on a more paramount character, this judgment changed. "Suddenly people were talking about it all over the country, and it really blew up then... I started seeing that it was growing, and I started being interested in being a part of it," he recalled. This, in turn, contributed to the emergence of a sense of collective efficacy among the '99%' to whom Occupy's frame appealed, pushing those who had been unsure whether to visit or participate in the movement toward taking that first step. "I started seeing that there was this national momentum happening," Zak recalled, "it was the excitement of the national moment against Wall Street and [for] the 99% - that was what was really motivating me." Clive, an older participant in the movement similarly described how Occupy "seemed to have some momentum that we hadn't seen in a long time," and that it was this momentum which attracted him and his wife to participate in a movement largely composed of much younger people, from a different generation.

These conditions of convergence acted as a catalyst for the affinities between Occupy's participants and the movement. While at its zenith, the occupation's cognitively and structurally paramount status as a attracted new participants with affinities of which they were well aware, the occupation's gradual growth was underpinned by less conscious affinities, empowered by the occupation's character as an exceptional space, with low barriers to entry, making participation by those not highly identified with or sympathetic to the movement more palatable, be it Frank and his dinner parties, or Rose and her artistic projects. Occupy's character as an open, pluralistic space in which participation could take many forms offered a space for the many new Occupiers who were not highly political or die-hard activists when they first encountered the movement. Finally, for those who had lost their home, or felt wronged by the financial crisis, Occupy's paramount framing offered an outlet for those frustrations, while the protection from police repression afforded by its materially opportune characteristics allowed those who had been outcast by civil society

(be it punks, deviants or even the homeless) to see the occupation as a refuge and even a home.

## **Conclusions and Implications**

The stories which have served as illustrative examples in this section, only give a snapshot of the different pathways many took to Occupy. Nonetheless, their pathways are indicative of the routes taken by a great many more. Among those I interviewed, I encountered former employees of Wall Street banks, political journalists, music critics, seasoned activists from other cities, former homeless, filmmakers, students and all manner of others, who had taken their paths to Occupy guided by affinity, rather than pursuing clear or readily apparent network links.

Equally, the very notable importance of affinities in the case of Occupy should not be taken to mean that other relations: conventional social ties, networks and organisations were irrelevant or unimportant. A considerable number of very active and involved occupiers arrived at Occupy through social networks, prior to the occupation's establishment in Zuccotti. Among the contacts I have discussed so far, those who encountered Occupy directly though networks include individuals such as Michael, Annie and Larry, all of whom became involved in Occupy early on, drawing upon their contacts in New York's activist and anarchist communities.

The operation of affinities and other aspects of mobilisation often complemented and intersected with one another – even in cases where very direct network ties existed, participants also tended to hold clear and evident affinities with the occupation. Furthermore, as exemplified in the case of the New York Transport Workers Union, affinities also existed at the level of entire networks and organisations as well, allowing individuals who might not have held clear affinities with the occupation to encounter it through the actions of their organisation or tendencies of their network which, collectively, did.

There is also an array of 'unsung' affinities which drew in the periphery of occasional visitors who would tour the park, donate small figures, pick up a pamphlet, or perhaps become peripheral supporters such as Mary and Frank. For some, simply sharing a social

space with the occupation or occupiers could be enough, particularly in the presence of other supporting affinities. Nonetheless, while affinities might have been enough to bring people to Occupy Wall Street under conditions of convergence, they were not enough to fully integrate them into activist networks or organisations. While in rarer cases, these encounters would offer a chance for these affinities to also crystallise into more concrete social ties, for the majority of those who encountered Occupy Wall Street, brief encounters, underpinned by affinity and convergence, would be the totality of their experience.

It is also worth briefly considering those who did not participate in Occupy, despite possessing some degree of affinity to the movement. Among these, the most notable were the local residents of the Financial District. During my fieldwork, in order to get a sense of the Zuccotti area and those who lived there, I spent two months living in the Financial District. During this time, I spent time with a great many locals, and held regular conversations with a wide range of individuals across the social spectrum<sup>25</sup> as well as the residents of the luxury Financial District apartment complexes, and the employees of major corporations whose offices were only steps away from Zuccotti. While their daily patterns of activity could predispose them to perhaps fleetingly spend time at the park, or encounter Occupy activists, a great many tended to actively avoid the site instead. This was particularly pronounced among those living close to Zuccotti, who managed to avoid the occupation with an exacting effort. To further understand this phenomenon, I conducted an interview (unrecorded at the subject's request) with one such local resident, who had lived very close to the park, in one of Wall Street's \$1.7m condominiums, a short distance from the park. In our conversation, he explained how his friends and colleagues in his building and small business owners working around the park had felt remarkably repulsed by Occupy. Though they may have had affinity to the occupation with respect to their coinciding everyday patterns of activity, these individuals lacked any substantial affinity to Occupy in any other regard. In fact, psychologically, their identities, perception of injustice, and attitudes were actively dissonant with participants in Occupy, making the prospect of their own participation substantially more unlikely.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> These included police officers, proprietors of local businesses, charity-workers, food vendors, construction-workers, service industry employees and many others.

In some contexts, even when participants did have a seemingly promising psychological affinity to the movement, their participation was temporarily frustrated by intervening social factors. A number of those I talked to had passed up their initial opportunities to participate in Occupy because of such issues had presented themselves, only to participate later when they were biographically available. The similar lack of social affinity was true of individuals among the poorer African American communities in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, which were even deliberately targeted for movement outreach by Occupy's working groups. In some cases, this lack of affinity to the movement was later compensated for when a greater number of conditions of convergence coincided: the exceptional space of Zuccotti attracted far more participants once it had also developed the characteristics of an opportune space and still more when it was contextualised by an opportune situation.

Accounting for these instances of temporary and permanent non-participation offers a substantial benefit for our understanding of affinity and convergence. The case of the Financial District locals highlights how simply having affinity to a cause in one particular respect can be rendered insignificant by a profound lack of psychological affinity, or even an active stance of opposition to the cause itself. The case of the temporarily frustrated participation trajectories shows that biographical factors can present a similar impediment to participation. Finally, the case of those who were at one point reluctant to participate in Occupy but later came to join under more extensive conditions of convergence indicates that the catalytic effect of convergence is intensified by the presence of multiple conditions, and potentially suggests that different conditions of convergence may have differential appeal to different sets of affinities<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> I would hesitate to develop an analysis of this differential appeal, given the small number of cases developed here. Instead, I would advance that the question of the precise interaction between particular affinities and particular conditions of convergence would require a more systematic study with a much larger sample size.

# **Chapter 3. Revolt in Cairo**

By January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011, Egypt had been under strain for a long time. The Mubarak regime's economic plans were returning fewer and fewer benefits to Egyptians of any class, with the small exception of high-ranking kleptocrats. Protests were tightly controlled by an extensive public and secret police force, with occasional exceptions for anti-American, or anti-Israeli manifestations, when the political mood permitted. "The country was actually boiling since 2004," Hakim, a highly involved revolutionary told me, "and this was like a snowball that started [rolling]... all the way from Kefaya to Ayman Nour, to April 6<sup>th</sup>, even to the Ultras"<sup>1</sup>. The sociologist Hazem Kandil, a keen political observer at the time, offered a similar sentiment in a post-revolutionary interview with New Left Review (2011) "Over the last few years, a rebellion had been brewing under the surface," he had told the journal's interview team, "There was a general sense that the status quo could not be sustained. Movies, novels, songs were permeated by the theme of revolt: it was everywhere in people's imagination."

Nonetheless, the revolt that took place in Egypt's 'Eighteen Days' was not the format many had predicted. A French Revolution style revolt had been the constant fear of Egyptian elites, staged by the desperate and starving masses which surrounded the country's major cities. "These are the poorest of the poor, whom many feared might one day stage an Egyptian jacquerie.," Kandil had told New Left Review. "In and around Cairo, they numbered between five and six million people, living in subhuman conditions... might they not one day ransack the city and burn it down?"

While the "menacing human mass" of Egypt's poorest and most desperate would remain largely forbearing, a revolt spearheaded by Egypt's "middle class"<sup>2</sup> transpired in Tahrir. In an eighteen-day period, the centre of Cairo played host to a sudden manifestation which could take the form of a protest, a party, a battleground or a festival at any given moment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> These organisations are discussed in the next section of this chapter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> This peculiar term was used constantly by the young elites, college professors, activists and Brotherhood members I encountered to describe their own socio-political class. I discuss its meaning in further detail in the next section (**3.2**)

This same manifestation would rapidly dissipate in the weeks afterward,<sup>3</sup> once the new order, the nominally 'temporary' authority of Egypt's military, had given its command.

Tahrir would become the lynchpin of revolutionary protest worldwide: an inspirational occupation with revolutionary consequences, inspiring Indignados, Occupiers and revolutionaries across the world, and yet none of those inspired had a sophisticated understanding of exactly what they were emulating. The underlying dynamics of Egypt's revolution were cloaked in mystery, and early diagnoses of a 'Twitter Revolution', or 'Facebook Revolt' latched on to the most apparent evidence of manifestation: the online record.<sup>4</sup> Over time, however, it became clear that the story of an online revolt that had spurred marches of millions to congregate in Tahrir Square and fell a whole regime was not only implausible, but impossible. It was later discovered that Tahrir could only have held about 250,000 people at maximum capacity; that the internet and mobile phones had been shut down the for the most crucial days of the protest; and that Egypt's dictatorial infrastructure remained largely in place, being readily re-established after the country's brief experiment with a managed democracy under the premiership of Mohamed Morsi. The hydra had lost one head, and exposed a multitude.

When we as sociologists describe what transpired in Egypt in 2011 a revolution, we should be aware that it was distinctly political in scope. State structures remained unchanged, society remained as it was, and despite brief post-Mubarak euphoria, the country now finds itself in the grip of a regime far more entrenched and sophisticated than its predecessors. With its kingmakers (Mubarak) and figureheads (Morsi) cut away: the resilient regime has offered glimpses of its true face: a deep state that permeates every part of Egyptian social life. In short, though there was a revolution in Egypt, it was a revolution against an illusion.<sup>5</sup>

Egypt's revolution was also a revolution *of* illusions. False representations, secrecy, masked allegiances, and total information disparity were not only rife, but integral to the revolutionary process. The participants in Egypt's revolutionary struggle were often unsure or unaware of what they would accomplish, who they were benefiting, and even who they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Though Tahrir would be reoccupied, and protests would take place, nothing on the scale and with the atmosphere of the Eighteen Days would occur again.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See for example: Castells (2012,2015), Gerbaudo (2012), Lotan et. al. (2011).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Kandil (2012) for an excellent discussion of Egypt's regime-structure between Nasser and the events of 2011, and the crucial role of the deep state in maintaining this regime over time.

were truly fighting. Even the most active and well organised revolutionaries had little control over the course of events they had clumsily helped to initiate and encourage. In the place of a cohesive and well organised movement came Egypt's masses, drawn to Tahrir Square for a paramount situation, on the basis of long-standing motivations: a moment many had dreamed of, but few had anticipated.

This chapter outlines the emergence, explosion and denouement of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in Cairo, detailing its character, development and dissipation. This first section explores the structure of revolutionary agitation surrounding the Eighteen Days, problematising the notion that major organisations, elites, or networks of activists held sufficient sway over the course of events, and offers a vision of the revolution as an historical event without a cohesive revolutionary movement to underpin it. Instead, an array of contending, occasionally intersecting groups relied upon mass mobilisation in order to advance a process no group had dependable control over. In its second section, this chapter offers an analysis of how mobilisation on the basis of affinities overcame vastly differential network ties, benefiting from several key conditions of convergence in place during the revolutionary period.

### 3.1 Eighteen Days in Tahrir, Ten Years in the Making

### Egypt's Impossible Social Movements

"Looking back now, we see the progression, from small groups collecting medicines for the Intifada, to the civil movement Kifaya hitting the streets, to the massive workers' strikes in Mahalla, to the point where every sector in civil society... is fighting with the government"

- Ahdaf Soueif (2014:19)

Though January 25<sup>th</sup> 2011 has been regarded by many as the first day of the Egyptian Revolution, in truth it was the culmination of the work of several Egyptian social movements. It was also a mobilisation which had initially held an aspiration for reform, rather than revolution. The events of the 25<sup>th</sup> occurred on an occasion originally intended merely as a human rights protest on Egypt's Police Day, the most recent in a long chain of counter-regime actions that had emerged over the course of the past decade<sup>6</sup>.

Ten years prior to the revolution, President Hosni Mubarak stood all but unrivalled as the ruler of Egypt. He had eliminated his major opponents within his own National Democratic Party, decapitated the military's political wing, and reorganised the national security forces to function as more of an occupying force than a police force. After banning or imprisoning his most dangerous opponents, Mubarak had ensured, through a series of regulations and crackdowns, that any opposition parties which he had not already made illegal were so heavily hamstrung that they were unable to compete. The Muslim Brotherhood, the nation's unofficial opposition, remained banned. Mubarak was, however, 72 years old. Having secured himself against institutional threats, Mubarak's next concern appeared to be preparing a succession plan for his son Gamal, while making notional reforms in order to appease growing international criticism of the nature of his regime among Egypt's economic partners. Unfortunately for Mubarak, these ten years would play host to the emergence of an array of Egyptian social movements which would in time set the scene for revolution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Where Occupy Wall Street had been, in many ways, a break with a previous era of organising which commenced a new social struggle in the United States, the protest which sparked the Egyptian Revolution constituted the reverse: the culmination of an ongoing social struggle.

A post-millennial social movement wave in Egypt had drawn much of its early energy from mass-protests against the second Iraq War, and student mobilisations around the second Palestinian intifada, initiated in 2000. Though protests were officially banned in Egypt under the country's draconian long-lived "Emergency Law," in practice the Mubarak regime and security forces exercised three criteria for whether they would tacitly tolerate a protest: first, that the protest take place exclusively on a university campus or, very occasionally, at a mosque and not find its way into the streets; second, that the protest should in no way concern domestic politics or contradict NDP interests; and third, that the protest should be entirely peaceful and non-disruptive. With these carefully choreographed permissions, regime officials often attempted to co-opt these protests for their own gain, using protests over Palestine to pressure Israel, and those against the Iraq War to influence the Americans (Abou-El-Fadl, 2015:41; Shorbagy, 2007).

Since the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000, demonstrations of solidarity with Palestine had become a notable feature of Egyptian student culture, occurring on an almost weekly basis, accompanied by a disproportionately heavy security presence (Schemm, 2003). These protests largely took place on university campuses and were engineered by an increasingly politicised student movement alongside newly formed 'solidarity committees' of those sympathetic to the cause, under the tacit understanding that this 'managed' outlet for frustration would restrict itself to regional, rather than domestic politics. However, with a surge of protests in 2002 in the wake of a new Israeli incursion into the Palestinian Territories, student groups and solidarity committees appeared to be pushing these boundaries. Protesters were spilling out of their university campuses and onto the streets of Cairo, with their chants and critiques shifting from messages of solidarity with Palestinians to words of outrage with their own regime: "Mubarak, you coward, you are the client of the Americans," protesters chanted, while others chimed in: "We want new government because we've hit rock bottom" (quoted in Schemm, 2002). With two weeks of daily protest from late March until mid-April, and crowds numbering from eight to nine thousand in Alexandria, and ten-thousand in Cairo (Schemm, 2002), the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram's weekly edition noted that "thousands of Egyptians, responding to the Israeli atrocities against Palestinians, have become politically charged and highly mobilised -- and are now finding ways to act" (Howeidy, 2002). In response, harsh police repression was employed to subdue the demonstrations. Police even shot some protesters dead. "The objective conditions for another outburst are there, but you never know when the spark will come,"

one activist had warned Paul Schemm (2002), a journalist working with the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP).

Almost exactly one year later, on March 20<sup>th</sup> 2003, that spark came. An Egyptian protest of unprecedented scale erupted in Egypt, this time in the heart of Cairo: Tahrir Square. "The second war in Iraq was outrageous. A lot of humane atrocities, a lot of massacres on both sides..." one of the attendees at the March 20th protest recalled (Interview Hakim), "I would say it was like an awakening for the Arab people." In retrospect, the day seems almost like a dress-rehearsal for the taking of Tahrir that would happen almost eight years later. Tens of thousands of protesters would flood into Tahrir Square, occupying it for the day in a dedicated sit-in complete with lectures, discussions and pitched battles with the Egyptian police's paramilitary 'Central Security Forces' before the square was returned to regime control (Human Rights Watch, 2003). The next day, Friday March 21st, another march, numbering in the tens of thousands, would fight its way to Tahrir, originating at Al Azhar mosque in Islamic Cairo and surging through masses of security forces, vandalising the National Democratic Party headquarters by tearing down posters of Mubarak, and setting fires at the nearby Nile Hilton (Schemm, 2003, Hassan, 2003). Militant students were this time joined by members of Egypt's increasingly oppositional cultural and political elite. "You had novelists, movie directors... professors at school, philosophers, some politicians, editors in chief," Hakim recalled. Protests would continue for two weeks afterward, while the Mubarak regime desperately engaged in damage-control. Their solution was a collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood to arrange orderly, neutralised protests in order to diminish the public upsurge (Halawi, 2003)

The Iraq War protests of March 20<sup>th</sup> and 21st would set the stage for a formation of a new coalition of Egyptian political and social movements. "The links that happened during the demonstrations resulted in some groups meeting [informally] on a regular basis... [and] eventually these discussions led to.... a unified body" Hakim explained. One early form this took was the '20 March Popular Campaign for Change', with slogans inviting Egyptians to Struggle against despotism and dictatorship" and say "No to extension, no to hereditary succession" (Radsch, 2016: 110). A more comprehensive alliance was built the next year. "The same groups, the same people, the same body who actually demonstrated against the war in Iraq transformed to be the first opposition group: Kefaya [Enough]," (Interview: Hakim) which would officially announce its launch one year later at a conference of

Egyptian intellectuals and cultural elites, many of whom had been politically active in a previous protest wave during the 1970s, on September 22<sup>nd</sup> 2004 (Al-Sayyid, 2009). The goal of Kefaya, also known as the 'Egyptian Movement for Change', was to unify a diverse and divided Egyptian opposition around undisputed core principles, bringing together 20 March movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Egypt's leftist parties in an alliance of 15 different organisations (Howeidy, 2004). The mission was to provide a platform to resist and oppose the regime.

Kefaya's first protest, on December 12th 2004, constituted the first formal, well-established anti-Mubarak protest in Egyptian history, adopting the slogan: "No Extension of Mubarak's Fourth Term in Office, No to Mubarak's Succession by His Son" (Bisgaard-Church, 2011). Though this protest was ultimately only a small gathering of 300 of the group's members outside Cairo's downtown High Court building, this was the first in a series of increasingly forceful and popular protests targeted directly against not only the Mubarak Regime, but the person of the President. Kefaya's membership and supporters would only grow as time went on. By the next year, Egypt's first contested elections were planned<sup>7</sup>, after Mubarak bowed to international pressure and declared a constitutional referendum take place in February of 2005. Kefaya strongly opposed the changes, and implored members to boycott the referendum, organising protests in 15 major cities around Egypt, in outright defiance of the Emergency Law, declaring "No Constitution without Freedom" (Zenati, 2005). At this point, almost five-thousand Egyptians had become members of the group, by publicly signing its founding statement. "It might be remembered as the first sustained effort to bring together ordinary and elite Egyptians under a common project of resisting," the blogger 'Baheyya' mused in 2005.

Hard work and organisation had paid off for Kefaya and its associates, with protests becoming almost routine events in the Egyptian streets, rather than the carefully stagemanaged rarities that had cropped up on Egyptian campuses in years prior. However, the forthcoming elections to the Egyptian parliament and presidency marked a dividing-point for activists. While Kefaya advocated an electoral boycott, many of its supporting parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the popular opposition figure Ayman Nour, were getting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Previously 'elections' in Egypt were run as referenda on a single presidential appointment made by parliament.

ready for full-fledged participation. Excitable commentators worldwide contrasted this moment with the revolutions of 1848 and 1989 in Europe. "The Arab Spring of 2005 will be noted by history as a similar turning point for the Arab world," conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer (2005) asserted, before noting with some caution that "we do not yet know, however, whether this initial flourishing of democracy will succeed." By the end of the year, Ayman Nour had won an impressive 8% of the presidential vote, and the National Democratic Party had lost 94 of the 404 parliamentary seats which it had previously controlled. Most notably, a coalition of officially 'independent' candidates representing the still-banned Muslim Brotherhood's platform had managed to secure 20% of the total seats in the parliament (88/454). Furthermore, amidst widespread accusations of regime-led election-rigging, Kefaya would organise its most momentous protest yet: with 10,000 taking to the streets of Cairo in open opposition to the regime in a protest spanning 23 governorates (Egypt Independent, 2011).

The Mubarak regime was unsurprisingly unenthusiastic about this 'flourishing of democracy'. In response to the gains made by Kefaya, as well as the electoral successes of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ayman Nour's presidential campaign, regime forces began a harsh crackdown on political parties and protests. Nour himself was imprisoned and tortured on the basis of the deeply suspicious and largely unevidenced charges of 'document forgery' used to discredit his election campaign<sup>8</sup>. Meanwhile, Kefaya was not only faced with harsh police repression, but also plagued by further problems. In the wake of the election, the careful alliance that had constituted the movement's political support had all but collapsed, with Islamists particularly dissatisfied with their lack of influence over Kefaya's operation. This combination of organisational weakness, a lack of support from major players, and stepped-up regime oppression would serve to cripple Kefaya's efforts to organise over the coming years. Kefaya was not the only major opposition entity to suffer. Though formally illegal, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood had long been considered one of the regime's more dependable opposition organisations, who would play by the rules expected of it by the NDP (Schemm, 2003; Howeidy, 2004). In the wake of their unexpected election gains, this lease of generosity was reversed, and mass-arrests of Brotherhood members

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The charges were grounded on evidence provided by Nour's co-defendant Ayman Ismail Hassan, who, after recanting his statement on the grounds that it had been coerced by threats to his family, was found hanged in his cell (Sullivan and Jones, 2008:95).

began in March 2006 with the number detained steadily climbing into the thousands (Brownlee, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2006; Williams, 2006).

Under this atmosphere of harsh police repression of social movements and opposition parties came two alternative outlets for young Egyptians' frustration. The first of these was a burgeoning independent blogosphere, fostered throughout the 2005 election year, and persisting well beyond it. Through the creation of anonymous blogs, Egyptian commentators ranging from professional journalists to ordinary teenagers could circumvent all the boundaries of censorship put in place by the Mubarak regime to constrain conventional media sources. Provocative articles, photographs, and reports were uploaded on a regular basis, with many bloggers contributing new content on an almost daily basis. A new, alternative and unrestricted public sphere was brewing, though it was only accessible to any Egyptian fortunate enough to have an internet connection and, in the case of some blogs, literacy in English<sup>9</sup>. Nonetheless, the conversations and considerations on these blogs would inform and shape both activist and elite discourse during this quieter period of the revolution's prehistory.

A second outlet came with the emergence of a phenomenon known as the "Ultras." Notionally, the Ultras were groups of fanatical football fans, associated with Egypt's two most popular teams "Zamalek SC" (Ultras White Knights) and "Al Ahly SC" (Ultras Ahlawy). Swiftly attaining tens of thousands of members between them, Ultras groups were organised into a series of local chapters and would function as a social community, discussing football and visiting games together. Because of their size and unruliness, they swiftly developed a reputation (alongside other 'Ultras' groups around the world) for hooliganism and violence. This in turn provoked harsh treatment and occasional attacks by the Egyptian police forces, which served to create a considerable antipathy on behalf of the previously apolitical Ultras. "They're young guys who hate and despise the state security and the Central Security soldiers," one former Ultra (Interview: Egypt/Withheld1)<sup>10</sup> explained, "because they're guarding the matches. So, they're the only social group in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The capacity to speak and write in English is something of a marker of class in Egyptian society. Among many of the highly educated, well-off young Egyptians I encountered while in the field, English was not only a language which they were fluent in, but one which they preferred speaking to the Egyptian dialect, even with one-another.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> This information would be identifying if corroborated by other aspects of our interview which may be referred to in this manuscript or future work, and consequently the interview name is withheld.

country who are confronting the police and they're shooting them with fireworks and stones." Violent confrontations between police and ultras continued to intensify until the 2011 revolution.

In 2008 political resistance enjoyed a brief reprieve. Workers from El-Mahalla El-Kubra - a major industrial complex in the Nile Delta – announced that they were planning to strike in April of that year. Two activists, Esraa Rashid and Ahmed Maher created a page on Facebook, an increasingly popular social media platform among Egypt's youth (with 800,000<sup>11</sup> members) to try and bring together some kind of protest in solidarity, in support of the striking workers. Both had previously been volunteers with the youth wing of Ayman Nour's "El Ghad" Party, while Maher was also an active member of Kefaya's youth. Each had enjoyed successes organising rather small protests in the past, and were cautiously optimistic that they would manage a small mobilisation against the regime.

