

Limits of the real

A hypertext critical edition and translation of Bhartṛhari's
Dravyasamuddeśa, with the commentary of Helārāja

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Abstract

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first is a critical study of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, a chapter from the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, a 5th-century Sanskrit philosopher of language. It also deals with the 10th-century commentary of Helārāja, which was highly influential in shaping the interpretation of the text by later authors. Although the *Vākyapadīya* is a treatise on Sanskrit grammar, and this particular chapter purports to deal with the grammatical category of *dravya*, in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari is mostly concerned with establishing a non-dual theory of reality. Helārāja, five centuries later, defends this theory and attempts to re-interpret other schools of thought, namely Buddhism and Sāṃkhya, in its terms. The second part of the dissertation is a critical edition and annotated translation of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* and the commentary. It also describes the making of the edition – for this project, an open source software package was developed to automatically collate diplomatic transcriptions of manuscript witnesses in order to generate an apparatus variorum. The resulting apparatus forms part of an interactive, online digital edition of the text, from which the printed edition is generated.

Preface

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution.

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the Degree Committee of the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies.

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The *Dravyasamuddeśa* of Bhartṛhari

ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śarīraṃ tattvam ity api |
dravyam ity asya paryāyās tac ca nityam iti
smṛtam || 1 ||

It is also called: *ātman*, *vastu*, *svabhāva*, *śarīra*,
and *tattva*. These are synonyms of *dravya*, and it
is traditionally taught that it is permanent.

satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate |
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyam evābhidhī-
yate || 2 ||

The real entity is determined through its unreal
forms; only the real is denoted by words, which
have unreal delimiters,

adhruveṇa nimittena devadattaḡṛhaṃ yathā |
ḡṛhītaṃ ḡṛhaśabdena śuddham evābhidhī-
yate || 3 ||

just as Devadatta's house is grasped by a tempo-
rary mark, but only the bare house is denoted by
the word "house",

suvarṇādi yathā yuktaṃ svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ |
rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ śuddham evaiti vācya-
tām || 4 ||

just as gold, etc., is endowed with its own, tran-
sient forms, but it is really the pure gold that is
expressed by denotations such as "ring".

ākāraiś ca vyavacchedāt sārvarthyam avaru-
dhyate |
yathaiva cakṣurādīnāṃ sāmartyaṃ nāḍikādi-
bhiḥ || 5 ||

And the capacity of a word to mean everything
is restrained because the object is differentiated
by its forms, in the very same way that the capa-
bility of the eyes, etc. is restrained by a hollow
stalk, etc.

teṣv ākāreṣu yaḥ śabdās tathābhūteṣu vartate |
tattvātmakatvāt tenāpi nityam evābhidhī-
yate || 6 ||

The permanent substance is denoted even by a
word that expresses solely forms of such a kind,
since those forms are identical with the real.

<p>na tattvātattvayor bheda iti vṛddhebhya āga- maḥ atattvam iti manyante tattvam evāvicāri- tam 7 </p>	<p>There is no difference between the real and the unreal, according to the tradition passed down from the elders. What others think is “the un- real” is really the real which has not been prop- erly examined.</p>
<p>vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tattvam evāvikalpitaṃ na cātra kālabhedo 'sti kālabhedaś ca gr̥hyate 8 </p>	<p>It is really the unconceptualized real which as- sumes the form of conceptualization. And there is no temporal difference in it, yet temporal dif- ference is grasped,</p>
<p>yathā viṣayadharmāṇāṃ jñāne 'tyantam asaṃ- bhavaḥ tadātmeva ca tat siddham atyantam atadātma- kam 9 </p>	<p>just as the properties of the object of cognition absolutely do not belong to cognition itself, and, although seemingly identical, it is established that they are absolutely non-identical,</p>
<p>yathā vikārarūpāṇāṃ tattve 'tyantam asaṃbha- vaḥ tadātmeva ca tat tattvam atyantam atadātma- kam 10 </p>	<p>just as transformations of the real absolutely do not belong to the real, and, although seemingly identical, the real is absolutely non-identical with its transformations.</p>
<p>satyam ākṛtisamhāre yad ante vyavatiṣṭhate tan nityaṃ śabdavācyaṃ tac chabdāt tac ca na bhidyate 11 </p>	<p>That reality which remains at the end, when all forms are destroyed, that is permanent, that is expressed by the word, and that is not different from the word.</p>
<p>na tad asti na tan nāsti na tad ekaṃ na tat pṛthak na saṃsṛṣṭaṃ vibhaktaṃ na vikṛtaṃ na ca nā- nyathā 12 </p>	<p>It does not exist nor does it not exist, it is not sin- gular, it is not separate, it is not connected nor divided, it is not transformed nor is it otherwise.</p>
<p>tan nāsti vidyate tac ca tad ekaṃ tat pṛthak pṛthak saṃsṛṣṭaṃ ca vibhaktaṃ ca vikṛtaṃ tat tad a- nyathā 13 </p>	<p>It does not exist and it does, it is singular, it is many separate entities, it is connected and di- vided, it is transformed, it is otherwise.</p>
<p>tasya śabdārthasambandharūpaṃ ekasya dṛśyate tad dṛśyaṃ darśanaṃ draṣṭā darśane ca prayoja- nam 14 </p>	<p>That singular reality is seen as the word, the ob- ject, and their relationship. It is what is seen, the seeing, the seer, and the purpose of the seeing.</p>

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vikārapagame satyaṃ suvarṇaṃ kuṇḍale yathā |
vikārapagame satyāṃ tathāhuḥ prakṛtiṃ pa-
rām || 15 ||

vācyā sā sarvaśabdānāṃ śabdāś ca na pṛthak ta-
taḥ |
apṛthaktve ca saṃbandhas tayor nānātmanor
iva || 16 ||

ātmā paraḥ priyo dveṣyo vaktā vācyāṃ prayoja-
nam |
viruddhāni yathaikasya svapne rūpāṇi ceta-
saḥ || 17 ||

ajanmani tathā nitye paurvāparvivarjite |
tattve janmādirūpatvaṃ viruddham upala-
bhyate || 18 ||

Just as, when the transformations go away, only
the gold in the ring is real, in the same way, they
say that, when the transformations go away, only
the absolute, primordial matter is real.

That primordial matter is expressed by all
words, and words are not separate from it. And
even though they are not separate, there is a
relationship between words and the primordial
matter, as if they were distinct from one another.

Self and other, friend and adversary, speaker,
spoken and purpose of the speaking: just as, in a
dream, a single mind takes these contradictory
forms,

in absolute reality – unborn, permanent, and de-
void of sequence –, contradiction, in the form of
birth, etc., is perceived.

Introduction

What is real? This seems like an unlikely question for a grammarian to address, and yet, it is precisely what the 5th-century Sanskrit grammarian Bhartṛhari sets out to do. Embedded in the *Vākyapadīya* – a vast technical and philosophical tract dealing with words and sentences, parts of speech, number, grammatical gender, and complex formation – is the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, the chapter on substance. This short chapter purports to deal with the grammatical category of *dravya*, but there is not much grammar discussed here; early on, the third and fourth verses refer to grammatical points discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya*, the 2nd-century BCE commentary on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, but those discussions are re-purposed to a philosophical end: as similes for the relationship between the transient – and ultimately unreal – forms that we perceive in the world and the absolute, immutable, non-dual reality that Bhartṛhari asserts is real. Then, immediately after establishing this point, he demolishes the linguistic categories of real and unreal, being and non-being, for non-duality could never admit such distinctions.

Perhaps it is because so many ideas are expressed so concisely in this chapter that it was so useful for the author of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*,¹ a 14th-century doxography, when it came to describing the philosophy of the grammarians. Four verses from the *Dravyasamuddeśa* are quoted there, which, given the length of the chapter, is exceptional. The *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is, by far, the most influential of Sanskrit doxographies, and it is most likely because of that text that Bhartṛhari is, today, the de facto representative of what has become known as the *Pāṇinidarśana*. Although the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is a highly idiosyncratic representation of philosophy in India, as Andrew Nicholson has pointed out, it has “often been considered an accurate depiction of the Indian philosophical schools, so much so that Deussen's volume on India in his *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* is largely based on [it]”;² similarly, Max Müller's *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, in its short sections devoted to language, seems to be discussing passages from the *Pāṇinidarśana* chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.³ Thus, the influence of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* can be felt even in shaping early Western ideas about the philosophy of language in India.

But the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* does not only quote Bhartṛhari's verses; it also reuses large passages

¹The *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is traditionally attributed to Mādhava, although newer scholarship attributes it to Canni Bhaṭṭa, a younger contemporary of Mādhava (see Yamashita 1998, 22-32 and K. Kunjuni Raja's preface to Klostermaier 1999).

²2013, 159. See Deussen 1914, 190ff. Deussen translates *Vākyapadīya* I.14 as it is quoted in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, without recognizing its source (1914, 399).

³Yamashita 1998, 3. See Müller 1899, 397ff.

from Helārāja's 10th-century commentary on them. Helārāja takes a very active role in delineating Bhartṛhari's doctrinal position – he rejects the theory of *pariṇāma* twice in his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, both times insisting that Bhartṛhari is a *vivartavādin*; he also takes care to specify which Buddhist beliefs are compatible with the kind of Advaita that Bhartṛhari espouses, and which are not. Writing five centuries after Bhartṛhari, Helārāja had to contend with Buddhist epistemologists who radically transformed Bhartṛhari's ideas as well as with Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas who staunchly rejected them, and his interpretation of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* is, evidently, shaped by the centuries of debate that preceded him. His particular take on the philosophy of Bhartṛhari is then filtered through the Śāṅkarite lens of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and translated into English in 1882 by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, making its way into the still-nascent western Indological discourse of the late 19th century.

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first is a critical study, outlining the philosophy of Bhartṛhari's *Dravyasamuddeśa* and how Helārāja uses the text to engage with the doctrines of other schools of thought. I am greatly indebted to earlier foundational studies on the *Vākyapadīya*, such as K. A. Subramania Iyer's *A study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries*⁴ and Ashok Aklujkar's doctoral dissertation,⁵ in which he argues that the text – consisting of three kāṇḍas – which scholars consider to be the *Vākyapadīya* is more accurately known as the *Trikāṇḍī*. I also draw on the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, which helps to provide a fuller picture of his attitude towards issues such as the permanence of the linguistic referent. In contrast to Bhartṛhari, comparatively less scholarship has been devoted to Helārāja as a philosopher in his own right; it is hoped that this study will contribute to the understanding of Helārāja's intellectual and historical context and the ways in which he leverages the text of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* to bear on the philosophical concerns of his own time.

The second part is a critical edition and annotated translation of the text. This edition improves upon the text of Subramania Iyer, thanks to a number of additional manuscripts which have shed new light on the transmission of the text. Major differences are listed in the preface. This thesis is the first attempt – of which I am aware – to study systematically the relationship between the extant manuscripts of the text and to hypothesize a stemma codicum. This is also the first translation of the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* on the *Dravyasamuddeśa* into any European language. The *Dravyasamuddeśa* is the second of fourteen *samuddeśas* in the *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*.⁶ Five other translations, focusing on different *samuddeśas*, have been published previously: the section on the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* was translated by Jan Houben;⁷ the section on the *Samkhyāsamuddeśa* was translated by Pascale Haag;⁸

⁴Subramania Iyer 1969.

⁵Aklujkar 1970.

⁶It has been argued that there once existed up to sixteen *samuddeśas* (Aklujkar 1969, 548); conversely, what is currently known as the *Bhūyodravayasamuddeśa* may have originally been part of the *Guṇasamuddeśa* (see Houben 1995, 85 & 100).

⁷Houben 1995.

⁸Haag 2005

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the section on the *Kālasamuddeśa* was translated by Peri Sarveswara Sharma;⁹ and the sections on the *Kriyāsamuddeśa* and the *Puruṣasamuddeśa* were translated by Giovanni Bandini.¹⁰ These earlier translations have been immensely helpful in the study of Helārāja's distinctive vocabulary and prose style.

The second part also includes a chapter on methodology: for this project, an open source software package was developed to automatically collate diplomatic transcriptions of manuscript witnesses in order to generate an apparatus variorum. The resulting apparatus forms part of an interactive, online digital edition of the text, from which the printed edition is generated. More information on the online edition can be found in chapter 5.2 as well as in the appendix.

⁹Sharma 1972.

¹⁰Bandini 1980, 1982.

Part I.

Critical study

1. Bhartṛhari on *dravya*: the real as delimited by the unreal

1.1. The semantics of the term *dravya*

The word *dravya* has a very wide semantic scope and denotes an important concept in virtually all genres of Indian literature. In the Vedas, the material offering used in a ritual is called *dravya*.¹ In narrative literature and Dharmaśāstra, it can mean worldly goods, gold, wealth, or property. In Āyurveda, it means medicinal herbs or medicine in general.²

Pāṇinian derivations

According to the grammatical tradition, the word *dravya* could be derived either from a verb or a noun. In the first case, it is derived from the verb *dru*, meaning “to flow” or “to dissolve”, via A 3.1.97 *aco yat*, which states that the *kṛt* affix *yaT* can be used with a verbal root ending in a vowel to form a future passive participle (*kṛtya*).³ The resulting *dravya* would mean something like “to be dissolved”, and this might be connected to the use of the word in the sense of “medicinal ingredients” or “spirituous liquor”.⁴ In the second case, it is derived from the noun *dru*, meaning “wood” or “tree”, via the taddhita affix *yaT*, as specified in A 4.3.161 *droś ca*. As the *Kāśikāvṛtti* explains it, the resulting *dravya* has the meaning of “a modification of a tree” (*vikāra*) or “a part of a tree” (*avayava*).⁵ This particular use of

¹Manfred Mayrhofer suggests a possible connection between *dravya* and *havya* (1992, 757).

²See Vatsyayan et al. 1999, 69ff.

³*dru dhātoḥ aco yat iti* (*Tattvabodhinī*, ed. Śāstri Paṇḍīkara 1908, 269).

⁴Monier-Williams et al. 1899, 501.

⁵*druśabdād yatpratyaayo bhavati vikāravayavayor arthayoḥ* (ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstri and Śukla 1965–1967, III, 728).

the word is rare, but attested in the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*.⁶ A third meaning, considered irregular, is the sense of “suitable” or “worthy”, which is given by A 5.3.104 *dravyam ca bhavye*. As examples, the *Kāśikā* gives *dravyo 'yaṃ rājaputraḥ*, “the prince is worthy”, and *dravyo 'yaṃ māṇavakaḥ*, “the youth is worthy”.⁷

These three Pāṇinian derivations give rise to quite disparate meanings, but that has not stopped some later grammarians from heroically attempting to reconcile some or all of the meanings of the word *dravya*; for example, in Vardhamāna's *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* – a 12th-century metrical arrangement of the nominal bases in the *Gaṇapāṭha* – the author's commentary on the word *dru* reads:

druḥ iva dravyam ayaṃ rājaputraḥ | yathā dru-
maḥ phalapuṣpapallavādibhir arthinaḥ kṛtā-
rthayati sa hi bhavanam arhatīti bhavyo bha-
vaty ātmavān iti dravyam ucyate | kriyā hi dra-
vyaṃ vinayati nādravyam iti | puruṣārthasā-
dhakatvād hiraṇyādikam api dravyam |⁸

This prince is worthy (*dravya*), like a tree (*dru*). Just as a tree realizes the purpose of the purposeful through [the production] of fruits, flowers, and shoots etc., for it is worthy (*bhavya*) – that is, worthy of being – thus it is called *dravya*, that is, self-possessed. For action [can only] govern *dravya*, not a non-*dravya*. Because it is a means for attaining human goals, gold, etc. is also *dravya*.

In this passage, Vardhamāna is fairly comprehensive in explaining the meaning of *dravya* as defined in various lexicons as well as by the Pāṇinian rules where *dravya* is specifically derived, and he also incorporates an important semantic field that has not yet been mentioned: *dravya* as substance, substrate, substantive, or individual thing. This is by far the most dominant use of the word *dravya* not only in grammatical literature but also in other philosophical schools – from Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, to heterodox traditions like Buddhism and Jainism. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, there is one occurrence of the word *dravya* where it seems to be used in this sense: A 5.4.11 *kimettinavyayaghād āmv adravyaprakarṣe*. This rule governs the use of the affix *āmU* after certain words formed with *gha*, which is the technical term for the comparative *taraP* and superlative *tamaP* affixes.⁹ The condition *adravyaprakarṣe* stipulates that *āmU* cannot be used in cases where the comparative or superlative is applied to *dravyas*. According to the *Padamañjarī*, the word *dravya* seems to be used here in contrast to *guṇa*, quality, and *kriyā*, action, which are valid conditions for the use of the affix, since those categories can be differentiated in terms of degree¹⁰ – examples given in the *Kāśikā* include *uccaitarām*, “louder” or “higher”, and *pacatitamām*, “cooking the best”. On the other hand, a *dravya*, which here seems to mean a substance or an individual thing, does not have degree; an individual thing cannot be more or less itself. It is only the qualities which inhere in an individual, its *guṇas*, which

⁶ *atha yūpya eko dravya eko gatya ekaḥ... atha ya ūrdhva vakalo dravyaḥ sa mānuṣaḥ* (10.2, ed. Rai 1987, 77). A. B. Keith translates *dravya* as “rich in wood” (Keith 1920, 404) while P. Ghosal translates *dravya* as “duramen” (Mukhopadhyaya and Basu 1999, 77).

⁷ (ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī and Śukla 1965–1967, V, 313).

⁸ ed. Eggeling 1963, 233.

⁹ A 1.1.22 *taraptamapau ghaḥ*.

¹⁰ *yathoktam bhāṣye – guṇasyaiva prakarṣo na dravyasyeti* (ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī and Śukla 1965–1967, IV, 332).

can have degree.¹¹

A substance and its qualities: *dravya* and *guṇa*

Although this use of the word *dravya* is not derivable via the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*,¹² it became such an important concept in the grammatical tradition that later grammarians seem to feel the need to retroactively read it back into the Pāṇinian derivation of *dravya*; for example, Haradatta, glossing *dravya* in his commentary on A 4.3.161 *droś ca*, does not follow the *Kāśikā* in understanding it as meaning “a part or modification of a tree”, but rather gives an alternative definition: *guṇasaṃdrāva*, “a confluence of qualities”.¹³ This is, in fact, an etymology given by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya*,¹⁴ using the common root *dru*, from which both *drāva* and *dravya* are derived, as the basis for his analysis. As Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat remarks, this is not a Pāṇinian derivation; Patañjali, instead, calls it a *nirvacana*, an etymological analysis modeled on Yaska’s *Nirukta*.¹⁵

The definition *guṇasaṃdrāva* appears in the commentary on A 5.1.119 *tasya bhāvas tvatalau*. This rule governs the formation of abstract nouns using the *tva* and *taL* affixes. According to Kātyāyana, these affixes express *guṇas*, qualities, which inhere in a *dravya*.¹⁶ Patañjali defines the *guṇas* as sound, touch, appearance, taste, and smell;¹⁷ then he asks, how is *dravya* different from *guṇa*? If the *guṇas* encompass all that can be perceived of an object, what else is there?¹⁸

iha samāne varṣmaṇi pariṇāhe cānyat tulā-
gram bhavati lohasyānyat kārṇpāsānām, yatkrto
viśeṣas tad dravyam | tathā kaścit spṛśann eva
chinatti kaścil lambamāno 'pi na chinatti, ya-
tkrto viśeṣas tad dravyam | kaścicid ekenaiva pra-
hāreṇa vyapavargaṃ karoti, kaścit dvābhyām
api na karoti, yatkrto viśeṣas tad dravyam |¹⁹

Given the same width and height, the weight of iron is different from that of cotton; that which causes the difference is *dravya*. Similarly, something cuts just by touching, and something else, pressed in, doesn’t cut; that which causes the difference is *dravya*. Something makes a split after a single blow, while something else does not after two blows; that which causes the difference is *dravya*.

While the *guṇas* are defined as properties that can be directly perceived by the five senses, *dravya* is something that can only be inferred and differentiated in comparison. As B. K. Matilal points out,

¹¹There is one more occurrence of *dravya* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*: A 5.1.51 *vasnadravayābhyām ṭhankanau*. This rule specifies the *kaN* affix for the word *dravya*, forming the word *dravyaka*, meaning “one who carries/procures (*harati*) *dravya*”. In this case, the context would suggest, for *dravya*, a meaning such as “thing” or “money” (Sharma 2002–2003, IV, 464).

¹²Rama Nath Sharma states that *dravya* in the sense of *vastu* is considered *avyutpanna*, underived (2002, IV, 350).

¹³ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstri and Śukla 1965–1967, III, 728.

¹⁴*guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam iti* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, II, 366).

¹⁵1998, 46–47.

¹⁶*siddhaṇ tu yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdāniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, II, 366).

¹⁷*śabdaspārśarūparasagandhā guṇāḥ* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, II, 366).

¹⁸*ananyat śabdādibhyo dravyam. na hy anyad upalabhyate* (Ibid.).

¹⁹Ibid.

this is one of the earliest extant examples of this kind of inferential reasoning, which he compares to *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* from the Nyāya tradition.²⁰ Patañjali then goes on to give yet another definition of *dravya*: as something whose essence (*tattva*) is not changed when different *guṇas* become manifest in them, like a mango that changes colour but remains a mango.²¹ This example leads him to give the etymology of *dravya* as *guṇasaṃdrāva*, a confluence of qualities²² – it is the aspect of an object which is permanent, which gives it its identity, even when its qualities change.

1.2. Patañjali on the *jāti* and *dravya* views on word-meaning

This definition of *dravya*, and the associated notion of permanence, becomes crucially important in the discussion over whether a word denotes a *jāti*, a generic property, or a *dravya*, an individual. This is one of the most debated questions not only in the grammatical tradition, but also in any philosophical school that deals with language. It is mentioned in various places in the *Mahābhāṣya*, but the lengthiest discussion occurs around rules A 1.2.58 *jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām* and A 1.2.64 *sarūpānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktāu*. According to Kātyāyana, these two rules support two opposing views on the question: respectively, that of Vājapyāyana, who held that a word denotes *jāti*, and that of Vyāḍi, who held that a word denotes *dravya*.²³ Rule A 1.2.58 states that the plural inflection can be used optionally when *jāti* is being expressed. For example, one could say *sampanno yavaḥ* in the singular or *sampannā yavāḥ* in the plural,²⁴ referring to “excellent barley” in general in both cases. This rule seems to support the *jāti* view of word meaning. On the other hand, rule A 1.2.64 states that when two or more words with the same form are reduced to one word, that form need only appear once, with its inflectional ending reflecting its number. So, for example, in order to express “two trees”, instead of saying *vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca*, one could say *vṛkṣau*, reducing the two identical nominal bases *vṛkṣa* to a single occurrence, with a dual ending. In the same vein, *vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca* could be reduced to *vṛkṣāḥ*, with a plural ending. The very existence of this rule seems to show that Pāṇini thought of a word as denoting an individual thing, since, if the word *vṛkṣa* denoted the class or genus of “tree”, then this rule would not be needed. But, to illustrate an unintended consequence of this assertion, Patañjali provides two injunctions as examples: *brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*, “brāhmaṇas should not be killed”, and *surā na peyā*, “alcohol should not be drunk”. In these cases,

²⁰“...a method by which we come to know the existence of an unperceived or even an imperceptible object or event through parity of reasoning, induction and analogy” (2005, 72).

²¹*athavā yasya guṇāntareṣv api prādurbhavatsu tattvaṃ na vihanate tad dravyam | kiṃ punas tattvam | tadbhāvas tattvam | tad yathā | āmalakādīnāṃ phalānāṃ raktādayaḥ pitādayaś ca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanti, āmalakam badaram iti eva bhavati* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, II, 266).

²²As Scharf notes, this definition could be taken as synonymous with *guṇasamudāya*, the definition of *dravya* given under A 4.1.3 (1996, 24).

²³Patañjali also refers to these two rules in the *Paspaśāhnika: ākr̥tīṃ padārthaṃ matvā jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām ity ucyate | dravyaṃ padārthaṃ matvā sarūpānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktāu ity ekaśeṣa ārabhyate* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 6).

²⁴ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 365.

the words *brāhmaṇa* and *surā* clearly denote *brāhmaṇas* and alcohol in general, as *jāti*s, rather than individuals; otherwise, these sentences would mean that a particular *brāhmaṇa* should be spared, but leave open the possibility that all other *brāhmaṇas* could be killed; that some particular unit of alcohol should not be drunk, but that alcohol consumption in general is not prohibited.²⁵

Naturally, this seems like a false dichotomy; why should a word denote only *jāti* or *dravya* in all cases? Even while discussing A 1.2.58, which purportedly supports the view that it is *jāti* that is denoted by words, Patañjali acknowledges that the choice between using a noun in a plural or singular inflection depends on the speaker's intention – when a genus is intended, the singular is naturally used; when a group of individuals is intended, the plural is naturally used.²⁶ Near the end of the discussion, having presented both sides of the argument, Patañjali presents a pragmatic solution to the problem:

na hy ākṛtipadārthikasya dravyaṃ na padārtho
dravyapadārthikasya vākṛtir na padārthaḥ | u-
bhayor ubhayaṃ padārthaḥ | kasyacit tu kiṃcit
pradhānabhūtaṃ kiṃcid guṇabhūtam | ākṛti-
padārthikasyākṛtiḥ pradhānabhūtā dravyaṃ
guṇabhūtam | dravyapadārthikasya dravyaṃ
pradhānabhūtam ākṛtir guṇabhūtā |²⁷

It is not that, for one who holds the word-meaning to be the generic property, an individual is not [also] meant; nor is it that, for one who holds the word-meaning to be an individual, the generic property is not [also] meant. Both meanings hold for both. [The question is] which is primary and which is subordinate and for whom. For one who holds the word-meaning to be a generic property, the generic property is primary and the individual is subordinate. For one who holds the word-meaning to be the individual, the individual is primary and the generic property is subordinate.

As is also shown elsewhere in the *Mahābhāṣya*, in this passage Patañjali makes it clear that both positions are acceptable. This becomes an axiom for later grammarians; Bhartṛhari, in the *Jātiśamuddeśa*, codifies it as *jātir vā dravyam eva vā padārthau sarvaśabdānām*.²⁸ This passage also shows an important detail about Patañjali's vocabulary: his frequent use of the words *jāti* and *ākṛti* as synonyms. As Peter Scharf has shown in his exhaustive study, the two words are often used interchangeably in the *Mahābhāṣya* to mean "genus" or "class property".²⁹

²⁵*brāhmaṇamātraṃ na hanyate surāmātraṃ ca na pīyate | yadi dravyaṃ padārthaḥ syād ekaṃ brāhmaṇam ahatvaikāṃ ca surām apītvānyatra kāmācāraḥ syāt* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 242-243).

²⁶*tad yadā dravyābhīdhānaṃ tadā bahuvacanaṃ bhaviṣyati. yadā sāmānyābhīdhānaṃ tadaikavacanaṃ bhaviṣyati* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 230).

²⁷ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 246.

²⁸ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 8.

²⁹Scharf 1996, 35-36. Although Patañjali seems to define the relationship between *jāti* and *ākṛti* under A 4.1.63 as *ākṛti-grahaṇā jātir*; "*jāti* is that which is grasped through *ākṛti*", as Scharf points out, under A 1.2.58, Patañjali explicitly attributes the same features to *ākṛti* as are attributed to *jāti* under A 4.1.63.

The gold simile

However, *ākṛti* has a broader semantic field than *jāti*; it is also used in the sense of the physical shape or form that an object takes. This becomes important in the *Paspaśāhnika* when, again, Patañjali is discussing whether a word denotes *dravya* or *ākṛti*. The main consideration here is which of the two is *nitya*, permanent; since the *vārttika siddhe śabdārthasambandhe* states that the word, its object, and their relation are permanent, then whichever of the two is permanent must be the object of a word:

dravyam hi nityam ākṛtir anityā | katham jñāyate | evaṃ hi drśyate loke | mṛt kayācid ākṛtyā yuktā piṇḍo bhavati | piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdyā ghaṭikāḥ kriyante | ghaṭikākṛtim upamṛdyā kuṇḍikāḥ kriyante | tathā suvarṇaṃ kayācid ākṛtyā yuktam piṇḍo bhavati | piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdyā rucakāḥ kriyante | rucakākṛtim upamṛdyā kaṭakāḥ kriyante | kaṭakākṛtim upamṛdyā svastikāḥ kriyante | punar āvṛttaḥ suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ punar aparayākṛtyā yuktaḥ khadirāgārasavarṇe kuṇḍale bhavataḥ | ākṛtir anyā cānyā ca bhavati dravyaṃ punas tad eva | ākṛtyupamardena dravyam evāvaśiṣyate |³⁰

For *dravya* is permanent while *ākṛti* is impermanent. How is this known? It is thus seen in the world. Mud, associated with a certain *ākṛti*, is a lump. When the lump *ākṛti* is destroyed, pots are made. When the pot *ākṛti* is destroyed, jars are made. In the same way, gold, associated with a certain *ākṛti*, is a lump. When the lump *ākṛti* is destroyed, necklaces are made. When the necklace *ākṛti* is destroyed, bracelets are made. When the bracelet *ākṛti* is destroyed, *svastikas* are made. The gold, again reverted to a lump, again associated with another *ākṛti*, becomes two earrings having the colour of embers of *khadira* wood. The *ākṛti* is always different [in each case] while the *dravya* is the same. It is the *dravya* that remains upon the destruction of the *ākṛti*.

Earlier in the *Paspaśāhnika*, Patañjali has defined *ākṛti* as *sāmānyabhūta*, being a universal or genus,³¹ but here, it is clearly used in the sense of the different shapes that a substance, like gold, can take – a bracelet, a ring, or even just a lump. The word *dravya* here also takes on a different meaning; rather than an individual object, it clearly has the sense of the underlying substance of which the object consists, as in the discussion on A 5.1.119, when it was defined as *guṇasaṃdrāva*. As a result of the different senses in which *ākṛti* and *dravya* are used in this passage, the terms of this debate have a strikingly different character from the one in the discussion of A 1.2.58 and A 1.2.64; the evidence is not drawn from analyzing sentences and deducing the speaker's intention, but rather from thinking through the ontological import of *dravya* and *ākṛti*. This passage hinges not so much on the question of what is meant, but rather on what is there.

³⁰ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 7.

³¹*tadbhinneṣv abhinnaṃ chinneṣv acchinnaṃ sāmānyabhūtaṃ* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 1).

1.3. Bhartṛhari's treatment of *jāti* and *dravya*

In the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari generally keeps the ambiguity of the terms *ākṛti*, *jāti*, and *dravya* as they are presented in the *Mahābhāṣya*. In some cases, *jāti* and *ākṛti* are taken as synonymous, while in other cases *ākṛti* means the shape or form of an object while *jāti* refers to a universal property that inheres in an object.³² The word *dravya* inherits all the connotations it had in the *Mahābhāṣya*, and it also gains two more definitions: firstly, as an individual object, *dravya* is defined as anything that can be referred to by a pronoun; secondly, as substance, it is given an Advaitin interpretation – as the underlying, monistic substance of reality, synonymous with *brahman*.

As Jan Houben points out, “if the main theoretical division in the second Kāṇḍa is the division between the acceptance of either the sentence or the word as primary, the main theoretical division within the third Kāṇḍa is no doubt that between the ‘universal’ and the ‘substance’ view. The opposition between these two is pointed out at the beginning of the first or *Jāti-samuddeśa*, and plays a role, sometimes more manifest, sometimes more at the background, also in the other chapters.”³³ As in the *Mahābhāṣya*, both views are acceptable, since a word denotes both, but either *jāti* or *dravya* will be primary depending on the circumstances. This position is echoed by Bhartṛhari in the *Ṛttisamuddeśa*, in a passage that paraphrases Patañjali's conclusion in his discussion on A 1.2.64 – whichever of the two is primarily denoted by a word, the other, unexpressed aspect nevertheless acts in a subordinate capacity.³⁴ In addition, both in the *Vākyapadīya* – especially in the third kāṇḍa – and in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, Bhartṛhari elaborates upon the statements made by Patañjali and theorizes different models to account for how words are related to objects, starting from the premise of a word expressing a *jāti* or a word expressing a *dravya*.

Jāti as the primary referent

As Patañjali objected in the *Mahābhāṣya*, in the sentence *gaur jātaḥ*, “the cow is born”, the word *gauḥ* clearly refers to an individual; how could it stand for a *jāti* in this case?³⁵ The *Dīpikā* gives an answer: as S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen summarize it, “words stand for an *ākṛti* or *jāti* in the first place, and are used to refer to individuals through a process called *tādrūpyāpādana*. This process consists in particularizing the *ākṛti* or *jāti* by connecting the word expressing it with words which express a *guṇa*, *kriyā* or *saṃjñā*”³⁶. For example, the word *go* on its own would refer first to *gotva*, cow-ness; then, it might be particularized by the word *śukla*, which refers to *śuklatva*, white-ness. In the case of *gaur jātaḥ*, the cow is particularized by an action, that of being born. In this way, words that refer

³²For example, in the *Ṛtti* to 1.93 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 159), *ākṛti* is used to explain *jāti* in the verse; on the other hand, in the *Ṛtti* to 2.156 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1983, II, 223), *ākṛti* is used in the sense of the physical form that a substance takes.

³³Houben 1995, 132.

³⁴*Ṛttisamuddeśa* 354-357, ed. Subramania Iyer 1973, 313-314.

³⁵*gaur jāta iti sarvaṃ gobhūtam anavakāśaṃ syāt* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, 244).

³⁶Joshi and Roodbergen 1986, 102.

to class properties are particularized in order to refer to individual objects.³⁷ But what makes the recognition of the individual object possible in the first place is that the object possesses a particular *ākṛti* – we always recognize different individual cows as a cow because of the “permanence” of the *gotva* that inheres in each one.

Dravya as the primary referent

On the other hand, if the main referent of a word is a *dravya*, how can these individual objects be distinguished from one another, i.e., how can one cow be distinguished from another cow? The answer, given both in the *Dīpikā* and in the *Guṇasamuddeśa*, is almost identical to the *jāti*-model: a *dravya* is particularized by differentiating features such as *jāti* and *guṇa*.³⁸ As explained above in relation to A 5.4.11, a *dravya* cannot admit of degree in and of itself;³⁹ in order to differentiate one cow from another, one must rely on the qualities – for example, whiteness – that inhere in each cow, which do admit of degree, i.e., one cow might be more white than the other. As Helārāja says, when *dravya* is defined in this way – as something to be qualified or differentiated – then even a *jāti* or a *kriyā* could be thought of as *dravya*, presumably following the logic laid out in the *Dīpikā* above.⁴⁰

As Madhav Deshpande points out, this notion of *dravya* has no particular ontological status.⁴¹ It is a functional definition that is flexible enough to allow language to refer to things that may or may not exist; it is even broader than Patañjali’s notion of *guṇasamudāya*. But this is not the final word on *dravya*; as Wilhelm Halbfass puts it, “this functional and empirical concept of substance is superseded by the idea of an absolute substance, which coincides with the nondual *brahman*, the ultimate ground of language and the world”.⁴² But how does the notion of *dravya* as the referent of a word become transformed into the notion of *dravya* as the all-pervasive substance of reality? In other words, how does the question of meaning become answered, eventually, with a notion of existence?

If we look at Bhartṛhari’s functional definitions of *jāti* and *dravya*, we find that he has taken Patañjali’s four categories of words – *jāti*, *guṇa*, *kriyā*, and *yadṛcchā* – and essentially distilled them into two: *bhedya* and *bhedaka*. In the definition of *jāti* as *bhedya*, something to be differentiated (in order to

³⁷*tatra kriyāṃ pratipadyamānaṃ dravyaṃ gāmānāyeti cararūpeṇābhidhīyate | evaṃ śuklo gaur iti | śuklatve-naikārthasamavetasamavāyena gotvam upalakṣyate | eko brāhmaṇa ity ekatvena brāhmaṇatvam iti | sarvaḥ śabda ākṛtīm āha* (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 26).

³⁸*jātyādayas tu bhedakā dravyasya sattvaṃ vaktum (Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, quoted in Houben 1995, 103) and savyāpāro guṇas tasmāt svaprakarṣanibandhanaḥ | dravyātmānaṃ bhinnaty eva svaprakarṣe niveśayan (Guṇasamuddeśa 8, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 207).*

³⁹In fact, later discussions of A 5.4.11 note that *adravyaprakarṣe* would be a redundant restriction, since a *dravya* inherently admits of no degree; the *Padamañjarī* quotes verse 3 of the *Guṇasamuddeśa* – *sarvasyaiva pradhānasya na vinā bhedahetunā | prakarṣo vidyate nāpi śabdasyopaiti vācyatām* (3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 204) – and states that the restriction applies when a *dravya* is being qualified by a *guṇaśabda* with a comparative affix (ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī and Śukla 1965–1967, IV, 332). Interestingly, Haradatta has a different version of the verse, replacing *sarvasyaiva pradhānasya* with *dravyasyāvya-padeśasya* from the previous verse.

⁴⁰*tathā ca jātyādir api viśeṣyatvena ced vivakṣitas tadā dravyam iti (Prakīrṇaprakāśa ad Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 188).*

⁴¹Deshpande 1992, 34.

⁴²1992, 91.

express an individual), the *bhedakas* are qualities, actions, and names. In the definition of *dravya* as *bhedya*, according to Helārāja, the *bhedya* could also be *jāti* or *kriyā*, and the *bhedakas* are whatever qualifies them – in the case of *kriyā*, the agent of the action, its object, or an adverb like *sādhu*. Whatever is to be differentiated is *dravya*; this is a crucial condition in Bhartṛhari’s definition of *dravya* as something that can be referred to by a pronoun:

vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate |
dravyam ity ucyate so 'rtho bhedyatvena viva-
kṣitaḥ ||⁴³

That, for which a pronoun is employed to mark a particular object (*vastu*), is said to be the substance (*dravya*). [Its] meaning is expressed as something to be differentiated.

Helārāja refers to this definition, given in the *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa*, as *sāṃvyavahārika*, a definition of *dravya* that is transactional or worldly, perhaps in the sense that it is functional, and contrasts this to the definition of *dravya* as absolute, undifferentiated reality, given in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, which he terms *pāramārthika*. But although these two notions serve different theoretical purposes – one is linguistic, the other ontological – the process of meaning-making by distinguishing a thing – be it an object, a genus, or even an action – via its properties mirrors the way in which, in the non-dual philosophy of Bhartṛhari, an undifferentiated reality is conceptualized by segmenting and differentiating it.

1.4. *Dravya* in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*

The gold simile revisited

If one posits that reality is ultimately undifferentiated, then the question naturally arises as to the nature of the differences that appear in the world. For Bhartṛhari, who famously asserts that all cognition manifests through language,⁴⁴ this question can be answered by trying to understand what is really expressed by words. Again, the gold simile from the *Mahābhāṣya* is referred to: since, in all of its different transformations, even as it is melted down and re-shaped into a different form, the gold persists, then logically, it must be the gold, the *dravya*, that is expressed by the word “ring” or “bracelet”:

suvarṇādi yathā yuktaṃ svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ |
rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ śuddham evaiti vācyatām ||⁴⁵

Just as gold, etc., is endowed with its own forms, which are transient, [but] it is really the pure [gold] that is expressed by denotations such as “ring”, etc.

Again, this simile treads a fine line between epistemology and ontology; it assumes that what really exists must be what is really, ultimately, meant. But Bhartṛhari goes even further than Patañjali – he

⁴³*Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 187.

⁴⁴*anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate* (1.115, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 188).

⁴⁵*Dravyasamuddeśa* 4.

asserts that *only* the pure gold is expressed by the word “ring”. The different forms of the gold are only *upādhis*, limiting qualifications, and since they are not permanent, they cannot be what is expressed by a word. The pragmatic concession that Patañjali made in the *Mahābhāṣya* – that, according to the view that *dravya* is denoted by words, *ākṛti* is also secondarily denoted – is notably absent here. As Bhartṛhari says in the second verse of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, “only the real is denoted by words, which have unreal *upādhis*”.⁴⁶

The crow on Devadatta’s house

To illustrate this, Bhartṛhari furnishes another example, also taken from the *Mahābhāṣya*. In a discussion on rule A 1.1.26 *ktaktavatū niṣṭhā*, a question arises as to the function of the anubandha *K* in the affixes *Kta* and *Ktavatu*, which are used to form past participles. Kātyāyana points out that, in verbal usage, these anubandhas are discarded — when *Kta* is applied to the verb *kr*, in the resulting participle, *krta*, the anubandha *K* is absent.⁴⁷ If this is so, then how can one still recognize that the *ta* in *krta* marks a past participle? There are similar-looking words, such as *garta*, meaning “cave”, which are not past participles – without the anubandha, how can the *ta* in *krta* be distinguished from the *ta* in *garta*? Patañjali illustrates this problem with a scenario:

tad yathā | katarad devadattasya gṛham | ado
yatrāsau kāka iti | utpatite kāke naṣṭaṃ ta-
dgṛhaṃ bhavati | evam ihāpi lupte 'nubandhe
naṣṭaḥ pratyayo bhavati |⁴⁸

For example: “Which one is Devadatta’s house?” “That one, where that crow is.” When the crow has flown away, his house has disappeared (i.e., can no longer be distinguished). In the same way, also in this case, when the anubandha is dropped, the affix disappears (i.e., can no longer be distinguished).

If someone were to describe Devadatta’s house as the house on which the crow is perched, and the crow flies away, it would be impossible to find the house; in the same way, since the *K* anubandha is dropped in verbal usage, there is no way to tell that the *ta* in *krta* marks a past participle.

But the anubandha is not the only thing which distinguishes the affix; the context in which it appears also gives clues to its function:

⁴⁶*Dravyasamuddeśa* 2.

⁴⁷*anubandho 'nyatvakara iti cen na lopāt* (ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī and Śukla 1965–1967, I, 74).

⁴⁸ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 74-75.

kāarakakālavīṣeṣāv upādeyau | bhūte yas taśab-
daḥ kartari karmaṇi bhāve ca iti | tad yathā |
itaratrāpi ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakārī
bhavati, so 'dhruveṇa nimittena dhruvaṃ
nimittam upādatte, vedikāṃ puṇḍarikāṃ
vā |⁴⁹

[Only] a particular capacity (*kāra*)⁵⁰ and a particular tense are admissible. The *ta* expresses the past tense and [one of three capacities –] active (*kartr*), passive (*karman*), or passive intransitive (*bhāva*). For example: in another circumstance as well, this man who acts with foresight perceives a permanent mark through an impermanent mark, [such as] a platform or a white lotus (*puṇḍarika*).

That is to say, one knows that the word *kṛta* expresses the past tense as well as the passive voice; therefore, from that context, one can recognize the *ta* affix in *kṛta* as *Kta*. Those two pieces of contextual information are not impermanent, like the anubandha *K*. In the same way, although a man recognizes Devadatta's house, for the first time, because he is told that a crow is perched on it, the next time he looks for the house he will not rely on the crow to recognize it – rather, he will look for a more permanent distinguishing mark, like an architectural feature. In later literature, the example of the crow becomes codified as a typical case of *upalakṣaṇa*, an inessential property of an object that is nevertheless used to distinguish it.⁵¹

As he did with the gold simile, Bhartṛhari takes the example of Devadatta's house and draws a different conclusion from it. First of all, for him, the crow on Devadatta's house is akin to the different forms that gold can take; both are impermanent. Therefore, in the same way, the word “house” can only express the bare house, excluding any of its impermanent attributes, like the crow temporarily perched on it.⁵² Moreover, Bhartṛhari does not seem to distinguish between impermanent attributes, like the crow, and more permanent ones, like architectural features, as Patañjali does – in the *Dīpikā*, Bhartṛhari repeats the example of Devadatta's house, except that, instead of a crow, the house is recognized by “things like a *svastika*”.⁵³ For him, any attribute that is used to distinguish an object is unreal, because the object is really an undifferentiated whole.

Everything is everything

But if we follow this reasoning to its logical end, then we would argue that even the word “house” simply expresses an unreal attribute of an underlying, undifferentiated, non-dual reality, which Bha-

⁴⁹ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 75.

⁵⁰Although *kāra* is generally understood as “case relation”, in this instance, Patañjali seems to be referring to the voice of a verb.

⁵¹For examples, see the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (ed. Yogīndrananda 1968, 175), the *Dhvanyālokalocana* (ed. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī 1940, 140), the *Saundaryalaharīlakṣmīdharavyākhyā* (ed. Veṅkaṭānāthācārya 1969, 132), the *Yoginīḥḍayadīpikā* (ed. Kavirāja 1963, 105), or the *Advaitasiddhi* (ed. Nārāyaṇaswami Sastri 1937, 31-32).

⁵²*adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagrham yathā | grhītaṃ grhaśabdena śuddham evābhidyate (Dravyasamuddeśa 3).*

⁵³*yathā svastikādayo devadattagrhasyāvācakah śanta upalakṣaṇaṃ grhasya bhavanti* (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 22). In architectural terms, *svastika* can mean “an auspicious mark, the *Omkāra* symbol, the fire cross, the sun symbol, a symbol for Buddha and Siddha, the crossing of the arms, the meeting of four roads, a type of village, a joinery, a window, a type of pavilion, a kind of phallus, a class of halls, a type of building, a sitting posture” (Kumar Acharya 1945, 594).

rtṛhari calls – borrowing from Sāṃkhya terminology – *prakṛti parā*, the absolute, primordial substance.⁵⁴ All words denote this, and, consequently, it would seem that all words would ultimately become synonymous. That is plainly not the case; otherwise, language would be useless. Bhartṛhari’s solution is to posit that, while the object itself that is denoted by a word is undifferentiated, the form through which that word operates restricts the perception of the object:

ākāraiś ca vyavacchedāt sārvarthyam avaru-
dhyate |
yathaiva cakṣurādīnāṃ sāmartyaṃ nāḍikādi-
bhiḥ ||⁵⁵

And the ability [of a word] to mean everything is restrained because [the object] is differentiated by [its] forms, in the very same way that the capability of the eyes, etc., [is restrained] by a hollow stalk, etc.

When one perceives an object through a hollow tube, the tube serves to artificially mark the boundaries of the object. But one’s perception is directed at the object itself, not at the tube. This simile could be understood on two different levels. On a pragmatic level, it points out that a word always restricts one’s perception of an object to a specific conception of it. A form through which a word operates, such as a “ring”, serves to artificially restrict the object, but ultimately the word denotes the object itself, and not its form. The fact that one can change the shape of the object, melting it down and re-forming it, shows that the word expresses something beyond a mere form. But on the level of absolute reality – if we take seriously Bhartṛhari’s assertion that, when all forms have been destroyed, all that is left is the primordial substance – then this simile points out that each word is like a hollow tube, through which one perceives an undifferentiated, non-dual reality.

Beyond real and unreal

So far, this analysis is based on the presumption that whatever is permanent must be real, and that only the real is denoted by a word. As Bhartṛhari says, whatever remains at the end, when all forms have been destroyed, that reality is not only expressed by language, but it is also identical to it.⁵⁶ For a grammarian, this is as far as the analysis of reality can go, since it is bounded by language, by the concepts of real and unreal, permanent and impermanent. But can any object really be said to be permanent? In both the examples, of gold and of Devadatta’s house, the denoted object can be destroyed; as Bhartṛhari says in the *Dīpikā*, even a *dravya* is subject to destruction.⁵⁷ When he talks about the permanence of the object of denotation, with regards to the question of whether it is a *jāti* or *dravya*, he is referring to a practical notion of permanence, or *vyavahāranityatā*.⁵⁸ That is, he is not

⁵⁴*vikārapagame satyāṃ tathāhuḥ prakṛtiṃ parām (Dravyasamuddeśa 15cd).*

⁵⁵*Dravyasamuddeśa 5.*

⁵⁶See *Dravyasamuddeśa 11.*

⁵⁷*dravyaśya ca vināśadarśanāt (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 22).*

⁵⁸*yeṣāṃ ākṛtīr abhidheyā sā nityā | dravye pi padārthe vyavahāranityatā (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 18).* “For those [words] in which the genus is denoted, it is [the genus] which is permanent. Even when the substance is the meaning of a word, that is practical permanence.” The *yeṣāṃ... sā* correlation here is not clear; Bronkhorst translates this sentence as “According to those who [hold that] the form (*ākṛti*) is the meaning, that [form] is what is denoted; it is eternal” (1987, 70).

concerned with permanence in the sense of the smallest, indestructible atom of matter – that is what he calls absolute, or *paramārtha*, permanence.⁵⁹ Rather, he is concerned with the fact that a word will consistently perform the function of denotation, no matter the speaker.⁶⁰ In the final analysis, even the word, the object, and their relation are conventions that depend on a presumption of duality that, according to Bhartṛhari, is not the absolute form of reality; beyond that, language fails:

nityaḥ pṛthivīdhātuḥ | pṛthivīdhātau kiṃ sa-
tyam | vikalpaḥ | vikalpe kiṃ satyam | jñānam |
jñāne kim satyam | oṃ | atha tad brahma | tad
etad uktaṃ bhavati | ataḥ paraṃ śabdārtha-
vyavahāre nivartate | vyavahārātīto 'yam artha
iti |⁶¹

The element of earth is permanent. In the element of earth, what is real? Conception. In conception, what is real? Cognition. In cognition what is real? *Oṃ*. That is *brahman*. [But] this is said – beyond that, the convention of word and object ceases to operate; that object is beyond the convention [of language].

If we follow the framework that Patañjali establishes in the *Mahābhāṣya* – that is, using permanence as the criterion to determine the object of denotation – to its logical conclusion, then there is a point at which language breaks down. If we presume reality to be ultimately non-dual, then this point is where the categories that make language possible – real and unreal, permanent and impermanent – cease to apply, because they are subsumed into a non-dual whole. For Bhartṛhari, the highest reality that one can still name is *brahman*. This is what is ultimately expressed by words; this is what words ultimately are. But the non-dual reality of *brahman* – or perhaps, even, the non-dual reality that lies beyond the verbal concept *brahman*⁶² – cannot be accessed by words. It can only be hinted at by mutually contradictory statements, such as “it does not exist nor does it not exist”, etc.⁶³

This tension is deeply felt in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*. On the one hand, Bhartṛhari is concerned with what is permanent (*nitya*), real (*satya*), and essential (*tattva*) in the system of language. On the other hand, he also wants to make the point that there is no difference between real and unreal; even those distinctions are just linguistic conventions. This point, which seems to be a fundamental tenet in his philosophy, also has practical implications: it is what allows elements that he considers unreal, such as forms, to participate in the process of denotation. As Helārāja explains it, a form itself has no independent nature; it is entirely dependent on the object that it qualifies. In that sense, it is not

⁵⁹As mentioned above, Helārāja, on the other hand, interprets *dravya* in the *Dravyasamuddeśa* in a *paramārtha* sense.

⁶⁰*nityatā cāpi dvividhā | vyavahārāśrayā paramārthāśrayā ca | paramārthāśrayā ca vaiśeṣikadarśane paramāṇavaḥ akāśādini ca | vyavahārāśrayā nāgarātivīṣāmustakvāthaḥ syād āmapācana iti na carakavacanād eṣām āmapācānavam | kiṃ tarhi ? svabhāvāt | evam ihāpi pāṇinīnānyena vā śabdāḥ [smṛtā] eva svato 'rthapratyāyakā iti vyavahāranityatāivehopakāriṇī |* (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 17). “And there are two kinds of permanence: in the practical sense and in the absolute sense. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, atoms and space, etc., are [permanent] in the absolute sense. [The statement,] ‘a concoction of *nāgara*, *atviṣā*, and *musta* herbs assist in digestion’ is [permanent] in the practical sense, since it is not only because of Caraka’s words that [those herbs] are able to assist in digestion. Then how? Because of the nature [of the herbs]. Also here, in the same way, words taught by Pāṇini or by someone else convey their meaning on their own; thus in this case, only permanence in the worldly sense is useful.” The quotation is from the *Cikitsāsthāna* of the *Carakasamhitā* (15.98, ed. Āchārya 1941, 520).

⁶¹ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 22.

⁶²As Helārāja says, even *brahman* is a word which relies on *upādhis* to be expressive (*Prakīrṇaprakāśa* ad *Dravyasamuddeśa* 16).

⁶³See *Dravyasamuddeśa* 12-13.

1. *Bhartṛhari on dravya: the real as delimited by the unreal*

real. But if we simply understand it as a qualification of a real object, then the form too could be considered “real” – not in and of itself, but as a way of framing reality.⁶⁴

⁶⁴*tatra ca vicchinnānvayo vicchedo 'vadhāryata iti vicchinnaprakāśaḥ satyo vidyaiva (Prakīrṇaprakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 7). “And in that case, if ‘interruption’ is understood as the persistence [of reality] being interrupted, then [even that] real, [albeit] interrputed manifestation is really knowledge.”*

2. Helārāja on *dravya*: an all-encompassing doctrine

At the beginning of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari presents a list of five synonyms of the word *dravya*. Whatever his own intention was, Helārāja interprets each of the words to refer to a specific school of thought: Ātmādvaita, Buddhism, Sattādvaita, Sāṃkhya, and Cārvāka, respectively. The two kinds of Advaita are presented as siddhāntas: Ātmādvaita is associated with the *Dravyasamuddeśa* and with the view that the object of a word is a substance, while Sattādvaita is associated with the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* and with the view that the object of a word is the summum genus, Being. Buddhists, Sāṃkhyas, and Cārvākas are presented as philosophical opponents. As Johannes Bronkhorst notes, Advaita was “conspicuously absent in listings of philosophical schools during Bhartṛhari’s time,”¹ and yet here, in Helārāja’s 10th-century commentary, it is mentioned twice. His does not correspond to any common list of philosophical schools; some words, like *tattva*, naturally lend themselves to be associated with a certain school, but in general, the choices Helārāja makes are very idiosyncratic, and give us a sense of which philosophical opponents he was most concerned with. Moreover, unlike many other doxographies, Helārāja is not so much concerned with refuting rival doctrines as with showing that all of them can be subsumed by the kind of non-dual philosophy that Bhartṛhari proposes.

2.1. On the Cārvākas

Very little is known of the Cārvākas – also known as the Bārhaspatyas or the Lokāyatas –, the materialist school of thought that has served as the butt of criticism from almost every other school, and

¹2001, 484.

2. Helārāja on dravya: an all-encompassing doctrine

much of what can be known of the Cārvākas is gleaned from the texts of these other traditions. In fact, the two aphorisms that are quoted by Helārāja, *pr̥thivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni* and *tatsamudāye śārīrendriyaṣayasamjñā iti*, appear in over a dozen other texts, including doxographies like the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.² They have been attributed to the original source text of the Cārvāka school, now lost, which scholars have named the *Bārhaspatyasūtras* or the *Cārvākasūtras*.³ Since these two aphorisms are so commonly quoted, they do not say much about what Helārāja knew of the Cārvākas, nor of what he thought of them. In fact, his explanation of why they can also be considered non-dual philosophers – that with respect to *pāramārthika dravya*, even they agree that reality is non-dual – is half-hearted at best:

tattvam iti caturbhūtatattvavādibhiś cārvākair
dravyam ucyate | pr̥thivy āpas tejo vāyur iti ta-
ttvāni | tatsamudāye śārīrendriyaṣayasamjñā
iti vacanāt | tad evam etaiḥ paramārthata ekam
eva vastūcyate |⁴

The Cārvākas, proponents of the four elements, call the concrete entity *tattva*, because it is said that “earth, water, fire, and air are the elements (*tattva*), [and] in the combination of those is what are termed the body, the senses, and the object”. In this way, they say that, with respect to the absolute, [*tattva*] is really a unitary reality.

This explanation is quite terse, but its equivalence of *tattva* with *dravya* perhaps relies on an unspoken parallel with a passage in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* that enumerates the *dravyas*: *pr̥thivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi*.⁵ It also refers to the stereotype of the Cārvākas as radical reductivists and materialists – they completely deny the possibility of a soul that is separate from the physical body; that is, a soul that is distinct from physical phenomena. Therefore, as Helārāja’s reasoning goes, the Cārvākas also believe that the body and the soul belong to the same non-dual reality.

There is a single extant text that purports to follow the Cārvāka school: the 8th-century *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśi. There is some debate over whether Jayarāśi truly represents the Cārvākas; he certainly considered himself one, quoting the Cārvāka aphorisms with reverence and stating that they agree with his own position;⁶ in fact, the two aphorisms that Helārāja cites appear at the beginning of the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*.⁷ However, it is clear that Jayarāśi goes much further in his criticisms of the *pramāṇas* than the doctrine generally ascribed to the Cārvākas, who, although rejecting the validity of *anumāna*, seem to accept at least *pratyakṣa* as a valid means of cognition; Jayarāśi rejects even that, transforming materialism into pure skepticism.⁸

²ed. Śāstrī Abhyankar 1924, 2.

³See Shastri 1928 and Bhattacharya 2011, 77.

⁴*Prakīrṇaprakāśa* ad *Dravyasamuddeśa* 1.

⁵*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.4, ed. Jambūvijayaji 1961, 2.

⁶Franco 1987, 4.

⁷Franco 1987, 68.

⁸Franco 1983, 148. Franco notes that there seemed to be two schools of Cārvākas: one that granted inference a limited validity, and one that denied both perception and inference.

Much of the criticism of the Cārvākas was directed at their supposed rejection of the validity of *anumāna*. For this, some philosophers denigrated them as inferior to animals, since even animals use inference.⁹ However, as Ramkrishna Bhattacharya points out,¹⁰ whenever the pūrvapakṣa of the Cārvākas is presented, philosophers invariably quote from the *Vākyapadīya*, without disclosing the source of the quote: Śāntarakṣita, Vālideva Sūri, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, and Vācaspati Mīśra all quote verse 32 of the *brahmakāṇḍa*,¹¹ while Śīlāṅka quotes verse 42,¹² which is similarly critical of the reliability of *anumāna*. It is a distinct possibility that the real target of their criticisms is actually Bhartṛhari, since many of these thinkers were opposed to Śabdādvaita and other aspects of his philosophy; as Bhattacharya notes, Jñānasrībhadrā “brackets the Bārhaspatya and Bhartṛhari, urging both to accept the validity of inference.”¹³ Another possibility is that they were simply not familiar with Cārvāka texts at all, and they picked a well-known verse from Bhartṛhari to stand in for the Cārvākas. Helārāja may have been aware of this practice, although nothing in his short note on the Cārvākas seems to suggest it. It is more likely that he, like other philosophers of his time, considered the Cārvākas as the most extreme example of a skeptical philosophy, and that by reconciling the Cārvākas’ materialism with his Advaitin metaphysics, he could claim to have disarmed even the most ardent of critics.

2.2. Ātmādvaita

As Helārāja says at the beginning of his commentary on the first verse of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, it is from the point of view of what he calls Ātmādvaita that he will be interpreting the rest of the chapter. Compared to the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, this chapter is much shorter, at only eighteen kārikās long. However, both the *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* and the *Guṇasamuddeśa* can be considered part of the exposition on *dravya*. But still, as Houben notes, there is an important “structural difference” between the *Jāṭi* and *Dravyasamuddeśas*: while in the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, a number of different views on *jāṭi* are given, the

⁹Bhattacharya 2011, 118.

¹⁰Bhattacharya 2011, 117.

¹¹*avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu | bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā* (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 88). “Due to differences in circumstance, place, and time, it is very difficult to prove, through inference, [the nature of] things in their different capacities.” Although, in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Śāntarakṣita does not attribute this verse to Bhartṛhari, Kamalaśīla introduces the verse with *tathā bhartṛharir āha* in his commentary (ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, 426). Vālideva Sūri embeds this verse in a discussion of the Cārvāka position that *pratyakṣa* is the only valid *pramāṇa* (*Syādvādaratnākara ad Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra* 2.1, ed. Osvāl 1988, 262). In Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s play *Āgamaḍambara*, the Cārvāka character Vṛddhāmbhi utters this verse, along with 34 and 42, as part of his refutation of *īśvara* (ed. Dezső 2005, 156-158). Vācaspati Mīśra quotes this verse in the *Bhāmātī*, in the context of *Brahmasūtra* 3.3.53, which, according to Śāṅkara, presents the Cārvāka refutation of the *ātman* as something separate from the physical body; knowledge of the *ātman* relies on *anumāna*, which is unreliable – *na cāpratyakṣam ātmatattvam anumānadibhiḥ śakyam unnetum* (ed. Śāstrī and Śāstrī 1938, 851).

¹²*hastasparsād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvātā | anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ* (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 98). “Just like a blind man, running on an uneven path with hands held out, it is difficult not to fall relying chiefly on inference.” Śīlāṅka quotes this passage in his commentary on the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, again in a presentation of the Cārvāka position that there is no *ātman* that is separate from the four elements – *na pṛthivyādīvyatirikta ātmāsti* (ed. Mahārāja and Jambūvijayajī 1978, 10).

¹³Bhattacharya 2011, 115 note.

2. Helārāja on dravya: an all-encompassing doctrine

focus here is on presenting an Advaitin view, in which “all words express a single entity.”¹⁴ Moreover, although Helārāja interprets *ātman*, *vastu*, *svabhāva*, *śarīra*, and *tattva* according to different schools of thought, they are all ultimately made to agree with Advaitin ontology. Since all words express *dravya*, so the different words used by different schools of thought to express their own notion of fundamental reality all ultimately express *dravya*.

