PATTERNS OF POLITICS AND KINSHIP IN A GREEK-CYPRIOT COMMUNITY, 1920-1980

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Paul Sant Cassia

This thesis examines the changing patterns of politics and Kinship in a Greek-Cypriot village in Paphos, Cyprus, between 1920 and 1980. It seeks to show that patterns of political organization in the periphery can only be properly understood with reference to the role of kinship and the nature of property transmissions within the family. In analysing the political organization of Mediterranean communities and their integration with the wider society it is important to treat kinship not as a dependent variable but as an institution exerting an influence in its own right.

Changes in the mode of property transmission from inheritance to dowry are analysed. The investment of marriage with a more pronounced property component has not only shifted its significance and given it a more pronounced symbolism per se, but have also affected the types of political links available. The dominant political ties in 1920 were of an intergenerational type and agnatic links; in 1980 they are mainly intre-generational links between affines and fictional kin.

The pattern of politics between 1920 and 1980 is then examined against the background of Greek nationalism, the Church and the wider society. The phenomenon of factionalism which characterises this period is approached by reference to the State (including the Colonial State), political parties, and the Church. Political organization in the pre-1960 period centred around merchant-moneylenders and the church's representatives in charge of the vast areas of church owned land which was leased to villagers. The predominant form of political organization was the vertical dyadic link between patron and client. Local patrons often entered into loose coalitions either to protect their credit or marketing monopolies, or to prevent the

emergence of horizontal class organization. Around 1960 radical changes occured: leftists established marketing co-operatives breaking the merchant monopoly, the church sold most of its land to the villagers, new cash crops were planted, and new political elites emerged out of the 1955-59 EOKA struggle. Their power lies mainly in their control of access to important national politicians, State resources and the readiness to use violence, rather than in control over scarce credit and land. Nevertheless factional conflict has become more intense. This is brought out in an analysis of local elections where the electorate, in the space of a few days, first elected a right-wing coalition and then proceeded to elect leftists a few days later. The reasons for this shift are then examined.

Finally, it is suggested that the increasing importance of the family as a property holding institution, and the significance of marriage as an alliance-forming mechanism, exert an important influence upon political organization. For, whereas the village was previously a religious institution and political organization centred around the Church, contemporary political organization centres more visibly around the real and fictional kinship bonds established by individuals in pursuing their strategies.

How far these kinship bonds will be used as a basis of political organization in the village will depend upon the ability of parties to establish enduring institutional links in the periphery which will in turn affect the solitarity of the family.

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

MAP 1. MAP OF CYPRUS SHOWING THE FIVE DISTRICT CAPITALS AND THE TURKISH OCCUPIED NORTH



CS: COFFEE SHOP; ST: STORE; VB: VILLAGE BANK

2. THE VILLAGE PLATEA

NOT TO SCALE

Acknowledgements

The research upon which this thesis is based was funded by two sources. The Wenner Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research funded field work in Cyprus between 1978-80, and the William Wyse Studentship enabled me to write up my fieldwork. I should like to record my debt to these institutions, and to thank the Master and Fellows of Christ's College, Cambridge for election to a Research Fellowship in 1981.

I owe a lot to past and present teachers. My greatest debt is to my research supervisor, Professor Jack Goody, for his support, interest and guidance in my work. I should also like to register a great debt to Dr Peter Loizos for his interest and participation which went far beyond the boounds of duty. I have benefitted enormously from his consistent encouragement and his painstaking comments on earlier drafts. If the conclusions and explanations I offer on Cypriot political culture somewhat differ from his, this only goes to emphasize how stimulating I have found his work; the true value of something is how much comment it provokes, not how much comment it stifles. I should also like to thank Professor P. Serracino Inglott and Dr C. Humphrey for reading and commenting on various draft chapters, and my colleagues at the Department of Social Anthropology for various stimulating discussions.

Numerous people helped me in Cyprus. The Director of the Lands Record Department, Mr Ieronymides, kindly allowed me to work on the land records, the Paphos Bishop on Church records, Father Porphyrius on Kykkos Monastery records, Mr Phaedros Galatopoulos on his father's then unpublished memoirs, and the officials of the Cooperative Movement to attend a number of meetings.

The Peyiotes are the protagonists of this thesis, and it is always difficult for the ethnographer to adequately and meaningfully express his gratitude for the confidence and trust they place in him. I hope that I have not betrayed their friendship. Space does not permit me to thank them all individually, but I must remember Christodoulos, Zinonas, and Sarras for their philia, and much more besides. This thesis is dedicated to my parents and to the Peyiotes who contributed in different ways, and in two very different Mediterranean islands, to make this thesis possible.

* * * * *

Declaration

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. It does not exceed 80,000 words in length, including appendices and notes of reference.

Paul Sant Cassia

31st July 1981

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the patterns of political organization and of kinship in a Greek Cypriot village in the Paphos District between 1920 and 1980. It has two main purposes. First, it examines the means employed by the State and its ruling groups and political parties to obtain access to its citizens in one village in the periphery, as well as the strategies employed by grass roots politicians. In so doing it helps explain the causes for the endurance of factionalism in Greek Cypriot politics across time. Its second purpose is to show that the patterns of politics in the periphery can only be properly understood with reference to the role of kinship and the nature of property transmission within the family. This helps explain the causes of 'village solidarity' which has been noted in the ethnography of Cyprus (Peristiany, 1968; Loizos, 1975).

This thesis follows two lines of enquiry in analyzing political organization which differs from the normal loosely defined concept of politics in anthropology: (a) it investigates the role of the State and the form of government (the Aristotelian concept of politics which deals with public control relationships in the *polis*), and (b) it investigates the political implications of kinship and the family as an institution exerting an influence in its own right (the study Aristotle called *eikonomia*). Of course the importance of kinship should logically extend throughout society from periphery to centre, but my point is that it is much more politically significant on the village level. In short, I view political anthropology as the study of the relationship between

the politics of the State and the politics of kinship on the village level, not as Cohen claims: "Social anthropology brought up to a high degree of abstraction" (1979: 111) which does not recognize the specificity of politics. This approach, I believe, can also help in bridging the gap between political science (which examines the state) and anthropology, by examining the ways small scale communities are involved in national politics, a study many observers have noted is still in its infancy (Davis, 1977; Boissevain and Friedl, 1975; Grillo, 1980).

Cyprus is particularly interesting for its own sake and for comparative purposes. To begin with the national politics of a small island are easier to grasp than those of more economically, politically and regionally diversified countries such as Italy or Spain which were the preserves of competing diverse powers and nationally unified after long struggles. It is easier for the observer to follow links from the centre to the periphery and vice versa, as well as to grasp the overall national political situation and its implications on the village level. Secondly, its central institutions in the late colonial period have been relatively simple. Finally, the periphery has long been involved in market relations with the centre. The power of the State has long extended to the villages, and villagers have in varying degrees been involved in national politics either through the Church or political parties. This does not mean that their political involvement is similar to that of urbanites; indeed this thesis investigates the reactions of villagers to national politics, their forms of organization, and will attempt to account for the causes of these reactions.

The major question which arose in this study of looking at

the relationship between centre and periphery is that of the cohesiveness of the village. This is not a parochial problem as most accounts of Mediterranean communities make some reference to it (Pitt-Rivers, 1961; Pratt, 1980; Silverman, 1975; Bailey, 1973). Briefly put the two observers of Greek Cypriot culture had noted two facts. To begin with in 1954 Peristiany identified three often conflicting sources of power within a mountain village: priest-Church, Mukhtar-Central Government, teacher-new educated elites. He added that "however advanced the internal segmentation of public opinion the village always attempts to present a united front to strangers" (1968: 83). Peristiany located the significance of this in intervillage relations and did not investigate the involvement of villagers in national politics.

Sixteen years later Loizos working in the Morphou area concluded that "the key valve which the villagers invoke when political competition threatens the course of village social relations ... is that of village solidarity" (1975: 4-5). He added that whilst villagers will not always succeed in controlling conflict nevertheless they "are relatively likely to succeed in controlling the next threat of violence" (ibid. 295).