The page grew exponentially over its first few days and weeks, with numbers in the tens of thousands. Accordingly, the group's administrators swiftly reformulated the page as not merely a protest for the "April 6 Strike," but a new "April 6 Movement." The April 6 page served as a hub for discussion of radical and oppositional ideas, drawing in members from all manner of backgrounds, much like Kefaya had before it. Another set of strikes were planned by the group for 2009, and again in 2010. Both times, actions on the scale of 2008 failed to materialise. This was perhaps unsurprising, as the movement had come into existence by co-opting - rather than organising - the set of strikes which inspired its name. Nonetheless April 6<sup>th</sup> had garnered a substantial following and online 'membership'<sup>12</sup>, reaching over 70,000 members, a substantial proportion of all Egyptians on Facebook (Shapiro, 2009) who were now exposed to a whole array of resistant and contentious ideas circulated and discussed on the page.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Facebook in Egypt is demographically skewed in a very particular way: its earliest adopters were not only young and tech-savvy, like many of those who used Facebook in its early days, but also and economically well-off, having the economic means to afford comparatively expensive smartphones, laptops, and internet connections which many ordinary Egyptians could only dream of ever owning. See Howard (2010:132-135) for more on this and the facts and figures cited here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Because of the online component of these organisations the term "membership" is often used flexibly. Generally, 'membership' should not be taken to mean active, involved members, but merely people who chose to affiliate by either liking a page on Facebook, or signing a petition.

With the failure of the April 6<sup>th</sup> movement to replicate the success of the 2008 strike, and Ayman Nour still in jail, another presidential election (expected to take place in 2011) was fast approaching: Egypt's progressive movements needed a new candidate<sup>13</sup>. "[We] were looking for a guy who will be internationally recognised, someone who is well protected and has affiliations, and can be presented to the Egyptian people as a possible candidate." Hakim told me. Three potential options arose: Ahmed Zewail, the Nobel Prize winning chemist; Amr Moussa, the Secretary-General of the Arab league<sup>14</sup>; and Mohamed ElBaradei, the retiring 12-year head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Nobel Peace Prize winner. Of these three, only ElBaradei appeared interested, with Amr Moussa seeming to step-aside, and Zewail declaring "I have no political ambition… I only want to serve Egypt in the field of science and die as a scientist."(Reuters, 2009; Al Ahram, 2016)

After dropping substantial hints in a TIME magazine interview, by February 2010 ElBaradei appeared to be clearing the road for a run for the presidency(TIME, 2009). An organisation, "The People's Campaign to support ElBaradei" had already been set up on his behalf (Hanslohner, 2010). ElBaradei, however, had further plans. Only days after touching-down on the tarmac at Cairo Airport, he announced a new Egyptian social movement: The National Association for Change (NAC). The NAC would bring together established elites such as Ayman Nour, Hamdi Qandil<sup>15</sup>, Mohamed Ghoneim<sup>16</sup> and Muhamed el-Beltagy<sup>17</sup>, political parties such as the Democratic Front, Al Karama, and Al Wasat, and more activism-inclined groups such as the April 6th movement, Revolutionary Socialists and Egyptian Women for Change. In an organisation, which appeared much like a more political, targeted redux of Kefaya, "the idea was to bring together everyone known to oppose the Egyptian regime," the activist and NAC member Wael Ghonim (2012:44) recalled. Unlike Kefaya, however, the Muslim Brotherhood offered only partial support, eventually choosing to support the NAC in parallel to its activities, rather than under the organisation's umbrella. Part of the reason for this was that the National Association for Change was almost

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> This was particularly pressing as constitutional reforms implemented in 2007 upholding a ban on independent candidates while also mandating that any party's candidate must be a member of that political party' senior leadership for at least one year prior to running for the presidency.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Amr Moussa had in fact been the subject of a petition, signed by thousands of Egyptians, asking him to run in the 2005 elections, an opportunity which he declined.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> A well-known Egyptian journalist.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> One of Egypt's leading medical professionals.

 $<sup>^{17}</sup>$  A Muslim Brotherhood politician who had served as a member of Egyptian Parliament between 2005 and 2010

inseparable from ElBaradei's presidential campaign, which the Brotherhood was understandably reluctant to support.

At this point, three key issues were cemented in the Egyptian public consciousness, both fuelling and fuelled by the agitation over the past ten years: a common hatred of the police, a strong distaste with the regime, and horror over Mubarak's attempt to install his son as president in a forthcoming September election. Accordingly, the National Association for Change demanded a resolution to exactly these three concerns: ending the state of emergency, thus weakening police powers; a two-term limit on the presidency, thus preventing a Mubarak-family dictatorship; and free elections<sup>18</sup>, thereby allowing for a shake-up of the deeply embedded political regime. This was done by means of a petition circulated by the NAC which garnered almost one million signatures. The petition was conducted with such sincerity that it had required those signing it to give their national identity information for verification and anti-fraud purposes<sup>19</sup>. Its principal supporters were three of the key groups which would also play roles in setting the stage for a revolution: The National Association for Change<sup>20</sup>, the Muslim Brotherhood<sup>21</sup>, and Kefaya.

While the attempts to gather signatures continued, some young members of the NAC, who had been lending their technical efforts to the petition process, saw a chance for something different: organising around the murder of Khaled Sayid. Sayid had been a young Egyptian man who had died in June 2010 from severe injuries sustained during a brutal arrest and attack by Egyptian policemen – alleged to have been a form of assassination by torture in response to Sayid's possession of video material implicating the officers in illegal activities. Ghonim had organised the page as a hub for discussion and organising after a horrifying post-mortem photograph of Sayid, showing the full extent of his injuries, had gone viral on social media. Among them, Wael Ghonim, an executive at Google living outside the country at the time, had built a popular Facebook page called "We are all Khaled Sayid." Ghonim's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> This constituted: voting by national ID, with monitoring by civil society groups, judicial oversight, equal media access, and no arbitrary restrictions on who could run.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> This was an incredibly big risk for those who signed, and consequently many refused to do so. What many suspected, but did not know, was that Egypt's considerably entrenched police intelligence were desperately trying to locate the database for its own purposes (Interview: Hakim).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Operating the website <u>http://www.taghyeer.net/</u>, which had obtained 123, 052 signatures by the start of 2011 (Taghyeer Campaign, 2011)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Operating the website <u>https://www.tawkatonline.com/</u> which obtained 817,280 signatures by the start of 2011 (Tawkatonline, 2011)

page was used to organise a series of "Silent Stands" against police brutality, and in favour of human rights. These appeared to be only somewhat successful. Though a non-protest incarnation of these actions on January 7<sup>th</sup> in Alexandria had garnered some substantial media attention, those that had focused on human rights had not been particularly impactful events. Ibrahim, who attended some of the early stands, recalled that these protests "did not last for long because the police came and asked us to leave." At his first stand, Ibrahim recalled "just standing over there, looking at the Nile, with your backs to the streets, you're wearing a black T-shirt that's it… we stayed for, I don't know, ten minutes maybe and then, police officers came and [said] "yeah, you cannot stand here," and the event promptly ended. Nonetheless, it was from Ghonim's Facebook page, which had organised these generally underwhelming and minor actions, that Egypt's revolution would be proclaimed.

Before the year's end, one final event would set the stage for the 2011 revolt: Egypt's 2010 Parliamentary elections, deemed by observers to be "the most fraudulent in the country's history" (Freedom House, 2012:203). Every single political party was wiped out by the now incredibly unpopular NDP, with the Brotherhood and almost every other political party reduced to either a single seat or no seats at all<sup>22</sup>. At age 82, this could have been Mubarak's final chance to set the stage for his son Gamal's succession, but he had instead incensed popular opinion. Furthermore, he had almost entirely alienated the Brotherhood by denying them the capacity for participation, and thus any organisational stake, in the Egyptian state.

## A Revolutionary Moment without a Revolutionary Movement

In some sense, Egypt's activist community had been preparing for a revolution for years. Ever since the Second Intifada protests of 2002, and the Iraq War protests of 2003, organisers had routinely described their successes in terms of preparing and politicising their peers in expectation of something bigger in the future. "Greater importance was placed on being present as a protest movement than on ideology," Walid Shawky(2016), a member of the April 6<sup>th</sup> movement recalled. "We began in a moment in which there was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Except for the Leftist "Tagammu" or National Progressive Unionist Party, which received five seats.

little space or means for expressing political opinion, making the act of protest the centre or core of the political protest," he explained." By 2011, this had in many ways been achieved. Protests had become an acknowledged feature of public life, in open defiance of the emergency law, and criticism of the regime was at an all-time high. It had become socially acceptable to not only criticise and condemn Mubarak's regime, but to say so publicly, even in the face of criminal penalties.

"Events outside Egypt suddenly gave us the spark we needed," Ghonim (2012:131) recalled in his memoir, "Revolution 2.0," and with Tunisia's revolution underway, a new revolutionary fervour was brewing in Egypt as well<sup>23</sup>. Ghonim's page had proved a hub for discussion on the topic, and his focus would swiftly turn from silent stands to non-violent revolution. After consulting with fellow organisers who had also been involved in the NDP and Kefaya, he swiftly set-about retooling a protest event he was organising for January 25<sup>th</sup>, Egyptian National Police Day. He would rename the event: "January 25<sup>th</sup>: Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption and Unemployment." Ghonim was particularly careful with the framing of the event, being careful to appeal to widely held notions of common grievances, shared opponents and a unified identity. "I deliberately included poverty, corruption and unemployment...," he recalled, "because we needed to have everyone join forces... If the invitation to take the streets had been based solely on human rights then only a certain segment of Egyptian society would have participated" (Ghonim, 2012:137). Though he "did not coordinate extensively with other pages to get them to publish our content... the idea was that everyone had a right to advertise the day."

Soon enough, Ghonim's event took on a viral nature, being shared by fellow activists who "worked in parallel, without any coordination of effort. Yet our independent work was all aimed at one thing: Jan25" (Ghonim, 2012:119). Importantly, the notion of a revolution on January 25<sup>th</sup> had resonated well beyond activist circles, with invitations to protest in Tahrir being shared by pages for popular figures, humour pages, and even the 250,000-strong following of Egyptian Sugar Cane Juice.

Ghonim was painfully aware of the need to keep the invitation as broad as possible. "Let us focus from now until Jan25 on discussing Egypt's economic condition and our living

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> One could call this a 'social change belief structure'.

standards," he implored those following his page, "We must reach out to the helpless layman who only cares about finding his loaf of bread... [and] refrain from elitist sophisticated talk so we don't end up only 1,000 or 2,000 on the street" (2012:120). "Reaching working-class Egyptians was not going to happen through the Internet and Facebook," he recalled, and accordingly a flurry of an estimated 20,000 fliers were distributed by activists from the April 6<sup>th24</sup> movement. This was complemented by a flurry of mass text-messages, circulated shortly in advance of the 25<sup>th</sup>.

Alongside social media activities, other attempts to organise around the day were being conducted, with mixed success. Egypt's largest leftist party, "Tagammu," had openly opposed the protests, while the Muslim Brotherhood, had explicitly declared on January 20<sup>th</sup> that it would not participate. Though it had declined to participate, the Brotherhood had also not openly stated opposition the protests, issuing no formal prohibition on attendance, and even drawing attention to the seventeen other organisations who had pledged their support to the events on the 25<sup>th</sup> (IkhwanWeb, 2011; Al Wafd, 2011). Alongside Kefaya and the NAC, this list included several established political parties including Ayman Nour's Ghad party, the Liberal 'Democratic Front', and the Nasserist 'Dignity Party'. There was also a smattering of minor progressive groups, which had emerged in the wake of the 2010 elections. Some of these groups were organising their own form of action on the 25<sup>th</sup> through locally managed 'popular assemblies'. These local neighbourhood assemblies had been formed in the wake of parliamentary rigging in 2010. The assemblies' publicly announced plans to march from the Egyptian High Court to Tahrir Square contributed to growing media attention and speculation around the day (Ghonim 2012:132).

By the morning of the 25<sup>th</sup>, in addition to work on the ground, invitations to protest had been sent to over one million Egyptian Facebook users, one tenth of which had confirmed in advance that they would attend on the day (Ghonim, 2012:160). However, it remained to be seen whether organising efforts would mature into action on the streets. "Unlike the Muslim brothers... we did not have the same level of commitment," Mahmood, a highly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> In addition to Ghonim's (2012) testimony, the Muslim Brotherhood's news service also discusses the role of April 6 members on the day (IkhwanWeb, 2011).

involved activist at the time, had explained.<sup>25</sup> "It was only volunteer work from us- we never had the culture or the same way as the Brotherhood - so our organisational capacity was limited to directing the marches."

Turnout on January 25th was considerable, though substantially smaller than expected with tens of thousands (rather than Ghonim's desired 100,000) marching to Tahrir Square. They initially converged at numerous gathering points around Cairo, supported by thousands more protesting in other Egyptian cities such as Alexandria, Aswan, El-Mahalla El-Kubra and Ismaïlia. Ghonim's event had been ambiguously presented, such that the 'revolution' put forward on the day bore greater resemblance to extensive political reform than the fall of the Mubarak regime. As it became clear that the protest was going ahead, elementary steps were taken by the Ministry of the Interior to block individual activists' mobile phones, as well as disabling national access to Twitter and the video streaming website Bambuser (Raoof, 2011). These were not entirely successful. In fact, authorities' attempts to block Facebook on January 26<sup>th</sup> undid other restrictions which they had put in place previously.

As protesters marched towards Tahrir, a heavy-handed police presence, live ammunition and brutal attacks on peaceful protesters marked the day. These experiences strongly impacted on those who marched, with a radicalising effect. Sam, who had marched to Tahrir on the 25<sup>th</sup> recalled that though protesters had been "very, very peaceful...the reaction was very violent." At around 6pm that day, regime troops had stormed Tahrir Square, beating faces bloody and brutalising the peaceful crowd. <sup>26</sup>"How violent things became suddenly.... I think this was the turning point" Sam explained. "If they're hitting people like that in the streets then they [the regime] are not going to do anything, and I remember the chants started to be: "The regime falls." Enraged and emboldened, organisers liaised with established opposition groups over the next two days. Meanwhile, discussion among protesters and sympathisers online led to a development in both agitation and objectives. The events of the 25<sup>th</sup> had made it clear that peaceful revolution was impossible, and would, as John F. Kennedy had once remarked about a previous revolutionary wave, make violent revolution inevitable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Quotation translated from the original Arabic during the interview, to which intelligent verbatim was then applied.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> As if to add insult to injury, 3G services in Tahrir Square were also shut down two hours later.

While there were sporadic protests on the 26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup>, including small pitched battles between police and protesters in and around Cairo, as well as a small event at the city's Actors Syndicate, many Egyptians were hastily anticipating a second mobilisation. This had been announced by Ghonim for the  $28^{\mbox{\tiny th}}$  of January, and was planned to take place immediately after Friday prayers. Meanwhile, Ghonim and his associates<sup>27</sup> set about using their organisational contacts to build a coalition for the day. In the wake of the 25<sup>th</sup>, the Muslim Brotherhood were all too keen to try and take credit for the day's success, claiming its rebellious youth members had been crucial in the effort<sup>28</sup>. It appeared that the Brothers would make a more official showing come the 28th, with Brotherhood youth passing word to activist groups that their members would be present at the designated rallying points after Friday prayers, but would not move unless they were accompanied by huge masses beyond their own membership. Likewise, they were willing to help occupy Tahrir until 4pm, after which they would withdraw unless they were re-enforced by a great many protesters (Interview: Mahmood) Likewise, the 30,000 strong 'Ultras' of Ahly and Zamalek had been solicited by activists affiliated with Ghonim and April 6, and appeared to be ready to fight for Egypt's future. The day was shaping up to be altogether more eventful, and more dangerous, than January 25th.Ghonim had called it: "The Friday of Anger: A Revolution against Corruption, Injustice, Torture, and Unemployment.."

Unfortunately, Ghonim would not get to see the fruits of his comrades' labour: by the evening of the 27<sup>th</sup> of January he had been arrested. He had been seized upon by agents of Egypt's Ministry of the Interior after a dinner with two friends visiting from the United States that evening. He would not be released until February 7<sup>th</sup>. Almost simultaneously with Ghonim's arrest, at around 22.12 GMT a major shutdown of Egypt's internet providers commenced. The first connections to be severed were those with Telecom Egypt and Link Egypt, and other providers followed shortly afterward.

By the next day, mobile phone access in Cairo was dwindling, with networks eventually shutting down altogether in the afternoon. "Little did the regime know that this was the single largest promotional effort possible for the revolution" Ghonim (2012:178) recalled, "Every citizen who had not heard of the uprising now realised that a major challenge to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Spanning activists from April 6<sup>th</sup>, Kefaya, and ElBaradei's National Association for Change.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Put citation referring to brotherhood's website here.

regime must be under way. Huge numbers of people decided to take to the streets, some for no other reason than just to find out what was happening." As the Egyptian communications professor Mohammad el-Nawawy had put it some days later, "The government has made a big mistake taking away the option at people's fingertips," he said. "They're taking their frustration to the streets" (Richtel, 2011). With the online space digitally blockaded, Tahrir and the paths leading to it would now constitute the sole spaces of convergence for Cairo's potential revolutionaries.

The events of the 28<sup>th</sup> were profound and overwhelming. Egyptians numbering in the hundreds of thousands took to the streets, progressing toward Tahrir from Friday prayer sessions across Cairo. In an attempt to frustrate organising efforts, police forces had attempted to close some of the city's more popular mosques, such as Omar Makram, which was adjacent to Tahrir. Nonetheless, marches snaked through Cairo, originating from the city's many suburbs, just as they had on January 25<sup>th</sup>, but this time with greater force, numbers, and determination. Protesters would not only reach Tahrir, but battle through lines and lines of Central Security Force troops, forcing the permanent retreat of Egypt's police for the remainder of the revolution. With occasional exceptions, these were by no means organised revolutionary brigades. In fact, January 28<sup>th</sup> would also mark the moment when the activists who had collaborated loosely in organising the revolution's early protests, told me how the few activists who had been assigned to each protest site had arrived only to realise that numbers were too large for them to effectively direct or manage.

Communications problems only intensified once protesters reached Tahrir and communication lines remained down. "Many of our ideas were unable to be put forward, because we definitely lost control," Mahmood told me. "We barely found each other, and we were just making sure that we were okay, because there were millions<sup>29</sup> in the streets." One could be forgiven for thinking that the conflicts with Egypt's military, and the burning of the National Democratic Party headquarters that day were examples of such lapses of organisation. However, the contrary appears to have been the case. One interviewee

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> This is something of an exaggeration for dramatic effect. Many of my interviewees used the word 'millions' quite liberally, both in reference to protest attendance, and in everyday metaphor. Generally, it would refer to anything over a hundred thousand.

(Interview: Egypt/Withheld2)<sup>30</sup>, also involved in organisation on the day of the 28<sup>th</sup> recalled to me how some carefully organised battalions of highly mobilised protesters had agreed to burn the NDP headquarters that afternoon, and entered Tahrir Square in the evening with "no other objective, there is no other thing that we have [to do], except burning their HQ to the ground." Indeed, Mahmood corroborated this story, recalling how some groups of protesters had planned and "prepared for a scenario in which to confront the security forces violently, using plastic shields and even some people carried Molotov cocktails." His own contingent of organisers, however were disinclined toward such measures.

In the wake of the 'Friday of Anger' on January 28<sup>th</sup>, the Mubarak regime's attempts at damage-limitation moved into overdrive. With internet and mobile phone connections interrupted, public panic, regime-affiliated propaganda news organisations, and an aggressive rumour-mill, an image of a country under siege by vicious mobs began to spread. This would only intensify following the success of revolutionaries in Tahrir that day, the burning of the NDP headquarters and the withdrawal of police from the streets. A profound fear spread rapidly around Egyptian neighbourhoods. This was only intensified by missives from retreating units of the Central Security Forces and swiftly deploying units of the Armed Forces stating that the jails were open, all assistance was gone, and help was not available.

"Misinformation campaigns are well orchestrated." surmised Pierre Sioufi (2011), who was able to witness the dissonance between news reports and the reality on the ground in realtime from his top-floor apartment on Tahrir Square. "Families and friends are now pressurising the protesters because they are now brain washed by the Egyptian TV and the security forces rumour spreading organism.." The campaign had been incredibly effective, and almost all of the participants I spoke to would explain how their ability to visit Tahrir had been kept in check by their family's own desire for safety. Later in the Eighteen Days, this sentiment would reverse, with the swelling occupation in Tahrir constituting a place of safety amidst an unpoliced and unsecured Egypt.

Accordingly, in these early days of the revolution, Tahrir's popularity came in ebbs and flows. One satellite image, taken by GeoEye mid-morning January 29<sup>th</sup> showed only a tiny

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> This information would be identifying if corroborated by other aspects of our interview which may be referred to in this manuscript or future work, and consequently the interview name is withheld.

gathering in the square. There was a serious danger of losing momentum. The square was "empty, really empty," Hakim explained. To combat regime misinformation, a number of activists embarked on misinformation campaigns of their own in order to magnify the impact of the protests. "We spread that there are maybe 20, 30 demonstrations in Cairo heading to Tahrir Square [on the 28th], and actually there were around eight, or seven I guess," he noted. "We spread that there are huge casualties happening in different cities. We didn't know what's happening, we just spread everything in a very random way... actually, this motivated people more." Further to this, at times when the square was sparsely populated, some activists tried to prevent journalists from taking photos, while sending reports of inflated numbers "We actually sent false pictures of the square," Hakim explained. "We had connections to international media publications: ...we have connections to the BBC, Amnesty International, a lot of Human Rights organisations as well. This enabled us to spread huge false, and right, news for the nation. And Aljazeera,<sup>31</sup> by that time they had a very important role," he admitted. Activists like Hakim worked hard to present a profound, historically important presence in Tahrir, underwriting the sense of autonomy and power in the space, but also providing a sense of security to those who would otherwise be hesitant to participate.

After three more days of disruption, Hosni Mubarak appeared on national television in an attempt to de-escalate the situation. In an impassioned speech, Mubarak offered to meet protesters' demands, but would remain president until the end of his term. In response, numbers in Tahrir had taken a nosedive. Fortunately for Egypt's revolutionaries, concerns over the square's populousness would be swiftly resolved thanks to a sudden and unexpected attack on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of February by a deluge of regime-aligned thugs who had mysteriously been allowed through military cordons to assault the protesters. One of the participants I interviewed, a former soldier, had made contact with military units on that day, and recounted to me that when he asked why they had allowed the attack to take place, they had told him that "these are our orders: Not to do anything." (Interview: Yusha). The conflict became known as the 'Camel Battle', named for the brigades of camel and horse-riding brigands who charged into the square, armed with clubs, swords, and Molotov

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Al Jazeera had, at the time reported "three million" protesters flooding the square, a physical impossibility by 1100%. The original reporting is now removed, but other media organisations still cite it, for example the Telegraph's (The Telegraph, 2011) live blog of the revolution

cocktails. News of the battle swiftly incensed the previously calmed passions of those who had opted-out of attending Tahrir, and ensured substantial manifestations in the days to come. With the arrival of this new offensive against scores of ordinary Egyptians, Tahrir was reaffirmed as the site for a final showdown with the regime under these new conditions of urgency.

## Occupying Tahrir

In the wake of the Camel Battle, Tahrir transformed from the location of daily protests to a full-blown occupation and, with thousands staying overnight and on most evenings, protesters would set about creating a more organised common-space in the square. By the 3<sup>rd</sup> of February a central campsite had been formed in the middle of the Tahrir roundabout, with auxiliary camps emerging on the patches of grass and concrete encircling it, such as near the central office of the State Bureaucracy, known as the Mugamma. These camps grew more and more heavily populated as days went on. The main camp hosted a space for internet use, a recycling point, and even a nursery-area for young children. Closer to the Nile, on Tahrir street, an array of food-sellers and flag-sellers had set up shop near some publicly accessible toilets and a nearby drinking-water tap. On the other side of Tahrir a makeshift stage had been set up where public figures and other speakers would address the square, and televised speeches of critical importance would be aired. The 'downtown' side of Tahrir also featured a clinic set up in a nearby KFC restaurant, as well as a small space for public artwork. Closer to the Egyptian museum a second clinic had been set up, along with a newspaper-board displaying all of the country's main dailies, to allow protesters to catch up on any developments they had missed.<sup>32</sup>

Away from the street, a number of the local buildings also fulfilled supportive functions. One particular building, belonging to a wealthy middle-aged Cairene named Pierre Sioufi, had become something of a haven for activists who found themselves overwhelmed by the masses in Tahrir. Pierre's top floor flat, with its seemingly unstoppable internet

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> The BBC has an excellent map of Tahrir during the Eighteen Days, which illustrates all of these locations. (BBC,2011)

connection<sup>33</sup>, would become the nerve centre of the revolution's media and planning operations, playing host to all manner of intriguing characters. One of these characters was Heba, a teenage girl at the time of the revolution. She had arrived in Tahrir shortly after the Camel Battle, and found her way to Pierre's after meeting a colleague who had just left jail. "Most of the very active older activists – not the people who just came for the revolution – knew him and went to his place." she told me. "There were so many people everywhere sleeping... cooking... bloggers who know Pierre just come up and write their blogs and post it from there. It was a hub of active social media, and media in general" Pierre's flat also played host to foreign journalists, and many of the iconic photos of Tahrir during the Eighteen Days were taken from his tenth-floor balcony<sup>34</sup>. "They were really hospitable and open; anyone could go in and no-one asked who you are. The door was open all the time, and people just came to use the bathroom, to sit, and then they make food every day and anyone whose there could eat. It was a really collective spirited place," Heba told me.