The term *ātmādvaita* is used by Advaitins themselves to denote a siddhānta; Vimuktātman uses it in contrast to Bhartṛhari’s *śabdādvaita*, which he rejects, following in the Śāṅkarite tradition.¹⁵ For him, words like *ātman* characterize *brahman*; on the other hand, a word like *śabda* is as banal as the word “pot”. For him, a term like *śabdādvaita* is as nonsensical as *ghaṭādvaita*, “pot non-dualism”. Helārāja, similarly, puts words into two classes – words like *ātman*, and words like “pot” –, but for him, they only differ in degree. All words ultimately refer to *brahman*; it is simply that the word *ātman* is closer to referring to its absolute nature.¹⁶

For Helārāja, *ātmādvaita* is not just a general term for a non-dual philosophy centered on the *ātman*. His use of the word is much more idiosyncratic. In his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, he leverages the polysemy of the word *ātman* in order to make the connection between *dravya* and *brahman*. As he says, the word *ātman* denotes *brahman*; this is well-established.¹⁷ But he points out that the word *ātman* can also be used in the sense of a substance, by referring to a passage in the *Mahābhāṣya*:

kathaṃ punar jñāyate bhedakā guṇā iti | evaṃ
hi dṛśyate loke | eko 'yam ātmodakaṃ nāma
tasya guṇabhedād anyatvaṃ bhavati | anyad i-
daṃ śītam anyad idam uṣṇam iti |¹⁸

Now how is it known that qualities are differen-
tiators? It is thus seen in the world: “This single
entity (*ātman*) is water; because of its different
qualities, it becomes different – this is cool [wa-
ter], this is warm [water].”

Helārāja leverages this passage in two ways. First of all, it provides a canonical precedence for the use of the word *ātman* in the sense of a *dravya*; this example of an *ātman*, water, being differentiated by its qualities (*guṇa*), brings to mind both Patañjali’s own definition of *dravya* as *guṇasaṃdrāva* as well as Bhartṛhari’s definition in the *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* of *dravya* as something which is differentiated. Secondly, he also wants to show that the word *ātman*, besides denoting an absolute reality, can also be used to refer to conventional, everyday things, such as water.¹⁹ This tendency – to relate

¹⁴Houben 1995, 96.

¹⁵*tasmād ātmādiśabdair brahmātmanor lakṣyatvaṃ yuktam, na tu śabdaśabdena... tasmād ātmādvaitam eva sidhyati, na śabdādvaitaṃ ghaṭādvaitaṃ veti siddham* (Iṣṭasiddhi, ed. Hiriyanna 1933, 175-176.)

¹⁶*ghaṭādiśabdāpekṣayā tv ātmādiśabdāḥ pratyāsannāḥ* (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Dravyasamuddeśa* 16). “However, words like *ātman* are closer [to *brahman*], compared to words like ‘pot’.”

¹⁷*tad evaṃ ātmaśabdābhidheyasya brahmaṇaḥ padārthaparamārtharūpatvād...* (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Dravyasamuddeśa* 16). “In that way, because *brahman*, which is denoted by the word *ātman*, is the absolute form of [all] things [expressed by] words...”

¹⁸*Mahābhāṣya* ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.1 ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 41-42.

¹⁹*saty api tadabhidhāyitve vakṣyamāṇanayenātmādiśabdānām eva sarvatra ghaṭādvāy avyāhataprasaratvam* (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Dravyasamuddeśa* 1). “Even though words like *ātman* denote [the absolute], it will be shown later that their scope is not obstructed at all when it is applied to [things like] pots, etc.”

absolute reality to the conventionally experienced world – runs throughout his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa*.

2.3. Sattādvaita: a brief history

The two schools of Advaita Vedānta

Traditionally, scholars divide early Advaita into the schools of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra. Śaṅkara's doctrine is sometimes called *ātmādvaita*, while Maṇḍana is said to espouse *bhāvādvaita* or *sattādvaita*.²⁰ But this characterization is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, as Paul Hacker notes, Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana are not, in fact, very different doctrinally; rather, he attributes their rivalry to “sociological differences” – conjecturing that Śaṅkara came from a Vaiṣṇava background, while Maṇḍana came from a Śaiva background.²¹ But regardless of sectarian affiliation, the rivalry between the two later became a doctrinal one as it was amplified by Śaṅkara's followers, such as Sureśvara. Therefore, to understand what the terms *ātmādvaita*, *bhāvādvaita* and *sattādvaita* really refer to, we must consider them in the context of the doctrinal debates of later philosophers, rather than Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana themselves; indeed, neither of them refers to his own philosophy in those terms, and it is only in the works of their followers, commentators, and detractors that they are used. Helārāja, when he uses the terms *ātmādvaita* and *sattādvaita*, does not seem to be alluding to this rivalry between Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana, but rather to the dichotomy between the *Dravyasamuddeśa* and the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*.

Secondly, despite its seeming semantic equivalence, *sattādvaita* is not a synonym of *bhāvādvaita*, although many scholars have taken this for granted.²² In fact, the two words differ both in what they denote and also in the dialectical context in which they are employed. The term *bhāvādvaita* seems generally to be used by opponents to describe a pūrvaśakṣa; specifically, it is used in the *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsātīrtha – a 16th century Dvaita Vedānta tract – to refer to a certain Advaitin doctrine which allows for the reality of both existent (*bhāva*) and non-existent (*abhāva*) entities, while not contradicting the ultimate non-duality of *brahman*.²³ The term is then echoed in the long line of Dvaita and Advaita commentaries that follow, and the doctrine is eventually attributed to Maṇḍana.²⁴ In this theory, *brahman* is the only ultimately real existent entity, but *prapañcābhāva* – the non-existence of the phenomenal world – and *avidyādvamsa* – the cessation of ignorance – are also ultimately real, albeit as negative realities.²⁵ However, as S. S. Suryanarayana Shastri shows, this theory does not have

²⁰See, for example, Kuppaswami Sastri 1937, xl-xlii, Gupta 1963, 84, Sarasvati 1989, 383, Rao 1998, 104, and Aklujkar 2001, 469.

²¹Halbfass and Hacker 1995, 39.

²²See note 20 above.

²³*athavā bhāvādvaitamate ātmānyā satyaiva nīṣṭtir iti* (*Nyāyāmṛta*, ed. Pāṇḍuraṅgi 1994–1996, II, 673).

²⁴*yad api mithyāvaghaṭako 'bhāvo yadi na tātvikaḥ, tadā siddhasādanādi | atha yadi tātvikaḥ, maṇḍanamate bhāvādvaitasvikārān nādvaitahānir iti...* (*Gurucandrikā*, ed. Srinivasachar and Venkatanarasimha Sastri 1933, 190).

²⁵Hiriyanna 1923, 260–261; Kuppaswami Sastri 1937, xli.

anything to do with Maṇḍana – nowhere in the *Brahmasiddhi* does Maṇḍana describe *prapañcā-bhāva* or any other negative entity as ultimately real, rather, he merely points out that for “one and the same entity there is verbal usage both as existent and non-existent (i.e., positive and negative), e.g., ‘when the pot is destroyed, the potsherds are originated’”.²⁶ The term *bhāvādvaita*, then, does not refer so much to a school of Advaita Vedānta than to a stereotype that is useful for dialectical purposes. It does not even refer to a system of thought but merely to a single doctrinal issue, used as a way to contrast Maṇḍana with Śaṅkara, who, by that time, had become representative of orthodox Advaita Vedānta.

While *bhāvādvaita* appears in Vedantic philosophical tracts from the 16th century onward, *sattādvaita* appears in much earlier texts, such as Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s 9th century *Nyāyamañjarī*, and it is used to contrast Advaitins with Buddhists. Moreover, as scholars such as Hacker have pointed out, at least until the 10th or 12th century, it was Maṇḍana and not Śaṅkara who was held as the main proponent of Advaita Vedānta,²⁷ and, accordingly, it was Maṇḍana who played the part of the Advaitin pūrvapakṣin for Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, and even Jaina logicians. Moreover, as a pūrvapakṣa, the debate in which *sattādvaita* is brought up – on whether *sattā* can be considered the summum genus – is present already in Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika*, and his opponent there seems to be Bhartṛhari.

Bhartṛhari and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: philosophical framings

satyāsatyau tu yau bhāgau pratibhāvaṃ vyava-
sthitau |
satyaṃ yat tatra sā jātir asatyā vyaktayaḥ
smṛtāḥ ||
saṃbandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavā-
diṣu |
jātir ity ucyate tasyāṃ sarve śabdā vyavasthi-
tāḥ ||
tāṃ prātipadikārthaṃ ca dhātvarthaṃ ca pra-
cakṣate |
sā nityā sā mahān ātmā tām āhus tvatalāda-
yaḥ ||
prāptakramā viśeṣeṣu kriyā saivābhidhīyate |
kramarūpasya saṃhāre tat sattvam iti ka-
thyate ||²⁸

Of the real and unreal parts residing in each thing, that which is real is the universal, and it is taught that the particulars are unreal.

It is *sattā*, differentiated according to [its own] correlates, which is called the universal in cows, etc.; all words are based on it.

They declare it to be the meaning of the nominal base and the meaning of the verbal base; it is permanent, it is the great *ātman*, and the *tva* and *taL* affixes, etc. express it.

When it assumes sequence among particulars, it is called action. When its sequential forms have been reabsorbed, it is declared to be a substance.²⁹

²⁶Suryanarayana Shastri 1936, 64, a rendering of *ekasyāpi vastuno bhāvābhāvarūpeṇa vyapadesāt, yathā – ‘yadā ghaṭo naśyati tadā kapālāni jāyante’ iti (Brahmasiddhi, ed. Kuppaswami Sastri 1937, 122).*

²⁷Halbfass and Hacker 1995, 30. See also Potter et al. 1981, 17 and 604 note 25, and Potter et al. 1977, 486 and 604.

²⁸*Jāṭisamuddeśa* 32-35, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 40-42.

²⁹Helārāja glosses *sattvam* here as *dravya* (*Prakāśa ad Jāṭisamuddeśa* 35, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 43).

2. Helārāja on dravya: an all-encompassing doctrine

In these verses from the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari seems to employ the Vaiśeṣika system of a hierarchy of universals, with *sattā* as the highest universal,³⁰ in order to argue that all words ultimately refer to *sattā*. For the Vaiśeṣikas, *sattā* is all-pervasive and inheres in everything, including substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*), and actions (*karma*).³¹ Logically then, as Bhartṛhari argues, no matter whether it is a noun – denoting a substance – or a verb – denoting an action –, every word ultimately expresses *sattā*. And by equating *sattā* with *ātman*, he neatly reinforces the Advaitin point of view that runs throughout the *Vākyapadīya*; in this way, Bhartṛhari seems to have laid the foundation for what becomes known as Sattādvaita.

Kumārila refutes Bhartṛhari’s notion of *sattā* in three different aspects: *sattā* as the referent of a word, *sattā* as a summum genus, and *sattā* as the object of perception. Although the first two of these is discussed by Bhartṛhari, the last one seems to make its earliest appearance in Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika*.

Against *sattā* as the referent of a word

In the *Tantravārttika*, Kumārila’s criticisms are directed at a verse in the second kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya*, which begins with *astyarthaḥ sarvaśabdānām*.³² As Toshiya Unebe points out, there seems to have been a tradition of interpreting *astyarthaḥ* in the verse as a compound, with the *asti* glossed as *sattā* by the Jaina philosopher Mallavādin;³³ in that case, it would echo the verses from the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, stating that the referent of all words is *sattā*. Although Kumārila glosses *asti* with *vastu* rather than *sattā*, his criticism of this verse is nevertheless directed at the notion of *sattā* as a summum genus. For him, it makes no sense to postulate a summum genus that subsumes all other categories as the referent of all words; in the most naïve interpretation of this theory, it would be impossible to express anything specific, since all words would simply denote *being*. If, on the other hand, words denote the universal *sattā* as differentiated by, as Bhartṛhari puts it, “its own correlates” (*saṃbandhin*),³⁴ then the question arises as to what these correlates are. As Kumārila argues, if these correlates are the lower universals, then the denotation would be circular, since the lower universal itself already denotes *sattā*; that is, since *gotva* itself already denotes *goḥ sattā*, then it makes no sense to say that *go* really denotes *sattā* as qualified by *gotva*. And even if, rather than the universal *gotva*, *go* denotes

³⁰*sāmānyam dvividhaṃ param aparaṃ cānuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam | tatra paraṃ sattā mahāviśayatvāt sā cānuvṛtter eva hetuvāt sāmānyam eva | dravyatvādy aparaṃ alpaviśayatvāt (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, ed. Dvivedin 1895, 111). Bhartṛhari also uses the terms *sattā* and *dravyatva* in the specifically Vaiśeṣika sense of higher and lower universal in *Sambandasamuddeśa* 14 (see Houben 1995, 191-198). It must be noted, however, that Bhartṛhari is chronologically earlier than Praśastapāda. Johannes Bronkhorst believes that the *Vākyapadīya* “may shed light on the early history of Vaiśeṣika” (1994, 75).*

³¹*sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sā sattā (Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.2.7 ed. Vīrarāghavācārya 1958, 45). The edition of Jambuvijayaji omits *sā sattā* (1961, 9), although the attached commentary of Candrānanda reads *bhinneṣu dravyādiṣu triṣu yato jāyate ‘sat sat’ iti buddhiḥ sā sattā*. See also Matilal 1986, 173-174 and Halbfass 1992, 116-117.*

³²*Vākyapadīya 2.119, ed. Subramania Iyer 1983, 58.*

³³2009, 416-419.

³⁴According to Helārāja, the possible correlates of *sattā* are listed in verse 40, but the list is vague, including, for example, *āśraya* (substratum) and *vyatirekinaḥ* (things different from *sattā*) (*Jāṭisamuddeśa* 40, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 46).

sattā as qualified by the particular, individual cow, the same argument applies.³⁵

Against *sattā* as the summum genus

In the *Ākṛtīvāda* of the *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila again addresses this problem, further strengthening his argument. According to the commentator Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamiśra, Kumārila's criticism is aimed at a *sattādvaitavādin*:

atra kaścit sattādvaitavādy āha –

sattvagotvādisāmānyam parasparavi-
lakṣaṇam |
varṇadrutādivanmithyā pratibhāty eva kintv
idam || iti |³⁶

On this point, a certain proponent of Sattā-
dvaita has said:

Universals like *existing* and *cow-ness* are differ-
ent from one another,
But this [difference] is really only an erroneous
appearance, like in the fast, [medium, or slow
pronunciation] of a phoneme.

Although this quote has not been traced, the ideas presented in it are strongly reminiscent of Bharṭṛhari. According to this opponent, the difference between universals is similar to the difference between pronouncing a phoneme quickly or slowly;³⁷ in both cases, there is no difference in what is denoted. All universals really denote *sattā*, and the differences between them are merely a result of how *sattā* is manifested; in the same way, a phoneme denotes the same phoneme no matter if it is spoken quickly or slowly.³⁸ According to this theory, difference lies at the level of the *vyāñjaka*, the manifestor, and not the universal that is manifested. Kumārila, however, insists that the universals themselves – cow-ness and horse-ness – are by nature different from one another, and that the difference between them does not depend on their manifestors. His reasoning is similar to the line of argumentation he used in the *Tantravārttika*: if the difference between universals is really due to their manifestors being different, then how would you account for the difference between the manifestors themselves? If you argue that the difference between the manifestors is natural, then the same could be said of the universals.³⁹

³⁵Unebe 2009, 422-423.

³⁶*Śarkarikā* ad *Ślokavārttika Ākṛtīvāda* 48, ed. Kunhan Raja 1946, 15. This quote does not appear in Sucarita Miśra's commentary on this verse (Adyar Library MS TR 66, 2587-2588). I am greatly indebted to Kei Kataoka for sharing facsimiles of this manuscript.

³⁷*druta* is listed as one of the defects of speech in the *Paspasāhnikā* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 13; see Joshi and Roodbergen 1986, 199). It is regarded simply as a mode of recitation (*vṛtti* or *prayoga*) in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* (13.19, ed. Deva Shastri 1959, 57 and 13.46, ed. Deva Shastri 1931, 397) along with *madhyama* and *vilambita*. See also *Vyāsaśikṣā* 475 (ed. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī 1976, 177).

³⁸It is important to note that the opponent uses the term *druta* rather than *hrasva*; *hrasva*, *dīrgha*, and *pluta* do create a semantic difference, i.e., a short *a* versus a long *ā*, while the speed of recitation, whether *druta*, *madhyama*, or *vilambita*, does not. Kumārila notes this difference in *Spṛṣṭavāda* 56-57 (ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978, 455).

³⁹*svato gotvādibhedas tu na tu vyāñjakabhedataḥ || mā bhūd drutādivanmithyā vyāñjakasya tu kiṃ kṛtaḥ | bhedo hastyādipiṇḍebhyaḥ svataś ced iha tat samam ||* (*Ślokavārttika Ākṛtīvāda* 48-49, ed. Kunhan Raja 1946, 15). See Jhā 1900, 290.

Against *sattā* as the object of perception

Perhaps Kumārila's most influential critique of Sattādvaita occurs in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* of the *Ślokavārttika*. In this section, one of the principal debates is centered on the object of perception. For the Buddhists, perception produces a non-conceptualized cognition of an individual, and this thesis functions as the main pūrvapakṣa. However, before launching into a detailed refutation of the Buddhists, Kumārila briefly presents two other pūrvapakṣas that seem to represent polar opposites to the Buddhist view: the first, that even perception always produces a conceptualized cognition (*savikalpa pratyaya*), and the second, that the object of perception, although non-conceptualized, is not an individual but a universal, namely, the summum genus. The first of these non-Buddhist pūrvapakṣas has been attributed by commentators to Bhartṛhari. As Sucarita Miśra explains it, since, for a *śabdādvaitin*, all cognition is infused with language, it is necessarily already conceptualized.⁴⁰ The second pūrvapakṣa has been attributed generically to a *vedāntin*, *vedāntavādin*, or *advaitavādin*.⁴¹

mahāsāmānyam anyais tu dravyaṃ sad iti co-
cyate |
sāmānyaviśayatvaṃ ca pratyakṣasyaivam āśri-
tam ||
viśeṣās tu pratīyante savikalpakabuddhi-
bhiḥ |⁴²

But it is said by others that [the object of a non-conceptualized cognition] is the summum genus, called “substance” and “the existing”, and thus, the object of perception has the universal as its basis.

Distinctions, on the other hand, are cognized by conceptualized cognitions.

Although this pūrvapakṣa has not been attributed explicitly to Bhartṛhari by commentators, the influence of the *Vākyapadīya* can be seen in it. Both Bhaṭṭa Umbeka and Pārthasārathi Miśra have replaced *sat* with *sattā* in their commentaries;⁴³ Umbeka, in glossing this passage, says that some call the summum genus, which is the object of a non-conceptualized cognition, *sattā*, and others call it *dravya*;⁴⁴ Pārthasārathi, similarly, says that *vedāntins* refer to it using the words *sattā* and *dravya*.⁴⁵ This mirrors the division of the *Jāti-* and *Dravyasamuddeśas* in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*: in the *Jā-tisamuddeśa*, the object of words is said to be the universal, which, ultimately, is *sattā*, while in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, the object of words is said to be *dravya*, although both *sattā* and *dravya* are, according to Helārāja, synonymous with *brahman*.

⁴⁰*evaṃ hi manyate – sarva eva savikalpakaḥ pratyayaḥ, vāgrūpānuviddhabodhāt | na hi sa nāma loke pratyayo dṛśyate yaḥ śabdānugamād vinā bhavati (Kāśikā ad Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra 112, ed. Śambaśiva Śāstrī 1926, 247). This is a paraphrase of Vākyapadīya 1.115: na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte | anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 188). Umbeka quotes the verse in full (ed. Ramanatha Sastri et al. 1971, 157).*

⁴¹Umbeka refers to *vedāntavādinah* (148), Pārthasārathi to *vedāntinah* (122), and Sucarita to *advaitavādinah* (I, 250).

⁴²*Ślokavārttika* 114-115, ed. Śambaśiva Śāstrī 1926, 250.

⁴³Sucarita, on the other hand, leaves it as is: *dravyaṃ sad ity evamāditi paryāvācyam mahāsāmānyam anyaiḥ pratyakṣasya grāhyam ucyate iti* (ed. Śambaśiva Śāstrī 1926, 250).

⁴⁴*vedāntavādinah tu — mahāsāmānyam nirvikalpasya viśayam āhuḥ | tac ca kecit sattām āhuḥ, apare dravyam ity etad darśayati — mahāsāmānyam iti* (ed. Ramanatha Sastri et al. 1971, 148).

⁴⁵*vedāntinah tu mahāsāmānyam eva sattādravyaśabdābhilāpya[m] nirvikalpasya viśayam āhuḥ* (ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978, 122).

2. *Helārāja on dravya: an all-encompassing doctrine*

Kumārila, naturally, rejects both *śabdādvaitin* and *sattādvaitin* positions. In response to the first position, Kumārila states that cognition without language is apparently possible, giving the example of infants (*bāla*) and mute persons (*mūka*).⁴⁶ In response to the *sattādvaitin*, Kumārila states that, in fact, distinctions really are cognized at the level of perception; it would be absurd to assert that one does not perceive the difference between a horse and a cow, even if those differences are not immediately conceptualized.⁴⁷ This objection seems to harken back to the arguments against *sattā* as a summum genus in the *Tantravārttika* and the *Ākṛtivāda*; for Kumārila, difference is natural and not an illusion produced by a manifesting agency which is superimposed on an ultimately non-dual reality. However, here in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, the debate is not centered on the referent of words nor the existence of higher and lower universals, but rather on the object of perception. While it is clear that Bhartṛhari considers *sattā* to be the ultimate referent of all words and that he considers it to be the summum genus in a hierarchy of universals, as John Taber notes, there is no indication in the *Vākyapadīya* that he understands *sattā* as the content of a non-conceptualized cognition by means of the faculty of perception.⁴⁸ However, it is not unprecedented for Kumārila to take ideas from the *Vākyapadīya* and transform them slightly so that they form an ideal *pūrvapakṣa*; in his presentation of Śabdādvaita, which is clearly taken from Bhartṛhari, he similarly extrapolates the notion that all cognition is bound up with language and renders it into an argument claiming that even the content of perception is necessarily a conceptualized cognition. In the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, both the Śabdādvaita and Sattādvaita aspects of Bhartṛhari's thought have been transformed in order to function as opposing viewpoints to the Buddhist notion of non-conceptualized perception, and this particular framing of Bhartṛhari's ideas endures for centuries to come.

Maṇḍana Mīśra: in defense of *sattā*

As noted earlier, Maṇḍana Mīśra is generally considered by scholars to be the main proponent of Sattādvaita, although he never uses the term himself. Certainly, in the *Brahmasiddhi*, *brahman* is characterized as the universal *sattā*, and both his imagery and language seem to owe much to Bhartṛhari. However, the arguments that he uses to defend Sattādvaita clearly show the influence of Kumārila's critiques:

saṃhṛtākḥilabhedo	'taḥ	sāmānyātmā	Because difference is completely withdrawn, it
sa ⁴⁹ varṇitaḥ			is described as a universal,
hemeva	pārihāryādibhedasamhārasūci-		like gold is revealed by the withdrawal of differ-
tam 1.3			ent [forms], such as a bracelet.

⁴⁶*asti hy ālocanājñānaṃ prathamam nirvikalpam | bālamūkādivijñānasadrśaṃ śuddhavastujam (Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra 112, ed. Śambaśiva Śāstrī 1926, 248). On the other hand, as John Taber notes, Bhartṛhari considers even infants to have "an awareness of words based on past impressions, that is, impressions from previous lives" (2005, 203-204). See Vākyapadīya 1.113, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 186.*

⁴⁷Taber 2005, 95.

⁴⁸Taber 2005, 206.

⁴⁹The masculine gender of the pronoun here suggests that it may be referring to *ātman*, or possibly to Prajāpati from the first verse. However, in the gloss of the verse, it is clearly *brahman* which is meant.

2. *Helārāja on dravya: an all-encompassing doctrine*

yataś ca viśeṣapratyastamukhena tannirūpa-
ṇam, ato 'nyair brahmavidyābhiyuktaiḥ sāmā-
nyarūpaṃ brahma nirūpitam — 'sa eva mahān
aja ātmā sattālakṣaṇaḥ' tathā 'sattaiva sarva-
bhedayoniḥ prakṛtiḥ parā' iti | yathā suvarṇata-
ttvaṃ kaṭakāṅgulīyādiviśeṣopasaṃhāreṇa ni-
rūpyamāṇaṃ tat sāmānyam iti |

ye vā – 'nirviśeṣaṃ na sāmānyam bhavec cha-
śaviśāṇavat' ity abhāvam āhuḥ, tān praty u-
cyate — saṃhṛtākḥilabheda iti | yadi tāvad a-
sāmānyatvaṃ sādhyate siddhasādhanaṃ | vi-
śeṣāṇām abhāve keṣāṃ tat sāmānyam? sāmā-
nyam tūktaṃ brahmavādibhir viśeṣapratyasta-
mukhena nirūpaṇād upacārataḥ | athābhāva
eva sādhyāḥ, viśeṣair evāsyā nirviśeṣair vyabhi-
cāra iti ||⁵⁰

And since it is indicated by means of the ces-
sation of particulars [as said in the previous
verse], *brahman* is described as a universal by
others well-versed in the Vedas – for example,
“It is that which is the great, unborn *ātman*,
characterized as *sattā*”, and “Only *sattā* is the
origin of all difference, the absolute primordial
substance.” In the same way, the reality of gold,
indicated by the withdrawal of [its] particular
[forms] such as a bracelet or a ring, is a univer-
sal.

To those who say that [*brahman* as universal]
does not exist, since “a universal without par-
ticulars should not exist, like a hare’s horn”, he
responds to them by saying [the verse]. Firstly,
if [they want to] prove that [a universal with-
out particulars] would not have the quality of
being a universal, then they are proving what is
already established (*siddhasādhana*). If there
are no particulars, then what would the univer-
sal be of? But *brahmavādins* call it a universal
in a figurative sense because it is indicated by
the cessation of particulars. [Secondly], if it is
the non-existence itself [of a universal without
particulars] that is to be established, this is in-
conclusive, because particulars of [a universal]
themselves have no [further] particulars.

The simile used in this passage, that of the gold taking different forms, is the same one used by Pata-
ñjali in the *Mahābhāṣya* and Bhartṛhari in the *Dravyasamuddeśa* to justify the reality of substance,
dravya, over form, *ākṛti*, which is unreal. It may seem that Maṇḍana is attempting to use the simile
to prove the opposite conclusion – that it is the genus that is real; however, as Kumārila’s commen-
tators have pointed out, for a *sattādvaitin*, *dravya* and *sattā* are synonymous, since they both refer to
an underlying, non-dual reality. In fact, in the untraced passage that Maṇḍana quotes, *sattaiva sa-
rvabhedayoniḥ prakṛtiḥ parā*, he relates *sattā* to *prakṛtiḥ parā*, which, as Allen Thrasher points out, is
used in verse 15 of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* to describe *dravya*, the reality that remains when all trans-
formations have ceased.⁵¹ Moreover, while the other passage quoted by Maṇḍana, *sa eva mahān aja*

⁵⁰*Brahmasiddhi*, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri 1937, 37. Madeleine Biardeau translates *sāmānyātmā* as “l’ātman comme genre”
(Biardeau 1969, 189).

⁵¹Thrasher 1993, 84.

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ātmā sattālakṣaṇaḥ, seems to be from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the Upaniṣadic version omits *sattālakṣaṇaḥ*; Thrasher traces this to the *Ṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1.145, where *mahān ātmā* is qualified by *sattālakṣaṇa*.⁵² It could equally be an influence from verse 34 of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, where *sattā* is described as *mahān ātmā*.

The opponent who argues that “a universal without particulars cannot exist” is, in fact, Kumārila, and the quote is from the *Ākṛtivāda*.⁵³ It seems that either Maṇḍana was not entirely comfortable with the characterization of *brahman* as the summum genus or that Kumārila’s argument was unassailable; in response, Maṇḍana concedes that the characterization of *brahman* as a universal is only figurative.⁵⁴ But his main concern is not to precisely define *sattā*, but to prove that *sattā* – that is, *brahman* – is the object of perception. For Kumārila, Sattādvaita was only ever a briefly-mentioned pūrvapakṣa that was used to illustrate what he considered to be an extreme view; in the *Brahmasiddhi*, Maṇḍana develops it into a long and detailed siddhānta refuting the Buddhist theory of perception. In Maṇḍana’s hands, the terms of the debate shift again – while Kumārila frames his arguments around the question of whether the object of perception is an individual or a universal, Maṇḍana asks whether perception can be a *pramāṇa* for *brahman*. As the Buddhist opponent argues, since perception cognizes different individual things, it cannot be a *pramāṇa* for *brahman*, which is undifferentiated by definition; therefore, it would seem that perception is contradictory to scripture, which declares the non-duality of reality.⁵⁵ The main opponent here is Dignāga, who famously argues that the object of perception is a unique individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) and that its cognition is non-conceptualized. Maṇḍana agrees that the object of perception is non-conceptualized, but he asserts that the content of its cognition is existence and not difference – “the operation of perception cannot be solely differentiation, nor both [asserting existence and difference] simultaneously, nor differentiating before asserting [existence], since only an already established thing can be negated with respect to an established scope – in the sentences, ‘it is not here, this is not that’, an established pot [is negated] with respect to the established ground, or a horse [is negated] with respect to an [established] cow. Negation is not possible without [first positing] both what is to be negated and the scope of the negation.”⁵⁶ In this way, Maṇḍana argues that perception cannot possibly cognize differentiation, and that, first and foremost, it establishes existence. However, ultimately, he believes that perception is tainted by nescience (*avidyā*) and imperfect;⁵⁷ his argument in this case is

⁵²Ibid. Numbered as verse 137 in Subramania Iyer’s edition. *teṣām ṛṣayaḥ kecit pratibhātmani vivartante, sattālakṣaṇaṃ mahāntam ātmānam avidyāyonim paśyantaḥ pratibodhenābhisambhavanti* (*Ṛtti* ad *Vākyapadīya* 1.137, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 226).

⁵³*Ślokavārttika Ākṛtivāda* 10, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978, 387.

⁵⁴Thrasher, on the other hand, interprets this to mean that Maṇḍana is “not much troubled” by Kumārila’s argument, and that he “does not admit the opponent’s definition of ‘universal’” (1993, 85).

⁵⁵*kena punaḥ pramāṇenāsyārthasya samadhigamaḥ ? na tāvat pratyakṣeṇa, tasyaitad viparītabhedaviṣayatvāt* (*Brahmasiddhi*, ed. Kuppuswami Sastrī 1937, 22).

⁵⁶*na tāvad vyavacchedamātram pratyakṣavyāpārah, na yugapad ubhayam, na vyavacchedapūrvakaṃ vidhānam; yataḥ siddhe viṣaye siddharūpam eva niśidhyate – ‘nedam iha, nāyam ayam’ iti siddhe bhūtale siddho ghaṭaḥ, gavi vā aśvaḥ | na pratiśedhyāt pratiśedhaviṣayāc ca vinā pratiśedho ‘vakalpate* (*Brahmasiddhi*, ed. Kuppuswami Sastrī 1937, 44).

⁵⁷*āmnāyaikanibandhanatvam tu tasyocyate, pratyakṣādīnām avidyāsaṃbhinnatvāt* (*Brahmasiddhi*, Kuppuswami Sastrī 1937, 157).

made to refute the Buddhists and prove perception and verbal authority (i.e., the Vedas) are not in contradiction, since knowledge about *brahman* is based on the Veda.

While Kumārila positioned himself as a moderate and rational alternative to three extreme pūrvapakṣas – Vijñānavāda, Śabdādvaita, and Sattādvaita –, arguing that even in a non-conceptualized cognition, both the individuality of the object and its general features are manifest, Maṇḍana takes up the position of Sattādvaita, at the extreme opposite end from Vijñānavāda. Hugh Nicholson argues that Maṇḍana is forced into this position because his main aim is to defend Advaita Vedānta against comparisons with the Buddhists, and by foregrounding the contrast of *sattā* against *sva-lakṣaṇa* he is able to obscure the substantial similarities between Vijñānavāda and Advaita Vedānta.⁵⁸ However, Maṇḍana does not seem to be adverse to comparisons if they are favourable to his defense of the validity of Sattādvaita – in one passage, Maṇḍana makes the Buddhist opponent argue that even difference is ultimately unreal (*niḥsvabhāva*) and merely a product of conceptualization (*vikalpa*); Maṇḍana replies that this is precisely what Advaita Vedānta posits as well, that difference is an unreality produced by nescience (*avidyā*).⁵⁹ Moreover, Nicholson neglects to take into account the influence of the conceptual framework that Kumārila set up in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* that underlies the discussion in the *Brahmasiddhi*. The sides of the debate were already established by Kumārila, with the Buddhists on one end and Advaita Vedānta, as represented by a creative interpretation of Bhartṛhari's ideas, on the other. Since Kumārila portrayed both of those views as pūrvapakṣas, Maṇḍana must still contend with Kumārila's criticisms against Sattādvaita even after he has argued for the superiority of Sattādvaita over Vijñānavāda. To this end, he explicitly rejects Kumārila's argument that in perception, there is always the cognition of a specific form, even if that form isn't immediately conceptualized.⁶⁰ Maṇḍana states that this view was disproven already; he may be referring to the above-mentioned passage in which he rejects the possibility that perception simultaneously establishes the existence of a thing and also differentiates it from other things, which recalls Kumārila's assertion in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* that even the object of a non-conceptualized cognition has a dual nature (*dvyātmaka*), with both specific and general properties.⁶¹

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta: in the footsteps of Kumārila

In 9th century Kaśmīr, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta again takes up the question of non-conceptualized cognition in a long discussion in the second āhnika of his *Nyāyamañjarī*, where he investigates perception. The Buddhists are, again, the main opponent, although, just as in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, other pūrvapakṣas are briefly explored. But in addition to the three perspectives that Kumārila lists – Vi-

⁵⁸2002, 583.

⁵⁹yadi niḥsvabhāvo bhedaḥ – na hi vastuṣṭhityāsti, vikalpā eva kevalam upadarśyate.... vāyam api etad eva brūmaḥ – na bhedo bhāvato 'sti, anādyavidyāvilasitam etad iti (*Brahmasiddhi*, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri 1937, 48).

⁶⁰ye tv āhuḥ — darśanād eva bhāvānām bhedaḥ sidhyati | tathā hi — nirvikalpasya pratyakṣasya sāmānyaviśayatvam apākurvatoktam — 'tad ayuktaṅ pratidravyaṅ bhinnarūpopalambhanād' iti.... te prāg eva pratyuktāḥ (*Brahmasiddhi*, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri 1937, 58). The quote is from *Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra* 117, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstri 1978, 123.

⁶¹nirvikalpakabodho 'pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ (*Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra* 118, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstri 1978, 123).

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jñānavāda, Sattādvaita, and Śabdādvaita – Jayanta appends a fourth view, inspired by Kumārila:

kiñ ca kiṃ nirvikalpakena gr̥hyata ity etad eva
na jānīmaḥ ||

bhavanto nirvikalpasya viṣayaṃ sampraca-
kṣate |
sajātiyavijātiyaparāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇam ||

mahāsāmānyam anye tu sattā tadviṣayaṃ vi-
duḥ |
vāgrūpam apare tattvaṃ prameyaṃ tasya ma-
nvate ||
kecid guṇakriyādravyajātibhedādiruṣitam |
śabalaṃ vastu manyante nirvikalpakagoca-
ram ||⁶²

But what [exactly] is grasped by a non-
conceptualized [cognition]? This we really do
not understand.

[The Buddhists] explain that the object of a
non-conceptualized [cognition] is the unique
individual, distinct from other [individuals]
which are similar and from those which are dis-
similar.

But others consider its object to be Being, un-
derstood as the summum genus,
while [still] others think that language itself is
ascertained by it.

Some think that the scope of a non-
conceptualized [cognition] is a mixed-up
thing,

in which quality, action, substance, genus, etc.
are smeared together.

Although the basic distinctions between the different views remain intact, much has changed since Kumārila wrote the *Ślokavārttika*. Most prominently, the Mīmāṃsaka view on non-conceptualized cognition, represented here by the term *śabalaṃ vastu* which Jayanta takes from the *Ākṛtīvāda*,⁶³ is no longer a siddhānta, but yet another pūrvapakṣa. More subtly, Śabdādvaita plays a different role here: in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, Kumārila used it as a pūrvapakṣa that asserted that all cognition is necessarily conceptualized because it is infused with language, but Jayanta re-interprets it to mean that language is the very object of a non-conceptualized cognition. This has the effect of making Śabdādvaita seem completely absurd – as Jayanta counters, how is language perceived by the eye? Moreover, language relies on the relation between word and object; how can language be expressive if, presupposing the non-duality of word and object, this relation is not cognized?⁶⁴

In the case of Sattādvaita, Jayanta's explanation is fairly straightforward and closely mirrors Kumārila's – that the object of a non-conceptualized cognition is Being, the summum genus. However, it is clear that Jayanta also relies heavily on Maṇḍana in order to furnish the voice of the Sattādvaita pūrvapakṣin, and, in doing so, he shows his deep knowledge of Maṇḍana's philosophy; in fact, he quotes directly from the *Brahmasiddhi* when he presents the thesis that perception can only posit existence

⁶²*Nyāyamañjarī* 2.91-93, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, I, 250-252.

⁶³*yadā tu śabalaṃ vastu yugapat pratipadyate || tadānyānanyabhedādisarvam eva pralīyate | (Ślokavārttika Ākṛtīvāda 62-63, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978, 317).*

⁶⁴*vāktattvapratibhāso 'pi pratikṣipto 'nayā diśā | katham ca cākṣuṣe jñāne vāktattvam avabhāsate || agrhīte tu sambandhe gr̥hīte vā'pi viśmṛte | aprabuddhe 'pi saṃskāre vācakāvagatīḥ kutaḥ? (Nyāyamañjarī 2.103-104, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, I, 255).*

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and not difference.⁶⁵ Because of Maṇḍana, Sattādvaita is no longer merely a peculiar perspective on non-conceptualized cognition, as it was for Kumārila, but an entire system of Vedāntic thought. In the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*, Kumārila's *sattādvaitin* explained that differences are manifested in conceptualized cognitions. But in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, – when Jayanta asks, if perception only grasps an undifferentiated Being, then how can individual objects ever be cognized? – Jayanta's *sattādvaitin* gives a more Vedāntic answer: differences are a product of nescience (*avidyā*).⁶⁶

The final refutation of the *sattādvaitin* does not occur until the ninth āhnikā, devoted to investigating liberation (*apavarga*),⁶⁷ where Jayanta offers a thorough rebuttal that – as the Vedāntins contend – the removal of nescience leads to liberation, attacking the very notion of nescience from multiple angles. Firstly, he asks, if nescience is distinct from *brahman*, then how could non-duality hold? The Vedāntin answers that nescience is a non-thing, an illusion, whose nature is the manifestation of error. Moreover, the locus of nescience is not *brahman* but the individual souls, the *jīvas*.⁶⁸ But Jayanta has no patience for the subtleties of Advaita Vedānta; for him, there is either identity or difference, and the notion that the *jīvas* are both different and not different from *brahman* is preposterous – “it is not that sparks glowing differently from the flame do not have the nature of fire”.⁶⁹ As the *Granthibhaṅga* commentary points out, Jayanta is employing an Upaniṣadic image here – just as sparks shooting out from a fire are nevertheless of the same nature (*sarūpa*) as the fire, diverse beings are born from *brahman* and are reabsorbed into it.⁷⁰ It seems that even the Vedāntin's authoritative texts do not support the special status of nescience. And, having invalidated the claim that difference is produced by nescience, Jayanta claims that he has refuted not only Sattādvaita, but Śabdādvaita as well.⁷¹

Jayanta seems to consider both Sattādvaita and Śabdādvaita as species of Advaita Vedānta⁷² – since they concur that *brahman*, whether characterized as the summum genus or as language, is the nature of reality –, and therefore, even though he devotes a section to refuting Śabdādvaita specifically, he also has opportunities to attack both of them simultaneously.⁷³ As in the *Ślokavārttika*, these are

⁶⁵*tad uktaṃ — ‘āhur vidhātṛ pratyakṣaṃ na niṣeddhṛ vipaścitaḥ | naikatva āgamas tena pratyakṣeṇa virudhyate ||’* (*Nyāyamañjarī* 9, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, II, 494). This is verse 2.1 from the *Brahmasiddhi* (ed. Kuppaswami Sastri 1937, 39).

⁶⁶*sattāgrahaṇapakṣe ‘pi viśeṣāvagatiḥ kutaḥ | nāvidyāmātram evedam iti ca sthāpayiśyate* (*Nyāyamañjarī* 2.101-102, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, I, 254).

⁶⁷Defined in the *Nyāyasūtra* as final liberation from suffering: *bādhānalakṣaṇaṃ duḥkham iti | tadatyantavimokṣo ‘pavargaḥ* (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.21-22, ed. Tailaṅga 1896, 2).

⁶⁸*avidyā tv iyam avasturūpā, māyā, mithyāvabhāsavabhāvā ‘bhidhīyate... jīvātmanām avidyā, na brahmaṇaḥ* (*Nyāyamañjarī* 9, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, II, 466). This characterization of the locus of *avidyā* is often used to distinguish Maṇḍana's Advaita Vedānta from Śaṅkara's.

⁶⁹*nanu! ke te jīvātmanāḥ? te ‘pi brahmaṇo ‘nyānanyatayā cintyā evāḥ! kṣudratārkika! sarvatrānabhijño ‘si | brahmaiva jīvātmanāḥ, na tato ‘nye | na hi dahanapiṇḍād bhedenāpi bhāntaḥ sphuliṅgāḥ agnisvarūpā na bhavanti* (Ibid.).

⁷⁰*na hi dahanapiṇḍād iti tathā śrūtiḥ – ‘tad etat satyam – yathā sudiptāt pāvakād visphuliṅgāḥ sahasraśaḥ prabhavante sarūpāḥ | tathā akṣarād vīdhaḥ soṃya bhāvāḥ prajāyante tatra caivāpi yanti’* (*Granthibhaṅga* ad *Nyāyamañjarī* 9, ed. Shah 1972, 219). The quoted verse is *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.1.1 (ed. Olivelle 1998a, 442).

⁷¹*avidyāmāyāvinirmitavidhabhedaprathanakalpaś ca sattādvaitadūṣaṇāvasara eva nivārīta iti śabdādvaitam api tad-vad asamānjasaṃ iti siddham* (*Nyāyamañjarī* 9, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, II, 486).

⁷²Ājāda Mīśra propounds the same thesis (Mīśra 1986, 272-273).

⁷³For example: *avidyāmāyāvinirmitavidhabhedaprathanakalpaś ca sattādvaitadūṣaṇāvasara eva nivārīta iti śabdā-*

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portrayed in opposition to the Buddhist *vijñānādvaita*, which posits that emptiness is the ultimate nature of reality. However, Jayanta also finds possibilities to group all three of them together, as doctrines of Advaita which are all ultimately erroneous, and in one such list of Advaita *darśanas*, he mentions “*vijñāna, sattā, ātman, śabda*, etc”.⁷⁴ It would seem that Jayanta also knew of a fourth kind of Advaita, *Ātmādvaita*, although that term does not appear in the *Nyāyamañjarī* except as part of the above-mentioned list. In contemporary literature, *Ātmādvaita* brings to mind the school of Śaṅkara, but this does not seem to be what is meant here. As Alexis Sanderson and others have noted, there do not seem to be Kaśmīri sources from this period that betray knowledge specifically of Śaṅkara’s philosophy, and it is rather Maṇḍana who seems to be the source for the Advaitin pūrvaapakṣin in the *Nyāyamañjarī*.⁷⁵ Moreover, Jayanta does not refute *Sattādvaita* and *Ātmādvaita* separately, as two schools of thought. It is more likely that, for him, they represented two doctrines of the same Vedāntic school – the first, that perception can be a *pramāṇa* for *brahman*, since its object is the undifferentiated summum genus, and the second, – which he sometimes calls *ekātmavāda* – that there is only one *ātman*, which is not different from *brahman*.⁷⁶ Both of these, as well as *Śabdādvaita*, are doctrines defended in the *Brahmasiddhi*.

Setting the stage for Helārāja

By the time Helārāja comes to comment on the verses in the *Vākyapadīya* that gave rise to *Sattādvaita*, there has already been five centuries’ worth of debate on it. Even though the foundations of *Sattādvaita* are found in the *Vākyapadīya*, where Bhartṛhari conflates the Vaiśeṣika notion of *sattā*, the summum genus, with the ultimately undifferentiated *mahān ātmā*, it is not until Kumārila transforms those ideas into a pūrvaapakṣa that it becomes a definitive doctrine. This was, in turn, developed into a siddhānta by Maṇḍana, who uses it to attack the Buddhist notion of perception, incidentally making *avidyā* an important part of *Sattādvaita* doctrine. It becomes a pūrvaapakṣa again for Jayanta, whose spirited refutation is used as a model for later thinkers like the Jaina logician Prabhācandra.⁷⁷ It is through this complex dialogue between philosophers of opposing schools that those nascent ideas, barely hinted at in the *Vākyapadīya*, become a system of thought – passed back and forth between Vaiśeṣikas, Grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas, Buddhists, Advaitins, Naiyāyikas, Jainas, and others, almost every major branch of Indian philosophy has had a hand in creating what we now understand as *Sattādvaita*.

dvaitam api tadvad asamamjasam iti siddham (*Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, II, 486).

⁷⁴*yat tu vijñānasattātmaśabdādyadvaitadarśanam tat mithyājñānam eveti na niḥśreyasasādhanam iti* (*Nyāyamañjarī* 9, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, II, 464).

⁷⁵Sanderson 1985, 210 note 41.

⁷⁶*ātmabhedasya vispaṣṭasiddhatvāt... ekātmavādo ’pi na yuktimān ity alaṃ vistareṇa* (ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, II, 487). See also I, 546 and II, 469.

⁷⁷*viśayābhāṣaḥ – sāmānyam yathā sattādvaitavādinah | kevalam viśeṣo vā yathā saugatasya | dvayam vā svatantram yathā yaugasya* (*Prameyakamālamārtanda*, ed. Kumar Shastri 1990, 643). Prabhācandra, like those before him, contrasts *Sattādvaita* with the Buddhists. He also adds a third option, attributed to the Naiyāyikas, that both universal and particular are independent. On the use of *yauga* to refer to Naiyāyikas, see Chaṭṭopādhyāya 1927.

2.4. Casting Sāṃkhya as Sattādvaita

In contrast to the other thinkers who have expounded on Sattādvaita, Helārāja is not interested so much in refuting other doctrines as in bringing them into agreement with the *brahmavāda* that is expounded upon in the *Vākyapadīya*. In Sattādvaita, expressed, as in the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, as a doctrine in which all things resolve into an undifferentiated Being, Helārāja finds a fruitful ground for comparison with the Sāṃkhya notion of *prakṛti*, a primordial, undifferentiated substance.

Uniting *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*

Although Sāṃkhya is a fundamentally dualist philosophy, based as it is on the duality between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, with a little creative interpretation, many philosophers have claimed that Sāṃkhyas, too, espouse non-dualism. For example, Abhinavagupta, in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, argues that, since all matter has its origin in *prakṛti*, a single, primordial, substance, Sāṃkhya philosophy can also be said to be a kind of Advaita.⁷⁸ Even *puruṣa*, with a little effort, can be subsumed into *prakṛti* – if the *puruṣa* is interpreted as an individual soul (*jīva*), then in Advaitin terms, it is also a manifestation of a non-dual whole.⁷⁹

In glossing the word *śarīra* in the first verse of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Helārāja makes a similar move:

prakṛter ekadeśaḥ cetanaḥ puruṣas taddvā-
reṇa śarīraśarīriṇor avyatiṛekāt śarīraṃ dra-
vyaṃ pradhānam eveti prakṛtikaiḥ śarīram e-
vaika ātmā yeṣaṃ taiḥ śarīrātmabhir ucyate |⁸⁰

The sentient person is part of the primordial matter – in that way, since there is no distinction between the body and the embodied, the body (*śarīra*) is substance, namely, the primordial; thus it is said by the proponents of the primordial matter (*prakṛtika*), those embodied selves for whom the unitary Self is really the body.

The term *śarīrātman* is not used in Sāṃkhya literature; however, it does appear twice in the *Mahābhāṣya*, and the problem which is raised by that term is very much something that Helārāja is concerned with. The first occurrence is in the discussion on A 1.3.67 *ṇer aṇau yat karma ṇau cet sa kartānādhyāne*, which governs passive constructions with causative verbs. As examples, Patañjali gives the sentence *darśayate bhṛtyai rājā*, “the king lets the servants see him”, which corresponds to *paśyanti bhṛtyā rājānam*, “the servants see the king”.⁸¹ In the first sentence, with the verb in the causative, the king is the agent; in the second sentence, he is the object. At the end of the discussion, Kātyāyana raises the objection that the self cannot be used as an object in this situation, since, as

⁷⁸ *ekaprakṛtyārdhatvād ekam eva viśvam iti prakṛtivāde 'py advaitaṃ pradarśitam* (*Gītārthasaṅgraha* ad *Bhagavadgītā* 7.5, ed. Sankaranarayanan 1985, 125).

⁷⁹ *śaiva jīvatvaṃ puruṣatvaṃ prāptā parā mamaiva nānyasya ca* (Ibid.).

⁸⁰ *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Dravyasamuddeśa* 1.

⁸¹ ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 292.

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Patañjali points out, the sentence *hanty ātmānam*, “he kills himself”, would have the corresponding causative sentence *ghātayaty ātmā*, “the self causes the self to be killed”⁸² – in this case, which *ātman* is the killer, and which *ātman* is killed? In response, Patañjali states that there are, in fact, two selves:

dvāv ātmanau | antarātmā śarīrātmā ca | anta-
rātmā tat karma karoti yena śarīrātmā sukha-
duḥkhe 'nubhavati | śarīrātmā tat karma karoti
yenāntarātmā sukhaduḥkhe 'nubhavatīti |⁸³

There are two selves: the inner self (*antarātmā*) and the bodily self (*śarīrātmā*). The bodily self experiences joy and suffering via the actions that are performed by the inner self. The inner self experiences joy and suffering via the actions that are performed by the bodily self.

Patañjali does not elaborate, but this passage appears identically in the discussion on A 3.1.87 *karmavāt karmaṇā tulyakriyāḥ*, which states that, when the agent is related to a given action in the same way as when it is the object, then the verb requires passive morphology. This rule was formulated to allow for passive sentences such as *bhidyate kusūlena*, “the granary breaks”, which corresponds to *bhidyate kusūlaḥ*.⁸⁴ An objection is raised that this rule would not be needed if the word *ātmanā* were assumed to be understood in the sentence – *bhidyata ātmanā kusūlaḥ* could easily be transformed into *ātmā bhidyate kusūlena*. Again, the exemplar sentence that Patañjali chooses is “he kills himself”, this time formulated as *hanty ātmānam ātmanā* and *ātmanā hanyata ātmā*.⁸⁵ Again, in order to explain how these sentences can have two selves, he repeats his explanation of *śarīrātmā* and *antarātmā*.

It is difficult to understand why Patañjali would posit two selves in order to understand the sentence, “one kills oneself”; the most obvious interpretation would be to assume the same self to be both the agent and the object of the action. Perhaps he is simply pointing out that, in common experience, there seems to be a distinction between the physical body and the mind that controls it. There is an echo of this dualism in verse 55 of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*: “in [the world], the sentient being (*cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ*) experiences suffering caused by old age and death. As long as the subtle body does not cease, suffering is naturally [experienced].”⁸⁶ As in Patañjali’s account, there is a body which acts and an inner self which experiences the suffering that results, although it must be noted that the Sāṃkhya dualism between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is radically different from mind-body dualism, since the *puruṣa* has no agency.⁸⁷ But for Helārāja, any distinction between the physical body and con-

⁸²*ātmanāḥ karmatve pratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ. hanty ātmānam. ghātayaty ātmeti. sa tarhi vaktavyaḥ* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 292).

⁸³ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 292. Scharfe compares *antarātmā* to Śabaravāmin’s use of the term *pratyagātmā* (Scharfe 1961, 149 note).

⁸⁴Cardona 1974, 241-242.

⁸⁵ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, II, 68.

⁸⁶*atra jarāmaraṇakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ | liṅgasyāvinivṛttes tasmād duḥkhaṃ svabhāvena* (ed. Srinivasan 1967, 162). As Ellwood A. Welden has pointed out, early commentators on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* have distinguished between the *liṅga*, the thirteenthfold organ, and the *liṅgaśarīra*, the substratum or subtle body that accompanies the *liṅga* as it transmigrates through re-birth (Welden 1910). However, in this particular verse, *liṅga* seems to refer to the *liṅgaśarīra* (See Larson 1979, 189-191).

⁸⁷Kaiyaṭa gives two interpretations of the *antarātmā* mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*: for the Naiyāyikas, it is the *puruṣa*,

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sciousness – whether endowed with agency or not – is untenable, both from an absolute, Advaitin point of view, and also from a grammarian’s point of view. As Bhartṛhari says in the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*, the attribution of a grammatical role to a thing is only a mental state; the thing itself does not inherently possess the role of agent or object.⁸⁸ Helārāja, commenting on this point, refers back to the sentence *hantya ātmānam ātmanā*: in that sentence, “a single *ātman*, subject to the different [conceptions] resulting from the speaker’s intention, is seen in three different capacities (*kāraka*) [i.e., as agent, object, and instrument].”⁸⁹ Moreover, for him, the sentence “he kills himself” does not only illustrate a linguistic problem; it also illustrates the unreal differences that are attributed to the universal that remains when all differences have been re-absorbed – *sattā*.⁹⁰

As in the example above from the *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, Helārāja wants to argue that the *puruṣa* is actually a part of *prakṛti*. But in doing so, he is very close to casting the Sāṃkhyas as materialists. He says that, for them, the *ātman* is really the body, glossing *śarīrātman* as *śarīram evaika ātmā*; this is almost exactly the same doctrine that Yamuna, in his *Ātmasiddhi*, ascribes to the Cārvākas: *deham evātmēti bārhaspatyāḥ*.⁹¹ In order to make Sāṃkhya a kind of Advaita – specifically, in Helārāja’s case, Sattādvaita –, it is not enough to just reduce the conscious self to being part of the physical world. A further step is required: he must show that *prakṛti* is identical to *sattā*.

Interpreting *prakṛti* as *sattā*: A falsified quotation from the *Pātāñjalayogaśāstra*

Verses 32 to 35 of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* seem to be the locus of the discussion on what Helārāja calls *sattādvaita*.⁹² Although initially, the purport of these verses is linguistic – that is, they are concerned with what words mean –, they also make ontological claims about reality. Verse 34, in particular, shows this quite clearly: firstly, it states that *sattā* is “the meaning of the nominal base (*prātipadikārtha*)”, and “the meaning of the verbal base (*dhātvartha*)”; then, it makes ontological claims – “it is permanent (*nitya*), it is the great *ātman*”. Helārāja glosses each of these statements: all things

the soul; but for the Sāṃkhyas, it is the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the mind as an inner organ, since the *puruṣa* has no agency – *sāṃkhyapakṣe ’ntaḥkaraṇam antarātmā tasyaiva kartṛtvasaṃbhavāt puruṣasyākartṛtvāt. naiyāyikādīnām tu mate puruṣasya kartṛtvāt sa evāntarātmā vivakṣitaḥ. śarīrātmanā sukhaduḥke iti – śarīrasyācetanavāt sukhaduḥkhaḥetubhyām śarīram saṃbandhyata iti vyākhyeyam* (ed. Bhikaji Josi 1987, II, 173).

⁸⁸*ekasyaiva buddhyavasthābhir bhede ca parikalpīte | kartṛtvaṃ karaṇatvaṃ ca karmatvaṃ copajāyate* (*Sādhanasamuddeśa* 104, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 313). “The nature of agent or instrument or object of a single thing arises when a difference is conceived [in its capacities] to it according to [different] states of the mind” (trans. Vergiani, forthcoming).

⁸⁹*hantya ātmānam ātmanā ity ekasyaivātmano vivakṣāprāpitarūpabhedādhīnaḥ kārakatrayayogo dṛṣyate* (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 314). Kaiyaṭa, in turn, quotes verse 104 of the *Sādhanasamuddeśa* in his commentary on *hantya ātmānam ātmanā* in the *Bhāṣya* on A 3.1.87 (ed. Bhikaji Josi 1987, III, 121).

⁹⁰*dṛṣṭaś ca kālpaniko bhedaḥ yathā hantya ātmānam ātmanā iti | na hy ātmavyatirikto hantā kaścit pratyavabhāṣate* (*Prākīrṇaprakāśa ad Jāṭisamuddeśa* 40, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 47). “And the difference that is perceived [in *sattā*] is fictitious, as in [the sentence] ‘he kills himself’; for no killer distinct from the self manifests at all”. In the verse, Bhartṛhari gives different possibilities for why difference is seen in *sattā* (*sattāyā bhedadarśanaḥetavaḥ*).

⁹¹*Siddhitrāya*, ed. Ramanujacharya 1972, 12. See also the *Cārvākadarśana* of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (ed. Śāstri Abhyankar 1924, 3).

⁹²See above.

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depend on Being, and therefore all nominal bases (*prātipadika*) express Being; every action depends on the existence of the things involved in the action, and therefore even verbal bases (*dhātu*) depend on Being to be expressive; Being is permanent (*nitya*), because even while individual beings come and go, the notion of Being itself, the summum genus, persists.⁹³ Up to that point, Helārāja's glosses are quite banal. But when it comes to *mahān ātmā*, he makes the surprising move of quoting a passage from the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*⁹⁴ that uses the terms *mahat*, *ātman*, and *sattā*:

ete sattāmātrasyātmano mahataḥ ṣaḍ viśeṣa-
pariṇāmāḥ, yat tatparam viśeṣebhyo liṅgamā-
tram mahattattvam, tasminn ete sattāmātre
mahaty ātmany avasthāya vivṛddhikāṣṭhām a-
nubhavanti | pratisaṃsṛjyamānās ca tasminn
eva sattāmātre mahaty ātmany avasthāya yat
tan niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasad avyaktam ali-
ṅgam tasmin pratiyanti

ity evaṃ sāṅkhye buddhitattvaṃ mahaccha-
bdavācyam ādyaṃ jagatkāraṇam nirdiṣṭam
iti... sattādvaitavādaḥ sāṅkhyanayenāpy
upabṛṃhitaḥ |⁹⁶

As Helārāja says, this quote seems to show that the Sāṅkhyas believe *sattā* – which is also called *mahat* or *ātman* – to be the originary cause of the world. This would seem to make Sāṅkhyā ontology very similar to the idea expressed in *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 34, where Bhartṛhari qualifies *sattā* as *mahān ātmā*. According to this quote, *mahat*, which is described as *sattā*, is the first cause, and it has six particularized transformations, which, while abiding in *mahat*, reach the upper limit of their development. When these transformations are being re-absorbed, they are, again, abiding in *mahat*.

However, this is a very peculiar distortion of Sāṅkhyā ontology. *Mahat* is definitely not the first cause; it is, in fact, the first product of *prakṛti*, which is the primordial essence of reality. The quotation that Helārāja uses, then, does not seem to be a faithful description of Sāṅkhyā philosophy. In fact, when

“These are the six particular transformations of *mahat*, which is the *ātman*, which has the nature of mere Being. That essence of *mahat*, mere signifier, beyond the particular [transformations] — it is in that *mahat*, mere Being, *ātman*, that those [six transformations] rest, and in which they experience the upper limit of their development. And when [those six transformations] are involuting, resting in that *mahat*, mere Being, *ātman*, it is in that [*mahat*],⁹⁵ without being or non-being, without real or unreal, unmanifested, unsigned, to which they return.”

In this way, according to the Sāṅkhyas, the essence of *buddhi*, expressed by the word *mahat*, primordial, causing the world, is taught; thus the doctrine of Sattādvaita is supported even according to the Sāṅkhyas.

⁹³ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 41-42.

⁹⁴Philipp Maas has argued that the *Yogasūtra* together with its *Bhāṣya* commentary is a single text, which, in manuscripts, is titled the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* (Maas 2013a). Federico Squarcini, on the other hand, argues for the *Yogasūtra* as an independent text (Squarcini 2015, cxi-; an English summary of his arguments, by Elisa Freschi, is available at <http://elisafreschi.com/2017/06/20/squarcini-on-the-authorship-of-the-yogasutra/>).

⁹⁵*tasmin pratiyanti* is grammatically awkward here, since the verb *pratī* does not usually take the locative.

⁹⁶*Prakṛṇaparakāśa* ad *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 34, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 42. See the appendix for a collation of this passage from available manuscripts.