Both accounts brought out the problem of the persistence of campanilismo when national polics has been characterized by factionalism and violence. This led to other questions. Although there has not been a landed Cypriot aristocracy, the single largest landowner in rural areas has traditionally been the Orthodox Church. How did the Church exert its power in rural areas, for here one would expect a greater degree of intervention in local politics than in those areas of the Mediterranean where spiritual power

was distinct from temporal power (Cutileiro, 1971; Lison-Tolosana, 1966; Davis, 1973). Indeed it is impossible to view the village as a land unit statically involved with the Church, for land reforms and subsequent redistributions are often a function of the village's relations with such outside institutions. This makes it difficult to view the village as a static entity 'receiving politics' from 'the outside'. Nor can the family be seen as a stable institution if there is a redistribution of property as a result of land reform, as it can respond to this change in a variety of ways.

On the classically political level it is necessary to ask whether land reform is a response to political party activism or to a partisan individualism or even to a desire on the part of the land-holding class or institution, such as the Church, to diversify its wealth more productively. White (1980) has claimed from her study in South Italy that if reform is a response by a landed aristocracy to grass roots <u>party organized</u> activism, then villagers will subsequently tend to emphasize collective action rather than personal entrepreneurship such as clientage in dealing with the centre.

However what are the effects of the phenomenon in Cyprus where the Church, partly out of a desire to diversify its wealth more productively, and partly out of a desire to reward political activists who resorted to violence on its behalf, sold its land to the villagers? Finally how does the family respond to being invested with more land? Does it respond in a 'traditional' way or do radical changes in the transmission of property occur? Most accounts of politics treat the family as a dependent variable rather than as an institution exerting an influence in its own right.

For example rather than looking at the effects of land reform upon property transmission and its implications, White concentrates instead on how families uphold political activism. On a more general level this problem of whether kinship is 'a thing in itself' is important in anthropology as the debate between Leach and Sahlins testifies. But this is difficult to discuss when there is a static relationship between land distribution and kinship. On the other hand a change in the distribution of land (such as a land reform) can radically transform the pattern of transmission of property and consequently the political significance of kinship can change across time closely influenced by the transmission of property. This justifies my methodological approach as outlined above.

To answer these questions I chose to study Peyia in 1978-80, a Greek village in the Paphos district which differs from Loizos' Kalo in two significant ways. First, the Church owned nearly 25% of agricultural land there, which implied that it was more closely involved in village politics. In 1960 it then redistributed its land partly to modernize its wealth, and partly to favour EOKA gunmen who had taken up the gun on its behalf. This land reform did not affect collective mentalities in the same way as the peasant appropriation of land owned by the aristocracy in White's Luco. Rather it encouraged a new type of political language which emphasized individual violence rather than party-organized collective militancy in dealing with the centre and 'complemented' the tendency to use violence as a way of solving inter-ethnic problems. It also gave such men a head start over other villagers in wealth, and they were subsequently able to dominate village politics

and exploit the national political fluidity as violent political entrepreneurs. Second, it differs from Kalo in that the mode of property transmission has itself changed across time, largely but not exclusively as a result of this land reform. In contrast to the past most property is now transmitted inter vivos at marriage. To simplify my argument, this means that relations among kinsmen have changed, as have relations between affines. I show that this change in property transmission has itself affected the types of political coalitions which men enter as kinsmen or affines. It is in this sense of the change of the uses of kinship ties as building blocks for political organization that the family can be seen as an institution exerting an influence in its own right.

By placing the village in the context of the sociology of the political system on a macrolevel and looking at the effects of its history on local mentalities, I show that it is then possible to account for this phenomenon of territorial solidarity, its elaboration and manipulation by certain groups, and the underlying political cohesiveness and political use of kinship links among Peyiotes. Instead of following either anthropological grass roots analysis in which it is usually not clear what is important in political organization, or the exclusive emphasis of political science on the centre in which local complexity becomes irrelevant, I am taking the view of a complex interrelationship of many variables, the most important being the politics of the State and the politics of the family. In short I investigate the State on the one hand and local forces such as kinship on the other as equal interacting factors, as outlined in the beginning.

A note on the research techniques used

I lived in Peyia from 1978-80, although I was often out of the village with Peyiotes when they were dealing with Government officials. I also visited Nicosia alone to interview senior Civil Servants, national politicians and Churchmen.

As a 'xenos' ('outsider') I had to gain the confidence of a justly suspicious people; this took time and patience. Peyiotes believe that their political beliefs are kept on file; they are correct in believing so.

I chose 1920 as a starting point for three reasons. To begin with I wanted my account to be sufficiently historical in two senses: in the structural sense (i.e. in changes in land tenure, in marketing, political organization) and in the collective mentalities of generations (i.e. in the perceptions of differences with the past, and in different experiences). 1920 fitted both conditions admirably. Second, village records, and indeed documentation of the detailed type I required, become available from that year onwards. The first General Survey of properties was conducted between 1909-29; this gave details on all the properties in every village, their type, etc. I spent three months transcribing these records for Peyia; I also took a complete list of all the land transfers (conveyances) at 5-yearly intervals between 1920-75. This forms the basis of Chapter 5. Finally I obtained access to the records of Kykkos Monastery, and tabulated the distribution of private property in 1974. All these were laborious tasks, which required further analysis. However I believe that this is the first research on a Greek Cypriot village which makes such an extensive use of land records.

The final reason for choosing 1920 is that living memories in 1978-80 did not extend further back than this date, and I wanted my account to be based on actual experiences.

My other quantitative work included a survey of 75 households, randomly chosen from the Mukhtar's list of inhabitants. The questionnaire dealt with family, land-holdings, work, irrigation, social contracts, types of greetings and a socio-economic ranking exercise.

At the time of field work £1 Cypriot was equal to £1.20 sterling. The measurement of land is in donums. 1 Donum is equal to one-third of an acre, of .133 hectares; 1 oke equals 2.8 lbs.

CHAPTER 1

ISLAND AND VILLAGE

1.1 Brief history of Cyprus

Cyprus is the third largest Mediterranean island (3,584 square miles), 40 miles south of Turkey and 60 miles west of Syria. Its maximum length is 140 miles and its breadth 60 miles. The population in 1881 was 186,173, by 1973 it had risen to 631,778. Eighteen per cent of its population are Turkish speaking Moslems, descendants of sixteenth century Ottoman colonizers, the rest are Greek members of the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus.

The landscape is extremely varied. The north is traversed laterally by the Kyrenia Range, whilst the Troodos Massif dominates the south. To the north and north-east are the Kyrenia Lowlands and the Karpas Peninsula; the Massaoria lies in the centre of the island, and the Paphos and Limassol Lowlands are to the south.

Although this is not a historical thesis, nor does it deal with inter-ethnic conflict, it is important to note that Cyprus's fortunes have been linked to international geopolitics: the Venetians occupied it as a staging post for trade, the Ottomans for grain, and the British to control the sea route to India.

Greek nationalism, which had originally been limited to the Church and urban intellectuals, increasingly spread in the early twentieth century across the different social strata, primarily through the activities of merchants and moneylenders who dominated marketing of agricultural products. Britain also established a Legislative Council composed of elected Greek and Turk representatives. These positions became rapidly filled by merchant

interests who followed a policy of non-cooperation in favour of enosis. The Turkish representatives equally insistently opposed it, but relations between Turks and Greeks were mainly peaceful. In 1931 there were mass riots in favour of Enosis, the Governor's residence was burnt down, and the Constitution was suspended. The Legislative Council was dissolved, and Mukhtars (village head-men) who had previously been elected by their co-villagers were directly appointed by the Colonial Government, as they were suspected of having been actively involved in the uprising. The posts were made elective in 1979, after an interval of fifty years.

In 1941 the government permitted the establishment of Trade Unions and the establishment of a Communist Party which soon involved itself in establishing rural cooperatives to break the power of the merchants and moneylenders. Municipal elections took place in the towns in 1943 and 1946, most of which were won by the Communists.