Though the occupation was by no means a comprehensive operation, it was enough for Tahrir to persist and survive. "People just had to organise themselves and things just went in a certain flow... the roles just kind of divide on their own, it was all just very random" Heba explained. This flow was guided by two elements: inclination, and ability. For some, particularly the older generation, delivering supplies to Tahrir served as a good way to participate without having to endure the harsh winter cold, whereas for others their professional skills would guide their engagements: doctors would operate clinics, bloggers would engage in media operations, and the unskilled would do manual labour. "People just start doing something...and everyone starts coming to help" she recalled. "Like: someone says I want to build a bathroom... and then he has 100 people helping him. Things just happened very spontaneously." This spontaneous nature applied not only to the means by which key tasks were achieved, but to every element of social life in the square. One example was the daily exercises that became a morning-feature in Tahrir after a small group began to organise them. Heba recalled how "suddenly the whole square was doing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> The details of Pierre's set-up are unknown, but it proved useful even after cellular and internet access had been restored, as 3G services in Tahrir were so overloaded after the Occupation began that getting a reliable, strong internet connection while there was exceedingly difficult.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Pierre's photos, and his personal Facebook page, were always brutally honest. At a time where the activists in the square had been trying to craft careful images of a space packed at all times, Pierre would upload photographs showing exactly how full, or how empty, the square was at any given time, commenting on its status with matter-of-fact assessments, ranging in tone from the laconic to breathless.

morning exercises together and they just wake you up when you're sleeping... and you just want to kill them but then you can't so you just go and exercise with them! Things just fell into pattern."

One organising effort which did occur in Tahrir, with mixed success, was the attempt to build a Revolutionary Youth Coalition. "At some point after the 28<sup>th</sup> of January there was talk that there was nobody to negotiate in the square, and that they [the regime] don't understand the demands of the people" Mahmood, a member of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, explained. "There were attempts from the side of the regime to meet young people, so that they can be considered to be 'the revolutionary youth', [and] so that they can reach an agreement with them that was not representative of what people wanted." Under this context Mahmood and his fellow activists attempted to establish the Revolutionary Youth Coalition- a group which brought together the diverse activists of various organisations in Tahrir, alongside some of the early organisers of the protests on the 25<sup>th</sup> and the 28<sup>th</sup>.

The Revolutionary Youth Coalition was not a particularly sophisticated organisation. It existed primarily as a 'block' on formal negotiation between the regime and groups claiming to represent the protesters. "I remember our slogan was 'No negotiation until the fall of the regime'" Mahmood had told me. Nonetheless, regime outlets had offered them all manner of promises, including that Mubarak would not run in the upcoming elections, and that the rigged 2010 parliamentary elections would be repeated fairly. Attempting to build any authority for this coalition, however, proved largely fruitless. "People in the square would actually stop and question us: 'On what basis are we actually represented in this? Why have you formed this coalition?' These people don't know us... we were not known by the masses, so this is why people did not trust us." Mahmood explained. In the light of some positive media depictions, the Revolutionary Youth Coalition would eventually gain some acceptance in the square, but never any power. This was borne out by the coalition's attempts to organise in the wake of the revolution, which were met with very limited success indeed.

Those who arrived in Tahrir came from varied backgrounds. Cairo's richer classes, as well as workers from nearby neighbourhoods, and groups from the Muslim Brotherhood formed a hefty contingent during the daytime. In addition to this, a sprinkling of cultural elites, intellectuals, Salafis, and political types were also drawn to activities in Tahrir, often setting up their own corner of the square consistent across each day. Those who had slept in the square, however, also included somewhat different groups than those who had arrived in the daytime. One person who bore stark witness to this was Heba. After discovering Pierre's, Heba had offered, and successfully been allowed, to take over the role of kitchen duty. Enormous batches of lentil soup, cooked up in Pierre's kitchen would be prepared and handed out to individuals in the square to keep them warm and energised in the harsh Cairo winter. "When you're handing out the soup... you get to see all the kinds of people... [and] you start a bit of small conversation," she explained. During these casual conversations Heba discovered much about those who had joined the Tahrir sit-in's permanent element. "There was definitely a lot of people from outside of Cairo," she explained, telling me how, for many, the events of the 28<sup>th</sup> of January had prompted them to leave their villages and come in to the city. "There's two types of these people," she told me. Some were those who had left their livelihoods and families behind, with their eldest son taking care of the family, but others brought their entire families down. "There was something special about people how came outside of Cairo because they came all the way.... they're staying and some of them who are very poor had to bring their families with them because if they left their families at home their families would have nothing to eat." Another contingent who Heba recalled participating heavily in Tahrir's occupation were the city's taxi drivers. With banks closed, traffic blocked, check-points set-up all over the city, and consequently no easy means to make money, many of Cairo's taxi-men had made their way to Tahrir, and would stay until the fall of the regime.

In the wake of February 3<sup>rd</sup>, conflicts with NDP-supporting forces had died down, with relatively few incidents thereafter. Egypt's defence minister, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi had even visited the square the next day, and detachments of the Armed Forces seemed to be providing some form of security to the encampment. Without major new threats to defend against, and plenty of time to bide, Tahrir would evolve from protest to party. "The Square is in a party mood still...Nothing really is happening but there is a sense of expectation all over," Pierre Sioufi (2011) had noted that day in a post to his personal Facebook page. An interview conducted by Awad and Dixon (2011) with a protester named Wael Adel (a civil engineer) drew attention to Adel's assertion that "the festive atmosphere was a key element to drawing the high numbers that Egypt had rarely seen." "People felt safe so they came out," he explained. By contrast, Heba recalled how this festive atmosphere

acutely frustrated those who were trying to accomplish some form of organisation: "After a couple of days there were all these festivities, which were nice and everything, but you know when you feel that something is being treated very cheaply?" she had asked me rhetorically. "Just don't take it too far, let's celebrate and do everything, but just don't take it that far. It's not a festival."

Despite Heba's sentiments, a festival is almost exactly what Tahrir became, and those who had gone down to Tahrir from the beginning stated that they had felt a subtle difference in the kinds of people flooding into the square. Over the next week, Tahrir existed in the centre of Cairo as some kind of a militant fête – with self-determined deputations of its more radical contingents advancing to protest elsewhere, all to the backdrop of ongoing discussions between the various groups who had found themselves in Tahrir and the regime. "We were all celebrating," Yusha told me," these were the best 11 days of my life." He likened Tahrir to a "party for family, but this family is about 20 million people... You can eat for free, you can have anything you need, you just hang around people were singing, guitars and stages- it was like a carnival for ten days. ... everywhere, everyone was celebrating. The spirit, I like to call it the Tahrir Spirit, it was amazing."

# Victory and Defeat

On February 10<sup>th</sup>, Egypt's military, in concert with regime elites, finally played its decisive hand. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces held a meeting, from which Mubarak and his Vice President were notably absent, and later that day announced:

"In affirmation and support for the legitimate demands of the people, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [SCAF] convened today, 10 February 2011... and decided to remain in continuous session to consider what procedures and measures that may be taken to safeguard the nation, and the achievements and aspirations of the great people of Egypt." <sup>35</sup>

"All your demands will be met today," Hassan al-Roueini, the general in charge of the Cairo metropolitan area, had told protesters in Tahrir. Meanwhile, Hossan Badrawy, Party Chief

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> This quotation is sourced from the Washington Post's (2011) reporting.

of the NDP announced to the international press that he expected Mubarak to "make an announcement that will satisfy [protesters] demands." It appeared that Mubarak was being forced out. When Mubarak did take to the airwaves, however, it was not to satisfy demands, but to reiterate his current position in a speech strikingly similar to the impassioned plea he had given on the eve of the Camel Battle. Mubarak remained steadfast in his commitment to rule the country, delegating unspecified 'powers' to the Vice President and reforming the constitution. Immediately afterward, Mubarak's appointed Vice President, Omar Suleiman took to the stage "The door is open for more dialogue," he told protesters, "return to your home and work" (Michael, 2011).

Protesters' demands had not been met that day. With their hopes dashed, and outrage at a high, the last manifestation of the Egyptian Revolution was underway. Ashraf Khalil(2011) recalled how within the first hour after Mubarak's speech, "one group of protesters was moving to surround the Information Ministry... [while] another seemed determined to make the several-mile trek to the presidential palace." By the next day, a Friday 'of Departure' (the second Friday to be given this name), protesters had set up camp outside both locations, in addition to seizing the offices of Egypt's state television stations, who would finally defect in favour of the revolution. The streets were swollen with angry Egyptians, and later that day Mubarak would flee the country. "And then," one journalist who had been covering the protests recalled, "with a short, lugubrious statement from Suleiman, it was over. Mubarak was out, and the military was in command" (Hounshell, 2011).

One element which is not often discussed with regard to the Eighteen Days, but is worth highlighting, is that the distaste for the Mubarak regime shared by many Egyptians were also held by members of the Armed Forces. Ghonim (2012:118) recalled how posts about the January 25<sup>th</sup> event even attracted responses from an Egyptian army officer, who had declared that "victory is soon, [and] Jan25th is the day," confidentially telling Ghonim "that the general mood within the army's ranks was supportive of our revolution." Indeed, though army officers did not shout with the revolutionaries, they certainly felt a common cause: "The Army officers, they were against Mubarak… young officers and even lieutenants and older ranks" Yusha, who had just left the Army when the revolution hit, explained, "but only a few higher ranks, or fewer people controlled everything." As Kandil (2012) notes, among the higher ranks of the army, a similar sentiment of distaste for

Mubarak had generated. With the fall of Mubarak, and the establishment of temporary military authority, this sympathetic toleration of protest would soon fall away.

It is worth offering a consideration of the paths trodden by those radicalised by the events of 2011, and the new ties they sought out. In other words, where did all the revolutionaries go? As far as more organised platforms were concerned, though they had come together for the revolution, there was little sense of unity during the Eighteen Days. Each had arrived in Tahrir for their own reasons, and their own interests. They just happened to coincide. By contrast, those who had swelled revolutionary ranks in the Eighteen Days had converged upon Tahrir in response to the shared perceptions, attitudes and identities to which Ghonim and the revolution had appealed. This took place in an exceptional and opportune situation and place of revolt, peaking after Tahrir had already become established by those who had marched in the revolution's earlier days. Though Tahrir proved an opportunity for the intensely divided groups in Egyptian society to encounter one another on a cordial, united basis, these encounters did not appear to produce new social ties or coalitions which stretched across existing divisions in the same way as encounters during Occupy had. Once negotiations with the regime began, each individuated group took its own direction, and the cross-platform "Revolutionary Youth Coalition" which had scrambled to establish some kind of platform in the wake of February 11<sup>th</sup>, instead gradually faded away into obscurity.

"Revolution 2.0 is no longer enough," Al Ahram declared, as the political parties who had supported the revolution gradually moved to focus on their own agendas. "Political campaign 101 is badly needed. It is time to move from Facebook to face time, and fast" (Swelam, 2011). Meanwhile the core of activists who had worked in Kefaya, April 6 and the National Association for Change prior to the revolution continued to focus on furthering the human rights agenda which they had adopted prior to Mubarak's downfall. This kind of divergence between activists and political parties had occurred before around preparations for the 2005 election, and just as before, disunity provided space for repression and a withering away of support for social movements. There were now diverse outlets and avenues for Egyptians' common grievances, each proposing alternate, even contradictory solutions.

Activists' complex rhetoric about human rights did not prove particularly popular, and as time went on, the shape of Egyptian popular protest swung away from activists, and in favour of parties. "We keep saying: where are the people who were there in the Eighteen Days, why aren't they here now?" Heba recalled in 2014, "but we never took the effort to know why they were there in the first place, and why were they interested - People do things because they're interested in them." For Heba, it was this shift to human rights that had isolated ordinary Egyptians. "Now we're asking for things they don't care about, first they wanted to eat, these people just wanted to eat they just wanted to live, but we just look in our own circles like we want freedom, we don't want torture we don't want prisoners, like they don't give a shit about that, they just want food, they want their kids to get treated when they're ill, that's all they want." She reiterated this point again later on in our interview: "It's not all of a sudden that we became a hundred people who protest, no, it happened gradually," she affirmed, "and it's because we kept neglecting the needs of the *actual* masses, not intentionally, but it's something that happened"

Though Tahrir proved an opportunity for the intensely divided groups in Egyptian society to encounter one another on a cordial, united basis, these encounters did not appear to produce new social ties or coalitions which stretched across existing divisions. Though many of those I talked to recalled making new friends in Tahrir, these friends were almost always members of their social class, and often shared each other's cultural, political and religious inclinations too. "If I didn't know [redacted] from the revolution, I would have known him another way," Yusuf had affirmed, when I asked him about the group of friends he had made during his time in Tahrir. Despite a diverse array of encounters, there was little substantive cooperation and interaction that brought already divided individuals or groups together for more than an instant. When I had asked my sources about the "times that people really came together," their answer was almost always the same: moments of collective opposition to the regime or experiences of a collective cordiality. Though I was told frequent vignettes about how bearded Brothers would help young women set up tents, or how atheists and Salafis would fight together against the Central Security Forces, these moments would come to an end and the individuals involved would go their separate ways. Many had only visited Tahrir for a day or two of the 18 total, and no distinctive 'identity' had been clearly associated with being a protester in Tahrir except for the notion of representing the 'Egyptian people' as a whole. Accordingly, there were few opportunities, and little ground for most of those who entered the square to encounter those not already in their milieu more than once.

Furthermore, at the Tahrir occupation's peak, even a member of a quite particular group could find enough people from their own relational 'bubble' in the square due to the sheer size of the revolutionary upheaval. Even if diverse groups had come together in Tahrir there had been few opportunities for repeat interactions except among those who had slept overnight, and even then, there was no need for members of these groups to associate extensively. "Most non-activist protesters did not join a protest network." Gunning and Baron concluded in their analysis of the revolution. (2014:234). In part, they argued, this was because "identification with the historical moment [focused] on the event, not the movement." Indeed, though many Egyptians had arrived for the grand historical event of Egypt's Revolution, particularly in the later days, the Revolution was not the distinctive property of a single clear movement, nor under the control of any definable political force in Egypt. This meant that not only were the various Egyptian social movements which had supported the revolution unable to capitalize on Tahrir as a recruiting event, but that ordinary Egyptians would have no idea exactly who to turn to even if they had wanted to become involved in some form of protest network.

In some sense, then, it is unsurprising that after the 2011 revolution, activists' initiatives would only see a brief reprieve when a much-hated figure, Egypt's new president Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, had pushed the nation's post-revolutionary tolerance to its limits. "There has been at least one steady pattern in Egypt over the past two years," Hazem Kandil(2012b) mused in an article for the London Review of books, "subversion has constantly outpaced efforts to consolidate a new regime.... without organisation, leadership or even a clear direction, revolutionary subversion has done little more than reshuffle the cards, hoping for a better hand next time." This reshuffling of the cards, as Kandil had put it, was made possible by a reunion of almost all of the movements who had supported the initial revolution alongside former supporters of the NDP who had lost out in 2011 as part of a massive petition campaign called "Tamarrud" (rebellion). They were bolstered by the sympathetic intervention of the Egyptian security sector, with command over approximately two million employees, half of which were military or paramilitary in nature (Alsharif and Saleh, 2013; Kandil, 2012:194),. The most prominent faction was the Interior Ministry, the same entity many Egyptians had rallied against on January 25<sup>th</sup>, "Of course we joined and helped the movement, as we are Egyptians like them and everyone else.," one interior ministry official told Reuters, referring to the institutional support given to *Tamarrud* (Alsharif and Saleh, 2013).

Almost one year later, in August 2013, a 'temporary' regime under the thumb of then secretary of defence (and later, president) Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was still holding power in Egypt. It was at this point that the army, police, and Central Security Forces would take steps to ensure that the deck would never be reshuffled again. This began with a massacre, claiming the lives of at least 817, and possibly over a thousand, pro-Morsi protesters, many of whom were associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. "I couldn't believe that all that sound was guns." one visitor to the sit-in on the day of the massacre had told me, "There was too much [ammunition] fired. I got out, I heard an echo in my ears, a strange echo in my ears. I went back to the concrete where people are gathering....and they told me: 'you're shot'" (Interview: Egypt/Withheld3)<sup>36</sup>.

This was the last time he ever attended a protest, but the last day many of those who had sat in protest at *Rabaa al-Adawiya* and *Nahda* squares would ever see. Though the sit-in had been armed, like many of the conflicts during the Eighteen Days, it had been largely peaceful, and the new regime's attacks on peaceful protesters would only escalate as time went on. In the three and a half years which have followed, the Sisi regime would continue to enclose freedom of assembly, expression and association in Egypt, co-opting the state-run media for propaganda purposes, while heavily censoring private newspapers. The April 6<sup>th</sup> Movement, beloved for its role in the revolution, was banned, and activists and organisers were arrested for the participation in the 2011 revolution, which the regime has attempted to re-narrativise as a mistake engineered by terrorist and foreign elements. Even the online space is closely monitored and controlled: in 2015 a 22 Egyptian law student, Amr Nohan received a three-year jail sentence for posting an image of Sisi wearing Mickey Mouse ears to Facebook (Daoud, 2015). The latest report by Amnesty International (2016) assessed in 2016 that 3-4 Egyptians were being forcibly disappeared by authorities every single day.

In some sense, the revolution had always been a poisoned chalice. "The former regime did not fall," Mohamed ElBaradei had declared when he withdrew his candidacy for President in January 2012. "My conscience does not permit me to run for the presidency or any other official position unless it is within a real democratic system" (quoted in Kirkpatrick, 2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> This information would be identifying if corroborated by other aspects of our interview which may be referred to in this manuscript or future work, and consequently the interview name is withheld.

ElBaradei, like many others, was critical of the transitional Supreme Council of the Armed Forces regime, arguing that it was simply a continuation of elements of Mubarak's regime. In many senses he was right: though the NDP and Mubarak family had been ousted from Egyptian politics, no other aspect of the Egyptian state had been shattered – even the severe physical damage inflicted on the Interior Ministry was swiftly remedied, as the organisation returned emboldened and reinforced.

Though there had been a political revolution in Egypt, a social one was yet to come. "A day of reckoning will come," ElBaradei predicted. "And I am asking the Egyptian people to keep a record of every case of torture and oppression and the violation of personal liberty." ElBaradei had proved soothsayer before: in December 2010, he commented, when asked about the 1979 Iranian revolution, "Things were boiling underground, and that is what I see here in Egypt, I would not be surprised if you saw violence in a couple of weeks, or in a month or two." Perhaps ElBaradei's second prediction will also come true. Despite the crackdown, Egypt still witnessed 1,736 protests in the 2016, and 1,995 in 2015 (Ahram Online, 2016). They have remained generally small, and seldom impactful, but it is a sign that protests are still happening, and activists are still organising, even when doing so puts their lives at risk. As conditions for the poorest Egyptians continue to falter, perhaps, as the popular magazine CairoScene<sup>37</sup> put it, Egypt's stepped-up repression "is only an indication of how fragile the government and the army are" (Daoud, 2015). After all, they added, "how can anyone feel safe when those protecting them are afraid of Mickey Mouse?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> The article has since been removed.

# 3.2 Affinities and Convergence in Egypt's Revolution

"We were all suffering with the same stuff, we were all facing the same injustice, we were all facing the same problems... [for] those Eighteen Days, it was pure, everybody just wanted change, and that was the main problem for everything that came after that. Nobody knows from where to start, who is the leader. What do we want to do, how are we going to do it? There are no objectives. We just want change. What kind of change? That was the problem."

– Yusuf

The Egyptian Revolution stands as an excellent study of the full spectrum of mobilisation, but affinity plays a particularly starring role in the Eighteen Days. The means by which affinities came to play such a vital role in Egypt's revolution are notably different than the case of Occupy Wall Street, just as the roles played by networks and organisations were also distinctly different. As the previous section has illustrated, Egypt's revolution was a coming-together of individuals and organisations where neither was acutely aware of the ideas, intentions, and agency of the other. Indeed, many Egyptians still remain uninformed about the 2011 revolt which they themselves participated in. Many of the participants whom I interviewed, even well educated, informed and connected ones, professed not to know how the revolution was organised, who was calling the shots, or what exactly was going on. Meanwhile, the activists and organisers whom I spoke with have largely professed to be equally clueless about who their supporters were, and why they came down to Tahrir. It seemed to them as if the great mass of people who had assembled in Tahrir were compelled by an entirely separate force, and merely intersected with the plans of the revolution's emboldened organisers.

Alongside my own interviews, other studies have confirmed that though networks of friends and acquaintances would encounter each other once they arrived at Tahrir, "neither social nor activist networks played a large part" (Gunning and Baron, 2014:206) in the decisions made by non-activists to demonstrate during the Revolution. Among more highly mobilised individuals' social networks appear to have played a role, as highlighted in my discussion of the case. Beyond these smaller arrays of individuals, however, many in Egypt came together *despite* distinctly divided social networks, taking an array of intersecting routes to protest.

Conventional social ties in Egypt – people's milieu and social networks, though extensive, are deeply restricted along class lines. Among a given social class and cultural persuasion Cairene society is incredibly close-knit. This is particularly true among the city's 'middle class youth'. From a conventional sociological perspective, the 'middle class' Cairo 'youth' are neither of these things: a youth could pertain to anyone under the age of about 45, whereas "middle class" held two entirely distinct meanings, depending on which "middle class" you were talking to.

Classically, the section of Egypt's population which came to be known as the middle class was a very small, privileged section of the population, which we might call the 'wealthy class'. When I asked two members of this class about their position in society over a pizza dinner at Cairo's exclusive Gezira club, they gave a particularly telling response. "They're not *filthy* rich," Abdelrahman told me, over a mouthful of Pizza, "but they have money too." "They're [just] rich," his friend Saussan interjected. These were people who lived comfortably, "but not Mubarak people," she noted, referring to the tycoon class which had emerged over the course of Mubarak's reign.<sup>38</sup> In addition to this 'wealthy class', the designation of middle class also applied (perhaps more sociologically accurately) to the nation's aspirational, educated petit-bourgeoisie, many of whom came from the less wellheeled branches of the state bureaucracy or less-favoured political families. Among the Egyptian youth this often manifested as the portion of their generation who not only attended university but were able to procure a degree. Many of those among this class whom I met had pursued degrees in medicine or engineering, even if they were unable to put these skills to use in their day-to-day jobs. Abdelrahman had described these as "the B class and the C class that are educated at university, and can have a [good] job."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> This wealthy class was in fact comprised of three distinct sub-groups, as exposed by Kandil (2012:206-11). The first of these comprised the 600 traditionally upper-class families who had held land in Egypt prior to the 1952 revolution, and which Anwar Sadat, during his reign as President, had sponsored heavily. Second in this category were a group of party apparatchiks, who had enjoyed the economic benefits of state-allegiance and office holding. Third, there existed a "new elite of state-nurtured capitalists, wholly invested in the regime, and towering over the two middle-class fragments from before," (Kandil, 2012:209). The most successful elements of this third section would go on to become the new tycoon-class, where the less successful would remain in this middle-class as smaller-scale business owners and investment-holders.