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the quotation is compared to the passage in the Agāśe edition of the *Yogaśāstra*, there are significant differences:

ete sattāmātrasyātmano mahataḥ ṣaḍ avi-
śeṣapariṇāmāḥ, yat tatparam aviśeṣebhyo
liṅgamātram mahattattvam, tasminn ete
sattāmātre mahaty ātmany avasthāya vivṛddhi-
kāṣṭhām anubhavanti | pratisaṃsṛjyamānās
ca tasminn eva sattāmātre mahaty ātmany
avasthāya yat tan niḥsattāsattaṃ niḥsadasan
nirasad avyaktam aliṅgaṃ **pradhānaṃ** tat
pratiyanti |⁹⁷

These are the six **unparticularized** transforma-
tions of *mahat*, which is the *ātman*, which has
the nature of mere Being. That essence of *ma-
hat*, mere signifier, beyond the **unparticular-
ized** [transformations] — it is in that *mahat*,
mere Being, *ātman*, in which [those six trans-
formations] rest, and in which they experience
the upper limit of their development. And
when [those six transformations] are involut-
ing, resting in that *mahat*, mere Being, *ātman*,
it is to that **primordial essence (pradhāna)**,
without being or non-being, without real or un-
real, without unreal, unmanifested, unsigned,
which they return.

This passage comments on sūtra 2.19, which states that there are four levels in the transformation of the undifferentiated primordial essence into the multiplicity that is seen in the world. The primordial essence itself is said to be *aliṅga*, which has been translated variously as “indistinctive”, “the undifferentiate”, or “the signless”.⁹⁸ In this state, the three *guṇas* – *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* – are in equilibrium. The first evolute of the primordial is called *mahat*, and it is said to be in the state of *liṅgamātra*. As Georg Feuerstein notes, this term does not occur anywhere else in the *Yogaśāstra*, making it difficult to translate; he understands the *-mātra* part of the compound in the sense of “substance” or “material”, as in the words *tanmātra* or *asmitāmātra*.⁹⁹ As the quotation itself suggests, this seems to denote a state of pure, undifferentiated Being, *sattāmātra*. From this state, the six unparticularized (*aviśeṣa*) evolutes arise – which are the five *tanmātras* of sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell, along with *asmitāmātra*, the sense of self. From these, sixteen particularized (*viśeṣa*) evolutes arise – mind (*manas*), the ten *indriyas*, and the five *bhūtas*.¹⁰⁰

In Helārāja’s version of this passage, the four levels have been reduced to two: *sattā* and its particularized evolutes. This suits his purposes perfectly; it aligns Sāṃkhya ontology with the process described in *Jātisamuddeśa* 32 to 35, in which *sattā*, the highest universal, is differentiated into particulars. However, in Sāṃkhya terms, his version makes no sense. This does not seem to be a case of Helārāja having a different recension of the *Yogaśāstra*; the quotation as he presents it would not fit in the context of the original passage. In Helārāja’s version, there are six particularized evolutes; how-


⁹⁷*Bhāṣya* ad *Yogasūtra* 2.19, ed. Āgāśe 1904, 84. Relevant differences are marked in bold.

⁹⁸Bryant 2009, 638; Feuerstein 1980, 42-43.

⁹⁹Feuerstein 1980, 43.

¹⁰⁰*tatrā*”kāśavāyavagniyudakabhūmayo bhūtāni śabdasparsarūparasagandhatanmātrāṇām aviśeṣāṇām viśeṣāḥ | *tathā śtrotratvakcaḥsurjihvāghrāṇāni buddhīndriyāṇi, vākpāṇipādapāyūpasthāḥ karmendriyāṇi, ekādaśaṃ manaḥ sarvārtham, ity etāny asmitālakṣaṇasyaviśeṣasya viśeṣāḥ* (ed. Āgāśe 1904, 74).

Pātañjalayogaśāstra



Prakīrṇaparakāśa




Figure 2.1.: The different models of material evolution in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*.

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ever, in the *Yogaśāstra*, these are numbered sixteen.¹⁰¹ More importantly, Helārāja omits the word *pradhāna*, making *sattā* the most primordial state and the first cause of the evolution of the material world. Helārāja does, however, retain the word *aliṅga*, which, in a Sāṃkhya context, would clearly refer to *pradhāna*. But out of context, the term is more ambiguous – in the *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad*, for example, it is used to refer to the *ātman*.¹⁰²

Helārāja's use of quotation

The question of textual quotations in Sanskrit is a thorny one, and its study is complicated by the paucity of comprehensive, critical editions of key texts. But even given this uncertainty, there is a notable discrepancy between Helārāja's quotations and the source texts from which he quotes. This is especially pronounced in his quotations of the *Mahābhāṣya*, which are particularly abundant in the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*;¹⁰³ in fact, in the commentary to the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Helārāja's quotations rarely correspond to the text as printed in the editions of the *Mahābhāṣya*. However, the meaning and intent of the quoted passages always remain intact, no matter whether the textual differences are considered as genuine variants or as the result either of quoting from memory or of contextualizing the quote to better fit the discussion at hand. This kind of "loose quotation" is not unprecedented, and can be found in a wide variety of texts across the Sanskrit tradition.¹⁰⁴ But in this case, in Helārāja's quotation of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, the meaning of the passage has been dramatically altered in order to provide a textual proof for the alignment between Sāṃkhya ontology and Sattādvaita. This seems very much to be a deliberate alteration; there is no way in which Helārāja's version of the passage could fit in the original context of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. Perhaps the temptation to use this quote was too great to pass up; the qualification of *mahat* with *ātman* and *sattāmātra* seems to perfectly echo *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 35. It simply required a few small modifications in order to remove *pradhāna*¹⁰⁵ and to make *sattā* the state in which all differences are re-absorbed.

2.5. Casting Buddhists as *dravyavādins*

In earlier texts, Buddhists have been depicted as taking the polar opposite view from Sattādvaita – while Sattādvaitins are said to believe that the object of perception is, not only a genus, but the summum genus, Being, Buddhists believe that the object of perception is a *svalakṣaṇa*, a unique individual. This contradistinction is also taken up by Helārāja, and in this respect he is still using the

¹⁰¹Raghunāth Śarmā, commenting on the passage in the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*, names the six particularized evolutes as *ahaṅkāra* and the five *tanmātras* (1991, 77). However, in the the *Yogaśāstra*, these are the unparticularized evolutes.

¹⁰²*katama ātmeti | yo 'yam śuddhaḥ pūtaḥ śunyaḥ śāntādilakṣaṇoktaḥ svakair liṅgair upagrhyah | tasya tal liṅgam aliṅga-syāgner yad auṣṇyam āviṣṭaṅ cāpāṃ yaḥ śivatamo rama ity eke* (6.31, ed. Cowell 1935, 167).

¹⁰³See Vergiani 2015, 200-202.

¹⁰⁴See Freschi 2015.

¹⁰⁵In other cases, Helārāja does not ignore *pradhāna* – for example, in his commentary on *Dravyasamuddeśa* 1, where he glosses *dravya* with *pradhāna* (see above).

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same, basic argumentative frame that Kumārila presents in the *Pratyakṣasūtra*, although again, the debate has shifted slightly: Helārāja applies this debate to the object of a word rather than to the object of perception. But in his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, he leverages the polysemy of the word *dravya* to argue that, since *dravya* and *svalakṣaṇa* are synonymous, Buddhists are proponents of the *dravya* model of denotation. This is not a difficult connection to make; as Richard King has pointed out, the scope of *svalakṣaṇa* is quite similar to the Abhidharmic notion of *dravyasat* – something that is substantially real, as opposed to *prajñaptisat*, something which is only nominally real.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, this argument is also aided by the clear echo of Nāgārjuna’s *Acintyastava* in the first verse of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* – Nāgārjuna uses *dravya* as a synonym for absolute reality, the knowledge of which leads to enlightenment.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, unlike earlier thinkers, Helārāja does not reject Buddhist epistemology outright; in fact, he embraces some aspects of it, such as using the criterion of *arthakriyā* in order to validate an object of cognition. But what really sets him apart from the other thinkers discussed so far is that, rather than rejecting both Sattādvaita and Buddhist epistemology – as Kumārila and Jayanta do – or taking the side of Sattādvaita – as Maṇḍana does – he endeavours to prove that these two seemingly opposite doctrines are ultimately not contradictory, since both *sattā* and *dravya* are synonymous with *brahman*.

Dravya* and *arthakriyā

In the *Mahābhāṣya*, the word *dravya* often means simply an individual thing, as opposed to a genus. This seems to be how it is understood at the beginning of Helārāja’s commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, where he argues that it is the *dravya*, the individual thing, which is real: “Since, in the world, it is the *dravya* that is employed in purposive action (*arthakriyā*), it is that which impels purposeful people. Therefore, it is that which is expressed by words.”¹⁰⁸ This is the same formulation that Dharmakīrti uses to argue that only the unique individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) is real – because it is only that which effects purposive action (*arthakriyākārin*).¹⁰⁹ Helārāja repeats this in his explanation of the word *vastu* in the first verse, this time explicitly glossing it as *svalakṣaṇa*, again giving Dharmakīrti’s definition of “that which effects purposive action”, and this time, directly attributing this definition to the Buddhists.¹¹⁰ Since the Buddhists believe in the reality of the *svalakṣaṇa*, and since *svalakṣaṇa* and *dravya* are both synonyms of *vastu* – a concrete object that effects purposive action –, then logically, the Buddhists are proponents of the *dravyapakṣa*, the view that *dravya* is denoted by a word.

For Dharmakīrti, the question of what exists is bound up with the question of the means by which reality is cognized, and so the validity of the means of cognition, the *pramāṇas*, is a central concern. Since for him, direct perception and inference are the only two valid means of cognition, there can

¹⁰⁶King 1995, 109.

¹⁰⁷See note on the translation of *Dravyasamuddeśa* 1.

¹⁰⁸*ihārthakriyāyāṃ dravyam evopayujyate iti tad eva pravartakam arthinām | ataḥ śabdena tad evocyate (Prakīrṇaparakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 1).*

¹⁰⁹*yad arthakriyākāri tad eva vastu ity uktam (Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti, ed. Gnoli 1960, 84).*

¹¹⁰*vastu svalakṣaṇam arthakriyākāri dravyam iti śākyair uktam (Prakīrṇaparakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 1).*

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be only two kinds of cognized objects that correspond to them: the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya*). The particular is cognized by direct perception, and the universal is cognized by inference. But Dharmakīrti goes even further than his predecessor Dignāga and argues that, of the two, only the particular is real, because only the particular possesses *arthakriyā*.¹¹¹ This term has been variously translated as “purposive action”, “causal efficacy”, and even “telic function”, and is complicated by Dharmakīrti’s various usages of the term *artha*, but what emerges clearly from the argument is that the particular is real because it has the capacity to participate in an action that fulfills some goal or need. The scope of these goals is always conceived of as practical and human – bounded by *vyavahāra*.¹¹² Moreover, not only does the validity of a cognition as *prameya* depend on the validity of the instrument of cognition as a *pramāṇa*, but the validity of the instrument also depends on the validity of its object, and it is precisely this worldly practice, *vyavahāra*, that is the means by which one ascertains whether a cognition is valid.¹¹³

Consequently, the criterion of *arthakriyā* is not applicable when proving the validity of doctrinal beliefs that are inaccessible to both direct perception and to inference, nor is it useful for reasoning about *abhāvas*, non-entities. As Pascale Hugon argues, what is striking in Dharmakīrti’s discussion of *abhāvas* as *prameya* is that he never mentions *arthakriyā*: “One can see here a parallel between the context of cognitions pertaining to *abhāvas* and that of Scriptures: supersensible objects and non-existent entities have in common that the knowledge pertaining to them cannot be tested by a means that would presuppose direct access to the object. One can thus understand why their reliability is not evaluated via *arthakriyāsthiti*, but rather, through non-opposition.”¹¹⁴ In other words, the criterion of *arthakriyā* has a very specific domain of applicability: *vyavahāra*.

Reconciling Buddhists and Advaitins

At the beginning of his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Helārāja states that *dravya* can be understood in two senses – absolute (*pāramārthika*) and conventional (*sāmvyavahārika*). In the conventional sense, it seems to mean an individual thing – it is something that can be referred to by a pronoun.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, the absolute sense of the word – which, according to him, is what is being described in the *Dravyasamuddeśa* – is synonymous with *ātman*, with absolute reality. The conventional sense of *dravya* can be reasoned about, using such criterion as *arthakriyā*; but when it comes to thinking about non-duality, reasoning breaks down.

For Helārāja, these two senses of the word *dravya* really represent two levels of the same reality. On the level of *vyavahāra*, it makes sense for Buddhist epistemologists like Dharmakīrti to employ

¹¹¹Hugon 2011, 369-370. Matilal also makes this point: “The main thesis of the Dinnāga school was that “The world consists of unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*): universals belong to imaginative construction, to language” (Matilal 2005, 37). See also Herzberger 1986, 82.

¹¹²Dunne 2004, 259-260.

¹¹³*pramāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa* (*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2.5, as quoted in Hugon 2011, 373).

¹¹⁴Hugon 2011, 381.

¹¹⁵Helārāja quotes the *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* on this point (*Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 187).

2. Helārāja on *dravya*: an all-encompassing doctrine

logical criteria to determine the validity of their knowledge about the world; but absolute reality, which is beyond what can be directly perceived or even inferred from perception, cannot be evaluated with *arthakriyā*.¹¹⁶ The way in which Bhartṛhari hints at the nature of this absolute reality bears a noteworthy resemblance to Buddhist doctrine – as Hajime Nakamura notes, verses 12 and 13, which describe absolute reality in mutually-contradictory terms, very closely mirror passages from the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and also from the *Mahāyānasūtrāṅkārā*, “one of the most essential and central passages in all *Mahāyāna* literature”.¹¹⁷ Other verses of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* are also strikingly Buddhist in character – as mentioned previously, the first verse seems to be modeled on a verse from the *Acintyastava*, attributed to Nāgārjuna, with the addition of the word *ātmā*.¹¹⁸ Helārāja is not adverse to pointing out the Buddhist tone of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* – in fact, he attributes the ninth verse to a doctrine held by the Vijñānavādins, quoting a verse from Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* in support.¹¹⁹ Even so, he is unable to subsume some of the core tenets of Buddhism into his system; at the end of his commentary on the first verse, still insisting that all schools teach the reality of *dravya*, he concedes that the Buddhists would not admit the permanence of *dravya*, since they argue rather for the radical impermanence of all things.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, his overall aim is clear – to show that all schools of thought, no matter how heterodox, are compatible with the ideas expressed in the *Vākyapadīya*, which, like grammar itself, is universally applicable (*sarvapārśada*).

¹¹⁶Lindtner argues that when Dharmakīrti uses *arthakriyā* as a criterion for an object of valid cognition, he has verses 1.33 to 35 of the *Vākyapadīya* in mind (1994, 204). In contrast to Dharmakīrti, Bhartṛhari uses *arthakriyā* to argue that *anumāna* is not always reliable, and that one must ultimately accept *āgama*, scripture, as a valid *pramāṇa*.

¹¹⁷Nakamura 2004, 494.

¹¹⁸Lindtner 1994, 199. See the note on the translation of *Dravyasamuddeśa* 1.

¹¹⁹As noted in the translation, Helārāja’s quotation takes a different form from the original verse (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Dravyasamuddeśa* 9). Nakamura, working with the editio princeps of the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*, also sees the “adoption of Buddhist doctrine” in Helārāja’s commentary on *Dravyasamuddeśa* 4, where the editio princeps reads *śākyasamakakṣyatayā* rather than *sādhyasamakakṣyatayā* (Nakamura 2004, 289).

¹²⁰*yady api śākyādidarśane nityam na bhavati dravyam tathāpi tanmatasyānabhyupagamād adoṣaḥ | kevalam yad as-mākaṃ dravyam anyair evam abhidhīyate ity evam atropanyāsaḥ* (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Dravyasamuddeśa*.1). On the other hand, Bhartṛhari, in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, has argued that even Buddhists accept the permanence of reality (See the translation of the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* passage).

3. Epilogue on dreams

The *Mahābhāṣya* begins with, perhaps, the most important axiom of the grammatical tradition: *siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe*, a word, its object, and the relationship between the two are established. Patañjali interprets *siddha* in that *vārttika* to mean *nitya*, permanent. For if the referent of a word were impermanent and constantly shifting, how could language be effective? At the beginning of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari affirms this axiom – the *dravya*, the reality that is denoted by a word, is permanent, no matter whether this reality is called the *ātman*, a *vastu*, *svabhāva*, *śarīra*, or *tattva*. In fact, all words ultimately refer to the same, absolute reality; even the very duality of the word and its object can be subsumed into that singular reality. Paradoxically, by affirming the permanence of reality, Bhartṛhari comes to conclude that the permanence of the word, its object, and their relationship – the permanence that grammarians speak of – is itself merely a convention that is part of the system of language. It is only because the word and its object seem distinct from one another that one can even say that there is a relationship between the two at all. These distinctions exist as if in a dream, where an expression and what is expressed by it seem to be two different things, even though they are merely the product of a single mind. This is how Bhartṛhari ends the *Dravyasamuddeśa*; he does not elaborate. If, in absolute terms, distinctions such as being and non-being or permanent and impermanent are untenable, then are we to understand that, for Bhartṛhari, the system of language is as illusory as a dream?

And what about for Helārāja – what can be said of his philosophy? Throughout his commentary, he is very much concerned with mapping out distinctions between his philosophy and other schools, specifying points of agreement and disagreement. He agrees with the Buddhists that *arthakriyākāritva* can define a valid object of cognition, but disagrees that those objects are ultimately impermanent; he agrees with the Sāṃkhya that all of the multiplicity seen in the world is the product of a single, primordial substance, but disagrees that those products are real transformations of that substance, rather than unreal manifestations. Yet, if even self and other or friend and adversary are unreal, dreamlike distinctions, how can those doctrinal differences be any more real? At the end of his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Helārāja begins by distinguishing a dream from waking reality: quoting a passage from the *Vṛtti* to the first *kāṇḍa*, he argues that a dream is the creation of a single mind, and thus confined to a single perceiver, while the waking world, which is a divine creation, is shared by everyone. The dreamer seems to have an independent, creative power, but that power is restricted to the dream itself; their dream creations are phantom projections of the individual soul. But even before Helārāja has made this distinction between a dream and the waking

3. Epilogue on dreams

world, he has already refuted it – both dreaming and waking are states in which unreality is perceived, since nothing that is seen in either of those states persists into the fourth state, *turiya*. Even the waking world is merely an illusion based on nescience. No wonder, then, that the Śaiva exegete Yogarāja, commenting on the same *Vṛtti* passage, claims that, for *brahmavādins*, the independence of *brahman* itself only exists at the level of a dream.¹

¹See the note in the translation of the commentary on *Dravyasamuddeśa* 17-18. Although there are echoes of Śaiva terminology in Helārāja's work, his philosophy does not seem to betray Śaiva influences. A parallel can be made with the *Mokṣopāya*, a non-dualistic text from the same period in Kaśmīr; as Jürgen Hanneder notes, "the author was undoubtedly fully aware of the Śaivism of his time, and he would probably have subscribed to some positions of the more radical monistic Śaiva cults, but this... must not seduce us into assuming the author being a crypto-Śaiva" (2006, 143-144).

Part II.

Edition and translation

4. Methodology: Towards a hypertext critical edition

4.1. The dream of the total library

Todo estará en sus ciegos volúmenes.... Todo, pero por una línea razonable o una justa noticia habrá millones de insensatas cacofonías, de fárragos verbales y de incoherencias.

Jorge Luis Borges, *La biblioteca total*

For Borges, the notion of a “total library”, a compendium of all texts that could possibly exist, is a sort of hermeneutic nightmare. A library of every possible text is also a library of every variation of every text; in such a Hell, as he describes it, facts are indistinguishable from falsehoods, and the promise of total knowledge becomes a twisted parody of itself. The scenario he sketches out is comparable to the task faced by the editor of an ancient text, grappling with dozens – sometimes hundreds – of witnesses, full of variations most of which seem like meaningless cacophonies – spelling mistakes, incomprehensible readings, inexplicable gaps. In a way, the critical edition is the editor’s valiant effort to shield the reader from this anarchy – having spent months, perhaps years, sifting through the available evidence, the editor emerges with a critical text, along with an apparatus that has already been refined to screen out any useless information. But in the past decade, faced with the possibility of and desire for total knowledge, scholars have begun to create digital editions that, rather than presenting an editor’s interpretation of the text, present an archive of all witnesses. No one variant is privileged over another; even a trivial spelling mistake might have consequences for the textual

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tradition, if, for example, it was copied from one witness to another. But such an archive without signposts seems like a step towards the utopic Library that Borges describes – there is a fine line between problematizing a text and obscuring it.

In fact, the choice between the traditional, critical edition and the diplomatic document archive is a false dichotomy. The digital medium, with its capacity for vast amounts of storage and its possibility for fast and sophisticated search, does not dictate the way in which a text ought to be presented. A patient and knowledgeable editor is needed more than ever, if not to produce a critical reading, then at least to critically curate the available witnesses. But, in contrast to a print edition, where only the end result of a long and laborious editorial process is presented, a digital edition allows an editor to “show the work”, as it were; by presenting diplomatic transcriptions of the sources, as well as, in some cases, digital facsimiles of the manuscripts used in the edition, the editor opens up each editorial decision to the scrutiny of other scholars and readers.

This ideal has been discussed and theorized in countless articles and conferences, but scholars usually come to the conclusion that we do not yet have reliable tools that are up to the task.¹ For the edition of Bhartṛhari’s *Dravyasamuddeśa* with Helārāja’s *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* commentary, I have developed an open source software package with this kind of digital edition in mind, tailored to the presentation of Sanskrit texts. It consists of a backend which performs automatic collation based on diplomatic transcripts and a frontend which displays the text with the automatically-generated apparatus, with each variant linked to the full transcription of the manuscript from which it derives.

4.2. The method of collation

Martin West, in his 1973 landmark monograph on textual criticism, lays out the basic method for editing a text: begin with a good printed edition, or at least the best witness you can find. Then, each manuscript “is compared with a printed edition word by word, and the differences written down. Some people write them in the margins of the edition, but even if the copy is interleaved this does not give one room for more than a few manuscripts’ variants, and I usually use a separate notebook.”² He then goes on to give advice on using ink instead of graphite, and different coloured inks for different manuscripts. Although most editors now use word-processing software to achieve this, the basic method has not changed. In fact, even when editors, in the 21st century, use tailor-made editing software like Classical Text Editor or use sophisticated computer programs to analyze variants and produce stemmas, the work of collation is still methodologically the same. For example, take this recent project at the University of Vienna that aims to produce a critical edition of the *Carakasamhitā Vimānasthāna*:

In the first phase of our still-ongoing editorial work, the “collation,” all textual witnesses are compared with the widely known edition of Trikamji, that we chose as our

¹For example, see Buzzetti and McGann 2007.

²West 1973, 66.

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standard version. In the course of this comparison all differences in readings between the manuscripts and the text as edited by Trikamji are noted with very few exception, like, for example, sandhi-variants, variants of punctuation, variants of consonant gemination after “r,” variants of homograph and semi-homograph akṣaras.³

Even though, in this case, cladistic computer software was applied to the collated data in order to aid in the production of a stemma, the collation itself is essentially the same task that West outlines. Notably, some editing is already done at the collation stage; some information is already being discarded even as variants are recorded, such as sandhi variants and punctuation. This is a standard editorial practice – not all information is useful, and, especially when there are a large number of witnesses, the critical apparatus would become unmanageably large and unreadable if every sandhi variant were recorded. However, it would be better if this information were retained in some way; for studying the transmission of a text, even punctuation might be a vital clue.

Ultimately, the decision to retain or discard a piece of information depends on how an editor assumes the text will be used. In some cases, editors have tried to minimize these assumptions, and, instead of creating a critical reading, produce what Elena Pierazzo calls “digital documentary editions” – that is, diplomatic transcriptions of the witnesses themselves.⁴ The emergence of the TEI standard has enabled extremely detailed transcriptions that are nonetheless machine-readable, and also easily transformable to be human-readable. But these editions aim to be uncritical; they do not present a text but rather a document, and, for many Sanskrit texts, their corrupted versions as preserved in the documents we have are simply unreadable. Ideally, a digital critical edition would provide both a critical reading as well as diplomatic transcriptions of all the documents used in the edition. In this project, this ideal is pushed a few steps further: the critical apparatus is generated automatically and on-demand, and the reader is able to configure the shape of the apparatus based on a number of options, such as which witnesses to include and what level of detail should be presented in the variants. The reader is able to generate an apparatus not only for the critical reading, but for any witness.

Computer-aided collation

If provided with suitably prepared transcriptions of the manuscripts, purged of coincidental errors, a computer could draw up a clumsy and unselective critical apparatus.... the very considerable trouble involved in submitting them to a computer does not appear worth while.

Martin L. West, *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique*⁵

³Maas 2013b, 32.

⁴Pierazzo 2011.

⁵1973, 71-72.

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Interestingly enough, the algorithms and fundamental techniques described in this chapter were already available when West produced this statement. What may have changed, since the 70's, is the general scholarly attitude towards what an edition could be. In this edition of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, the transcriptions are not purged of coincidental errors; instead, each witness is transcribed as diplomatically as possible, and then, at the collation stage, an editor or reader can selectively decide what an “error” is, using algorithms. This has the advantage of giving us the ability to change our minds later, since the diplomatic transcriptions themselves will not be affected. Moreover, all of the transcriptions are available and included along with the critically edited text; perhaps this alone makes this approach worthwhile. But the main aim of this method will be to refute West’s most serious allegation – that the resulting apparatus would be clumsy and unselective.

There have been two notable open source projects aimed at the task of computer-automated collation: *CollateX* and *Juxta*. The developers behind both projects met in 2009 and collaboratively developed what they call the “Gothenberg model” of the collation process, which consists of three steps: tokenization, collation, and visualization. Each of these three steps is handled separately. Tokenization is the subdivision of the text into tokens, or units of comparison. In many texts, tokens are delimited by whitespace, i.e., each word is a token. In that case, the collation software would perform a word-level comparison. In the collation step, an algorithm is applied to compute the difference between two texts; *Juxta* uses the Myers diff algorithm, as implemented in *java-diff-utils*, whereas *CollateX* offers three different possible algorithms – Dekker, Needleman-Wunsch, and MEDITE. Finally, in the visualization step, the computed data is transformed for display to the user. Both projects offer visualizations that differ significantly from a traditional print edition: *CollateX* offers “variant graphs”, and *Juxta* offers “heat maps”.⁶

My approach differs in a number of important respects. Firstly, no tokenization is done before the text is collated; the Myers diff algorithm is used at its most fine-grained level, performing a character-by-character comparison. The “tokens” – or, in more traditional terminology, the lemmata – are determined only after the comparison is made, which offers a bit more flexibility. Secondly, in visualizing the differences, no attempt is made to devise a wholly new and unfamiliar interface for the text; instead, the standard format of a Sanskrit edition is used, and it has only been modified it to make it more legible, using hyperlinks and some interactive elements to reduce the amount of visual clutter that often afflicts editions that provide a great deal of information on every page. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, there is an additional step at the beginning of the process: a filtering stage, in which the witnesses are transformed so that certain elements, such as punctuation, are filtered out before the text is collated. This step is dependent not only on the editor’s input, but also on the reader’s; the user interface of the edition includes options for selectively enabling or disabling all of the text filters, in order to dynamically modify the level of detail in the apparatus. The software consists of two parts: *upama.php*, the backend which performs the collation, using Myers diff as implemented in *google-diff-match-patch*; and *saktumiva*, a plugin for the *DokuWiki* content

⁶The Interedition Development Group 2017.

management system, which comprises the frontend, rendering the resulting text and apparatus in HTML.




Figure 4.1.: Generating a critical apparatus.

4.3. Diplomatic transcription and its limits

Inevitably, the shape of a critical edition depends on the question that is asked about the text. The editor might ask, “What did the author mean here?” and tailor both the critical text and the apparatus to answering that. But the reader may have a different question in mind: especially in the case of Sanskrit texts, with their rich layers of commentaries and sub-commentaries, separated by periods of hundreds of years, a particular reader may be more interested in what text a particular commentator was reading rather than what the author had intended. Some scholars may not even be interested in the content of the text, but only in the use of punctuation in the manuscripts. In this digital edition, I hope to accommodate such possible uses of the data, while still presenting a critical text that attempts to get as close as possible to the “authoritative” original.

As Pierazzo has pointed out, in TEI, there is virtually no limit to the amount of detail that can be included in a transcription. For a modern, printed book with no annotations, it may be enough just to transcribe page breaks, but for a hand-written draft of a novel, with notes and corrections by multiple editors, the editor may choose to describe even the precise position of each note on the page. One of the goals of TEI is to allow for such diverse use cases; its flexibility is its greatest strength. However, critics have noted that the high degree of customization of TEI schema to fit each particular project has led to a fragmentation of the standard – as Tara Andrews writes, “this idiosyncratic interpretation and insistence upon customization, wherein exception becomes the rule, is a misunderstanding of the nature of a digital data model that effectively prohibits large-scale interchange or machine analysis across different projects.”⁷ However, the wide array of applications for which TEI has been used seems to naturally prevent the establishment of a single, standardized interpretation of TEI tags. One possible solution is to have standards for specific genres of documents; for this project, I have followed the schema developed by the Sanskrit Manuscripts Project at the University of Cambridge. But to a degree, the fear that Andrews raises, that the flexibility of TEI markup prohibits machine analysis, is unfounded. As long as each dataset has a consistent standard, then it is possible to apply an XSLT stylesheet to the entire set in order to make it conform to another schema, as might be needed for a large-scale project employing multiple datasets.

⁷Andrews 2013, 63.

But even if there are no limits to the amount of information that can be encoded in a diplomatic transcription, there are certainly limits to how useful the information is, especially if a digital facsimile of the document is available. For example, while TEI allows us to meticulously describe exactly where each element is situated on a page, the exactitude of that information still pales in comparison to what could easily be achieved using computer vision techniques. In the present transcriptions, I have taken a diplomatic, but not “ultra-diplomatic”⁸ approach: I try to reproduce the orthography as precisely as possible, and note additions, deletions, and marginal annotations, page breaks and line breaks, as well as any lacunae or illegible areas. Most Sanskrit manuscripts are written in *scriptio continua*, and I have followed the common practice of inserting spaces where possible between words. Where an actual space occurs in the manuscript, they are indicated with the <space> tag.

4.4. Expressing text-critical principles as algorithms

By using diplomatic transcriptions as the basis for a critical edition, some processing needs to be done before the source material is passed on to the collation algorithm. In general, a reader does not want every orthographic variant to be listed in the critical apparatus, and in order to filter out unnecessary information, unwanted variations are identified and replaced with their normalized versions before the texts are collated. Moreover, the more similar two texts are, the shorter the time it takes for the Myers diff algorithm to complete; this is partly due to a number of pre-processing optimizations implemented by Neil Fraser in the *google-diff-match-patch* library.⁹

There are a number of advantages to this method. Firstly, the collation can be automated without the need to manually normalize orthographic variations; the diplomatic transcription remains faithful to the orthography of the source document and can be consulted at any time. Secondly, the normalization step is much more precise than if done by hand. And finally, the formulation of the rules that dictate what and how to normalize forces the editor to be more rigorous and transparent; these rules then act as an explicit and precise description of the text-critical principles that are followed in the collation of the witnesses.

For this task, regular expressions are used to replace one spelling with another. Regular expressions are a way of describing a search pattern in a text, which can then be compiled into a computer algorithm. When an editor selectively ignores certain orthographic variations during the collation of a witness, they follow certain rules, and these rules can be formalized as search patterns. For example, consider one of the principles for excluding a variant cited above from the study of the *Carakasamhitā*:

...variants of consonant gemination after “r”,...

which can be observed in words such as *vartate/varttate* and *kartum/karttum*. This principle can

⁸D’Iorio 2010, 52.

⁹Fraser 2006.

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easily be expressed as a regular expression. For example, if we wish to replace all instances of doubled consonants after *r*, we might search for

$$/r([kgcjtdṭḍ])\1/$$

and replace it with

$$/r\1/$$

However, we can be much more specific than that. In our case, the only consonant gemination observed is *tt*; therefore, we can reduce our expression to

$$/rtt/rt/$$

which will replace all instances of *rtt* with *rt*. But *r* is not the only character that causes the gemination of *t*, and in order to capture more cases, we can broaden the scope of our search. In the manuscripts of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, not only do we find the geminated *t* after *r*, but also after vocalic *r*, after *i*, and after *pa*. We can use a look-behind¹⁰ in order to make the expression cleaner and also more efficient, resulting in

$$/(?<=[rri] | pa)tt/t/$$

This final regular expression searches for *tt* and then checks if it is preceded by *r*, *r*, *i*, or *pa*; if so, it replaces it with *t*. Whenever it encounters *varttate*, it will replace it with *vartate*; whenever it encounters *prakṛtti*, it will replace it with *prakṛti*. Not only can we automate the filtering process that was previously done manually by the editor, but we have also expressed the text-critical principle, “ignore consonant gemination after *r*”, in a more precise and formal manner.

As another example, let us consider the variation among semi-homograph nasals. In Sanskrit manuscripts, the nasals *ṅ*, *ṅ̃*, *ṇ̇* and *n* as well as the labial *m* are often written as *ṁ*. In order to regularize this spelling across all of the transcriptions, we might use the expression

$$/[ṅṅ̃ṇ̇n]ṁ/$$

which would replace all nasals as well as *m* with *ṁ*. However, we can again be much more specific. Each of these characters is written as *ṁ* only when they are followed by certain consonants – usually consonants in the same varga. We could then come up with a different expression for each one, using look-aheads¹¹:

$$/ṅ(=[kg])/$$
$$/ṅ̃(=[cj])/$$
$$/ṇ̇(=[ṭḍ])/$$
$$/n(=[tdn])/$$
$$/m(=[pbd])/$$

and then combine them into a single expression:

¹⁰A look-behind states a pattern to look for that precedes the pattern to be replaced, and is expressed as (?<=).

¹¹A look-ahead states a pattern to look for that follows the pattern to be replaced, and is expressed as (=?).

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`/ñ(?=[kg])|ñ̃(?=[cj])|ṅ(?=[ṭḍ])|ṅ̃(?=[ṭḍn])|ṁ(?=[pbd])/ṁ/`

In English, this expression could be rendered as:

Replace

ñ if it is followed by *k* or *g*,

ñ̃ if it is followed by *c* or *j*,

ṅ if it is followed by *ṭ* or *ḍ*,

ṅ̃ if it is followed by *t*, *d*, or *n*, and

ṁ if it is followed by *p*, *b*, or *d*

with *ṁ*.

Generally, the more specific the expression is, the faster it will run; however, there are also certain patterns that run more quickly than others, and in this case, the heavy use of the alternator “|” is computationally expensive.¹² It is possible to re-write this rule more generally so that it runs faster, and since we are developing software that collates on-demand, speed is an important consideration. However, there may be certain trade-offs regarding the precision of the expression. More detail on the optimization of these regular expressions is provided in the appendix, as well as a full list of text-critical principles used in the collation of the text. In the user interface, each of these filters can be turned on or off, depending on the requirements of the editor or the reader.

Some normalization rules only apply to certain scripts; for example, in Malayālam script, word-final *m* is replaced by a nasal that corresponds to the same varga as the following consonant, rather than by an anusvāra – a Malayālam manuscript will read *tattvan tu* rather than *tattvaṁ tu*. For these script-specific rules, the software checks the script of the witness that is declared in the `mainLang` attribute of the `<textLang>` tag of the file; for example, since manuscript T (University of Kerala MS Paliyam 329) is in Malayālam script, the XML transcription includes the tag `<textLang mainLang='sa-Mlym'>`, which indicates that the text was originally written in Sanskrit in Malayālam characters.

4.5. Filtering XML tags

The diplomatic transcripts have been extensively marked up using TEI-compliant XML tags. For example, text that has been deleted is marked `[deleted text]`, and text that has been added is marked `<add>[added text]</add>`. In the online user interface, four options are provided for the display of each tag: *include*, *hide*, *ignore tags only*, and *ignore all*.

- *Include* will cause the tag to be collated and reported if it is a variant.
- *Hide* will cause the tag and its content not to be shown at all.
- *Ignore tags only* will show both the tags and their content, but the tags will not be collated.

¹²Friedl 2006, 231-232.

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- *Ignore all* will ignore both the tags and their content, but they will continue to be shown.

For most XML tags, the default option is to *ignore tags only*. For example, consider two witnesses, one which reads:

jātir vā dravyaṃ vā padārthāv ity uktam

and another which reads:

jātir vā <unclear>dravyaṃ</unclear> vā padārthāv ity uktam

which indicates that when the text was being transcribed, the word *dravyaṃ* could not be clearly discerned from the source document. If the <unclear> tag is set to *ignore tags only*, then the word *dravyaṃ* will not show up in the apparatus as a variant, since, if the tag is ignored, there is no difference between the two readings. However, if the <unclear> tag is set to *include*, then *dravyaṃ* will show up as a variant, marked as <unclear>.

We can also deal with a number of stereotyped TEI constructions that involve nested tags. For example, consider a witness in which a word has been crossed out and corrected in the margin, transcribed like so:

jātir vā dravyaṃ <subst>ca<add>vā</add></subst> padārthāv ity
uktam

This indicates that the *ca* was deleted in the manuscript and replaced with *vā*. In this case, the default options have been set in order to take the replacement text into account while ignoring the deleted text:

- <subst> set to *Ignore tags only*
- <add> set to *Ignore tags only*
- set to *Ignore all*

With these settings, the collation algorithm will effectively read the sentence as

jātir vā dravyaṃ vā padārthāv ity uktam

taking into account only the corrected text, ignoring the deleted text, and also ignoring the fact that a correction was made. On the other hand, we might use these settings instead:

- <subst> set to *Ignore tags only*
- <add> set to *Ignore all*
- set to *Ignore tags only*

In this case, the collation algorithm will read

jātir vā dravyaṃ ca padārthāv ity uktam

taking into account only the deleted text, and ignoring the correction.

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RORI Alwar MS 4781 (A)

sarvavidyānāṃ tadupādhimukhaṃ tad eva
viṣayaḥ siddha iti

sarvavidyānāṃ tadupādhimukhaṃ tad eva
viṣayaḥ siddha iti

University of Kerala MS Paliyam 329 (T)

sarvaśabdānāṃ tattadupādhimukhaṃ tad eva
viṣayas siddha iti

sarvaśabdānāṃ tattadupādhimukhaṃ tad eva
viṣayaḥ siddha iti

Delhi University MS 5954.29 (D)

sarva<subst>
vidyānāṃ
<add>śabdānāṃ</add>
</subst> tadupādhimukhaṃ tad eva viṣayaḥ
siddha iti

sarvaśabdānāṃ tadupādhimukhaṃ tad eva
viṣayaḥ siddha iti

Sarasvati Bhavan MS 38824 (V)

sarvaviśabdānāṃdyānāṃ tadupādhimukhaṃ
tad eva viṣayaḥ siddha iti

sarvaviśabdānāṃdyānāṃ tadupādhimukhaṃ
tad eva viṣayaḥ siddha iti

Figure 4.2.: Before and after normalization.

The *hide* option has been provided in case a reader finds certain transcribed elements distracting, such as line breaks and page breaks. While the default option is simply to ignore the tags so that they do not get collated, they can also be hidden from view. A full list of XML tags used and their default options is given in the Appendix.

4.6. Output

When the editor or reader has selected the texts to be collated and adjusted the collation options, the collation can be performed on demand. The resulting XML is transformed to be displayed as HTML via XSLT. The main text is displayed in a column in the centre, flanked by the apparatus on the right. The text is hyphenated and formatted in order to approximate the experience of reading a printed edition. In addition, the resulting apparatus can also be exported to LaTeX format for printed output.

Since the web is an interactive medium, we do not need to rely on traditional typographic devices such as line numbers, underlining, or reference symbols that have been used in printed editions in order to show where the variant corresponds to in the main text being displayed. Instead, when the user moves the cursor over a variant, the lemma in the main text is highlighted.

As stated earlier, the aim of this hypertext edition is not to radically re-imagine what a critical edition and a critical apparatus might look like in a digital medium; rather, interactivity is employed to improve the experience of reading and to offer the editor and the reader the ability to customize the display of the edition and the apparatus. The different text filters and XML tag options are available in the sidebar on the left (Figure 4.4). Moreover, while the transcriptions are made in IAST, the text

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<p>taramaṇīyaṃ parākṣayā vyavasthitaṃ tatvaṃ evābhinnam tīrthikā bhedadarśa- navyavasthitā bhedātmakam atatvaṃ manyamta iti vicāreṇa brahmaiva vikalpi- taṃ bhavatītilaye brahmaikaniṣṭatā darśanaṃ tad uktaṃ satyā viśuddhis tatro- ktā vidyaivetyādi</p>	<p>vaikagha° D, A, T: ca A: °cayo T: vi- cēde T: apratha° T: °vicāre T: na ki- ñci d D, T: °ṣṭhate D, A, T: °ṇīyaṃ { D, T: pari° A: parokṣayā } T: °sthāpitan T: vicāreṇāvidyā° D, A: vi- dyā° { D, T: °ṣṭhatā A: °tād } { A: ada° T: °nānām } A: viśuddhi- sū° A: vidyaivetyādi</p>
<p>evaṃ tena tena rūpeṇa brahmaiva vikalpitaṃ bhavati sarvaṃ viśabdānāṃ dyā- nāṃ tadupādhimukhaṃ tad eva viśayaḥ siddha ity āha</p>	<p>A: vatyaiṃ { D: °śabdānāṃ vidyānāṃ T: °śabdā nān A: °vidyānām } T: tatta°</p>
<p>vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tatvam evāvikalpita na cātra kālabhedo sti kālabhedas ca grhyate</p>	<p>A: °pa D, A, T: °tam T: ka°</p>
<p>paramārthato vikalpita vikalpānām aṣṭayo yat tattvaṃ tad eva vyavahāre nya- syābhāvād vikalpamānaṃ vikalparūpaṃ nānātridha! bhedāvabhāsamānādisi-</p>	<p>D, A, T: °tam { D, A: nānāvi° T: nānā- vidhabhedāvabhāsam a° } { T: °bhā-</p>

Figure 4.3.: A collation of V with D, A, and T. The highlighted variant corresponds to the highlighted lemma in the main text.

and apparatus can be displayed in a variety of South Asian scripts, such as Devanāgarī. This feature is important not only for readers who may be more familiar with other scripts, but it is also useful for the editor, when checking the transcript against the document, to read the transcript in the same script as the document.

Since all of the witnesses have been transcribed diplomatically, the variants in the apparatus are displayed as they appear in the witness, that is, without orthographic normalization. Again, this is useful both for the editor and the reader; for example, if a word is spelt with an anusvāra *ṃ* rather than *m* in a Devanāgarī manuscript, then it is more plausible that it may have been a transcription error, since the anusvāra is usually represented as a simple dot above the śirorekha. Moreover, punctuation that has been ignored during collation is restored in the display; for example, in one instance, the main text reads *bhedyabhedakaprastāvena* while another witness reads *bhedyam | bhedhakaprastāvena*. Even though it was only the anusvāra *ṃ* that caused the collation algorithm to consider this a variant, the daṇḍa between the two words gives the reader further evidence that the *ṃ* was not merely a scribal error. Line and page breaks are similarly useful. One variant might read *ta<1b/>tatvam*; here the line break lends credibility to a hypothesis of dittography, so that it should be read *tattvam* rather than *tat tattvam*.

4.7. Afterword

When Martin West stated that a machine-collated critical apparatus would be clumsy and unselective, the notion of what variants the editor should “select for” was predicated on a number of editorial

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Figure 4.4.: The different types of filters can be configured from the sidebar.

assumptions that have since been called into question. A new generation of scholars no longer view the critical edition as authoritative, and some have championed the primacy of the document over the artificiality of a critical text, which has no physical evidence to prove that it had ever existed as a text before it was compiled by the editor. However, at least for Sanskrit texts, there is a clear need for critical editions; without the groundwork laid by textual criticism – so-called “lower criticism” – it would be impossible for higher criticism – poetics, philosophical studies, comparative work – to proceed. Simply put, scholars need a text in order to read, and, in the absence of autographs, we are unable to access the text without comparing its witnesses, which, individually, often contain incomprehensible readings or extensive lacunae. Nevertheless, there is scope for improvement in terms of how we curate the witnesses, and machine collation allows us much greater flexibility in this regard, compared to manual collation – we can be as selective as West demands or as unselective as many contemporary scholars now require. That is not to say that a machine-collated apparatus would not still benefit from some manual fine-tuning by a good editor. But that almost goes without saying; how could we justify presenting a text to readers that we have not painstakingly read over many times ourselves? What we have shown in developing machine collation software for Sanskrit texts is that interfacing with a machine forces editors to think carefully about exactly what text-critical principles they are applying when they edit a text. When these principles are expressed precisely and formally, the machine can do much of the work.

5. Prefatory material

5.1. Transcription and apparatus conventions

All Sanskrit text has been transcribed into Roman script using the IAST standard. However, a number of additional glyphs are also used:

–	explicit hiatus (halant or virāma)
—	half-letter (i.e., a Devanāgarī consonant missing a vertical bar)
‡	line filler (i.e., a vertical bar at the end of a line)
˘	empty śirorekha
oṃ	oṃkāra sign
oṃ	Jaina oṃkāra sign
l̥	retroflex lateral approximant
ṛ	Telugu valapalagilaka

In the printed apparatus, the following abbreviations and typographical conventions have been employed:

(L. X)	line break; X denotes the line number
(F. Xx)	page break; X denotes the folio number, and x is either "r" for recto or "v" for verso
<u>text</u>	identifies the text either as <i>sic erat scriptum</i> or as unclear

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<u>text</u>	identifies the text as deleted. A double-underlined space indicates the deleted text is overwritten or illegible.
text	in a variant reading, identifies the text as inserted; in the edited text of the commentary, identifies the text as a quotation from the verse
<u>X</u>	in a critical note, an underlined siglum indicates that the variant reading in that manuscript may have some orthographic differences from what is shown
[OM]	indicates the lemma is omitted in the witness
[OM] °text	indicates part of the lemma is omitted in the witness
[ADD] text	indicates additional text after the lemma

Some details have not been reproduced in the print edition – for example, pṛṣṭhamātrās have not been marked, and the reasons for when a reading is marked as “unclear” have not been printed. This data is preserved in the digital transcriptions, and they are reproduced in the digital apparatus.

Four levels have been included in the apparatus – sources, parallels, testimonia, and variants. These follow, roughly, the guidelines established by the *Union Académique Internationale*:¹

- *Sources* provide references for quotations, text re-use, and allusions to earlier texts. These are footnotes marked with arabic numerals.
- *Parallels* record parallel passages in the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* as well as other, roughly contemporaneous texts. For verses from the *Vākyapadīya*, this apparatus records parallel passages in the *Vākyapadīya* kārikās, the *Vṛtti* on the first and second *kāṇḍa*, and the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*. These are footnotes marked with upper-case roman numerals.
- *Testimonia* present quotations of the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* and the *Vākyapadīya* in later texts. These are marked with lower-case roman numerals.
- *Variants* record variant readings in other printed sources and manuscript witnesses. They are not marked in the text, but are keyed by line number.

5.2. Using the online, hypertext edition

This printed version of the critical edition has been automatically generated from the online version, which is available at <https://saktumiva.org/wiki/dravyasamuddesa/start>.

Positive and negative apparatus

For the critical text with the full apparatus, click on the link labeled “with full apparatus”. The critical text with a full apparatus will be displayed. The following actions are possible:

¹In practice, it is difficult to establish a single standard that fits the needs of all editions across text traditions; see Giannouli 2015 for an overview of different apparatus standards.

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- Move the cursor over a variant in order to see the lemma highlighted in the text.

evaṃ tena tena rūpeṇa brahmaiva vikalpitaṃ bhavati sarvaśabdānāṃ dyā-
nām tadupādhimukhaṃ tad eva viśayaḥ siddha ity āha


A: vatyaiṃva { D: °śabdānāṃvidyānāṃ
T: °śabdānān A: °vidyānāṃ } T: tatta°

- Click on the variant to make the lemma stay highlighted.
- Text that has been marked by colour, underlining, or other effects have notes attached. Move the cursor over the text to see the note.
- Click on a siglum to go to the transcription of that witness.
- A siglum with a dotted underline indicates the presence of a minor orthographic variation. Move the cursor over an underlined siglum to display it.
- In the text, click and drag to highlight a passage in order to show a positive apparatus.

evaṃ tena tena rūpeṇa brahmaiva vikalpitaṃ bhavati sarvaśabdānāṃ tattadu-
pādhimukhaṃ tad eva viśayaḥ siddha ity āha—

O, L: [om.] G₁, G₂: jū° C_T: tana rū°
A: vatyaiṃva { O: sarvaṃ avidyānāṃ
κ^{Ed}, A, L: °vidyānāṃ K, V: °viśabdā-
nāṃdyānāṃ G₁: °dhim, vānāṃ
G₂: °viṃvānāṃ } { D, K, V, A, O, L: ta°
M, P: tata u° κ^{Ed}: tadupādhisu°
G₁, G₂: tadupādhibhuravaṃ }
G₁, G₂: āhā

- In the positive apparatus, click on the  symbol to display a cladistic tree.



Generating a new apparatus

In addition, an apparatus of variants can be automatically generated for any witness. In order to do this, first select any manuscript transcription or printed text from the start page as mentioned above. Then:

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
- Click  in the sidebar on the left in order to display a list of other witnesses.

- Select one or more witnesses from the list.



- Click  in order to display an apparatus of variants from the selected witnesses.

- A number of additional options are available. See chapters 4.4 and 4.5 for more information.



- In the transcriptions of K^{Ed} and O, page breaks have been linked to digital images of the witness. Click on the page break to go to the image of the corresponding page or folio.

5.3. Witnesses

The critical text is edited from twelve manuscripts and four printed editions. The information presented here has been redacted from the TEI metadata attached to each transcription file. For full details, see the digital edition.

Printed Editions

R^{Ed} Wilhelm Rau. *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya: Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen*. Steiner: Wiesbaden, 1977.

Script: Roman (IAST)

Extent: XXI + 338 pages

This book contains a comprehensive critical edition of the verses of *Vākyapadīya*. It does not contain any of the commentaries. After its publication, Rau continued to find manuscripts of the *Vākyapadīya*, and he published articles detailing additions to his critical apparatus:

- 1977. “Zwei neue Vākyapadīya-Handschriften”. *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 3.
- 1984. “Three Further Kārikā-Manuscripts of the Vākyapadīya”. *R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume*.

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- 1985. “Ein bisher unzugängliches Trivandrum-MS des Vākyapadīya”. *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10.
- 1991. *Bharṭṛharis Vākyapadīya II: Text der Palmblatt-Handschrift Trivandrum S.N. 532 (=A)*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- 1993. “A new manuscript of the Vākyapadīya-mūlakārikās”. *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 18.

K^{Ed} Rāmacandra Śāstrī Koṭibhāskara. *Vākyapadīya, A Treatise on the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar by Bharṭṛhari, With a Commentary by Helārāja*. Benares: Vidyā Vilās Press, 1905.

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 746 pages

Namaskāra: || śrīḥ || śrīyaśodānandanāya namaḥ | atha saṭike vākyapadiye ṭṭīyakāṇḍārambhaḥ | śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ |

This is the earliest published text of the third kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya*, including the commentary. It is not known from what manuscripts this text was composed, but, as K. A. Subramania Iyer has pointed out, the text is very close to that of V (MS 38824 from the Sarasvati Bhavan Library); however, that particular manuscript contains a number of lacunae which are not reproduced in the edition. Nevertheless, it is clear that the editor was working from one or more manuscripts from the northern branch of the textual tradition, to which V belongs. A digital facsimile of the edition is available at <https://archive.org/details/VakyapadiyaPadakanda1905>. The page breaks in the digital transcription of this manuscript have been linked to the corresponding image.

I^{Ed} K. A. Subramania Iyer. *Vākyapadīya of Bharṭṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja Kāṇḍ III, Part 1*. Poona: Deccan College, 1963.

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 427 pages

Namaskāra: śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ || || om̐ namaḥ śrībhagavatpāṇinikātyāyanapatañjalibhyaḥ ||

K. A. Subramania Iyer was the first person to critically edit the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*, Helārāja’s commentary on the third kāṇḍa. In preparing his critical text, Subramania Iyer collated the manuscripts V, P, H, T, and C_T,² as well as COL 2393 from the University of Kerala, which no longer seems to be available. As Jan Houben has pointed out, Subramania Iyer’s readings are not always consistent with what appears in the manuscripts themselves.³ This is possibly due to the fact that Subramania Iyer was often working with transcriptions, which may have included errors. He also seems to have made

²With some caveats; see the entries for each manuscript for details.

³Houben 1995, 329.

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some errors himself; for example, in the case of H, he sometimes misinterprets *ṛṣṭhamātra* vowels. Despite this, his edition is an important achievement and a vast improvement over the editio princeps, mainly because he had access to southern manuscripts, which often have better readings. Corrections which appear in the Errata at the end of the book have been incorporated into the variant readings as additions and deletions.

Ś^{Ed} Raghunātha Śarmā. *Vākyapadīyam [Part III] (Pada-Kaṇḍa) (Jāti, Dravya and Saṃbandha Samuddeśa) With the Commentaries 'Prakāśa' by Śrī Helārāja & 'Ambākartrī' by 'Padmaśrī' Pt. Raghunātha Śarmā*. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1991.

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 10 + 4 + 6 + 4 + 358 pages

Namaskāra: śrīgaṇeśāmbikābhyāṃ namaḥ ||

Raghunātha Śarmā's text does not contain a critical apparatus, but it does contain the editor's commentary, the *Ambākartrī*. The text adheres closely to the critical edition of K. A. Subramania Iyer, with some additional avagrahas, some silent emendations, as well as some explicit emendations appearing in brackets.

Manuscript Sources

The manuscripts have been divided into a number of branches, based on a provisional stemma (see below).

The “northern” branch

D Delhi University Library MS 5954.29

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 341 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 8-10 lines per page

Date: 19th century

The transcription of this manuscript is based on a black and white facsimile of the manuscript held in Delhi University Library. Due to the poor quality of the facsimile, some readings remain unclear. The facsimile begins on the recto side of the second folio, near the beginning of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* until the end of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa* on folio 341. This manuscript seems to be based on at least two archetypes. Many corrections have been made — possibly by a different hand — which transmit

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readings which are common to manuscripts M and P, whereas the ante correctionem readings are preserved in manuscript A. These corrections have, in turn, been transmitted to manuscripts K and V, which seem to be based on D. In addition, some avagrahas have been added in the interlinear space to clarify certain negative words and compounds. Daṇḍas have been inserted just above the line. The corrections are thoughtful and learned, and show an active engagement with the text.

This manuscript is not included in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and was not known to Rau.

K Asiatic Society of Bengal MS G1114

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 239 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 12 lines per page. Triple black lines framing the left and right margins.

Dimensions: 12.1 cm x 26.7 cm

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: śrīyaśodānandanāya namaḥ

This manuscript, held at the Asiatic Society in Kolkata, extends from the beginning of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* to the end of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*. It is very closely correlated with the manuscript from Delhi University Library (D) — it incorporates a marginal gloss from D, *āryā*, into the body of the main text. Not much is known with regards to the provenance of the manuscript, which forms part of the Government Collection – Haraprasāda Shāstrī, in the preface to the first volume of his manuscript catalogue, writes that the collection began “under the order of Lord Lawrence’s Government in 1808.”⁴

This manuscript is known as RASB VI 4320 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[5] in Rau’s list.

V Sarasvati Bhavan Library MS 38824

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 262 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 9 lines per page. Impressed guidelines.

Dimensions: 11.6 x 27.4 cm

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: śrīganeśāya namaḥ

⁴Shāstrī 1917, iii.

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The transcription of this manuscript was made from a black and white photocopy of the manuscript, which is held in the Sarasvati Bhavan Library of Sampurnanand Sanskrit University in Varanasi. It is designated as “D” in Subramania Iyer’s edition. It extends from the beginning of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* to the end of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*; however, only the first 100 folios were made available for this project. In the manuscript, *va* and *ba* are not distinguished, and *ī* is often mistaken as *ā*. The consonant cluster *dbha* is often written as *bhda*. This manuscript is very closely correlated with the manuscript from the Asiatic Society of Bengal (K); they both seem to descend from the manuscript from Delhi University Library (D). In fact, in one place, this manuscript omits one full line from K, which may indicate that this manuscript was copied directly from K. However, it also has some readings which are more correct than K, namely *vākyapadīye* where K has *vokyapadīye*.

This manuscript is listed as SB New DC. X. 38824 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[43] in Rau’s list.

A Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute (Alwar branch) MS 4781

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 301 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 9 lines per page.

Dimensions: 11.3 x 26.5 cm

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: || śrīganeśāya namaḥ || śrīpatamjalaye namaḥ || niraṃtaśayasnāvatt_śrīr

This manuscript is held at the Alwar branch of the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute. It formed part of the library of the Mahārāja of Alwar, which was catalogued by Peter Peterson in the late 19th century. As Peterson notes, the collection originated with Banni Singh,⁵ who ruled Alwar in the first half of the 19th century. The manuscript extends from the beginning of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* until near the end of the commentary on the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*, breaking off just a few sentences before the end. The manuscript does not seem to be complete. There are a few peculiarities to this scribal hand – *ma* is often written as *nya*, and *rā* as *śa*.

This manuscript is listed as RORI XXI 4781 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum, F[1] in Rau’s list, and 1170 in Peter Peterson’s *Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Library of His Highness the Maharaja of Ulwar* from 1892.

The “European” branch

O University of Oxford, Chandra Shum Shere MS d. 247

⁵Peterson 1884, 3.

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Script: Telugu

Extent: 125 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 22 lines per page. Left and right margins framed by double black lines.

Dimensions: 10 x 24 cm

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: | śrīganeśāya namaḥ | śrīpataṃjalaye namaḥ | niraṃtarāyo stu | (Gambier-Parry reads *nirantarāyāstu.*)

This paper manuscript, written in Telugu script, is part of the Chandra Shum Shere collection at the Bodleian libraries. The text extends from the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* until the end of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*, although folios 109 to 111 (as indicated by the original Telugu foliation) are missing. As Dominik Wujastyk notes, the manuscript was bought in Varanasi, as part of a private collection of 6330 manuscripts, by the Maharaja Sir Chandra Shum Shere in 1909, and presented to the University of Oxford.⁶ The manuscript was bound into book form by the library, and the folios were numbered by Thomas Gambier-Parry in pencil.⁷ Gambier-Parry's foliation differs from the original, Telugu foliation – he begins numbering at the first flyleaf of the book, so that the first manuscript folio is numbered “3”. Moreover, his foliation does not take into account the missing folios.

The different scripts that have been used in the manuscript give an indication both of its provenance and also of the different cultural contexts through which it traveled. Although the text is written in Telugu script, at the end of the manuscript, on the last folio, there are some additions in Devanāgarī script – the title of the work has been written in Devanāgarī on the otherwise-blank verso side, and on the recto side, at the bottom, the last sentence of the manuscript – the section final rubric – has been transcribed from the original Telugu into Devanāgarī script. These additions were, perhaps, made by the scholar who owned the manuscript in Varanasi. Finally, when the manuscript was acquired by the University, Gambier-Parry made a number of additions at the beginning of the manuscript – for example, transcribing the opening invocation of the text into Roman script, writing it in pencil on the flyleaf facing the recto side of the first folio.

For this edition, I have commissioned the digitization of a microfilm of this manuscript (colour images were prohibitively expensive). The images are available at <http://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/809a5212-276f-487f-96ca-17a7d939ac1b>. The page breaks in the digital transcription of this manuscript have been linked to the images of the corresponding folio.

This manuscript is not included in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and was not known to Rau. It is listed as no. 3800 in the original handlist that arrived with the collection and is numbered 35 in Wujastyk's *Handlist*.⁸

⁶Wujastyk 1978, 1.

⁷Wujastyk 1978, 2

⁸Wujastyk 1994, 167.

5. Prefatory material

L British Library MS IO SAN 329

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 222 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 12 lines per page. The written area is framed by a border of black, red, and yellow lines. There is an additional, larger black frame that includes the foliation.

Dimensions: 15.2 x 28.6 cm

Date: saṃvat 1862 (1805 CE)

Namaskāra: om śrīganeśāya namaḥ || śrīpatamjalaye namaḥ || om

Colophon: || || om || || || śubham astu lekhakapāṭhakayoḥ || || || om || || || saṃvat 1862 jyeṣṭhaśu-
ddhaikādaśyāṃ samāptīkṛtam idam || || || ||

This manuscript was part of the private collection of H. T. Colebrooke, who then presented it to the East India Company Library in 1819.⁹ It is now held in the India Office collection at the British Library. The manuscript extends from the beginning of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* to the end of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*. The writing is very neat and legible, boxed in by a carefully rendered red, yellow, and black border. Corrections have been made using yellow paste. The manuscript has been bound into book form. The colophon dates it to the third month of saṃvat 1862; this is the only dated manuscript that has been consulted for this edition.

In a letter to E. B. Cowell, dated November 5th, 1895, Colonel G. A. Jacob states that Franz Kielhorn had collated this manuscript “with others in his possession”.¹⁰

This manuscript is listed as IO 707 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[10] in Rau’s list.

G University of Göttingen MS SAN 194

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 32 + 30 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 11 lines per page. Left and right margins are framed by two to four red lines.