1945-55 was an intense period of social conflict in Cyprus. The Church strongly condemned the Party and violence often broke out between rightists and leftists. In 1950 Makarios was elected Archbishop; under his dynamic leadership the Church started an active national and international campaign in favour of enosis. He was assisted not only by the liberal international climate, but also by a Greek of Cypriot origins, Colonel George Grivas, who had previously organized a terrorist anti-Communist organization X (Chi) in Greece during the Greek Civil War. Grivas landed secretly in Paphos in 1955 and began organizing EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a guerilla organization composed of young men which waged a hit-and-run war against the British in

favour of enosis. In face of gaining support for the nationalist cause and the decidedly anti-Communist character of EOKA, AKEL (the Communist Party) suddenly switched from demanding self-government to demanding enosis, a move which did not increase its political credibility according to the nationalists.

Instead of enosis, however, the island was granted independence guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey in the Zurich Convention. Under the Constitution there is a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President and a 50-seat House of Representatives, elected by universal adult suffrage, divided into 35 Greek seats and 15 Turkish seats. A complicated set of checks in the constitution was designed to ensure that no ethnic group could dominate the other. The National Guard was also divided along ethnic lines and the Greek part commanded by mainland Greek Army officers.

Relations between Greeks and Turks which had never been warm after 1945 (and especially after 1955 when Britain replaced Greek policemen by Turks to deal with the disturbances), became further strained between 1963-74 over constitutional issues. General Grivas, who had never been satisfied with Independence, returned briefly from Greece to organize the irregular bands of Greek fighters who were then being lionized as national heroes. The new generation of young men from humble rural origins were to become the new political elite and some were given important Cabinet posts. Inter-communal violence broke out in 1963-67 and as a result the Turks moved into armed enclaves.

In 1969 a secret nationalist organization, the Ethnikon Metopon (National Front) emerged with the express aim of purusing enosis. The organization was not proscribed until a capture of

Limassol Police Headquarters where a large quantity of arms were stolen. This further alarmed the Turkish Cypriots. Between 1970-74 there were a number of unsuccessful assassination attempts on Makarios and various politicians of the Left; soon after the attempt on Makarios' life, the ex-Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Yeorghadjis (an ex-EOKA fighter who had staffed the Ministry, especially the Police Department, with his clients) was shot by persons unknown.

Between 1972-74 there were rumours of impending coups and Grivas landed secretly in 1972 to organize EOKA B in favour of Enosis, receiving support from Greek army officers. EOKA B blew up Government buildings, threatened communists, and distributed illegal leaflets exhorting the Greek youth to take up the nationalist cause. Violence broke out between various bands, and the society, Church, and Civil Service split vertically over the enosis issue. After ordering the withdrawal of the Greek army officers President Makarios was toppled in a coup in 1974. Turkey then invaded and occupied 40 per cent of the island. Cyprus is now effectively partitioned. There has been a massive population swap-over, which has resulted in 200,000 Greek refugees in the south, and a Turkish Cypriot Federated State has been proclaimed in the north. President Makarios died in 1977 and the Presidency is now occupied by Spiros Kyprianou. Both Greeks and Turks are now engaged in inter-communal talks over some territorial adjustments, the status of refugees, and the form of government.

1.2 The Village and its Inhabitants

> 'A line drawn from the latter cape to the mouth of the Poli River begins the wild forest tract of the Akamas, so called from the ancient name of its extreme Northern point, which, except for the two or three villages on the summit and East of the Central ridge, and hardly to be included in the district at all, is devoid of human settlement other than isolated tchifliks or huts inhabited only in summer. It is a sterile corner of Cyprus, thickly covered with shrub, abounding in deep gullies and bold rock formations, the central spine being broken into bold peaks or miniature table mountains: here and there in a tiny valley is a cultivated patch, but nine-tenths of the district produces nothing but game.'[1]

What this visitor described during the late nineteenth century would still hold largely true today, but the area has seen more important and populated periods. The Hellenistic-Roman period left a Necropolis and a monastery was founded during the Byzantine-Lusignan period. Peyia lies nine miles north of the District capital, Paphos, in the south of the island and 110 miles from the capital, Nicosia. The road that links it to Paphos and to Nicosia passes through two major Greek villages and a huge ex-chiftlik[2] linked to the left by the sea. Until recently it was the last village on the Paphos road; now a new 'Tourist Road' will connect it to a new input of tourists and one more step in the 'process of integration' will be reached.

Two buildings dominate the village which nestles along the slopes of a rocky unproductive hill: the Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the Improvement-Development Board building. The former was built in the latter part of the nineteenth century through a donation of an important Peyioti merchant.

Like most Greek-Cypriot villages Peyia has a nickname and an 'export model'. Its name derives from the Italian baia (bay), the name by which it is known in sixteenth century Venetian maps.

In more modern times it has been known as 'Little Moscow' due to the large numbers of leftists in the late '40s and early '50s. Political allegiances have subsequently changed; there are less leftists now, and most would prefer to present Peyia as 'the most beautiful one in Cyprus'. There is an anticipation of the potential beneficial effects of tourism, none more so than among some former EOKA men who formerly took up arms against the British and are building restaurants to attract English tourists.

More than mere token references of 'connections with the outside' must be made in describing change. For example the village square was traditionally the area where men intereacted, important men lived there and those who lived on the outskirts were mere shepherds considered to be 'outside society', in short inconsequential men, clients of others. The square is still the prime public place but is no longer the area where men exhibit their dominance through residence. Instead the wealthy and literati build their houses far away from the centre 'to relax in the sun just as the tourists do'. Indeed one cannot help wondering whether this is a suburb of urban Greece or even Australia: migrant Peyiotis visit regularly and the only telephone is besieged by women phoning their children abroad. On the other hand there are some women who have never been to Nicosia.

Peyia's total area is 32,620 donums equivalent to approximately 17 square miles. Of these some 5,350 donums are State land and forest, their borders having been fixed in 1909. Largely unproductive, consisting of rough rocky outcrops, they are used mainly by shepherds. Land is not of uniform quality. To the north-east and east, where the bulk of privately held land was

previously located, fields are small and soils are rocky and poor. Lying on hilly areas they are susceptible to strong erosion and can only be reached by footpaths. To the west and south-west the Church lands, amounting to 21.6 per cent of the total village area, were located. This extends down to the sea five miles away. This land has always been of better quality and can support richer crops. It is more accessible as it is linked by roads. The Church was the single largest landowner until 1953; it sold most of this land to the villagers between 1953 and 1961, and now owns an insignificant, unproductive 6 per cent (see maps pp.16 and 17).

Summer extends from April to October and the average rainfall is 6 inches. Cereals (wheat, barley) and carobs were the main export crops until the early '60s. A two-field fallow rotation system was followed. Vines were grown in the hills to the north-east and the wine fermented for home consumption. Cereals are still grown, but they are largely secondary. Carobs, previously the main export crop, have also dwindled in importance; few trees have been grafted since 1959. Although they provide welcome cash, harvesting is labour-intensive and not enough hands can be found. The most important crops now are vegetables (potatoes, onions, tomatoes), bananas and table-grapes, cultivated on lands that previously belonged to the Church. This is a changing landscape; a few enterprising farmers have planted citrus saplings and olives in anticipation of a new irrigation scheme which will affect 870 hectares (57 per cent of the total village area). The village in 1980 is thus a very different one from 1920 for in place of the monoculture of the past a wide variety of export crops have been planted. There are now only four full-time farmers



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MAP 3: LAND PREVIOUSLY OWNED BY THE CHURCH
Note the large sized plots.



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MAP 4: PLAN OF LAND AREAS WHICH HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PRIVATELY OWNED.
Note the fragmentation

who solely grow cereals.

These new crops require regular water supplies. Peyiotes draw upon three main sources of irrigation. The Mavrokolymbos Dam irrigates an area of 862 donums. This, the Potima Estate, is leased by government to 26 Peyioti families. A government well sunk in 1971 irrigates approximately 500 donums and numerous private wells sunk between the late 1950s and early 1970s provide a third source of irrigation. In 1970 a well cost £2,000 to sink, a considerable investment. By 1979 approximately 700 donums of village land were irrigated. Forty-four per cent of all households own at least one irrigated plot. Nowadays it is not so important how much land a man has but whether it is irrigated or not.