These two 'middle classes' of Egypt - the wealthy class and the petit-bourgeoisie experienced incredibly different material conditions and existed in radically different networks. Within these silos, however, familiarity was ubiquitous. "In Egypt, all our friends are connected to each other," Yusuf, a member of the Egyptian petit-bourgeoisie recalled, "The world is so tight. Everyone in Egypt, in the middle class, nearly knows each other." With these two strands of the middle class isolated from the bulk of the population, they would create tightly constrained networks and life-experiences that would bring together well defined communities existing around clubs and wealthy neighbourhoods, as well as fashionable restaurants, bars and cafés. When they manifested on the streets and in Tahrir during the Eighteen Days, it was alongside many of their similarly inclined friends, but in some part also against parents, cousins and schoolmates whose livelihoods had also intersected with or depended on regime patronage or allegiances, joining the ranks of the poor and needy who so many in the richer classes not only ignored, but even feared and disdained. As one visitor from Tahrir from Egypt's better off classes (Interview: Gamal) put it, "The majority of people from the top 10% ... wouldn't go and act against the revolution, but they were not happy about it."<sup>39</sup> He told me how his family and friends would complain about the revolution: "I can't import any products from outside! How are we going to live without police? How is my daughter going to go to the [leisure] club? My son has stopped his sports!"

But what was so compelling about the Revolution that it was able to overcome Egypt's deep divisions and activate cross-class affinities? Occupy Wall Street activists, with the luxury of time, could wait for an array of gradually realised affinities to leisurely guide participants to the occupation as a static point of convergence. By contrast, Egypt's Eighteen Days did not offer this luxury: the revolution was instead a thing of some urgency. Accordingly, the affinities which underpinned mass mobilisation in Egypt's revolt were distinct, clear congruencies, of which participants were acutely aware: a common hatred of the police, a strong distaste with the regime, and horror over Mubarak's attempt to install his son as president in a forthcoming September election.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> He had estimated that about 20-30% of Egypt's better off classes overcame this sentiment, and clearly supported the revolution.

The reason for this distaste with the regime, however, differed according to participants own conditions. For some, such as the poorest Egyptians, a pressing concern was the negative effects of the regime's awful economic mismanagement. For others, such as the young middle class, human rights violations were particularly upsetting. Still others were revolted at the corruption endemic in Mubarak's regime. In his long reign, Mubarak had made many enemies. "The revolution didn't' just happen overnight," Heba had told me, "It was spontaneous and chaotic and everything, but people have been keeping it inside themselves for years and years and years."

We could describe the Eighteen Days as a case in which direct, rapid paths to action were underpinned by a narrow range of affinities held by those who participated. In this case, the core affinities of Egypt's revolt were threefold: shared perceptions of the country's conditions and potential for resolution, an attitude of strong distaste to regime forces, and a fundamental national identity as Egyptians; also the three main themes evoked by the revolution. While social class and regular patterns of activity did play a role in the mobilisation of poorer Cairenes during the early days of the revolution (particularly January 25<sup>th</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup>), these complemented, rather than substituted for with the core affinities described above, and were all but overwhelmed by them once a general vision of the revolution, and of Tahrir, was more firmly established.

There were, however, some notable societal intersections which became spaces of convergence across the boundaries of class, such as shared or bordering neighbourhoods, and places of prayer<sup>40</sup>. Indeed, members of Ghonim's group were careful to plan their most impactful protests around the Friday prayer sessions that would begin the Egyptian weekend. "Friday prayers were by far the largest weekly gatherings of Egyptians from all classes," he explained in his memoir (2012:132). Accordingly, it was only at midnight<sup>41</sup> on Thursday January 20<sup>th</sup> that "protest locations would be announced… in order to make sure that congregations at Friday prayers –the following day- could promote Jan25th," while protests on the 28<sup>th</sup> were deliberately scheduled to begin from mosques immediately after the Friday afternoon *Jumu'ah* prayer.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Some of these were under the auspices of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation and network which brought together Egyptians from across classes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Midnight in Egypt is not quite as late as it might seem in other countries. During my fieldwork, I often found myself arranging meetings, and even conducting interviews well after midnight.

In interlinking their cause with Friday prayer sessions, activists were able to present the opportunity to become involved in the 28<sup>th</sup>'s revolutionary protests to Egyptians who had not have had access to or knowledge of his Facebook page, and the relevant event arrangements. Prior to the establishment of an occupied Tahrir places of worship offered an initial space of convergence for revolutionary protest, even if the act of worship was formally separated from the (immediately subsequent) call to protest. The Mosque as a notionally religious, rather than political space enabled encounters with the burgeoning revolutionary movement outside of a politicised context without having made the conscious choice to engage in activism. Once Tahrir was occupied, religious practices and identity (both Islamic and Christian) remained present as affinities, with regular prayer sessions for both faiths performed in the square under the protection of its masses.

As the protests elevated concerns common to all Egyptians (supported by Ghonim's careful framing of events), many had affinity to the revolutionary cause on the basis of shared perceptions and attitudes, and were given an instant opportunity to act upon it by joining the protests. "We needed to be among the demonstrators...: if they're youth, you need to bring youth, if they're women, you need to bring women... bringing people who are able to [make] contact with others for the demographics who are participating in the revolution." Hakim explained. One group of activists even made an effort to organise marches on the 25<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> from a sweet shop in *Boulaq al-Dakrour*, an impoverished area on the Giza bank of the Nile, two bridges away from Tahrir Square. A group of activists camped out in the area in the days prior to January 25<sup>th</sup>, distributing fliers and gauging participation. Later, the people of *Boulaq al-Dakrour* would converge as revolutionaries, forming a considerable contingent who would help clear the way for other protesters on the 25<sup>th</sup>, breaking through police cordons to reunite with other protesters in Tahrir (Levinson and Coker, 2011).

Like mosques, the streets themselves offered spaces of convergence in the revolution's early days. This was chiefly accomplished by the presence of the enormous marches which would make their way towards Tahrir. It was not only the organising efforts of activists that would bring poor Egyptians out onto the streets. Indeed, some of the most incredible moments of inter-class cooperation during the revolution came when affinities were activated spontaneously, rather than sought out. On the other side of the Nile banks, in the similarly impoverished *Boulaq Aboul Ela*, a demonstration coming from Imbaba had been

ambushed by Central Security Forces. I had visited this particular *Boulaq* myself the summer I had spent conducting interviews in Cairo: it was a region most of my middle-class friends in the city had refused to visit, particularly if they were unaccompanied. As a naïve foreigner, however, I had arrived in *Boulaq* in a misguided attempt to reach Tahrir. I was greeted by a giant chasm in the road, covered over with planks and boxes. Dust, refuse and wandering herd-animals littered the streets, which opened up to reveal a labyrinthine Souq, selling everything from fabric, to food, to motorcycle parts. I wandered around the Souq for almost an hour, before disappearing down an alleyway, and then another before finding myself in pitch darkness – outside of the Souq, it seemed much of the neighbourhood had not been connected to the electricity grid. This would be the scene for the confrontation to come.

"Central Security soldiers were destroying everyone," Hakim explained. Protesters had been penned in by police forces without much hope of ever reaching the square. It was then that locals sprang into action: "The people of Boulaq simply... closed from the side... and then they ambushed everyone and freed the demonstrators, [armed] with cables, with steel sticks, wooden sticks, they even used gunfire when they [the police] started using canisters." After all, the poor of Cairo had almost more reason to hate the police than anyone, possessing no resources to resist any incursion, arrest, and harassment by security forces. "The people who used violence, who burned all the police stations, are poor classes... who are being harassed and being ripped off by the police, being used by the police," I was told. In the Eighteen Days, however, Cairo's poor had an opportunity for "payback time" (Interview: Hakim).

Poorer Cairenes and those from outside Egypt would relentlessly defend their own communities from police incursions, enter into violent street conflict with regime forces, and even sleep underneath military vehicles (Interview: Heba) to prevent them from moving. Indeed, though many have depicted the events in Tahrir as a predominantly middle-class phenomenon, such a description is not entirely representative of the events of the revolution as a whole. As Ketchley's (2017)<sup>42</sup> study notes, attacks on police stations across Cairo and throughout Egypt were found in areas of high unemployment, with few

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Page citation unavailable, as this refers to a pre-publication copy.

college graduates, and a history of police repression. This included those local to the two *Boulaqs*.

This 'payback time', constituted one of the conditions of convergence evoked in the Eighteen Days. With the presence of challenge to state and police authority, coupled with the weakening of and later full dispersal of police forces, the oppressed and downtrodden of Cairo experienced a moment during which the impediments to collective action usually placed upon them were removed with serious consequence. <sup>43</sup> The more well off, most notably the aforementioned 'middle class youth' also experienced this exceptional situation, in which both the material disincentives and the norms and rules of Egyptian society (as well as their enforcers) were temporarily suspended. As Gamal, a teenager during the time of the revolution, later recalled, "the fear wall," of social repression, in which people were afraid even to express their political opinions in private, let alone act publicly, "just dropped." "Before that people were very afraid to post on Facebook, very few people were posting on Twitter about it [and]... people would be scared to talk in very intimate conversation," he explained, "because maybe someone with the neighbours is with the police or with the government and would hear and the police would come and take us."

Beyond the fear of political expression, Egyptians' interpersonal fears were also particularly alleviated during the Eighteen Days. Protesting alongside a Muslim Brother was no longer a taboo, intermingling with those of a different class was no longer considered danger to one's safety, and joining a mass crowd ceased to be the frightening prospect it had once been. Gamal, who spent his time intervening in the sexual assaults of Egypt's revolutionary and post-revolutionary crowds, recalled how the gatherings of the Eighteen Days had been incredibly safe when compared with other public gatherings (and, indeed, only one case of sexual assault was reported during the revolution, on its very last day)<sup>44</sup>. By contrast, he and others told me stories of young women and girls being sexually assaulted, physically torn apart, even gang raped in later manifestations, in a phenomenon known as *taḥarrush gama'ei* (collective harassment) or, more recently, "the circle of hell." This fear of crowds

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Outside of Cairo this was also echoed by the wave of supportive strikes (for an excellent discussion of these strikes see Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014), which usually would have been met with harsh police repression.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> This phenomenon is discussed in greater depth in the article by Fathi (2013).

was ingrained in many young Egyptian women, and for good reason – yet this fear was suspended during the revolution, bringing many onto the streets.

There were many such instances of solidarity-based actions on the basis of a shared identification 'as Egyptians' during the revolution, a pivotal affinity in Egypt's contentious episode. "Once non-activists became involved, feelings of solidarity towards other protesters became a factor in overcoming fear," Gunning and Baron(2014:205-6) surmised from their interviews of 40 Egyptians<sup>45</sup>, ranging from those who had participated in the revolution to those who had merely observed it taking place. Just as Gunning and Baron(2014:206) cite the example of a protester who "decided to stay on the square 'because he was afraid that if he left...the others would be arrested, [and] beaten," my own interviews evoked similar sentiments of solidarity. "When you all suffer from the same issues, even if you're different it kind of unites us in fear. You know, it's our fear that unites us, the oppression that has been put on us united us." Yusha had told me.

Just as they had shared fears, Egyptians in Tahrir also shared a single dream. As Yusha put it, "The dream united us. This dream of freedom, the dream of possible things that could happen, the dream of justice." In a great sense, this was an intersection of the three core affinities mentioned earlier: perception, attitude and identity. Those who went to Tahrir believed that change was indeed possible, with a shared set of general attitudes about how that problem might be solved (regime overthrow, and a common identification with other protesters as ordinary Egyptians sharing these beliefs.

These three affinities were, in a broad sense underpinned by the social change belief structure (Abrams and Grant, 2012) which Tahrir embodied. This profound sense that an alternative was possible came to offer an opportune frame for Egyptian revolutionary upheaval. This first emerged when the police withdrew from the streets on January 28<sup>th</sup>, was bolstered further when Mubarak announced his plans to step down on February 1<sup>st</sup>, and finally even more established once the Armed Forces appeared to be supporting the motives of the revolution (February 3<sup>rd</sup>). Such a frame was complemented by the emergent paramount framing of the revolution as an 'historical moment' (Goodwin and Pfaff,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> These interviews took place with members of Egyptian's upper middle class (or "wealthy class"), and, unlike my own interview set, excluded those who had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood, football supporters, and those economically situated outside of the wealthy classes.

2001:293-4), mentioned in the previous section. With these two conditions of convergence combined, participation was not only framed in terms of imminent success, but also a period of importance.

A final key condition of convergence which came into being after February 1<sup>st</sup>, was the space of Tahrir itself, as discussed more extensively in the "Occupying Tahrir" subsection of the first portion of this chapter. Alongside the various elements discussed in that section, such as the nature of Tahrir as an exceptional space, one notable element of Tahrir was that it was also an opportune space, shielding those who visited from otherwise dangerous conditions during the Eighteen Days. Being in Tahrir "felt safer than when you left," Sam had told me when I had asked her about her experiences in the square. "Being there with the people? It made me feel safer," she asserted. One older woman, Fatima, told me of how she had brought her teenage daughter to Tahrir. "I took my daughter with me, she was 12 years old," Fatima explained. When I asked her further about safety concerns she simply responded that ""There was no police, so there was no violence: we were sitting and singing and chanting, and discussing with one another." It transpired that she had even allowed her daughter to live and sleep on her own overnight in the square.

## **Conclusions and Implications**

This section has outlined the array of affinities and convergence conditions underpinning mobilisation in the Eighteen Days. Three core affinities predominated: perceptions of injustice; attitudes to the regime; and a shared identity as Egyptians. Acts of protest in the revolution, particularly in Tahrir, focused directly upon these three areas, enabling protesters to make a conscious decision to visit the square, or check out a march. Though other affinities, such as shared urban space, or religious patterns of behaviour did play a role in some contexts, particularly on the 25<sup>th</sup> and the 28<sup>th</sup>, this was less prominent during the occupation of Tahrir, which made up the central space of convergence during the contentious episode of the Eighteen Days. Activating these affinities were three core conditions of convergence: first, an emergent opportune frame, or social change belief structure, underpinned by the success of Tunisian revolutionaries, and the defeat of police on January 28<sup>th</sup>; second, the paramount framing of the revolution itself: be it the 'payback time' of the poor and downtrodden, a sudden opportunity for liberation, or even a once-in-

a-lifetime experience for revolutionary tourism; and finally, an exceptional space, in which participants were able to feel freer, more empowered, and even physically safer than they would normally have been.

The Egyptian case, unlike the case of Occupy Wall Street discussed in the previous chapter, serves as an example of just how rapidly affinities can result in collective action, particularly under time-sensitive conditions of convergence. To some extent this was a consequence of the urgency and remarkable nature of the historical moment of the revolution: this was something Egyptians had never experienced before, and would be unlikely to experience again. By contrast, though some participants in Occupy Wall Street talked of an exceptional 'movement moment' in their own experience, the scale of importance of such a moment in the Egyptian case is radically different: it was a total break from their entire lived experiences, and a paramount situation of possibility which, if not seized, could not reasonably be expected to ever exist again. One of the notions impressed upon me by the interviews I conducted was that to be in Tahrir in the Eighteen Days was the closest thing many Egyptians had ever felt, and might ever feel, to freedom.

It is also worth considering the extent to which the affinities between Egyptians and the episode of the Eighteen Days were deeper and more intensively felt than those possessed by Occupiers. The perceived injustices addressed by the revolution were ones which had, generally, been present for the entire life-times of its participants, and common to a great many Egyptians. Occupy Wall Street had swelled its ranks with a great many who were not particularly politicised, particularly desperate or politically disadvantaged. Though it was supported by the frame of 'the 99%', there was still a strongly autonomous, individualist quality to the Occupy movement. By contrast, the Egyptian case activated grievances, attitudes, and a common identity which strongly resonated with participants as Egyptians, while defining themselves against the Mubarak regime.

# **Chapter 4. The French Revolution**

"In the early years at least, once we have accounted for the efficacy of pamphlets and journals, and the spoken propaganda...there still remains an element of spontaneity that defies a more exact analysis" – George Rude (1959:231)

It was with the words quoted above that George Rude ended the last substantive chapter in his history of *The Crowd in the French Revolution*, which remains to this day the definitive and quintessential work on the revolutionary mobilisations that beset Paris between 1788 and 1795. This chapter begins where Rude left off: trying to understand the element of spontaneity which he identified as a question which historians might be inclined to leave "more particularly to the province of the sociologist" (Rude, 1959:218). As a sociologist, I arrive at the French case having developed and drawn upon some conceptual tools which were not on offer at the point Rude was writing in the 1950s: underlying affinities and conditions of convergence - a motor by which crowds might come together in a revolutionary context. Attempting to offer a potential resolution to Rude's identified problem presents an ideal control case for the framework which I engineered in light of newer social struggles. By examining the social struggles of the French masses we can determine not only the utility of my approach in conventional cases, but also how, in the period of contention between 1788 and the Jacobin ascendance in 1793,<sup>1</sup> the dynamics of affinity and convergence in such cases can differ from newer struggles.

The analysis in this chapter does not attempt to account for the full breadth of the French Revolution, nor does it attempt to outline the character and development of the Revolution more generally. Unlike the Occupy and Egyptian case, where a rather more thorough overview is integral to portraying a full understanding of the mechanisms underlying mass mobilisation in these cases, there have been countless excellent histories of the French Revolution since its occurrence more than two centuries ago.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> After which I found that affinity-based organising subsided in favour of formal organisation relying on clearly defined networks.

Accordingly, I refrain from offering a new account of its *marche generale* that does not substantially disrupt or oppose already extant historical narratives, and instead draw from the considerable literature on this case in composing my more specific assessment of affinity and convergence in the Revolution. Indeed, this section approaches the Revolution as both a control case for the findings in previous chapters, and as a starting point for the resolution of George Rude's well identified problem of the early means of mass revolutionary action.

This chapter examines why and how ordinary French men and women joined a budding revolution with the emergence of a contentious episode in 1789. Accordingly, a first section traces the underlying affinities which would be awakened during the Revolution. A second section then discusses how these affinities were activated in the 1789 revolution, examining three principal elements: the new assemblies created during the convocation of the Estates General, the various cafés, societies and political clubs, and finally, revolutionary gatherings in public places. This section then details how the initially sporadic means of mobilisation in the Revolution was gradually brought under the control of revolutionary groups by the careful management of some of the revolution's key points of convergence and the propaganda campaigns of pamphleteers and revolutionary publishers. Finally, a closing section discusses the dynamics of mass mobilisation in the Revolution, more directly theorising the role of affinities and convergence in the French case.

### 4.1 Affinities and Convergence in the French Revolution

#### <u>Underlying Affinities – The Common Ground of France's Revolutionary Masses</u>

"Come the unanticipated political void of 1788-89, the king's most industrious and necessitous subjects would be more than ready to add their harsh voices to the national outcry for change."

- Bailey Stone (1994:226)

Though some of the affinities underpinning revolutionary mobilisation would emerge in the process of the French Revolution itself, some of the core affinities which characterised those mobilised in the revolution's early days had been considerably long-standing. As Stone (1994:226-7) outlines, "the uprising of the country's humbler folk had certain roots in the *ancien regime*"<sup>2</sup>. Hunt (1976: 324-30) advances three particular antecedents here: economic vulnerability, antipathy toward social elites (anti-seigneurialism), and familiarity with revolutionary activity elsewhere. Thus, the textbook case for revolution was, in Hunt's analysis, "manufacturing, military and naval construction towns… where ruling elites had refused to open their ranks…where prices rose steeply," and which had "close contact with other revolutionary centres," (Hunt, 1976:324).

There was a considerable contingent ripe for revolutionary mobilisation among the nation's poorer souls, should the thought occur, the time come, or the place emerge. When it did, members of these poorer classes who were particularly overtaken with revolutionary fervour would come to be described as the revolutionary *sans-culottes*. For Hampson (1963:139-40), the *sans-culotte* was epitomised in the economic have-not, who "had no classical education," and generally "worked with his hands as an artisan, kept a shop, or was employed in some minor clerical post." Rather than strictly bounded economic class, *sans-culottes* constituted the great mass of individuals in France's major cities – not so poor as to be denied access to the political sphere, but poorly resourced enough to be vulnerable to the slightest reconfiguration in economic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See also: Stone's (2002) account, which is complementary to his 1994 work.

or political conditions. Initially this term was used during the Revolution as a means of (occasionally sneering) classification by well-heeled spectators seeking to describe the kind of person who participated in revolutionary events, though later it would take on an altogether more politicised significance when the Paris assemblies were opened to the broader public in 1792. It should be noted though, that *sans-culottes* were not a purely Parisian phenomenon, having also been present in the French provinces (Cobb, 1987:333)

The existence of the class-conglomerating *sans-culottes* as a revolutionary force was not to say that the non-aristocratic contingent of the French population was genuinely united. There were, in particular, "deep internal divisions" among France's urban population (Hampson, 1963:139-40) and even actually competing interests between the rural and urban populations, many of which would be exposed in the wake of Jacobin ascendance in 1793. At the outset of revolution, however, these otherwise divided classes were united against a long-standing common enemy: the feudal order, and more particularly, France's aristocracy.

Indeed, Jones (1988), Ado (1996) and Boutier (1979) all draw attention to sporadic instances of outrage outside the capital in the form of mob violence and intimidation stretching back to December 1788. Underpinning these early risings was a single common concern: the price of food. For France's urban bourgeoisie and working classes, amid a time of "high prices, falling wages and mass unemployment" (Doyle, 1980:31) the escalating price of bread and meat was a cause of deep concern, propelling patriotic factions to seize upon the plump stores of aristocratic profiteers.<sup>3</sup> We could concur with Gurr(1970) in calling this a sense of relative deprivation, particularly as France's downturn, alongside predominantly harming the poorer classes, had emerged in the wake of relative economic prosperity through which these same classes – though largely excluded – had experienced some taste of the good-life they were now denied.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Bread, in particular, was 60% more expensive than its standard cost in February of 1789, taking its cost to the point at which the poorest in France would fear starvation (Andress, 1999:53). As time went on the price would continue to increase, taking conditions from dire to deadly.

Just as the urban classes found themselves bereft of bread, France's peasantry were equally aggrieved at the unjust extraction of their produce by the aristocratic classes in their own time of economic hardship: the source of the very same bread and meat which had concerned the petit-bourgeoisie and urban toiling classes. It was thus that a shared sense of grievance was also accompanied with a sense of a common enemy. The aristocratic classes found themselves in the crossfire of poor urbanites and rural peasants, articulating their allied but ultimately contradictory demands: the peasantry could not sell its produce for enough, and the urban classes could not afford it. The common solution was to eliminate the extractive element, constituted politically as the aristocracy, their taxmen, and the institution of feudal dues.<sup>4</sup> With the affinities of a shared grievance, and a common enemy, the urban and rural classes would later seize upon the confusion and uncertainty of the Parisian revolution and converge in their offence on the heart of the French social order.

Beyond the widely held sense of grievance across France, and a commonly held enemy in the form of the aristocratic classes, the Parisians with whose exploits we associate the Revolution's central story had some more specific affinities of their own which would power the capital's role as a revolutionary powder-keg. The plight of urban workers was relatively generalisable between Paris and other cities in France, particularly at the outset of 1789 (Doyle, 1980:9), the Parisian element were possessed of some key affinities which others were not.

One such affinity noting is the extent to which Parisians were subject to common fears beyond those experienced by ordinary Frenchmen. These fears (much like the common fears of Cairenes detailed to me by Yusha), often formed the legitimating basis for unified mass mobilisation. Unlike the French provinces, Paris itself was largely isolated from the rest of France, making the prospect of famine, invasion, or any other such incident all the more daunting. This was illustrated in the profound panics over all

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This uneasy alliance could only last so long as a common enemy remained. As Jones (1988:70) notes, "The alliance of townspeople and country dwellers... was not automatic." In regions such as Strasbourg, once the feudal classes had been disposed of, bourgeoisie and peasant turned on one another, prefiguring the later conflicts of the Revolution.

manner of matters, ranging from the price of bread to movements of troops which marked the capital during the Revolution's early years (Richet, 1989:125).

One of the most notable affinities active in Paris came from the its denizens' patterns of activity. The roughly 600,000 Parisians present in the city in 1789 (Kennedy, 1989:6) were regularly drawn to some particular centres of rendezvous, namely the shopping arcades and gardens of the *Palais Royal* (discussed at length later) and the city's dozen bridges, most particularly the *Pont Neuf* – the most heavily trafficked bridge in the city at which "if you waited... for an hour, it was said, you could meet whomever you wanted" (Kennedy, 1989:9). It was upon the *Pont Neuf*, and on Paris' other bridges that everyone from revolutionary bands to government recruiters would sweep up whomever was passing by into whatever form of action they had plans for. Around these bridges, and the city's centre in general, were not – as today – the houses of the rich and well to do, but those of the poor, the needy, and the desperate: the foot soldiers of the coming revolution.