Dimensions: 16.3 x 21 cm

Date: ~1874

⁹Rocher and Rocher 2011, 139.

¹⁰This letter has been bound into a copy of the editio princeps of the *Vākyapadīya*, held in the University Library at Cambridge, available in the rare books room. The letter does not seem to be signed, but it is likely to be from Colonel G. A. Jacob – it is marked “Oakridge, Redhill”, which is listed as his place of residence in the *List of Members of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (Bendall et al. 1904, 15).

5. Prefatory material

Namaskāra: || śrīganeśāya namaḥ || śrīpaṇṭajalaye nama || niraṇṭarāvamnāvāt_

This manuscript is held at the University of Göttingen. It was commissioned by Franz Kielhorn and received in 1874 from Nānā Shāstrī at Sāgar. It is documented in a letter between government officials, dated the 15th of August 1876; in the letter, it is stated that “two copies of the Harikārikāvyaḥyāna by Helārāja (grammar)” have been sent to Kielhorn.¹¹ The archetypal manuscript from which this manuscript was copied is listed as having 74 folios, with 10 lines to a page and 2000 ślokaś.¹² The text is incomplete, starting from the beginning of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* and breaking off in the middle of the commentary on the 15th kārikā of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*. The manuscript contains two copies of the text; the first (G₁) is clearly a copy of the second (G₂). G₁ omits a large section of text corresponding precisely to the verso side of folio 27 in G₂. Each copy is foliated separately, but both of them are bound together in book form; in addition, a page of notes in Kielhorn's hand has been pasted into the beginning of the book, listing the different sections of the *Vākyapadīya* and the number of verses in each, along with the manuscripts that were either known to him or that he had surveyed. From these notes, it seems that, in 1874, Kielhorn only knew of two manuscripts of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* – this one, and the one held at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Both copies contain many errors. Avagrahas at the end of a section of commentary are often rendered as a long ā, frequently resulting in the reading āhā for āha. Anusvāras are often displaced one akṣara to the left of where they should be, and retroflex consonants are sometimes written as dentals.

This manuscript is listed as Gottingen 194 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[16] in Rau's list.

The “Mahārāṣṭra” branch

M Bhau Dāji Memorial MS 56

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 94 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 13 lines per page.

Dimensions: 11.4 x 24.1 cm

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: || śrīgopījanavallabho vijayatetarām || om̐ namaḥ śrībhagavatpāṇinikātyāyanapatam-
jalibhyaḥ ||

This manuscript is held in the Library of the Asiatic Society in Mumbai. It was formerly held at the Bhau Dāji Memorial until 1882, when it was transferred to Oliver Codrington at the Bombay Branch

¹¹Gough 1878, 203.

¹²Kielhorn 1874, 90.

5. Prefatory material

of the Royal Asiatic Society by Vishvanath Naravan Mandlik and Ardaseer Pramji Moos.¹³ The text is incomplete, breaking off after the 50th verse of the *Sādhanasamuddeśa* at the bottom of the recto side of the last folio, leaving the verso side blank. The transcript of this manuscript was made from a monochrome microfilm.

On the top line of each page, the *i* and *ī* vowel signs, some anusvāras, and clustered rephs are hyper-extended upwards as a decorative element.

This manuscript is listed as Bhau Dāji 56 and BBRAS 53 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[3] in Rau's list.

P Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute MS 109 of 1881-82

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 76 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 18 lines per page.

Dimensions: 12.7 x 26.7 cm

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: || śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ || om̐ namaḥ śrībhagavatpāṇinikātyāyanapatamjalibhyaḥ ||

This paper manuscript was acquired by Franz Kielhorn in 1881 for the Government of Bombay;¹⁴ a government stamp appears twice on the last folio. The text extends from the beginning until a few lines into the commentary on verse 51 (counted as 67 in this manuscript) of the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*. It is strongly correlated with the manuscript from the Bhau Dāji Memorial, which suggests that they descend from the same archetype. This transcription was made from grayscale photographs.

Often, when the scribe has not left enough space to write the vertical bar for the short *i* vowel, he puts a small slash under the akṣara to indicate that it should be read as *i*. Subramania Iyer, in his collation, misreads this as an *e* vowel.

This manuscript is listed as BORI 109 of 1881-82 and P 22 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[24] in Rau's list.

The “southern” branch

H Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñāna Mandira MS 7312

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 55 folios

¹³Naravan and Moos 1882, clix-clx.

¹⁴Kielhorn 1881, 22.

5. Prefatory material

Material: Paper

Layout: 17 lines per page. Left and right margins framed by double lines.

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: om̐ namo bhagavate rghajñālaśvara śrīmadivya nṛ lakṣmī nṛ sahiyāya || śrīgurubhyo namaḥ ||

This paper manuscript is held at the Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jain Jñān Mandir in Patan, Gujarat. It is written in a Devanāgarī script which alternates between śiromātrā and pṛṣṭhamātrā vowels; this inconsistency led to some misreadings in the critical edition of Subramania Iyer. There are also a number of peculiar glyphs – *stha* is written as *scha*, and *jya* is written as *cha*; but since these glyphs are quite consistent, the text is very legible. The text extends from the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* until the end of the *Bhūyodhravyasamuddeśa*, breaking off after a few words from the beginning of the commentary on the *Guṇasamuddeśa*. The transcription of this manuscript has been made from black and white printouts of digital images.

This manuscript is listed as F[23] in Rau's list. It is not listed in the New Catalogus Catalogorum.

T University of Kerala MS Paliyam 329

Script: Malayālam

Extent: 100 folios

Material: Palm leaf

Layout: 12 lines per page. Two stringholes.

Dimensions: 4.5 x 30.5 cm

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: hariḥ śrīgaṇapataye namaḥ avighnam astu

This is a palm-leaf manuscript held at the Manuscript Library in the University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram. It is listed in a Supplemental volume of the catalogue, in Volume VII. It was previously part of the private collection of the Paliyam family, before it was acquired by the University. It seems to be the same manuscript K. A. Subramania Iyer consulted, which he designated as L, since the readings match up almost exactly. However, Subramania Iyer writes that his manuscript only extended until the end of the *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, whereas this manuscript extends from the beginning of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* to the beginning of the commentary on verse 139 of the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*. Since Subramania Iyer was working with a transcript, it is possible that his transcript did not cover the full extent of the manuscript. There are some signs that this manuscript has been previously collated or transcribed – at arbitrary points in the text, there are slashes and X marks drawn in with a green highlighter, possibly by a transcriber marking waypoints.

5. Prefatory material

On the recto side of the first folio, in the left margin, *vākyapadīya* has been written at the top and *śaṅkarasya* has been written at the bottom.

This manuscript is listed as Trav. Uni. Sup 14680 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum; the manuscript that Subramania Iyer used is F[40] in Rau's list.

C_T Adyar Library MS 555

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 1108 pages

Material: Industrial paper

Layout: 14 lines per page. The text is handwritten in a notebook with a red border on all four margins. There are 15 ruled lines per page, but the top line has been reserved for page numbers and a running title: *vākyapadīyavyākhyāyām* on left-facing pages, and *dravyasamuddeśa* on right-facing pages.

Dimensions: 21 x 16.5 cm

Date: 20th century

Namaskāra: || avighnam astu ||

This manuscript is held in the Adyar Library in Chennai. MS 555 is a Devanāgarī transcript of MS 554, which is a Malayālam palm-leaf manuscript. The transcript has been written with a pen in four bound notebooks filled with lined pages. The commentary is written in black, while the verses are written in red. It covers the whole of the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*, albeit with significant gaps, most likely due to the palm-leaf archetype being severely damaged. The gaps in the text are represented by blank lines with interspersed dots. In K. A. Subramania Iyer's edition, a different transcript of MS 554 was used for editing the *Dravyasamuddeśa*.

This manuscript is listed as Adyar D. VI 555 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[17] in Rau's list. The transcript of MS 554 that Subramania Iyer used is represented by the siglum B in his edition.

Concordance table

	Siglum	New Catalogus Catalogorum	Rau	Subramania Iyer
Wilhelm Rau's edition	R ^{Ed}			
Rāmacandra Śāstrī Koṭibhāskara's edition	K ^{Ed}	Ptd. (15)	Drucke Nr. 1	A
K. A. Subramania Iyer's edition	I ^{Ed}		Drucke Nr. 9	
Raghunātha Śarmā's edition	Ś ^{Ed}	Ptd. (22)		
Delhi University Library MS 5954.29	D			
Asiatic Society of Bengal MS G1114	K	RASB VI 4320	F[5]	
Sarasvati Bhavan Library MS 38824	V	SB New DC. X. 38824	F[43]	D
Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute (Alwar branch) MS 4781	A	RORI XXI 4781	F[1]	
University of Oxford, Chandra Shum Shere MS d. 247	O			
British Library MS IO SAN 329	L	IO 707	F[10]	
University of Göttingen MS SAN 194	G	Göttingen 194	F[16]	
Bhau Dāji Memorial MS 56	M	Bhau Daji 56; BBRAS 53	F[3]	
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute MS 109 of 1881-82	P	BORI 109 of 1881-82; P 22	F[24]	C
Śrī Hemaandrācārya Jaina Jñāna Mandira MS 7312	H		F[23]	M
University of Kerala MS Paliyam 329	T	Trav. Uni. Sup 14680	F[40]	L
Adyar Library MS 555	C _T	Adyar D. VI 555	F[17]	B

Manuscripts not consulted

The following manuscripts, which are known to contain the *Dravyasamuddeśa* and Helārāja's commentary, were not consulted for this edition:

- University of Kerala: COL 2393 is a Devanāgarī paper manuscript that was collated by Subramania Iyer, but as of 2015, it could not be located in the library.
- Asiatic Society, Kolkata: no. 675 in the old catalogue contains the entire *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*.
- Oriental Institute, Baroda: no. 315 is a fragmentary paper manuscript that contains verses 7-15. Wilhelm Rau acquired a copy of this manuscript.¹⁵
- Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Varanasi: According to Rau, no. 40179 extends from the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* to the middle of the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*. The extent of no. 38652 is unknown.¹⁶

5.4. Stemmatic analysis

A preliminary stemma was constructed based on observations made during the transcription process. It was immediately clear that the manuscripts consulted fall into two main groups – one northern and one southern. In addition, manuscript D shows clear evidence of contamination, with some words from one branch crossed out and replaced by a reading from another branch – for example, where A has *sarvavidyānām* and T has *sarvaśabdānām*, D has *sarvavidyānāmśabdānām*. K and V seem to be descended from this contaminated archetype – they both read *sarvavidyānāmśabdānām*.

After creating a preliminary draft of a critical text, cladistic analysis was performed using all the transcriptions – including those of the printed editions and my own critical text – as data. The process is as follows:

- The transcriptions were exported as a string of characters, in SLP1 encoding, with spaces removed.
- The strings were aligned using MAFFT.
- The aligned sequences were imported into SplitsTree, where a network was created using the NeighborNet algorithm. Only parsimony-informative characters were considered.
- A tree was created from the network using the neighbor-joining method.

The resulting unrooted tree (Figure 5.1) re-enforces conclusions made during the preliminary stemmatic analysis – there is a clear bifurcation between the northern and southern witnesses. In addition, it shows the three manuscripts that are held in European libraries as one branch. The editio princeps, K^{Ed}, is interpreted as an archetype of the northern branch; it is clear that the editor did not have access to southern manuscripts. The three other editions – those of Subramania Iyer, Raghunātha Śarmā, and myself – are much closer to the southern witnesses.

¹⁵Rau 1971, 35-36.

¹⁶Rau 1971, 42.

5. Prefatory material




Figure 5.1.: The unrooted tree.




Figure 5.2.: The rooted tree.




Figure 5.3.: The stemma.

The tree was then rooted (Figure 5.2), using my own edition as the root text, since I hypothesize that my critical text is the one closest to the earliest archetype. Then, based on observations made in the preliminary stage, a stemma was constructed (Figure 5.3).

Dissenting evidence

While, in the stemma, O, L, and G are a sub-branch within the northern branch, they have some occasional congruences with the southern branch. For example, in the commentary to verse 6, O, L, G, C_T, and T all read *upādhimad dravyam*, while all other manuscripts read *upādhimallīnatā tadā dravyam*. This would indicate a more complex relationship between the southern and northern branches that has not yet been captured by the current stemma. Further study, including a cladistic analysis of other sections of the manuscripts, may yield a more accurate stemma.

5.5. Major differences from K. A. Subramania Iyer's edition

A number of corrections and minor differences which do not significantly impact the meaning of the text have been omitted here. A full collation of all variants between my critical edition and the

5. Prefatory material

printed editions of Subramania Iyer, Rāmacandra Śāstrī Koṭibhāskara, Raghunātha Śarmā, and Wilhelm Rau can be consulted using the digital edition: https://saktumiva.org/wiki/dravyasamuddesa/00-edition?upama_ver=ffwk6x3a6k. The aim of the edition was to reconstruct the text of Helārāja's commentary; Bhartṛhari's kārikās are of secondary concern, since they were thoroughly studied by Rau. Nevertheless, I have occasionally departed from Rau's edition where both the manuscript evidence as well as Helārāja's commentary suggest a different reading; that is, I have tried to reproduce the mūla text that Helārāja was reading in the 10th century.

- p. 90, ln. 7, *ātmādvaitavādibhiḥ* : Subramania Iyer reads *ātmā dvaitavādibhiḥ*, understanding *ātmā* to be a pratīka from the verse. This seems to be an error carried over from the editio princeps, which reads *ātmā | dvaitavādibhiḥ.... sattā | dvaitavādibhiḥ....*
- p. 93, ln. 6, *tadrūpolliṅganam* : Subramania Iyer reads *tadrūpālīṅganam*, following the editio princeps. He does not record the reading *tadrūpolliṅganam*, which is found in H, T, and C_T. M reads *tadrūpālīṅgānām* – the geminated *l* could be a vestigial trace from *-ollīṅga-*. All other manuscripts read *-ālīṅga-*.
- p. 95, ln. 1, *atra niyatasvāmika...* : Subramania Iyer reads *atrāniyatasvāmika...*, following the editio princeps. This reading is not attested in any manuscript.
- p. 96, ln. 5, *prthakśabdavācyam* : This is my emendation, which has no manuscript basis. See the note in the translation. Subramania Iyer reads *aprthakśabdavācyam*, along with all manuscripts.
- p. 97, ln. 5, *suvarṇam ity eva* : Subramania Iyer omits this, although it is present in the editio princeps.
- p. 98, ln. 2-3, *kṛtapadabandhāḥ* : Subramania Iyer reads *kṛtapadasaṃbandhāḥ*, following the editio princeps. See the note in the translation.
- p. 102, ln. 1, *vyāpakatvāt* : Subramania Iyer reads *vyāvartakatvāt*. His reading is not attested in any manuscript, although H reads *vyāparttakatvāt*.
- p. 103, ln. 6, *vicchedo* : Subramania Iyer reads *vacchedo* here, along with the editio princeps and the northern manuscripts.
- p. 103, ln. 6, *satyo* : All printed editions read *satyā* here, which is not attested in any manuscript.
- p. 103, ln. 8, *atattvam* : Subramania Iyer reads *tattvam* here, which is not attested anywhere.
- p. 104, ln. 8-9, *vikalpyamānam* : Subramania Iyer reads *vikalpamātram*, which is not attested anywhere.
- p. 106, ln. 7, *yathā* : Both Rau and Subramania Iyer read *tathā* here, but I have followed Raghunātha Śarmā's reading, which fits better with Helārāja's commentary.
- p. 107, ln. 8, *tac chabdāt tac ca na bhidyate* : Subramania Iyer reads *tac chabdatattvam na bhidyate*, following the editio princeps. I have followed Rau's reading of the verse, which is also clearly what Helārāja is commenting upon.

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- p. 111, ln. 8, *tadātmeva* : This is my emendation, which has no manuscript basis. See the note in the translation. Subramania Iyer reads *tadātmaiva*, along with all manuscripts.
- p. 112, ln. 6, *vedyamānaṃ vedyatvād* : Subramania Iyer reads *vedyamānaikavedyatvād*. There does not seem to be any justification for this reading.

6. Critical edition

jātir vā dravyam vā padārthāḥ ity uktam ¹ ^I ^{II} | tatra vājapyāyanadarśanena ² ^{III} jātiṃ viśeṣaṇabhūtāṃ padārthaṃ vyavasthāpya vyāḍidarśanena ³ viśeṣyabhūtāṃ ^{IV} ^V dravyam api padārthaṃ vyavasthāpayituṃ yathādarśanaṃ tad eva paryāyāntarair uddiśati |

5 ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śārīraṃ tattvam ity api | ⁴ ⁱ ⁱⁱ ⁱⁱⁱ
dravyam ity asya paryāyās tac ca nityam iti smṛtam || 1 ||

¹padārthānām apoddhāre jātir vā dravyam eva vā | padārthau sarvaśabdānām nityāv evopavarṇitau || (*Jāṭisamuddeśa* 2, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 8). ²ākṛtyabhīdhānād vaikaṃ vibhaktāu vājapyāyanaḥ (*Vārttika* 34 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.2.64, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 242). ³dravyābhīdhānaṃ vyāḍiḥ (*Vārttika* 45 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.2.64, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 244). ⁴hetupratyayasambhūtā paratantrā ca saṃvṛtiḥ | paratantra iti proktaḥ paramārthas tv akṛtrimaḥ || svabhāvaḥ prakṛtis tattvaṃ dravyam vastu sad ity api | nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ paratantras tu vidyate || (*Acintyastava* 44-45, ed. Tsuda 2016, 50). Lindtner (154) also reads "tu vidyate", while Tola & Dragonetti, following Tibetan sources, read "na vidyate" (18). Both Lindtner and Tola & Dragonetti read "bhāvo", indicating an elided "aparatantras" following it; however, this seems to be a typo, since they translate it as "relative" (155) and "dependent" (33), respectively.

¹jātir vā dravyam vety evam ukta iti (*Tikā* ad *Vākyapadīya* 2.79, ed. Subramania Iyer 1983, 39). ^{II}tatra vyāḍimate bhedo vākyārthaḥ, padavācyānām dravyāṇām dravyāntaranivṛttitātparyeṇābhīdheyatvāt | jātivādino vājapyāyanasya tu mate saṃsargo vākyārthaḥ, samānyānām padārthānām saṃśleṣamātrarūpatvād vākyārthasya (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 5, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 15). ^{III}jāṭiśabdārthavācino vājapyāyanasya mate gavādayaḥ śabdā bhinnadravyasamavetajātim abhidadhāti.... dravyapadārthavādivyāḍinaye śabdasya vyaktir evābhīdheyatayā pratibhāsatē | jātis tūpalakṣaṇatayeti nānāntyādidōṣavakāśaḥ | pāṇīnyācāryasyobhayaṃ saṃmatam (*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, ed. Śāstrī Abhyankar 1924, 307-308). ^{IV}guṇo jātir vā viśeṣaṇam idaṃ dravyam viśeṣyam iti (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Vṛttisamuddeśa* 92-93, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 196). ^Vtathā ca jātyādir api viśeṣyatvena ced_ vivakṣitas tadā dravyam iti tīrthāntariyadravyalakṣaṇānādarāt_ vyāḍidarśanena sārvaṭrikī dravyapadārthavyavasthā siddhyati | yathā vājapyāyanadarśane jātir anvītapratyayanimittaṃ sarvaśabdānām arthaḥ (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 188).

ⁱnanu sūtre 'svātmani' iti śuddham upāttam, vṛttau tu 'sarveṣām' iti saṃbandhipadaṃ yad uktam, tat_ kuta ānīyēti āśāṅkamāna āha 'sva' iti | ātmaśabdo 'pi yady api 'ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca.....|' iti dṛṣṭyā svabhāvavācī saṃbandhiśabdaḥ, tathāpi vaiśeṣikādidṛṣi svatantra eva ātmapadārtha iti śāṅketāpi; svaśabdopādāne tu svabhāvavacanatā asya gamyate (*Īśvarapratyabhijñānāvṛttivimarśinī*, ed. Kaul Shāstrī 1938-1943, I, 41). ⁱⁱnanu ātmaśabda eva 'ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca.....|' iti sthityā svabhāvavācī vyākhyāyisyate kiṃ svagrahaṇena iti | āha 'svaśabdaḥ' iti (*Īśvarapratyabhijñānāvṛttivimarśinī*, ed. Kaul Shāstrī 1938-1943, I, 47-48). ⁱⁱⁱ'vastu' iti pradhānaṃ dravyam.... yathā pūrvam uktaṃ 'kiñcīt_ vastu bhavati |' iti 'ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śārīraṃ |' iti ca (*Īśvarapratyabhijñānāvṛttivimarśinī*, ed. Kaul Shāstrī 1938-1943, III, 78-79).

1 vā] [OM] T. 1 uktam]] ukta K V. 1 vājapyāyanadarśanena] vājapyāyaṃ tadarthane P; °ne M. 1 jātiṃ viśeṣaṇabhūtāṃ] jātivi° H; jātiviśeṣaṇabhūtā P. 1 viśeṣaṇabhūtāṃ] °bhūtā K V. 2 padārthaṃ] padārthatvena M P. 2 vyāḍidarśanena] vyāḍida° T C_T; yāḍeda° G₁ G₂. 2 viśeṣyabhūtāṃ] viśeṣyarūpaṃ Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D A O L G₁ G₂; viśeṣyarūpa K V. 2 dravyam] dram G₁. 2 api] iti pi D G₁ G₂; iti L. 2-3 vyavasthāpayituṃ] °yitu P H. 3 yathādarśanaṃ] tathā da° L. 3 eva] eca A; evaṃ G₁ G₂. 3 paryāyāntarair uddiśati]] paryāyā(SPACE OF 7 AKṢARAS) C_T; °taraiḥ uddiśati G₁ G₂; °taraisaddiśati(SPACE) P. 4 vastu] vasta G₁ G₂. 4 svabhāvaś] svabhāvāś L; svabhāvāpy G₁ G₂. 4 ātmā...śārīraṃ] [OM] C_T. 4 ca śārīraṃ] aśa° G₁ G₂. 4 ity] ipy I^{Ed}. 4 api] āpi G₁ G₂. 5 dravyam] śā(L. 5)dravyam M; sa dravyam P. 5 asya paryāyās] asyāparyāyās K V. 5 paryāyās] payāmyaḥ(L. 10)S G₁. 5 tac ca] tatva O; tatvam G₁ G₂. 5 tac...nityam] tatvamiśram L. 5 nityam] itham G₁ G₂. 5 smṛtam]] smṛtaśa G₁ G₂; smṛtat || ♡ || H.

6. Critical edition

ihārthakriyāyām dravyam evopayujyata iti tad eva pravartakam arthinām | ataḥ śabdena tad evocyate | anabhidhīyamānā tu jātir avacchedikā guḍaśabde mādihuryādaya iveti ⁵ VI VII VIII dravyavādinām darśanam | dravyam ca dvididham, pāramārthikam sāmvyavahārikam ca | ⁶ tatra dvitīyam bhedyabhedakaprastāvena guṇasamuddeśe vakṣyati—

5 vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra ⁷

ityādīnā | anena ca dravyeṇa vyādidarśane sarve śabdā dravyābhīdhāyino bhavanti |

iha tu pāramārthikam dravyam nirūpyate | tathā hy ātmādvaitavādibhir ātmaśabdena tad dravyam uktam | ātmaiva hy upādhibhinnaṃ pratibhāsamānam dravyam padānām artha iti teṣāṃ darśanam ihaiva vakṣyamānam |

10 vastu svalakṣaṇam arthakriyākāri ⁸ dravyam iti śākyair uktam |

svabhāva iti sattādvaitavādibhiḥ svabhāva ātmabhūtā satteti kṛtvā | tathā hi kramarūpopasaṃhāre

⁵tatraikeṣāṃ mādihuryādayo 'tyantam anabhidhīyamānā guḍādibhiḥ śabdaiḥ tām arthān [sajante] iti (*Dīpikā* ad *Mahābāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 15). ⁶nityatā cāpi dvididhā | vyavahārāśrayā paramārthāśrayā ca | ...dravye 'pi padārthe vyavahāranityatā (*Dīpikā* ad *Mahābāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 17-18). ⁷vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra sarvanāma prayujyate | dravyam ity ucyate so 'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ || (*Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 187). ⁸yad arthakriyākāri tad eva vastu ity uktam (*Pramāṇavārttikasvarṭti*, ed. Gnoli 1960, 330).

^{VI}darśanād yathā guḍam upalabhya mādihuryam indriyāntaraviṣayam pratipadyate | śravaṇād yathā guḍaśabdam śrutvā mādihuryam aśabdakam pratipadyata iti (*Yuktīdīpikā* ad *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 4, ed. Wezler and Motegi 1998, 73). ^{VII}yadā tu nābhīdhīyate dravyam, tadānabhidhīyamānam abhidhīyamānāyā jāter guḍaśabda iva mādihuryāder bhedakam ity ātmādhārālīṅgasamkhyopahāreṇopakāritvād guṇa iti yujyate vaktum (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Vṛttisamuddeśa* 336, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 305). ^{VIII}na caitad vācyam vākyasyaiva pratyāyakatvaṃ na padānām, yato yathā guḍaśabdo guḍadravyam abhidhatte tathā pratyāyaty api tadavinābhāvi mādihuryam (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* 6, ed. Raghavan 1999, 345).

1 ihārthakriyāyām] °kriyām A. 1 ataḥ] tataḥ O; [ADD] ca M P H. 2 evocyate] evovyate G₁ G₂. 2 anabhidhīyamānā] anadhidhī° G₂; anadyi(L. 11)dhī° G₁; 'nabhivīya° H. 2 guḍaśabde] [OM] Ś^{Ed}; guḍaśabder M; guṇḍaśabder P; °bdena C_T. 2 mādihuryādaya] mādihuramādaya K V. 2 iveti] raveti A. 2-3 dravyavādinām] °dinā P C_T. 3 darśanam] da G₁ G₂. 3 dravyam] dravya H. 3 ca] va G₁ G₂. 3 dvididham] dvididha K V; dviivam H. 3 darśanam...sāmvyavahārikam] [OM] darśa...sāmvyā° C_T. 3 sāmvyavahārikam] sāvyā° H. 3 ca] va G₁ G₂. 3 tatra] ta A. 3 dvitīyam] [ADD] dravyam H. 4 bhedyabhedakaprastāvena] bhedyam bhe° M P; (L. 3)bhedyabhedapra° C_T; bhadyabhedakaprastavema G₁ G₂; °kamaḥyāvema V; °prahyāvena K. 4 guṇasamuddeśe] °muddeśe A. 4 vakṣyati—] vakṣyate Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed}. 5 vastūpalakṣaṇam] vasturūpa° P; vasttūpa° G₁ G₂. 5 yatra] [OM] M P. 6 ityādīnā] °na G₁ G₂; [ADD] darśanam dravyam ca dvi(F. 109v)vidham pāramārthikam sāmvyavahārikam ca tatra dvitīyam bhedyabhedakaprastāvena guṇasamuddeśe vakṣyati vastūpala(L. 2)kṣaṇam yatretyādīnā | D. 6 ca] [OM] L; va G₁ G₂. 6 vyādidarśane] vyādi° G₁ G₂; vyāliḍa° T C_T. 6 dravyābhīdhāyino] dvavyā° K V; °yinom A; °yine G₁ G₂. 6 bhavanti] bhavati G₁ G₂. 7 pāramārthikam dravyam] pāramārthakam C_T. 7 dravyam] dravya P; [OM] T. 7 ātmādvaitavādibhir] ātmā advai° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed}. 7 tad] tḍ A G₁ G₂ P T; [OM] H. 7-8 dravyam uktam] dravyayuktam K V O L G₁ G₂. 8 ātmaiva] jātmaiva P. 7-8 tad...pratibhāsamānam] (L. 8)(SPACE OF 1 LINE)(L. 9)(SPACE OF 1 AKṢARA)nam C_T. 7-8 pratibhāsamānam] pragtibhā° G₁ G₂; pratiṣabhā° K. 8 dravyam] dravya K V. 8 padānām] pādānām M P. 8 teṣāṃ] neṣāṃ G₁ G₂. 9 vakṣyamānam] vakṣamānam G₁ G₂; vakṣyamāna H. 10 vastu] vasta G₁ G₂; [OM] H. 10 svalakṣaṇam] svarūpam L; svalakṣamānam H. 10 svalakṣaṇam arthakriyākāri] svalakṣaṇakri° M P. 10 śākyair] kyair K; kair V; śraukair M; ślokair P. 11 svabhāva] svabhāvam D K V A O L G₁ G₂. 11 sattādvaitavādibhiḥ] satādvai° P; sa cādvai° H; sattā | dvai° K^{Ed}. 11 svabhāva²] svabhāva T C_T. 11 satteti] sattaṃti K; sataṃti V; samṭeni G₁ G₂; sateti P; satte H. 11 kṛtvā] kṛtā | K^{Ed}; katvā K V; vikṛtvā | H. 11 kramarūpopasaṃhāre] kramasta(L. 11)po° H; °popasaṃhāre G₁ G₂.

sattaiva sattvam iti ⁹ svasaṃbandhibhir upādhibhir upahitabhedā saiva dravyam |
 prakṛter ekadeśaḥ cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ, ^{10 11 12} taddvāreṇa śarīraśarīriṇor avyatiṛekāc **charīraṃ** dravyam
 pradhānam eveti prakṛtikaiḥ, ¹³ śarīram evaika ātmā ^{IX X} yeṣāṃ, taiḥ śarīrātmabhir ¹⁴ ucyate |
tattvam iti caturbhūtatattvavādibhiś cārvākair dravyam ucyate | pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni, ^{15 16}
 5 tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviśayasamjñeti vacanāt | tad evam etaiḥ paramārthata ekam eva vastū-
 cyate |

dravyam ity asyeti | dravyam nāma yaḥ padārthaḥ, tasyaita eva **paryāyāḥ** | eteṣāṃ eva pāramārthi-
 karūpābhīdhāyitvāt | nānye ghaṭādiśabdāḥ | saty api tadabhidhāyitve vakṣyamāṇanāyena ātmādiśa-

⁹saṃbandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu.... kramarūpasya saṃhāre tat sattvam iti kathyate (*Jāṭisamuddeśa* 33-35, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 42). ¹⁰tasmāt tatsamyogād acetanaḥ cetanaḥ iva liṅgam | guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteva bhavaty udāsinaḥ || (*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 20, ed. Dutt Sharma 1933, 22). ¹¹tatra jarāmaraṇakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ (*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 55ab, ed. Dutt Sharma 1933, 50). ¹²atrocyate 'cetanaṃ pradhānam cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ iti... (*Gauḍapādabhāṣya* ad *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 57, ed. Dutt Sharma 1933, 52). ¹³pratipakṣāḥ punas tasya puruṣeṣāṇuvādinaḥ | vaināśikāḥ prakṛtikā vikārapuruṣās tathā (*Yuktidīpikā*, ed. Wezler and Motegi 1998, 2). ¹⁴dvāv ātmanau | antarātmā śarīrātmā ca | antarātmā tat karma karoti yena śarīrātmā sukhaduḥkhe 'nubhavati | śarīrātmā tat karma karoti yenāntarātmā sukhaduḥkhe 'nubhavatīti (*Mahābhāṣya* ad *Vārttika* 9 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.3.67, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 292). ¹⁵pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni | tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviśayasamjñāḥ (*Cārvāka Fragments* L.2-3, Bhattacharya, 78). ¹⁶pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.4, ed. Jambūvijayajī 1961, 2).

^{IX}deham evātmēti bārhaspatyāḥ (*Siddhitrāya Ātmasiddhi*, ed. Ramanujacharya 1972, 3). ^Xtac caitanyaviśiṣṭadeha evātmā (*Sarvadarśanasamgraha Cārvākadarśana*, ed. Śāstri Abhyankar 1924, 3).

1 sattaiva] sasaiva V. 1 sattvam] svatvam T. 1 sattvam iti] satvabhi G₁ G₂. 1 sattvam...svasaṃbandhibhir] svatvam C_T. 1 svasaṃbandhibhir] svaṃ saṃ° G₁ G₂. 1 upādhibhir] [OM] Ś^{Ed}; upādhir M P. 1 upādhibhir upahitabhedā] upahitabhedāt H. 1 upahitabhedā] ahitā sattābhedā M; ahitā (L. 6)bhedā P. 1 upādhibhir...saiva] iti C_T. 1 saiva] sattaiva L M H; sataiva P. 1 dravyam]] dravya K V. 2 ekadeśaḥ] ekadeśa K V. 2 cetanaḥ] ceka(ta)naḥ C_T. 2 puruṣaḥ,] punaṣas G₁; punuṣas G₂. 2 taddvāreṇa] tadvāreṇa K^{Ed} D K V A O G₁ G₂ M P H T. 2 śarīraśarīriṇor] °riṇor K V; °riṇo G₁ G₂. 2 avyatiṛekāc charīraṃ] vyatiṛekā śarīraṃ G₁ G₂; °rekaḥ śarīraṃ O; °rekaḥ śarīraṃ C_T; °kā śarīraṃ L. 2 dravyam] dradhyaṃ G₁ G₂. 2-3 dravyam pradhānam] dravyapra° P. 2-3 pradhānam] padhānam A. 3 prakṛtikaiḥ,] prakṛtikai A. 3 śarīram evaika] śarīradevaika C_T. 3 evaika] eva O M P; evai G₁ G₂. 3 evaika ātmā] evātmā H. 3 taiḥ] tai G₁ G₂. 3 śarīrātmabhir] śarīrātmibhir T; śarī(L. 7)tmabhir P; śarīrakibhir C_T; °tmavādibhir Ś^{Ed}. 3 ucyate]] ucyante(SPACE) A; uvyate G₁ G₂; ucyete | te M; ucyete P. 4 caturbhūtatattvavādibhiś] catubhūta° M P; °tavādibhiś T; °tatvādibhiś L. 4 cārvākair] cākaikair A; cārvākai G₁ G₂; ārvākais P; śvārvākair C_T. 4 dravyam] tatvam M P. 4 ucyate]] uvyate G₁ G₂. 4 pṛthivy...vāyur] pṛthivyaptejovāyur Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V L M; pṛthivyātejovāyur A; pṛthivyaptejovāyava O; pṛthivyap_tajivāyur G₁ G₂; pṛthivīvyaptejovāyur P. 4 iti] iti P. 4-5 tattvāni,] tatāni K V; tatvābhiḥ P. 5 tatsamudāye] tatsamu° K V. 4-5 pṛthivy...śarīrendriyaviśayasamjñeti] (SPACE OF 4 AKṢARAS)(L. 7)(SPACE OF 1 LINE)(L. 8)śaktire(ri)ndri° C_T. 4-5 śarīrendriyaviśayasamjñeti] śaraurem° K V; śarīredri° A P; °ṣayaṃ saṃjñā iti G₁ G₂. 5 vacanāt]] vacantat K V; vavanāt G₁ G₂. 5 tad] ptad G₁ G₂. 5 evam] [OM] T. 5 tad...etaiḥ] taiḥ O; tadaikāiḥ C_T. 5 paramārthata] pāramārthika T C_T; °rtha K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂. 6 vastūcyate]] vastū G₁ G₂. 7 dravyam] vyam G₁ G₂. 7 ity...]] ityisyeti H. 7 asyeti]] asyaiti(SPACE) P. 7 dravyam...yaḥ] dravyānām ayaṃ C_T. 7 yaḥ] ya H. 7 tasyaita] ta(L. 2)syaiva V. 7 eteṣāṃ] eteṣās A. 7 eva] eṣi M P. 8 pāramārthikarūpābhīdhāyitvāt]] pāramārthikarūpatvābhi° H; °pāyitatvāt T. 8 ghaṭādiśabdāḥ]] ghaṭādi° D K V; °śabdāḥ P H. 7-8 dravyam...tadabhidhāyitve] drabhi° G₁ G₂. 92.8-93.1 vakṣyamāṇanāyena ātmādiśabdānām] °na(SPACE OF 14 AKṢARAS)(L. 14)(SPACE OF 9 AKṢARAS) C_T; °ye ātmādiśabdānām O; °ye vātmādiśabdānām G₁ G₂; °yena (L. 7)ātmādiśabdānām T.

6. Critical edition

bdānām eva sarvatra ghaṭādāv avyāhataprasaratvam | tathā ca bhāṣyam—

eko 'yam ātmā udakaṃ nāma ¹⁷

ity atrātmaśabda udake prayujyamāno dravyavacanaḥ | ākṛtidvāreṇa cānye śabdā dravye vartante |
ime tu tatparityāgena mukhyayā vṛttyeti viśeṣaḥ |

5 siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe ¹⁸

ity atra

dravyaṃ nityam ākṛtir anyā cānyā ca bhavati ¹⁹

iti vadatā bhāṣyakāreṇa nityaṃ dravyaṃ smṛtam | saṃgrahoktasya ²⁰ tasyārthasyānuvādāt smṛtam
ity āha |

10 yady api śākyādidarśane nityaṃ na bhavati dravyaṃ ^{XI} tathāpi tanmatasyānabhyupagamād adoṣaḥ |
kevalaṃ yad asmākaṃ dravyaṃ tad anyair evam abhidhīyata ity evam atropanyāsaḥ | yad vā bhāṣyā-
nusāreṇa svarūpānyathātvānāpattiḥ, vikārabhede 'pi nityatvaṃ vivakṣitam eveti sarvatra tatsiddhiḥ
|| 1 ||

¹⁷kathaṃ punar jñāyate bhedakā guṇā iti | evaṃ hi dṛṣyate loke | eko 'yam ātmodakaṃ nāma tasya guṇabhedād anyatvaṃ
bhavati | anyad idam śītam anyad idam uṣṇam iti (*Mahābhāṣya* ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.1, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I,
41-42). ¹⁸siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe (*Vārttika* 1, *Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 6).
¹⁹ākṛtir anyā cānyā ca bhavati dravyaṃ punas tad eva (*Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I,
7). ²⁰saṅgraha etat prādhānyena parikṣitam nityo vā syāt kāryo veti | tatroktā doṣaḥ prayojanāny apy uktāni | tatra tv eṣa
nirṇayo yatheva nityo 'thāpi kārya ubhayathāpi lakṣaṇaṃ pravartyam iti || (*Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Abhyankar
and Kielhorn 1972, I, 6).

^{XI}tatra kṣaṇikavādinām avicchedena pravṛttir yā sā nityatā (*Dīpikā* ad *Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Bronkhorst 1987,
23).

1 eva...ghaṭādāv] [OM] C_T. 1 avyāhataprasaratvam] | apy āhatasya pratyakṣatvaṃ | M; apy āhatasya pratyakṣa-
tvaṃ(SPACE) P; °tasya prasaratyaṃ | H; °prasyaṃdatvaṃ O; °prasyatvaṃ L G₁ G₂; prasaratām· C_T. 1 ca] va G₁ G₂.
1 bhāṣyam—] bhāṣyam P. 2 eko] ko G₁ G₂ H. 2 udakaṃ] [ADD] nātmeti | atrātmaśabda udake G₁ G₂. 3
prayujyamāno] praprajya° K V; prayuchamāno H. 3 dravyavacanaḥ] | dravyavadanaḥ G₁ G₂. 3 ākṛtidvāreṇa]
sākṛ° O L G₁ G₂. 3 cānye] vānye O G₁ G₂. 3 śabdā] śabdāḥ V; śabde T. 3 dravye] saty api tadabhidhāyitve
vadravye V. 3 vartante] | varttate K^{Ed} V A G₁ G₂ P H; vaṃrtate K. 4 ime] [ADD] na H. 4 tatparityāgena] [OM]
ta° A; °ge T. 4 vṛttyeti] dravyavṛ° M P; vṛtjeti V. 7 ākṛtir] ākatir K V. 7 anyā] avyā H. 7–8 cānyā...iti]
vānyāvabha° G₁ G₂. 7–8 bhavati iti] bhavantīti T. 7–8 nityam...bhāṣyakāreṇa] ni-(L. 5)tya(SPACE OF 18 AKṢARAS)
C_T. 8 nityaṃ] niṃtyaṃ G₁ G₂. 8 smṛtam] | smṛti G₁ G₂. 8 tasyārthasyānuvādāt] tantrārtha° C_T; tatrārthā° T;
tatrārthasyānupādānām H; °syāvuvādā G₁ G₂. 8 tasyārthasyānuvādāt smṛtam] °dātasyatam P. 8 smṛtam] sṛtam
T. 9 āha] | āhā G₁ G₂. 10 api] [ADD] ca M P H T C_T. 10 śākyādidarśane] śākyādi° M P; śākyāhida° G₁ G₂. 10
na] [OM] O L G₁ G₂. 10 bhavati] bhayati G₁ G₂. 10 tathāpi] [OM] C_T. 10 tanmatasyānabhyupagamād] na
ma° A; °mān P. 10 adoṣaḥ] | evādoṣaḥ H T C_T. 11 kevalaṃ] kevala K V; [ADD] dravyaṃ H. 11 dravyaṃ] [ADD]
iti L. 11 tad] [OM] Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed}. 11 anyair] [ADD] apy H T C_T. 11 evam] avem G₁ G₂; [OM] M P. 11 abhidhīyata]
abhidhāyata K V. 11 evam atropanyāsaḥ] | evātro° H. 11 atropanyāsaḥ] | aṃtro° V; °nyāsāḥ || G₁ G₂. 11 vā]
ca K^{Ed} O L G₁ G₂; vāc ca D K V; [ADD] ca A. 12 svarūpānyathātvānāpattiḥ,] °thā tv anāpattiḥ O; °thāt tānāpapattiḥ
G₁ G₂; °tvānāpatir P. 12 svarūpānyathātvānāpattiḥ, vikārabhede] skarūpānyathātvānāpattivi° A. 12 vivakṣitam]
vivakṣim G₁ G₂. 12 svarūpānyathātvānāpattiḥ,...eveti] °thā(SPACE OF 7 AKṢARAS) C_T. 12 eveti] atreti L G₁ G₂ H T;
ity atreti M P; [ADD] tat T. 12–13 tatsiddhiḥ || 1 ||] latsiddhiḥ A; [OM] tat° C_T.

evaṃ darśanāntarāśrayaṇenoddiṣṭeṣv api dravyabhedeṣu svasiddhāntāśrayeṇa sārvaṭrikīm dravya-
padārthavyavasthām kartum āha—

satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate |
asatyopādhibhiḥ^{XII XIII iv v} śabdaiḥ satyaṃ evābhidhīyate || 2 ||^{vi}

- 5 iha sarvaśabdānām pāramārthikaṃ tattvaṃ sākṣāt spraṣṭum aśaktānām anekopādhiṣayanihitapa-
dānām tadrūpolliṅgaṃ vyavahāre samālakṣyate | upādhinām cāgamāpāyavaśavidhuritanijasvarū-
pānām arthisārthasamāśāpūraṇapratihataśaktitvān na tāvaty eva paryavasānam ity upalakṣitarūpa-
pṛṣṭhapātināḥ śabdā vyavasthāpyante | avadhṛtarūpaniveśitvāc ca śabdānām avadhāraṇānusāram
arthe pravṛttiḥ, avadhṛtiś cākāradvāreṇa | nirākārasya buddhyupārohāyogāt | yathāpratyayaṃ bhe-

^{XII}asatyopādhi yat satyaṃ tad vā śabdanibandhanam (*Vākya-padīya* 2.127ab, ed. Subramania Iyer 1983, 61). ^{XIII}jātyādayas
tu bhedaḥ dravyasya sattvam vaktum | upādhibhūtās te śabdasyeti (*Dīpikā ad Mahābhāṣya Paspāśāhnika*, ed. Bronkhorst
1987, 15).

^{iv}asatyopādhi yat satyaṃ tad vā śabdanibandhanam (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 889ab, ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, I, 284). ^vanye
tu āhuḥ— yad asatyopādhi satyaṃ sa śabdārtha iti | tatra śabdārthatvenāsatyā upādhyo viśeṣā valayāṅguliyakādayo
yasya satyasya, sarvabhedaṇuyāyinaḥ suvarṇādes sāmānyātmanaḥ, tat satyam asatyopādhi | śabdanibandhanam iti |
śabdapravṛttinimitam abhidheyam ity arthaḥ (*Pañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 889ab, ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, I, 284).

^{vi}dravyapadārthavādino pi naye saṃvillakṣaṇaṃ tattvam eva sarvaśabdārtha iti saṃbandhasamuddeśe samarthitam –
satyaṃ vastu... (*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, ed. Śāstrī Abhyankar 1924, 306).

1 evaṃ] paraṃ K^{Ed} D K V A G₁ G₂. 1 darśanāntarāśrayaṇenoddiṣṭeṣv] darśanāntaāra° C_T; darśanāntareṣv api śra-
yeno° M; °tareṣv api¹ (L. 14)śrayaṇoddiṣṭeṣv P; °śrayaṇenoddi (F. 38R)ṣṭeṣv O; °śrayaṇenoddiṣṭagedy G₁ G₂; °śrayaṇoddi-
ṣṭeṣv H. 1 dravyabhedeṣu] dravyaebhe° L; bhedeṣu K^{Ed} A. 1 svasiddhāntāśrayeṇa] svasiddhānām śra° K V; sva-
siddham tāśrayeṇa G₁ G₂. 1 sārvaṭrikīm] sārvaṭrikām K V; (L. 6)sārvaṭrikīm A; sāvaṃkrikīm G₁ G₂; svā(L. 5)bhāvīkīm
M; svabhāvīkām P. 1–2 dravyapadārthavyavasthām] dravyapa(L. 2)pa° D; dravyapapadārthavyavya° K V; °vasthī G₁
G₂; °vasthā P T. 3 satyaṃ] satvaṃ G₁ G₂. 3 vastu] vakra G₁ G₂. 3 asatyair] asatyer A. 3 avadhāryate || eva°
A; avadhīryate | H. 4 śabdaiḥ] śaṇḍaiḥ C_T. 4 evābhidhīyate || evābhi° P; evābhidhīyate(SPACE) K V; evābhidhī-
yale(SPACE) A. 5 pāramārthikaṃ] para° K V L G₁ G₂; pāāra° D; °rthitkatkaṃ M; °(L. 6)rthika(SPACE OF 18 AKṢARAS)
C_T. 5 tattvaṃ] ta(L. 5)tva K; tatra V. 5 sākṣāt] [OM] Ś^{Ed} H; sākṣyāt A. 5 spraṣṭum] praṣṭam G₁ G₂; spraṣṭubh
P. 5 aśaktānām] aśabdānām P. 5–6 tattvaṃ...anekopādhiṣayanihitapadānām] [OM] tattvaṃ...ṣaya° C_T. 5–
6 anekopādhiṣayanihitapadānām] anekāpā° H; °yavihitapadānām L; °hitānām padānām O. 6 tadrūpolliṅga-
naṃ] tadrūpālīṅgaṃ Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D A O L G₁ G₂; tadbhayaḷiṅgaṃ K V; tadrūpālīṅgānām M; tadrūpālīṅgānām
P. 6 samālakṣyate |] samātmaḥṣyate | H; °kṣya M P. 6 upādhinām] upādhanām K V A. 6–7 cāgamāpāya-
vaśavidhuritanijasvarūpānām] vāga° L; cāgamāpāya eva śabdavidhur iti ni° M P; vāgamāpāyavaśavidhuritam ilasva°
G₁ G₂; °pānā sākṣāt_ H. 7 arthisārthasamāśāpūraṇapratihataśaktitvān] marthi° H; arthisārthasamāśāsara° K; a-
rthisārthasamāśāsara° V; avisārthasamāśāpūraṇapratihataśaktiḥ vān G₁ G₂. 7 na] naṃ A. 7 tāvaty] nāvaty
A. 7–8 upalakṣitarūpaprṣṭhapātināḥ] upalakṣitapr° O L; °tapṛchapātināḥ || G₁ G₂; °pṛṣṭhapātināḥ K V H; °pṛṣṭhavā-
tināḥ A; °tītaḥ(SPACE) P. 8 śabdā] śabda P. 8 vyavasthāpyante |] vyavasthāpane L; vyavasthāpyane G₁ G₂. 8
avadhṛtarūpaniveśitvāc] avadhūta° P; avavṛta° G₁ G₂. 8 avadhṛtarūpaniveśitvāc...avadhāraṇānusāram] a(SPACE
OF 8 AKṢARAS) (L. 13)(SPACE OF 14 AKṢARAS)asāram C_T. 8 avadhāraṇānusāram] °raṇānusāra(L. 6)m H; °ṇāt tu sāmye
M; °sāramye P. 9 arthe] rthe M P. 9 pravṛttiḥ,] prakṛti K^{Ed}; prakṛti D K V A O L G₁ G₂; pratipattiḥ M P H. 9
avadhṛtiś... |] avadhṛtisvākā° M P. 9 cākāradvāreṇa |] ca kā° G₁; cākāradvāriṇa G₂. 9 buddhyupārohāyogāt |]
nudhyu° K V; vukṛyāro° G₁ G₂; °hābhāyovāgāt_ T. 9 yathāpratyayaṃ] yathāpratyayaṃ M; °tyatyayaṃ G₁ G₂; °tya-(L.
3)yas tv C_T; [ADD] ca M P H T. 94.9–95.1 bhedāvasāyasya] abhe° C_T.

dāvasāyasya bādhyamānatvād anuyāyy abhinnaṃ eva rūpaṃ paramārthataḥ | tad eva brahmarūpaṃ
satyam || 2 ||
syād etat | upādhiṣu śabdānāṃ viśrāntyabhāve śabdārthopādhitvaṃ teṣāṃ na syāt | avācyasya tadu-
pādhitvāyogād ity etad vicārayitum āha—

5

adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagrhaṃ yathā | ²¹ XIV vii
grhītaṃ grhaśabdena śuddham evābhidhīyate || 3 ||

ado devadattasya grhaṃ yatrāsau kākaḥ prativasati

²¹tad yathā | katarad devadattasya grhaṃ | ado yatrāsau kāka iti | utpatite kāke naṣṭaṃ tadgrhaṃ bhavati.... tad yathā |
itaratrāpi katarad devadattasya grhaṃ | ado yatrāsau kāka iti | utpatite kāke yady api naṣṭaṃ tadgrhaṃ bhavaty antatas
tam uddeśaṃ jānāti.... tad yathā | itaratrāpi katarad devadattasya grhaṃ | ado yatrāsau kāka iti | utpatite kāke yady api
tam uddeśaṃ jānāti saṃdehas tu tasya bhavatīdaṃ tadgrhaṃ idaṃ iti (*Mahābhāṣya* ad *Vārttika* 3-4 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.26,
ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 74-75).

^{XIV}gotvādayas tv anabhidhīyamānāḥ śabdasyopādhibhūtāḥ pravṛttinimittam | yathā svastikādayo devadattagrhasyāvā-
cakāḥ santa upalakṣaṇaṃ grhasya bhavanti (*Dīpikā* ad *Mahābhāṣya Paspāśāhnika*, ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 22).

^{vii}adhruveṇa nimittena.... iti | bhāṣyakāreṇāpi siddhe śabdārthasambandha ity etad vārtikavyākhyānāvasare dravyaṃ hi
nityam ity anena granthenāsatyopādhyavacchinnaṃ brahmatattvaṃ dravyaśabdavācyaṃ sarvaśabdārtha iti nirūpitaṃ
(*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, ed. Śāstrī Abhyankar 1924, 306-307).

1 bādhyamānatvād] badhya° K V. 1 anuyāyy] anupāyy L; anupādhy M P. 1 anuyāyy abhinnaṃ] upādhyabhi-
nnaṃ O. 1 abhinnaṃ] abhivaṃ K V; abhitvaṃ G₁ G₂. 1 paramārthataḥ]] paramārthataḥ O L G₁ G₂. 1 brahmarū-
paṃ] [ADD] satyaṃ P. 2 satyam ||] syasatyam· C_T. 3 upādhiṣu] upādhiṣu A; upādhiṣu G₁ G₂. 3 śabdānāṃ]
[OM] śa° G₁ G₂; śabdānāṃ A. 3 viśrāntyabhāve] viśrāntyabhāve T; °bhāvo V; °bhā(SPACE OF 10 AKṢARAS) C_T. 3
śabdārthopādhitvaṃ...avācyasya] (L. 7)(SPACE OF 14 AKṢARAS)sya C_T. 3 avācyasya] avātyasya V; avādhyasya G₁ G₂.
3-4 tadupādhitvāyogād] la upā° G₁ G₂; tadupodhi° H. 4 vicārayitum] vyabhicā° T C_T; vibhicā° H; vicāyara° M;
vivāra° G₁ G₂. 5 devadattagrhaṃ] devada(L. 5)ttam grhaṃ A; °ttagrahaṃ P. 6 grhītaṃ] grhīptaṃ G₁ G₂; grahītaṃ
P. 6 grhītaṃ grhaśabdena] grhītagr° A. 6 evābhidhīyate ||] evābhidhīyate K V; °yato G₁ G₂. 7-8 ado] ādau
M P. 8 devadattasya] dede° G₁ G₂; devadattasya V. 8 yatrāsau] yatrausau A. 8 prativasati] pratīva° A; prasa°
P.

ity atra niyatasvāmikagr̥hopalakṣaṇāyopalakṣaṇabhūtasya ²² XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX kākasyotpatite 'pi, tasminn upalakṣaṇasya kṛtatvād adhruvatvam anityatvam iti | tadanādareṇaiva tadupalakṣitam gr̥ham abhidhīyate gr̥haśabdena yathā tathā prakṛtisambandhād asatyopādhyupalakṣitam satyam upādhirūpānādareṇa śabdair abhidhīyata ity anabhidhīyamānasyāpy abhidhānaviṣayaniyāmakatvād upalakṣaṇatve saty upādhitvaṃ nidarśanena samarthitam | tathā hi—
5 ktaktavatū niṣṭhā ²³ XX
ity anubandhasyāprayogasamavāyitvād adhruvasyopalakṣaṇatve tadrahitasya śuddhasya pratyaya-

²²tathā dravyam api abhidhīyate upalakṣaṇam gotvādaya iti vyāḍimatam (*Dīpikā* ad *Mahābhāṣya Paspāśāhnikā*, ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 16). ²³ktaktavatū niṣṭhā (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.26, ed Böhrtlingk, 4).

^{XV}kākadupalakṣaṇamātratvād iti cet, na, paryāyavāt | upalakṣaṇam viśeṣaṇam vyavacchedakam iti paryāyā eva | devadattagr̥ham kākīti pratītiprasaṅgād iti cet, na, uktavāt | yathāsamayaṃ pratītir iti daṇḍena paribrājakah, kākēna devadattagr̥ham iti nānāyora vyavacchedakatve viśeṣo 'sti (*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, ed. Yogīndrananda 1968, 175). ^{XVI}bhaktiś ca dhvaniś ceti kiṃ paryāyavat tādrūpyam ? atha pṛthivītvam iva pṛthivyā anyato vyāvartakadharmarūpatayā lakṣaṇam ? uta kākā iva devadattagr̥hasya sambhavabhāvād upalakṣaṇam ? (*Locana* ad *Dhvanyāloka* 1.14, ed. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī 1940, 140). ^{XVII}viśeṣaṇam caturvidham vyāvartakaviśeṣaṇam uparañjakaviśeṣaṇam upalakṣaṇaviśeṣaṇam upādhanaviśeṣaṇam ceti.... upalakṣaṇaviśeṣaṇam kākad devadattagr̥ham (*Lakṣmīdharavyākhyā* ad *Saundaryalaharī*, ed. Veṅkaṭanāthācārya 1969, 132). ^{XVIII}aindropalakṣitam 'idi paramaiśvare', paramaiśvavyavān indrah | atra śrutiḥ — “indro māyābhīḥ pururūpa iyate” iti | tatsambandhi aintram karma tenopalakṣite | kākad devadattagr̥ham itivad viśvasarjanādivyavahāro 'syopalakṣaṇam na tu svarūpadharma iti yāvat (*Dīpikā* ad *Yoginīhṛdaya* 2.19, ed. Kavirāja 1963, 105). ^{XIX}yena ca svoparāgam udāsīnam kurvatā viśeṣyagatavyāvartakadharmopasthāpanena vyāvṛttibuddhir janyate tad upalakṣaṇam, yathā kākādi (*Advaitasiddhi*, ed. Nārāyanaswami Sastri 1937, II, 32). ^{XX}ktaktavatū° || 26 || ihānubandhāḥ kāryārtham upādīyante | prayogas tv eṣāṃ luptatvān nāsti | yatra ca sārūpyam tatra sandehaḥ — katham asyānubandhakāryam kṛtam asya tu na kṛtam iti pūrvapakṣābhīprāyaḥ || siddhāntavādī tu manyate — adhruveṇānubandhena niyatasannidhānā arthāḥ kārakalādayo lakṣyante | taddarśanād anubandhasmṛtau ca tallakṣitānām kāryānām sādhitvaṃ vijñāyate (*Pradīpa* ad *Mahābhāṣya* ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.26, ed. Bhikaji Josi 1987, I, 315).

1 atra niyatasvāmikagr̥hopalakṣaṇāyopalakṣaṇabhūtasya] anuni° G₂; atrāni° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed}; anuniyatasvā G₁. There is a large lacuna in G₁ here. See the manuscript description for details. 1 niyatasvāmikagr̥hopalakṣaṇāyopalakṣaṇabhūtasya] niyatasvāmigr° T; niyatasvāmikagrahopa° M P; niyatvasvā-(L. 13)migr̥hāyopalakṣaṇāyopa(SPACE OF 7 AKṢARAS) C_T. 1 kākasyotpatite] kākasya utpaṃtite A; [OM] C_T. 1-2 tasminn] tasmij G₂. 1-2 'pi,...upalakṣaṇasya] [OM] 'pi, tasminn u° C_T. 1-2 upalakṣaṇasya] upalakṣyaṇasya A; upalaṇatvasya O. 2 upalakṣaṇasya kṛtatvād] °ṇasvakṛtatvād K V L G₂. 2 adhruvatvam] adhravam O; adhruvatmam H. 2 anityatvam] anityam O; [OM] G₂. 2 tadanādareṇaiva] tadāda° M P; °re(L. 10)ṇeva H. 2 tadupalakṣitam gr̥ham] °lakṣaṇagr̥hītam M P. 3 abhidhīyate] abhidhāyate K V; adhiyate | C_T. 3 gr̥haśabdena] gr̥hasambandhena M P. 3 yathā] tathā O L G₂. 3 tathā] yathā O G₂; [OM] H. 3 prakṛtisambandhād] vrakṛ° G₂; prakṛtasam° C_T; prakṛtasam° I^{Ed} M P H T. 3 asatyopādhyupalakṣitam] apaty° C_T; asahyāpā° G₂; asatyāyādhyu° L; asatyopādhyapa° K V; °lalakṣitam A. 3-4 upādhirūpānādareṇa] upādhi° H; °pān anādareṇa A. 4 śabdair] śabder O. 4 abhidhīyata...anabhidhīyamānasyāpy] abhidhāya° K V; abhidhīyamā° K^{Ed} D A O L G₂. 4 anabhidhīyamānasyāpy abhidhānaviṣayaniyāmakatvād] abhidhīyamānasyābhi° M P. 4 abhidhānaviṣayaniyāmakatvād] °niyamakatvād H. 4-5 anabhidhīyamānasyāpy...upalakṣaṇatve] °-(L. 6)syā(SPACE OF 16 AKṢARAS) C_T. 4-5 upalakṣaṇatve] °kṣaṇe L H. 5 upalakṣaṇatve saty] °ṇatvasaty O. 5 upādhitvaṃ nidarśanena] upādhitvani° I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D A; upādhiḍa° M P; upādhitvaniḍa° K V. 5 nidarśanena] °nebha G₂. 6 ktaktavatū] ktaktavat K V; ktaktavas tu P; kṛkṛvatta H. 6-7 niṣṭhā ity] nisety K V; niṣṭety A P H. 7 anubandhasyāprayogasamavāyitvād] ananu° M P; anubandhasya pra° K^{Ed}; anubamyyāprayogasamāvā° G₂. 7 adhruvasyopalakṣaṇatve] radhruvasyopalakṣaṇe L; adhyupalakṣaṇatvena M P. 96.7-97.1 pratyayarūpasya] pratyayayā° V; pratyayasvarū° H.

rūpasya saṃjñā'prasaṅga²⁴ ity atredaṃ bhāṣye nidarśanam uktam || 3 ||
 nanu kāko 'tivilakṣaṇād gr̥hād bhedenāvadhāryamāṇo mā bhūd gr̥haśabdābhidheyah | ghaṭādayas
 tv ākārāḥ pṛthagānupalabhyamānatattvāḥ, katham iva tacchadbair nābhidhiyeran | anyo hy upādhir
 upalakṣaṇabhūtaḥ sāmānādhikarāṇyēnāvachedakaḥ | tad yathā dṛṭiharir ity atra paśuḥ |²⁵ anyat
 5 tu viśeṣaṇaṃ pṛthakśabdavācyam uparañjakam | tad yathā vāneyam udakam iti vanasaṃbandho-
 pādhiyamānarūpaviśeṣam udakam abhidhiyata iti vanasaṃbandho viśeṣaṇam uparañjakatayābhi-
 dheyakam āpadyata iti | tathā cuktam—
 arthaviśeṣa upādhis tadantavācyah samānaśabdo yah |

²⁴yady api lupyate jānāti tv asau sānubandhakasyeyam saṃjñā kṛteti (*Mahābhāṣya* ad *Vārttika* 3 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.26, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 75). ²⁵harater dṛṭināthayoḥ paśau (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.2.25, ed Böhrtlingk, 95).