A rough indication of the importance of agriculture is given in Table 1.1. The total income of products marketed through the cooperative in 1978 (a normal year) was £152,413. If one were to include vegetables, grapes, and bananas marketed individually, and the barley retained by shepherds, the total village agricultural

	Cereals			Carobs		Table-Grapes		Wine-Grapes	
Year	Wheat (wt)[i]	Barley (wt)	Value £	Weight	Value £	Weight	Value[iii] £	Weight	Value[iv] £
1978	269,707	156,832	36,418 (ii)	266,012	16,995	320,000	64,000	450,000	35,000

TABLE 1.1: VILLAGE PRODUCTION OF MAIN CROPS IN ONE YEAR

SOURCE: Records of the Cooperative Society, Peyia

NOTES:
(i) Weight in okes.
(ii) Data only covers crops marketed through the village cooperative and excludes that kept as animal fodder.
(iii) Figure denotes amount exported through SEDIGEP.
(iv) Figure excludes wine grapes retained for home production or raisins.

income would be in the region of £240,000 per annum, equivalent to an average income of £703 per each of the 341 households.

Peyia's population of the village was 799 souls in 1881. The population continued to rise until 1946 when it reached a peak of 1,409. In 1976 it stood at 1,249 (Table 1.2). When compared to the national figures the process of rural depopulation becomes clearer: in 1976 the national population was 4.6 times the 1881 figure, Peyia's 1976 population is only 1.6 times that of 1881.

Year	Inhabited Houses	Population Males	Population Females	Population Total
1881	190	411	388	799
1891	217	470	428	898
1901	259	n.a.	n.a.	919
1911	259	n.a.	n.a.	1,041
1921	267	587	523	1,110
1931	273	584	544	1,128
1941	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1946	344(i)	n.a.	n.a.	1,409
1956	n.a.	467(i)	498(i)	965(i)
1960	434(ii)	664	737	1,401
1966	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1976	341(iii)	634	615	1,249(iii)

TABLE 1.2: PEYIA: POPULATION (1881-1976)

NOTES:
(i) Data from registration of paopulation which was compulsory for persons 12 years and over for the purpose of issuing identity cards
(ii) Total Housing units
(iii) Total Households including Hamlet of Ag. Georghios

SOURCE: Cyprus Blue Books and Data on the Population, Statistics and Research Department, Nicosia.

For administrative purposes members of the villages are those residing there for over six months. Thus the 1976 figures include 12 households consisting of 48 refugees residing at the hamlet of Ag. Georghias, but who in Peyioti terms are not considered villagers (horyani). Indeed if one were to adopt Peyioti criteria the number of villagers would be much higher than the official figures as they would include all those born there, but now absent, and to a lesser extent those married into the village. Sentiments of village membership are embodied in nicknames (Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Cohen, 1977) which separate the established from the outsiders. Whilst some nicknames are merely mnemonic devices used to distinguish individuals with the same name, those applied to in-marrying men denote their place of origin[3]. Indeed the presence or absence of nicknames gives a good indication of the boundaries of the community. Peyioti nicknames are predicated upon the familiarity (and competition) of equals, or the safety of distance. They also indicate where one social group ends and another begins. Certain men who are considered to possess higher status, be above approach or even feared, such as teachers, the Cooperative Bank Secretary, the Mukhtar or ex-EOKA fighters, do not possess nicknames. Nicknames denote familiarity.

A 'sense of place' (Pratt, 1980) implies a strong sentiment of a common morality and identity. The Italian word campanilismo has often been used in this context to signify that the highest referent point is the village bell tower (Silverman, 1975, etc.). However as I shall indicate it is dangerous to ascribe much weighting to the concept. Like many indeterminate concepts campanilismo can survive in spite of internal competition which conflicts with this

'strong sense of local patriotism' (Pitt-Rivers, ibid., 30) and can even survive because of these internal tensions. Nor is there a corporate religious identity as is found in Malta (Boissevain, 1965). Indeed if campanilismo has any meaning at all it emerges out of its dialectical opposition to the town. For example the village attitude towards work which maintains that men must always be 'doing something' is contrasted to the life of indolence in the town, which is considered no work at all when it does not involve the hoe (tzappa). For most people an 'interest in work' is not considered a pertinent criterion. Nor is there much love for the land, unlike Spanish farmers (Lison-Tolosana, 1966). My attempt to conduct an occupational ranking survey was viewed as a superflous exercise by most, because what was being asked them was axiomatic. Hence the almost complete unanimity in placing the Doctor at the top of the list and rural occpuations at the bottom. In effect, the exercise served mainly to bring out problematic cases, such as the papas. Most men were at a loss on where to rank the occupation and eventually settled on a 'middle' category, often disagreeing with their wives who desired to rank him higher. Women are more intimately involved in religious practices than men.

The opposition between town and village is further brought out in the local concepts of social classes. Criteria used in identifying social classes are drawn either from past personal experiences, or from attributes possessed by individuals whose structural position locates them at the interface of the village with the wider society. The former include social classes of the past (e.g. 'the merchants who ate all my parents' property'),

within the latter it is a question of 'having more friends, relatives and singenia (kinship)'. Wealth is viewed as synonomous and causally related to social assets. When talking about social classes Peyiotes do not distinguish between monetary and social capital: friends, relatives, contacts, and cash are ultimately part of the same constellation of assets.

The words 'koinoniki thesis' (social position) and 'ektimisis' (prestige, respect) are the key words used in defining social classes rather than time (honour). Indeed the word is hardly ever heard. Ektimisis implies both the social confidence to move effortlessly across the various strata of society, and the capacity to act as the confidant of those below. The Doctor is considered the highest occupation not merely because of income, nor simply because of the seemingly effortless way it is made (which seems practically magical: 'You pay him a visit, and pay £5'), but also because he is the rural confidant par excellence, as manifested in the baskets of produce (kalathia) presented discreetly in addition to payment. The essential 'organic intellectual' of country life, he "brings into contact the peasant masses with the local and State administration" (Gramsci, 1971:14).

The tendency to rank doctors, lawyers and notaries, what Gramsci has called 'organic intellectuals', higher than 'functionaries' such as State administrators and employees, factory managers and so on, does not derive mainly as Friedl (1964) maintains from a 'lagging emulation' of townsmen and a vision of Sjoburg's pre-industrial city. Rather, it is a product of the particular type of integration with the State. The village is both incompletely economically integrated and bureaucratically subjugated to the town.

In addition there is little point of contact between separate villages, except through the centralized administrative framework. Hence the essential role middlemen perform is both traditional (e.g. marriage negotiators) and multi-faceted, linking villagers not only to the bureaucracy, but also to other villages. Indeed the question of 'having more friends, more relatives', or even '*ta mesa*' (ins, contacts) is applied by the villagers to the archetypal, didactic example of justice, the essence of impersonality: 'court examples always favour the wealthy', i.e. those who have the ability to influence the widest circle of people in *milieux* essentially disturbing to the villager.

On the other hand whilst villagers unanimously assert the national existence of social classes, they are often reluctant to identify them in Peyia. In response to direct questioning they identify a variety of *individuals*: the *Mukhtar*, the Bank Secretary, the Teachers, an observation strongly denied by these men. But the fact that they are neither the wealthiest, nor the ones with the largest acreage, indicates that the criteria employed nowadays are neither single stranded nor simple; they are an amalgam of economic and symbolic factors.

The first most basic 'rule' villagers apply is whether men are 'economically independent'. By this is meant the ability to be 'one's own master' or 'not to have anyone above you'. This is a critical value because it gives men a certain autonomy. The concept is not a static one, it depends upon two factors: the number of dependents (especially daughters) and the point in the developmental cycle. Wealthy men who have no problems in provisioning children and keeping their womenfolk at home are

economically independent at any point in the cycle, poor men only so when they have fulfilled these obligations. This is a problem which is readily appreciated by all men; it is a strict economic means to end relationship.

Ektimisi, prestige or the respect of others, is partly a function of the way a man goes about adapting these means to his family's needs but with an added dimension: it is partly formed by and through the social field.

The stratification system has changed across time. Until 1960, and especially between 1920-40, land was the most important component. The extent of a man's acreage marked the extent of his prestige. But even then literacy and urban contacts were important, though not the overriding factors they are nowadays. Men who possessed these three resources were the archontes (leaders) of the past: the merchants, politicians, grocers and to a lesser extent the moneylenders. The word, less commonly used now, meant above all large property holders allied with political power, similar to Lison-Tolosana's pudientes (1966). In the past the major social division was between the merchants and the peasants.