## From Affinity to Mobilisation

1788 had not been a good year for France. Louis XVI and his ministers were facing bankruptcy, an increasingly dissatisfied class of nobles, a despondent peasantry and a spate of protests across the nation. Addressing France's manifold issues was the backdrop to Louis XVI's decision to indulge a convocation of the nation's Estates-General: France's formal constitutional and legislative advisory body, with the power to recommend legislation to the Crown (much like the original English Parliament). This was, in fact, Louis XVI's second attempt to indulge a centuries old institution: he had reconvened the Assembly of Notables (which had not met since 1626), in 1787. The principal difficulty was that, despite the dire economic situation, Louis had been unable to implement vital tax reform policies (generally these constituted an array of unpopular increases) owing to a reluctance of local courts (named *parlements*). Calling the Assembly of Notables, and later the Estates General, was a means to force the *parlements*' hand by appealing to some form of representative legitimacy. The Estates-General was dominated by the power-holders of the feudal order: France's clergy and nobility comprised the first and second Estates (chambers) respectively. The body's Third Estate was to be elected from among the common people, and would be twice as large, though equally powerful, as either of the others Estates. France had not had an election since 1614, and as such the process generated a considerable degree of national excitement. "Citizens, the nation is in danger!" one election pamphlet had read, "Domestic enemies, more dangerous than foreign armies are secretly plotting its ruin" (Hardman 1999:13). This was a theme that would continue throughout the Revolution, and throughout the life of its ambitious and radical author, Maximilien Robespierre.

In line with the new elections, and the original tradition of the Estates General, local districts were invited to submit *cahiers de doléances*, from each of the three Estates – lists of complaints and requests drawing attention to popular grievances and potential reforms. Initially small, intensely local groups would formulate initial *cahiers* and subsequently send representatives to broader, general assemblies, formulating general *cahiers*, which would then be sent alongside elected delegates to Versailles, with the obligation to express the grievances listed in the local *cahiers*. This offered a rather novel opportunity for the French people to engage in debate and make decisions on practically every issue, ranging from grand reforms to the most petty and bizarre disputes.

The meetings at which *cahiers* were formulated were home to a great many novel encounters between Frenchmen converging across social and structural divides in service of a common task, and in response to a common affinity: their frustrated attitude toward the status quo, and their shared hope for its resolution. In this protective context of political dissent and discussion, all manner of new political and social proposals were catalysed. One parish, Vitry-sur-Seine, simultaneously demanded "the total suppression of all [feudal] privileges," "the price of bread to be fixed at a lower price," and "the selling of grain by weight," but also requested with the same force the

"total destruction of all rabbits" and the "total abolition" of the right to keep pigeoncoups<sup>5</sup>.

The electoral process and solicitation of *cahiers* for the Third Estate led to an array of meetings, organised in every parish, professional guild<sup>6</sup>, township and city in France. These meetings allowed ordinary Frenchmen (or, at least, those over the age of 25, who owned property and paid taxes) to engage "in a multifaceted evaluation of their burdens" (Crook, 1996:12). Many groups and entities who had never been in contact before were suddenly able to meet and discuss their intersecting and differing grievances, with meetings proving to be the "settings for considerable thought" regarding the oppressive and constraining elements of the institutions of the feudal regime (Markoff, 1996:20).

In many regards, the Revolution's early local meetings served to mobilise their participants along the lines of an array of affinities, particularly: locality, profession and class, but also across them: nobles, clergy and commoners would often share the same space. These meetings offered spaces for radical discussions about new social and political possibilities, and had substantial outcomes. Participants in these meetings spoke of 'breathing a new atmosphere', experiencing 'the finest days in our lives', and inhabiting a place of political freedom that had not existed in France for two centuries Rose(1983:25). It was, in short, a form and place of political association entirely unrivalled for the struggling masses who had lived their entire lives under the thumb of an aristocratic order (even if, at this point, the very poorest were still notionally excluded from this process).

As the electoral historian of the French Revolution, Malcolm Crook (1996:12-13) had noted, these meetings "mobilised the French people in an unprecedented fashion," by the provision of generally horizontal, participatory and autonomous democratic spaces in which decisions could be made. It was these meetings, Crook (1996:12) stated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This is drawn from the original French Archives Parlementaires, later republished in full by Mavidal and Laurent (1879:601-3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> With regards to professions, exceptions were often made for professional groups not in guilds which asserted their desire to participate, except for the unemployed and landless (Crook, 1996:12).

emphatically, that "created the first generation of revolutionaries." They had created a space, in which an ordinarily political excluded cross-section of the French people were able to critically reflect on the awful state of the country, and suggest solutions to their every political and social plight.<sup>7</sup> These spaces, understandably, proved popular with the deputies of the Third Estate who largely occupied them, with many *cahiers* calling for regular convocations of the Third Estate, and a continuation of organised assemblies. Though the Crown did not take steps to guarantee it, local assembly meetings continued

beyond electoral matters, even without the generation of *cahiers*, thereby offering new political spaces in French daily life.

While across France, municipal and local assemblies were meeting and formulating *cahiers*, the people of Paris faced continuing repression. Having been denied the right to compile *cahiers*, denied the right to meet with their noble and clergy counterparts, and allowed only a single day to meet, sixty municipal 'districts' of Paris would begin open resistance to the Crown. "On the morning of 21 April [1789] men who had never been accustomed to act together politically met for the first time to transact business for which there were no precedents." R.B. Rose (1983:25) detailed in his exposition of Parisian democracy in the French Revolution. "Within a few hours, from one corner of Paris to another, these ad hoc assemblies, varying in size from two dozen to almost five hundred members, had each improvised modes of procedure for elections, committee business, the conduct and reception of deputations, and the drafting and publication of their proceedings." (Rose, 1983:25) Unlike the guild and parish communities of the rest of France, Parisians had been given no such structure under which they could conduct their assembly meetings. Nonetheless, they rejected the Crown authorities and emissaries which had been sent to administer these meetings, instead autonomously and unanimously appointing their own representatives and deciding upon their own practices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> As I came to understand more about these *cahiers*, I was reminded of something Larry had said in our Occupy Wall Street interview, which could well have been an account of these revolutionary meetings: *"Our goal...was to have a general assembly.... We're going to gather these people together... and then we're going to have a conversation about how fucked up everything is. And that was it."* 

Though the actions of these assemblies were autonomous, they had, to some extent, been responding to a call put out some days earlier. A pamphlet named "*Arrêtés concernant le choix des electeurs de paris par un assemble de citoyens*" (Orders regarding the choice of Paris Electors for a Citizens' Assembly) had been devised shortly after Parisians electoral regulations had been published on April 13<sup>th</sup>. It implored assemblymen to disregard the instructions given to them by the Crown, and instead to elect their own president, officers, and stand in protest. A model *cahier* had even been circulated, issuing a Declaration of Rights. Rose (1983:31) has noted that not only did several assemblies explicitly refer to brochures such as this in their decision-making, but that the production of this pamphlet was associated with later revolutionary leaders including Mirabeau and Lafayette. "A hidden hand was certainly manipulating events," Rose noted, "but the influence of a conspiracy is not enough, nevertheless, to explain the virtual universality of the districts' revolt, with only six out of the sixty...failing to upset the official regulations."

Though organisers were clearly active at this stage in the revolution's early days, like Egypt and Occupy's early organisers, they could not have possibly anticipated the impact of the calls to action which they had put out. Most particularly, these assemblies swiftly "established a network of communications with one another and with allies among the parallel assemblies of the nobles and the clergy," with some districts sending their own deputies to others' meetings, spreading details of their rebellion, and fervour for future resistance (Rose, 1983:25). These assemblies would persist in such a form until July 1790, much longer than the single-day existence envisaged by the Crown. They would even reconvene in order to assist with one of the revolution's most quintessential *journees*: the 14<sup>th</sup> of July, and the fall of the Bastille, and persist in the form of 'popular committees' throughout the nation thereafter.

Alongside the burgeoning democratic spaces in France, an invitation of free press contributions regarding the matter of Estates General had inadvertently made possible the subverting of restrictions previously placed on the French press (Andress, 1999: 42). Accordingly, the effect of the solicitation of public contributions on the matter of the Estates General had a significant and immediate impact on France's press environment. Editors and pamphleteers who had previously been concerned about the possible ramifications for expressing political opinions in the public press "issued a flood of pamphlets to a public roused by the forthcoming meeting of the Estates-General" (Gilchrist and Murray, 1971:4). As the convening of the Estates General drew closer agitant pamphlets and improvised briefings by printers changed distinctly in their form, partially emulating the style of professionally produced newspapers – with the sheer volume of material being circulated it became impossible for authorities to effectively censor or prevent this uncontrolled reporting and the new entries into the mainstream press. Indeed, 140 new periodicals were started in Paris alone, 34 of which persisted beyond one year of reportage (Popkin, 1990:33).

The increasingly politicised French electorate, and even those who could not vote, consumed these pamphlets ravenously, with groups meeting in private clubs, cafés and even as crowds in the street to discuss the content of pamphlets, which were sometimes even read out loud in the squares of towns and cities. It was amid this new, politically vibrant context that many of the early revolts of the French people crystallised around long-standing rural unrest throughout the months of March, April and May 1789. Small towns and villages across France were "busily engaged upon their own Bastille-style revolutions," the historian Peter Jones (1988:68) recounted. Even before these risings, bitter contention had served as the backdrop to everyday French politics, and "virtually every region of France was touched by insubordination," (Jones, 1988: 67). Originating as mob attacks on hoarders and looting, these would solidify in March 1789 to include the popular de-facto abolition of local taxes, dues and charges in the more radically inclined communities. Indeed, some communities had even declared themselves entirely free of their feudal obligations and organised hunting parties to steal from noble Estates.

With the gathering of the *cahiers*, and the ongoing election process, the proliferation of pamphlets across France further intensified as model recommendations or endorsements of particular ideas, or even entire *cahiers* often came to form the backbone of public discussion (Andress, 1999:50). Some of the common demands which swiftly emerged included the freedom of the press, the abolition of a variety of

taxes and feudal tithes, the reform of the *privilège*, the creation of a representative government, and a new French constitution. Accordingly, by the time the Estates General had arrived in Versailles, it was in an atmosphere of much public anticipation. Though the Third Estate had already been granted, by the Crown's munificence, the right to double representation, its deputies were not content with this concession. After all, double representation was useless unless voting was to be conducted by head, rather than the present arrangement of voting by Estate. Should the Estates be amalgamated, and voting by head instituted, the deputies of the Third Estate would only require a small number from among the other two Estates to carry an overall majority. This forceful proposal, supported not only by almost the entirety of the Third Estate, but with a number of outspoken proponents in the First and Second, had caused legislative deadlock at Versailles.

By the start of June legislative deadlock had worsened into outright subordination. The Third Estate, now calling itself the "Commons" in a reference to parliamentary structures elsewhere, started the legislative process unilaterally. In response, troops sequestered from foreign powers – German and Hungarian regiments – were beginning to encircle the Capital's environs, including Versailles, under the guise of instilling public order in the face of some small riots over the past month.

By the 13<sup>th</sup> of June, the "Commons" underwent a second change in identity, redubbing itself the "National Assembly" and inviting members of the other Estates to join them in their legislative deliberations. Having been joined by a small number of sympathisers from the other two Estates, and believing themselves to have popular support, the deputies of the Third Estate would formally declare their sovereignty as a National Assembly of the French People on the 17<sup>th</sup> of June, thereby initiating a revolutionary challenge to Louis XVI's own sovereignty. They were swiftly assisted by hosts of supporters flocking to Versailles<sup>8</sup>, fuelled by rumours of an attempted coup by the Crown to suppress the Third Estate's deputies and deny the French people the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For a detailed discussion on the Third Estate, its composure, and political engagement with the Crown, see Tackett's (1996:94-158) account.

representation about which they were enthusiastic. Furthermore, news of the Austrian and German troop movements in the area around Versailles had circulated wildly. France's press, assemblies, and streets quickly became incensed, as pamphleteers urged radical action and notably inflamed political meetings and gatherings across the nation. By the 20<sup>th</sup> of June, the National Assembly had issued a vow to continue meeting until they could formulate a new constitution for France, further incensing the Crown. This confrontation would come to a head on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of June, when Louis would dismiss Jacques Necker, his popular finance minister, and would then move to orchestrate a plot to eliminate the Assembly once and for all. Unfortunately, by this time the Assembly had attracted crowds of sympathisers at Versailles, Necker's replacement had been murdered in the street, and an insurgent fervour was brewing.

The masses which flocked to Versailles were sustained, in a great sense, by a common (and justified) fear of an aristocratic conspiracy (Lefebvre, 1947:116-117; Rude: 1959:47): the revolution's downtrodden beneficiaries believed that they had gained much by the emergence of the National Assembly only days earlier, and feared a sudden reversal of fortune. This was assisted by the activities of revolutionary rabble-rousers in the public spaces of Paris and other such towns, most particularly those in the city's Palais-Royal, which would prove pivotal in the coming July days. When it was time for the plot to be executed, troops under the command of Louis François Joseph, Prince de Conti (an influential Cadet branch of the Bourbon dynasty) refused to fire upon the Assembly, or upon the thousands who had stood in its defence. With this attempted purge having failed, Louis would formally recognise the Assembly on the 27<sup>th</sup> of June.

## **The Revolution Begins**

Now with something to defend, the first test of French revolutionaries' mobilising capacities came in the month of July. With the situation at Versailles remaining precarious, the beginnings of revolutionary associations would take place. In the wake of June 22nd, revolutionary agitators had begun to crop up in the public spaces of Paris with rousing news, revolutionary slogans, and even calls to action (Rude, 1959:47). Such fervent activity also found its way to the provinces, where these encouragements

were met with major insurrections of revolutionary peasants on an unprecedented scale: sieges and organised attacks on noble Estates and castles became rife as well as group-lynching of nobles themselves, having complemented already-existing anxieties and motivations already present in those beyond the capital. Law and order entirely broke down in some districts as thousands of peasants mobilised into armed forces. This became known as *La Grande Peur*, or Great Fear<sup>9</sup>, believed by its contemporaries to have been a plot by elites to spread anarchy and disorder in the provinces (Lefebvre, 1947:151).

Underpinning the Great Fear was not the desperate hunger that characterised the riots of the winter of 1788/1789, but instead a more structural, political set of concerns. As Jones (1988:74) notes "By the summer, hunger and desperation had ceased to be the dominant factors behind the peasant offensive. They had been replaced by an awareness that the entire social order was crumbling, and by an opportunistic desire to strike while the iron is hot." This "hatred of the peasants for the lords was not a thing of yesterday," Lefebvre (1947:142) noted in his classic history of the revolution's early days. Indeed, anti-seigneurial agitation in some respect or other had been a periodic occurrence in France's history, and reflected long-underlying disputes between peasants and landholders dating back to the time of serfdom. What catalysed the shift from primitive revolt to principled revolution was, in Jones' view, the drawing together of disparate provincial forces in the democratic institutions which had emerged during the convocation of the Estates General. "The experience of drawing up the cahiers helped country dwellers to formulate their grievances, while the experience of the baillage electoral assemblies taught them who their allies and their enemies were likely to be." (Jones, 1988:74) In other words, these early assemblies and meetings at which cahiers were drawn, particularly in the rural context, served as spaces of convergence for the more politically minded, and insurgent-predisposed members of the peasantry,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Though the insurgency accompanying the Grande Peur is sometimes depicted to have largely subsided by the Autumn of 1789, Jones' (1988:70) analysis of the extent of these endeavours shows a more persistent pattern of contention, finding that "a little over a hundred chateaux were invaded by peasant bands drawn from at least 330 different parishes," between December 1789 and March 1790."

as opposed to the de-politicised spaces of the "brook, river or bakery," which were, by contrast "a matrix of cultural reproduction and stability" (Kennedy, 1989:31-32).

The points of assembly for *cahiers* and elections also functioned as spaces of convergence at which future members of revolutionary bands could assemble on the basis of their common concerns, and begin to engage in the collective action which would eventually explode during the period of the Great Fear. Nonetheless, it was not merely the creation of these meeting-places that powered the enormous upsurge in the French countryside. Lefebvre, for his part, offers a further reading of the impact of the political process on mobilising the peasantry: "One can hardly exaggerate the echoes produced by this event in the countryside. On hearing of it the peasants concluded that, if the king invited them to set forth their grievances, it was because he meant to give them satisfaction."

We might conceptualise this "collective state of mind" (Lefebvre, 1947:144), in socialmovement-speak, as an opportune frame, reminiscent of a 'social change belief structure', (Abrams and Grant, 2012) or a motivational frame (Benford and Snow, 2000:615-7), in which peasants considered the convocation of the Estates General as a collective opportunity to act on their complaints. Accordingly, a progression from looting to more politicised actions can be seen as these political processes became embedded in rural life, as Jones(1988:74) details. "As the year advanced the disturbances acquired an explicitly anti-feudal character: that is to say, they ceased to resemble mere food riots and took on a more organised and purposeful appearance."

Such an interpretation is further corroborated by Markoff's (1996:376-7) in-depth, analysis of peasant democratic and protest activity, which found that "although the deputies of the Third Estate were more gradualist than the countryside wished... peasants had come to believe that rural action against seigneurial rights had a good chance of paying off." Markoff continued: "The trajectory of anti-seigneurial actions shows that rural action was not merely a blind and angry reflex. There may have been anger, but the uprisings developed as the moment seemed opportune and faded as goals were achieved."

Despite its contentious component, in some regions the Great Fear was also underpinned by a genuine panic around a potential aristocratic conspiracy or reaction against prior peasant insurgencies. Cobb (1975:27) notes that the spread of this rural panic became almost contagious, radiating through the roving bands of migratory workers and dispossessed vagabonds: they became the carriers of "popular fears and prejudices, news and rumours of great events, of violent political changes, of great disasters natural and human." While the carriers of such fear-laden rumours, these bands also emerged as the very subject of fears. Lefebvre (1947:150) recounts the "warning panics" which would constantly re-elevate long held tensions about rural banditry, in which the stream of workers and vagabonds were re-imagined as hordes of brigands, thought to be instruments of an aristocratic conspiracy. This latter framing, Lefebvre suggests, was reinforced by rumours circulating across the social strata: "these included bourgeois, priests and monks; postal couriers... and village curates, local officials and gentry," he notes, "even the government sub-delegates and mounted constabulary were no exception," (Lefebvre, 1947:150).

This genuine panic was not merely a rural phenomenon, having also been present (and, some historians<sup>10</sup> contend, concocted) in Paris. At this time, the most notable space in which new revolutionary recruits would coalesce in the capital was, by far, the *Palais-Royal*. Indeed, the *Palais-Royal* would serve as one of the most important places of combination in the practice of Parisian street politics throughout the revolution's early days. It was a rather novel public space in Paris, which had emerged in the 1780s as a forum or agora of sorts. Its owner, Louis-Phillipe, Duc D'Orléans, had seized the initiative to open his palace to the public, and had built a grand series of arcades in and around its picturesque gardens, with great galleries containing all manner of coffee shops, restaurants, markets, boutiques, theatres, operas and other establishments where Parisians might meet, shop, and generally spend their time(Hetherington, 1997:2). It even included a Masonic lodge and a stock exchange. The *Palais-Royal* had also become famous in Paris for its excellent stock of Enlightenment literature and philosophy, as well as its ready supply of journals and newspapers. It had also become

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Tackett (2004) for a summary of these claims, and a critique of their feasibility.

particularly well known for its coffee houses, of which approximately 1200 existed in Paris by 1788 (Bradshaw, 1978:27).

"During the revolutionary period, different political factions each had their favourite café in the *Palais-Royal*," Kevin Hetherington (1997:15) remarked in his sociological examination of the *Palais-Royal* during the French Revolution. The *Palais-Royal*, however, was home to more than a bourgeois public sphere and commercial society. Indeed, though at its centre beautiful gardens bloomed, and the great and the good would associate, the *Palais* was also home to a plethora of seditious theatres, cafés and small meeting places, while "in the newly built arcades, prostitutes would rent small shops with rooms above, in order to be able to provide sex for their clients. Streetwalkers would mingle with the fashionable crowds and dress up to disguise their intent....[and] the bookshops sold not only the latest Enlightenment works, political pamphlets, newspapers and journals, but alongside them pornography and seditious writings." It was, Hetherington(1997) concluded, a "heterotopia," in which all manner of people of differing origins, backgrounds, and inclinations could associate freely and indulge in joint experiences. Such a space was crucial to early revolutionary mobilisations.

"The *Palais-Royal* played a central role in Revolutionary Paris..." the revolutionary historian James Billington (1980:31) surmised, offering "a privileged sanctuary for intellectuals, where they could turn from speculation to organisation.... [providing] a living link with the underworld of Paris and with the new social forces that had to be mobilised for any revolutionary victory." Indeed, as Isherwood has (1986:222) noted, the *Palais-Royale* had also become home to all manner of "debauched youths, thieves, petit-maitres, swindlers, prostitutes, and financiers," in addition to the great and the good of Parisian society. Guaranteed liberty of action by its Royal ownership and patronage, the *Palais-Royale* was a haven for not only erotic or political perversions, but the perversion of distinction itself.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> And, in this regard, Larsen (2010) even included the *Palais-Royal* among a list of Temporary Autonomous Zones, a sentiment with which this author agrees.

In addition to his libertine spirit the Duc D'Orleans, was also a revolutionary agitant . Though elected to the Estates General as a member of the nobility, he had been one of the first to align himself firmly with the Third Estate, and was well known to associate with pamphleteers, journalists, provocateurs, and other such agitators. It was in the wake of the conflict with the Crown over the Estates General that these "pamphleteers and journalists in the entourage of the Duke of Orleans... began to establish a permanent headquarters at the *Palais-Royal*" (Rude, 1959:47). Thousands would congregate at the *Palais* on a daily (or, indeed, nightly) basis, which played the quintessential role in developing a popular revolutionary direction in the Revolution's early days<sup>12</sup>. Indeed, "If the French Revolution can be said to have begun in any single spot at any single moment," Billington(1980:31) assayed, "it may have been in the gardens of the *Palais-Royal* at about 3.30 in the afternoon of Sunday, July 12, 1789, when Camille Desmoulins climbed up on a table and cried *Aux armes!* To the milling crowd... suggesting a collective Parisian response."

Desmoulins<sup>13</sup> would later offer his own assessment of how crucial the *Palais-Royal* had been as an early organising space in his pamphlet, *Discours de la Lanterne aux Parisiens* (1789:49), and it is worth quoting him at length here because of his active participation in revolutionary street politics. "This garden is the home of patriotism, the rendezvous of the highest patriots who have left their homes and provinces to attend the magnificent spectacle of the Revolution," Desmoulins proclaimed. "Many Parisians do not care to go to their district assemblies, it is shorter to go to the Palais-Royal. There is no need to ask permission from the chairperson, to wait for his turn for two hours. The motion is proposed, if it finds supporters, the speaker climbs on a chair, if it is applauded, he drafts it, if it is booed, he goes away." Desmoulins then went on to describe the pivotal role of the *Palais-Royal* in the early stage of the Revolution:

"It is from the Palais-Royal that the selfless citizens set out to free from the prisons d'Abbaye those French Guards who had been detained for the good cause. It is from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> As Rude (1959:48) put it: "In the early days it was the *Palais-Royal* alone that gave a positive direction to the popular movement."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> These translations are my own, from the original French in Desmoulins (1789:48-50)

the Palais-Royal that the orders were given to shut the theatres and go into mourning on the 12th of July. It from the Palais-Royal that, the same day, we were called to arms and adopted the national cockade. It was the Palais-Royal which, for six months, has inundated France with all of the brochures that have made all of us- even the soldier - philosophers. It is at the Palais-Royal that patriots mingled with the Cavalry, the Dragoons, the Horse-Guards, the Swiss Guards, and the Cannoneers - embracing them, intoxicating them, and handed out gold for them to drink to the health of the Nation, won over the entire army, and upset the infernal projects of the Catilinas<sup>14</sup>. It is the Palais-Royal which saved the National Assembly and the ingrates of Paris from a general massacre." (Desmoulins, 1789:50-51)

It was in the wake of the 12<sup>th</sup> of July, and in concert with the city's assemblies that a Parisian militia numbering 48,000 men was rapidly formed, taking for itself the title of "National Guard" on the 13<sup>th</sup> of July. This National Guard was comprised not only of more ordinary Parisians, but also a number of defectors from the French military corps. By the next day this revolutionary militia, accompanied by a host of agitated Parisian citizens, stormed the fortress of the Bastille and had conducted a summary street-trial and execution of both the conservative mayor of Paris and the commander of the Bastille's defending regiment.<sup>15</sup> One day later, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of July, Louis XVI pledged to the National Assembly that royal troops would be sent away from Paris and Versailles, though this was too late for the Parisian municipal assembly, which had already declared itself to be a democratic revolutionary Commune, with a new mayor and an independent military force in the form of the victorious National Guard. The 16<sup>th</sup> of July saw Louis recall ministers favourable to the Assembly and, by the 17<sup>th</sup> of July, the King formally met with the Paris Commune, accepting the revolutionary cockade (with the red and blue of the city of Paris superimposed atop the traditional white of the ancien *regime*), and thereby symbolically endorsing the Revolution itself.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Desmoulins is referring to the Roman senator Catiline, who attempted to overthrow the Republic. In this context, he is referring to royalist conspirators.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For a detailed discussion of the storming of the Bastille and its ramifications see Chapter 2 of Lüsebrink and Reichardt (1997:38-78)

The storming of the Bastille, and de-facto victory of the Assembly over the Crown was not the only momentous revolutionary activity to have taken place in July. Indeed, many of France's major towns had mirrored the example of the Paris Commune and established revolutionary committees of their Third Estate representatives, with local militias, established in the previous months serving as their military wings. As Andress (1999:59-60) notes, of France's thirty major cities, only ten were not in some way controlled by revolutionaries. These self-interested urban bodies constituted organisations which were independent from the National Assembly, and would, subsequently come to disregard national authority in accordance with their own, often more radical agendas.