1 saṃjñā'prasaṅga] saṃjñāṃ pra° G₂. 1 nidarśanam] [OM] ni° K^{Ed} D K V A G₂ M P. 1 uktam ||] upa|ktam | M ;
 upakṣam(SPACE) P. 2 'tivilakṣaṇād] sti vi° K^{Ed} D K V A ; vilakṣaṇod O ; sti vilakṣaṇo M P ; °kṣaṇo H. 2 'tivilakṣaṇād
 gr̥hād] °nāgrhāt_ G₂. 2 gr̥hād] gahāta K ; grahāta V ; gahāt_ A ; grahād P. 2 bhedenāvadhāryamāṇo] bhedenāya-
 dhā° A. 2 'tivilakṣaṇād...mā] tivila(SPACE OF 5 AKṢARAS) C_T. 2 bhūd] bhud O. 2 gr̥haśabdābhidheyah] | raha°
 G₂ ; gaha° K V. 2 ghaṭādayas] ghaṭhādayas A ; ghū__da(L. 6) yas G₂. 3 tv ākārāḥ] svākārā P ; tākārāḥ C_T. 3 ākārāḥ]
 ākāmrā A. 3 pṛthagānupalabhyamānatattvāḥ,] pṛthakanu° G₂ ; °laḍābhyamānatattvāt P ; °natvāt M ; °tatvā K V. 3
 nābhidhiyeran] | nātidhi° G₂ ; nābhidhāye° K V. 3 hy] py K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₂ C_T. 2–4 bhūd...upalakṣaṇabhūtaḥ]
 bhūta H. 3–4 upādhir upalakṣaṇabhūtaḥ] upādhirūpa° D K V A. 3–4 upalakṣaṇabhūtaḥ] °kṣaṇah bhūtaḥ G₂.
 4 sāmānādhikarāṇyēnāvachedakaḥ] | sāmānyēnādhir ui(L. 9) palakṣaṇabhūtaḥ(SPACE) samādhi° P ; sāmādhi° M ; sā-
 mānā(L. 7) dhir aka° G₂ ; °raṇyānāvacheda(L. 16) kaḥ | O. 4 yathā dṛṭiharir] yathā iti harir K^{Ed} K V A M P H ; yathā |
 iti hariṣya G₂. 4 dṛṭiharir] [ADD] paśur M P H T C_T. 4 ity] [OM] O L ; i G₂. 4 atra] anyatra O L ; [OM] G₂.
 4 paśuḥ] | paśu P. 4 anyat] anya V A C_T. 4–5 anyat tu] anyatra M P ; anyatraṃ H. 5 pṛthakśabdavācyam]
 apr° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₂ M H T ; aprathamaśabda° P. 5 tu...uparañjakam] | [OM] tu ...rañ° C_T. 5 upara-
 ñjakam] | uṃpa° G₂ ; uparajamkaṃ K V ; param janakaṃ L. 5 tad] [OM] O. 5 tad yathā] tathā T. 5 yathā]
 yavyā K V. 5 vāneyam] cāneyam K V ; vānedam O ; neyam L. 5 udakam iti] udakavini V. 5–6 vanasaṃbandho-
 pādhiyamānarūpaviśeṣam] vanīsam° Ś^{Ed} ; vanasaṃbandhopadhī° T C_T ; vanasaṃbandhopādhiya° P ; vanasaṃ(L.
 9) babadhopyādhāyamānarūpaviśeṣaṇam K ; vanasaṃba(L. 6) dhopyādhāyamānarūpaviśeṣaṇam V ; °dhopyādhāyamā-
 narūpaviśeṣaṇam O L G₂ ; °pāpādhiyamānarūpaviśeṣaṇam D ; °śeṣaṇam K^{Ed} A. 6 udakam] [OM] K V O L G₂ D A. 6
 abhidhiyata] asidhi° G₂ ; abhidhāyata K V. 6 iti] | i V. 6 vanasaṃbandho] vacanaśarīrasam° A ; vanaśarīrasam° D
 O L G₂ ; vanīsam° Ś^{Ed} ; vacanaśarīrasambandhe K^{Ed} ; vanaśarīrasambandho K V ; °bandho pi T C_T. 6–7 uparañjakatayā-
 bhidheyakam] uparamjakam tadābhi° G₂ ; °taryābhidheyakam K V ; °tayāābhidheya(SPACE) kam D ; °tadābhidheyakam
 L ; °yatvam Ś^{Ed} O ; [ADD] apy O. 7 āpadyata] āpāpa° G₂ ; āpy apa° L. 7 iti] | eva H T C_T. 7 cuktam—] vuktam |
 G₂. 8 arthaviśeṣa] āryā^{artha}° D ; āryā artha° K V. 8 upādhis tadantavācyah] upādhitādam° O L G₂. 8 tadanta-
 vācyah] tadanya(vā) dācyah Ś^{Ed} ; tadanuvācyah K^{Ed} D K V A. 8 tadantavācyah samānaśabdo] °vācyasamānaśabde
 M P. 8 samānaśabdo] sa āryāmā° K^{Ed}. 8 yah] | yah H.

anupādhir ato 'nyaḥ syāc chlēghādiviśeṣaṇaṃ yadvat || ²⁶ XXI XXII XXIII XXIV

ity āśaṅka sadṛśataram atra nidarśanam āha—

suvarṇādi yathā yuktaṃ svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ |

rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ śuddham evaiti vācyatām || 4 || ²⁷ ²⁸ viii

5 rucakakuṇḍalādyākāraviśeṣopādhiyamānarūpabhedam api suvarṇam ity eva sarvatrānapāyirūpaṃ

²⁶gotracaraṇāc chlēghātyākāratadaveteṣu (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.1.134, ed. Böhtlingk 1887, 236). ²⁷yathā somyaikena lohamaṇinā sarvaṃ loham ayaṃ vijñātaṃ syāt | vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ loham ity eva satyaṃ (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1.5, ed. Olivelle 1998a, 246). ²⁸tathā suvarṇaṃ kayācid ākrtyā yuktaṃ piṇḍo bhavati | piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdya rucakāḥ kriyante | rucakākṛtim upamṛdya kaṭakāḥ kriyante | kaṭakākṛtim upamṛdya svastikāḥ kriyante | punar āvṛttaḥ suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ punar aparayākṛtyā yuktaḥ khadirāgārasavarṇe kuṇḍale bhavataḥ (*Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 7).

^{XXI}tadantatvāt tadvācyāḥ samānaśabdo 'yam_ iti ca smarāṇāt (*Vidhiviveka*, ed. Gosvāmī 1984, 318). ^{XXII}dvididho 'py upādhir upahitasamānādhikaraṇas tadvyadhikāraṇas ca | tad yathā | ḍṛtihariḥ paśuḥ, gārgikayā ślēghate iti ca | tatra yaḥ samānaśabdaḥ sa samānādhikaraṇopādhiḥ sa tadantavācyāḥ pratyayāntavācyo ḍṛtihariḥ paśvādiḥ | na tv asamānaśabdo 'samānādhikaraṇo gārgikayā ślēghate ity ādih | na hi gārgikayeti ślēghādyadhikāravihite vuni tadantenā 'samānādhikaraṇaḥ, gārgikayā ślēghā 'bhidhiyata ity arthaḥ (*Nyāyakanikā* ad *Vidhiviveka*, ed. Gosvāmī 1984, 318). ^{XXIII}upādhiśabdena ceha tulyanyāyāvād viśeṣaṇam apy ucyate | kvacit tu, tayor bhedena vyavahāro drśyate | yathā 'nopādhir upādhir bhavati viśeṣaṇasya vā viśeṣaṇam iti || 'arthaviśeṣa upādhis tadantavācyāḥ samānaśabdo yaḥ | anupādhir atonyaḥ syāc chlēghādi viśeṣaṇam yadvat ||' iti (*Pradīpa* ad *Mahābhāṣya* ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.1.1, ed. Bhikaji Josi 1987, III, 1). ^{XXIV}gotvaṃ ca jātir upādhir bhaviṣyati | tena nātiprasaṅgaḥ | na copādher abhidhānam | anabhihitasyāpi tacchabdenopahitāvachchedakatva-darśanāt | yathā gārgikayā ślēghata ity atra ślēghopādhihito buñ na ślēghām āheti bhāvaḥ |seyaṃ vyadhikaraṇe 'nupādhou gatiḥ | samānādhikaraṇe tu paśvādāv upādhou pratyayāntarāśabdavācyatvam eva, yathā ḍṛtihariḥ śvete |tathā ca smarati bhagavān_ kātyāyanaḥ— tadantavācyāḥ samānaśabdo 'yam_ iti | samānaśabdaḥ samānādhikaraṇaśabdaḥ, ya upādhir asau pratyayāntaśabdavācyā ity arthaḥ | tasmād vyaktiniyame apratītā jātir aśaktā | na ca gośabdād anyad asyāḥ pratyāyakam astīti sā 'pi tena pratyāyanīyeti siddham na vyaktimātraṃ padārtha iti (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* ad *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.60-61, ed. Thakkura 1996, 432-433).

^{viii}tad yathā— katarat suvarṇam, ya eṣa rucakāḥ svastiko vardhamānaka iti ; na hy atra rucakādyākāradvāreṇa pravṛttas suvarṇaśabdo rucakādyākāram abhidhatte, uparateṣu vā rucakādyākāreṣu tadvyavacinnasvarṇarthaparataṃ parityajati | tad uktam— adhriveṇa nimittena devadattaḥ yathā | ḡṛhitaṃ ḡṛhaśabdena śuddham evābhidhiyate || suvarṇādi yathā yuktaṃ svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ | rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ śuddham eve(vai)ti vācyatām || tathopalakṣaṇe jātv ākṛtau vā samāśrite | vyaktayo yānti śabdānāṃ śuddhā evābhidheyatām || (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* 6, ed. Raghavan 1999, 329).

1 anupādhir] anu(L.13)(SPACE OF 1 LINE) C_T. 1 ato] anto M; ahito H. 1 ato 'nyaḥ] anonya A. 1 'nyaḥ] nyaṃ D; nya G₂; nyat T. 1 'nyaḥ...chlēghādiviśeṣaṇam] nyasyā° H; nyasmāt_ ślā° L. 1 syāc chlēghādiviśeṣaṇam] syā_ghā° P; syāc_ślēghā° T; syāt_ ślāślēghā° D. 1 chlēghādiviśeṣaṇam] [ADD] syāt_ (L.19) O. 1 ato...yadvat ||] (L.14)(SPACE OF 6 AKṢARAS)d C_T. 2 ity] itir P. 2 sadṛśataram] [ADD] ity M P. 2 nidarśanam] midaranam G₂. 3 yuktaṃ] bhinnaṃ ^{Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed}}. 3 svair] syair G₂. 3 apāyibhiḥ]] apāyi(SPACE) G₂; upādhibhiḥ || M; upādibhiḥ(SPACE) P; aṇayibhiḥ | H. 4 rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ] haca° K V; savakā° G₂; rucakādhyabhidhānānā P. 4 evaiti] eveti O L G₂ C_T; mavaiti P. 4 vācyatām ||] vācyamtām(SPACE) A; vāvyatām G₂; vācyatāt_ || ^ᳵ || H. 5 rucakakuṇḍalādyākāraviśeṣopādhiyamānarūpabhedam] rucakakuṇḍalāchyākā° P; (L.4)rucakakuṇḍalādyākāviśeṣo(L.5)padhī° C_T; syamkakuṇḍalādhāraviśeṣo bhidhāyamānarūpābhedam G₂; °śeṣo bhidhāyamānarūpābhedam O; °śeṣo bhidhāyamānarūpābhedam L; °ṣoṇadhāyamānarūpābhedam H; °ṣoṇadhāyamānarūpābhedam T; °pādhyāyamānarūpābhedam K V; °rūpābhedam K^{Ed} D A. 5 suvarṇam] (L.17)suvatṛaṇam H; savarṇam T. 5 suvarṇam ity eva] [OM] ^{Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed}}. 5 sarvatrānapāyirūpaṃ] sarvatropādhirūpaṃ K^{Ed} D K V A M P.

6. Critical edition

satyam ity apāyibhir ākāraviśeṣais tatsādhyārthakriyā'karaṇān^{29 30} na tatraiva rucakādiśabdāḥ kṛta-
padabandhāḥ^{XXV XXVI} | kiṃ tu tadatiricyamānam arthavastv abhidhāyakatvena samāviśanti,^{XXVII}
tadvat prakṛtisambandhād ākārōpahitanānātvam api paratattvaṃ śabdagocara ity arthaḥ | tatra ca
apāyibhir iti hetunirdeśaḥ sādhyasamakakṣyatayā kṛtaḥ, tataś copādhinām avācyatvam asatyatvaṃ
5 ca siddhyati | asatyatvād evārthakriyā'karaṇāt tadarthaṃ ca śabdavyavahārād avācyatvaṃ teṣāṃ ity
arthaḥ |

nanu ca rucakādaḥ prakṛtyanvayo^{31 XXVIII} 'vadhāryata eva | ihāpi vastūnām jñāyamānatvena^{XXIX}

²⁹na ca tatsvalakṣaṇagrahaṇottarakālabhāvinilavikalpasya viśayeṇa nilārthasādhyārthakriyā kriyate (*Hetubindu*, ed. Steinkellner 1967, 35). Reconstructed from the Tibetan translation. ³⁰na ca tatsvalakṣaṇagrahaṇottarakālabhāvinilavikalpasya viśayeṇa nilasādhyārthakriyā sādhyate (*Hetubindu*, ed. Steinkellner and Krasser 2016, 3). ³¹atha yo 'sāv ādyaḥ kapotaḥ salomakaḥ sapakṣo na ca samprati prāṇiti kathaṃ tatra prāṇiśabdo vartate iti | atha matam etat prakṛtyanvayā vikārā bhavantiḥāpi na doṣo bhavati (*Mahābhāṣya* ad *Vārttika* 5 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.3.155, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, II, 325).

^{XXV} asatyēṣu bhedeṣv eva śabdāḥ kṛtapadabandhā nābhinnam advayaṃ tattvaṃ saṃspraṣṭuṃ śaktā iti vitatha eva śā-
bdo vyavahāraḥ (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Sambandhasamuddeśa* 73, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 174). Subramania Iyer records
the variant reading kṛtasambandhā in K^{Ed}, V, and COL 2393 of the Travancore University Manuscripts Library which is
not collated here. ^{XXVI}yato bahiḥsadasattvam anapekṣyaiva vivakṣāprāpitasaṃnidhāne 'rthe vṛtapadabandhāḥ śabdāḥ
(*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Vṛttisamuddeśa* 570, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 405). No variants recorded for vṛtapadabandhāḥ. Ra-
ghunātha Śarmā corrects vṛta to kṛta (III, iii, 602). ^{XXVII}anyatra saṃjñāsamāveśo bhavati | kānyatra | loke vyākaraṇe ca |
loke tāvat | indraḥ śakraḥ puruhūtaḥ puramdarāḥ | kanduḥ koṣṭhaḥ kuśūla iti | ekasya dravyasya bahyaḥ saṃjñā bhā-
vanti (*Mahābhāṣya* ad *Vārttika* 1 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.1, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 296). ^{XXVIII}prakṛtyanvayā iti |
prakṛter anvayo yeṣu te prakṛtyanvayāḥ | prakṛtir eva vikārārūpatām āpadyamānā vikārāvasthāyām api kvacit prakṛtiśā-
bdenābhidhīyata ity arthaḥ (*Pradīpa* ad *Mahābhāṣya* ad *Vārttika* 5 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.3.155, ed. Bhikaji Josi 1987, IV, 227).
^{XXIX}bhāvanām hi jñāyamānatvena jñānopārūḍhatayā sattvam eva, bahir adhyavasānāc cāpi sattvam (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa*
ad *Sambandhasamuddeśa* 63, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 169).

1 satyam] satyabh G₂. 1 ity] [OM] H; i(SPACE OF 6 AKṢARAS) C_T. 1 apāyibhir] upādhibhiḥ K^{Ed} D A; upādhibhi KV; apāyibhi G₂. 1 apāyibhir ...tatsādhyārthakriyā'karaṇān] [OM] apā...dhyārtha° C_T. 1 tatsādhyārthakriyā'karaṇān] tatsādhyā° H T; °yākaraṇān L M P. 1 tatraiva] tetraiva G₂. 1 rucakādiśabdāḥ] ruvakādiśabdā G₂; °śabda(SPACE OF 2 AKṢARAS) C_T. 2 kṛtapadabandhāḥ] °dasambandhāḥ Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₂; °baṃ(L. 14)dhā P. 2 kiṃ] ki H; kan T; tākīṃ C_T. 2 kiṃ tu] kituṃ KV. 2 tadatiricyamānam] [OM] ta° A; °rivyamānam G₂; °mānaśarīram M; °māne śarīram P. 2 arthavastv] arthavasty KV; arthavasy G₂; arthād vastv M; arthyād vasty P; arthavahastv H. 2 abhidhāyakatvena] abhidhaya° K; abhidhāya° D; abhidheyaketana O; abhidheyakatana L G₂; abhidheyakeyakeṇa H; ābhidheyakena T C_T; °yakena M P. 2 samāviśanti,] saptāvi° P; samāviśanti G₂; samāviśati C_T. 3 prakṛti-sambandhād] tatvakṛ° G₂; prakṛtasam° T; prakṛsam° H; prakṛtipratyayasam° L; °bandandhād C_T. 3 ākārōpahitanānātvam] āro° D K V O G₂; āropi___hi° L; āropāhi° K^{Ed} A M; āropāhitanānātvam P; °hitānānātvā-(L. 12)m C_T. 3 paratattvaṃ] paratvaṃ O L G₂; paran tattvaṃ T; paraṃ tattvaṃ C_T. 3 śabdagocara] śabdagovara KV; śadagovaram G₂; °caram O L. 3 tatra] atra H. 3-4 tatra...apāyibhir] atraivopādhibhir M P. 3-4 ca apāyibhir] vāpā° G₂. 4 sādhyasamakakṣyatayā] śākyasa° K^{Ed} D K V A; sādhyama(SPACE OF 3 AKṢARAS)(L. 13)kṣya° C_T; śākyasamakakṣyatayā O L; śākyasamakakṣyatayā G₂; °kakṣyatayā M P. 4 kṛtaḥ,] kataḥ KV; vṛtaḥ || G₂. 4 copādhinām] copādhinām K V; vopādhinām G₂; copādhimām H. 4 avācyatvam] avāvyatvema G₂; asatyatvam M; atyatvam P. 4 asatyatvaṃ] [OM] a° G₂; [OM] O; avācyatvaṃ M P. 5 evārthakriyā'karaṇāt] ecārtha° A; evārthākri° G₂; °yākāra(L. 9)ṇāt M; °yākāraṇā P; °yā(SPACE OF 3 AKṢARAS)(L. 2)(SPACE OF 1 AKṢARA)ṇāt C_T. 5 tadarthaṃ] tadartha M P. 5 ca] va G₂. 5 śabdavyavahārād avācyatvaṃ] °hāravācyam C_T. 5 avācyatvaṃ] avāvyatvaṃ G₂; [ADD] atas M P. 6 arthaḥ] arśaḥ KV. 7 ca] [OM] Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} M P H; va KV G₂. 7 rucakādaḥ] kāryādaḥ K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₂. 7 prakṛtyanvayo] prakṛtyacayo A. 7 'vadhāryata] vadhāryate M P. 7 eva |] prava G₂; evam M P. 7 vastūnām] vastunām P; vastūnā C_T. 99.7-100.1 jñāyamānatvena] jñāy° K^{Ed} K V A O G₂.

sattvāj jñānasya vaikalpikākārānavasthānān nirākārasuddhasaṃvinmātrānugamasya svasaṃvitsiddhatvād adoṣaḥ | nanu viśeṣaṇoparaktam^{32 33} viśeṣyābhidhānam yuktam ity upasarjanībhūtasābhidhāne kā kṣatiḥ | na kācit, kevalam upādhiṣv evātra tātparyadrṣṭyā padabandho nivāryate | guṇatvena³⁴ tv abhidhānam astu, na tāvaty eva viśrāntir iti dravyaniṣṭhatāsiddhiḥ || 4 ||

5 ata eva viśeṣaṇoparāgāt sānkaryadoṣaṃ parihartum āha—

ākāraiś ca vyavacchedāt sārvarthyam^{XXX} avarudhyate |
yathaiva cakṣurādīnām sāmartyam nādikādibhiḥ || 5 ||^{ix}

sarvabhāveṣu brahmaṇo dravyalakṣaṇasyābhedāt tadabhidhāyitve śabdānām sarvatra tasya bhāvāt sārvarthyam śabdāntarābhidhāyamānārthatvaṃ sānkaryam prasajyetety atredam ucyate | pratiniya-

³²yadi hy ekāntato bhinnam viśeṣyāt_ syād_ viśeṣaṇam | svānurūpam sadā buddhim viśeṣye janayet_ katham (*Ślokavārttika* 142, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978, 128). ³³svānurūpam iti | viśeṣaṇasvarūpoparaktam | yato viśeṣaṇoparaktam viśeṣyam grāhayad viśeṣaṇam ucyate, anyathā viśeṣaṇa(tva)syānupapannatvād iti bhāvaḥ | yathoktam – svabuddhyā yena rajyeta viśeṣyam tad viśeṣaṇam iti (*Pañjikā* ad *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1296, ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, I, 387), which is a quotation of *Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra* 142, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978, 128). ³⁴na hy ākṛtipadārthikasya dravyam na padārtho dravyapadārthikasya vākṛtir na padārthaḥ | ubhayor ubhayam padārthaḥ | kasyacit tu kiṃcit pradhānabhūtam kiṃcid guṇabhūtam | ākṛtipadārthikasyākṛtiḥ pradhānabhūtā dravyam guṇabhūtam | dravyapadārthikasya dravyam pradhānabhūtam ākṛtir guṇabhūtā (*Mahābhāṣya* ad *Vārttika* 53 ad *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.2.64, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 246)

^{XXX}ekam āhur anekārtham śabdām anye pariṣakāḥ | nimittabhedād ekasya sārvarthyam tasya bhidyate (*Vākyapadiya* 2.250, ed. Subramania Iyer 1983, 103).

^{ix}uktaṃ ca— ākāraiś ca vyavacchedāt sārvartham avarudhyate | yathaiva cakṣurādīnām sāmartyam nalikādibhiḥ || (*Śrīgāraprakāśa* 6, ed. Raghavan 1999, 329-330).

7-1 nanu...sattvāj] [OM] nanu... sa° G₁. 1 sattvāj] matvāt_ V; satvā T. 1 vaikalpikākārānavasthānān] vai(L. 8)kalpikārā° L; vaika(L. 10)lpikākārasyāna° M; °kārāvavasthānām G₁ G₂; °kārasyānavasthānā P; °nābhūtasābhidhāne kā kṣatiḥ na kā(L. 5)cit kevalam upādhin V. 1 nirākārasuddhasaṃvinmātrānugamasya] irā° G₁ G₂; nirākārasū° D; °gamyasya K^{Ed}. 1-2 svasaṃvitsiddhatvād] svasaṃvitasiddha° P; svasaṃvit_ siddha° Ś^{Ed}. 2 adoṣaḥ] | aśeṣaḥ O L G₁ G₂. 2 nanu] na tu O. 2 viśeṣyābhidhānam yuktam] °dhānayuktam P. 2 yuktam] [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂. 2-3 viśeṣyābhidhānam...upasarjanībhūtasābhidhāne] [OM] viśe...tasyā° C_T. 2-3 upasarjanībhūtasābhidhāne] upasarjanābhū° K V; °syāribhānam G₁ G₂; °dhānam O L. 3 kā kṣatiḥ] | kakṣyatiḥ || G₁. 3 kṣatiḥ] | kṣati A. 3 kācit,] kāvit G₁ G₂; [OM] M P. 3 upādhiṣv] upādhir G₂. 3 upādhiṣv evātra] upādhiṣtevātra A H; upādhir vyavātra G₁. 3 evātra] vyavātra G₂; evātrāpi M P. 3 tātparyadrṣṭyā] tātparyam drṣṭvā M P; °drṣṭvāmṣṭyāda H. 3 padabandho] padaṃ baṃdho H. 4 abhidhānam] anidhānam K; avidhānam V. 4 na] [ADD] ca M P H T C_T. 4 tāvaty] tīvaty G₁ G₂. 4 dravyaniṣṭhatāsiddhiḥ] | dravyanimutāsiddhiḥ K V; dravyaniṣṭhatāsiddhiḥ A P H; dravyasiddhiḥ O L; dravyanisiddhiḥ G₁ G₂. 5 viśeṣaṇoparāgāt] viśeṣaṇavasamgā G₁ G₂; °paśamarāgāt P. 5 sānkaryadoṣaṃ] sāmkarśerya° C_T; sākaryadvoṣaṃ H; °doyam K V. 5 parihartum] parihartam K V. 6 ca vyavacchedāt] svavya° H. 6 vyavacchedāt] vyavadvedāt G₁ G₂. 6 sārvarthyam] sāmartyam O; sāmartyam L; sāmartyam G₁ G₂. 6 avarudhyate] | anuru° K^{Ed}; °dhyata(SPACE) P. 7 cakṣurādīnām] vakṣu° G₁ G₂; °dīnā P. 7 nādikādibhiḥ] | | śabdāntarābhidhāyamānārthatvaṃ sāmna° V; nalikādibhiḥ R^{Ed} M P H T. 8 sarvabhāveṣu] sarvatāveṣu G₁ G₂. 8 brahmaṇo] bra(L. 7)hmanā H. 8 dravyalakṣaṇasyābhedāt] °bhedat G₁ G₂. 8 tadabhidhāyitve] tadatidhātive G₁ G₂. 8 tasya bhāvāt] tasyābhā° O. 8 bhāvāt] bhāvā G₁ G₂. 9 sārvarthyam] sarvārthyam P. 9 śabdāntarābhidhāyamānārthatvaṃ] śabdābhi° L; śabdāntarātidhi° G₁ G₂; śabdāntarābhidhāyā° K V; °mānatvaṃ O. 9 sānkaryam] sāmākarya K V. 9 prasajyetety] pramajye° G₁ G₂; prasatyetety V; prasajyatety A; prasa(L. 4)jyaya ty P; prasaṣvetety H. 9 atredam] atredan G₁ G₂. 100.9-101.1 pratiniyatakāraparicchinnavṛttitvāt] (L. 2)pratiniyatakā° L; °richinavṛttitvā G₁ G₂.

tākāraparicchinnavṛttivāt sarvārthatvapatibandhād asaṅkara ity arthaḥ |

ghaṭākāropadhānapuraḥsaraṃ ghaṭāśabdena brahmadravayam abhimukhikriyate, paṭākāropadhā-
nena tu paṭāśabdenetyādy upādhirūpopahitavivekitvam abhidhānīyam | tad yathā nāḍikāśuṣirava-
rtmanihitanayanās tadavakāśāvasthitam evārthabhāgaṃ paśyanti, tathāvidyāvachchinnadr̥kśaktibhir
5 ākārabhedair eva vastūpalakṣyate |^x tathaiva ca yathādhyavasāyaṃ śabdaniveśāc chabdair abhidhī-
yata ity arthaḥ |

yathāvaraṇādinendriyasyaiva prakāśāsaktiḥ pratibadhyate, na viśayo vikriyate, tathānādyavidyāvach-
chedaprakalpitavibhāgānām^{XXXI} jīvanām eva saṃvedanaśaktir niyamyate, yena vicchinnārthābhī-
dhānena bhedaviśayāṇy abhidhānāni prayujyante, na tu tattvam avidyayāvilīkriyata iti nāḍikānīda-

^{XXXI}iha hi vijñānātmano brahmaṇo vibhaktāḥ syuḥ, avibhaktā vā, svato brahmaṇaiva vā vibhajyeran_ bhogārthaṃ krī-
ḍārthaṃ vibhūtikhyāpanārthaṃ vā svabhāvād vā; avidyānibandhano vā tadvibhāgaḥ (*Brahmasiddhi*, ed. Kuppuswami
Sastri 1937, 21).

^xtathā hi—yathā cakṣurādīśabdānām aśeṣarūpādīprakāśanasāmarthyam nalikādisuṣiravartmani yuktaṃ darśanasya ta-
davakāśāvasthitarūpabhedoparuddhatayā viśayāntareṣu na viprakīryate, tathā jātyākṛtibhyām avaruddhaviśayā gavādi-
śabdānām abhidhānaśaktir nāśvādiṣv atiprasajyata iti (*Śrīgāraprakāśa* 6, ed. Raghavan 1999, 329).

1 sarvārthatvapatibandhād] sarvārthatvaṃ pra° V P; sarvārthapra° C_T; sarvārthatvāpra° K^{Ed}. 2 ghaṭākāropadhā-
napuraḥsaraṃ] ghaṭākādopa° K V; ghāṭākāropadhānapuraḥsaraṃ G₁ G₂; °dhāne puraḥsaraṃ O; °sara L. 2 abhimu-
khikriyate,] āmu° T C_T. 2–3 paṭākāropadhānena] ghaṭā° P. 3 paṭāśabdenetyādy] paṭāśa° A; paṭāśaddene°
G₁ G₂; °netvādy K V; °nety M; °ne tu P. 3 upādhirūpopahitavivekitvam] upādhirūpopāhi° I^{Ed}; °tatvam T C_T; °ve-
kitvam P. 3 abhidhānīyam...tad] atidhānīyata G₁ G₂. 3–4 nāḍikāśuṣiravartmanihitanayanās] nālikāmuṣira°
H; nālikāśuṣira° M; nāḍikāśuṣira° O L; nālikā(L. 3)śuṣiva° T; nāḍi(L. 5)kāśuyi_iva° A; nāḍikāśuṣivanmarmāni° C_T; nā-
ḍikāśuṣiravartmani° G₁ G₂; nālikāśuṣiravartmanī hi° P. 4 tadavakāśāvasthitam] tadavakyasāva° G₁ G₂; °vaśchitam
K. 4 evārthabhāgaṃ] eva(L. 5)rtha° L; evārthabhāgaṃ G₁ G₂. 4 paśyanti,] vaśyaṃti L G₁ G₂. 4 tathāvidyā-
vacchinnadr̥kśaktibhir] tathāvichin° H; yathācadhinam dr̥° L; tathāvadinaṃ dr̥k_śaktirbhi_r O; tathāvadhinam
dakūśaktibhir G₁ G₂; °napṛthakśaktibhir K^{Ed} D K A M P. 4–5 nāḍikāśuṣiravartmanihitanayanās...ākārabhedair] nā-
ḍikāra° V. 4–5 ākārabhedair] akā° G₁ G₂; ākāramedair A; ākārabheḍair P. 5 eva vastūpalakṣyate]] avevastū°
G₁ G₂. 5 vastūpalakṣyate]] vastupa° P. 5 ca] [OM] O L G₁ G₂. 5 yathādhyavasāyaṃ] yathārthāva° H. 5
śabdaniveśāc chabdair] śabdaviśeṣāc chabdair C_T; °veśāc chaśabdair H. 5–6 abhidhīyata] ebhi° I^{Ed}; evābhi° Ś^{Ed};
abhidhāyata K V. 6 ity] ity P; ity T. 6 arthaḥ]] artha || G₁ G₂. 7 yathāvaraṇādinendriyasyaiva] yathācara°
L; yathāvaraṇāminem° G₁ G₂; yathā āvaraṇādīdri° P; yathā āvaraṇādīm!(L. 4)dri° M; °yasyeva O. 7 prakāśāsaktiḥ]
prakāśanaśaktiḥ H; prakāśāsaktiḥ G₁ G₂; °śakti(SPACE) K P. 7 na] tena M P. 7 vikriyate,] 'pi kri° C_T. 7–8 tathā-
nādyavidyāvachchedaprakalpitavibhāgānām] tathānādyāvi° M; tathānādyavidyāvachchanda° P; tathānādyāvachcheda-
prakalpata° G₁ G₂. 8 jīvanām] vijñānānām O; jijñānām L; jijñānām G₁ G₂; jīvāmenām H. 8 eva] evaṃ K. 7–8
pratibadhyate,...saṃvedanaśaktir] [OM] V. 7–8 saṃvedanaśaktir] save° K H; °śakriśaktir I^{Ed}. 8–9 vicchinnā-
rthābhīdhānena] vidyinnā° A; vichinnāyā(L. 8)bhi° L; vicchinnādyābhi° O; vichinnā(L. 5)rdyābhi° K; vichinnāyātidhī
tena G₁ G₂; °bhīmānena M P H. 9 bhedaviśayāṇy] °yāṇy P. 9 bhedaviśayāṇy abhidhānāni] °yāsmābhīdhānāni
O L G₁ G₂. 9 abhidhānāni] ābhyabhi° C_T. 9 prayujyante,] prayuyamte K V; prayuṃjate O L C_T; prāyuyamte G₁ G₂;
prayujyate(SPACE) P; prayujate H T. 9 tattvam avidyayāvilīkriyata] tatvavi° C_T. 9 avidyayāvilīkriyata] avidyayā
āvi° M P; avidyayā bali° L; avidyamāyāvilīmkri° H; °yāvanīkṛteya G₁ G₂. 101.9–102.1 nāḍikānidarśanena] nāḍi! (L.
9)nālikā° P; nālikā° M H T; nāḍi-(L. 8)kāḍida° C_T.

rśanena sūcayati | nāḍikādibhir ity ādigrahaṇād avadhānapratighātāmūrtyabhijanādyavarodhaḥ |
yatraiva hy avadhānaṃ tad evāvadhāryate | mūrtyabhijano rūpasaundaryam tenāpahṛto 'nyam na
paśyati || 5 ||

ye tarhy ākāramātraniveśinaḥ sanniveśādiśabdās te dharmamātram abhidadhyur iti sārvaṭrikī dra-
vyapadārthavyavasthā viśīryetety āśaṅkyāha—

teṣv ākāreṣu yaḥ śabdās tathābhūteṣu vartate |
tattvātmakatvāt tenāpi nityam evābhidhīyate || 6 ||

upādhimātrasvabhāveṣv api sanniveśādyākāreṣu ³⁵ sanniveśādiśabdā vartamānāḥ, paramārthatas
tattvād avyatirekād upādhināṃ tanniṣkarṣe svarūpasyāsvarūpatvāt tadātmanaiva sattvāt tad eva ni-
10 **tyam** upādhimad dravyam, evam apy abhidhāne 'bhīhitam bhavati | tattvam ātmā hy upādhinām,

³⁵yo vā saṃniveśaviśeṣaḥ saṃyogaviśeṣaṇam ca hastyādiṣv iva sākr̥tir eva (*Dīpikā ad Mahābhāṣya Paspāśāhnika*, ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 15).

1 sūcayati |] sūcavati KV; sūvayati G₁ G₂; sūcayati(SPACE) P. 1 nāḍikādibhir] nālikā° M P H T. 1 ity ādigrahaṇād]
ityādi | gra° M. 1 ādigrahaṇād...avarodhaḥ |] ādigrahaṇānavadhānapratighātamatyabhi° O; °ṇānavadhānapratighāta-
martyabhija___nādyavirodhaḥ | L; °ṇānavadhānaprativātamarṭtyatijanāghṛvarodhaḥ G₁ G₂. 1 avadhānapratighātāmū-
rtyabhijanādyavarodhaḥ |] avaghānabhūpra° M; avadhānapra° K^{Ed}; avadhānapratitaghā° T; avadhānapratidhāta° A;
°ghātātāmūrtyabhijanam nādyavarodhaḥ | H; °rtyajanādyava-(L. 10)rodhaḥ C_T. 2 yatraiva] yatraivavye O L; yatrai-
vam C_T. 2 hy] [OM] M P H. 2 yatraiva...avadhānaṃ] yatrai°vyevghava° G₁ G₂. 2 avadhānaṃ] vyava° M P H;
āva° A. 2 evāvadhāryate |] eva hy ava° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A O L; eva hy adyadhā° G₁ G₂. 2 mūrtyabhijano] mū-
rcyabhi° G₁ G₂; °janā K^{Ed} A. 2 rūpasaundaryam] [OM] rū° O; rūpaṃ saun° C_T; rūpasaudaryam K V A P; saudaryam
L; ya saum̐darya G₁ G₂; °darya H. 2 tenāpahṛto] tenāpahato Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A; tenāpahuto G₁ G₂. 2 'nyam]
nya P; nyan T C_T. 4 ye] rya K V; tye G₁ G₂; yena M P; yanam H. 4 tarhy] tahy G₁ G₂. 4 ākāramātraniveśinaḥ]
°nirdeśataḥ K^{Ed} K V A O; °nirdeśanaḥ D; °nirveśataḥ L. 4 ākāramātraniveśinaḥ sanniveśādiśabdās] āṃkāramā-
ganirveśataḥ eṃniveśāriśabdā G₁ G₂. 4 sanniveśādiśabdās] saṃtive° A. 4 abhidadhyur] abhidaṣkar H. 4 iti]
[ADD] na M P. 4 sārvaṭrikī] sārvaṭrikā K V; sāvaṭrikī G₁ G₂. 4-5 dravyapadārthavyavasthā] °rthasya vyavasthā
H. 5 dravyapadārthavyavasthā viśīryetety] °sthāviśīryota ty G₁ G₂; °sthābhidhīyetety M; °sthābhidhīyatety P. 5
viśīryetety] viśārye° K V; viśīryatety H. 6 teṣv] tiṣv G₁ G₂. 6 teṣv] [ADD] ādhy C_T. 6 ākāreṣu] ākā° P. 6
ākāreṣu yaḥ] ākāreyuyūḥ G₁ G₂. 6 yaḥ] ya K V. 6 tathābhūteṣu] sadā bhū° C_T; tathāḥ bhūtedhyu G₁ G₂. 6
vartate |] varttato G₁ G₂. 7 tattvātmakatvāt] ta cātma° G₁ G₂. 7 tattvātmakatvāt tenāpi] °katvoktenāpi C_T. 7
nityam] nityem A. 7 evābhidhīyate |] evābhidhīyate KV. 8 upādhimātrasvabhāveṣv] || upādhisva° M; upā-
dhiṣv abhā° P; °traśvabhāveṣv A; °svalāves G₁; °svalāves tu G₂; °ve O L. 8 api] kvacit O; (F. 64R)kvāpi L; tu pi G₁; pi
G₂. 8 sanniveśādyākāreṣu] °reyu K V; °reṣur G₁ G₂. 8 sanniveśādiśabdā] sanivaāśā° G₁; saniveośā° G₂; °śabda K
V; °śabdo M P H. 8 sanniveśādiśabdā vartamānāḥ,] °śabdāḥ T C_T. 8 vartamānāḥ,] vartamānā K V; vartabhānāḥ
A; varttamājāḥ G₁ G₂; varttamānāḥ M P H. 8 paramārthatas] papa° A; para-(L. 5)rthatas G₁. 9 avyatirekād upā-
dhinām] °kānupādhinān T; °kānupādhinām C_T. 9 upādhinām] [ADD] na G₁ G₂. 9 tanniṣkarṣe] tanniṣkarṣam
V; tanni(L. 2)karṣe L; tu miṣkarṣe G₁ G₂. 9 svarūpasyāsvarūpatvāt] svarūpasyātmasva° P; svarūpatvādy G₁ G₂. 9
tadātmanaiva] ātma° K^{Ed} D K V A O L; atmanaiva G₁ G₂; ātmany eva M P. 9 sattvāt] satvā A P; sattāt G₁ G₂. 10
upādhimad] upādhimallinatā(SPACE) tadā P; °mallinatā tadā K^{Ed} D K V A M; °mallinavā tado H. 10 upādhimad
dravyam,] °madravyam L G₁ G₂ T. 10 evam] [OM] P. 10 apy] [OM] O; avyapy C_T. 10 evam...abhidhāne] ā-
patidhāne G₁ G₂. 10 abhidhāne] ubhi° P; abhidhā(ā)ne C_T. 10 abhidhāne 'bhīhitam] abhidhānābhi° H. 10
'bhīhitam] nihitam M P; [OM] G₁ G₂. 10 bhavati |] tvabha° C_T; bhavāti K V; ti G₁ G₂. 10 'bhīhitam...tattvam]
bhīhitatvam O L. 10 ātmā] ātmām P. 10 hy upādhinām,] śkapā° H. 10 upādhinām,] apādhānām K; apādhānā
V; unādhinām G₁ G₂.

na tu te tasyātmāna iti vyāpakatvāt sarva evopādhayas tadātmanā santas tathaivābhidhiyante | yadā
hy upādhimallinatā tadopādhaya upādhayo na bhavanti | tatas tu niṣkarṣe dharmāntarāśrayatayā
svātantryād upādhimattvam eva nopādhitvam^{XXXII} ity āśayaḥ || 6 ||

yady evaṃ dharmāṇām apy avasthāntare dharmirūpatvān nityatve satyatve cākārāṇām asatyatvam,
5 dravyasya tu satyatvam ity etasya niyamasyānupapattir ity āśaṅkyāha—

na tattvātattvayor bheda iti vṛddhebhya āgamaḥ |
atattvam iti manyante tattvam evāvicāritam || 7 ||

ayam atrārthaḥ | nehādvaitanaye satyāsatye dve rūpe staḥ, advaitahānīprasāṅgāt | kiṃ tu pāramā-
rthikam ekam evādvayaṃ tattvam | tac cānādisiddhāvidyāvilasitasahaṃ^{XXXIII} pramātrīṣayatayā ya-

^{XXXII}yathā ca nirupādhino dravyasya prakarṣo nāsti tathā dravyān niṣkrṣṭasya svatantrasya guṇasyāpi śuklataraṃ rūpata-
raṃ rūpaṃ iti svataḥ prakarṣo nāsti, api tu tadavasthāyāṃ dravyāyamaṇatvād_ guṇasyāparasamargidharmāntaranimi-
tta eva prakarṣa iti (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Guṇasamuddeśa* 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 204). ^{XXXIII}tad yathā cintāmaṇir
arthināṃ yathāśayam ākārānāntvam uddarśayati tathānantaśakti sanmātraṃ brahma avidyāvilasitasahaṃ sāmsārika-
pramātrīṣaye nānārūpaṃ cakāstīty ante vastusatattvam uddhātitaṃ (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 40, ed. Subra-
mania Iyer 1963, 47).

1 na tu] nanu H. 1 te tasyātmāna] tevalasyā° K V; kevalasyā° K^{Ed} D A M P. 1 tasyātmāna] tat syāt māne L. 1
vyāpakatvāt] vyāparttaka° H; vyāvartaka° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed}. 1 sarva evopādhayas] sarvapadopā° G₁ G₂. 1 evopādhayas]
evopacayas C_T; [ADD] te T C_T. 1 tadātmanā] tadātmanāṃ K^{Ed}. 1 santas] sattaḥ H; san T C_T. 1 santas tathaivā-
bhidhiyante] sattayaivā° M; sa(L. 14)tayaivabhi° P. 1 tathaivābhidhiyante |] tathaivātīdhivate G₁ G₂; °bhidhiyante
K V; °dhiyate | C_T; [ADD] (F. 35V)tathā H. 1 yadā] dā K V; yathā O C_T; tadā M P. 2 upādhimallinatā] upāvimā° H;
upādhyadhī(L. 4)natā L; upādhimallinatā P; °mallānatā K V; °madhīnatā O G₁ G₂; °-(L. 11)macchinnatā C_T. 2 tadopā-
dhaya] tadopādheya K^{Ed} D K V A O L M P; tadopādheva G₁ G₂. 2 upādhayo] vapā° G₁ G₂; dhayo K V. 2 na] [OM] T
C_T. 2 tatas] tata G₁ G₂. 2 tu] [OM] G₁ G₂. 2 niṣkarṣe] nimeṣe K; nimeṣe V; nīpūrve O; pūrve L; śrutipūrve G₁ G₂;
niṣkrṣṭe C_T. 2 dharmāntarāśrayatayā] dharmota° G₂; dharmeta° G₁; °śrayā(SPACE OF 6 AKṢARAS) C_T. 3 svātantryād]
śvātāmtryad G₁ G₂. 3 upādhimattvam] upādhitvam M P; °matva O L G₁ G₂. 3 eva] va O L G₁ G₂. 3 nopādhitvam
] nopadhitvam P T. 3 āśayaḥ ||] arthaḥ || L; āśaya || G₁ G₂; bhāvāḥ M P. 4 apy] [OM] Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁
G₂. 4 avasthāntare] avasthāntare G₁. 4 dharmirūpatvān] dhamirū° P; dharmirūpitvān H. 4 dharmirūpatvān
nityatve] ___dharminī rūpatvāni° L; °tvānityatve G₁ G₂. 4 cākārāṇām] vākā° G₁ G₂; cākārāṇām K V. 4 cākārāṇām
asatyatvam,] cākārāṇāsasa° L. 4 asatyatvam,] anityatvam M P. 5 dravyasya] avayavadra° M P. 5 satyatvam]
saātyatvam G₁; satyatva M; satyatve P. 5 ity] nityatve P. 5 ity etasya] nityatve tasya M. 5 etasya] tasya P. 5
niyamasyānupapattir] niyūmesyā° G₁ G₂; niyamesyā° L; °pattier T. 6 na] [OM] O; nanv L. 6 tattvātattvayor
|| tatvata(L. 6)syayor O; atasya yo L; °tvayār H. 6 tattvātattvayor...iti] ca tasyayārte darati G₁ G₂. 6 vṛddhebhya]
dravyebhya O; dhrovebhya L; dhruvebhya G₁ G₂. 6 āgamaḥ |] āgataḥ(SPACE) P. 7 manyante] manyantve K V;
maṃnyate L. 7 evāvicāritam ||] ivā° L; evāvivāritam K V; evāvivāvāritam G₁ G₂. 8 ayam] asyāyam M P. 8 atrā-
rthaḥ |] ātrārthaḥ | H; arthaḥ T C_T. 8 nehādvaitanaye] na hi dvai° P; nehī dvai° L; neho dvai° G₁ G₂; na hy advai° O.
8 satyāsatye] satyasatye H. 8 dve] [ADD] satye L. 8 dve rūpe] dvarūpe P. 8 dve...staḥ,] dvarūpantaḥ H. 8
staḥ,] stuḥ K V. 8 advaitahānīprasāṅgāt |] advaitadvāni° G₁. 8–9 pāramārthikam] (L. 8)para° L; pāramārthikam
O; paramārthekam G₁ G₂. 9 ekam] evam V; [OM] M P. 9 tattvam |] [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A O L. 9 tattvam...tac]
[OM] G₁ G₂. 9 cānādisiddhāvidyāvilasitasahaṃ pramātrīṣayatayā] cānādisiddhāvidyāvilambitasahapramāpra° O
L; cānādisiddhāvīvilasitasahayamāpra° K V; cānādisiddhāt nidhāvīlamvinasahapramāpramāśrīṣṭhaya° G₁ G₂; °(L.
9)sahapramāpramātrīṣayatayā D; °sahapramāpramātrīṣayatayā A; °sahapramātrīṣayatayā M P H T C_T. 103.9–104.1
yathātattvam] yathātattvam L G₁ G₂; yathātattvam M P.

thātattvam anavabhāsamānam ity anekavikalpapariḡhaṭitākārarūpatayā vyavahāram avatarati | ta-
thā ca tad evākāranānātvonnīyamānasvarūpabhedam^{XXXIV} cakāsti, nānyat | tadvyatiriktasyānyasyā-
bhāvāt |

tatra ca yo 'yaṃ prakāśaḥ sā vidyā | aprakāśas tu tamo 'vidyā | na ca prakāśābhāvo 'prakāśo nāma
5 kaścit pramāṇasiddho nirūpyaḥ | tataś ca yo 'yaṃ bhedaprakāśaḥ saivaikaghanaprakāśābhāvaḥ pra-
kāśavicchedo 'vidyā | tatra ca vicchinnānvayo vicchedo 'vadhāryata iti vicchinnaprakāśaḥ satyo vi-
dyaiva | vicchedamātraṃ tv apradhānasvabhāvaṃ na kiṃcid avidyeti paramārthatvavicāre na kiṃ-
cid atattvaṃ vyavatiṣṭhate | tattvam eva yathāpratibhāsam bhedena cakāsad avicāritaramaṇīyaṃ
prapañco 'tattvam iti vyavahriyata iti brahmavidyaḥ | tathā cāvīcāritaramaṇīyaṃ parīkṣayā vyavasthā-
10 pitam tattvam evābhinnam tīrthikā bhedadarśanavyavasthitā bhedātmakam atattvaṃ manyanta iti

^{XXXIV} ekam eva brahma sarvaśaktiṃ pramāṇena siddhe 'sminn arthe 'vidyāparikalpitasya bhāvabhedasypāramārthika-
tvāt kāryanānātvonnīyamānaḥ śaktibheda evaikṣya yukto na tu svarūpabhedāḥ (*Prakīrṇaprakāśa* ad *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 22,
ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 34).

1 anavabhāsamānam] atadhabhā° K V. 1 ity] [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂. 1 anekavikalpapariḡhaṭitākārarūpa-
tayā] akene° H; anekakika° G₁ G₂; anekavikalpapari(L. 11)ghari° C_T; anekaviṣayavikalpapariḡhaṭitākāranākā° L. 1 avata-
rati] anasarati M P. 2 ca] va K V G₁ G₂. 2 evākāranānātvonnīyamānasvarūpabhedam] evākāranānātvō nī° G₁
G₂; evākāranānātvonnī° L; °tvonnīyamānasvarūpabhedā V; °bheda K. 2 cakāsti,] vakāsti G₁ G₂. 3 tadvyatiriktasyā-
nyasyābhāvāt] tadhvati° G₁ G₂; tadyati° K; °ktasyābhāvāt T C_T; °nyasyābhāvāt | O. 4 tatra] tathā M P. 4 ca] va
G₁ G₂. 4 yo] yor A. 4 'yaṃ] ya A. 4 prakāśaḥ] praṃkāśaḥ K. 4 sā] sa^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A O L; [OM] G₁ G₂. 4
vidyā] vidhā A; mavidhā G₁ G₂. 4 aprakāśas] [OM] a° H. 4 aprakāśas tu] aprakāśakta G₁ G₂. 4 tamo] namo
G₁ G₂. 4 'vidyā] vidhā A G₁ G₂. 4 na ca] [OM] L. 4 ca] va G₁ G₂. 4 prakāśābhāvo] prakāśābhya° (SPACE) P;
°bhā | M. 4 prakāśo] prakāśe vicchedo A; gakaśo G₁ G₂. 4 nāma] vidyā tatra ca vinānya A. 5 kaścit pramāṇa-
siddho] kaścīhāmāṇāsiddho G₁ G₂. 5 pramāṇasiddho] prakāśamā° V. 5 nirūpyaḥ] nirūpya A; nirūpas H. 5
yo] yor H. 5 'yaṃ] ya H. 5 saivaikaghanaprakāśābhāvaḥ] sa evai°^{Ed} I^{Ed} O; sevaikaghaṭana° H; saivaikaghāna°
K V; sevaikaghanaprakāśātāvaḥ || G₁ G₂; saivaiyanaprakāśakabhāvaḥ (SPACE) P. 5–6 prakāśavicchedo] prakāśavi° L;
prakāśa G₁; °vidyāvicchedo C_T. 6 'vidyā] vipā O G₁ G₂; viyā L. 6 ca] [OM] ^{Ed} I^{Ed}; va V G₁ G₂. 6 vicchinnānvayo]
vichedānvachin° P; vichedānvachinnā(L. 4)nnā° M; vichinnā° G₁ G₂; vichinnācayo A; [OM] O. 6 vicchedo] vacchedo
^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A L G₁ G₂; vicśede T. 6 'vadhāryata] vadhāye G₁; vadhāryate G₂. 6 vicchinnaprakāśaḥ] vichittir
apra° M; vichitipra° P; °kāśa L. 6 satyo] satyā^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed}; sato M P. 6–7 satyo vidyaiva] tanāvi° H. 7 vidyaiva]
viccaiva G₁ G₂. 7 vicchedamātraṃ] chinne mātraṃ L; vichemātraṃ G₁ G₂; °mā(L. 8)tra H. 7 vicchedamātraṃ tv]
chedamātratvaṃ P. 7 tv] tu^{Ed} I^{Ed}. 7 apradhānasvabhāvaṃ] aprathana° T; aprathāna° O; pradhāsva° P; apra-
dhāsva° M H; aprathanasvabhāva C_T; °svabhavaṃ G₁ G₂. 7 na] [OM] P. 7 kiṃcid] kiṃvid G₁ G₂. 7 avidyeti]
avidyo L; avidheti G₁ G₂. 7 paramārthatvavicāre] °rthavicāre^{Ed} I^{Ed} T C_T; °rthatatve M P; °rthatatve vicāre H; °vivāre
G₁ G₂. 7 na] [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A L G₁ G₂ M P. 7–8 kiṃcid] kiṃvih G₁ G₂; kicid H. 8 atattvaṃ] tattvaṃ^{Ed} I^{Ed}; yat
tatvaṃ M P. 8 vyavatiṣṭhate] ca ti° L; vyavatiṣṭate K V A H. 8 eva yathāpratibhāsam] evāya° G₁ G₂. 8 cakāsad]
ca (L. 9) sakā° C_T; vakāsamd G₁ G₂; cāvakāśād iti M P. 8 avicāritaramaṇīyaṃ] [OM] a° M P; apīvi° T; avivāri° G₁ G₂;
°maṇāyaṃ K V. 9 prapañco] prapaṃca O. 9 vyavahriyata] vyavadbhiyata H. 9 tathā] [ADD] pratibhāsam
bhedena O L. 9 cāvīcāritaramaṇīyaṃ] cakāsad avi° O L. 9 prapañco...parīkṣayā] paṃcodayā G₁ G₂. 9 parī-
kṣayā] parākṣayā K V; parokṣayā A; prapaṃco pakṣayā L. 9–10 vyavasthāpitam] vyavasthitam K^{Ed} D K V A O L
G₁ G₂ M P. 10 evābhinnam] evāsinam G₁ G₂. 10 evābhinnam tīrthikā] e(L. 6)vātyaṃtatī° M; evābhinnatārthikā
L; evātyaṃtatīrthikā P; evābhinnatīyikāra H. 10 bhedātmakam] nedā° H. 10 bhedātmakam atattvaṃ] bhedā-
tmakatamatvaṃ L; bhedatmakata G₁; bhedātmakata G₂. 10 atattvaṃ] tatvaṃ O P. 10 manyanta] manyūṃta G₁
G₂.

vicāreṇāvidyāvīlaye brahmaikaniṣṭhatā darśanānām | tad uktam—

satyā viśuddhis tatroktā vidyaiva³⁶

ityādi || 7 ||

evaṃ tena tena rūpeṇa brahmaiva vikalpitaṃ bhavatīti sarvaśabdānām tattadupādhimukhaṃ tad

5 eva viśayaḥ siddha ity āha—

vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tattvam evāvikalpitaṃ |
na cātra kālabhedo 'sti kālabhedas ca gṛhyate || 8 ||

paramārthato 'vikalpitaṃ vikalpānām aviśayo yat tattvam tad eva vyavahāre 'nyasyābhāvād vika-
lpyamānaṃ vikalparūpaṃ nānāvidhabhedāvabhāsam anādisiddhāvidyāvaśāt samavalambate, jīvā-
10 tmabhedenāvatiṣṭhamānaṃ tadgatatveneti mūrtivivartāśrayadikśaktipravibhaktadeśanānātvaṃ ni-

³⁶tasyārthavādarūpaṇi niśritāḥ svavikalpajāḥ | ekatvinām dvaitinām ca pravādā bahudhā mataḥ || satyā viśuddhis ta-
troktā vidyaivaikapadāgamā | yuktā praṇavarūpeṇa sarvavādāvirodhiṇā (*Vākyapadīya* 1.8-9, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966,
30-36). Rau reads bahudhāgatāḥ (1977, 38).

1 vicāreṇāvidyāvīlaye] vicāreṇa vi° D K A ; vicāreṇa brahmaiva vikalpitaṃ bhavatītilaye V ; vivāreṇa vidyākilaye G₁ G₂ ;
°dyāvīlaye P. 1 brahmaikaniṣṭhatā] °niṣṭatā K V ; °niṣṭatād A ; °nichatā G₁ G₂ ; °niṣṭatayā H ; °ṣṭhatayā M P. 1 bra-
hmaikaniṣṭhatā darśanānām] °tādarśanam | K^{Ed}. 1 darśanānām] darśanam D K V O L G₁ G₂ ; adarśanam A. 1
tad] ta O L ; tan G₁ G₂. 2 satyā] satya G₁ G₂. 2 viśuddhis] vi-(F. 281)śaddhis C_T. 2 viśuddhis tatroktā] viśu-
ddhisūtroktā K^{Ed} A. 2 tatroktā] tatrokta P. 2 vidyaiva] vidyā L. 2-3 vidyaiva ityādi ||] vidyaivityādi(SPACE)
A. 3 ityādi ||] vetyādi | L. 4 tena] [OM] O L ; [ADD] tana C_T. 4 tena rūpeṇa] jūpeṇa G₁ G₂. 4 brahmaiva]
vatyaiva A. 4 sarvaśabdānām] sarvavidyānām K^{Ed} A L ; sarvaviśabdānāṃdyānām K V ; sarvam avidyānām O ; sarva-
dhim(L. 4)vānām G₁ ; sa(L. 15)rvaviṃvānām G₂ ; °nāmvidyānām D. 4 tattadupādhimukhaṃ] tadu° D K V A O L ; tata
upā° M P ; tadupādhisukhaṃ, K^{Ed} ; tadupādhībhuravaṃ G₁ G₂. 5 āha—] āhā G₁ G₂. 6 vikalparūpaṃ] °rūpa A. 6
bhajate] bhajete G₁ G₂. 6 evāvikalpitaṃ] evāvīlpitaṃ G₁ G₂ ; °lpita K V. 7 cātra] vātra G₁ G₂. 7 kālabhedo
'sti] [OM] L. 7 cātra...kālabhedas] cātrākārabhedas O. 7 kālabhedas] k_ālā° T. 7 kālabhedo...ca] kālabhedas-
kta G₁ G₂. 7 ca] tu O L. 8 'vikalpitaṃ] avi° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} O L G₁ G₂ ; 'vikalpita V. 8 vikalpānām] vikarabhyānām G₁ G₂.
8 aviśayo] amiśayo G₁ G₂. 8 yat] 'yaṃ C_T. 8 yat tattvam] yatatvaṃ G₁ G₂. 8 tattvam] eva P. 8 tad eva]
tatvaṃ P. 8 vyavahāre] tyava° G₁ G₂. 8 'nyasyābhāvād] py asti svabhā° M P ; nyasyād G₁ G₂. 8-9 vikalpyamā-
naṃ] vikalpamātram, Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} ; vikalpamānaṃ K^{Ed} D K V A G₁ G₂ P T C_T ; vikalpayānaṃ L. 9 vikalparūpaṃ] [ADD]
vikalparūpaṃ P ; vikalparūpaṃ H. 9 nānāvidhabhedāvabhāsam anādisiddhāvidyāvaśāt] nānātridhabhedāvabhā-
samānā° K V ; nānāvidhabhe(L. 8)dāvasāsamānā° L ; nānāvidhabhedāvabhāsamānā° D A M P C_T ; nānāviśabhedāvabhā-
sanādisiddhāvidyāvaśāt H ; °bhāsamānād asiddhāvidyāvaśāt G₁ G₂. 9 samavalambate,] marvam ava° H ; sarvam ava°
M P. 9-10 jīvātmabhedenāvatiṣṭhamānaṃ] jīcātma° G₁ G₂ ; jīvātmabhāvenā° T C_T ; jīvātmabhāvenāvatiṣṭhamānaṃ
H ; °tiṣṭhamānaṃ K V A. 10 tadgatatveneti] ta ata° A ; kālākhyasvatamtraśakti | (L. 18)tad ata° O ; tad ata° K^{Ed} ; tadga-
tatyeneti H. 10 tadgatatveneti mūrtivivartāśrayadikśaktipravibhaktadeśanānātvaṃ] °nerti vivartāśrayād avāśa-
ktivibhaktadeśamānātvaṃ G₁ G₂. 10 mūrtivivartāśrayadikśaktipravibhaktadeśanānātvaṃ] mūrtivivartāśrayād eva
śaktivi° O L ; mūrtivivartān mayarik_śaktivi° A ; °dikaśaktinibhi(L. 7)ktadeśanānātvaṃ V ; °ktivibhaktadeśanānātvaṃ
K^{Ed} D ; °ktivibhaktadeśanānātvaṃ K.

atyantam iti jaḍājaḍayor na kenacid aṃśena sārūpyam ity āha | tathā coktam—

ekadeśena sārūpye sarvaṃ syāt sarvavedanam |

sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vrajet || ⁴⁰ ⁴¹ ⁴² XXXVIII XXXIX XL

iti || 9 ||

- 5 atha cāsaṃbhavidharmācchuritaṃ vijñānaṃ viśuddhabodhasvabhāvam apy avidyāyāṃ vyavahāre 'vabhāsata itiṣṭaṃ nidarśanāntaram apy āha—

yathā vikārarūpāṇāṃ tattve 'tyantam asaṃbhavaḥ |

tadātmeva ca tat tattvam atyantam atadātmakam || 10 ||

⁴⁰sarvātmanā hi sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vrajet | sāmye kenacid aṃśena syāt sarvaṃ sarvavedanam (*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.434, ed. Tosaki 1988, 115). ⁴¹sarvātmanā ca sārūpye jñāne 'jñānādītā bhavet | sāmye kenacid aṃśena sarvaṃ syāt sarvavedakam (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 2039, ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, I, 571). ⁴²ajñānatā— jaḍarūpatvam (*Pañjikā* ad *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2039, ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, I, 571).