There is now a more complex threefold division which distinguishes between those who work the pen, with their hands, and the land. Peyiotes distinguish four socio-economic groups: urban white-collar workers, farmers, craftsmen and labourers.

The urban white-collar workers (teachers, Government officials, Cooperative officials, clerks) occupy the top of the occupational hierarchy and 10 per cent of the population. Known as the morphomeni (the educated ones) they are not necessarily the

wealthiest in income, nor in land holdings. Two critical advantages, however, give them the lead in village affairs: education and security of income. Education ensures that they are looked upon for guidance and leadership, displacing the traditional role of the papas who was often previously the only educated villager. The morphomeni are always addressed as 'Kyrie' by unrelated men in other groups and they maintain a lifestyle at complete variance with other groups: their womenfolk do not associate as freely with neighbours, they have recreation in the town, and a more private life closed to the rest of the village. They shun the coffee houses. Their security of income enables them to oversee rather than labour in their fields, which support highly lucrative cash crops. Politically they exert an 'unseen hand' in village affairs, intervene sparingly, and have their own clubs and associations outside the village.

The full-time farmers (yeorghii, 25 per cent of the total population) come close behind. Their position has now been elevated from its previous depressed state through the introduction of irrigated cash crops. Their prestige derives from their wealth and readiness to innovate rather than mere acreage which is no longer a valid criterion of predominance. The importance of types of land has changed radically. This can be culled from the requests made to the Land Registry Office for adjudication over boundary disputes: until 1960 nearly all requests concerned agricultural land; nowadays people conflict mainly over building plots.

The importance of the yeorghii derives from their wealth. They dominate village committees, coffee house conversations and

public life. As they have the necessary land (usually above 40 donums) they can obtain loans and generally carefully plan the use and transmission of resources. In external relations (e.g. dealings with officials, etc.) they are somewhat hampered by their lack of education, but they nevertheless aspire to the life-style of the morphomeni through investing heavily in their children's education although employment prospects are now limited. Farming is still considered as a second-best. The term yeorghos covers a wide variety of occupations. At one end of the scale are the few 30-45-year-old progressive vinegrowers and vegetable growers; in the middle are the majority, the 45-55-year-old farmers growing small amounts of vegetables, grapes and cereals, and at the end are the remnant old men who rely solely on monoculture. At the bottom end of this group there is some movement downwards into the lower end of the social scale, and life-styles vary. The top farmers do not allow their womenfolk to work for others, and some not even in their own fields. The cereal-growing farmers allow their women to work occasionally for kin.

The subsequent two groups are marked by a lack of both land and education. The third group comprises craftsmen, skilled workers, taxi drivers, tractor drivers, coffee house keepers and constitutes 21.5 per cent of the working population. Most earn good wages but lack the security of land holdings to fall back on. However, they usually have sufficient land to obtain loans which they invest in land and new crops. Most urban workers are unionized and political activists. There is some debate as to whether skilled workers are better off than the small farmers. With small farms becoming uneconomical, and the gap amongst farmers

widening, land is losing its traditional significance. Although vocally politically activist, they rarely take the initiative in village affairs, but are more dependent upon the morphomeni than upon the yeorghii.

Finally labourers (ergates) and shepherds (voskii) occupy the bottom of the social scale and together constitute 42 per cent of the working population. Their position is completely different to the top two groups. Whereas the case of the morphomeni and yeorghii brings out that political power is not directly synonomous with economic power (indeed it is more than that), the case of labourers and shepherds brings out the direct equation of economic poverty with political dependence. They work for most of the week at a daily rate of £4 (men) and £2 (women), and they are imprisoned by their lack of land, skills and education. The most precarious are the day-labourers who work on building sites; higher up are the relatively few fully-employed men, and at the top are the shepherds whose social position is devalued by the work involved.

While the nature of their dependencies vary (shepherds upon butchers to sell their meat, grocers for their cheese, and farmers for land; labourers upon building site foremen), they are essentially politically dependent. They rarely engage in coffee house conversations and openly express their political beliefs. Nor are their opinions given much weight. There is a considerable amount of movement from one occupation to the other. Men who own some land become shepherds if they can rent land close to their pens (mandra). Otherwise lack of labour (at least two individuals are necessary to tend a moderately sized flock of 70 sheet and goats),

or land, obliges them to become labourers. In other cases husband and wife follow different occupations. Their lack of land means that they can only qualify for small loans, making it very difficult for them to expand and modernize their holdings or invest in University education for all their young. It is this class which has emigrated to a greater extent although statistics are unavailable.

There are at least nine coffee shops in the village square where men gather in the evenings, but the practical use made of the public domain by different social groups varies. First, not all social groups use the coffee house framework in the same intensity; second, these social groups use their framework in qualitatively different manners. Shepherds considered to be '*exo ap'tin kinonia*' ('outside society'), because of their lack of social skills and poverty can be verbally abused and ridiculed by the farmers, tend to group among themselves and rarely engage in the shouting matches so characteristic of farmers' conversations, where each individual attempts to shout down his opponent. The teachers and white-collar workers, by contrast, use the public domain infrequently for validation of prestige. They seek recreation in the town rather than in the village public area and they usually do so collectively as family groups rather than following the sexual division of recreation as with the farmers and shepherds. The teachers without exception shunned the village coffee houses considering them anarchic places where men of little education made crude spectacles of themselves. Likewise, they tend to utilize the more formal forms of address when speaking to others whom they consider to have less status and are reluctant

to use nicknames when possible. Most villagers criticize them behind their backs saying that they have put on airs and the old men, recalling more participation by teachers in public life, complain that by removing themselves the teachers are relinquishing the possibility of giving good examples.

By abstaining from regularly visiting the coffee shops the teachers and white collar workers indicate their unwillingness to be drawn in a continuous series of exchanges with others. When they do visit they will either carefully choose whom they will sit by, or sit alone in order to be able to pay for their coffees, which would necessitate a series of further exchanges. In the village idiom, where you sit, and whom you sit by, indicates who you are, and whom your friends are.

There are two further ways by means of which social contracts can be strengthened and manifested within the village: through drinking groups and card-playing groups. Both cases are different in composition, their process of recruitment and their semiotic value.

First, drinking groups in tavernas tend to be composed of small pools of mutual friends and are less fluid in composition than those in coffee houses. Coffee houses are clearing houses for information, usually occupied in the early hours of the morning and evening, and men often visit to exchange information and coffee. Indeed to sit by someone implies to transact information, to barter, and this explains why teachers and white-collar workers use the coffee house framework infrequently - they have little to exchange with farmers. Drinking groups by contrast are different; they have little practical purpose and the signs used are more pronounced,

are indulged in for their own sake, and are more oriented towards the specific purposes of binding men together once a relationship of friendship has been established beforehand. This action achieves its meaning by reference to what it indicates to others about those conducting it and by reference to its intruisic value to themselves. Consequently, they take place for three reasons. First, when men actually want to celebrate friendship and renew its symbolic component. Secondly, when they want to create the right psychological climate to execute a common task, as for example prior to elections; and thirdly, when a man wants to make a display of the other as in the case where a man publicly entertains an important friend, or even a patron, in order to make known his powerful contacts.

Hence most drinking groups are composed of kinsmen, men of the same status or men who have similar political beliefs. When men of the same status sit together they compete to pay. Finally, in the third case men who have similar political beliefs drink together to cement political ties. There is little of the Southern Italian practice of using drinking and feating groups to bridge differences (Schneider, 1972). In Peyia close friends, not potential ones, break bread together.

1.3 Conclusion

This has been a brief, more or less straightforward description of certain basic changes in Peyia between 1920 and 1980. Agriculture has become cash-crop oriented; the Church owned 21 per cent of all agricultural land, it now owns a minimal amount; the stratification system has become more complex: whereas there was a two-fold division between the merchants and the peasants in 1920,

nowadays the Peyiotes distinguish four basic socio-economic groups. The process and implications of these changes will be examined in the next chapters, but it is first necessary to deal with the early origins of Greek nationalism and the emergence of the merchant elites in the early twentieth century in order to understand the patterns of politics and kinship in 1920 Peyia.