By the time that Louis XVI had surrendered power to the National Assembly the core spaces of convergence for the revolutionary masses were twofold. First among these was a growing practice of street politics. With newspapers publicly read out and rousing speeches echoing across the court of the *Palais-Royal*, alongside a litany of theatres, cafes and marketplaces in which revolutionary conversations could be had, large crowds of people would assemble in a process which would often elicit (as in the Parisian case discussed earlier) spontaneous revolutionary activity from the diversely associated crowds that formed. This was underpinned by means of oppositional pamphlets and newsletters, which delivered revolutionary news to the French people, with opinions and propositions of every persuasion, but almost entirely universal in their opposition to the status-quo. These newspapers, circulated throughout France, made exceptional tools for prompting and rousing revolutionary activity by instilling novel perceptions and attitudes among their readership. Political discussion began with the ideological beliefs of opinionated editors and the debates of public assemblies and ended with the dissemination of revolutionary news to the French People at large and the generation of new affinities between them.

Beyond the street, a vast array of local meetings had formed during the genesis of the Revolution, and had taken a permanent place as 'municipal assemblies', 'communes' or 'local committees' over the subsequent months. These would function as massive public political meetings, offering opportunities for autonomous discussions and decisionmaking which would often manifest in radical revolutionary action "Everywhere in France during the opening months of the Revolution, and especially after the fall of the Bastille, revolutionary municipalities were being set up by local communities" Cobban (1943:15) recalled, "The National Assembly soon had to recognise the existence of the new revolutionary municipalities... but the towns and villages of France did not wait for permission from the Assembly for their own elected municipalities to function" In many cases, "the revolutionary [or, popular] committee simply usurped the powers of local government and presented the central government with a fait accompli," where in others they would contend directly with the authority of town officers. By 14 December 1789, under looming threat of an insurrection by local committees if the Assembly did not comply, all of France's 44,000 municipalities were extended the right to form their own assemblies, and empowered them to meet and decide on almost all matters of local governance.

In many regards, the popular committees offered a permanent revolutionary space (Hunt, 1979) through which new participants would flock in the same way as they had to the assemblies for elections and cahiers, but with an even broader appeal across social classes than the comparatively restrictive Third Estate convergences had had. Hunt's (1976:342) study of these committees emphasises their importance in providing an initial space in which proto-revolutionaries would come together on the basis of shared grievances. "When the committees were created; the veil covering community affairs was pulled apart, and politics became a daily activity," she notes. "The fact that an emergency political organization could challenge and supplant traditional institutions, that an alternative government could be created and maintained, transformed the townspeople's perception of government: it could be changed by their collective action." (Hunt, 1976:343)

A major test of these new revolutionary associations' capacities to mobilise in and around Paris in particular came in October, 1789. The origins of the incident in Paris began on October 3<sup>rd</sup>, where rumours of a banquet at Versailles in which the new 'national' tricolore cockade had been insulted by the court, Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette herself were circulating amidst the political classes. Lefebvre's history of the

events which followed is particularly illuminating. "The district assemblies went into permanent session," he recounts, and began formulating all manner of measures to combat this gross insult, ranging from the criminalisation of wearing any cockade but the national one, the ejection of royal regiments from the capital, which in turn prompted considerable public discussion. "On Sunday the fourth a crowd swarmed at the *Palais-Royal*," Lefebvre continued, in which women were "unusually numerous and declared their intention of marching to Versailles the next day."

The next morning, similar groups of women congregated in the public markets around Paris and led contingents across the city to the Hotel de Ville, proclaiming that their intention was to procure bread from the royal palace itself. They were joined, Lefebvre (1947:200) recalls, by individuals flooding the streets of Paris as tocsins "were ringing throughout the city, the district assemblies were meeting," and the National Guard, supposed to be keeping the rising in check, instead poured forth in support, even shouting "To Versailles!" as they went. With the Assembly remaining relatively silent in response to emergent concerns, fuelled by popular rumour, about the loyalty of Louis XVI to the new arrangement imposed on France, (Doyle, 1989:121) the crowd of 7,000 women, men who had poured forth into the streets in response to the *tocsin*, and dubiously inclined regiments of the National Guard (Which Lefebvre estimates, combined, constituted at least 20,000 people) would march to Versailles, after seizing arms and bread from the on their way, preparing a deputation to confront the King.

When Lafayette – commander of the National Guard – arrived later that night along with his own detachment, the guardsmen officially opted to side with the *menu peuple*<sup>16</sup> against the Crown, occupying the grounds of Versailles, effectively besieging the palace itself (Doyle, 1989:121-122). Soon, the masses had swarmed to Versailles, demanding the relocation of both the King and the Assembly itself to Paris. The Assembly were quick to acquiesce.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> "*Menu peuple*" refers to the common people of France – usually wage earning but not particularly well off. These can be contrasted with *sans culottes*, a more expansive category which included the propertied classes and even some full citizens (though the exact meaning of this term differs between historians).

By the 6<sup>th</sup> of October, Louis XVI was relocated to Paris, accompanied by a 60,000-strong procession, and followed soon after by the entire governmental apparatus. The government of France had been made servile in the face of "popular despotism" (Doyle 1989:123; de Tocqueville 1959:98), and "every day," the Assembly would conduct its business to "vituperations from the galleries" (Furet 1988: 92-93). The ever-popular Courier de Provence encapsulated and re-enforced popular sentiment in its December article "Love of Liberty," defending the October agitation, as well as the ongoing revolutionary fervour in France, with the damning conclusion: "When the aristocrats [in the National Assembly] ...complain about the disturbed spirit of the citizens, it is a case of the fever accusing the pulse of the speed and strength of its beating" (in Gilchrist and Murray, 1971:80).

The Revolution of 1789 was only successful as a consequence of spontaneous mobilisations of individuals and groups, the vast bulk of whom had held no formal political association with one another until they were mobilised. What they had shared, however, were affinities: by reading the same newspaper, frequenting the same marketplaces, or living in the same district they were able to access and entertain revolutionary propaganda, and even associate to debate and possibly even execute in the various contexts of convergence that had emerged since the revolution's beginning.

The beneficiaries of these mass mobilisations had in many cases little understanding or sometimes even expectation of how they were to occur, and if they would succeed. As Rude (1959:62-63) notes, "The *menu peuple* of Paris were no more helpless accessories, willing to stage an insurrection for the sole benefit of the constitutional monarchists in October, than they had been...for the Paris Electors in July. While they might share the general alarm... they also had their own particular preoccupations." These preoccupations generally concerned the scarcity of bread, a general lack of funds, and a distaste for the conspiracies of the aristocracy which they shared with their bourgeois democrat beneficiaries in the Assembly.

Though these Democrats had proved efficient in guiding the already mobilised *menu peuple* towards their goal, it was consistently the *menu peuple* who would begin their

protest activity, and the Democrats who would temporarily fasten their fortunes to these mobilisations (Rude 1959:63). Where the Democrats had proved effective so far was placing themselves among the combinations of a dissatisfied Parisian people, and offering well-constructed outlets for their distaste. This would not prove enough for the Democratic movement – they would not only desire to influence the assemblage of the *menu peuple*, but to control it.

#### Activating Affinities After 1789

Though with his acceptance of the revolutionary *Tricolore* cockade, Louis XVI had functionally resigned his sovereignty to the National Assembly (despite his remaining King of France), it was not only the National Assembly who had been a driving force in securing their revolution. New power arrangements prompted a division of those who had been vital in accomplishing the 1789 revolution into two differently interested entities: the varying factions of the Assembly's revolutionary elites, and the *menu peuple* of Paris and the provinces. For the bourgeois assemblymen who France's revolution in 1789 had benefited, the novel associations of the French *menu peuple* – the poorer, unestablished, ordinary constituents of French society – proved an unwieldy phenomenon. Having associated autonomously under their own auspices, with notably different goals from the beneficiaries of their actions they had proved useful in the revolts of July and October of that year, but had been excluded from much of the concessions granted in those revolts. The agendas of the Revolution's victors and its protagonists on the ground were diverging.

A means of remedying this availed itself in the form of the establishment of political clubs and societies, as well as a reconstitution of the two of the elements which had previously been so helpful in rousing Parisians to action in 1789: revolutionary news, and local assemblies. These entities, though means of association for the *menu peuple*, were under the auspices (and ownership) of members of France's bourgeoisie, most of whom were aligned with the more radical wing of the National Assembly, which was keen to consolidate and further its revolutionary gains. Accordingly, though lacking a sophisticated network, the new political forces in France were able to consciously sculpt

an array of political spaces in which those with revolutionary affinities might converge, and thereby have some purchase on how they might be mobilised.

The first move to direct the *menu peuple* toward some kind of ideological end was the rapid and dramatic transformation of the revolutionary press into sophisticated media organisations. This began with the transformation of Parisian news from disorganised flurries of pamphlets into an organised, nation-wide newspaper system, through which most editors proclaimed a variety of revolutionary opinions in line with their allies in the Assembly. Meanwhile, in provincial France, remaining advertising pamphlets, or affiches, swiftly transformed into full newspaper endeavours which connected the political and social upheavals in the French capital to provincial citizens in previously impossible ways. As Popkin (1990:33-34) put it, "By the end of the year 1789... the entire French press system had been altered almost beyond recognition," With its increasing professionalisation, the news agenda was swiftly reorganised along the lines of the emergent factions of the Assembly itself. Accordingly, the revolutionary press swiftly became deftly skilled at equating Assembly members' positions with the 'public will'. "Why debate when everyone is in agreement?," the then incredibly popular *Courrier de Provence*<sup>17</sup> had once asked its readership. "Did not the common good clearly manifest itself? The first [member of the Assembly] to display a new tribute to the public interest did no more than express what the others already felt: there was no need for debate or fine speech to have adopted what had already been decided by the majority and commanded by the overwhelming authority of the nation's mandates."<sup>18</sup>. This language of 'the sovereign people' and a general will was routinely used as both a means of legitimating particular visions, as well as offering a call to action<sup>19</sup>.

Publications under the influence of radical factions in the Assembly would swiftly dwarf all others, making it exceedingly difficult to get any news at all, except from a revolutionary. By contrast, the limited set of papers and pamphlets aligned to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Quoted in a sourcebook compiled by Gilchrist and Murray (1971:13)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Le Courrier de Provence, No. 24 in Gilchrist and Murray (1971:60)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> A considerable number of reports, constituting an excellent representative sample of the French Press can be found in Gilchrist and Murray's (1971) collection. Also of interest is Gough's (2002) overview of the revolutionary press in France.

conservative causes struggled to compete with the more sensational and numerous revolutionary communiqués. One very prominent paper, *L'Ami du peuple*, had, in December 1790, encouraged direct action from its readership without reservation, ordering them to "Form yourselves into an armed body, present yourselves at the National Assembly and demand that you immediately be given some means of subsistence from the national wealth"<sup>20</sup> While alienating conservatives in the Assembly, this popular upsurge had given the more radical elements of the revolution's leaders a means of shaping, in the most general terms, the convictions of the ordinary men and women who carried out the revolutionary insurrections that would determine their fate.

Conservatives in the Assembly (at this point the dominant component) were less enthusiastic about the upsurge of spontaneous revolt, and set about prescribing a restructuring of local assembly meetings throughout Paris and the provinces. A set of reforms were advanced in the spring of 1790 which would replace Parisian districts and their subordinate assemblies with "sections," divisions by which officeholders could be duly elected in an easier way than the chaotic process by which the Assembly's own Parisian deputies could be formed. The section model would reduce the number of assemblies in Paris from 60 to 48, and restated the conditions of participation to ensure that only "active" male citizens could join the sections. In the place of assembly participation, Tackett(2003:94) notes, the radical leadership "cultivated close ties with the local communities, lending them a certain grassroots character... not unlike those of the Cordeliers Club and the fraternal societies."

It was these societies, however, which predominated as the emergent means by which revolutionaries hoped to gain some influence over the *menu peuple*. With the expansion of political clubs in Paris and across France, radicals could offer an emulation of the spaces which had attracted early revolutionary fervour in the *Palais-Royal*, and also the more staunchly political focus of the now restricted assemblies. This shift from the *Palais* to the club as a space of convergence owed its origins to a multitude of factors,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Quoted in Gilchrist and Murray (1971:79)

ranging from yet more Assembly diktats restricting freedom of assembly outdoors to the declining enthusiasm of the Phillipe D'Orleans with the exact direction the Revolution was taking.

The decline of the *Palais-Royal's* revolutionary potency would eventually be completed by 1793, with Phillipe D'Orléans (now Philippe-Egalité) execution, and the restriction of the space under the rule of the Jacobins who had been "deeply suspicious of the *Palais-Royal* because of its obvious lack of discipline" (Billington, 1980:31). In many regards the political clubs which emerged across France were direct replacements for the more diverse associations which the *Palais-Royal* and other such spaces had played host to. Indeed, some of the first political clubs were established at the *Palais* itself, including the Lycée de Paris, Lycée des Arts, Musée Francais, Roseum and Club de 1789, which Philipe D'Orleans had sponsored within his walls, but also the array of *Palais* cafés which had gradually reconstituted themselves as proto-clubs early in the course of the Revolution, playing home to revolutionary orators, motions of action, and even tribunals of sorts.

Formally established clubs, however, grew rapidly across Paris, as well as across France, over the course of 1790 and 1791. Some of these had sprung up in the early days of the Revolution, being spontaneously converted from popular cafés, salons, and even Masonic lodges "as men reacted to the fluid political situation in which they found themselves," (Forrest, 2004:108). Unlike the spaces which they had overtaken, "the new societies were exclusively focused on politics, the spread of information and the exercise of influence," and were unwavering in their dedication to these principles. These clubs were, as Hunt(1976:344) puts it, "alternative political forms" which offered a similar space of agitation to the popular committees and assemblies which the Assembly had begun to crack down on. They also carried for the spirit of their revolutionary predecessors: the cafés, wine shops and public spaces such as the *Palais Royal*.

But all this should not undercut the actual practices of club members beyond purely political intent or revolutionary fervour, even though this was often the ultimate consequence of joining such spaces. As Forrest (2004:109-10) notes, "one of the most salient features of the club movement, indeed, was its diversity: they did not all speak with the same voice, nor did they look consistently to Paris for leadership." Indeed, though ideology was often a reason people chose to join clubs, they also did so in search of "sociability, a place to meet friends and kindred spirits. In the early months, indeed, they were often open and welcoming to newcomers, a broad church where men of differing views could mingle and debate." Though later in the Revolution club-membership would become more strictly delineated and hierarchical, initially citizens would often be members of multiple clubs and popular societies at the same time. To some extent, then, club membership was driven by two particular categories of affinity: ideological attitudes on the one hand, and social drives on the other.

Of the clubs which would come to prominence in the Revolution, the Cordeliers and Jacobin clubs predominated.<sup>2</sup> The Jacobins would boast a remarkable 921 chapters throughout France by July 1791, compared to only 23 chapters in February 1790. The Jacobin and many other political clubs throughout France adopted a parliamentary structure, providing spaces for structured political engagement with ideological trajectories offered up by its masters in the Assembly and their allies in the presses. "A more systematic indoctrination of the sans-culottes with their ideas of the advanced political groups took place...above all, in the clubs and societies and Sectional committees," which likewise played "an even more significant part in the political education of the Parisian menu peuple in Jacobin principles," Rude (1959:213) had noted. These efforts at indoctrination were perhaps most visible in the days prior to the Massacre of the Champ De Mars, on July 17<sup>th</sup>, 1791, and were coupled by the beginnings of efforts by the Cordeliers club to shift from affinitive mass mobilisation to more dependable organisational methods. In the wake of two grassroots mobilisations of workers and the unwaged in the city that spring, the men of the Cordeliers sought to bring these proto-movements under their auspices by offering them space to meet and Accompanying this, there had been "continuous efforts made by the associate. democrats in the course of the spring and summer of 1791 to indoctrinate and win the allegiance of the small tradesmen, craftsmen and employed and unemployed workers of the capital" (Rude, 1959:81-82). This initially took the form of offering material

assistance (such as meeting places) in which these groups could assemble, as well as sympathetic coverage in club-controlled presses. Eventually, however, these efforts became part of a move to integrate both the *menu peuple* and *sans-culottes* into the clubs' own infrastructures, where they could be instructed and educated in the ways of democratic thought, and then mobilised accordingly. As Tackett(2003:114) noted "many of the Parisian clubs had been created specifically to attract those "passive citizens" whom the National Assembly had excluded from voting and office holding by means of property qualifications."

Alongside these clubs, a spat of "fraternal societies" - more than thirty in total - had emerged in 1790 and 1791, each different in their constitution. Though of differing constitution, these societies were united in the goal of trying to obtain full franchise and office-holding rights for men and, in some rare cases, women too. While the Jacobins had adopted the strategy of opening clubs across the nation, the Cordeliers sought to consolidate power in Paris and, in the spring of 1791, established a 'Central Committee' around which the smaller political clubs and more diverse fraternal societies of Paris could be coordinated. This committee would be under the control of the Cordeliers, of course, and proved the backdrop for a disastrous mobilisation at the Champ Du Mars, which nonetheless was able to turn out a crowd of an estimated 50,000<sup>21</sup> for the mere signing of a petition, and prompted a renewed wariness about more formal attempts to organise the capital's revolutionary masses by those who might participate, shifting the preferred spaces of convergence in favour of the then less-structured Jacobin clubs.

These new avenues of action constituted a move from organically occurring contexts of convergence, coupled with the coincidental affinities of a diverse and free-associating *menu-peuple* to the emergence of deliberate manipulation of the conditions of contention by competing elites. Revolutionary news would raise support for the agendas of well-defined and comprehensible revolutionary factions, corresponding with elements in the Assembly whose interests were not necessarily aligned, but all with profoundly transformative, radical visions. While, in the revolution's early days the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> This figure is sourced from accounts by Rude (1959) and Doyle (1989).

publications, debates and discussions in the street constituted exchanges of opinion between people with broad affinities, the emergent revolutionary affinities after 1789 were guided by the emergent revolutionary public sphere, situated within the realm of political faction and ideology. Likewise, control over the revolution's core spaces and avenues of association in which participants would converge allowed a corresponding control over the outcome of these convergences, effectively availing the bourgeois revolutionary 'leaders' to loosely shape and even potentially manufacture political opportunities to their advantage.

Edmund Burke (1790:126-127), in the series of letters which would become his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, had warned of a "spirit of aesthetical fanaticism that is inspired by a multitude of writings dispersed with incredible assiduity and expense, and by sermons delivered in all the streets and places of public resort." "These writings and sermons," he noted, "have filled the populace with a black and savage atrocity of mind, which supersedes in them the common feelings of nature as well as all sentiments of morality and religion." Indeed, many of the grand mobilisations that followed 1789 would do little more than enhance the power of assembly elites, while ordinary revolutionaries were subjected to great and greater structuring of opportunities for revolutionary interaction.

This marked a shift to a context in which mobilisation, though still occurring beyond movement structures, would present as "occasions where crowds collected in direct response to the call of leaders" rather than the more chaotic gatherings of 1789 (Rude, 1959:220). Though these were not the more autonomously driven instances of the revolution's early days, participants were still drawn by affinity rather than concrete organisational or network ties. The most notable of these came in April of 1792. By this point in the Revolution France was facing staunch foreign opposition, beset by a harsh famine, and had elected a new "Legislative Assembly." On April 20<sup>th</sup>, a declaration of war against Austria finally launched France into crisis once again (Doyle 1989:183). While the war had initially inspired great popular enthusiasm, a series of mutinies and defeats on the battlefield quickly shattered the nation's confidence (Andress 2004:158). By May

it was believed that Louis XVI, the *Feuillants*<sup>22</sup> and a coalition of military generals were conspiring to betray the French people (Furet 1988:108 ; Doyle 1989: 184). Nicolas Ruault (quoted in Doyle, 1989: 184) observed at the time that it was widely believed "that nobody is to be trusted... that Paris will be taken in six weeks by the Austrians," supported by a secret "Austrian Committee" within the French government (Doyle, 1989: 184 ; Furet, 1988: 108).

The month of June was punctuated by organised popular disturbance, most notably the storming of the Royal Palace by thousands of self-proclaimed *sans-culottes* on the 20<sup>th</sup> (Furet, 1988: 108-9), now a term of political identification. Though literally meaning "without breeches," at this point *sans-culotte* referred to a type of revolutionary, particularly prevalent in Paris, drawn from the working and middle classes who identified squarely as a political activist of the Jacobin persuasion in the loose sense, at this point more generally driven by passionate speeches and publications more than by clearly given orders (Higonnet, 1989: 393-399).

By July, Prussia had entered the war against France, and matters had reached a crisis point. A state of "*patrie en danger*" [fatherland in danger] was declared: all of the nation's government bodies would sit permanently until it was resolved, and were urged to recruit volunteers for the coming war (Doyle, 1989:187). This new state of "*patrie en danger*" had effectively made permanent many of the spaces of convergence which brought so many of the early revolutionaries together, particularly those in Paris. Accordingly, one of the new groups attracted to these spaces was the growing concentration of *fédérés* in the capital. The *fédérés*, since 1790, had been, as Doyle(1989:187) puts it, "the pick of the provincial patriots," who would attend the yearly *Fête de la Fédération* celebrations – those which we would today call Bastille Day – in the nation's capital and other major cities. In 1792, however, the pressing demands of the war led to the decision to militarise the *fête*, inviting all good patriots to travel to Paris first, for the celebrations, second for military training, and ultimately for deployment for the coming war effort.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> A constitutional monarchist faction in the Assembly.

In their home-towns, many of the *fédérés* might not have met the qualification for participation in local political institutions (likely for the same reasons that it was so feasible for them to travel to the capital on such a patriotic whim). This would swiftly change, as their arrival was soon followed by a decree from numerous Parisian sectional assemblies that they would accept all citizens, rather than just those with voting rights. Furthermore, the *fédérés* quickly became involved with Parisian political clubs, most notably that of the Jacobins, which, as by far the most prominent club in France, would be familiar to the *fédérés* from their own towns and villages. Accordingly, attendance at the clubs and sections of Paris sky-rocketed, and by the 25<sup>th</sup> of July Paris' sectional assemblies were also sitting continuously (Dolye, 1989:188). Parisian popular politics was now open to all: *fédérés* from all over France, members of political clubs, and men and women at sectional assemblies.

It was amid this period of the dramatic expansion of political organising structures in the capital that there began to emerge a variety of methods by which mass mobilisations could be somewhat more predictably elicited from the newly emergent masses who would converge upon Paris's clubs and sections in the throes of revolutionary patriotism. For those who were not already strongly attached to the patriotic cause, Paris's activists, pamphleteers and provocateurs would attempt to instil the dispositional affinities upon which their successes in 1789 had hinged. A mass of leaflets, pamphlets and papers, accompanied by staunch ideological sermons in Parisian clubs and sectional assemblies provided opportunities to radicalise many of the common people of Paris who had made their way into these newly opened political spaces. Paris's fraternal societies would be coordinated into a central committee, alongside the reformed Paris sections, which would also hold joint coordinating meetings. "By the spring of 1791 both the sections and the fraternal societies were becoming organs of influence," Tackett (2003:94) noted. A consequence of increasing revolutionary control over these new spaces of convergence was that the creation of the kind of massive insurrectionary *journée* that had previously only been possible in the context of an outraged and precarious *menu peuple* became far more readily available. It was in such a context that Assembly had opened membership of the National Guard to all citizens, "swamping the cautious men of property who had hitherto dominated its

Parisian units" (Doyle, 1989:188), and mandated the distribution of weaponry to all French citizens (Doyle, 1989:188), providing the newly organised men of the clubs and assemblies with the physical force to affirm their provocateurs' decrees as political realities.