^{XXXVIII}sārūpyaṃ grāhyatvam iti cet, asaṃnihito 'pi nilārtho nilajñānagrāhyaḥ syāt | kiṃ ca kathaṃcit sārūpyaṃ sarva-jñānānāṃ sarvārthair avīṣiṣṭam, sarveṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvāt ; tatas ca saiva sarvajñātāpattiḥ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye 'rthava-jñānasyāpi jaḍatvaṃ syāt | yathāhuḥ — “ekadeśena sārūpye sarvaḥ syāt_ sarvavedakaḥ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vrajet ||” iti (*Tātparyaṭīkā* ad *Ślokavārttika Śūnyavāda* 20, ed. Ramanatha Sastri et al. 1971, 246). ^{XXXIX}kiñ ca idam ekena vā kenacid ātmanā jñānārthayoḥ sārūpyaṃ sarvātmanā vā | ekadeśasārūpye nilam api pītasamvidāḥ sarūpam_ ubhayoḥ kṣaṇikatvād asādhāraṇatvāc ceti tad api grāhyaṃ bhavet | evaṃ ca sarvo sarvavit_ syāt | atadutpatter agrāhyatvam iti ced, na | pramāṇābhāvād_ nilabuddhir nilapītabhyāṃ sadṛśī nilād evotpadyata iti na naḥ pramāṇam kramate | api ca nilād apy utpattau na pramāṇam ity anantaram eva vakṣyāmaḥ | samaṃ ca sārūpyam iti na grāhyetaravivekaḥ | sarvātmanā tu sarūpyam ātiṣṭhamāno jaḍatvam apy arthasya buddhāv ādadhyāt | evaṃ cāndhyam eva jagataḥ | yathāhuḥ — “ekadeśena sārūpye sarvaḥ syāt_ sarvavedakaḥ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vrajet ||” iti (*Kāśikā* ad *Ślokavārttika Śūnyavāda* 20, ed. Śāmbaśiva Śāstrī 1929, 101). ^{XI}kiñ ca, kathaṃcit_ sārūpyaṃ sarvajñānāṃ sarvārthair avīṣiṣṭam, sarveṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvāt, tatas ca saiva sarvajñātāpatti | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye 'rthavajñānasyāpi jaḍatvaṃ syāt | yathāhuḥ — “ekadeśena sārūpye sarvaḥ syāt_ sarvavedakaḥ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vrajet” || iti (*Nyāyaratnākara* ad *Ślokavārttika Śūnyavāda* 20, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978, 196).

1 atyantam] [OM] a° K^{Ed} D K V A M P ; atyatam L ; atyaṃm G₁ ; aṣyatyamtam H. 1 jaḍājaḍayor] jaḍājaḍāyoyor M ; jaḍā(L. 13)jaḍar P. 1 na] naai O. 1 kenacid] vyenacid A ; kenavid G₁ G₂. 1 sārūpyam] sārū(L. 2)pyam L. 1 coktam—] voktamā G₁ G₂. 2 sārūpye] sārūpyem O ; sārūpya P. 2 sarvaṃ] samrva G₁ G₂ ; samvit M P. 2 syāt...] syārvavedanāṃ || G₁. 2 sarvavedanam] sarvavadanaṃ H ; °danāṃ || G₂. 3 sarvātmanā...sārūpye] °nātmasārūpye C_T. 3 sārūpye] sabhūpye G₁ G₂. 3 sarvātmanā...jñānam] °nātmasārūpyajñānam T. 3 sārūpye jñānam] sārūpyā samvit P. 3 jñānam] samvit syāt sajjñānam M. 3 ajñānatām] syāt sajjñā° P ; ajñānatā K V. 3 vrajet ||] vrated A. 5 atha] athaṃvā A ; athavā L G₁ G₂. 5 atha cāsaṃbhavidharmācchuritaṃ] athavā sam° ^{Ed} I^{Ed} M P H ; athavā sambhavidharmākṣuritaṃ K^{Ed} D ; athavā sambhavidharmo kṣuritaṃ K V. 5 cāsaṃbhavidharmācchuritaṃ] cāsaṃtavadha° O ; saṃtavadha° L G₁ G₂ ; saṃbhavidharmākṣuritaṃ A. 5 vijñānaṃ] [OM] K V ; vijānaṃ G₁ G₂ ; vijñāna P. 5 viśuddhabodhasvabhāvam] viśuṃvodha° G₁ G₂ ; °dhanasvabhāvam H. 5 avidyāyāṃ] anujñāyā K^{Ed} D K V A O L ; anujāyādy G₁ G₂. 5 vyavahāre] avahāre G₁ G₂. 6 itiṣṭam] iti itthaṃ K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂ ; iti iṣṭam M ; iti dṛṣṭam P ; iḥamtiṣṭam H. 6 nidarśanāntaram] °nāṃm āha P ; °nāntam T. 6 apy] [OM] ^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂ ; e(L. 6)py T. 6 apy āha—] pyā |(SPACE) P. 6 āha—] āhā G₁ G₂. 7 yathā] tathā R^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V O L G₂ ; tayā G₁. 7 ...vikārarūpāṇāṃ] tathāpi kā° A. 7 vikārarūpāṇāṃ] °pāṇān K^{Ed}. 7 tattve] tat te G₁ G₂ ; yatve P. 7 'tyantam] tyamtyam P. 8 tadātmeva] tadātmaiva M P H. 8 tat] ttat A ; [OM] H ; tatāt C_T. 8 tat tattvam] tatra tvam P. 8 tattvam] tacam G₁ G₂. 8 atyantam] anyam tam L. 8 atadātmakam ||] atata° A ; adātmakam 10 |(SPACE) P.

sāṃkhyasyāvīkṛtaṃ pradhānatattvaṃ sarvavikāragranthi bijāvastham abhinnaṃ anupasr̥ṣṭam eva mahadādivikārarūpaiḥ paramārthataḥ | tad dhi mahadādivikārasaktiyuktaṃ guṇasāmyāvasthātma-
kaṃ guṇavaiśamyavimardavaśopajāyamānavikāranānātvād⁴³ vilakṣaṇam eva | atha ca vyavahāre
mahadādivikārarūpāvdhāraṇena vinā tadupalambhāsambhava iti sarvadarśaneṣv avidyānvayinī |
5 evam asatyākāropadhānena tattvpratibhāsaḥ siddha iti sādhyānvayo 'rthagṛhītaḥ || 10 ||
kathaṃ punar etad avagamyate, ākāra asatyāḥ, tato 'nyat satyam ity āha—

satyam ākṛtisamhāre yad ante vyavatiṣṭhate |^{xi}
tan nityaṃ śabdavācyaṃ tac chabdāt tac ca na bhidyate || 11 ||

10 tad eva hi nityaṃ yasmimṣ tattvaṃ na vihanyate⁴⁴

⁴³guṇavaiśamyavimardāt tasya ca bhedās tu pañcāśat (*Sāṃkhyakārikā* 46cd, ed. Prasad Sarma 1922, 4). ⁴⁴tad api nityaṃ yasmimṣ tattvaṃ na vihanyate (*Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 7).

^{xi}atha cādṛṣṭasamsthānabhedopaplavavivekam api buddhyā bhedāpohadvāreṇa svayaṃ pratiyate, parasmai ca pratipādyate, sa eṣa pratipattikramaḥ śrūtyaiva darśitaḥ—“sa eṣa neti neti” iti, tathānyaiḥ—“satyam ākṛtisamhāre yad ante vyavatiṣṭhate” (*Brahmasiddhi*, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri 1937, 26).

1 sāṃkhyasyāvīkṛtaṃ] sāṃkhyavi° D K V A O L G₁ G₂; sāṃkhyābhimatam avi° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed}; (L. 6)sāṃkhyasyāpi kṛtaṃ C_T. 1 sāṃkhyasyāvīkṛtaṃ pradhānatattvaṃ] || sāṃkhyāvīkṛtapradhānatvaṃ | M; | sāṃkhyasyāvīkṛtapradhānatvaṃ P. 1 pradhānatattvaṃ] pradhānaṃ ta-(L. 7)tvam C_T. 1 sarvavikāragranthi] °rasūddhigranthi H. 1 sarvavikāragranthi bijāvastham] °thicijāvasthamṃ G₁ G₂. 1 bijāvastham] nijā° T. 1 abhinnaṃ] abhinamaṃ G₁ G₂. 1 anupasr̥ṣṭam] anupanuprasr̥ṣṭam I^{Ed}; nupabhr̥ṣṭam G₁ G₂; anuspr̥ṣṭam P; anupamr̥ṣṭam H. 2 mahadādivikārarūpaiḥ] śopajāma° G₂; mahādā° D K; °dirūpaiḥ M P. 2 paramārthataḥ] | °(L. 16)rthata P; °rthattattvaṃ H. 2 mahadādivikārarūpaiḥ...dhi] [OM] V. 2 mahadādivikārasaktiyuktaṃ] mahādā° V; °rasya śaktiyuktaṃ K^{Ed}; °yukta G₁; °yuktuṃ P. 2-3 guṇasāmyāvasthātmaṃ] muṇa° G₁ G₂; guṇasāmāva° L H; °vaśyātmaṃ V. 3 guṇavaiśamyavimardavaśopajāyamānavikāranānātvād] guṇavaiśamyavimardaāva° C_T; guṇavaiśamyava° M; guṇavaiśamyavaśopajāyamānavikāragramthibijāvasthanānād P; °tvān_ H. 3 vilakṣaṇam] vihalā° O; vilakṣyaṇam P; vilakṣaṇar H. 3 eva | atha] iva | atha Ś^{Ed}; eva ayaṃ K^{Ed} K V A O L; eva adyaṃ G₁ G₂. 3 ca] va G₁ G₂. 3 vyavahāre] srava° G₁ G₂; vyahāre O. 4 mahadādivikārarūpāvdhāraṇena] mahāṃdā° V; mahadādirūpavi° P; mahadādirū(L. 4)vi° M; °pād adhāraṇena H; °dhaṇo na G₁ G₂. 4 vinā] pinā A; [OM] M P H. 4 tadupalambhāsambhava] tadupalabhā° H; °samṃmaya K. 4 sarvadarśaneṣv] sarvadeśeṣv K^{Ed} A O; sarvaddēśeṣv D; saveddeśeṣv K; saveddeśe V; sarvadeśeṣu L; sarvadeśe G₁ G₂. 4 avidyānvayinī] | tha vidyātuvini V; avidyā ca vinā A; avidyātuvini L; vyadhiyātradhini G₁ G₂; °nvayini D K; °yini C_T. 5 evam] yavam G₁ G₂. 5 asatyākāropadhānena] āpy ākāro pradhā° G₁ G₂; asyākāropadhā° O; apy ākāro pradhā° L; °ro pradhānena K^{Ed} D K V A; °ro pradhānena ca M P. 5 tattvpratibhāsaḥ] °timāsaḥ G₁ G₂; °bhāyaṣaḥ H. 5 sādhyānvayo] sa(SPACE OF 1 AKṢARA)ddhyā° T; sādhyācayo A; sārtthānvayo O L G₁ G₂; sādhyānya(L. 6)yo. 5 'rthagṛhītaḥ] | | gṛhītaḥ Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂ M P; rtham gṛhītaḥ H. 6 kathaṃ] katha G₁ G₂. 6 etad] etadupamḍ H; [OM] T C_T. 6 avagamyate,] anugamamyate L; anyāmyate G₁ G₂; °myataē T. 6 'nyat] nyata P. 6 satyam] satvam G₁ G₂. 6 ity] [ADD] ata O. 7 satyam] āsatyam C_T. 7 ākṛtisamhāre] ātṭya(L. 2)ti° A; ākṛmisam° G₁ G₂; °hāro P. 7 vyavatiṣṭhate] | vyavatiṣṭate K V A P H; vyavatiṣṭato G₁ G₂. 8 tan nityaṃ] tāni G₁ G₂. 8 nityaṃ] nitya O. 8 nityaṃ śabdavācyaṃ] niśajñāvācyaṃ L. 8 tac chabdāt] tachabdāmt K; tac chabdān O. 8 tac chabdāt tac ca] tac chabdatattvaṃ Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed}; tachabdāmtatvaṃ V; tachabdātatvaṃ A P; tachabdātvadha G₁ G₂. 8 tac ca] tatvaṃ D K M; nityaṃ O. 7-8 tan...bhidyate] | | [OM] C_T. 8 bhidyate] | | vidyate L M; vidyato G₁ G₂; vidyatai 11 ((SPACE) P. 10 eva] ava P. 10 nityaṃ] tityaṃ A. 9-10 tad...yasmimṣ] (L. 5)(SPACE OF 10 AKṢARAS)S C_T. 10 yasmimṣ] yasmis A P H; yasmimṣ G₁ G₂. 10 tattvaṃ] sūtvam G₁ G₂. 10 na] nya P. 10 vihanyate] vihinyata P.

iti bhāṣyānusāreṇaitad ucyate | tathā hi tatroktaṃ—

kanakam ity eva satyaṃ punar aparayākṛtyā yuktaṃ khadirāṅgārasavarṇe kuṇḍale bhavataḥ ⁴⁵

ity anenaiva dr̥ṣṭāntena vikārāpekṣayā'bhinnasya brahmaṇaḥ satyatocyate | yathā hi tatra rucakādyā-

kāropamardena suvarṇam ity eva satyam, evam anantavikāragrāmāpāye sarvānte 'vatiṣṭhamānam

5 anapāyi brahmarūpaṃ satyam, tad eva ca bhāvato nityam | āpekṣikaṃ tu jātyādīnām vyavahāre

nityatvam ucyate | tathā hi vyaktyapāye jātir avatiṣṭhamānā gotvādikā nityā | tatrāpy asvatvādibhe-

dāpāye pṛthivīty eva satyam | tatrāpy abādibhedāpāye vastv ity eva satyaṃ sarvanāmapratyāyyam |

tatrāpi saṃvidrūpasyānapāyino 'nugamād viṣayākāraviveke tad eva pāramārthikaṃ satyam iti neti

⁴⁵kaṭakākṛtim upamṛdya svastikāḥ kriyante | punar āvṛttaḥ suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ punar aparayākṛtyā yuktaḥ khadirāṅgārasavarṇe kuṇḍale bhavataḥ (*Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā*, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 7).

1 bhāṣyānusāreṇaitad | bhāṣyāśrayanu° M P; bhāṣyanu° K V G₁ G₂; bhāṣyānu° D; °reṇaṃta A. 1 ucyate |] ucyate | G₁ G₂. 1 tatroktaṃ— | atroktaṃ K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₂; atreḥktaṃ G₁; [OM] M P. 2 kanakam | kanam O L G₁ G₂. 2 eva | ava K V. 2 satyaṃ | satya V; saṃtya A. 2 punar | sanar A. 2 aparayākṛtyā | apareyā° T C_T; apy apayā° H; ayākṛtyāny G₁ G₂; °yā ākṛtyā M P. 2 yuktaṃ | [OM] L; uktaṃ G₁ G₂; yuktaḥ M; yukta P. 2 khadirāṅgārasavarṇe | °varṇaḥ M P. 2 khadirāṅgārasavarṇe kuṇḍale | rayadirāṅgārah suvarṇa(L. 4)kuṃ° A; °gārah suvarṇakuṇḍale D K V L; °gārah suvarṇakuṇḍale G₁ G₂; °gāre suvarṇakuṇḍale T; °sadr̥ṣe suvarṇakuṇḍale K^{Ed} O C_T. 2 kuṇḍale | suvarṇakuṃ° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed}; kuḍale H. 2 bhavataḥ | bhavaṃta A; bhakta G₁ G₂; bhava C_T. 3 anenaiva | [ADD] nityasya brahmaṇaḥ satyatocyate | M. 3 dr̥ṣṭāntena | dr̥kṣyaṃte na G₁ G₂. 3 dr̥ṣṭāntena...bhinnasya | nityasya P. 3 vikārāpekṣayā'bhinnasya | °yā bhinnasya Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} C_T; °yā abhinnasya T. 3 brahmaṇaḥ | brahmaṇa A. 3 satyatocyate |] satyatovyate G₁ G₂. 3 yathā | tathā K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂ M P. 3-4 rucakādyākāropamardena | rūca° O; haca° V A; rūpakā° G₁ G₂; stvakā°(L. 4)dyākāropamarddanena P; °marddanena M H. 3-4 brahmaṇaḥ...eva | (L. 11)(SPACE OF 12 AKṢARAS)tyaiva C_T. 4 anantavikāragrāmāpāye | anantaravi° T C_T; °grāmopāye G₁ G₂; °māpāmye K V. 4 sarvānte | saṃrvāte G₁ G₂; savato ṃte M; savato te P; sarvata te H. 4 'vatiṣṭhamānam | vatiṣṭhamānam K V A H; caṭipramāṇam O; ca pramāṇam L; vatipramāṇam G₁ G₂. 5 anapāyi | anapāṃ(L. 11)yi K; anapāyi L; anyadyāpi G₁ G₂. 4-5 'vatiṣṭhamānam...brahmarūpaṃ | °mānopādhirūpaṃ M P. 5 ca | va V G₁ G₂. 5 bhāvato | bhavato M P. 5 nityam |] nitya D K V. 5 āpekṣikaṃ | āpekṣyaṃ K^{Ed} D A L G₁ G₂; āpettyaṃ K V; apekṣyaṃ O; apekṣitaṃ M; āpekṣita P; āpekṣakan T; āpekṣakaṃ C_T. 5 jātyādīnām | (L. 15)nātyā° O; jātyādīnā A; nānyādīnām L; nātādīnām G₁ G₂. 5 vyavahāre | sarvavya° K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂. 6 nityatvam | nityatva G₁ G₂. 6 ucyate |] ucyato G₁ G₂. 6 vyaktyapāye | vyaktapāye G₁ G₂. 6 avatiṣṭhamānā | avatimumānā K V; avatiṣṭhamānā A H; iveti manyamānā O; iveti mamānā L G₁ G₂. 6 gotvādikā | gotrādikā G₁ G₂. 6 nityā |] niyā O; tikā M P. 6 tatrāpy | tatrā(L. 3)(SPACE OF 1 LINE) C_T. 6-7 asvatvādibhedāpāye | asvatyāpāye di° P; asvatvāpāye di° M; asvatvādibhedatyāge V; asvatvādibhedatyāye G₁ G₂; °bhedatyāge Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K A; °bhedatyāye L. 7 eva | ava K V. 7 asvatvādibhedāpāye...abādibhedāpāye | (L. 4)(SPACE OF 6 AKṢARAS)bhedyapāye C_T. 7 abādibhedāpāye | asvatvādi° M; avādi° L G₁ G₂; pṛthivivādi° O; atyādi° V; atyādi° K; aptvādi° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D A; asvatvādibhedopāye P; asvatvādibhedāpaye H; °dāpaye T. 7 vastv | castv A. 7 eva | e° G₁. 7 satyaṃ | sarvaṃ O; [OM] L. 7 sarvanāmapratyāyyam |] sarvatra nā° O; °pratvāyyaṃ G₁ G₂; °tyāyyaṃ A. 8 saṃvidrūpasyānapāyino | saṃvidrūpatyāna° G₂; saṃvidūpatyāna° G₁; saṃvidrūpatvāna° L; °pasyāṃ nayāyino K; °pasyāṃ nuyāyino V. 8 saṃvidrūpasyānapāyino 'nugamād | °syānuyāyīnānavagamād M; °syānuyāyīnānavagamād P. 8 'nugamād | napaga° H. 8 'nugamād viṣayākāraviveke | nugamāvi° L; nugamāviṣayā° G₁ G₂; '(L. 6)nugamāviṣayākāravivekaṃ C_T. 8 viṣayākāraviveke | avi° K^{Ed} K V A. 8 pāramārthikaṃ | pāra° P; vyāra° L; pāramā-(L. 10)rthiākaṃ G₁. 8 satyam iti | satyakṣiti A. 8 neti | neti P; ne T.

nety upāsīteti ⁴⁶ bhāvanayā codyate | saṃvic ca paśyantīrūpā parā vāk śabdabrahmamayīti brahma-
tattvaṃ śabdāt pāramārthikān na bhidyate | vivartadaśāyāṃ tu vaikharyātmanā bhedaḥ | tatra ca
tad eva nityaṃ jātyādirūpeṇa śabdavācyam | tatrāpy āntaropādānaviśrāntīyā ⁴⁷ ⁴⁸ vācakatvasya vya-
vasthāpanāt svarūpāntargatasyārthasya vācyatvād vācyavācakayor avibhāgaḥ siddha iti prathama-
5 kāṇḍe nirṇītam | ata evānantaram ihābhidhāsyati—
tasya śabdārthasaṃbandharūpam ekasya dṛśyate ⁴⁹
iti || 11 ||
yad uktam—
tadātmeva ca tat tattvam atyantam atadātmakam
10 iti tatrātyantam atadātmakatām tāvad vyācaṣṭe |

na tad asti na tan nāsti na tad ekaṃ na tat pṛthak |
na saṃsr̥ṣṭam vibhaktam na vikṛtam na ca nānyathā || 12 || ^{xii} ^{xiii}

⁴⁶athāta ādeśo neti neti | na hy etasmād iti nety anyat param asti | atha nāmadheyaṃ satyasya satyam iti (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.3.6, ed. Olivelle 1998a, 66). ⁴⁷athāyam āntaro jñātā sūkṣme vāgātmani sthitaḥ | vyaktaye svasya rūpasya śabdatvena vivartate (*Vṛtti ad Vākyapadīya* 1.107, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 174). Verse 1.115 in the edition of Wilhelm Rau (47). ⁴⁸idam ity asya vicchinnavimarśasya kṛtārthatā | yā svavarūpe viśrāntir vimarśaḥ so 'ham ity ayam (*Ajadapramā-tṛsiddhi* 15, ed. Kaul Shāstrī 1921, 6). ⁴⁹tasya śabdārthasaṃbandharūpam ekasya dṛśyate (*Dravyasamuddeśa* 14ab).

^{xii}tāni ca vākyāni pratiśakhaṃ sarvopaniṣadbhīyo 'vagantavyāni | pramaṇāntaraṇām apy ekatvapratipādanaparativād eva grāhiṇaḥ pratyakṣasya miśraih kṛta eva kleśaḥ | uktam ca vākyapadīye 'na tad asti ca tan nāmni' ityādi | vidhyavagamyatā ca śārīrāvarakād avasātavyā (*Manubhāṣya ad Manusmṛti*, ed. Jhā 1932, 490). ^{xiii}na tad asti na tan nāsti na vāggocaram eva tat (*Yogavāsīṣṭha Nirvāṇaprakaraṇa Uttarārḍha* 31.36cd, ed. Śāstrī Paṇaśīkara 1937, II, 1129).

1 nety] netīy O M P H. 1 bhāvanayā] bhāvanāya ^{ŚEd} I^{Ed} T; bhābhāvanā-(L, 8)ya C_T. 1 codyate]] voyate G₁ G₂. 1 saṃvic] saṃvi G₁. 1 saṃvic ca] saṃviśya P. 1 ca paśyantīrūpā] paramaṃtī G₁. 1 paśyantīrūpā] paramaṃtī^o L G₂; paramaṃnīrūpā O; paśyaṃtī M P. 1 parā] parār K V M P. 1 vāk śabdabrahmamayīti] vāk aśabda^o P; vāchabda^o H; vākyaśabda^o O L G₁ G₂. 2 pāramārthikān] ^orthikaṃ M; ^orthika P. 2 bhidyate]] bhidyatte K V; bhidyata iti M P. 2 vivartadaśāyāṃ] vi^ovartta^o A; vivattaṃ da^o L G₁ G₂. 2 vaikharyātmanā] (L, 19)traisvaryā^o O; vaivaryā^o M P; vaiśvaryā^o K V. 2 bhedaḥ]] bheda K V; bhedaḥ G₁ G₂. 2 pāramārthikān...ca] ^okā(SPACED OF 18 AKṢARAS) C_T. 3 tad] (SPACE OF 1 AKṢARA)d T. 3 jātyādirūpeṇa] ^opeṇa G₁ G₂; ^openeti M P. 3 tatrāpy āntaropādānaviśrāntīyā] tatrāṃtare pā^o D K V A L; tatrāntare upā^o K^{Ed}; tatrāṃtare yadā^o O; tatrāntaropādānaśabdaviśayavi^o M P; tatrāṃtare pādānaviśrāntīyā G₁ G₂. 3 āntaropādānaviśrāntīyā] ^onaśabdaviśrāntīyā H. 3 vācakatvasya] vākattasya G₁ G₂; vācakasya P. 3-4 vyavasthāpanāt] vyavasthāpa^o A; vyavasthānāt H. 4 svarūpāntargatasyārthasya] sarū^o K V; svarūpāta^o H; svarūpāntānisyā^o G₂. 4 svarūpāntargatasyārthasya vācyatvād] svarūpāntānisyāvā^o G₁. 4 vācyatvād] [OM] H. 4 vācyavācakayor] vāvyavāvakayor G₁ G₂; ^okatayor C_T. 4 avibhāgaḥ] api bhā(F, 286)gaḥ C_T. 4 siddha] siddhāḥ G₁ G₂. 5 nirṇītam]] niṇātam K V; nittam A; niṣitam G₁ G₂. 5 ata] a P. 5 evānantaram] evānāntaram A. 5 ihābhidhāsyati—] ^odhāyati(SPACED) P. 6 śabdārthasaṃbandharūpam] ^obandham rūpam K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂. 6 dṛśyate] na(L, 9)śyata L; mṛśyata C_T. 5-7 evānantaram...iti]] [OM] ^oram...iti || H. 9 tadātmeva] ^ovava M P. 9 tat tattvam] ttatvam G₁ G₂. 9 tattvam] tavam K V. 9 atadātmakam] ajadā^o A; ^otmaka C_T. 10 atadātmakatām] adā^o A; ^otmatām ^{ŚEd} I^{Ed} K^{Ed}; ^otmakatām G₁ G₂. 8-10 yad...atadātmakatām] [OM] H. 10 tāvad vyācaṣṭe]] vaddhyācaṣṭe || 9 || H. 10 vyācaṣṭe]] vyāvaṣṭo G₁ G₂. 11 na] [ADD] tad asti na (L, 6)tan nāsti nnad ekan na tan(L, 7)na C_T. 11 tan] ta G₁ G₂. 11 ekaṃ na] ekaṇam K V. 11 na tat] natpṛtat M. 12 saṃsr̥ṣṭam] maṃsr̥ṣṭam G₁ G₂. 12 na] vā ^{ŚEd} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} M; na vā A; navā2 D; vā na K V; [OM] P. 12 vikṛtam] vivākṛtam P. 12 ca] na R^{Ed} T C_T; va K V G₁ G₂. 12 nānyathā]] cānyathā R^{Ed} T C_T.

atha ca tadātmevāvidyāyām avadhāryata ity āha—

tan nāsti vidyate tac ca tad ekaṃ tat pṛthak pṛthak |
saṃsr̥ṣṭaṃ ca vibhaktam ca vikṛtam tat tad anyathā || 13 ||

5 bhāvābhāvavikārāvabhāsajananaśakti tad eva 'asti nāsti' iti ca sattāsattopādhikavyavahārasaham,
bhāvatas tu niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasat paraṃ brahma | vyāvahārikam caikānekavyavahāram jāti-
vyaktyātmanā tad eva vartayati | saṃkhyopādhikam api ca | evaṃ saṃyogopādhikam apy anyasaṃ-
sargitayāvabhāsanāt | evaṃ vivekāvasāyas^{XLI} tatra | tathā samastavikārātmanā janyamānam ivākā-
śādyātmanā kūṣasthatayā tad evāvabhāsata iti tadātmeva tattvam ity uktam || 13 ||

evaṃ ca kṛtvā sarvasya tanmayatvād virodhino 'pi vyavahārās tatraivopalīyanta ity āha—

10 tasya śabdārthasambandharūpam ekasya dṛśyate |
tad dṛśyam darśanam draṣṭā darśane ca prayojanam || 14 ||

^{XLI}parāmarśacetasā hi dvitīyaṃ prathamād vyatirekeṇa na vyavasthāpyeta dvitīyaparāmarśacetasā yataḥ tad api tadā-
dyānubhayarūpatve sati ekarūpa eva vyavasthitaṃ bhaved grāhakākāra eveti yāvat | tataḥ kuto vivekāvasāyaḥ | (*Pramā-
ṇavārttikālaṅkāra* ad (*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.385, ed. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1953, 408).

1 ca] va G₁ G₂. 1 tadātmevāvidyāyām] tadātmaivā^o I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A; tadātmaiva vi^o H; tadātmikā(L. 6)viśāyām L;
tadātmavāviśāyām G₁ G₂; tadātmaivāviśāyam M; tadātmaivāviśam avām P; ^oviśāyām O; ^odyāyāvyam C_T. 1 avadhā-
ryata] avadhāyeta G₁ G₂. 1 ity] itīy T. 1 āha—] āhā G₁ G₂. 2 nāsti] nāstī P. 2 tac ca] tatva G₁ G₂. 2
ekaṃ] aikam G₁ G₂. 2 pṛthak] pathak K V A. 3 ca¹] va G₁ G₂. 3 ca²] dha A; va G₁ G₂. 3 vikṛtam] viviktam
O; vikṛta P. 3 tat] ta L P. 4 bhāvābhāvavikārāvabhāsajananaśakti] bhāvāva^o K V; (L. 2)bhāvābhāvākārabhā^o C_T;
bhāvābhāvākārabhā^o T; bhāvābhāvādhikārāva ___bhāsajana^o L; ^ovadhikārāvabhāsa(L. 8)tanaśakti G₁; ^ovadhikārāvabhā-
sajana(L. 2)śakti G₂; ^osanaajananaśakti K^{Ed}; ^osatanana(L. 6)śakti A. 4 nāsti' iti] [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂; nāsti M
P; (L. 4)nāstīti H. 4 ca] va G₁ G₂. 4 sattāsattopādhikavyavahārasaham,] satāsattopādhikavyavahārasad P; satvā-
sattopādhikavyavahāram G₁ G₂; ^oramahāram K V; ^ohāram K^{Ed} D A O L; ^osad M H. 5 bhāvatas] ahambhāvas K^{Ed} D
A O L; ahāmbhavas G₁ G₂; ahebhāvas K V. 5 tu] tan M P H. 5 niḥsattāsattam] nissaktāsaktam C_T; ^osatvam P.
5 niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasat] niḥsattāsattaniḥ^o G₁ G₂. 5 niḥsadasat] (L. 5)nidaḥsa^o C_T; ^osad O. 5 vyāvahāri-
kam] rvyava^o K; vyava^o V A L G₁ G₂; vyāva^o D. 5 caikānekavyavahāram] vaikā^o L G₁ G₂; caikānaka^o P; ^ohāri H.
5–6 caikānekavyavahāram jātivyaktyātmanā] ^ohārajātivyaktyātmanā T. 5–6 jātivyaktyātmanā] jātivyaktyātmanā
C_T. 6 vartayati] vartata iti S^{Ed} I^{Ed}. 6 ca] va G₁ G₂. 6 saṃyogopādhikam] saṃyo^o L; saṃyogāpā^o G₁ G₂. 6
apy] [ADD] ca M P; [ADD] tu L. 7 anyasaṃsargitayāvabhāsanāt] ^oyā ca bhaśāsanāt_(SPACE) A. 7 vivekāvasāyas
] vicekāvasāyas A. 7 tathā] tadā O; yathā M P. 7 samastavikārātmanā] ^otmakā P. 7 janyamānam] tanya^o
K^{Ed}; tasya mānam A; janya(L. 6)mānavim H. 7–8 ivākāśādyātmanā] ^onāt K V. 8 kūṣasthatayā] kaṭa^o V; kṛṭa^o K;
kūṣasthayā O L G₁ G₂; kūṣastha M P. 8 evāvabhāsata] eva bhā^o T; [OM] ^ota D K V A L G₁ G₂. 8 iti] iti iti C_T. 8
tadātmeva] tadātmaiva S^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂ M P H T C_T; [ADD] tat T; [ADD] (L. 12)tat C_T. 9 evaṃ] eva A.
9 sarvasya] [OM] M P. 9 tanmayatvād virodhino] tanmayatvāvi^o M P H. 9 vyavahārās] vyavahāras M P. 9
tatraivopalīyanta] tad eva^o T C_T; ^ohiyata M P; ^oyamla A. 10 śabdārthasambandharūpam] ^osambadharūpam G₁ G₂;
^obandham rūpam L. 10 ekasya] ekaṃ hi M P. 10 dṛśyate] vidyate | H. 11 tad dṛśyam] tadṛśya G₁ G₂; tadṛśyan
T. 11 dṛśyam] dṛśya O L P; dṛśye M. 11 draṣṭā] dṛṣṭā P. 11 ca] va K V.

vācyavācakasambandhānām bhāvato 'dvayarūpatā | tatra hy āntare tattve śrutyarthaśaktī saṃsṛjyeta
iti ⁵³ vivartadaśāyām śrutyarthaśākhātmanā tasyaiva vikāsād vācyavācakarūpatayā bhedāvabhāsau |
jñānajñeyarūpatayaivāvidyeti | brahmakāṇḍa eva prapañcenāyam artho 'smābhir nirṇīta iti tata e-
vāvadhāryam |

- 5 draṣṭṛdṛṣyarūpatayā ca tasyaiva vivartaḥ | tathā hi **dr̥ṣyam** tāvad bhāvajātaṃ saṃvidupārūḍham ^{XLII}
vedyamānaṃ vedyatvād eva vedanaikaparamārtham, aprakāśasya prakāśamānatāyogād iti pūrvakā-
ṇḍe 'dvayasiddhau ca vitatya vicāritam | **draṣṭāpi** jīvātmā avidyākṛtāvacchedo niyataḥ saṃsārī bho-
ktā brahmaiva cetanatvād bhāvato bhedānupapatter iti tatraivāveditam | anena ca pradhānakartṛka-

⁵³apara āha— kramavān akramanimitam | akrame tu vāgātmani śrutyarthaśaktī saṃsṛjyete (*Vṛtti ad Vākyapadīya* 1.44,
ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 102).

^{XLII}ataḥ saṃvitprakāśa eva dvaitam sādhatyiti kiṃ siddhasādhanena | saṃvidupārūḍho hi nīlādir advaitam āpādayati
(*Kāśikā ad Ślokavārttika Śūnyavāda* 31, ed. Śāmbaśiva Śāstrī 1929, 106).

1 vācyavācakasambandhānām] vācyavāvakasambandhānā G₁ G₂; vāyavācakasambandhānā A; °dhānā D K V L. 1
bhāvato] sāvato G₁ G₂; abhāvate H. 1 'dvayarūpatā] °pato O L G₁ G₂ M P. 1 hy] [OM] G₁ G₂. 1 āntare] sāntaro
G₁ G₂. 1 āntare tattve] āntarataḥ M P. 1 tattve śrutyarthaśaktī] tattvaśru° K^{Ed} D A O L G₁ G₂; tatvayujyārtha° K
V. 1 śrutyarthaśaktī] saty artha° H; śrutya-(L. 5)rthaś_śaktī C_T; °śakti P. 1 saṃsṛjyeta] saṃsajyete K V G₁; saṃ-
sṛchete H. 2 vivartadaśāyām] [OM] vi° C_T; vivarbhadā° H. 2 tasyaiva] ta(SPACE OF 1 AKṢARA)syeva T. 2 vikāsād]
vikāsād Ś^{Ed}; vikārād H. 2 vācyavācakarūpatayā] vāyavāvakarūpa° G₁ G₂. 2 bhedāvabhāsau] bhedāvasā_yau
L; bhedavattāsau M; bhedavatāsau P; bhe_ādvabhāso C_T; °bhāse H; °bhāso T. 3 jñānajñeyarūpatayaivāvidyeti]
jñānajñeyai° K^{Ed} D K V A O; jñānajñeyavahidyeti L; jñānajñeyavāvidyetyeti G₁ G₂; jñānajñeyavaṃ vidheti M; jñāna-
jñeyavaṃ vidhamti(SPACE) P; °tayevāvidyeti H C_T; °ti(rūpatayā vā 'vidyeti) Ś^{Ed}. 3 brahmakāṇḍa] brahmakāṇḍe
K^{Ed}; brahmāṇḍa M P; brahmākāṇḍa H. 3 eva] (L. 13)evaṃ M. 3 eva prapañcenāyam] evoyam O. 3 pra-
pañcenāyam] prapañco yam L; prapañcayam G₁ G₂; prapañcam M P; saprapañcam ayam H T C_T. 3 'smābhir]
mmābhi G₁ G₂; smābhi P. 3 nirṇīta] nirṇāta K V; nerṇota A; virṇota G₁ G₂. 3 iti] imi G₁ G₂. 4 evāvadhāryam]
evācadhāryam(SPACE) P; °dhāyām G₁ G₂. 5 draṣṭṛdṛṣyarūpatayā] [OM] draṣṭṛ° K^{Ed} D K V O L G₁ G₂; dṛ(L. 10)ṣṭadṛ°
C_T; draṣṭadṛ° Ś^{Ed} H; tatra sa rū° M P; dathyarū° A. 5 ca] va K V G₁ G₂; [OM] L H; cā C_T. 5 dṛṣyam] (L. 7)dṛṣya P.
5 tāvad] bhāvad H. 5 tāvad bhāvajātaṃ] tāvahāvajāta G₁ G₂. 5 bhāvajātaṃ] bhāvajāta H. 5 saṃvidupārū-
ḍham] saṃvirupā° G₁ G₂; saṃvidrūpā° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed}; saṃcidupārūḍham K V; saṃcidrūpārūḍham A; saṃvidrūpārū(L. 4)ḍha L;
saṃvidrūpaṃ M P; saṃvidrūpākāra ichaṃ H; °rūḍham D. 6 vedyamānaṃ] [OM] K^{Ed} L M P. 6 vedyamānaṃ vedya-
tvād] vedyamānāve° T C_T; vedyamānaikatvād Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed}. 6 vedyatvād] vaidya° P; veyatvād K V; [ADD] eva cedam K^{Ed}.
6 eva] evaṃ M P. 6 vedanaikaparamārtham,] vedenai° T; cedam akeneka° H; vedam anekam aparārtha G₁ G₂.
6 eva...aprakāśasya] anekavedyamānam | aparārthapra° K^{Ed}. 6 vedanaikaparamārtham, aprakāśasya] cedam a-
nekaṃ aparārthapra° O; cedam ekaṃ aparārthapra° L; vedam anekam aparārthapra° D K V A; cedam anekaprakāśa-
paramārthasya M P. 6 aprakāśasya] [OM] a° G₁ G₂. 6 prakāśamānatāyogād] prakāśayo° M P; prakāśanāyo° H;
prakāśatayā yo° L; °nataāyogād T; °natayogād C_T. 6 iti] itiḥ(SPACE) P. 6–7 pūrvakāṇḍe] pūrvakāṇḍam K V. 7
pūrvakāṇḍe 'dvayasiddhau] pūrvakāṇḍaitasiddhau P; pūrvakāṇḍadvayavidhau H. 7 'dvayasiddhau] adva° Ś^{Ed}
I^{Ed}; dvitīya° K^{Ed} D K V A O L; dvitīyasiddhau G₁ G₂; dvaitasiddhau M. 7 ca] va G₁ G₂; ta P; [OM] T C_T. 7 ca vitatya]
pra(L. 11)vi° H. 7 vitatya] vitatya P. 7 draṣṭāpi] [OM] dra° K V; draṣṭāt tu M; dṛ(L. 8)ṣṭā P; dravyaṣṭāpi H. 7
jīvātmā] jāvātmā K V. 7 avidyākṛtāvacchedo] 'pi cakṛ° P; api cakṛ° M. 7 niyataḥ saṃsārī] (L. 11)niyatasam°
T. 7 saṃsārī] satvasam° M P; sa(SPACE) tv asam° K^{Ed}; satvaṃ sārī D K V A O L G₂; satyaṃ sārā G₁. 8 cetanatvād
bhāvato] vetanatvāhrāvato G₁ G₂. 8 bhāvato] tato M P; tāvato H. 8 bhedānupapatter] bhedo nu° P; °parttar
G₁. 8 iti] iti H. 8 tatraivāveditam] tatrevāveksitam G₁ G₂; tatraivopapāditam | M; traivopapāditam(SPACE) P.
8 ca] va G₁ G₂. 113.8–114.1 pradhānakartṛkarmarūpakāraṇirdeśena] pradhāvakartṛkarmarūpakāraṇiśvayena
G₁ G₂; °niścayena K^{Ed} D K A O L M P.

rmārūpakāraṅkārānirdeśeṅa kārakāntarasyāpy ākṣepāt siddharūpo vivartaḥ pratipāditaḥ |
darśanaśabdena ca pradhānakriyānirdeśakena kriyāntarasyākṣepāt sādhyasvabhāvakriyāvivarto 'py
 uktaḥ | kālaśaktyavacchinno hi kriyāvivartaḥ, dikśaktyavacchinnaś ca mūrtivivarta iti mūrtikriyāvi-
 vartarūpaṃ viśvaṃ pratipāditaṃ |

- 5 **prayojanaśabdena** ca samastakriyāphalanirdeśa⁵⁴ iti sādhyasādhanaphalarūpatayā viśvasaṃkala-
 nāyām aśeṣavivartānugūṇyaṃ brahmaṇaḥ pratipāditaṃ | etac ca—
 ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā |
 bhokṭṛbhokṭavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ ||⁵⁵
 iti brahmakāṅḍe pratipāditaṃ | tatraiva ca satattvanirṇayo 'smābhir vyadhāyi | prakhyopākhyātma-

⁵⁴adhiśrayaṅārambha eva phalābhisandheḥ samastakriyākālāpas tatraivādhyasyate (*Kriyāsamuddeśa* 5, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 9). ⁵⁵ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā | bhokṭṛbhokṭavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ (*Vākyapa-
 dīya* 1.4, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 21).

1 kārakāntarasyāpy ākṣepāt] kārakatirasyāpekṣan_ L; kārakatirasyāpekṣat O; °syāpekṣaṅāt K^{Ed} D K A; °syākṣepāt H.
 1 kārakāntarasyāpy...siddharūpo] kārakāntarasyārūpaśi° P; kārakatirasyāpekṣasi° G₁ G₂; °syākṣepasiddharūpo M. 1
 pradhānakartṛkarmārūpakāraṅkārānirdeśeṅa...pratipāditaḥ] [OM] V. 1 vivartaḥ...pratipāditaḥ] vivartapāditaḥ(SPACE)
 P. 1 pratipāditaḥ] °dito H. 2 darśanaśabdena ca] [OM] V. 2 ca] va G₁ G₂. 2 pradhānakriyānirdeśakena]
 °rddetaśakena O; °śakaṃ na A; [ADD] ca H. 2 pradhānakriyānirdeśakena kriyāntarasyākṣepāt] °rdeśeṅaikakri-
 yāntasyākṣepakṣā M P. 2 kriyāntarasyākṣepāt] kri(L. 13)yatasyā° H; kriptāntarasyāpekṣānt A; °syāpekṣaṅāt K^{Ed}
 O; °syāpekṣāt D K V L; °syāpekṣyāt G₁ G₂; °syāpy ākṣepāt_ T. 2 sādhyasvabhāvakriyāvivarto] sadhya° G₁ G₂; sādhyas-
 vabhāvāḥ kri° M P; sādhyakri° L; °vartau A. 3 uktaḥ] | uktam | C_T. 3 kālaśaktyavacchinno] kāraṅśaktyava-
 chinnā M P; kālaśaktyuvachinnā L; °cchinnā K^{Ed} D K V A O. 3 kālaśaktyavacchinno hi] °chinnādi G₁ G₂. 3 hi]
 'pi C_T. 3 kriyāvivartaḥ,] kriyā(SPACE) vi° K^{Ed}; °vartā M P. 3 dikśaktyavacchinnaś] ity uktavacchinnoś C_T. 3
 dikśaktyavacchinnaś ca] divaśaktyavacchinnaśya G₁ G₂; divaśaktyavacchinnaśya O L; divaśaktyāvachi(L. 4)nnasya M;
 divaśatayāvacchinnaśya P; °cchinnasya K^{Ed} D K V A H. 3 mūrtivivarta] mūrtir vi° O M P H; °varttya G₁ G₂. 3-4
 mūrtikriyāvivartarūpaṃ] mūrttakri° M; [OM] mūrtikriyā° P. 4 pratipāditaṃ] | pratipāditaḥ | G₁ G₂. 5 ca] va G₁
 G₂; [OM] C_T. 5 samastakriyāphalanirdeśa] samābhikriyāphala iti ni° P; samābhikriyāphala iti ni° M; sammatikri-
 yāphala iti nidarśa K^{Ed} D K A; sammatikriyāditam ekasya sarvabījasya ceyam anekadhā bhokṭṛbhokṭavya(F. 73R)phala iti
 nidarśa V; samatikriyāphala iti nidarśa O G₁ G₂; samatikriyāphala iti nidarśana L. 5 sādhyasādhanaphalarūpatayā]
 sādhyasā° P. 5-6 viśvasaṃkalanāyām] viśvasaka° P; viśvaṃ sakalanāyām L; °kalanāyām D K G₁ G₂; °kalanāyām V;
 °kalanāyām A; °kalaānāyām C_T. 6 brahmaṇaḥ] brahmaṇa P. 6 pratipāditaṃ] | °ditam || G₁ G₂. 6 etac ca—]
 [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂ H. 6-7 pratipāditaṃ...ekasya] °ditasyaikasya M P. 6-7 ekasya] etasya O. 7 sa-
 rvabījasya] pammāsa° T; samṛva° A; sarvapījasya G₁ G₂. 7 yasya] [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A O L M P. 7 yasya ceyam]
 veyayam G₁ G₂. 7 anekadhā] | ekadhā V O G₁ G₂. 7-8 anekadhā | bhokṭṛbhokṭavyarūpeṇa] anekabho° A. 7-8
 bhokṭṛbhokṭavyarūpeṇa] noktabho° L G₁ G₂; bhokṭabhokṭavyarūpe H. 8 bhokṭṛbhokṭavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa]
 °peṇābhogarūpeṇa O. 8 bhogarūpeṇa] [OM] K^{Ed}; bhogyarū° T. 8 ca] [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂. 9 brahma-
 kāṅḍe] brahma-(L. 4)kāṅḍe C_T. 9 pratipāditaṃ] | °divam G₁ G₂. 9 tatraiva] tatraiya G₁ G₂. 9 ca] va K V
 G₁ G₂; [OM] M. 9 satattvanirṇayo] sarvata° S^{Ed}. 9 'smābhir] smābhi D K V A G₁ G₂. 9 vyadhāyi] | abhyadhāyi |
 S^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed}; vyavadhāyi D K V A O L G₁ G₂ M P. 11.4.9-11.5.1 prakhyopākhyātmakatvāc] prācyopā° K^{Ed} D K V A;
 prakhyopakhyā° H; prakhyoyātma° P; prakhyopātma° M; prakhyopakhyāga(L. 4)maka° T; prādyopākhyātmāka° G₁ G₂.

katvāc^{XLIII XLIV XLV XLVI} ca vyavahārasya dvitve śabdārthasambandharūpam | tad dṛśyaṃ darśanaṃ
ceti bhedenātra nirdeśaḥ | etac cāvidyāmayam rūpaṃ kathyate | pāramārthikaṃ tu praśāntaprapa-
ñcarūpaṃ vakṣyati—

yatra draṣṭā ca dṛśyaṃ ca darśanaṃ cāvikalpitam |

5 tasyaivārthasya satyatvam śrītās trayyantavedinaḥ ||⁵⁶

iti || 14 ||

uktam idam—

ākṛtisamhāre 'nte yad avatiṣṭhate tat satyam

iti | tatraitat syāt | ante na kiñcid avatiṣṭhate | asad apadam evaitad viśvam āvirbhavatīty āśaṅkyāpi

10 hetunā'bhinnakāraṇapūrvakatvam anvayamukhena dṛṣṭāntopakramaṃ sādhyaitum āha—

vikārāpagame satyaṃ suvarṇaṃ kuṇḍale yathā |

⁵⁶yatra draṣṭā ca dṛśyaṃ ca darśanaṃ cāvikalpitam | tasyaivārthasya satyatvam śrītās trayyantavedinaḥ (*Sambandhasa-
muddeśa* 72, ed. Rau 1977, 125). Subramania Iyer reads vā vikalpitam (1963, 173).

^{XLIII}prakhyopākhyātmako dvividho vyavahāraḥ (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 100, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 99).

^{XLIV}tathā hi — audāsinyāvasthāyāṃ satsv api sādhanēṣu pacatītyādiprakhyopākhyayor abhāvād arthāntaraviśayatvam
tayoh (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Kriyāsamuddeśa* 1, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 4). ^{XLV}asaṃrabdhāsādhanasādhyā ca sattā

niyatam eva sādhanānāṃ sannihitēti prakhyopākhyayoh kadācitkatvābhāvaḥ (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* ad *Kriyāsamuddeśa* 1,
ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 6). ^{XLVI}prakhyopākhyā ca sattā yadyadasattā viparyayaḥ (*Ajaḍapramāṭṣiddhi* 2ab, ed. Kaul

Shāstrī 1921, 1).

1 ca] [OM] L G₁ G₂ M P. 1 dvitve] dditye G₁ G₂; nitye M P. 1 śabdārthasambandharūpam] | śabdārtha° H; śa-
bdāye saṃ° G₁; śabdārtharūpan T; śabdārtharūpaṃ C_T. 1 tad] ta A; [OM] M P. 1 tad...darśanaṃ] tadṛśyada°
G₁ G₂. 1 dṛśyaṃ darśanaṃ] dṛśyada° K^{Ed} D K V A O M H; dṛśyadarśana P. 2 ceti] veti G₁ G₂. 2 bhedenātra]
chede° C_T; bhede sra G₁ G₂. 2 etac] etav G₁ G₂. 2 cāvidyāmayam] jāvi° A; cāvīyāmayam L; vāvidhyāmayam G₁
G₂. 2 rūpaṃ] rūpa P. 2 kathyate] | kathyete L; [ADD] ta G₁ G₂. 2 pāramārthikaṃ] pāramārtha(L. 14)kaṃ P.
2-3 praśāntaprapañcarūpaṃ] prakāśam° G₁ G₂; prakāśata° V; praśātakāśata° K; prakāśita° D A L; prakāśita° K^{Ed} O;
praśāntaḥ pra° M P; °pañcaṃ T C_T. 4 yatra] (L. 4)yatrayatra C_T. 4 draṣṭā ca] iṣyāvasā O L; draṣyāvasā G₁ G₂;
iṣyāvasāt M; dravyāvasāt(SPACE) P. 4 ca] va K V; ta A; vaṃ G₁ G₂. 4 darśanaṃ] darśana H. 4 cāvikalpitam] |
vāvi° G₁ G₂; cāpi ka° M P. 5 satyatvam] śrityatvam O L; prityatvam G₁ G₂; nityatvam M P. 5 trayyantavedinaḥ ||
] traiyyam° O; tūryanta° C_T; tyetyamta° P; te tyamta° M; traīsyamta° L G₁ G₂; trayyeta° A; tv apy anta° K^{Ed}; °dita H.
6 iti ||] ity L. 7 uktam] yuktaṃ K^{Ed} D K V A O G₁ G₂ M P. 7 idam—] iti T. 8 ākṛtisamhāre] ākati° V; a-
kṛtasam° M P; [OM] ākṛti° T. 8 ākṛtisamhāre 'nte] āktatisamhārāṃte H. 8 'nte] te V A G₁ G₂. 8 avatiṣṭhate]
avatiṣṭatte A; avatiṣṭate H. 9 tatraitat] taitrat G₁ G₂. 9 tatraitat syāt] | tatraitasmāt(SPACE) P. 9 ante] atre
K V; atte A; tad M P. 9 na] ja G₁ G₂; anena M P. 9 kiñcid] kiṃvid G₁ G₂. 9 avatiṣṭhate] | avatiṣṭate K V A
H. 9 asad] asadam D K V L G₁ G₂; asaddam A; āsad P. 9 apadam] anyapadam K^{Ed}. 9 evaitad] eṃvai° G₁
G₂. 9 viśvam] viśram L. 9 āvirbhavatīty] āvirbhavīty P. 9 āśaṅkyāpi] āśaṅkya (L. 2)vinā H; āśaṅkyāpīta T.
10 hetunā'bhinnakāraṇapūrvakatvam] detu° G₁; hetubhin° P; hetutābhin° O; hetunā abhinnakāraṇe pū° T C_T; °ṇa-
sarvakatvam K V. 10 anvayamukhena] anvayaṃ mu° C_T; °mukhena G₁ G₂. 10 dṛṣṭāntopakramaṃ] dṛṣṭānto°
G₁ G₂; dṛṣṭāntomakramaṃ K V. 10 sādhyaitum] saṃdhāyitum P. 11 vikārāpagame] (L. 12)vihārāvagame C_T; °ga-
maṃ D. 11 satyaṃ] sa G₁ G₂; [ADD] satyaṃ V; [ADD] sa(L. 12)tyaṃ K. 11 satyaṃ suvarṇaṃ] satyasuvarṇair P. 11
suvarṇaṃ] kṣuvarṇaṃ A; suṃvarṇaṃ G₁ G₂. 11 kuṇḍale] kuṇḍalair M P.

vikārāpagame satyāṃ tathāhuḥ prakṛtiṃ parāṃ || 15 ||^{xiv}

kuṇḍalāvasthātmakavikārāpāye kuṇḍale suvarṇam ekaṃ satyam avatiṣṭhate yathā, tathā pṛthivyā-
divikāravigame 'nvayinī prakṛtir abhinnā satyāvatiṣṭhate ity upeyam | āhur iti āgamapramāṇasi-
ddhatāṃ dhvanati brahmaṇaḥ | tathā coktam—

5 ekam eva yad āmnātam⁵⁷

iti |

ātmaivedaṃ satyam^{58 59}

iti hi śrutih | upodbalamātraṃ cānumānam | tathā hi nirupākhyād asato 'padād vikāraprādurbhāvo
na yuktaḥ, abhāvasya bhāvarūpatvavirodhāt | na hi śāśāṅgāt kasyacid udbhavo dṛṣyate | asti ca
10 vijñānarūpatayā jagaty anvaya iti tatpūrvakam evaitat | tathā ca vakṣyati—

nābhāvo jāyate bhāvo naiti bhāvo 'nupākhyatām⁶⁰

⁵⁷ekam eva yad āmnātam bhinnāśaktivyapāśrayāt | apṛthak_tve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthak_tvene va vartate (*Vākyapadīya* 1.2, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 14). ⁵⁸athāta ātmādeśa eva | ātmaivādhastād ātmopariṣṭād ātmā paścād ātmā purastād ātmā dakṣiṇata ātmottarata ātmaivedaṃ sarvam iti (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.25.2, ed. Olivelle 1998a, 272). ⁵⁹sa ya eṣo 'nim aita dātmyam idaṃ sarvam | tat satyam | sa ātmā | tat tvam asi śvetaketo iti (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.7, ed. Olivelle 1998a, 252). ⁶⁰nābhāvo jāyate bhāvo naiti bhāvo 'nupākhyatām | ekasmād ātmano 'nanyau bhāvābhāvau vikalpitau (*Sambandhasamuddeśa* 61, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 166).

^{xiv}vikārāpagame satyāṃ suvarṇam kuṇḍale yathā | vikārāpagamo yatra tām āhuḥ prakṛtiṃ parāṃ || iti (*Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, ed. Śāstrī Abhyankar 1924, 309).

1 satyāṃ] samtyāṃ KA; satya H; satyāt_C_T. 1 prakṛtiṃ] prakṛviṃ G₁ G₂. 1 prakṛtiṃ parāṃ ||] prakṛtipaṃrām || K; prakṛtiparāṃ V_P. 1 parāṃ ||] paṇāṃ G₁ G₂. 2 kuṇḍalāvasthātmakavikārāpāye] kuṇḍalasvātmavi° K V O; | kuṇḍalaṃ svātmavi° P; kuṇḍalasvātmakavi° K^{Ed} D A L; kuḍala(L. 12)svātmakavi° G₁; kuṇḍalaśvātmakavi° G₂; || kuṇḍalaṃ svātmavi° M; (L. 14)kuṇḍalaṃ cāvasthātmakavi° C_T; °rāpāye T. 2 kuṇḍale] dve kuṇḍale K^{Ed} D K V A O L M P C_T T; dhe kuṇḍale G₁ G₂. 2 suvarṇam] svavarṇam V. 2 ekaṃ satyam] ekasatyam P. 2 avatiṣṭhate] evāva° T; avatiṣṭhate K V A H. 2 yathā,] [OM] H. 2 tathā] [ADD] vikārāpagame M P. 2–3 pṛthivyādivikāravigame] °kārādivigame P; °rapagame M. 3 'nvayinī] cayinī A; tv apāyini M; tv ayāyini P; yini yā H. 3 abhinnā] abhimbhā G₁ G₂. 3 satyāvatiṣṭhate] saty avā° K^{Ed} D L M P; saty avatiṣṭhata K V A; saty avatithata G₁ G₂; °tiṣṭhata H. 3 ity] itye C_T. 3 upeyam] apeyam K V; abhyupeyam M_P. 3 iti] iti P. 3–4 āgamapramāṇasiddhatām] āgamasī° M; āgamasiddhatā P; °ddhatā H C_T. 4 dhvanati] dhvanayati S^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} A; dhanati P H. 5 yad āmnātam] padāmnātam G₁ G₂. 5 āmnātam] āśrātam A; ātmātam O T C_T. 7 ātmaivedaṃ] ātmēvedaṃ A. 7 satyam] śasvam G₁ G₂; sarvam H. 8 hi] [OM] M P; ca H. 8 upodbalamātraṃ] upodvala° G₁ G₂; upoddala° A; upodvalanamātraṃ K^{Ed}; °lanamātraṃ S^{Ed} I^{Ed}; °mātra P. 8 cānumānam] tv anu° T C_T; ty anu° H; vānu° G₁ G₂; cānubhānaṃ A; cā!(L. 12)rumānaṃ | M; cārumāna P; [ADD] hi L. 8 tathā hi] tathādi G₁ G₂. 8 nirupākhyād] nirupā° D K V A G₁ G₂. 8 asato 'padād] asatopādānād T. 8 'padād] parāt K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂ M P H. 8 vikāraprādurbhāvo] [OM] vikāra° K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂ M P. 9 yuktaḥ,] yuḥktaḥ G₁ G₂; yuktiḥ | M. 9 abhāvasya] ābhā° P; śvabhā° G₁ G₂. 9 bhāvarūpatvavirodhāt] bhāvarūpa-(L. 9)tāvi° C_T. 9 śāśāṅgāt] śāśāṅgāt_C_T. 9 kasyacid] kasyavid A G₁ G₂. 9 udbhavo] uduvo V; uḍva | kṣodbhavo G₁ G₂. 9 dṛṣyate] | pṛṣyate(SPACE) A; vidyate M_P. 10 vijñānarūpatayā] [OM] vi° G₁ G₂. 10 anvaya] acaya A; envaya P. 10 tatpūrvakam] tatpūrvam K^{Ed} D K V A O L G₁ G₂; tpūrvam M; pūrvam P. 10 evaitat] evaiṣat | D; evaiṣat | K V; evaiṣa G₁ G₂. 10 tathā] tat || G₁ G₂. 10 ca] ta° G₁ G₂; [OM] P. 10 ca vakṣyati—] cakṣyati | M. 10 vakṣyati—] vati K V; śvadyati G₁ G₂. 11 nābhāvo] nvābhāvo G₁ G₂. 11 jāyate] jāyato L; vijāyate M P; vyate H. 11 naiti] neti H. 11 naiti bhāvo] naikabhāvo D K V A O L G₁ G₂; naikabhāvo hy M P. 11 'nupākhyatām] upā° M; upā° P; nupākhyatam A.

iti | tasya cidrūpasya cicchaktir aparīṇāminīti vikārābhāvān nedam sām̐khyānayatparīṇāmadarśa-
nam, api tu vivartapakṣaḥ | viśeṣaś cānāyor vākyapadiye 'smābhir vyākhyāta iti tata evāvadhāryaḥ |
ihāpi sambandhasamuddeśe vakṣyate | kāraṇāntaravyudāsaś cādvayasiddhāv abhīhita iti saty arthi-
tve tata evāvagantavyaḥ || 15 ||

- 5 tad evam ātmaśabdābhīdheyasya brahmaṇaḥ padārthaparamārtharūpatvād dravyarūpatvam upa-
pādya sarvaśabdavācyatvaṃ tasyaiva nigamayitum āha—

vācyā sā sarvaśabdānāṃ śabdāś ca na pṛthak tataḥ |
apṛthaktve ca sambandhas taylor nānātmanor iva || 16 ||^{xv}

- tattadupādhiparikalpītabhedabahulatayā vyavahārasyāvīdyābhūyastve pratiniyatākāropādhiyamā-
10 narūpabhedam brahmaiva sarvaśabdaviśaya^{xvi} ity ukto 'rthaḥ | ātmā, brahma, tattvam ityādayo 'pi hi
śabdāḥ samavalambitopādhyo 'pi dravyātmānam anu parivartante, nirupādhiṇo vāgviśayātītātāt |

^{xv} abhyupagatādvitīyatvanīrvāhāya vācyavācakayor avibhāgaḥ pradarśitaḥ— vācyā sā sarvaśabdānāṃ śabdāc ca na pṛtha-
ktataḥ | apṛthaktvepi sambandhas taylor jīvātmanor iva || iti (*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, ed. Śāstrī Abhyankar 1924, 309).
^{xvi} tattadupādhiparikalpītabhedabahulatayā vyavahārasyāvīdyāmātrakalpītatvena pratiniyatākāropādhiyamānarūpabhe-
dam brahmātattvaṃ sarvaśabdaviśayaḥ | abhede ca pāramārthike samvṛtīvaśād vyavahāradaśāyāṃ svapnāvasthāvadu-
ccāvacaḥ prapañco vivartata iti kārikārthaḥ (*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, ed. Śāstrī Abhyankar 1924, 309).