1.4 Notes

1 Hogarth (1889).

2 A Chiftlik is a large estate; see p.34-35 for their origins.

3 The case of Panayis Kissonerghites clearly brings out that in naming the locally born have predominance. He married into Peyia in 1945 and kept his original name, Panayis Ioannou, until 1965 as no-one else had one similar to his. However, by 1965 a locally-born Peyioti with the same name had grown to a young man. Panayis was obliged to cease using his original name and adopted the name of his village as a nickname.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EARLY GREEK NATIONALISM

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I deal with the emergence of a Greek-Cypriot elite, and with the transformation of Greek nationalism across time. There are two reasons for this. First, because village politics in the 1920-60 period was decisively influenced by the merchant elites, and indeed the issues which engaged the attention of Peyiotes then continue to influence political culture and mentalities nowadays. Second, because it is important to treat Greek nationalism differently to most observers by examining certain structural features of the political economy of Cyprus. This chapter is a brief account of national and regional politics and economies, and I compare Cypriot elites to rural elites elsewhere in the Mediterranean. I then examine village politics against this background in Chapter 3.

2.2 Church and Mercantile Elites under twentieth century Colonialism

The origins of Greek nationalism in Cyprus extend back to 1821 when a small group of merchants and local Church leaders attempted to support the Greek war of Independence. In spite of the suppression of the alleged complicity the attraction which the 'Megali Idea' (Great Ideal) held for local leaders had been paradoxically fostered by Ottoman Imperialism[1]. Due to its policy of retaining some measure of control over potentially wayward provinces, Ottoman rule had directly encouraged the political emergence and consolidation of the local Church as an interstital structure located between the subject population and the Imperial

representatives. This was a direct outcome of the Millet system which recognized religious rather than ethnic differences. The Church, after a long period of suppression under Lusignan (1192-1489) and Venetian occupations (1489-1571), when it lost most of its properties to the Latin Church, was given State protection in the collection of canonical and liturgical fees (zetetai), was exempted from taxation, and delegated with the right to collect tithes and taxes for Ottoman coffers. Its property was restored and it received donations from pious peasants and grants from people who feared the usurpation and envy of officials. Once these properties passed into the name of the Church or monastery they were safe and exempt from taxation (see the Imperial Berats). In such a manner the Church acquired the main large estates in the island which were then rented out back to the peasants during the British occupation. The general survey of 1909-29, the first reliable guide to property ownership, indicated that out of a total of 3,232,996 donums of agricultural land the Sees and Monasteries owned 222,296 donums or 6.8 per cent of the total agricultural land. The Church's properties were not evenly distributed. In the Paphos District, where field work was conducted, the Metropolitan See of Paphos and Kykkos Monastery owned 11.2 per cent of the land; in Peyia, the village dealt with in this thesis, both bodies owned nearly 25 per cent of the total agricultural land. Although 6.8 per cent seems a small national percentage these estates were by far the most productive properties in the island. Compared with most privately held land, which is extremely fragmented, nearly all of these estates were located in the fertile coastal plans having their own perennial source of water.

Together with the large estates or Chiftliks, probably the remnants of the large Venetian sugar plantations (Christodoulou, 1959:76), which amounted to 69,210 donums or 2.14 per cent of total agricultural land in 1909, these were the large estates in the island. Chiftliks belonged to absentee landowners living in Constantinople, and they were probably much larger in the past. Christodoulou notes that "dissolution and subdivision has been going on for decades if not centuries" (1959:76).

The process of land accumulation had therefore been due to an indirect, if somewhat unplanned, strengthening of local pre-existing institutions such as the Church. Turkish colonialism thus differed from, for example, the Catalan type in Sicily where 'robber barons' appropriated peasant holdings (Schneider and Schneider, 1976). Furthermore by being recognized as the political representative of the Christian (i.e. Greek) ethnos (nation) the Church could function both as the representative of the peasantry in negotiations with the Porte, and as the representative of Imperial power in its economic dealings with the peasantry through the collection of taxes.[2]

Beside encouraging the emergence of interstital political structures Ottoman colonialism indirectly encouraged the emergence of local trading elites as in Greece.[3] The Ottomans were more interested in the direct appropriation of agricultural produce such as grain than in trade, the main concern of Genoa and Venice. With the opening of the Atlantic trade route, the dismantling of the sugar plantations and the demise of the cotton industry, Cyprus was reduced to the backwater from which she had barely emerged in the fifteenth century. During this period the population

decreased and the island can be said to have had a frontier economy. The Turkish administration attempted to encourage an increased cultivation of cereals, but this was largely subverted by the often inefficient and predatory local officials as well as by high taxes. Goods were mainly transported by donkey train and exported by small caiques which called at the numerous little coves and landing places near the places of production well into the 1930s. These goods were not mainly basic foodstuffs such as wheat (upon which the Ottoman administration held a monopoly), but specialized local products such as carobs, the most abundant crop-bearing tree in the island and for many years the most valuable export crop, to be surpassed by citrus only in the 1950s. Under the Ottoman administration trade was mainly with neighbouring countries (Egypt and Syria), but European missions increasingly claimed a large share of the export trade. These capitulatory privileges, trade concessions granted by the Sultan to European powers, were originally given to Mediterranean powers such as the Ragusan Republic, and later to France, England and Austria. In time these foreign consuls were to assume considerable local influence of an unofficial kind. This had three effects. First, the power of the Central State was further weakened at the expense of local power holders such as the Church (which until 1821 was given certain privileges) and the Governor (after 1821). Second, European trade encouraged the cultivation of new crops. This together with the increase of population in the latter part of the eighteenth century created a new land market. Thirdly, it hindered the growth of a well developed internal market at the expense of external connections. In 1683 Van Bruyn (Cobham, 1908)

noticed the wide extent of the trading connections of the foreign consuls stationed in Larnaca.

With the execution of the leading prelates in 1821 the Porte continued the policy of strategic equilibrium of local class privileges and structures by transferring the right to collect tithes to tax farmers, often those merchants connected with foreign commerce.[4] By associating with the numerous North European trade missions merchants obtained more secure markets and diplomatic immunity in that they were administratively considered as nationals of foreign countries (Jenness; 1962).

The system specified that 10 per cent of the total produce was to be paid in tithes; in practice the amount extracted was usually greater. The tithe farmer often paid a fixed estimated amount to the Porte and was left free to collect as much as he could extract from the peasantry. In the case of more perishable crops, such as fruit, the tithe was commuted to money payments determinable by local Government Officials whose decisions almost always favoured the tax farmers. Tithe farmers could also often indefinitely postpone payments to the Government and interest was never enforced. There were thus many opportunities available for the accumulation of profits. The implication was that the peasantry was more often than not debt-ridden and in a perpetual state of obligation. The only way to reduce taxation was to cut back in production. Paradoxically one of the avenues available for reducing rapacious demands was in the long run, to contribute to a further deterioration in the condition of the peasantry. Fear of the envy of officials (who were not paid but bought their posts. Cobham; 371) and usurpation in the face of debts and

perhaps also a decrease in population,[5] as well as religious reasons, encouraged many peasants to donate their land to the Church. Once held by the Church (Archbishopric, Metropolitan Sees or Monasteries) it was exempt from taxation (Berat of 1866). In such a manner the Church acquired the main large estates in the island which were then rented out back to the peasants during the British occupation, as in Peyia.

When Britain assumed control of the island in 1878, she inherited a debt-ridden peasantry and local economic structures of domination and political representation through the Greek Orthodox Church. Many observers note that during this period nationalist ideology was limited to a few segments of the population, that its appeal was limited, and that it historically preceded Turkish nationalism. Speaking on this period Georghallides notes: "The Greek politicians knew that, in spite of its shortcomings and the unsatisfactory mandate under which Britain administered Cyprus, compared with the Ottoman domination, British rule was a blessing. They therefore believed that a breach with Britain should be avoided at all costs since, for the present, Britain protected them from worse fates" (1979:82).