A first manifestation of this new wave of affinitive mobilisation came in the events which would oust Louis XVI from not only political power, but the realm of the living. With the vast bulk of Parisian clubs, popular societies, and sections pushing fervently anti-monarchical propaganda to their members there was a rapidly rising tide of anti-monarchism (particularly amongst the *fédérés*), the sections, in concert with their allies in the Legislative Assembly, demanded that Louis XVI be immediately deposed (Doyle, 1989:187-188). By the next day, August 10<sup>th</sup> 1792, the chimes of the *tocsin* would serve as a call to arms for all of the veritable mélange of *sans-culottes*, citizens, National Guardsmen and *fédérés* from across France who had by now become familiarised with the symbols, signs and ideologies of a particularly radical revolutionary politics (Rudé, 1959:104).

Now in possession of the spaces of convergence in which fully fledged mobilisations would emerge, the radical wing of the revolutionary elite were no longer dependent on either reaching consensus in the Assembly or relying on the more spontaneous outpouring of grassroots popular sentiment to effect their desired political outcomes. The combined masses that formed, obeying Jacobin leaders, marched through the capital. Seizing the *Hôtel de Ville*, they marched on the Palace of the Tuileries to impose that which the Assembly had not granted. As Doyle (1989:189) concludes, Louis XVI's "authority fell with his palace," and the next year would begin with the trial and decapitation of the now "Citizen Louis Capet," and progress with the ascendance of the Jacobin movement in a "coup d'état against the national representatives" (Furet, 1988:128).

Indeed, in many ways the mobilisations against Louis XVI were the beginning of a period in which the actions of a more organic mass movement would be used to force the hand of France's representatives , though this would end in the wake of Jacobin

efforts to seize upon popular protest in May 1793. "Now, as so often in the past, the party contending to power began to turn this [popular] movement to its own advantage and to guide it into channels that accorded with its own political interests "Rude(1959:120) recalled. In this case, the Jacobins would be successful. May would mark the start of the Jacobin strategy of converting the spaces of convergence that constituted the clubs, sections, newspaper-sellers and street-corners of Paris into nodes in an organising network.

Prior to 1793 popular mobilisations retained a disordered, unmanaged quality, emerging organically from gatherings in exceptional spaces away from the prying eyes of police and open to a new form of politics: sometimes they would favour the Jacobins, sometimes the more moderate Cordeliers club, and other times the radical faction of the *Enragés*<sup>23</sup>. This time, however, the Jacobins were "both willing and able to use the popular movement to promote their political ends, they had no intention of allowing its direction to pass into other hands" (Rude, 1959:120). One move was to shut down the more open discourse of political clubs, having by this point, prohibited those attending the Jacobin club from also enjoying membership at other clubs (Forrest, 2004:109-10). Between 1793 and 1794 Jacobins began to further consolidate the otherwise open spaces of the clubs under their own control, placing themselves at "the centre of a tightly structured network of clubs united behind the Jacobin cause" (Forrest, 2004:109).

A programme of operation was formulated by Jacobin leaders in early April of 1793, and Robespierre's associates<sup>24</sup> issued a public invitation to the Parisian sections to attend and arrest rogue deputies of the Convention. Of course, the leadership of Paris's sections were already ideologically aligned with the Jacobins, and it was with this in mind that they had been able to rely on the Section assemblies as a means of mobilisation, with 35 of the 48 sections offering support for the day, suspiciously only recommending a purge of deputies from the Girondins, rather than the Jacobins. Coordinating with the Paris

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The *Enragés* were a faction of ultra-Jacobin extremists, dedicated not only to the Revolution, but to the levelling of inequalities across classes (Roux, 1793).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> In fact, this was carried out by his brother, Augustin Robespierre.

Commune, a body within which the Jacobins had also won substantial support, the three elements organised a "Central Revolutionary Committee" to formally direct operations between May 29<sup>th</sup> and June 2<sup>nd</sup>, during which the next revolution of Paris would be underway. Though this committee was possessed of both funds and manpower, still "the Jacobins and their affiliates were using the clubs and popular societies to draw in support from the men and women of the *menu peuple*" (Rude: 1959:121), even offering payment for lost time in work to the 20,000 laymen who would mobilise in concert with Central Revolutionary Committee (and thereby Jacobin) orders.

These laymen swelled the ranks of the local battalions of the National Guard who surrounded the Convention on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, and so it was that crowds and troops marched together to take the Revolution to its next stage. The Convention would be duly purged, and the Jacobin 'Montagne' would be victorious. Furet (1988:128) identifies the *journée* of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June as the moment when the Convention became little more than a "rump parliament sharing its sovereignty with the street mobs [of Paris]." These street mobs, in turn, were by now firmly under the command of the Jacobins. Accordingly, the Jacobin-led Convention, would routinely deploy the *sociétés populaires* and *sans-culottes* in the coming months, be it to organise national food procurement, pass out official notices and instructions or generally provide law and order to the Parisian *sections* (Cobb, 1970:188).

Despite Jacobin attempts to seize control in Paris, a more affinitive model of organisation was maintained outside of the capital. In the provinces, where the Jacobins had always had less success in exerting control over their own clubs (or, for that matter, the shape and direction of popular mobilisations), as many as seventy of the eighty-three departments were said to have rejected not just the authority of the Convention, but all central authority (Doyle, 1989:241)<sup>25.</sup> It was, as Forest(2004:144) notes, "a counter-revolution made in the popular-societies," in much the same way as the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>It should be noted however, that the exact number of *départements* that rejected central authority is not known, and estimates vary according to sources. Even the most conservative estimates, however, affirm that among the recalcitrant districts were three of France's four largest cities (the notable exception, of course, being Paris itself). (Doyle, 1989:241)

revolution itself had relied up on them. These "waves of local autonomy had washed away chains of command and administrative hierarchies," David Andress (1999:118) declared in his history of French revolutionary society. This movement of provincial revolts, later known as 'federalists' because of their resistance to central authority, was united in the broad belief that neither the eviscerated Convention, nor the bloodthirsty Jacobin *sectionnaires* could wield popular sovereignty. Instead the French people could administer the bulk of their affairs through local democratic practices (Doyle:1989, 241-2).

In the cities, a new spate of popular committees and judiciaries were established, declaring their municipalities to be in insurrection against the capital, and prosecuting those deemed to be agents of the Convention or the Commune (Doyle, 1989: 238-9). From the burgeoning broader federalist movement there would emerge the incredibly local and entirely unrestrained self-organisation of communes in the towns, cities and even villages of each *département* (Cobb: 1970: 181-5). Plans were even made for a "shadow Convention," and various *départements* co-ordinated to form an army to restore government by the Constitution (Doyle, 1989: 239).

It was in this context of opposition to the Revolution from within and outside of France that the Jacobins, seizing power in the capital, would orchestrate the Revolution's Reign of Terror. The Terror itself would then give way for conservative elements in the Convention to finally able to bring the Revolution under control, turning the revolutionary Terror architected by the Jacobins into a means for the destruction of popular organising capacities: the Sections, Clubs and Societies and newspapers of France, coupled with the further restriction of public assembly. With the destruction of these elements, and to the backdrop of a radically more resilient state with the capacity for terror well within its grasp, the French Revolution was finally brought to an end.

# 4.2 Dynamics of Mass Mobilisation in France

# "They cannot raise supplies, but they can raise mobs" – Edmund Burke (1790:352)

Burke's sentiment offers a poignant reflection of the capabilities of revolutionaries in the 1789-93 period upon which I have focused. The French Revolution was, in many ways, characterised by the spontaneous mobs which flocked through the streets on some contentious mission or other. However, when we break apart these mobs, and begin to interrogate those who became swept up in collective action during the Revolution, we see an incredible breadth of participants. Rural peasants, vagabonds and migrant workers in the provinces were mirrored by the petit-bourgeoisie of France's merchants, craftsmen and other such traders in the country's towns and cities. Likewise, the nation's plebeians- be it millers, bakers, garment-workers, sailors, fishwives, soldiers or the toiling classes – were constantly finding themselves drawn into revolutionary agitation.

Participants in the Revolution described feelings or, indeed, concrete experiences of being compelled by the crowds that swelled and assemblies that convoked for one revolutionary end or another. As one woman on the march to Versailles had noted in her formal deposition, it was when crossing the Notre Dame bridge at 8am on the morning of October 5<sup>th</sup> that she encountered "about a hundred women who told her that it was necessary for her to go with them to Versailles to ask for bread there." She had found "this great number of women" so irresistible, the deposition noted, "that she decided to go with them."<sup>26</sup>

In this section I draw together the affinities and conditions of convergence discussed and depicted throughout the chapter in a more distilled fashion, with the aim of conveying the dynamics of mass mobilisation in the French Revolution. I characterise the Revolution as having progressively transformed from a revolution underpinned by broad, general affinities and a sudden frame and time of possibility to one underpinned

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> This deposition, that of Jeanne-Dorothée Delaissement, a casual participant in the October days, is quoted from a sourcebook compiled by Levy, Applewhite and Johnson (1979:48-49).

by more specific perceptions and attitudes which developed over time in an emergent revolutionary public, centring around distinct spaces of convergence, in which an exceptional state of revolutionary activity - in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Zuccotti or Tahrir – was a permanent presence.

Over the course of the Revolution, the central affinities underlying mobilisation shifted from those that were in equal parts social and psychological to those more squarely underpinned by psychological factors. The earliest mobilisations were entirely grounded in an array of affinities which had existed long before the Revolution. These included; material disadvantages that made political action the only possible recourse; a sense of grievance that motivated such action; or even sudden spatial proximity to revolt for the dwellers in the Paris *faubourgs* and market-regions. As Stone (1994:226) notes: "Come the unanticipated political void of 1788-89, the king's most industrious and necessitous subjects would be more than ready to add their harsh voices to the national outcry for change."

As the Revolution progressed, new affinities would develop. One such example is shared information flows, exemplified in the reading of the new revolutionary periodicals. Another is the shared identity as *citoyens* which emerged during the revolution. These affinities came to be as a consequence of attempts by revolutionary factions to induce dispositions in the otherwise unpredictable masses, with the hope that they would come to serve a more pointed purpose in future mobilisations.

When we consider where this revolutionary compulsion comes from, it is worth separating the long-standing affinities underlying French mobilisation from the situations, frames, and spaces of convergence which served to activate them. As Doyle (1989:159-61) astutely notes in his history of the revolution's origins, there had existed a plethora of grievances, complaints, common sufferings, and "serious deficiencies" in grain affecting the nation in the two decades prior to the Revolution: the key difference in 1788 was that these deficiencies had placed the state's capacity at breaking point, prompting a shake-up of the long-persisting structures around France (Markoff, 1990).

The second half of this section draws together and theorises the conditions of convergence which sparked and later sustained the remarkable agitation of the revolution's early years. It begins by discussing an initial shift in cognitive framing launched by the convocation of the Estates General, before moving to discuss structural conditions of convergence, first in the sudden democracy of 1789, and second in the later politicisation of everyday life in the period of *patrie en danger*. There were also shorter time-periods, such as the revolutionary *journée*, also theorised herein, in which a sudden moment of revolt was announced by the clanging of the *tocsin*- the popular alarm – and carried though with marked rapidity. Finally, it explores the nature of the revolution's spaces of convergence, from the *Palais Royal*, to the democratic gatherings around the *cahiers*, emergent popular committees, and political clubs.

To begin with a consideration of the most particularly pivotal affinities in the period between 1789-93, we can note that initially, affinities were in equal parts social and psychological in nature. While in Paris and other major cities, merely living or working near a protest thoroughfare gave one a certain proximity to revolutionary action which could manifest in political participation, to which the depositions of the women who marched to Versailles in the October days attest. In Paris and across the nation, other shared material grievances, such as hunger, starvation and poverty among the *menu people*, were also reflected by a longer-standing sense of grievance, as well as a hatred of the aristocratic classes. In a great sense, as Stone (1994:226) observes, townsfolk, peasants and Parisians had been imbued with a "psychological preparedness for an active role in the politics of 1789" as a consequence of their shared material desperation.

There was, however, something of a shift in the role of affinities as the Revolution progressed. Over time, participants' psychological affinities came to play a principal role, most notably with the explosion of anti-seigneurial sentiment and discussion amid the convocation of the Estates General, which manifested in an increasingly widespread circulation of opinionated and propagandised pro-revolutionary news. These helped to cultivate shared perceptions and attitudes pointing to a common aristocratic problem which the urban and rural classes should unite against.

The kinds of attitudes generated by the revolutionary press became more complex as the factionalism of the Assembly came to leave its mark upon French politics more generally. The notion of an aristocratic, or Bourbon conspiracy was a particular favourite of revolutionary publishers and found much traction with the French people. A changing political culture would also cultivate the emergence of common attitudes and identities: be it as equal citizens in defence of their fundamental rights, or a dedication to one particular revolutionary ideology or another, supported by provocateurs in the popular press, or at one's local club. Indeed, the drive for political discussion itself became an affinity which predisposed individuals toward revolutionary participation, as most of the cafés, clubs and civil spaces in which political discussion could take place– as well as many local assemblies – had already become the initial sites of revolutionary convergence just as the cafés, theatres, salons, and Masonic lodges of the *Palais-Royal* and other such urban spaces had been long-standing revolutionary hotbeds.

The Revolution was possessed of an array of key conditions of convergence underpinning these affinities. After all, as Stone (1994:226) notes, "people who had always been absorbed primarily by the task of keeping themselves and their dependents alive from one day to the next" were hardly able to naturally gravitate towards the time-consuming process of revolution, unless something quite exceptional were to support it. Because of the distinctive pluralism of revolutionary mobilisation, a number of intersecting and complementary conditions of convergence can be detected, from emergent frames, to distinct times of opportunity or exception and, most prominently, an array of revolutionary places with a staunch supporting role.

Insofar as there was any single shift in framing underlying the Revolution's early contention, it can be said to have first occurred in response to the convocation of the Estates General. The notable shift in belief structures (detailed earlier in this chapter) which accompanied this new democratic process gave rise to a key exceptional frame of convergence through which the underlying affinities of a great many of the French people would become activated in favour of the 1789 rising. This was particularly true of the toiling classes and petit bourgeoisie, for whom Stone (1994:233) notes that the

"consciousness raising tasks of electing delegates... [and] drafting protests to the king" would lay the foundation for their role as "the brawn in most of these uprisings."

We can also consider an opportune situation as having emerged in the unique moment created by the new revolutionary conditions, not least the state-breakdown of 1788-1789. Indeed, the sudden "intervention of the kingdom's artisans, shopkeepers, urban workers and peasants in the epochal quarrel between conservatives and Patriots in 1788-89 was, like that quarrel itself, only made possible by the breakdown of a government overtaxed by its grandiose international mission," Stone (1994:226) notes in his analysis of the Revolution's emergence. Indeed, a great many historians of the Revolution consider central government power to have effectively broken down in the 1788-89, in areas such as fiscal capacity, constitutional authority, social support, and, most crucially, the instruments of physical coercion (Stone, 1994:230; Scott, 1978:27; Bertaud, 1989:22; Cobb, 1970). Consequently, peasants, Parisians and paupers were free to associate, assemble, and act in ways which had been previously restrained. A similar revolutionary time was initiated with the period of *patrie en danger* – a temporal convergence underpinned by a rather different principle than that of the convocation of the Estates General. Where, for the Estates General, collective action spilled out of political turmoil and state-weakness, the state of *patrie en danger* instead compelled citizens towards political association out of patriotism. Rather than merely something permitted at a time of state weakness, revolutionary activity itself become defensible, even laudable as a form of legitimate political expression. Consequently, those who had previously feared arrest or repression from organs of the state could now act on their affinities with the pride of patriots, and the security of citizens.

A somewhat briefer paramount situation was evident in the periodic emergence of a revolutionary *journée*. Across the Revolution, the revolutionary *journée* emerges as a opportune situation, as exemplified by the storming of the Bastille, the march on Versailles, and the fall of the Monarchy. Signified by the ringing of the *tocsin* – that quintessential alarm-bell of revolutionary activity – a *journée* signified a moment at which change became possible for the masses of Paris, and where one would be assured of a substantial enough crowd to impress the collective will in some regard or other.

Lefebvre characterises these *journées* such as those in July 1789 as "popular excesses.... [and] irruptions of popular violence," in which "passionate feelings, the fear, the frenzy for fighting, the thirst for revenge" all became possible (Lefebvre, 1947:212).

Finally, we cannot forget the revolution's spaces of convergence. Though enough has already been said in this chapter in the pivotal role of the *Palais Royal* in Paris as an exceptional space, its exact character is worth qualifying. Part of the reason that the *Palais Royal* played such a pivotal role in the early days of the Revolution is due to the intersection of two complimentary spatial attributes of convergence: its unstructured, libertine character (Blumer, 1951) and physical security from regime forces, giving it the elementary characteristics of a Temporary Autonomous Zone (Bey, 1991). Beyond the *Palais*, spaces such as the *Pont Neuf* bridge also offered the unassuming character of a banal urban space (a mere river crossing), but could easily give way to revolutionary mobilisation at any moment.

Hunt identifies as central "the revolutionary ambiguity" of these spaces of convergence, which created the conditions for popular politicisation from the bottom up. "Once men began to discuss public issues," she explained, "their social and economic interests became more apparent to them; freedom engendered questions about equality," and the committees "made the revolution permanent" insofar as it existed within a space in which shared sentiments could be converted into political action (Hunt, 1976:345). In our more sociological language, it was only when Frenchmen converged in these places that they would realise the shared affinities that brought them there, and would thereby engage in revolutionary agitation.

There were also more distinctly opportune spaces, which drew more consciously political Frenchmen alongside sympathetic proto-revolutionaries to them, such as the early assemblies to draw-up *cahiers* and appoint deputies to the Estates General in the revolution's early days. Once the Revolution began in earnest, these were replaced by the popular committees and communes of Paris and the provinces. The importance of these spaces for the convergence of the revolutionary masses was pivotal. Indeed, Hunt(1976:344) perhaps puts it best in the conclusion of her landmark analysis of the

political forms of the Revolution: "[revolutionary politics] as an activity includes decisions about common, shared or public questions, and discussion, argument, and conflict about those questions. It consequently requires a space.... where freedom was possible." The popular committees formed throughout France after the fall of the Bastille "did this by opening the question of government to everyone (or potentially to everyone)," Hunt (1976:344) details.

After assembly crack-downs had damaged the capacity of popular assemblies, committees and communes to provide such a political space, the clubs and societies of France, and Paris in particular served to provide a substitute until their subordination to state power in 1793. These spaces of convergence were a little different from their earlier alternatives. Though serving a similar general purpose, they were more comprehensively influenced by the revolutionary factions who owned the building, set the agendas for discussion, and organised events. Eventually, however, these spaces would become more distinctly organised entities, mobilising networks of members in revolutionary brigades, rather than engaging their various visitors in more open discourse.

# **Conclusions and Implications**

At the beginning of this chapter I presented the French case as something of a challenge to the applicability of the model which I developed chiefly in response to two 21<sup>st</sup> century cases, in dialogue with a suite of theories. With this task in mind, finding any readily visible affinities or conditions of convergence at all in the French case would be to demonstrate the applicability of such notions. Instead, the French case offers an example of mobilisation driven as much by affinity and convergence as was seen in either the Occupy or Egyptian cases. It could be considered unsurprising that we should see a broader array of affinities and conditions of convergence coming into play, as the case lasted much longer than either the Occupy or Egypt cases. I would nevertheless indicate that this is a surprising and positive result.

It appears that without the technological apparatus which made networking instantaneous and easy after initial contact between participants, modes of organising

oriented around affinities and conditions of convergence emerged. This is to be contrasted with the relatively brief instances of affinity and convergence in the Occupy case - after which activists and participants coalesced into a network. There is a similar contrast with Egypt, where activists were unable to determine what exactly mobilised the masses, and could only rely on pre-existing organisations such as the Brotherhood or state-forces for persistent mobilisation.

Until 1793 the Jacobins and others relied upon sculpting the conditions for convergence. We could consider this to be a more developed form of what Occupy did, and what Egyptian activists attempted to do in the Eighteen Days. By providing spaces of convergence in which members of the revolutionary movement were able to swiftly mobilise those arrived, French revolutionaries could effectively 'bait' participants for a ready cause. This was complemented by the use of an emergent public sphere, embodied most prominently by the revolutionary press to instil affinities of *attitude, identity,* and *perception* in the masses revolutionaries sought to mobilise. The next chapter offers some concluding thoughts, and draws the comparisons between these cases into sharper focus.

# **Conclusion: Mobilisation Beyond the Movement**

In this thesis, I have tried to convey how those beyond the bounds of movement organisations and broader movement networks are temporarily mobilised to participate in a limited way in contentious episodes. The initial intention underpinning this project was to explain the kinds of mass mobilisations which have typified the contentious episodes of 2011 in Egypt and the United States. Further to this, I wanted to see if these dynamics could be translated into useful theoretical tools which could assist in the broader study of social movements, revolutions, and contentious politics.

In considering the problem of these seemingly spontaneous mass mobilisations I found that it evoked a classic conundrum in Social Movement Studies: how to explain less organised or structured instances of collective action. Classical theory on this topic this topic was notably speculative in nature, but provided some modest conceptual touchstones in the form of individuals' dispositions, and some kind of circumstances of convergence. Nonetheless, the bulk of classical theorists (Blumer, 1951; Turner and Killian, 1957; Lang and Lang, 1961) left these notions understudied and empirically bereft. Consequently, their suggestions were explicitly rejected in favour of a markedly organisational turn in the study of social movements which would come to characterise the field as we know it today: a shift from mass mobilisation to organised contention (Morris and Herring, 1984).

More recent contributions to the field of social movement studies, particularly those coming from social psychology<sup>27</sup>, offered some useful signposts from which to develop a testable hypothesis. Rather than truly unstructured collective actions, it appeared that instances of mobilisation beyond the movement might be underpinned at the intersection of structure and agency: the conditions of the individual (Affinities) which predisposed them to partake in contentious episodes, and the emergent social conditions (Convergence) which activated these predispositions.

In the pursuit of a better understanding of mobilisation beyond the movement I drew together a comparative triad. This involved two cases from the 2011 wave in the form of Occupy and Egypt, alongside the classic case of the 1789 French Revolution to control for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Including: Abrams and Grant, 2012; Curtin and McGarty, 2016; Drury and Reicher, 2005; Klandermans, 1984; van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, 2008; and others discussed in my first chapter.

the impact of modern information and communication technologies. Considering the Occupy and Egyptian cases proved vital in drawing together and formulating my two core concepts: affinity and convergence. Though I had to some extent already drawn together the early sketches of these concepts in the investigatory stage of the thesis, they were further refined and theorised by consistently placing my empirical cases in dialogue with the many contributions to the study of social movements and collective action across disciplines which I had considered in approaching the conundrum of mass mobilisation.

Once this process was complete, I introduced these concepts to the third component in my comparative triad: The French Revolution. With some prior familiarity with the revolution from past research, I had expected the Revolution to offer a divergent case in which affinity and Convergence would play a more marginal role than it had in the cases which inspired the concepts. I was consequently surprised to discover, when I delved into the finer-grain histories of the revolution detailing mobilisation, politicisation and revolutionary activity, that the French case was also replete with examples of affinity and convergence. What was more, the Revolution served as a particularly interesting case in the respect that revolutionaries would later come to carefully shape conditions of convergence and consciously instil dispositional affinities in their potential revolutionary foot-soldiers, enabling them to repeat the mass mobilisations which had characterised the 1789 rising. This was as opposed to the Occupy case, where affinity rapidly gave way to a broader network of activists, and Egypt, where once conditions of convergence were curtailed contention rapidly declined.

What remains is to crystallise the results of my comparative analysis here, bringing together the expansive evidence presented across cases. This chapter opens by drawing together the comparative lessons of the cases I have studied, beginning with my findings pertaining to how the dynamics of mass mobilisation in my three cases prompt further consideration of the core concepts which I have advanced in this thesis: affinity and convergence. A second part of the chapter moves to discuss how we might situate affinity and convergence in the broader study of mobilisation, and the implications, limitations, and further prospects of my research.

### 5.1 Comparative Analysis

I approached my research with the notion that beyond movements and their networks, contentious episodes also attracted participation by another means. I suggested that individuals' predispositions to participate in certain causes based on a person's social or psychological traits, or 'affinities', could form the preconditions for participation. These affinities became activated, I argued, in the context of emergent conditions of 'convergence' which encouraged those with these affinities to temporarily participate. Though the three cases which I have studied have offered some clear validations of these notions, it is also worth discussing exactly what they have uncovered comparatively in greater detail here.