1 tasya] lasya KV; [OM] MP; tatra HT C_T. 1 cidrūpasya] vidrū° G₁ G₂; cidbhūyasya KV. 1 cicchaktir] vichaktir
G₁ G₂. 1 aparīṇāminīti] [OM] a° MP; °ṇāminīti T. 1 vikārābhāvān] vakā° C_T; vikāratvābhā° MP. 1–2 sām̐khyā-
nayatparīṇāmadarśanam,] sām̐khyā° H; śām̐khyānayatvarīnāmā° G₁ G₂. 2 cānāyor] cānayo KV; va | nāyor G₁
G₂. 2 vākyapadiye] vokya° K; vākyapradīpe K^{Ed}; gākyamadiye G₁ G₂. 2 vyākhyāta] vyākhyātam D KV A O L G₁
G₂ M; vyākhyā(L. 5)tām P; chākhyāta H. 2 evāvadhāryaḥ |] evāvadhāryaṃ G₁ G₂; evāvīdhāryaṃ A; eva vādhyāi P;
°dhāryam S^{Ed} I^{Ed} K^{Ed} D KV O L M T. 3 ihāpi] iha pi P. 3 sambandhasamuddeśe] °muddeśe KV; °ddeśa A. 3
vakṣyate |] vakṣyeta G₁ G₂; vakṣyati M P. 3 kāraṇāntaravyudāsaś] kāraṇāta° P; °tadravyadāsaś KV. 3 cādvayasī-
ddhāv] cādvayabhīdhau KV. 3 abhīhita] vīhita HT C_T. 3–4 kāraṇāntaravyudāsaś...evāvagantavyaḥ ||] [OM]
°saś...evāvagantavyaḥ || G₁ G₂. 5 brahmaṇaḥ] brahmaṇa A. 5 padārthaparamārtharūpatvād] °tvā/ T. 5 dra-
vyarūpatvam] adra° K^{Ed} KV A. 6 sarvaśabdavācyatvaṃ] sarvaśabdāvā° O. 6 nigamayitum] nigamamītum K
V; nigamīyitum L. 6 āha—] āhā T. 7 vācyā] vidyā K^{Ed} D KV A; vāyā L. 7 tataḥ |] tayaḥ | O; yataḥ | L; tata H.
8 sambandhas taylor] sambandhatayor L. 8 nānātmanor] nānātmanār P. 8 iva ||] ivā || ° || H. 9 tattadu-
pādhiparikalpītabhedabahulatayā] || (L. 4)tadupādhiparikalpītabhedabahulatayā M; | tadupādhiparikalpītabhe-
dabahulatayā P; °bheṇādaba ___hūtayā K; °hūtayā D V A O L. 9 vyavahārasyāvīdyābhūyastve] vya(L. 4)vātārasyāpi vī°
A; vyavahārasyāpi vī° K^{Ed} D KV O L M P; °stvena H. 9–10 pratiniyatākāropādhiyamānarūpabhedam] pratiniya-
vākā° H; pratiniyatākāropādhi° T C_T; pratiniyatākārotthīya° O M; pratiniyatākāro sthāya° KV; pratiniyatākāro sthīya°
K^{Ed} D A L; °ro hīyam ānarūpabrahmaiva bhedaṃ P. 10 sarvaśabdaviśaya] sarvavidyāvī° MP; °vīviśa(L. 11)ya H. 10
ityādayo] ity udaye D KV; ity udayer A; ity ukte M P. 10 'pi] hi A. 10 hi] pi A; [OM] O. 11 śabdāḥ] śa-
bdāḥ(SPACE) P. 11 samavalambitopādhyo] samabalaṃvīto° P; samalaṃbīkopādhyo T; °dhayo H C_T. 11 'pi] hi
D; [OM] KV HT C_T. 11 dravyātmānam] ātmānam K^{Ed} A O L M P; thātmanam KV; śabdāḥ samavalambitopādhyo py
ā(L. 2)tmānam D. 11 anu] ana KV; unu L. 11 parivartante,] parivartate(SPACE) P. 11 nirupādhiṇo] nihapādhiṇo
KV; °dhīto D A; °dhīko H. 11 vāgviśayātītātātāt |] vā viśa° M; vādyeṣa° V; °yātātāvīviśaya iti (L. 12)tad H.

vānmanasātītaṃ hi tattvam ity upadiśanti brahmavidāḥ | ghaṭādiśabdāpekṣayā tv ātmādiśabdāḥ
pratyāsannāḥ | sarvasya ca tanmayatvāc chabdā api tadātmakāḥ, yathā'vibhaktam prak | abhede 'pi
ca pāramārthike sāmṣṛto lokayātrāyāṃ bhedo 'satya iti ivaśabdāḥ | ata eva dviṣṭhasambandhopapa-
tīḥ || 16 ||

5 nanu cendrajālam idaṃ, yad avadhṛtarūpabhedānām api bhāvānām anādṛtya tattvam anavasiyamā-
nābhedaparamārthatopadeśanam ity āśankya dṛṣṭāntenaitat sādhayitum āha—

ātmā paraḥ priyo dveṣyo vaktā vācyam prayojanam |
viruddhāni yathaikasya svapne rūpāṇi cetasaḥ || 17 ||

ajanmani tathā nitye paurvāparyavivarjite |

10 tattve janmādirūpatvam viruddham upalabhyate || 18 ||^{xvii}

svapnāvasthāgataḥ prapañco jāgarayā bādhyamānatvād asatya iti sarvavādyabhyupagamaḥ | tenaiva

^{xvii}janmamaraṇādikaṃ tadvat_ prapañcaś ca tatrāvidyākālpita iti vedāntatattvam asmākam apiṣṭam eva | uktaṃ hi vā-
kyapadiye— 'ajanmani tathā nitye paurvāparyavivarjite | tattve janmādirūpatvam viruddham upalabhyate ||' iti | tasmād
avidyādaśāyām uktaṛityā jātir eva sphoṭaḥ (*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, ed. Trivedī 1915, 259).

1 vānmanasātītaṃ] vā ma° D K V A O L M. 1 hi] [ADD] tat H. 11–1 vāgviṣayātītatvāt...tattvam] vā viṣayātī-
tāhitatvam P. 1 hi tattvam] vitatvam C_T. 1 ity] [OM] H T. 1 upadiśanti] upapa° M. 1 brahmavidāḥ]
brahmavidāḥ A; brahmavida O L. 1 ghaṭādiśabdāpekṣayā] kyayadi° O L; tu ya(L. 6)di śa° M; kyayadi śa° D; yadi
śa° K^{Ed} A; tu yadi śabdo pe° P; yadi śabdāpekṣeyā K V. 2 sarvasya] sarva O. 2 ca] va K V; [OM] C_T. 2 ta-
nmayatvāc chabdā] tanmayatva tadātmakatvā H; tanmayatvac śabdā T. 2 tadātmakāḥ,] tadātmikāḥ D K V A O L;
tadātmatayā C_T. 2 yathā'vibhaktam] yathācittam M P. 2 prak | abhede] śaktyabhede M; śaktyabhede P. 3
ca] va K V. 3 pāramārthike] °rthikaṃ M P. 3 pāramārthike sāmṣṛto] °rthikasāmṣṛto K^{Ed} D A O L; °rthikasam-
vato K V. 3 sāmṣṛto] samṣṛtato M P; samṣṛto H. 3 pāramārthike...lokeyātrāyāṃ] (SPACE OF 18 AKṢARAS)yāṃ C_T.
3 lokayātrāyāṃ] traika° M P; lokayālayāṃ V. 3 bhedo] bheda P. 4 dviṣṭhasambandhopapattīḥ]] dviṣam°
P; dviṣasam° O; dviṣasam° L; dviṣtasam° K V A H. 5 cendrajālam] cedra° A; cedraṃjālam K V; ceṃdrajālam L.
5 idaṃ,] idraṃ L. 5 yad avadhṛtarūpabhedānām] padavivṛta° L; padavavṛta° O. 5 avadhṛtarūpabhedānām]
avavṛta° D K V A; avadhṛtam upa° M P. 5 bhāvānām] sambhāvanāsādhyasambhāvanām M P; bhāvanām H. 5
anādṛtya] anāvṛtya K^{Ed} D K V A L H; anādṛśya T. 5 anādṛtya tattvam] anādṛtatvam O. 5 tattvam] tatām C_T.
5–6 anavasiyamānābhedaparamārthatopadeśanam] ava° H; avasiyamānāpa° O; avasiyamānāpa° K^{Ed} D K V A L M;
avasiyamānāparamārthatopadeśanam] °mārthatopadeśanam S^{Ed} I^{Ed}; °rthakopadeśanam C_T. 6 dṛṣṭāntenaitat] dṛṣṭām-
tenetat V; °naivat H. 7 paraḥ] para K V; pari O; yadi L; pāraḥ¹⁷ T. 7 priyo] priyau A. 7 dveṣyo] dveṣyoau P.
7 vaktā] vakā O. 7 vaktā vācyam] vakāvācyam L. 7 ātmā...prayojanam] [OM] ātmā...prayo° C_T. 7 prayo-
janam] prayojanā(SPACE) P. 8 yathaikasya] yaṭhai° P; yathekasya H. 8 svapne] sapne K. 7–8 viruddhāni
...cetasaḥ]] [OM] V. 8 cetasaḥ]] vetasaḥ K A; cetasa || 9 || H. 9 ajanmani] ājan° P; atanmatti K; ajanmayini H.
9 paurvāparyavivarjite] paurvāparye vivakṣite | O; °vakṣite || L. 9–10 tattve janmādirūpatvam] [OM] V. 9–10
janmādirūpatvam] janmādirū° A. 10 janmādirūpatvam viruddham] °patvaviruddham T. 10 upalabhyate]]
upalyate(SPACE) A. 11 svapnāvasthāgataḥ] svupnā° A. 11 svapnāvasthāgataḥ prapañco] °gataprapañco C_T. 11
jāgarayā] jāgara(L. 10)ṇa T. 11 bādhyamānatvād] bā(L. 6)dhyāmā° O; bādhyana° H. 11 asatya] satya P. 11
sarvavādyabhyupagamaḥ]] sarvabādhābhyu° M P. 11 tenaiva] [ADD] ca H.

dr̥ṣṭāntena jāgarāyām api bhāvabhedas turīyadaśāyām ananuvṛtter asatyō 'vasthāpyate | yat kila sarvāvasthāsv anugataṃ tad eva satyam | tac ca saṃvinmātrarūpam abādhyamānam | avasthābhedas tv āgamāpāyitvād bādhitō 'san, sukhaduḥkhādivat | tathā hi rāgādayaḥ sukhādayaś cāsvabhāvavāt saṃvinmātrarūpaṃ na vikurvanti | tathāvasthābhedo 'py anekākāraḥkaluṣyopahataḥ |

- 5 tatra svapne viruddhakārollekho vaikalpikī dr̥ṣṭiḥ pratipramātrṇiyatā | vaikalpiko hi manovyāpārānusārī saṃsārī bhoktā, sa ca bhāvataś cetanavād brahmaiva | tathā ca tāvati svātantryān nirmītav īśvaro 'nanyopādānāt, bhāvān ābhāsyopabhuṅkte priyāpriyarūpatayā rāgadveṣādimayena saṃsāramohena svaparavibhāgānusārī parasamkathādiṣu | tad āhur vedāntatattvanipuṇāḥ—
pravibhajyātmanātmānam sṛṣṭvā bhāvān pṛthagvidhān |

1 dr̥ṣṭāntena] dr̥ṣṭāntana H. 1 jāgarāyām] jāgarīyām P. 11–1 bādhyamānatvād...api] buddhyamānatvā(SPACE OF 10 AKṢARAS) C_T. 1 bhāvabhedas] bhāva(L. 4)bheddas A; bhāvabhedam H. 1 bhāvabhedas turīyadaśāyām] bhāvabhedapurītati__da° L. 1 turīyadaśāyām] turāya° K; turyada° T C_T; turāyadaśāyām V. 1 ananuvṛtter] anana° M; ananavṛtter P. 1 'vasthāpyate] vyava° M P T C_T; paṣṭhā° H. 1 kila] kitma K; kitsa V; kiṃla A. 1–2 sarvāvasthāsv] sarvava° P. 2 anugataṃ] anurātaṃ A. 2 saṃvinmātrarūpam] saṃvinmātraṃ rūpam K^{Ed} D K V A O L M T C_T; sa(L. 15)vinmātraṃ rūpam P. 2 abādhyamānam] avādhyā° P; abuddhyamānaḥ C_T. 3 āgamāpāyitvād] āgamāyāyī° P. 3 bādhitō] bādhitāḥ K^{Ed} D K V A; bhādite O; bādHITE L; bāvito H. 3 'san,] tat K^{Ed}; sat D K V A O L M P C_T. 3 sukhaduḥkhādivat] mu(F. 37V)kha° H. 3 tathā] lathā K. 3 rāgādayaḥ] rāgādayayaś ca T. 3 sukhādayaś] mukhā° H. 3 cāsvabhāvavāt] ca sva° O M P; cāsva(SPACE OF 16 AKṢARAS) C_T. 4 saṃvinmātrarūpam] saṃvinmātraṃ rūpam K^{Ed} D K V O L M T; saṃdhinmātraṃ rūpam A; savinmā(L. 16)traṃ rūpam P. 4 vikurvanti] [OM] vi° P; vikurvati | L. 4 tathāvasthābhedo] tathā bhedo M P. 4 saṃvinmātrarūpam...anekākāraḥkaluṣyopahataḥ] [OM] saṃvi... a° C_T. 4 anekākāraḥkaluṣyopahataḥ] °rabuddhyopahataḥ K^{Ed} D K V A; °ramuṣyopahataḥ O L; °ratuṣyopahataḥ M P; °kāt tuṣṭopahatas H; °pahṛtaḥ | Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed}; °pahitaḥ T. 5 tatra] tac ca M P; [ADD] ca H C_T. 5 svapne] svapnaṃ K^{Ed} K V A. 5 viruddhakārollekho] viruddhakā° D K V; viruddhakārollekhou K^{Ed} A; viruddhakāro vairavo L; viruddhakārollekhe M; viruddhakārocekhe P; vi(F. 54V)ruddhakārollekhollekho T; °llekhā O; °llekhollekho H. 5 vaikalpikī] vaikalpikā K V; sārvatrikī M P. 5 pratipramātrṇiyatā] pratimā° K^{Ed} K V O L; pratimātrṇiyata M; pratimātrṇiyat_ P. 5 vaikalpiko] vaikalpikīti ko K^{Ed} D K A O L; vaikalpikīti V M; vaikalpiki(SPACE)ti ko P. 5–6 vaikalpiko...manovyāpārānusārī] vaikalpikābhīmāno vyā° H. 5–6 hi manovyāpārānusārī] ko bhīmāno vyā° M; bhīmānaḥ vyā° K^{Ed} O L P; bhīmāno vyāpārānusārī D K A; ko bhīmāno vyāpārānusārī saṃsārī V. 6 saṃsārī] [OM] L. 6 bhoktā,] bhokta H. 6 sa] su M P. 6 sa ca bhāvataś] svabhā° T; samavabhā__vatad L. 6 bhāvataś] bhāvavād K^{Ed}; bhāvavād D K V A O M P. 6 cetanavād] ace° K^{Ed} D K V A O L; acetanāt | M; eva tanāt(SPACE) P. 6 brahmaiva] brāhmaiva H; [ADD] ca M P. 6 ca] [OM] O. 6 tāvati] bhāti O. 6 svātantryān] svātantryā K^{Ed} D K V A O L H; svātantryam M P. 6–7 nirmītav īśvaro] nimitāpīśvare K^{Ed}; nimitāpīśvaro D A O; nimitāpāśvaro K V; nimitāpīśva(L. 5)ro L; ity apīśvaro M P; nmitāpīśvaro H; nirmmitāpīśvaro T. 7 'nanyopādānāt,] °dānān(t), Ś^{Ed}. 7 'nanyopādānāt, bhāvān] pādānābhā° L; naṃtyopādānābhā° M P; °nābhāvāt_ K^{Ed} D K V A O. 7 'nanyopādānāt,...ābhāsyopabhuṅkte] 'nanyo(SPACE OF 4 AKṢARAS) C_T. 7 bhāvān ābhāsyopabhuṅkte] bhāvānāhāryo ya bhūṅkte | H. 7 ābhāsyopabhuṅkte] nābhāsyāpi tu K^{Ed}; nābhāsyāyat tu D K V A; nābhāsyāpa(L. 11)la O; nābhāsyāpannakriyā L; nābhāsyāyatta M; nābhāsyāya(F. 36V)t_ P. 7 priyāpriyarūpatayā] (L. 11)(SPACE OF 1 LINE)(L. 12)yā C_T. 7 rāgadveṣādimayena] rāgadveyādi° K V; °dibhayena K^{Ed}. 8 svaparavibhāgānusārī] [OM] sva° K^{Ed} O; paraṃ vi° M P; paravibhāgābhā° D K V A L; °sāraḥ H; °sāram T C_T. 8 parasamkathādiṣu] °kathanād iti M P. 8 tad āhur] tathādāhu V; tathāhur M P T. 8 vedāntatattvanipuṇāḥ—] [OM] ve° V. 9 pravibhajyātmanātmānam] pratibhāṣvātma° H. 9 bhāvān] bhāvāt L. 9 pṛthagvidhān] pṛthavidhān_ P; °dhā(L. 7)t L.

6. Critical edition

sarveśvaraḥ sarvamayaḥ svapne bhoktā pravartate || ⁶¹ XLVII XLVIII

iti | bhokteti vacanāt pratyagātmasrṣṭir iyam uktā | tasya ca sarveśvaratvāt brahmarūpatve srṣṭisā-
marthyam uktam | sarvamayatvāc cānanyopādānavicitrabhāvaracanām ātmopādānām āhuḥ | ata
eva pravibhajyātmanātmānam iti kartṛkarmabhedābhāvāc ca vaikalpikatvam asyāḥ srṣṭeḥ sphuṭam

5 uktam | bāhyopādānā tu jāgarāyām aiśvarī srṣṭir viśvaśabdavācyā sarvaprāmāṭṛsādhāraṇī | ⁶² ⁶³

sthiratvāsthiratvagrahāveśanimittas tu bhedaḥ | ^{XLIX} avidyāpravṛttirūpatvāt punar asatyatā samā-
naiva | kevalam satyām avidyāyām aparo mohaś cicchakter āvārako nidrā ⁶⁴ nāma | tadvaśād atraiva

⁶¹pravibhajyātmanātmānam srṣṭvā bhāvān_ pṛthagvidhān | sarveśvaraḥ sarvamayaḥ svapne bhoktā pravartate (*Vṛtti* ad *Vākyapadīya* 1.119, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 195). Verse 1.140 in the edition of Wilhelm Rau (51). ⁶²jāgaritasthāno bahiḥprajñāḥ saptāṅga ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ sthūlabhug vaiśvānaraḥ prathamāḥ pādāḥ (*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 3, ed. Olivelle 1998a, 474). ⁶³bahiḥprajño vibhuḥ viśvo hy antaḥprajñas tu taijasaḥ | ghanaprajñāḥ tathā prājña eka eva tridhā smrtaḥ (*Āgamaśāstra (Gauḍapādakārikā)* 1.1, ed. Bhattacharya 1943, 1). ⁶⁴anyathā grṇṇataḥ svapno nidrā tattvam ajānataḥ | viparyāse tayoh kṣiṇe turīyaṃ padam āsnute (*Āgamaśāstra (Gauḍapādakārikā)* 1.15, ed. Bhattacharya 1943, 7).

^{XLVII}na tasya svapnapadārthāḥ svātantryeṇa pravartamānāḥ sarvakartṛtvalakṣaṇasvasāktipratibandham udbhāvayanti a-
saṃsāritvāt; kiṃtu svatantraḥ svasāktya yatheṣṭam tān_ srjati | yathāha bhartṛhariḥ 'pravibhajyātmanātmānam srṣṭvā
bhāvān_ pṛthagvidhān | sarveśvaraḥ sarvasāktiḥ svapne bhoktā prapadyate ||' iti | ata eva svapnasvātantryam etat —
ity uktam | tasya svapnajāgarayor viśeṣo nāsti, — iti tamovaraṇanirbhedaḥ sa evoktaḥ (*Vivṛti* ad *Spandakārikā* 4.4, ed.
Chatterji 1913, 102). ^{XLVIII}tathā 'svapnaḥ' tejo'vasthā brahmaṇaḥ | kutaḥ ? ity āha 'prakāśamāhātmyāt' iti... idam artha-
balād āyātam yat sa eva bhagavān_ svasvabhāvo devaḥ tattatpramāṭṛtām samāviṣṭaḥ svapnāyamānaḥ svātmānam eva
prakāśasvātantryāt_ grha-nagarāṭṭālādi-anekapramāṭṛvaicitryarūpatayā pravibhajya pratipramāṭṛ svapne asādhāraṇam
eva viśvaṃ prakāśayaty eva, — iti brahmaṇaḥ svātantryam svapna eva brahmadāibhiḥ abhyupagatam | yato vedānteṣu
idam uktam 'pravibhajyātmanātmānam srṣṭvā bhāvān_ pṛthagvidhān | sarveśvaraḥ sarvamayaḥ svapne bhoktā prakā-
śate ||' iti prakāśamāhātmyam eva atra hetuḥ, ataḥ svapno brahmaṇaḥ tejo'vasthā — iti (*Vivṛti* ad *Paramārthasāra* 35,
ed. Chatterji 1916, 77-78). ^{XLIX}nanu svapnakāraṇatve 'pi jāgaritavastuno na svapnavadavastutvam | atyantacalo hi svapno
jāgaritan tu sthiraṃ lakṣyate (*Śaṅkarabhāṣya* ad *Gauḍapādakārikā* 4.38, ed. Röer 1850, 547).

1 sarveśvaraḥ | sarvaiśvaraḥ A. 1 sarvamayaḥ | sarvamayaḥ(SPACE)P. 1 svapne bhoktā | sarvabhoktā M P. 1 pra-
vartate ||] pravarttamte P. 2 vacanāt | [OM] K^{Ed} D K V A O L M P. 2 pratyagātmasrṣṭir | pra-(L. 3)tya(SPACE OF 19 A-
KṢARAS) (L. 4)(SPACE OF 8 AKṢARAS)srṣṭim C_T; °tmāsiddhir M P. 2 iyam | iyum L; [OM] C_T. 2–3 uktā...srṣṭisāmarthyam |
arthyam C_T. 3 uktam |] u(SPACE OF 3 AKṢARAS)m_ukta T. 3 sarvamayatvāc | sarvaviśaya° M P. 3 cānanyopādā-
navicitrabhāvaracanām | °dānam vicitrabhāvasvabhāvānām K^{Ed}; °vidhitrabhāvasvanām A; °trasvabhāvam M P; °va-
svanām D K V. 3 ātmopādānām | ātmopajñānām K^{Ed} O; ātmopajñānām D K V A; ātmopajñānām L M; āho pajñānam
P; °dāna(nā)m Ś^{Ed}; °dānam I^{Ed} H. 3–4 ata eva | [OM] T C_T. 4 pravibhajyātmanātmānam | pravibhaṣv ātmā° H;
°jyātmanātmānam P; °tmavātmānam A. 4 kartṛkarmabhedābhāvāc | °bhāvāc T. 4 ca | [OM] M P. 4 asyāḥ |
asya K^{Ed} D K V A O L. 4 asyāḥ srṣṭeḥ | asvasrṣṭeḥ M P. 4 srṣṭeḥ | rsrsteḥsrṣṭeḥ I^{Ed}; srṣṭe T. 4 sphuṭam | spaṣṭam L.
4–5 sphuṭam uktam |] sphuṭaktam K V. 5 uktam |] ukām H. 5 bāhyopādānā | bāhyopādānā P; °nāt H. 5 tu |
ta A. 5 aiśvarī | aiśvarīr P. 5 viśvaśabdavācyā | °bda(L. 6)cṙā H; °vācyā D; °vācyā K V P. 5 srṣṭir...sādhāraṇī |]
[OM] C_T. 5 sarvaprāmāṭṛsādhāraṇī |] °ṭṛviśayī(L. 5)ṇi P; °ṭṛviśayīṇi | M; °raṇā K V. 6 sthiratvāsthiratvagrahāveśa-
nimittas | [OM] sthira...ratva° C_T; sthiritvāt sthiratvagrahāvedāni° L; sviratvāsthi(L. 6)ratvagrahāvedāni° A; °ratvāgra-
hāvedānimittas O; °vedānimittas K^{Ed} D K V; °vedanānimittas M P. 6 avidyāpravṛttirūpatvāt | [OM] a° H; avidyāprvṛ°
T. 6 asatyatā | asya sa° M P; asatyajā A; asatyatātā O. 7 samānaiva |] samanaiva O. 7 satyām | asatyām P;
[ADD] asatyām H. 7 avidyāyām | avidyām D K V A L; avidyā M P; [ADD] ayam T C_T. 7 aparo | paramo M P. 7
cicchakter | cikakter H. 7 āvārako | āpārako O; āvarako M P; āvarakā H; āpārato C_T. 7 tadvaśād | tadaśād A. 7
atraiva | attaiva O; atreva T.

bhrāntatvābhimāno 'rvāgdr̥śām | paramārthadr̥śām tu jananamaraṇarahite 'pravibhakte kūṭasthe
 parasmin brahmaṇi cidānandarūpe sarvam eva jagaj jāgratsvapnādyavasthāgatam mūrtikriyāviva-
 rtarūpam asatyam | ^{xviii} anvayicitsāmānyamātram tu paramārtha iti siddham | **viruddham upala-**
bhyata iti vadann avidyāyām virodham abhyupaiti | etad eva hy avidyāyāḥ svarūpam yad anupapa-
 5 dyamānam apy ābhāsopagamaṃ nayati, upapannatve vidyaiva syāt | tasmād asatyaprapaṅcaprakā-
 śanaśaktir brahmaṇo 'nādisiddhā grāhyagrāhakayugalam svānurūpam uparacayya jagannātyam ^L
 ātanotīty avicāritaramaṇīyām imām apanayanti tattvadṛśaḥ || 17-18 ||
 iti bhūtirājanayahelārājakṛte prakīrṇaprakāśe dravyasamuddeśo dvitīyaḥ ||

^Lyathā hi kalpanāmātrasāraṃ tata evānavasthitaikarūpaṃ kṣaṇena kalpanāśatasahasrasaḥ svapnādivilakṣaṇam api
 suṣṭhutarāṃ hr̥dayagrahanidānam atyaktasvāmbanabrahmakalpanaṭoparacitam rāmarāvaṇādi ceṣṭitam asatyam kuto
 'py abhūtāt_ bhūtavr̥ttāyā bhāti | tathā bhāsanam api ca pumarthopadeśopāyatām eti | tathā tādr̥g eva viśvam idam
 asatyanāmarūpaprapaṅcātmacam (*Abhinavabhāratī*, quoting from a lost work by Bhaṭṭanāyaka : *Fragments of Bhaṭṭanāyaka*,
 ed. Chintamani 1927, 268). Pollock reads atyaktasvāmbanam (2016, 458, note 17).

^{xviii}tad āhur vedāntavādanipuṇāḥ :— yathā svapnaprapaṅcayoṃ mayi māyāvijr̥mbhitaḥ | evaṃ jāgratprapaṅcopi mayi
 māyāvijr̥mbhitaḥ || iti | tad itthaṃ kūṭasthe parasmin brahmaṇi saccidānandarūpe pratyagabhinne vagate nādyavidyānivṛt-
 tau tādr̥gbrahmātmanāvasthānalakṣaṇam niḥśreyasaṃ setsyati (*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, ed. Śāstrī Abhyankar 1924, 309-310).

1 **bhrāntatvābhimāno**] matattvābhimāne ^{K^{Ed}} D K V A; bhaḥ tatvābhimāne O L; °māne M P. 1 **'rvāgdr̥śām** |] (L.
 17)yādr̥śām O; ryāgdaśā L; yā dr̥śām | M; yā P; rvāgdr̥śa H; rvvāgdr̥śām T. 1 **paramārthadr̥śām**] [OM] M; dr̥śām(SPACE)
 P; °rtthadaśām O L. 1 **tu** | tuṃ K V; nanu M P. 1 **jananamaraṇarahite**] janamaraṇarahitaiḥ O; °ṇaraḥhite T; °hitaiḥ
^{K^{Ed}} D K V A L M P; [OM] C_T. 1 **'pravibhakte**] apra° T. 1–2 **kūṭasthe parasmin**] kūṭasthair vāsmin M P. 1–2 **'pravib-**
hakte...brahmaṇi] [OM] C_T. 2 **cidānandarūpe sarvam**] °rūpasarvam P. 2 **jagaj**] jāgaj O; [OM] T. 2 **jāgratsvap-**
nādyavasthāgatam] jāgratsvapnāva° L; jā asvapnādyavasthāgata H; °pnāyavasthāganta V; °(L. 8)sthāganta K. 2–
 3 **jagaj...mūrtikriyāvivartarūpam**] jā(L. 3)gratsvapnādyavasthāgatamū° C_T. 3 **mūrtikriyāvivartarūpam asatyam** |]
 °rttasamṣṛsam M P; °rūpanasatyasaṃ H. 3 **asatyam** |] sat svāpnam ^{K^{Ed}}; sa ṣṛsapram D K V; sa ṣṛsaptam A; samṣṛt-
 sam O; sa ṣṛsam L. 3 **anvayicitsāmānyamātram**] acayi ci° A; anvayi, ci° ^{K^{Ed}}. 3 **iti**] i° O. 3 **siddham** |] simddha
 A. 3 **siddham | viruddham**] siddhivi° ^{K^{Ed}}. 3 **viruddham**] viruddhem A. 3–4 **upalabhyata**] apa° K V. 4
vadann avidyāyām] vedanavi° M P. 4 **abhyupaiti** |] upaiti | L. 4 **etad**] yat tad M P. 4 **etad eva**] tade O. 4
hy | ty A. 4 **avidyāyāḥ**] avidyāyā P. 4 **avidyāyāḥ svarūpam**] avi-(L. 7)(SPACE OF 1 LINE) C_T. 4 **yad**] ya tad P;
 [ADD] tad M. 4–5 **anupapadyamānam**] anupalabhyamānam T. 5 **ābhāsopagamaṃ**] āso° D K V A O L; apa° M
 P; ātmopa° ^{K^{Ed}}; °gama H. 4–5 **yad...nayati**,] [OM] yad... na° C_T. 5 **nayati**,] nāpaiti M P; nayāti | H. 5 **upa-**
pannatve] upan° C_T; upalabdhe ^{K^{Ed}}; upapalabdhe A; upalabdhatve L; °nacce D K. 5 **vidyaiva**] vidhaiya A; vid-
 haiva P. 5 **syāt** |] styāt_ K; vyāt H. 5–6 **asatyaprapaṅcaprakāśanaśaktir**] asatprapaṅc° C_T; asatprakāśanaśakti H;
 asat_ prapaṅcaprakāśanaśakti T; °prakāśanaśaktir A; °kāraśanaśaktir L; °śaśaktir M P; °śakti O. 6 **'nādisiddhā**] nā-
 disiprā A. 6 **grāhyagrāhakayugalam**] grāhagrāhakayugena P; °yugena M. 5–6 **upapannatve...svānurūpam**] pam
 V. 6 **grāhyagrāhakayugalam svānurūpam**] grāhyagrāhakayugalasyānu° H; °galasvānurūpam ^{K^{Ed}} D K; °galasvādarū-
 pam A; °galasānurūpam O; °galasyānurūpam L. 6 **uparacayya**] upacāratayā M P; °cayyā ^{K^{Ed}}; °cayā D K V A O; °canā
 L. 6 **jagannātyam**] jagalādyam ^{K^{Ed}} K V A O L; jagannādyam H. 7 **ātanotīty avicāritaramaṇīyām**] °tītavicāri-
 taramaṇīyam P. 7 **avicāritaramaṇīyām**] °maṇāyām K V; °ṇīyam M. 7 **imām apanayanti**] āmanāṃti M P. 8
bhūtirājanayahelārājakṛte] [OM] R^{Ed} C_T; bhūtirājananahe° A. 8 **prakīrṇaprakāśe**] [OM] R^{Ed} C_T; prakārṇa° K V;
 prakīrṇakapra° H T; prakīrṇakāṇḍapra° M P. 8 **dravyasamuddeśo**] sam_dra° P; [ADD] nāma ^{Ś^{Ed}} I^{Ed}. 8 **dvitīyaḥ** ||]
 [OM] R^{Ed}; [ADD] śubham D K V A; [ADD] śrīkṛṣṇo vijayatetarām M P; [ADD] || ☉ || (SPACE OF 2 AKṢARAS) || śrī || H.

7. Annotated Translation

Preliminary remarks

Square brackets enclose words which are supplied by myself; round brackets indicate the Sanskrit word which is being translated. Sources and parallel passages mentioned in the footnotes to the translation can be found in the relevant apparatus of the critical edition.

1

It was said that the object of a word can be a genus (*jāti*) or a substance (*dravya*).¹ Of the two, it has already been established [in the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*] that, according to Vājapyāyana, the object of a word is a genus, i.e., a qualifier; [now,] in order to establish that, according to Vyāḍi², the object of a word can also be a substance, i.e., that which is qualified, [Bhartṛhari] will declare what, according to different schools of thought, is, in fact, substance, using [different] synonyms [for *dravya*].

1 It is also [called]: *ātman*, *vastu*, *svabhāva*, *śarīra*, and *tattva*. These are synonyms of *dravya*, and it is traditionally taught that it is permanent.³

Since, in this [system of thought], only a substance can be employed in purposive action (*arthakriyā*), it is only [the substance] which impels purposeful persons (*arthin*). Therefore, only [the substance] is expressed by a word. The genus, on the other hand, which serves [only] to differentiate, is not expressed [by a word], just as the [qualities of] sweetness, etc. [are not expressed] by the word “jaggery” (*guḍa*) – [this is] according to those who say that the substance [is expressed by a word].⁴ Moreover,

¹See *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 2 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 8).

²Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi are mentioned in Kātyāyana’s *Vārttikas* as, respectively, proponents of the genus (*ākṛti*) and substance (*dravya*) views on word meaning (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 242-244). Vyāḍi is said to be the author of the *Samgraha* (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 20). See Scharfe 1977, 124-126 for a discussion of these two authors.

³As Christian Lindtner has pointed out, this verse seems to echo verse 45 from Nāgārjuna’s *Acintyastava* (1994, 199). In the *Acintyastava*, the phrase *ity api* refers back to the preceding verse: “it has been called (by you) ‘the dependent (reality)’; but the supreme reality is non effected. **Also (it could be) called:** an own being, the primary matter, the truth, the substance, existing entity” (trans. Tola and Dragonetti 1985, 33, emphasis mine). As Tola & Dragonetti note, using these positive descriptions to denote absolute reality is surprising “in the context of *Mādhyaṃika* philosophy” (1985, 49). This verse, in particular, has raised questions about the authorship of the *Acintyastava*, although Tsuda Akimasa’s recent review of the scholarship on this topic concludes that it was composed either by Nāgārjuna in his later years or by someone else just after his death (2016, 173). Verse 41 is even more forceful: “That is regarded as the truth, the supreme reality, the suchness, the substance [*dravya*]; that is the not deceiving element; through its knowledge (*bodha*) one is called *buddha*” (trans. Tola and Dragonetti 1985, 32).

⁴The source for this example is probably the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 15). The *Yuktidīpikā* also has a similar example (ed. Wezler and Motegi 1998, 73). In his commentary to the *Vṛttisamuddeśa*, Helārāja reverses the simile – it could also be said that *dravya* is not expressed, and that it is only a differentiator (*bhedaka*) for the *jāti* (ed. Subramania Iyer, III, ii, 305). This is perhaps why Helārāja emphasizes that this example here is presented according to the *dravyavādins*; for a *jātivādin*, it would be equally valid to use this same simile to come to the opposite conclusion – that only the genus is expressed by a word.

the substance is of two sorts: absolute (*pāramārthika*) and conventional (*sāmvyavahārika*). The second one of these will be elaborated upon in the *Guṇasamuddeśa*,⁵ with reference to “the differentiated” and “the differentiator”, [in the verse] beginning with

“That, for which [a pronoun], to mark a particular object,...”⁶

It is with reference to this substance [in the conventional sense] that, according to Vyāḍi, all words denote the substance.

But here [in this chapter], the substance in the absolute sense is examined. That is to say – according to the proponents of the non-duality of the Self (*ātmādvaita*), the substance is conveyed by the word *ātman*. For it is really the Self – that is, the substance, manifesting as differentiated by delimiters – which is the object of words; this view of [the *ātmādvaitins*] will be explained in this very [chapter].

The Buddhists say that *vastu*, that is, the object characterized only by itself which is the instrument of purposive action,⁷ is the substance.

Svabhāva: according to the proponents of the non-duality of Being (*sattādvaita*), *svabhāva*, which is [really] the Self, is Being. That is, since “when its sequential forms have been withdrawn, Being is a substantive,”⁸ it is really [Being] – to which difference is attributed by delimiters, which are its own adjuncts – which is the substance.

The sentient person is part of the primordial matter – in that way, since there is no distinction between the body and the embodied, the body (*śarīra*) is the substance, namely, the primordial; thus it is said by the proponents of the primordial matter (*prākṛtika*),⁹ those embodied selves for whom the unitary Self is really the body.

The Cārvākas, proponents of the four elements, call the substance *tattva*, because it is said that “earth, water, fire, and air are the elements (*tattva*), [and] in the combination of those is what are

⁵In extant manuscripts, this verse is in the *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa*. See Houben 1995, 85 & 100.

⁶“That, for which a pronoun is employed to mark a particular object (*vastu*), is said to be the substance (*dravya*). [Its] meaning is expressed as something to be differentiated” (*Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 187).

⁷This is an echo of Dharmakīrti’s well-known assertion that only the concrete object (*vastu*) can be an instrument in purposive action (*arthakriyā*). See the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (ed. Gnoli 1960, 84).

⁸“In things such as cows, it is really [the universal] Being which is differentiated according to [its] different adjuncts... when its sequential forms have been withdrawn, it is called a substantive” (*Jāṭisamuddeśa* 33-35, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 42).

⁹Helārāja seems to be referring to the Sāṃkhya here. However, the *Yuktidīpikā* lists *prākṛtikas* as opponents of Sāṃkhya doctrine (ed. Wezler and Motegi 1998, 2). Kumar & Bhargava understand this to be a reference to materialists, i.e., Cārvākas (Bhārgava and Kumar 1990–1992, I, 2). The term *śarīrātman*, which Helārāja uses here, also seems to point to a sort of materialism, in which the soul is really the body; for example, compare Helārāja’s formulation, *śarīram evaika ātmā*, with a similar one in Yamuna’s *Ātmasiddhi*: *deham evātmēti bārhaspatyāḥ* (*Siddhitraya*, ed. Ramanujacharya 1972, 12), which names the Cārvākas as the proponents of that view. The Jain philosopher Śīlāṅka has referred to Sāṃkhyas as *ātmaśaṣṭhavādins*, proponents of the *ātman* as the sixth element, and grouped them with the Cārvākas (Bhattacharya 2011, 35). For him, the difference is that the Sāṃkhyas consider the *ātman* to be distinct from the *bhūtas*, while the Cārvākas consider them to be identical – *yathā”tmāśaṣṭhavādina sāmkyādayo bhūtavyatiriktaṃ ātmānam abhyupagatavanto yathā ca cārvākā bhūtavyatiriktaṃ caitanyākhyam ātmānam iṣṭavantas tathā...* (*Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtravṛtti*, ed. Mahārāja and Jambūvijayajī 1978, 17). Here, Helārāja clearly intends for *prākṛtikas* and Cārvākas to be different groups. He seems to be using the word *prākṛtika* in the sense of *prākṛtivādin*, which is attested as referring to the Sāṃkhyas.

termed the body, the senses, and the object”.¹⁰ In this way, they say that, with respect to the absolute, [*tattva*] is really a unitary reality.

“Of *dravya*”: the object of a word is the substance, for which only these [words] are **synonyms**, because only these [words] denote the absolute. That is not the case for other words like “pot”, etc. Even though words like *ātman* denote [the absolute], it will be shown later that their scope is not obstructed at all when it is applied to [things like] pots, etc. For example, when it says in the *Bhāṣya*, “this single entity (*ātman*) is water,”¹¹ the word *ātman*, used in the sense of “water”, expresses the substance. And by means of a genus, other words can [also] express the substance. But the difference is that these [words like *ātman*], having abandoned [the genus], [denote the absolute] as their primary function. In [explaining] the *Vārttika* “the word, its object, and their relation are permanent”, [Patañjali,] the author of the *Bhāṣya*, saying that “the substance is permanent while the form changes again and again,”¹² teaches the substance to be **permanent**. Because [Patañjali] is reiterating the notion of [substance] as it was spoken of in the *Samgraha* [of Vyāḍi], [Bhartṛhari] says that it is “**traditionally taught**” (*smṛta*).

Even if, according to the Buddhists, etc., the substance is not permanent, even then there is no fault [in our argument], because [we] do not accept their doctrine.¹³ What is being stated here [in this verse] is that it is really our [notion of the] substance which is denoted by others [using those synonyms]. Or alternatively, if we follow the *Bhāṣya*, [there is also no fault, since] something cannot really be different from its own nature; even in the case of different transformations [of a thing], it is permanence that is really intended, and therefore [permanence] is established in all cases.

2

While, in this way, the different [senses of the word] *dravya* [can] also be described according to other doctrines, in order to establish that, in all cases, based on our established doctrine, the substance is the object of words, he says:

2 The real entity is determined through its unreal forms; only the real is denoted by words, which have unreal delimiters,¹⁴

¹⁰These two phrases are attributed to the Cārvākas in many texts. In Bhattacharya’s reconstruction of the *Cārvākasūtras*, he lists them as sūtras I.2 and I.3 (2011, 78). It is also very similar to a passage in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* which enumerates the *dravyas* (1.1.4, ed. Jambūvijayaḥ 1961, 2).

¹¹Now how is it known that qualities are differentiators? It is thus seen in the world: “This single entity is water; because of its different qualities, it becomes different – this is cool [water], this is warm [water]” (*Mahābhāṣya ad Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.1, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 41-42).

¹²*Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 7).

¹³In the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, Bhartṛhari displays quite a different attitude to the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence: “According to those who adhere to the doctrine that [all is] momentary (i.e. the Buddhists) eternity is uninterrupted continuation” (trans. Bronkhorst 1987, 81). Rather than rejecting the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, like Helārāja does, Bhartṛhari interprets the notion of an unending progression of moments as a sort of permanence. Moreover, it has been argued that Bhartṛhari does not exclude heterodox traditions, like Buddhism, in his contention that the science of grammar is applicable to all schools of thought (Houben 1995, 306-307).

¹⁴*asatyopādhibihīḥ śabdaiḥ* is translated by Rau as “durch Wörter benannt, welche das Irreale zum Substitut haben”,

In this [doctrine], [although] all words are unable to directly touch absolute reality, [and although] their basis is fixed¹⁵ in objects which have numerous delimiters, in the world (*vyavahāra*), it is observed that they manifest [absolute reality] by its characteristics.¹⁶ Because the ability of delimiters – whose own [independent] nature is suppressed because of their ephemerality (*āgamāpāya*) – to completely fulfill the wishes of multitudes of people (*arthisārtha*)¹⁷ is impeded, [the operation of words] does not cease at the level [of the delimiter]; thus, words are established as dependent (*prṣṭhapātin*) on the object that is marked [by the delimiter]. And because they are based on a determined object (*avadhṛtarūpa*), the operation of words with respect to their object is in accordance with how [that object] has been determined (*avadhāraṇa*), and determination (*avadhṛti*) takes place by means of forms (*ākāra*). This is because something without form cannot arise as a cognition. When the ascertainment of difference, according to [one’s own] conceptions, is obstructed, what follows after [this obstruction] is precisely the undifferentiated entity, in the absolute sense; that very reality is *brahman*.

3

This [objection] is possible: if words do not stop [operating] at the [level of] delimiters, then they would not be able to delimit the object of a word, since what is unexpressed is not able to delimit [the object]. In order to dispute this [objection], he says:

3 just as Devadatta’s house is grasped by a temporary mark, [but] only the bare [house] is denoted by the word “house”,¹⁸

[When someone says,] “That one is Devadatta’s house, the one on which that crow is perched”, because [the crow] has been made into a marker for [the house], even when the crow, which is a marker¹⁹ – in order to mark the house of a given owner –, has flown away, it is **temporary**, i.e., **impermanent**. **Just as**, precisely because we disregard [the crow], [only] **the house** which is marked [by

indicating that words have unreality as their delimiter. However, if we follow the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, Bhartṛhari seems to understand delimiters (*upādhi*) as universals (*jāti*) (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 15). Hideyo Ogawa, similarly, translates the phrase as “through its forms which are unreal” (2000, 9).

¹⁵*nīhitapada*, here interpreted in the sense of *padam nīdadhāti*, literally “to set foot in”, or metaphorically “to make an impression on” [Eindruck machen] (Böhtlingk and Roth 1855, IV, 445). Possibly in a similar sense as *kṛtapadabandha* in the commentary on verse 4 below, which seems to mean “having a firm footing on something”.

¹⁶Instead of *tadrūpolliṅganam*, Subramania Iyer reads *tadrūpālīṅganam*, following the editio princeps. Hideyo Ogawa translates this as, “Although all words cannot directly touch on ultimate reality, they can embrace it (*tadrūpālīṅgana*) if they get a footing in the domain of its various delimiting factors” (2017, 14). For *ullīṅgana*, cf. *ullīṅgay*, °*yati*, “aus Merkmalen erschliessen” (Böhtlingk 1879, I, 253) and Pāli *ullīṅgeti*, “makes manifest, shows by its characteristics” (Cone 2001, 512).

¹⁷*arthisārtha* is often understood as a group of petitioners or supplicants. This compound is often used with reference to the mythical Kalpa tree, which is said to grant every wish. For example: *sakalārthisārthakalpadrumaḥ* (*Pañcatantra* ed. Edgerton 1924, 3), *sarvārthisārthakalyāṇakalanākālpapādapaḥ* (*Avadānakalpalatā* 3.55, ed. Chandra Das and Vidyābhūṣaṇa 1940, 75), *kalpavṛkṣo rthisārthānām* (*Yogavāsīṣṭha* 5.8.2, ed. Śāstrī Paṇṣīkara 1937, I, 562).

¹⁸See *Mahābhāṣya* ad A 1.1.26 (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 74-75). This example is given in the context of the discussion on the scope of the technical term *nīṣṭhā* – see below.

¹⁹The crow on Devadatta’s house becomes the standard example for *upalakṣaṇa* in later literature, even though the meaning of *upalakṣaṇa* shifts. In the *Lakṣmīdharavyākhyā* on the *Saundaryalaharī*, it is defined as a type of

the crow] is denoted by the word “house”, in the same way, because of the relationship [of words] to the primordial matter,²⁰ reality, which is marked by unreal delimiters, is denoted by words, because we disregard the delimiter itself; therefore, since even what is not denoted can restrict the scope of the denotation, [we have established] the function of [the crow] being a marker; thus, the function of a delimiter [even if it is ultimately disregarded] is established by that example. To illustrate, in the *sūtra*

*ktaktavatū niṣṭhā*²¹

[it is explained that] since the *anubandha* [*k*] – which is temporary because it does not persist in verbal usage – is [merely] a marker, there would be no over-extension (*prasaṅga*) in applying the technical term [*niṣṭhā*] to the bare form of the affix [*ta* or *tavatū*], separated from [the *anubandha*]; this example is given in the *Bhāṣya*.

4

Objection: the crow, being determined as different from the house which has completely different features [from it], would never be expressed by the word “house”; but [conversely], how could [you possibly say that] forms such as a pot, whose substance (*tattva*) is not perceived separately [from its form], should not be expressed by those words [like “pot”]? For on the one hand, a delimiter, i.e. a marker, delimits [the substance] by being co-referential²² [with the substance] – for example, the [delimiter] “pack animal” (*paśu*) [which restricts the scope of the word] “bag-bearer” (*ḍṛtihari*).²³

viśeṣaṇa (ed. Veṅkaṭanāthācārya 1969, 132), whereas in the *Advaitasiddhi*, it is defined as opposed to *viśeṣaṇa* (ed. Nārāyaṇaswami Sastri 1937, 31-32). Here *upalakṣaṇa* and *viśeṣaṇa* are in opposition. As Hideyo Ogawa points out, Helārāja seems to imply that *upalakṣaṇa* is an adventitious qualifier, while *viśeṣaṇa* is an essential qualifier (2017, 16 note). An objection will be raised below, reversing these terms.

²⁰See *Dravyasamuddeśa* 16.

²¹*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.26. This *sūtra* states that the technical term *niṣṭhā* applies to the affixes *ka* and *ktavatū*, which form past participles. In the *Mahābhāṣya*, a discussion ensues over whether these affixes can be recognized even without the *anubandha* marker *k*, since, for example, when *ka* is applied to the verb *bhū* to form *bhūta*, the *k* is absent. But there are words, such as *garta*, which seem to have the same affix, but which are not past participles. How, then, would someone recognize when *ta* is really the *ka* affix? As Patañjali argues, the context in which the affix can be used – in this case, to form the past participle – helps one to recognize it (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 75).

²²*Sāmānādhikaranyena*, literally, because they share the same locus. The grammatical meaning of *sāmānādhikaraṇa*, “grammatical agreement in case”, does not seem to apply here, since the counterexample that follows, *vāneyam udakam*, also features both words in the same case.

²³This argument is also presented in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā* of Vācaspati Miśra (ed. Thakkura 1996, 432-433). There, the thesis is that the particular individual (*vyakti*) is the object of a word is examined. In that case, the genus (*jāti*) would be a delimiter, and although unexpressed, it could still delimit the individual. The example given is *gārgikayā ślāghate* – according to rule A 5.1.134 *gotracaraṇāc chlaḅhātvyākāratadaveteṣu*, the affix *vuṅ* can be applied to words that signify a lineage, such as *garga*, to form *gārgika*, but only on the condition that it is used in the context of praise (*ślāgh*), etc. In that way, the *upādhi* “praise, etc.”, even though it is not expressed by the affix *vuṅ*, delimits its usage. But a counterargument is raised – in the case of rule 3.2.25 *harater ḍṛtināthayoḥ paśau*, which prescribes the *iṅ* affix to form words such as *ḍṛtihari*, “bag-bearer”, the delimiter, *paśu*, “pack animal”, is expressed by the affix. That is, when one says *ḍṛtihari*, one is using it as a synonym for *paśu*. Therefore, it cannot be true that a particular individual is expressed by a word, whereas the genus, which delimits it, is not expressed.

On the other hand, a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*), which is expressed by a separate²⁴ word, is something that colours (*uparañjaka*) [the object]. For example, in “forest water” (*vāneyam udakam*), water is denoted as a particular object that is delimited by its connection to the forest; thus the connection with the forest becomes a qualification, which denotes [that connection] as a colouration. Thus it is said:

A delimiter, which is a characteristic of the object [of the word], is expressed by the affix [of the word] and is co-referential²⁵ with the word. On the other hand, a non-delimiter is different from that, like qualifications such as *ślāgh*, etc.²⁶

Thus having raised this objection, he now presents [another,] more apt example:

4 just as gold, etc., is endowed with its own, transient forms, [but] it is really the pure [gold] that is expressed by denotations such as “ring”, etc.²⁷

Although it [appears] differently as it is delimited by specific forms such as ring, bracelet, etc., it is really the gold that is, in all cases, the intransient reality; thus, since the purposive action that should be accomplished [by the substance gold] cannot be effected by those specific forms, [since they are] transient, words like “ring”, etc, are not based (*kṛtapadabandha*)²⁸ solely on [forms like ring, etc.]. Rather, [those words] equally apply (*samāviśanti*),²⁹ as denotations, to [the same] concrete object, which surpasses [its forms]; in the same way, because of the relationship [of words] to primordial matter,³⁰ absolute reality, even though multiplicity is attributed to it by its forms, is the scope of words. That is what is meant. And [in the verse], the word “transient” points out that the reason [given by the opponent, arguing that forms really are expressed] is itself yet to be proven [and thus

²⁴Although all available manuscripts read *aprthakśabdavācyam* here, I have emended it to *prthakśabdavācyam*, following the sense of the passage. Bhartṛhari uses the term *aprthakśabdavācyam* in the *Vṛttisamuddeśa* to say that both *jāti* and *dravya* can be “expressed by the same word”. Helārāja glosses it, in one instance, as *ekāśabdopādānatve*, and, in another instance, as *dvayor api śabdopādānatve* (ed. Subramania Iyer 1973, 313).

²⁵*Samānaśabda* is glossed by Vācaspati Miśra as *samānādhikaraṇaśabda* (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, ed. Thakkura 1996, 433 and *Nyāyakaṇikā*, ed. Gosvāmī 1984, 318).

²⁶This verse, in *āryā* meter, is untraced, although it is attributed to Kātyāyana in Vācaspati Miśra’s *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, where it is partially quoted (Thakkura 1996, 433). It is also partially quoted in Maṇḍana Miśra’s *Vidhiviveka* and Vācaspati Miśra’s *Nyāyakaṇikā* commentary thereupon (ed. Gosvāmī 1984, 318). It is quoted in full in Kaiyaṭa’s *Pradīpa* commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* (ed. Bhikaji Josi 1987, III, 1).

²⁷See *Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 7) as well as *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1.5 (ed. Olive 1998a, 246).

²⁸See the parallels in the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* to the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* and the *Vṛttisamuddeśa*. Houben understands this compound to mean, literally, “by which a footstep is made”, understanding *padabandha* as a “footstep” (1995, 400 and 413 note 927). However, it is more likely to mean “planting one’s feet”, as in *devadattena padabandham kṛtvā nāracaḥ kṣiptaḥ* (*Saṅghabhedavastu*, ed. Gnoli and Venkatacharya 1977–1978, I, 60), “Devadatta, having planted his feet [firmly on the ground], loosed the arrow”. Ingalls et al. have translated *padabandha* as “foothold” (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.20, 1990, 487–488). Subramania Iyer reads *kṛtapadasaṅbandha* here.

²⁹In the Pāṇinian tradition, *samāveśa* means the application of multiple designations to refer to a single object. This is discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya* on A 1.4.1 – Patañjali, giving an example of *samāveśa*, says that Indra, Śakra, Puruhūta, and Purandara all apply to the same object (*ekasya dravyasya*) (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 296). Here, Helārāja seems to be saying that different words, such as “ring”, or “bracelet”, all ultimately refer to the same piece of gold.

³⁰See *Dravyasamuddeśa* 16.

invalid],³¹ and therefore, the unexpressedness (*avācyatva*) and unreality (*asatyatva*) of delimiters is established. [That is,] because purposive action is not effected [by delimiters] precisely because [delimiters] are unreal (*asatyatva*), and because verbal communication has [purposive action] as its aim, [delimiters] are not expressed (*avācyatva*). That is what is meant.

Objection: [if delimiters are not expressed], in [a word] such as “ring”, only the persistence of the original substance (*prakṛti*) would be determined [by the word]. [Reply:] even in this case there is no fault, because objects exist inasmuch as they are cognized (*jñāyamānatvena*), cognition (*jñāna*) cannot have its foundation in forms which are conceptual constructs, and therefore the persistence of mere formless, pure consciousness is established through one’s own awareness [of it] (*svasaṃvitsiddhi*).³²

Objection: since the denotation of the qualified as coloured (*uparakta*) by the qualifier is correct, what is the mistake in [considering that there is] the denotation of a subordinate element?³³ There is none whatsoever; with a view towards the true import (*tātparyadṛṣṭi*) of [the argument], it is merely [the view that words have] their basis (*padabandha*) solely in delimiters themselves that is refuted [by the objection]. But let [delimiters] be denoted as a secondary feature; as long as [the operation of denotation] does not cease [at the level of the delimiter], [the fact of all words] referring to the substance is established.

³¹Helārāja seems to be arguing that the objection stated in the introduction to the verse – that delimiters are co-referential with the delimited object – is invalid because those delimiting forms, such as ring, etc., are not permanently associated with the object, since gold can be melted down and reformed into a different shape. On the topic of the logical fallacy *sādhyasama*, see Matilal 1974.

³²This argument seems to be based on a passage from the *Mahābhāṣya*, where someone objects that one should not be able to use the word “pigeon” (*kapota*) to refer to the corpse of a pigeon, since “pigeon” should refer to a living thing. Patañjali replies that “according to the view that the original substance (*prakṛti*) persists in its transformations, even in this case there is no fault” (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, II, 325). Albrecht Wezler calls this doctrine *sarvasarvātmakavāda*, “according to which everything that represents a *prakṛti*, whatever the position it occupies in a given causal chain, does not cease to exist as such when it passes out of visibility”, disputing the interpretation of Hartmut Scharfe, who argues that Patañjali is referring to *satkāryavāda* (Wezler 1986, 166, see also Scharfe 1961, 155). In any case, Helārāja has modified the argument so that the *prakṛti* that persists in all things is really consciousness.

³³This objection echoes Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s argument against the Buddhist view that the object of perception is an unqualified particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). In the *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila argues that a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) always produces a cognition of the qualified that conforms to the qualifier itself (*svānurūpa*) (*Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra* 142, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978, 128). In the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarākṣita quotes this verse, and Kamalaśīla, in his commentary, glosses *svānurūpa* as “coloured by the nature of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇasvarūpoparakta*) – since a qualifier is said to cause the qualified thing to be grasped as coloured by the qualifier, otherwise there would be no such thing as a qualifier” (ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, I, 387). While both the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Ślokavārttika* raise counterarguments, Helārāja accepts this objection, with a caveat – that the qualifier is grasped as a secondary feature, rather than as the primary referent of the word. This recalls Patañjali’s pragmatic solution to the *jāti/dravya* problem: “For one who holds the word-meaning to be the individual, the individual is primary and the generic property is subordinate (*guṇabhūta*)” (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 246). This concession will also prove useful in refuting the argument raised in the next verse.

5

Following from that [argument] – because [the object of denotation] is coloured by qualifiers,³⁴ [he is able] to refute the fault of confusion [that might arise otherwise]; he says:

5 And the capacity [of a word] to mean everything is restrained because [the object] is differentiated by [its] forms, in the very same way that the capability of the eyes, etc., [is restrained] by a hollow stalk, etc.

Because there is no difference between *brahman* – which is characterized as the substance – and all [other] entities, [all] words would denote [*brahman*] (*tadabhidhāyitve śabdānām*), therefore [*brahman*] would be present in all cases [of denotation] (*sarvatra tasya bhāvāt*); and thus the **capacity [of a word] to mean everything**, that is, the confusion which is the state of having its object being denoted by [all] other words, would result as an unintended consequence. This is what is said in [the verse]. [But] since the activity [of each word] is restricted by the form [that is secondarily denoted] in each particular case, [words] are prevented from meaning everything, and thus there is no confusion. That is what is meant.

The substance that is *brahman* is presented by the word “pot”, attended by the form of the pot as a support.³⁵ In the same way, with the form of a cloth as a support, the word “cloth”... etc.; thus, the discrimination imposed by the delimiter is meant to be expressed. Just like [people] whose eyes are directed through a hollow tube see only that part of an object which is contained by the scope of [the tube], in the same way, the real object (*vastu*) is marked precisely by those different forms, [by people] whose capacity of perception³⁶ is restricted by nescience. And therefore, because the basis of verbal usage (*śabdāniveśa*) is in accordance with [one’s own] mental apprehension (*adhyavasāya*) [of the real object], it is denoted by words. That is what is meant.