Although I shall not be dealing with the complex Greek-Turkish conflict except where it touches upon my argument, it is important to note that Turkish nationalism seems to have emerged partly as a response to an already well developed Greek nationalism in the 1950s. Indeed most observers (e.g. Hill, 1952; Crawshaw, 1979) agree on two things in spite of their differences in sentiment. First, that Greek Nationalism developed largely autonomously and independently from Turkish Nationalism. Second, that these two

groups possessed corresponding differences in ideology, language and religious belief which changed across time from being largely different, to being mainly oppositionary to each other. There seem to have been at least three critical factors which explain the emergence and transformation of nationalism and ethnic conflict in the island. First, there is the historical experience. Whereas the Greeks were, until 1878, rajahs, a tax-paying subject people, the Turks although numerically smaller were part of the ruling group. From 1878 both groups became subject peoples. Second, their internal political organization and modes of representation were different. Under the Millet system the Greeks were organized under the Orthodox Church which held a specific concept of the State and was expected to play a critical political role (Runciman, 1971). By contrast, after the Attaturkist reforms of 1922, the Turks attached great importance to the concept of the secular State. Thirdly, both groups differ in their conception of ethnic boundaries. Whereas the Greeks identify religion as expressed in marriage as the critical feature of their ethnic identity, the Turks have generally not been so specific. Vryonides (1975) has shown that on the question of intermarriage in examining Islamic and Christian law and practice, Islam was more elastic in both theory and practice.

Most observers however either tend to view ethnic conflict as essentially the product of British rule (e.g. A. Pollis, 1976), when it was largely a by-product. Alternatively they treat nationalism mainly in autonomous ideological terms. Whilst there certainly was a tendency towards ideological autonomy which, indeed, developed across time, they nevertheless often fail to

appreciate that the roots of Greek nationalism lie in a complicated set of internal political and economic factors rather than in any essential 'incompatibility' between the two ethnic groups. The internal factors which conditioned and determined the emergence of early Greek nationalism in Cyprus has been a neglected topic which merits attention and which I deal with below.

Early nationalism cannot be seen in isolation to elite formation and indeed recent studies on the Mediterranean have brought out that the process of elite formation is usually related to two factors: the emergence of the Modern State, and the capacity of certain local groups to maintain and reproduce themselves within this framework by successfully playing-off centrifugal forces embodied in the newly-emergent State against local interests (Blok, 1974; Schneider and Schneider, 1976; Hansen, 1977). According to the literature they have managed to do so either by creating their own power domains which resist the expansion of State power, or by monopolizing access to local resources and the circulation of essential commodities and basic foodstuffs. These two processes often operate jointly. For example, Blok's account of the Mafia in Sicily (1969;74) shows how the Mafia emerged from the local peasantry in Sicily to become the administrators or sub-letters of the latifundia held by absentee landlords residing in the towns. By separating the various conflictual levels of the society (landlords and peasants) Mafiosi exercised power in their own right, first, by fixing the limits to which they were prepared to be manipulated by the urban-based landlord class, generally reluctant to have much contact with the countryside; and second, through their monopoly of violence there which

prevented the emergence of any long-term highly organized and effective peasant movement. The Schneiders (1976) have also treated the phenomenon of Mafiosi, emphasizing the changing patterns of the economic integration of Sicily with the outside. They have interpreted the phenomenon of the Mafia more in terms of determination by and adaptation to economic factors, the Mafia itself, being seen as a cultural code, instead of directly political factors as Blok does with his emphasis on incomplete State formation.

P. Schneider has characterized the friendship coalition dominated by landed and commercial interests (of which the Mafia is an example) as "an outcome, an adaptation to a basic structural problem typical of early mercantilist colonies" (1972;256). This 'basic structural problem' is the organization, in the countryside, of critical economic activities in the absence of penetration of State institutions. By contrast to Northern Europe the development of the State did not precede, or proceed concurrently with, the market; rather market forces penetrated the periphery earlier than State institutions. Their particular characteristic was that they did not provide the basis of a cohesive internal political organization; rather, because of external economic links, they eventually tended to limit the expansion of State power through the creation of discrete power domains possessing their own cultural codes for organization such as the Mafia and omerta.

These approaches are useful but limited. Useful as they investigate the implications of colonization for local power domains. Ideologies and cultural codes can therefore be seen as idioms utilized to organize internal coalitions and resist external threats. But they are limited as they are drawn from the Western

Mediterranean (Sicily and Catalonia) where the Modern State emerged in the nineteenth century. When Cyprus is compared to Sicily its specific characteristics emerge.

To begin with internal power relations were extremely insecure and fragmented in nineteenth and twentieth century Cyprus, exceeding Sicily in overlapping and competing power domains (Schneider and Schneider, 1976; Schneider, Schneider and Hansen, 1972). Under late Turkish rule the Governorship was annually given to the highest bidder, an auction known as '*mangiare i danari*' (Drummond in Cobham, 1908:227). A Cypriot counterpart to the *massaria* complex was lacking. Instead Cypriot villages have traditionally been relatively small, ranging from a few hundred to two thousand inhabitants, separated from each other by average distances of five miles in the coastal plains. Their internal socio-economic composition has always reflected the agricultural base and their prxomity to the District capitals. There is no top-heavy stratum of a literate petty bourgeoisie to the extent found in Sicily and Southern Italy with their characteristic pettifogging lawyer. Cypriot villages are much less self-contained and less internally diversified than their Sicilian counterparts. Whereas Western Sicily is composed of relatively uniform agrotowns, Cyprus is composed of small, mainly separate, Greek and Turkish villages and District capitals. Local power bases in Cyprus were to a great extent dependent upon the use and control of external marketing and credit networks rather than the direct control of the means of production. In Western Sicily the baronial cliques controlled *land*: in Cyprus the traditional local elites with the exception of the Church mainly controlled externally oriented *trade*.

Nor were local elites homogeneous. Power structures were fragmented, merchants, professionals and the Church all providing relatively discrete power domains. Hence, it was relatively easier for the State and its institutions to penetrate the Cypriot countryside than in Sicily. It did so by transforming marketing and credit networks rather than the ownership of land.

Nationalism must be approached as a cultural code within this political and ecological framework. Not only did it have different meanings and intensities for different segments of the population, but its appeal changed across time, a function of the overall political framework.[6] No doubt at the beginning of the century it was inseparably linked to religion.[7] Indeed nationalism clearly spread from the Church to other segments of the population. There is ample evidence to support the view that nationalism is originally confined to a group of intellectuals without wide influence or even much ambition to mobilize mass support. The Church's renewed emphasis on nationalism is clearly related to the policies of the new administration as it was no longer recognized as the official spokesman of the Greek Cypriot community. The Ottoman practice of assisting the Bishops in the collection of their customary dues, liturgical fees and a personal tax paid by each member of the Orthodox Church, was abrogated. This implied a shift from recognition of religious differences to one of dealing with secular local leaders with corresponding ethnic differences. Georghallides notes the economic consequences for the Church: "deprived of the support of the State, the Orthodox Church could no longer collect its taxes with the result that the income of the episcopal sees was reduced to one third of what it had been

before the British administration" (ibid., 61).[8]

The indigenous mercantile elite quickly asserted itself in the early twentieth century through an expanded Civil Service and in the professions. Georghallides notes that "unlike the older politicians these persons had faint memories of the Ottoman period and were Athens trained lawyers" (ibid., 82). Between 1901-10 the island split into two opposing groups, the Kiriniaki and Kitiaki factions supporting rival contenders to the vacant Archbishopric. There is little evidence that this conflict penetrated the remote countryside surrounding Peyia, probably because the basis of these factions was credit and marketing monopolies which were underdeveloped in this area. In other areas such as the Karpas Peninsula where tobacco was the main export crop and credit-marketing was well developed there was a stronger degree of factionalism in the countryside (Attalides, 1977). In Paphos town at the same time the literary elites split into two groups linked to the above factions and clubs were established supporting rival contenders. Their members were mainly civil servants and merchants one of whom, a lawyer-merchant called Nicolaides, was later to exert a significant influence upon regional and village politics. The idiom in which such factionalism was framed was that of nationalism and religion, for the clubs had religious names.