In Chapter 2, I presented Occupy movement as relying on a more extensive range of affinities, while in Chapter 3 I described the Egyptian revolution as being underpinned by 'deeper and more intensive' affinities. In particular, almost all of the affinities underpinning the Egyptian case once Tahrir itself had become established appeared to be psychological in nature. Though social affinities did play a role, particularly in the revolution's early days, mobilisation in Egypt's Eighteen Days was chiefly underpinned by psychological affinities: perceived injustice, anti-regime (specifically anti-Mubarak and anti-police) attitudes, and a uniting national identity as Egyptians. A great many Egyptians flocked to Tahrir Square on the basis of these sentiments, but not necessarily with the fervour and drive of hardcore revolutionaries. Indeed, more than either France or Occupy it can be said that the revolution benefited from conditions of heightened convergence: the exceptional place of Tahrir, an opportune situation of regime weakness, and the paramount frame of an historical moment came together for the revolution's February days. Convergence spanning every type and context I had observed was concentrated around this incredibly brief period of massive mobilisation. With such a combination, those with an affinity for revolutionary participation, however slight, were presented with the most perfect conditions they had experienced in their entire lives. These variations across cases presented me with an interesting theoretical question: how did the categories of affinity and convergence relate to one another causally and temporally?

At first, it became apparent that there were some regularities in the functioning of affinities across cases. At the heart of affinity-based mobilisation in all three cases there was a core dispositional element grounded in participant psychology. Participants in protest generally possessed some manner of shared perceptions, attitudes, or some form of common identity with their respective causes. These 'core affinities', as I have called them form the principal dispositional element of many decisions to participate in social action. We might consider these three elements to be the consistent measure of the 'hearts and minds' appealed to by a particular cause. Nonetheless, I would be keen to not overemphasise the importance of these variables: the extent to which these 'core' affinities were present in any particular participant would differ greatly, and quite often only go as far as their not being actively hostile or dissonant towards a cause.

Ultimately, a model resting purely on psychological disposition does not tell the entire story of how the great many individuals in each of the cases I have discussed came to participate in protest. In addition to one's felt dispositions, the opportunity for some kind of eventual participation in a given cause was also conditioned by various social factors which would permit or promote such an eventuality. Thus, in order to complete this picture, we need to also consider the 'social affinities' at work in each case.

In contrast to the consistency of psychological factors, the particular role of social affinities differed according to the social context of each case. Though I was able to find all four categories of social affinity to be active in some way across all three of my cases, different categories held primacy in each case according to case-specific factors. Further to this, within categories, different particular factors were important - again depending on the social context of the case. One example of this is in the impact of patterns of activity as an affinity, and how it differed drastically in the case of Occupy Wall Street as compared with the Egyptian Revolution. New York's financial district was largely a tourist destination and not a place the majority of New Yorkers would visit during their time in the city unless they either worked on Wall Street or had the means to buy property in that area. By contrast, Tahrir Square was a major thoroughfare in Cairo, and surrounded by incredibly densely populated districts on almost every side with their inhabitants spending their days in the very same neighbourhoods. It is consequently unsurprising that while Occupiers recalled marching past balconies filled with nonchalant champagne sipping 1%ers (Interview: Michael), Cairo's poor had joined marches to Tahrir en-masse when they passed through their districts.

A similar contextual distinction can be seen between the dire socio-economic situations of Egypt and France and the much less dire context of Occupy. In the Egyptian and French

cases, social status (class), and need for basic necessities (food, information, security) played a much more central role in positively predisposing participation than in the case of Occupy, where one's resources played a more prominent role. Part of this was due to the kinds of battles being fought: in France and Egypt the emergence of a revolutionary situation altered (by interrupting conditions of life) or threatened (by creating the potential for an existential threat) the social conditions of already precarious or vulnerable social classes in ways which promoted their participation. By contrast, participation in the Occupy movement was not influenced by such a situation, but instead drew upon the capacity of participants to break from their usual sets of behaviours under conditions of relative normalcy, relying on their own personal resources to do so.

Similarly, contextual developments within a given case would sometimes initiate appeals to new kinds of social affinities. Indeed, the longer a case went on for, or the more spatially diverse it became, the greater the likelihood of these new social affinities coming to a fore. These were most active in Egypt's Eighteen Days during the early days, where participants would be 'swept up' in grand marches throughout Cairo, most active in Occupy in the longer routes which people took to the occupation, and particularly active in France which was a both temporally extensive and spatially diverse case. Beyond those who were involved from the outset, whether one became involved in a Parisian *journée* could hinge substantially on where one lived or shopped, just as the early marches of the Egyptian revolution drew forth ordinary Egyptians from their houses, mosques, and neighbourhoods in addition to the more committed activists who formed the marches' core.

Certain conditions of convergence lent themselves to the activation of different kinds of affinities. One example of this can be found within the 'exceptional' subtype of convergence. Exceptional structural (times) and cognitive conditions (frames), for example, often drew from the core triad of psychological affinities: identity, perceptions and attitudes, because they focused on making a kind of ideologically committed participation seem easier. By contrast, exceptional material conditions, such as the spaces of Zuccotti Park, or Paris' *Palais-Royal* offered liberatory, ideologically undefined zones, which activated affinities less driven by identification, shared perception or attitudinal agreement, as these places generally served as contexts in which the normal duties associated with participation were alleviated, and the possibility of highly autonomous involvement was increased, thereby opening an opportunity for a broader array of affinities to become activated.

It is also worth considering that each of the cases I have studied offer examples of activists and organisers clearly engaging with aspects of affinities and convergence, even though they did not theorise it as such. The most apparent means by which this was accomplished was through framing. In the case of Occupy, framing was deliberately employed to attract more participants to the occupation and its activities. This took forms such as the proposition of a 'US Day of Rage' and the propagation of a '99%' identity. In the Egyptian case, Ghonim and his associates took pains to frame their demands in a way which would help bring ordinary Cairenes out onto the streets. The same techniques were applied in The French Revolution through the popular outlets of revolutionary factions. Another such example is the use of an open structure to attract participants outside of activist traditions. It was important for the autonomist organisers of Occupy Wall Street that their movement should be open to anyone to participate, regardless of their skills. Likewise, the agitators of the *Palais-Royal* made use of its diverse shopping spaces, theatres and cafés to proselytise to an audience of diverse origins and frames of mind.

Despite activists' interaction with structures of affinity and convergence in their mobilisation activities, in the Occupy and Egyptian cases, conscious efforts at mobilisation would still predominantly focus on networks or organisation, rather than affinities. The exception to this came, rather surprisingly, with the case of France. Considering the unexpected divergence of the French case in favour of affinity and convergence, I returned to reconsider the structural constraints of the case, and realised unlike Occupy, where activists had access to both existing organisations and oppositional networks, and Egypt, where networked efforts at mobilisation remained possible, French revolutionaries under the ancien regime did not have reliable or substantial access to mobilizing structures. Lacking the instantaneous access to potential recruits offered by modern communications technologies, and instead inconvenienced by the need to meet and organise physically, concrete revolutionary organisations were incredibly difficult to establish in the prerevolutionary context of ancien regime repression, and carried a very high cost of participation. In other words, French revolutionaries had to construct their organisations and networks on the fly as the revolution progressed, drawing on grassroots mobilisations, elite conflict, and the chaos they created to serve as both a shield and a smokescreen for

their own organising<sup>28</sup>, becoming adept in the provocation and conditioning of popular upsurge.

While Occupy Wall Street activists swiftly developed the capacity to deploy a full suite of movement capacities, and Egyptians could rely on the online space, for French provocateurs in the Revolution's early years these options were not available and consequently they sought to mobilise by provocation, rather than by the directing of core members or movement-linked supporters. Even so, eventually revolutionary networks and organisations were built, and deployed by the Jacobins, laying the foundation for the Terror, the Thermidorian reaction, and the revolution's end.

Beyond this, one thing which draws together all three of the cases is a context of organisational weakness. In the case of Occupy, a poorly defined group of organisers (which can only very dubiously be considered a social movement by most formal definitions) tried to seize upon a day which had been given very little structure or direction. Though eventually Occupy would develop networks, and persist in various forms, initially the only reliable means of rapid expansion available to it was by affinity. Likewise, in the Egyptian case, a network of disunited organisations and movements had constantly failed to pull off any serious mass mobilisation, either between them, or individually (with the notable exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, which tended to avoid such things) and consequently it was affinity which was able to bolster the numbers of these movements. In France, formal movements and organisations emerged alongside the rapid mass mobilisations which characterised the beginning of the revolution, and did not really develop cohesively until many years into the revolution. In each of these cases, affinities are so detectable because of the weakness of other forms of mobilisation. Where social movements have strong, well actualised networks we are unlikely to see such powerful instances of affinity and convergence. It should also be noted, however, that the convergence component is critical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Though they may not have had access to the massive digital networks of the 2011 mobilisations, communications infrastructures in France were still of impressive sophistication. For more detail on the role and capacities of various communications infrastructures in the revolution, please see the following pages: the solicitation of cahiers and convocation of the estates general (153-6, 158, 161, 187-8), the role of radical presses (156-8, 160, 166, 169, 171, 185), networks of clubs (163-4 170-171, 173-5, 180), the importance of peasant and local rumours (160-62, 178), and the functioning of interlinked assemblies (156, 161, 166-167, 180).

to all of these cases. While organised movements and networks can carry out contention without eminently favourable circumstances, mobilisation on the basis of affinity needs all the help it can get. Without convergence, affinity to a cause is a paltry force which guides individuals to contention with the same unpredictability as any other affinity they might have guides them to anything else.

# 5.2 Situating Affinity and Convergence in the Study of Mobilisation

With all this in mind, how can we situate affinity and convergence in the study of mobilisation more broadly? We can think of mobilisation in a concentric fashion. First, we begin with the established knowledge in social movement and network theory: core participants and movement members form the kernel of a contentious episode, with other members of supporting networks forming the immediate contacts from whom they may draw. Adding to this, we can think about a broader circle of people: those who are mobilised in contentious episodes but are not core members or networked supporters of a movement.




Figure 2. A Concentric Representation of Mobilisation

As discussed throughout this thesis, affinity can be divided into two separate forms: psychological (relating to individuals' internal processes), and social (relating to their social context). The most central affinities across the cases I studied (and, one would predict, across other cases where affinity applies) were a triad of traits: perceptions of injustice, negative attitudes towards opponents, and some form of shared identity. Nonetheless, other (predominantly social) affinities such as one's social status, patterns of activity, needs and resources, or even one's passions or drives can still play an important role in predisposing an individual to participate in protest.

Affinity is a fainter element in mobilisation than that of network-members or a movement's core activists. Those with affinities are by no means dependable participants. In fact, they are remarkably inconstant, as they will have affinities to all manner of other things that are not a particular cause. Having a predisposition to protest does very little unless the prospect of participation comes to the fore in some way or other. By contrast, the more reliable elements of mobilisation: core organisers and those in movements' networks can be more readily and dependably mobilise. Often, mobilisation by affinity occurs only after core organisers and networks have already been mobilised. This was evidenced by both the Occupy and Egypt cases, in which hard work by various networks and groups of activists laid the foundations for the protests that were to come: be it the small group which planned and executed the September 17<sup>th</sup> occupation of Zuccotti Park in New York, or the hard work of Ghonim and April 6<sup>th</sup> in the build-up to Egypt's January 25<sup>th</sup> protests.

For the kind of massive participation which marks revolutions and social movements throughout history, most recently in the 2011 wave, there needs to be some kind of collective spark, or 'invitation' as one of my interviewees (Interview: Annie) put it. In other words, for affinity to become an effective part of mobilisation, it requires a catalyst in the form of conditions of convergence. These conditions of convergence are the situations, frames and spaces which shift collective hearts and minds toward the prospect of participation when participants cannot be formally recruited. This is expressed in the simple formula below, depicting the essential characteristics of my model of Affinity-Convergence mobilisation.

Affinity  $\xrightarrow{convergence}$  Participation

#### Figure 1. The Affinity-Convergence Model of Mobilisation

Though many conditions of convergence rely on external factors such as state-breakdown or weakness, some of these conditions of convergence are able to be created by movements, activists and their networks as a part of the process of contention. The previous section has mentioned how activists' framing activities and the spaces of protest which they create can potentially serve as conditions of convergence. More crucial, however, is the sense that conditions of convergence (and thereby the kinds of affinities which are activated in a contentious episode) can be created, dissolved, and change over time according to the behaviours of activists who create, maintain and alter them. Accordingly, the process of mobilisation of those beyond the movement is often affected by those within it.

### 5.3 Evaluating the Project: Limitations and Implications

#### Limitations

When I set out to understand the phenomenon which I have termed 'mobilisation beyond the movement', I did so with the ambition to offer something which, while explaining the particular problems which prompted my early theorizing, would make a contribution to our understanding of social movements, revolutions and other such forms of contention as a whole. At its core was the notion that concrete network or organisational ties need not exist in order for an individual to become mobilised in a period of heightened contention. By contrast, much of the way in which we think about social movements has only looked within the bounds of these social ties for concrete mobilizing structures.

What I have tried to do here is to shed some light on the mysterious processes of seemingly spontaneous mobilisation of those who are not members of social movements and their networks, with the aim of completing the picture of mobilisation from a theoretical perspective. This was something of an ambitious task: this kind of question has puzzled social movement theorists since the 1950s. Furthermore, the field of social movement studies has offered very few concerted developments on the matter since. Picking up the mantle of an almost 70 year old sociological problem was no small task, particularly as the context which had brought me to this question were distinctly contemporary: the mobilisations of 2011 which shocked the world and puzzled those of us in the academic community.

Consequently, it is worth also discussing the limitations of my research. First among these was the quality of evidence across cases. Insofar as the contemporary cases were concerned, I was extremely well served by the array of interviews which I conducted. This gave considerable descriptive power to my accounts of the Occupy and Egyptian case in offering an explanation of the role of affinity and convergence in the mobilisation process. The integration of qualitative interviews into historical methods offers sociologists the chance to get at the intersection of individual agents and the structures within which they act. We are able to ask the kinds of questions which reporters, authors, and those tasked with collecting primary historical data are not always interested in, or may not think to consider.

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Nonetheless, there are certainly ways in which the interviews I conducted as a part of my historical work could be improved. In the context of Occupy my selection of many of my interviewees using a 'snowball' method meant that a good number of the activists and participants whom I sampled shared network ties with one another. Ideally, I would have liked to increase the diversity of my sample by incorporating some randomised selection into the process. In the Egyptian context, the scope of my potential interviewees was also somewhat limited by the fact that most of my interviews would be conducted in English (with the exception of two or three which made use of interpreter). This was coupled with a further constraint: soliciting interviewees publicly was impossible in Egypt owing to the security situation and consequently I had to rely on pre-existing private networks using as many points of entry as I could muster. Though I was able to interview Egyptians from the upper and middle echelons of society, I did not have adequate access to the very poorest, whose involvement would have undoubtedly enriched my explanation of the revolution. I have tried to rectify this by asking those who I did interview to account more than merely their own personal experience, and to discuss the others whom they saw or encountered participating in the revolution.

In contrast to Occupy and Egypt, the kind of access to individual accounts which the French case permitted was something of a problem. Useful primary historical data in the French case proved frustratingly dispersed, and was often more readily available in sourcebooks or libraries than in the formal archives which I first consulted. Though the two months I spent in Paris archives were certainly useful in enhancing my overall sense of the case, much of the primary data I encountered was either not clearly evocative of the questions I was trying to answer. Consequently, only a few primary sources are cited in the text of my chapter on Paris.<sup>29</sup>

There were two means of overcoming this limitation. The first was my reliance on secondary sources, a staple of comparative historical sociology. I am particularly fortunate in this case that the questions of how French revolutionary crowds were mobilised, how the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> It is interesting to reflect that in decades to come those looking at archives of the 2011 events would have a considerable breadth of archival resources available to them, but that the preponderance of what we have tended to archive would almost certainly suggest an interpretation which relied heavily on the digital record and activity.

grand *journées* took place, and the social history of the revolution more generally, remain topics with which historians are fascinated. I have been empowered by the hard efforts of the plethora of historians who have scoured archives not only across France but all over the world in order to address the issues and questions of mobilisation with which I have also concerned myself. Without their hard work, carried out over hundreds of years<sup>30</sup>, a thorough analysis of the French case would not have been possible.

A second means of overcoming this limitation was in how I situated the French case, as the challenging 'test' case for my concepts, rather than one designed to underpin them. Consequently, by the time I had approached the French case, I already had a good idea of what exactly affinity and convergence looked like empirically, and was able to undertake an analysis of how these concepts could be used in relation to the case, in dialogue with the sociological problem which Rude (1959: 218) articulates: 'how... from such comparatively small beginnings in markets, bakers', and wine-shops did gatherings...develop into great revolutionary crowds with all the attendant manifestations of fear, heroism or destructive violence'.

Insofar as the selection of cases itself is concerned, though I am confident that I have established good grounds for the generalisability of my model, my exposition of affinity and convergence would have been well served by the addition of an additional test-case alongside France. Ideally, I would have liked to bring in a classic case of social movement theory, just as the French revolution has served as a classic revolutionary case. One such case is the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. In many ways the Civil Rights Movement was the seedbed for the organisational perspective on social movements (e.g. McAdam, 1982), and is served with comprehensive archives, living-participants for potential interview, and excellent secondary histories. On the other hand, cases from the American civil rights struggle also furnished arguments such as Piven and Cloward's(1977) landmark account of spontaneity among the urban poor. Accordingly, the case offers an interesting scholarly cleavage within which debates about exactly where organisation ends and spontaneity begins may be explored. It is, however, an incredibly diverse and complex

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Years during which much of the primary material they were working with has been lost, made inaccessible, or otherwise obscured, as I would find out during my archival visits in Paris.

case, and its addition would have stretched the entire project beyond its means, particularly due to its enormous breadth (as opposed to the generally city-centric episodes which I have considered). Nonetheless, I would advance that the US Civil Rights Movement would be an ideal place to begin further study in establishing the generalisability of this model.

Further to this, we might ask questions about the extent to which the model, developed in the context of social protest and revolution, can be applied to proximate contexts such as instances of riot. To some extent, we can see that the Affinity-Convergence model can offer insight into these risings, as evidenced by the peasant revolts and urban uprisings discussed in the chapter on France and (to a limited extent) the semi-riotous clashes in the early days of Egypt's revolution. Nonetheless, a case of riot occurring without adherence to a movement's social or political objective<sup>31</sup> might be a particularly valuable test case in this regard, as it would dispose of the confounding factor of an ongoing revolutionary process.

#### Implications

Though my theorising begins with an account of classical models and their utility, I do not consider this project to have been a vindication of the kinds of models these classical theorists advanced (Blumer, 1951; Turner and Killian, 1957; Lang and Lang, 1961). These models, as McPhail (1991) notes, were often reductive attempts to explain the irrational 'madness' of communities experiencing genuine civil strife, in an era where the social sciences did not always think kindly of protest movements, riots, and other such mobilisations. Though I consider and develop some of the more foundational elements of the classical theorists' thought, I consider this to be an attempt to rescue what was worthwhile about this arrested trajectory in social movement studies while transcending the frame with which it was more particularly developed.

It is also worth considering how this study impacts on debates regarding the role of spontaneity and organisation in protest. Do the findings of this work suggest that mass spontaneous protest (even revolution) is a potential occurrence across history, given the right context? The answer is yes, but not necessarily at the expense of organisation. Whether it is spontaneous mass protest or the skills and resources of organisers that we judge to be most crucial in achieving social change, when we turn to the empirical facts we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> The 2011 England riots would offer such a case.

will always see both. There is always, as Gamson and Schmeidler (1984:576) noted in their review of Piven and Cloward's (1977) *Poor Peoples' Movements*, a "subtle interplay between spontaneity and organisation" in the kinds of acts of mass defiance or protest which characterise much of contentious politics.

Indeed, a key strength of my research is that it comes from a position which not only acknowledges movement organisations and networks, but incorporates them into my analysis, a trait which Snow and Moss have identified as woefully lacking in prior analyses (2014:1139). I integrate and acknowledge the presence of the networks and forms of organisation constituting social movement, and the way in which the behaviour of these groups impacts on those who are beyond them. Though in terms of concrete ties those mobilised by affinity are not conventionally connected to the movement, they are still in relation with it. Many of the conditions of convergence I discuss– particularly where spaces are concerned- are created by movements, sometimes even stage-managed by them as shown in the latter half of the French case. Likewise, movements play a key role in structuring and creating the opposite 'pole' of an affinity relationship to which an individual is attracted when they come to participate in protest.

Further to this, among the central strengths of my work is that my approach is complementary to both existing and future approaches. In the broader sense, I have tried to provide a model which is generalisable to any case in which mobilisation for a given cause takes place beyond the bounds of movement-organisations or movement-networks but without seriously undercutting the body of existing theory. In other words: I aim to account for mass mobilisations where the full extent of mobilisation remains unexplained. While I anticipate the Affinity-Convergence model of mass mobilisation which I advance will particularly useful in such cases, I would be delighted if it were to be augmented by further research with even greater nuance, or exposing yet another side to mobilisation.

Though what I have offered is, at present, a demonstration of the wide-ranging sufficiency of affinity-convergence as a vector for mobilisation across diverse contexts, this sufficiency rests upon widespread freedom from impediment on the part of participants, assuming their freedom from the personal and contextual constraints which might restrict just as much as affinity and convergence enable. Indeed, there were many occasions in my research where I encountered stories of those who somehow could not or did not make their way to the instances of protest which I studied. In some individuals' cases, this was merely a temporary delay, where in others', potential participants evaded protest wholesale. These instances appear to falsify the Affinity-Convergence model on an individual level, and we can imagine potential cases where the presence of widespread constraints on individual action might falsify it on a collective level. Might there potentially be another side to the model, which could help offer a fuller picture of the chaos of contentious episodes? Just as I have discussed affinity here, we could imagine 'disaffinity' which might describe some kind of incompatibility with a given cause which would make participation much more difficult.

Perhaps, we could even see some kind of 'reaction' effect, which would underlie some form of political participation against a particular cause and in support of existing structures. Such instances of anti-movement participation could take the form of preventing activists from moving through one's local neighbourhood in a time of crisis (as many did in Egypt), or as dramatic as collaborating with state forces to crush or endanger potential dissidents (which, regrettably, others did in Egypt).

Likewise we might discover conditions of 'divergence', which could serve to separate causes from those who have affinities to them, or even to counteract conditions of convergence. We might imagine menacing conditions, such as epidemic disease, terrorist attacks, or dangerous weather conditions as potential collective impedance to participation. Alternatively, ultra-normative spaces or situations might similarly impede protest participation (one might recall the post-revolutionary collapse in protest attendance during Egypt's election season, or recall how Occupy Wall Street's attempt to occupy land owned by Trinity Church received remarkably little popular support).

It is worth briefly discussing the extent to which elements of the Affinity-Convergence model might have applications for the analysis of mobilisation within social movements, as well as beyond them. Indeed, one avenue for future research would be an examination of the functioning of affinity in a broader case than simply extra-movement, penumbral mobilisation. As discussed in Chapter 1, affinity to a cause is *not* exclusive to those beyond the movement, but instead possible across the spectrum of mobilisation. With this in mind, there is much scope for inquiry into how affinity affects those who are mobilised *within* movements. Though as a means of mobilisation it may be superseded by network ties or

organisational structures, we can ask whether affinity might somehow amplify the impact of these bonds, serving as a catalyst for within-movement mobilisation. This appears to be indicated by some of the social psychological research on sustained movement participation (Blackwood and Louis, 2012; Curtin and McGarty, 2016; Drury and Reicher, 2005; Louis et. al. 2016), as well as by work in political sociology, including McAdam's classic analysis of the Freedom Summer (1986, 1988) and Corrigal-Brown's (2012) more recent work on activists' participation trajectories.

Another avenue for future research would be an investigation into how conditions of convergence could have a positive mobilising impact on members of movement-networks or organisations, rather than those only possessing affinity to the cause. Indeed, some empirically similar contexts to the conditions of convergence I discuss are, for example, also discussed by Castells (2012:9), and Snow and Moss (2014) as elements underlying spontaneity in networked mobilisations. We might expect to see that the kind of conditions of convergence which activate affinities will also energise pre-existing network ties or organisational bonds such that they too become more effective means of mobilising than in non-convergence conditions. The case of Occupy Sandy, briefly discussed in Chapter 3, seems to offer one potential verification case for this hypothesis, where the collapse of state relief efforts (exceptional situation) and brewing humanitarian crisis (paramount frame) appeared to facilitate a renewed coalescence of extant Occupy networks.

Though I have aimed to be complementary to other theory in my work, I would like to end on something of a provocative note. While it is relatively unintrusive to suggest, as I have, that the process of mobilisation takes place in three concentric capacities: movement organisations, their networks, and affinities 'beyond the movement', this suggestion begs a further question. Namely, to what extent is 'the movement' as a bundle of networks or organisations actually a useful analytical unit for the assessment of contention? Is it just mobilisation which can lie beyond the movement, or does the process of contention itself take place with a broader scope than the distinct and identifiable groups and networks which we have tried to model so far? I would suggest that, with mobilisation as a demonstrative example of the utility of such an approach, we should continue to think 'beyond the movement' when evaluating contentious episodes. Perhaps, if we do, we might find something there.

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## Conclusion

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