When only the ability of a sense faculty to manifest [an object] is blocked by something such as a covering, the object [of perception] does not change. In the same way, when only the capacity for consciousness (*saṃvedanaśakti*) of the individual selves (*jīva*) – who are conceptualized as distinct [from *brahman*] through the delimitation [brought about by] beginningless nescience – is blocked, so that [multiple] expressions, which each have difference as their content, are employed [in the

³⁴This argument, besides referring to the objection directly preceding, also recalls the objection raised in the introduction to verse 4. There, the opponent states that a qualifier operates through colouration (*uparañjaka*), and that it is not expressed by the word that it qualifies.

³⁵The metaphor being employed here is, perhaps, that of an attendant (*puraḥsara*) who leads someone ahead to present them before an audience. See also Abhinavagupta’s use of *unmukhībhavati* in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (Ratié 2010, 470-471).

³⁶*drkśakti* is usually understood as the capacity of the perceiving agent, although the syntax here (...*drkśaktibhir ākāra-bhedair*) seems to suggest that it is the different forms which possess this capacity. Raghunātha Śarmā interprets this as *tathāvidhāḥ paricchinnadrkśaktayaḥ puruṣā ghaṭādyākārabhedair eva vastuto ’bhinnam api vastu brahmarūpaṃ bhinnam iva paśyanti* (Śarmā 1991, 214). “Individual beings, in such a way [i.e., as if their eyes were looking through a tube], whose capacity for perception is restricted, see the real object, that is, *brahman* – even though it is really undifferentiated –, through different forms such as pot, etc., as if it were differentiated”. I have followed his interpretation in my translation.

place of] a [single] expression for a [single] object that has been divided (*vicchinna*),³⁷ the essence [of reality itself] is not defiled by nescience; this is what he indicates by the example of the **hollow stalk**. [When he says in the verse,] “through a hollow stalk, etc.,” because of the word *etc.*, [one understands] an obstruction, such as something born of beauty (*mūrtyabhijana*), which blocks one’s attention (*avadhāna*); for where there is attention paid towards an object alone, it is only that object which is ascertained (*avadhāryate*). “Something born of beauty”³⁸ means the beauty of a [particular] form; someone who is distracted by it does not see another [object].

6

[Objection:] in that case, words like “configuration” (*sanniveśa*),³⁹ which are based solely on form [and not on substance], would denote solely a property [and not the property-possessor], and thus the fact of substance being the object of words in all cases would be demolished. Having raised this objection, he says:

6 The permanent [substance] is denoted even by a word that expresses [solely] forms of such a kind, since [those forms] are identical with the real.

Words such as “configuration” **express forms** such as a configuration, even though their real nature is merely [to act as] delimiters. [But] because delimiters are ultimately not separate from reality, when they are extracted from [reality], their real nature has no [independent] real nature, and thus they are real only in as much as they are identical with [reality]; therefore, it is really that permanent substance, the substrate of delimiters, which is denoted, even when such a denotation [in which a word like “configuration”, expressing only a form,] is used. For delimiters have reality (*tattva*) as their identity (*ātman*), but they are not the identity of reality; because of this pervasion [of reality in all delimiters], absolutely all delimiters, existing through their identity [with reality], [can be] denoted precisely in that sense. For when the substrate of delimiters (*upādhimat*) is concealed, delimiters are not delimiters [of anything]. However, when [a delimiter] is extracted from [its substrate], because it is independent in so much as it is a substrate for other properties (*dharmāntara*), it is really a substrate for [other] delimiters, rather than a delimiter itself.⁴⁰ That is the intention [of the verse].

³⁷That is, the term *brahman*, which denotes a universal self, is expressed using multiples of the term *jīva*, which denotes individual selves. See the commentary on verse 7 where Helārāja glosses *vicchinna* and *viccheda*, which has been translated there as “interrupted” and “interruption”.

³⁸Here Helārāja gives a gloss for *mūrtyabhijana*, suggesting that *mūrtyabhijana* is a technical term that is quoted from another source. However, I have yet to find this term elsewhere. It is also possible that this sentence was originally a marginal gloss in a manuscript, which was eventually incorporated into the text itself.

³⁹In the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, Bhartṛhari defines a genus (*ākṛti*) as a specific configuration (*sanniveśaviśeṣa*) that is qualified by connection (*saṃyogaviśeṣaṇa*) (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 15).

⁴⁰A parallel example is given in the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* to verse 3 of the *Guṇasamuddeśa*. A quality (*guṇa*) in and of itself, when it is extracted from the substance that it qualifies, does not have degree; it is only when the quality acts like a substance, in that it is a substrate for other qualities, that it has degree (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 204).

7

[Objection:] If, in that way, even properties – since [you say] they are [really] property-possessors in this alternate state – are permanent and real, then this principle – that forms are unreal, and [only] the substance is real – is untenable. Having raised this objection, he says:

7 There is no difference between the real and the unreal, [according to] the tradition [passed down] from the elders. What [others] think⁴¹ is “the unreal” is really the real which has not been [properly] examined.

This is the meaning here: in this non-dualist system of thought, real and unreal are not two things, because consequently (*prasaṅgāt*), the [doctrine of] of non-duality would fail. In fact, absolute reality is really singular, i.e., non-dual. And that [absolute reality], which supports the manifestation [brought about] by beginninglessly-established nescience,⁴² does not appear according to its true nature as an object of cognition for [any given] perceiver; thus, in the guise of forms that are agitated by multiple conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*), [reality] becomes fit for worldly transactions. And therefore, it is really that [absolute reality] which appears as having differences in its true nature which are inferred from the manifoldness of [its] forms, not anything else, because there is no other thing that is distinct from it.

And among [the real and unreal], that which is manifestation (*prakāśa*) is knowledge. That which is non-manifestation, i.e. darkness, is nescience. [But] non-manifestation – that is, the absence of manifestation – cannot be established by any valid means of cognition at all. And therefore, nescience – the manifestation of difference – is really just the interruption of manifestation, that is, the absence of the manifestation of [reality] as a single entity. And in that case, if “interruption” (*viccheda*) is understood as the persistence [of reality] being interrupted (*vicchinna*), then [even that] real,⁴³ [albeit] interrupted manifestation (*vicchinnaṅprakāśa*) is really knowledge. However, nescience, [if it is understood as] only interruption (*vicchedamātra*), whose own nature is subordinate [to that which it interrupts], [then it] does not exist whatsoever; therefore, when considering the absolute truth, no such thing as the unreal is tenable at all. According to those who know the Vedas (*brahmaṇid*), it is really the real, appearing differently according to [one’s own particular] representation [of it], which is termed the unreal – captivating if left unexamined –, that is, the proliferation (*prapañca*) [of phenomenal reality]. And therefore, [the unreal], which is captivating if left unexamined,⁴⁴ is established through analysis as **really the real**; it is this undifferentiated real which our

⁴¹Although in the verse, the subject of the verb “they think” (*manyante*) would naturally be construed as “the elders” (*ṛddhi*), according to Helārāja, the subject of the verb is their philosophical “opponents” (*tīrthikā*).

⁴²For *anādisiddhāvidyāvīlasitasahaṃ*, all manuscripts omit the *anusvāra*, putting the word in compound with *pramātrīṣayayā*. All printed editions, following the editio princeps, have the *anusvāra*. This reading is supported by a parallel passage in the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* on *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 40, where *avidyāvīlasitasahaṃ* is used to qualify *brahma* (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 47).

⁴³All three printed editions read *satyā* here, indicating that it is an adjective applying to *vidyā*, although this reading is not attested in any manuscript.

⁴⁴While in Bharṭṛhari’s verse, the adjective “unexamined” (*avicārīta*) qualifies the real, Helārāja interprets it as “captivating if left unexamined” (*avicāritaramaṇīya*) and uses it to qualify the unreal. The term *avicāritaramaṇīya* is

opponents, who maintain the doctrine of difference, **think is the unreal**, which is difference; by reflecting upon this, nescience is dissolved, and [all] doctrines are established in the singularity of *brahman*. Thus it is said:

Only the true, pure [knowledge] taught [in the Vedas]... etc.⁴⁵

8

In that way, it is really *brahman* that is conceptualized by this or that form; thus it is established that all words really have [*brahman*] — by means of delimiters proper to this or that [form] — as their object. Thus he says:

8 It is really the unconceptualized real which assumes the form of conceptualization. And there is no temporal difference in it, yet temporal difference is grasped,

It is really the ultimately **unconceptualized** – that is, not within the scope of conceptual constructs – **real**, which – being conceptualized in ordinary [verbal] transactions, because nothing else exists – embraces (*samavalambate*) **conceptualization** – that is, manifesting as manifold differences under the influence of beginninglessly-established nescience, [and] taking the form of different individual souls, in a way that corresponds to [each individual]; thus, the manifoldness of space, divided by the power of spatial extension (*dik*), which has material proliferation (*mūrtivivarta*) as its substrate, is capable of supporting causal succession. In that way, although not impelled by time, the real, which is without beginning or end, manifests [temporal] succession – referred to as the transformations of existence such as birth, etc. – under the influence of [the powers of] obstruction and permission, which rely on the power of independence called “time”. That is what is meant.

9

Objection: there should be no manifestation, in reality, of something that is not existent. Having raised this doubt, he settles it with [this] example:

9 just as the properties of the object of cognition absolutely do not belong to cognition itself, and, although seemingly identical, it is established that they are absolutely non-identical,

He says that, according to *Vijñānavāda*, because the form of the object of cognition is essentially unreal, a **property** which belongs to [the object], such as blue, which is insentient, **absolutely does**

commonly used in Buddhist texts to qualify conventional reality, as Jan Willem de Jong notes, from the 8th century onward (1989, 211). While it is generally used in a negative sense, it is used in a positive sense in the *Tattvopaplava-siṃha*, the only extant text purporting to be from the *Cārvāka* tradition (Franco 1987, 44).

⁴⁵*Vākyapadīya* 1.8-9, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 30-36. “Monists and dualists have many [different] doctrines, based on their [own] explanations, according to their own conceptions. [But] only the true, pure knowledge that is taught [in the Vedas], expressed in a single syllable and connected with the breath, is consistent with all doctrines.”

not belong to the cognition [of blue], which is sentient; therefore, the sentient and the insentient cannot be identical, [even] in part. Thus it is said:

In the case of partial identity, every [cognition] would cognize every [object]. But in the case of full identity, knowledge would become nescience.⁴⁶

10

And therefore, a cognition, tinged by properties which do not belong to it, manifests in the ordinary world where nescience operates, even though its real nature is pure consciousness; thus he also gives another valid example:

10 just as⁴⁷ transformations [of the real] absolutely do not belong to the real, and, although seemingly identical, the real is absolutely non-identical [with its transformations].

The untransformed primordial reality of the Sāṃkhya, a knot of all transformations, in a seed state, [and] undifferentiated, is, ultimately, not burdened by [its] transformations like *mahat*, etc. For, possessing the power to transform into *mahat*, etc., [when it is] in the state in which all qualities (*guṇa*) are equalized, [primordial reality] is completely different from the manifoldness of [its] transformations which arise by force of the conflict [that occurs] when the qualities [of *sattva*, *tamas*, and *rajas*] are unequal (*guṇavaiśamyavimarda*).⁴⁸ And since, in the world, the perception of [reality] is impossible without the ascertainment of [its] transformations such as *mahat*, etc., in all doctrines, nescience is always present. Since, in this way, the manifestation of the real as supported by unreal forms is established, the concomitance between what was to be proved (*sādhya*), [that the real manifests as unreal forms, and the reason (*hetu*), that perception is affected by nescience,] is understood from the meaning [of the verse].

11

Now how is this understood, that forms are unreal, while what is different from them is real? [In reply,] he says:

11 That reality which remains at the end, when all forms are destroyed, that is permanent, that is expressed by the word, and that is not different from the word.

This [verse] is stated according to the *Bhāṣya*:

⁴⁶*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.434 (ed. Tosaki 1988, II, 115). As Birgit Kellner points out, there are two versions of this verse – one which was transmitted within Buddhist tradition, and another, with the verse halves reversed, which was transmitted outside the tradition (Kellner 2009, 180 note). The version Helārāja cites is the latter, corresponding to the verse as it is quoted in the commentaries on the *Ślokavārttika*.

⁴⁷Both Rau and Subramania Iyer read *tathā* here. However, Helārāja's reading seems to be *yathā*, since he considers this verse to provide another example for the principle stated in verse 8.

⁴⁸For *guṇavaiśamyavimarda*, see *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 46 (ed. Prasad Sarma 1922, 4).

For it is that, whose essence is not destroyed, which is permanent.⁴⁹

Moreover, it is said there [in that passage in the *Bhāṣya*]:

That reality which is really the gold itself, endowed again with a different shape, becomes a pair of earrings the colour of *khadira* embers.⁵⁰

Through this very example, the reality of undivided *brahman* is expressed with respect to its transformations. For, just as when forms like a necklace (*rucaka*) are destroyed, it is only the gold in it that is real, in the same way, when the multitude of endless transformations have perished, it is the intransient *brahman*, remaining at the end of everything, that is real, and it is only [*brahman*] which is really permanent. In contrast, it is said that, in worldly [verbal] transactions, the permanence of entities such as universals (*jāti*) is relative. That is to say, when the individual instances (*vyakti*) [of a cow] have perished, the universal, such as cow-ness, which remains, is permanent. But even in that case, when distinctions [between universals] such as horse-ness have perished, it is only the [element of] earth that is real. And even in that case, when distinctions [between elements] such as water have perished, the only thing that is real, which can be made known by a pronoun, is the concrete thing itself.⁵¹ And even then, because [only] consciousness (*saṃvit*), which is intransient, persists, when the form of the object of cognition is analyzed, it is only [consciousness] which is [found to be] the absolute reality; thus, one is enjoined [to follow the precept,] “one should acknowledge that [absolute reality] is neither like this nor like that,”⁵² through meditation (*bhāvanā*). And since consciousness is the highest speech – consisting of *śabdabrahman* – in the form of *paśyantī*,⁵³ the essence of *brahman* is **not different from** the absolute word. But at the level of the manifestation [of the everyday world], there is difference, which takes the form of manifested speech (*vaikharī*). And [even] at that level, it is really [*brahman*] which is permanent, expressed by words in the form of universals, etc. But even in that case, it is because a verbal expression is established when it has come to rest in [its] inner source, [i.e., *śabdabrahman*,] that the object [of the expression], which is contained within the nature [of that expression], can be expressed;⁵⁴ therefore it is established

⁴⁹*Mahābhāṣya Paspasāhnikā* (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 7).

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹See *Bhūyodravayasamuddeśa* 3 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 187).

⁵²For a discussion on the translation of *neti neti*, see Acharya 2013. As Acharya points out, Maṇḍana relates the practice of *neti neti* to this verse in the *Dravyasamuddeśa* (2013, 3 note). For a brief discussion on the Upaniṣadic use of the verb *upās*, see Olivelle 1998b, 176.

⁵³Bhartṛhari is generally thought to have three levels of language in his system of philosophy – *paśyantī*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikharī*, while later Kaśmīri thinkers like Somānanda advocate a fourth, higher level, *parā vāk* (Dwivedi 1991, 96). However, George Cardona argues that Bhartṛhari recognizes four levels of language, including a supreme form of *paśyantī* – *param paśyantīrūpam* (Cardona 1993, 138 note). Helārāja’s wording here, *paśyantīrūpā parā vāk*, is somewhat ambiguous. Houben argues that Helārāja seems to think of *parā vāk* as the same as *paśyantī* (Houben 1995, 166-168).

⁵⁴This is possibly a reference to the Vṛtti on *Vākyapadīya* 1.107: “Now, this inner cognizer, abiding in the subtle nature of speech, comes forth as language in order to manifest its true nature”. (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 174). In the edition of Wilhelm Rau, this is listed as verse 1.115. This passage also recalls verse 15 of Utpaladeva’s *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi*, which is frequently quoted by Abhinavagupta: “The accomplishment of purpose [*kr̥tārthatā*] of the separated cognitive apprehensive [*vicchinnavimarśa*], ‘this’ – is the cognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*] of rest [*viśrānti*] in its own essential nature, [expressed] ‘I am he’” (trans. Lawrence 2009, 647).

that there is no difference between the expression and what is expressed, as it was settled in the first *kāṇḍa*. Thus he will say:

That singular [reality] is seen as the word, the object, and their relationship.⁵⁵

12

[In verse 10,] it was said, “and, although seemingly identical, the real is absolutely non-identical [with its transformations]”. Firstly, he expounds upon the absolute non-identity [that was mentioned there]:

12 It does not exist nor does it not exist, it is not singular, it is not separate, it is not connected nor divided, it is not transformed nor is it otherwise.

Because it transcends all worldly transactions which are transformations [of it], in its absolute form, the real is not identical with [its] transformations. That is, it cannot be said to **exist**. This is because a thing which is delimited by existence is not the true nature of the real, because it does not descend into the world in its [true] form. **Nor does it not exist**: this is because – since something delimited by non-existence also has no reality – the real, if it were understood to be identical to existence (*bhāvātmaka*),⁵⁶ could not be discerned by [any] valid means of cognition.

The real is not a particular entity that is delimited by the singular number, because the real, which is not delimited, is, in fact, undifferentiated, and because, consequently, one cannot conclude that it is **singular**. Nor is it qualified as being comprised of **separateness**, because its parts have no reality.

Nor is it delimited by connection or division, since [any] second element is not admissible by [any] valid means of cognition. From what would it be differentiated or **divided**? Or to what would it be **connected**?

By rejecting [the doctrine of] real transformation (*pariṇāma*), we accept the doctrine of apparent manifestation (*vivarta*); thus it is not **transformed**. And because of the manifestation (*vivartana*) [of the world] due to the wondrous activity (*adbhutayā vṛtṭyā*)⁵⁷ taking the form of multitudes of different beings [in the world], it is not even possible to say that it is “untransformed”; therefore the real, which transcends all representation, is absolute *brahman*.

⁵⁵*Dravyasamuddeśa* 14.

⁵⁶Raghunātha Śarmā emends *bhāvātmaka* to *abhāvātmaka* (1991, 223). In that case, the sentence would read, “the real, if it were identical to non-existence, could not be discerned by any valid means of cognition.” However, it is also possible to read the sentence as it is – that is, existence and non-existence are mutually dependent entities, and thus existence presupposes non-existence. As Helārāja says below, *brahman* is devoid of both.

⁵⁷T and C_T read *atyadbhutayā* here. Bhartṛhari uses the term *atyadbhutā vṛtṭi* once in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* and *adbhutā vṛtṭi* twice in the *Kālasamuddeśa*. Houben understands *vṛtṭi* in the sense of a “process” rather than “activity”, by which previously non-existent things become manifest, a process for which “no logical explanation can be found” (Houben 1995, 301-302). Peri Sarveswara Sharma translates it as “a miraculous course of action” (1972, 52 and 58). Note that in the two passages in which *adbhutā* appears, *kuto 'py adbhutayā...* (*Kālasamuddeśa* 17, ed. Subramania Iyer 1973, 46) and *yathaiṅvadbhutayā...* (*Kālasamuddeśa* 26 ed. Subramania Iyer 1973, 49), the reading could easily be *atyadbhutā* without any metrical deficiencies.

13

And now, since [it was also said in verse 10 that] it is ascertained as seemingly identical [with its transformations], [when considered] in terms of nescience, he says:

13 It does not exist and it does, it is singular, it is [many] separate [entities], it is connected and divided, it is transformed, it is otherwise.

It is really [*brahman*] which has the ability to produce the appearance of the transformations of being and non-being, and which is subject to conventional [verbal usage] delimited by existence and non-existence, [expressed in terms of] “it exists” and “it does not exist”; but by its very nature, absolute *brahman* is without existence or non-existence, without being or non-being. And it is really that [absolute *brahman*] which produces the pragmatic convention of singular and multiple, in the form of universals and particulars, and [so] it can even be [thought of as] delimited by number. In the same way, it is also delimited by connection, since it manifests as connected to something else. In that way, the ascertainment of distinctions within it is possible. Therefore, it is really [*brahman*], seeming to come into being as the aggregate of [all] transformations, that appears as stable, in the form of space, etc.; thus it was said that the real seems to be identical [to its transformations].⁵⁸

14

And that being so, since everything consists of [*brahman*], those worldly manifestations (*vyavahārāḥ*), even when they are mutually contradictory, merge in that very [*brahman*]. Thus, he says:

14 That singular [reality] is seen as the word, the object, and [their] relationship. It is what is seen, the seeing, the seer, and the purpose of the seeing.

The expressed, the expression, and [their] relationship are really non-dual. For, in the inner reality (*āntare tattve*), the powers of sound and meaning are united,⁵⁹ and thus at the level of the apparent manifestation [of everyday reality] – because it is really [the absolute real] which branches out as sound and meaning – [the two powers] have different manifestations, in the form of the expressed and the expression. That is to say, nescience [arises] in the form of the cognition and what is cognized. This topic has already been settled by us in detail in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*, and it can be understood from there.

Also, it is really the [absolute real] which manifests itself (*vivarta*) in the form of seer and what is seen. That is – firstly, **what is seen** [refers to] the totality of all beings, which is cognized as something which

⁵⁸Although all manuscripts and printed editions read *tadātmaiva* here, Helārāja seems to be referring back to verses 9 and 10, which read *tadātmeva*. Thus I have emended the text here. As Helārāja says above, verse 12 explains the absolute non-identity between *brahman* and its manifestations, while verse 13 explains the apparent identity between them.

⁵⁹This seems to be a reference to the Vṛtti on *Vākyapadīya* 1.44 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 102): “But in the sequenceless essence of speech, the powers of sound and meaning are united”. The term *akrame vāgātmani* in the Vṛtti is replaced here with *āntare tattve*. This passage also recalls the *āntaropādāna* in Helārāja’s commentary on verse 11 above.

has been brought within the scope of consciousness; precisely because it is cognized, [the object of cognition] is ultimately one with the cognition [itself], since what is unmanifested is incapable of manifestation; thus it was laid out and explained in the previous *kāṇḍa* and in the *Advayasiddhi*.⁶⁰ Even the seer, who is an individual soul (*jīva*), whose delimitation is effected by nescience, who is limited, a transmigrator, an enjoyer, [even he] is really *brahman*, since, because [the *jīva*] is conscious, a difference [between them] cannot really be justified. This is what is communicated [by the word “seer”]. And by pointing out the [two] main participants of the action (*kāraka*) – the agent and the object –, [all] the other participants of the action are also hinted at (*ākṣepa*); thus, the apparent manifestation of reality (*vivarta*), complete in itself, is explained.

And since by the word **seeing**, which points out the main action, the other actions [which are involved in seeing] are hinted at, the apparent manifestation of action, the nature of which is something to be accomplished, is also expressed. For the apparent manifestation of action is differentiated by the power of time, and the apparent manifestation of matter is differentiated by the power of space; therefore the whole world is explained as the apparent manifestations of fixed forms and actions.

And by the word **purpose**, the result of the aggregated actions⁶¹ is pointed out; thus, *brahman* is explained, conforming [to the theory of] apparent manifestation, as the structure of the whole world – that is, [in terms of] action (*sādhya*), factors of action (*sādhana*) and its result (*phala*). Thus [it was said],

[it is *brahman*] who is the single seed of all [things], by which this state of multiplicity [is produced], [who] abides as enjoyer, enjoyed, and enjoyment,

in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*⁶². And it is there that the teaching about reality was settled by us. And because it takes the form of a cognition and an expression (*prakhyopākhyā*),⁶³ conventional reality is dual, and thus [reality is seen as] **the word, the object, and [their] relationship**. There [in the verse], [the duality] is pointed out by those [two] different [terms] – **it is what is seen and the seeing**. And thus this form [of reality], which consists of nescience, is described. But [in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa*,] absolute [reality], in which the proliferation (*prapañca*) [of ordinary reality] has been extinguished, will be explained:

The knowers of Vedanta abide by the only object which is real, [namely], that in

⁶⁰This seems to be another text by Helārāja, no longer extant. It is mentioned again below as well as in his commentary on *Saṅkhyāsamuddeśa* 26 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1973, 111).

⁶¹As Bhartr̥hari explains in *Kriyāsamuddeśa* 5, when one refers to an action, that single action can be understood as a sequence of related actions. As Helārāja says in his commentary, an action such as “cooking” (*pacati*) is, in fact, composed of other actions, such as “putting the vessel on the fire” (*adhiśrayaṇa*). However, all of these intermediate actions really have cooking as their purpose (Subramania Iyer 1974, 8-9; Bandini 1980, 72).

⁶²*Vākyapadīya* 1.4 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 21).

⁶³Perhaps the earliest occurrence of this term is at the beginning of Utpaladeva’s *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi*, where it is used to qualify *sattā* (ed. Kaul Shāstrī 1921, 1). In his study of the *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi*, David Peter Lawrence has translated *prakhyā* as “basic knowledge” and *upākhyā* as “expressed knowledge”, following Harabhata Shastri who glosses the two words as *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* (Lawrence 2009, 642). Here, Helārāja seems to understand them in the sense of a cognized object and the verbal expression of that object.

which seer, seen, and seeing are not distinguished.⁶⁴

15

It was said that, at the end, when all forms have withdrawn, that which remains is real. In that case, this objection is possible: at the end, nothing remains. Having raised another doubt, that this whole world manifests as non-existent – that is, as having no foundation –, in order to establish causally (*hetunā*) the pre-existence of an undifferentiated origin, starting with an example (*dṛṣṭāntopakramam*) that shows the persistence [of a substance when its transformations disappear], he says:

15 Just as, when the transformations go away, [only] the gold in the ring is real, in the same way, they say that, when the transformations go away, [only] the absolute, primordial matter is real.

Just as, in a ring,⁶⁵ in which the transformation, that is, the state of being a ring, has gone away, **the gold** remains as the one reality, **in the same way**, when the transformations such as earth, etc., have gone away, the **primordial matter** that persists [in them] remains as the undifferentiated reality. That is accepted. [When he says, in the verse,] “**they say**”, he means that *brahman* is established by scripture (*āgama*), which is a valid means of cognition. And thus it was said, “it is taught as singular”,⁶⁶ for [it is taught] in scripture (*śruti*), “this reality is only the *ātman*”.⁶⁷ And inference [serves] merely to confirm this. That is, transformations cannot manifest out of [a reality that is] without expression, non-existent, [and] without foundation,⁶⁸ since non-being is incompatible with being; for nothing is seen to originate from a hare’s horn. And since, in the form of cognition, [the primordial matter] persists in the world, [the world] was really preceded by [the primordial matter]. Thus it will be said:

Non-being is not produced as being, nor does being ever reach a state of inexpressibility.⁶⁹

⁶⁴*Saṃbandhasamuddeśa* 72 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 173). I have followed Wilhelm Rau’s reading, *cāvikalpita*, while Subramania Iyer reads *vāvikalpita*. Houben has translated this verse as “Those who know the conclusion of the threefold (sc. knowledge, the Veda), have taken recourse to the truthfulness of that *artha* ‘thing’, in which seer, seen and seeing are *avikalpita* ‘not differentiated’” (1995, 292).

⁶⁵Although all manuscripts, except for H, read *dve kuṇḍale* here, that reading is difficult to construe grammatically. I have omitted the *dve*, following the three printed editions.

⁶⁶*Vākyapadīya* 1.2a (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 14).

⁶⁷This quote, *ātmaivedaṃ satyam*, is very close to a famous passage in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* which reads *ātmaivedaṃ sarvaṃ* (7.25.2, ed. Olivelle 1998a, 272). However, all but one of the manuscripts agree that Helārāja’s reading is *ātmaivedaṃ satyam*. It is possible that he is quoting from memory; it could also be a conflation of *ātmaivedaṃ sarvaṃ* with another common quotation from the *Chāndogya*: *tat satyaṃ, sa ātmā* (6.8.7, ed. Olivelle 1998a, 252). I have not found another possible source for this quotation.

⁶⁸This reading, *padād*, chosen by Subramania Iyer, is found only in C₁; T reads *padānād*. All other manuscripts, as well as the editio princeps, read [’]*parād*. However, the phrase *asad apadam* in the introduction to this verse lends credence to the reading *padād*.

⁶⁹*Saṃbandhasamuddeśa* 61ab (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 166).

The power of consciousness of [*brahman*], which is consciousness, is not really transformed (*apariṇāma*); thus, because of the absence of transformation, [this verse] does not [express] the doctrine of true transformation (*pariṇāma*), which is the point of view of the Sāṃkhya; rather, [it expresses] the view of apparent manifestation (*vivarta*). Since the difference between the two is explained by us in [the commentary on the first two kāṇḍas⁷⁰ of] the *Vākyapadīya*, it can be ascertained from there. It will also be explained here [in the *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*] in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa*. Moreover, it is declared in the *Advayasiddhi* that other causes [for the transformations seen in the world] are rejected; if someone is interested, [that argument] can be learnt from that very place.

16

In that way, having proven that *brahman*, which is denoted by the word *ātman*, is the substance because it is the absolute form of [all] things [expressed by] words, in order to sum up [the argument] that it is really [*brahman*]⁷¹ that is expressed by all words, he says:

16 That [primordial matter] is expressed by all words, and words are not separate from it. And [even though] they are not separate, there is a relationship between [words and the primordial matter], as if they were distinct [from one another].

Due to the preponderance (*bhūyastva*) of nescience in the everyday world, which takes the form of the abundance of differences that are framed (*parikalpita*) by this or that delimiter, it is really *brahman* – which takes on different aspects as delimited by any given particular form – that is the object of all words. That is the meaning expressed [in the verse]. For words, even ones like *ātman*, *brahman*, and *tattva* – even though the delimiters [through which they operate] are embraced (*samavalambita*)⁷² [by *brahman*] – operate according to the substance, because that which is undelimited transcends the scope of speech; for those who know the Vedas point out that reality transcends both speech and mind. However, words like *ātman* are closer [to *brahman*], compared to words like “pot”. And since everything consists of [*brahman*], even [all] words are identical to it, just as, originally, there was no distinction [between words and *brahman*].⁷³ Also, the word as if (*iva*) means that, even though they are ultimately non-different, there is a conventional⁷⁴ difference [between them]

⁷⁰This is perhaps a reference to the commentary, now lost, that Helārāja mentions in one of the introductory verses on the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 1).

⁷¹Although Helārāja claims the following verse demonstrates that all words express *brahman*, the feminine gender of the pronoun in the verse would indicate that Bhartṛhari is really referring to *prakṛti*, from the previous verse.

⁷²Raghunātha Śarmā glosses *śabdāḥ samavalambitopādhyayaḥ* as *śabdās tattadupādḥin svasvapravṛttinimittatayā vācyatvena samavalambyaiva* (1991, 230), indicating that *śabda* is the subject of the verb *samavalamb* – that is, “words rely on delimiters”. However, in his gloss of verse 8, Helārāja states, *avikalpitaṃ... tattvam... vikalparūpam... samavalambate*, “unconceptualized reality embraces conceptualization”; with this in mind, *samavalambitopādhyayaḥ* could be understood as delimiters which are embraced – or manifested by – an ultimately undifferentiated reality.

⁷³Although Raghunātha Śarmā prints *yathāvibhaktam*, in his commentary, he seems to understand it as if it were *yathā vibhaktam*, glossing *vibhaktam* as *vyākhyātam: sarvasya ca brahmanvikāratvāt śabdā api svaprakṛtibhūtabrahmābhinnā eva yathā vyākhyātam prak* (1991, 231). I read *yathā vibhaktam* here.

⁷⁴I read *sāṃvṛto* here, which is the reading chosen by Subramania Iyer, although it is only attested in manuscript T. All other manuscripts read *sām-*. On the difference between *sāṃvṛti* and *sāṃvṛtti*, see Nagao and Kawamura 1991, 13ff.

in worldly affairs, which is unreal. This is precisely how a relationship between the two [that is, between words and *brahman*,] can be justified.

17-18

Objection: this [teaching] is a delusion, that is, [you advocate] disregarding the reality of beings, whose different forms are [evidently] ascertained, [and] teach that the highest reality is non-difference, which is not ascertained; having raised this objection, in order to establish this [doctrine of non-difference] with an example, he says:

- 17 Self and other, friend and adversary, speaker, spoken and purpose [of the speaking]: just
 as, in a dream, a single mind takes these contradictory forms,
- 18 in [absolute] reality – unborn, permanent, and devoid of sequence –, contradiction, in
 the form of birth, etc., is perceived.

The proliferation that accompanies the dream state is unreal, because it is disrupted by waking; this is accepted by all theoreticians. By this very example it is established that, even when awake, different beings are unreal, because they do not persist into the fourth state [of consciousness], since, indeed, it is only that which persists in all states that is real, and that is pure consciousness, which is not disrupted. But [even] the different states [of sleeping and waking], which are disrupted because they are ephemeral, do not [really] exist, like [the states of] happiness and despair [do not exist]. That is, [states] such as love, etc. and happiness, etc., because they have no essence of their own, do not transform the nature of pure consciousness. Therefore, even those different states are afflicted by the impurity of different forms.

In a dream, the manifestation of contradictory forms is a conceptualized (*vaikalpikī*) vision, which is restricted to each individual perceiver. For the enjoyer – that is, the transmigrator, conforming to the activity of [his own] mind – is conceptualized; but [even] he is *brahman*, because he is conscious by nature. And therefore, he, a lord because of his independence [only] in so far as it is in [his dream] creation⁷⁵ – since there is no other material cause [of his dream] – having appeared as [dream] beings, enjoys [them] in the guise of friend and foe, through the illusion of *samsāra* which consists of passion, hatred, etc., having conversations, etc., with others. Thus those who are skilled in the essence of Vedānta say:

Having divided himself by means of himself, having created varied, individual beings,
the lord of all, of which all things consist, the enjoyer, engages in the dream.⁷⁶

⁷⁵Yogarāja, commenting on the same verse below, says that, for the *brahmvādins*, the independence of *brahman* exists only in dream: *brahmaṇaḥ svāntryaṃ svapna eva brahmvādibhiḥ abhyupagatam* (ed. Chatterji 1916, 76). Helārāja, on the other hand, seems to understand the enjoyer (*bhoktr*) in the verse as the individual soul (*pratyagātman*).

⁷⁶Rau lists this as verse 1.140 of the *Vākyapadīya*, whereas Subramania Iyer considers this to be part of the *Vṛtti* on verse 1.119 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 195).

By the word “enjoyer”, the creation by the individual soul [that is, the dream,] is expressed. And because he is “the lord of all”, in the form of *brahman*, he is said to be capable of creation. And, they say, because “all things consist of him”, the arrangement of multifarious beings, which have no other material cause, has the self as its material cause. And thus, [when it says in the verse that] “he divides himself by means of himself”, because there is no difference between agent and object, the imaginability (*vaikalpikatva*) of this creation is clearly stated. On the other hand, divine creation (*aiśvarī śṛṣṭi*), expressed by the word “everything” (*viśva*)⁷⁷ [as opposed to the word “all” (*sarva*)], which has its material cause outside [the individual soul], [experienced] in the waking state, is common to all perceivers.

Objection: [waking and dream realities] are different, due to the possession (*grahāveśa*)⁷⁸ of stability [in waking] or instability [in a dream].⁷⁹ [Reply:] Nevertheless, because [waking reality] is impelled by nescience, it is equally unreal. While nescience exists, [the world] is merely another illusion, a veil (*āvāraka*) over the power of consciousness, called sleep (*nidrā*).⁸⁰ By force of that [illusion], those [who understand reality] from a lower point of view (*arvāgdṛk*) have a fallacious conception of erroneous [cognition] with regards to [dreams]. But for those [who understand reality] in the absolute sense, with respect to absolute *brahman* – free from birth and death, undivided, stable, and consisting of consciousness and bliss (*cidānanda*) –, it is really the whole world – in the states of waking, sleeping, etc., taking the form of the apparent transformations of matter and action –, that is unreal. On the other hand, it is established that what is ultimately [real] is the mere universality

⁷⁷Gauḍapāda, in his commentary on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, refers to the waking state as *viśva* (ed. Bhattacharya 1943, 1). In *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 3-5, the waking state is called *vaiśvānara*, the dream state is called *taijasa*, and the state of dreamless sleep is called *prājñā* (ed. Olivelle 1998a, 474). There, the self in the dreamless state is called *sarveśvara*, while here, Helārāja interprets *sarveśvara* as the self in the dream state. Abhinavagupta also refers to these three states in *Paramārthasāra* 35 (ed. Chatterji 1916, 76), and Yogarāja, in his commentary, quotes this same verse from the *Vākyapadīya* when he explains the dream state (78). Evidently, there was a tradition of understanding this verse in the context of Gauḍapāda’s states of consciousness. Abhinavagupta’s verse is a reworking of Aḍiṣeṣa’s *Paramārthasāra* 31 (ed. Danielson 1980, 22; see also Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011, 2ff).

⁷⁸The term *grahāveśa* generally refers to demonic possession, although in philosophical discourse, it has been used as a metaphor or simile for an erroneous belief. For example, in *Acintyastava* 16 – *bhāvagrahagrahāveśaḥ paratantraḥ sti kas tadā*, “What [kind of] seizure (*grahāveśa*) of materialism (*bhāvagraha*) is then [the concept of an independent] dependent nature!” (ed. & trans. Lindtner 1982, 144-145). This possession is then cured by the “medicine” of a true teaching – *etat tat paramaṁ tattvaṁ niḥsvabhāvārthadeśanā | bhāvagrahagrhitānāṁ cikitsyam anuttarā*, “The ultimate truth (*tattva*) is the teaching that things (*artha*) are without own-being. That is the unsurpassed medicine for those obsessed by the fever of positivism (*bhāvagraha*) (*Acintyastava* 52, ed. & trans. Lindtner 1982, 156-157). Similarly, in the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* to *Gauḍapādakārikā* 4.55, *yadā punar mantrāusadhiviryēṇeva grahāveśo yathoktādvaitadarśanenāvidyodbhūtahetuphalāveśo [']panīto bhavati tadā tasmīn kṣīṇe nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ* (ed. Röer 1850, 560), “When the possession (*āveśa*) of cause and effect, produced by nescience, is removed by the teaching of non-duality as said [previously] – just as demonic possession (*grahāveśa*) [is removed] by the potency of mantras and medicinal herbs – then, when that is destroyed, there is no production of cause and effect.”

⁷⁹Śaṅkara presents the same pūrvapakṣa in his commentary on *Gauḍapādakārikā* 4.38 (ed. Röer 1850, 547). See also *Mokṣopāya Sthitiprakaṣa* 4.19.9 (ed. Slaje 2002, 147). This argument was employed by Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas against Buddhist idealism (1994, 42).

⁸⁰Gauḍapāda contrasts *nidrā* (sleep) with *svapna* (dream), each associated with a different kind of perceptual error: “Dream is for him who takes the truth otherwise, and sleep is for him who does not know Reality. The error in these two (*svapna* and *nidrā*) being destroyed one attains the stage of Turiya” (trans. Bhattacharya 1943, 7). Thrasher correlates these two types of error with *āvaraṇaśakti* (in the case of *nidrā*) and *vikṣepaśakti* (in the case of *svapna*) (1993, 72).

of consciousness, which [always] persists. By saying that “**contradiction is perceived**”, [Bhartṛhari] admits that contradictions arise in nescience. For that is the very nature of nescience: that is, even though it is not accepted [as something which really exists], it leads to the perception of [a certain] appearance, [since] what[ever] is accepted [to exist] should really be knowledge.⁸¹ Therefore, the beginninglessly-established power of *brahman* to manifest the proliferation [of the ordinary world], which is unreal, having constructed the duality of the perceived and the perceiver according to itself, plays out the world-drama (*jagannāṭya*);⁸² those who see reality [as it is] dismiss this superficially charming [nescience].

⁸¹As Vincenzo Vergiani and Isabelle Ratié have pointed out, Maṇḍanamīśra makes a similar point in the *Brahmasiddhi* – if *māyā* were to be accepted to exist, then it would not be an illusion at all (Vergiani 2016, 599).

⁸²The metaphor of a deity as an actor and the world as a drama is well-known from the *Śivasūtra* and has echoes in other Kāśmīri texts (Cuneo 2016, 43ff). But this image is by no means confined to Śaiva texts; for example, in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, *prakṛti* is compared to an actress (*nartakī*) (59, ed. Prasad Sarma 1922, 74). *Saṃsāraṇṛtya* appears in the *Pañcapādikā* (ed. Bhāgavatāchārya 1891, II, i, 35), while the *ātman* is described as a drama (*ṛtṭa*) in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (2.58, ed. Jacob and Hiriyanā 1925, 70). What is less common is to find both the metaphors of the world as a drama and of the world as a dream in the same place, with an emphasis on the illusory nature of the world as it is perceived; one interesting parallel is a quotation from Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the *Abhinavabhāratī* (ed. Chintamani 1927, 268): “That is to say, drama is exemplary in enabling us to grasp the barren, dualistic perception produced by our innate nescience. Consider the doings of Rama and Ravana. These are in essence merely imaginary, and precisely for this reason they do not have one single stable form, but rather can all of a sudden produce countless new imaginings. Although they are indeed different from a dream, just like a dream, they can be the source of profound emotional attachment without giving up their illusory character. When produced by an actor—and herein the actor is like the supreme being—these doings, however unreal, seem as if actually coming into existence out of some source, albeit a nonexistent one. And though in this way they remain mere appearance, they can become a means of understanding the true ends of man. The same applies to the universe as a whole, which functions in precisely the same way. It consists of a vast elaboration of nothing but names and forms...” (trans. Pollock 2016, 457-459).

Part III.

Appendices

8. Collation of *Jāṭisamuddeśa* 34, with Helārāja's commentary

Two additional manuscripts have been consulted for this collation: C_G (Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Chennai, MS D 15366) and LA (DAV College, Chandigarh, MS 6118).

sarvaśabdaviṣayatvam evābhivyanakti —

tām prātipadikārtham ca dhātvartham ca pracakṣate |
sā nityā sā mahān ātmā tām āhus tvatalādayaḥ || 34 ||

sarvabhāveṣu sadrūpaṃ sāmānyam anugataṃ | abhāvāsyāpi buddhyākāreṇa nirūpaṇāt, mahāsatta-
5 yānayāvīyogāt **prātipadikamātravācyā** sattā | tad uktam —

prātipadikārthaḥ sattā

iti | **dhātubhir** api sādhanādḥīnalabdhanmasu kriyāvyaṅgiṣu samaveta yathopādhyupagrḥitanā-
nātvā sattaivābhidheyatvam āpadyate | siddhasādhyarūpārthadvayātmanā ca tasyā eva vṛttes tada-
pararāśyabhāvāt sarvaśabdaviṣayatvam sattāyāḥ | pratyayabhāgenāpy atra yathāyatham saṅkhyākā-
10 rakādyupādhiṣiṣṭā sattaivābhidhiyate | sā codayavyayarahitavāt **nityā**, satpratyayasya sarvadānu-
vṛtteḥ |

ete sattāmātrasyātmano mahataḥ ṣaḍ viśeṣapariṇāmāḥ, yat tat paraṃ viśeṣebhyo liṅgamātram
mahattattvam, tasminn ete sattāmātre mahaty ātmany avasthāya vivṛddhikāṣṭhām anubhavanti |
pratisaṃsṛjyamānās ca tasminn eva sattāmātre mahaty ātmany avasthāya yat tan niḥsattāsattam
15 niḥsadasad avyaktam aliṅgam tasmin pratiyanti

1 sarvaśabdaviṣayatvam] °tvem P. 1 evābhivyanakti —] avābhivyanaktiḥ(SPACE) P; °ktiṃ LA. 2 prātipadikā-
rtham] prātipadikārthac P. 2 dhātvartham] °rthaj P. 2 ca] ja P. 3 nityā] vityā H. 3 mahān] mahāt H. 3
ātmā] āmā L; ātma H. 3 ātmā tām] ātmānām A; ātmākām C_T. 3 āhus] ahus T. 3 tvatalādayaḥ ||] ta° C_T C_G.
4 sadrūpaṃ] ta° T. 4 anugataṃ ||] °vaṃ L LA. 4 nirūpaṇāt,] °māṇān H. 4–5 mahāsattayānayāvīyogāt] ma-
hāsattayāvi° M; °tāyāvinayāvīyogāt P; °pi yogāt C_T. 5 prātipadikamātravācyā] ma° P. 5 sattā |] satā P. 6–7 sattā
iti] sattetī K^{Ed} D K V A L M H T C_T C_G LA; (L. 13) sattetī(SPACE) P. 7 dhātubhir] dhātor M P. 7 sādhanādḥīnalabdha-
janmasu] °bdho janmasu P; °(L. 7) mu H. 7 kriyāvyaṅgiṣu] kti° A. 7 kriyāvyaṅgiṣu samaveta] °susamaveta C_T.
7–8 yathopādhyupagrḥitanānātvā] yathāpādhyupagrḥitanānātvāt P; °tvāt M. 8 sattaivābhidheyatvam] sataivā-
bhidheyadhāyakam P; °dhāyakam L LA; °yam C_T; °kam D K V A; °dhāyakam M; °tem T. 8 sattaivābhidheyatvam
āpadyate |] °dhiyate | C_G. 8 āpadyate |] āpā° Ś^{Ed} I^{Ed} G_i; °tā H. 8 siddhasādhyarūpārthadvayātmanā] sā C_G;
°nām M. 8 vṛttes] vyāvṛttes D K V A; ca vṛttes L; vivṛttes H C_T; ca vṛttaiḥ LA. 8–9 tadapararāśyabhāvāt] tada-
paradrā° H; tadapārarādayabhāvā°(F. 22v) L; tadapārarāśyabhāvā° LA; °ṇayabhāvāt V. 9 sarvaśabdaviṣayatvam]
(L. 14) saṃ° C_T; °bdāviṣayatvam P. 9 sattāyāḥ |] satāyāḥ P; °yām | H. 9 pratyayabhāgenāpy] °vā H; °nyāpy T.
9–10 saṅkhyākarakādyupādhiṣiṣṭā] saṅkhyākā(L. 4) rā° LA. 10 sattaivābhidhiyate |] (L. 15) satai° P; °dhāyate K
V. 10 sā] sa P C_T. 10 codayavyayarahitavāt] cau° V; °taṃtvān P; °tvān T. 10 satpratyayasya] san_pra° C_G;
ṣapra° L LA; °yāsya P. 1–12 ete] eta H. 12 sattāmātrasyātmano] satā° P; °svātmano H. 12 ṣaḍ] yad K^{Ed} H;
ṣad D V; tad P. 12 viśeṣapariṇāmāḥ,] bhi° V; avi° T C_T; viśeḥ° LA; viśeṣāḥ ° K^{Ed}. 12 tat] OM. M. 12 tat paraṃ]
tatparaṃ G_i. 12 liṅgamātram] ligam° LA. 13 mahattattvam,] mahattata° C_G; mahatta(SPACE OF 2 AKṢARAS) C_T.
13 sattāmātre] satā° P. 13 mahaty ātmany] mahatvā° C_T. 13 vivṛddhikāṣṭhām] vivṛddi° C_G; vikā° L LA; °ryyam
K^{Ed}; °ṣṭām H. 13 anubhavanti |] °vati M P; °vatī H. 14 pratisaṃsṛjyamānās] ddhitisaṃsṛṣṭa° H; °haś C_T; °nā-(L.
20) aś C_G. 14 tasminn] tasmiṃś K^{Ed} D K V A L LA. 14 eva] ca K^{Ed} D K V A L LA. 14 sattāmātre] satā° V P. 14
mahaty] bhavaty L. 14 tan] taṃ L LA. 14 niḥsattāsattam] OM. H; nisattā(L. 9) sattan C_T; °ktāsattā M; °ktāsattā
P; °ktam[māntitva] C_G. 15 niḥsadasad] sadasad M; saddaśasadd P. 15 aliṅgam] aliṅga H.

ity evaṃ sāṅkhye buddhitattvaṃ mahacchabdavācyam ādyaṃ jagatkāraṇaṃ nirdiṣṭam ity ato 'na-
 ntarasya vikāragrāmasya kāraṇarūpānugamāt sattārūpatvam aviruddham iti sattārūpaṃ sarvaṃ ja-
 gadākhyātaṃ bhavatīti sattādvaitavādaḥ sāṅkhyānāyānāpy upabṛṃhitaḥ | evaṃ ca sarvaśabdavācyā
 5 sattā śabdapravṛttinimittabhūtetī yathāyatham bhinnopādhir bhāvapratyayābhidheyā saiva | nanv
 evaṃ gotvam iti prakṛtipratyayayor ekārthatāprasaṅgaḥ | naitat | upādhibhedena sattāyā bhedāt |
 prātipadikena gavāśrayāyās tasyā abhidhānam, pratyayena tu niṣkṛṣṭāśrayasya sāmānyasyābhidhety
 adoṣaḥ | prakṛtyarthanimittāś ca bhāvapratyayabheda iti na sāṅkaryaprasaṅgaḥ || 34 ||

15-1 pratyanti ity] prati° L C_G. 1 sāṅkhye] OM. MP. 1 buddhitattvaṃ] ṣuci° L; °mattvaṃ M P. 1 mahacchab-
 davācyam] (SPACE OF 2 AKṢARAS)śa° H. 1 ādyaṃ] āna° L LA; āya° D. 1 jagatkāraṇaṃ] °ṇan C_G. 1 jagatkāraṇaṃ
 nirdiṣṭam] °ṇaviśiṣṭam C_T. 2 vikāragrāmasya] vikārara° C_G; vikāraṇa° M; (SPACE OF 3 AKṢARAS)raḥ ° C_T; vikāranām
 asya A. 2 sattārūpatvam] satā° P. 2 aviruddham...sattārūpaṃ] aviruddhasatā° P. 2 sarvaṃ] sam° K; samrva
 A; sarve H. 2-3 jagadākhyātaṃ] jagadā(SPACE OF 2 AKṢARAS) H. 3 bhavatīti] mibhi° M. 3 sattādvaitavā-
 daḥ] satā° P; °da(L. 13) H. 3 sāṅkhyānāyānāpy...] °bhyupavṛṃhitaḥ K^{Ed} D K V. 3 upabṛṃhitaḥ] upaṣṭam°
 H; upavṛṃ° A P. 3 ca] OM. P. 4 sattā] satī L; satā P; satām LA. 4 yathāyatham] yathā(SPACE OF 2 AKṢARAS)
 C_T; yathām LA. 4 bhāvapratyayābhidheyā] °vābhidheyā H. 4 nanv] na tv D A. 4-5 bhinnopādhir...evaṃ]
 °dhibhāvapratyayābhi(SPACE OF 8 AKṢARAS)vaṃ C_T. 5 prakṛtipratyayayor] pratyayor P; pra(SPACE OF 8 AKṢARAS)r C_T;
 °yartthayor T. 5 ekārthatāprasaṅgaḥ] °saktāḥ P. 5 upādhibhedena] upāyame° LA; kriyāvi° K^{Ed}. 5 sattāyā]
 satāyā P. 6 gavāśrayāyās] gavāśrayās C_G; °ye nayās P. 6 tasyā] tasyām L. 6 tasyā abhidhānam,] °bhivādaānam
 H. 6 pratyayena] °yaina H. 6 niṣkṛṣṭāśrayasya] niḥ° L; niṣva° A. 6 sāmānyasyābhidhety] °tety S^{Ed} G₁. 7
 ca] va A. 7 bhāvapratyayabheda] °ye bheda T C_G; °daḥ I^{Ed}. 7 sāṅkaryaprasaṅgaḥ]] sāmkye ° P; OM. °pra...
 C_T.

9. Digital resources

- All of the code that runs the online edition and the machine collation algorithm can be found on GitHub: <https://github.com/chchch/upama>. This also includes the fonts used to display Devanāgarī, Malayālam, and Telugu. The Devanāgarī font is Sanskrit 2013, which has been modified to include the pṛṣṭhamātrā vowel character, the śirorekha character, and the puṣpikā character. The Malayālam font is Rachana, which has been modified to include some additional consonant conjuncts that appear in manuscripts, such as *śś*. The Telugu font is Pothana 2000, which has been modified to include the valapalagilaka character.
- All of the transcriptions, in TEI XML format, of the manuscript witnesses and printed editions used to generate the apparatus of variants are available as part of the critical edition: <https://saktumiva.org/wiki/dravyasamuddesa/start>. They can be downloaded by using the export button on the right side of the page.

10. TEI XML file format

A subset of the TEI standard has been used for document encoding, following most of the standards developed for the Sanskrit Manuscripts Project at the University of Cambridge.¹ Each document consists of at least the top-level <TEI> tag, a <teiHeader> tag, and a <text> tag:

```
<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0">
  <teiHeader>
    <fileDesc>
      <sourceDesc>
        <msDesc>
          <msIdentifier>
            <idno type="siglum">
              [Siglum to be used in the apparatus]
            </idno>
          </msIdentifier>
          <msContents>
            <msItem n="1" defective="false">
              <textLang mainLang="sa-Deva">
                [Sanskrit in Devanagari script.]
              </textLang>
            </msItem>
          </msContents>
        </msDesc>
      </sourceDesc>
    </fileDesc>
  </teiHeader>

  <text xml:lang="sa-Latn">
  </text>
</TEI>
```

¹See Formigatti 2018.

The siglum used to indicate the witness in the apparatus is identified with an `<idno>` tag under `<msIdentifier>`. If this tag is not present, then the filename will be used instead.

Since the collation software has been designed to work with Sanskrit texts transcribed in IAST, the `xml:lang` attribute of the `<text>` tag, under which the transcription will be inputted, is `sa-Latn`, i.e., romanized Sanskrit. on the other hand, the `mainLang` attribute of the `<textLang>` tag describes the language and script of the original document, which might be Devanāgarī (`sa-Deva`), Malayālam (`sa-Mlym`), or Telugu (`sa-Telu`).

11. Filtering the transcriptions

Three types of filters have been implemented, which have been grouped under the headings XML tags, Punctuation, and Orthographic variants.

XML tags

Below is a list of XML tags used in the transcriptions. This does not include tags that define text structure – such as `<div>`, `<p>`, and `<l>` – which do not reflect features in the source document, and therefore are not taken into consideration by the collation algorithm.

- `<add>` : text added to the main text
- `<choice>` : The construction `<choice><orig></orig><corr></corr></choice>` records an original reading (`<orig>`) and the transcriber's correction (`<corr>`)
- `<corr>` : correction by the transcriber
- `` : deleted text
- `<gap>` : text that was not readable
- `<hi>` : text that is marked in some way (e.g., underlined)
- `<lb>` : line break
- `<milestone>` : marks the folio or page, along with the line number, where the transcription starts
- `<note>` : notes added in the margin or between the lines
- `<pb>` : page break
- `<ptr>` : points to text that has been transposed
- `<unclear>` : text that is not clear to the transcriber
- `<g>` : marks an unusual glyph
- `<anchor>` : used as a footnote/endnote marker
- `<locus>` : the locus of a transposed section

n. Filtering the transcriptions

- `<metamark>` : additional, non-textual marks, such as an X-mark
- `<orig>` : original reading (that was corrected by the transcriber)
- `<sic>` : marks the text as sic erat scriptum
- `<space>` : blank space left on the page
- `<subst>` : The construction `<subst><add></add></subst>` marks text that was deleted and replaced
- `<supplied>` : text supplied by the transcriber
- `<surplus>` : text that the transcriber believes is superfluous
- `<caesura>` : caesura

Punctuation

These filters pertain to textual elements that can be either included or ignored in the comparison. By default, they are ignored:

- abbreviation sign 「 ° 」
- avagrahas 「 ’ 」
- brackets
- commas
- daṇḍas
- empty śirorekha 「 ^ 」
- explicit hiatus 「 _ 」
- hyphens and dashes
- line fillers 「 † 」
- middot 「 · 」
- numbers
- puṣpikās
- periods/ellipses
- quotation marks

Orthographic variants

These filters pertain to common variations in Sanskrit orthography, across different scripts, that are usually ignored in collation. Each filter is governed by a regular expression, which is presented descriptively here:

- geminated *t*
 - replaces *tt* with *t* if it is preceded by *r*, *ṛ*, *l*, or *pa*; replaces *tt* with *t* if it is followed by *r*, *v*, or *y*
- geminated consonants after *r*
 - replaces doubled *g, j, ṭ, ṇ, ḍ, n, b, m, y*, or *v* with a single letter if it is preceded by *r*, *ṛ*, or a space
- geminated aspirated consonants
 - replaces *jjh* with *jh*; replaces *ṭṭh* with *ṭh*; replaces *tth* with *th*; replaces *ddh* with *dh*
- visarga *āḥ* + voiced syllable
 - replaces *-āḥ* with *-ā* if followed by a word-initial vowel or voiced consonant
- visarga *aḥ* + voiced consonants
 - replaces word-final *-ar*, *-ar*, or *-o* with *-aḥ*
- visarga *aḥ* + vowels
 - replaces *-aḥ*, before a vowel with *-a*
- other visarga variants
 - replaces word-final *-(h)r*, *-(h)s*, *-(h)ś*, or *-(h)ṣ* with *-ḥ*
- internal visarga variants
 - replaces *-uṣ-* with *-uḥ-*; replaces *-ṣk-* with *-ḥk-*; replaces *-ss-* with *-ḥs-*
- final nasal variants
 - replaces word-final *-ṃl*, *-ṃs*, *-ṃś*, or *-nn* with *-n*
- internal nasal variants
 - replaces *m, n, ñ, ṇ*, or *ṅ* with *ṃ* if followed by *p, b, m, d, t, n, ṭ, ḍ, c, j, k*, or *g*
- final *au/āv*
 - replaces word-final *-āv* with *-au*
- final anusvāra variants

n. Filtering the transcriptions

- replaces word-final *-m*, *-ñ*, or *-ṃm* with *-ṃ*; replaces *kan* followed by word-initial *t* with *kaṃ*; replaces *kin* followed by word-initial *t* with *kiṃ*; replaces *-n* with *-ṃ*; replaces *-ñ* followed by word-initial *j*- with *-ṃ*
- final anusvāra variants (Malayālam)
 - replaces word-final *-m*, *-ñ*, or *-ṃm* with *-ṃ*; replaces *-n* with *-ṃ* if it is followed by word-initial *-t*, *-d*, or *-n*; replaces *-ñ* with *-ṃ* if it is followed by word-initial *j*- or *c*-
- *kcch/kś*
 - replaces *-k ś*-, *-k ch*-, *-kch*-, or *-kcch*- with *-kś*-
- *cch/ch*
 - replaces *-c ch*-, *-c ś*-, *-cch*-, *-cś*-, or *-t ś*- with *-ch*-
- final *t* + voiced syllable
 - replaces *-d* with *-t* if it is followed by a word-initial vowel or voiced consonant; replaces *-d* at the end of a paragraph with *-t*
- final *t* + *n/m*
 - replaces *-t* with *-n* if it is followed by word-initial *n*- or *m*-
- final *t* + *c/j*
 - replaces *-j* followed by word-initial *j*- with *t*-; replaces *-c* followed by word-initial *c*- with *-t*
- *sya, tra, ma* before *iti*
 - replaces *-sya iti* with *-syeti*, *-tra iti* with *-treti*, and *-ma iti* with *-meti*
- *a a/ā*
 - replaces *-a a*- with *-ā*-
- *-ena, -sya + u*
 - replaces *-ena u*- with *-eno*-; replaces *-sya u*- with *-syo*-
- *i i/ī*
 - replaces *-i i*- with *-ī*-
- *ā + iti*
 - replaces *-ā iti* with *-eti*
- *e/a + i*
 - replaces *-e* with *-a*, if it is followed by word-initial *i*-

- *i/y* + vowel
 - replaces *-y* with *-i*, if it is followed by a word-initial vowel
- *ɭ*
 - replaces *ɭ* (retroflex lateral approximant) with *l*

Optimizing the filters

In order for the apparatus to be dynamic, the collation algorithm must be fast enough so that when a user changes an option and re-generates the apparatus, the wait time is not too long. Since both the punctuation and orthographic filters are effected through regular expressions, there is a degree of optimization that is possible.

For the punctuation filters, all of the elements that are to be ignored are simply merged into a single regular expression using a character class. The resulting expression would simply be something like `/[\d\ | _ | - | ' | . | , | ']/`. Any character found by this expression would then be ignored.

The orthographic filters, unfortunately, need to be run one at a time. The general technique is to pick the most common spelling as the replacement and then use a regular expression to find every occurrence of every other variant. For example, in the case of visargas after non-*a* vowels, the most common spelling is *h*. Therefore, in our expression, we search for all of the more uncommon spellings with `/[r s š ʒ] (? \S) /` which would find, for example, *-ir*, *-is*, *-ís*, or *-iș*. They can then be replaced by *-ih*.

Other general principles that have been followed are being as specific as possible and using more efficient syntax where possible, such as character classes instead of alternations. However, the principle of specificity can sometimes conflict with efficiency; for example, the expression

$$/\dot{n}(?=[kg])|\ddot{n}(?=[cj])|\underset{\cdot}{n}(?=[tɖ])|n(?=[tɖn])|m(?=[pbd])/m/$$

for finding semi-homograph nasals with *m* is more specific than

$$/[mn\ddot{n}\underset{\cdot}{n}](?=[pbd\underset{\cdot}{t}n\underset{\cdot}{t}\underset{\cdot}{d}cjk g])/m/$$

since the former expression pairs each nasal with the consonants in its own varga, whereas the latter expression searches for all nasals followed by consonants in any varga. However, the use of alternations in the former expression is computationally expensive, and since, in the documents, we never find cases of, for example, *ñ* followed by *t*, we may consider using the second, more efficient expression without fear that it will capture unwanted cases.

Part IV.

Bibliography

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