Indeed it must be stressed that the two themes were originally interlinked both in the individual consciousness of Greek Cypriots and in institutions; a secular, in contrast to a religious, nationalism was to emerge later. In the early part of the twentieth century they were interlinked and inseperable. This

conflict over succession can be seen as an attempt by the secular representatives of the Greek Cypriots to capture and dominate an institution with material resources, but it is also significant that the means employed to legitimate and frame these attempts were largely couched in the idiom of political discourse supplied by the Church as an institution.

Competition and factionalism were, however, increasingly expressed in the secular political domain. The recently established Legislative Council, an elective body under the chairmanship of the Governor provided novel opportunities and these positions were rapidly filled by usury interests. Indeed a Governor noted:

> "I found on the Council eight advocates, three of whom were moneylenders, one landowner who was also a moneylender; one Bishop of the Cyprus Orthodox Church; one merchant and one farmer. Thus ... the interests represented in the Legislative were almost exclusively those of the numerically insignificant class of parasites who made a living out of the peasant producer." (Storrs, 1939:473)

Originally the Greek Cypriot politicians in the Legislative Assembly concentrated on opposing, in nationalist rhetoric, those economic measures (such as the Tribute to Turkey obtained out of taxes) which the Colonial administration had inherited from the 1878 Treaty. But with the expansion of the merchant and mesites (middlemen) class, incorporation of the peasantry in the credit network (and hence limited possibilities for profit expansion), and the saturation of the Civil Service, factionalism became more acute though not organized into permanent political parties. Indeed as Attalides notes factionalism concerned precisely the issue of nationalism:

> "At the beginning of the 20th century the demand for Union with Greece does not seem to have been

> expressed with unanimous vehemence among this class. In fact there was some degree of political conflict centred around this issue, splitting the merchant and political class, and through them the rest of the island, into 'moderates' and 'uncompromizing nationalists'" (1979:24)

It seems clear that those favouring 'uncompromising nationalism' were individuals and groups largely excluded from the exercise of power and the credit network, whilst those known for their 'moderation' benefitted from credit networks, were reluctant to transform the '<u>status quo</u>', and favoured limited cooperation with the Colonial authorities. Indeed the pre-1939 period was much more characterized by (i) the opposition of various Greek Cypriot groups and coalitions <u>to each other</u>, rather either than (ii) Greek Cypriot opposition to the Colonial status of the island and administration, or (iii) than by the opposition of Greeks to Turks. The second type of conflict characterized the 1945-59 period and the third type emerged during the 1963-74 period. The economic and political constraints which defined and characterized these three periods were different though each had their roots in the previous ones.

It is important to note that the socio-economic composition of both coalitions and factions were roughly similar. On both sides were to be found merchants, exporters, professionals, land-owners, and in certain critical moments the clergy. Through these coalitions vertical networks were formed linking the peasantry to the towns. Before 1939 the major difference between the politicians was in age, the uncompromizing nationalists being generally of a younger generation than the moderates. As many moderates occupied official positions besides controlling a large

share of the credit and marketing networks, they could resist State or colonial encroachment on their own domains for their own purposes within the certain limitations and powers they possessed. These were largely of a preventive nature. When a Financial Commission led by Sir R. Oakden arrived in the 1930s in Paphos to investigate the financial and social state of the District, they were met by professionals, men of letters, and merchants all favourable to the status quo and chosen by the Mayor (Nicolaides). This action was vigorously opposed by other merchants and professionals occupying unfavourable positions and having a smaller share of the market, who formed an unofficial delegation to make their dissatisfaction felt.[9]

2.3 The Implications of Rural Indebtedness

As a great deal of the power of these elites derived from their control of marketing and credit it is important to examine the effects of the British administration upon the local economy.

The new administration initiated infrastructural works which significantly altered the political and economic relations between centre and periphery. The most important were the introduction of a stable currency, the spread of a monetary economy, and the building of roads to facilitate communication within the island. When Turkey vacated Cyprus there was only one carriage road linking Nicosia with the seaport of Larnaca. By 1904 a well-developed system of carriage roads had linked up all the five major towns, and a number of villages.

Some administrative reforms at the end of the nineteenth century initially affected local structures of dominance adversely. Tax farming was abolished and Government agents empowered to

collect taxes. This was bound adversely to affect those previously engaged in tax farming. In 1879 the Commissioner for Paphos observed that:

> "I shall never forget the consternation which fell on the small merchants of this town when the new regulations were published ... the previous system suited these usurer merchants completely for as soon as the Government had taken its tithes, they pounced on the peasant and laid hold of the cocoons. Now the peasant is free to sell when and where it pleases him".

He went on to say that many peasants were selling carobs, the main export crop of the region (used as animal feed in England and as a syrup in Egypt) in the villages and were getting a better price for them.

Such optimism proved to be premature. Improvements in communications and the spread of a monetary economy pushed the economic frontiers into the countryside. Whilst they did qualitatively change the lot of the peasantry, they also extended the credit network. As a result, merchant networks were established in the villages firmly linking town and country and facilitating the export and marketing of cash crops such as carobs. Normally credit is an essential feature of a peasant economy but as I shall show, a certain combination of factors tended to make it appressive.

The introduction of a cash economy and of a new steady currency also transformed the system of exchange.

Within the previous system peasants had little need to transform products into cash except to pay certain taxes and to purchase a few necessary consumption items. Surplus agricultural produce was mainly redistributed through the regional system of religious fairs (zooemboropanayierka) where products were often bartered. The Panayierka system joined villages together on a

regional basis with very little surplus going to the regional towns, then mainly large villages. Fairs coincided with the harvesting of each village's main crops. There were 34 Fairs (Storrs and O'Brien, 1930) for the Paphos District and Peyia for example had two Fairs when most products were bartered.[10] Within the new system money penetrated the countryside as it became both the standard of measurement and the means of payment. This was a direct result of the introduction of all taxes which could only be paid in cash. The peasant was therefore obliged to seek means for disposing his surplus for cash. The establishment of permanent daily markets in the towns began the slow but definite transformation of the social relations of marketing. The zooemboropanayierka continued co-existing with the regular daily markets and, together with the establishment of village grocers who acted as middlemen (mesites) for town merchants, provided the main avenue for the penetration of credit relationships into the countryside.

Within the context of usury such transformations resulted in an increase in the economic exploitation of the peasantry. A report in 1928 made the following observation:

> "The peasant has to pay a high rate of interest to which must be added the percentages lost over the measuring of his produce, the undercutting for it, the overcharging for any produce given him by the merchant (on the condition of receiving half the crop on return). In the cases of crop failure the peasant was obliged to repay in money at the rate of 30% to 40%. To tide over a bad year the peasant was obliged to borrow cash in order to buy essential foodstuffs often from the very same moneylender in the village".

It also noted that "two bad years may so cripple the peasant that he is only able to pay interest charges on his loans" (Surridge, 1930:44), further reproducing and sustaining the cycles of

indebtedness. If the peasant were to challenge the often higher than legal rates of interest, he was likely not to obtain credit the next year. Most peasants were illiterate; they had to take the merchant's word for the state of accounts. Abuses were therefore common practice.

A report of 1918 outlined the process of the debt cycle:

> When the account has been struck the farmer makes an admission that he owes the account which is shown to be due, and frequently gives a bond for the amount. The same procedure is followed year after year until the farmer is hopelessly insolvent. Then his property is mortgaged to the merchant and if the farmer's wife has any property she is induced to give a mortgage on her property too to procure a prolongation of the credit. Sometimes the farmer's children are induced to join in a bond with their father. The mortgaged property can be sold up in a summary way under the law. After the farmer is bound in the way above described, if he is left in possession, he becomes a mere bailiff of the merchant. He is in a worse position than a hired labourer because he cannot change his master. If the farmer's property is sold up, he becomes a labourer with no chance of rising, because he carries always the burden of a debt which grows year by year at 12% interest.
> (Cyprus. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the extent, causes and effects of indebtedness in the island, Nicosia, 1918).

Surridge's report of 1930 gives a breakdown of the estimated percentage of debtors for the period according to their estimated value of property (Surridge, 1930:40). Table 2.1 shows that the greatest percentage of debtors (93%) in the Paphos District, were to be found in the lower categories, the poorest peasants owning property valued between £50 and £100. This was equivalent to holdings of between 31-63 donums, whereas, the size of a sufficiently productive holding necessary to support a nam, his wife and three children through cereal cultivation was estimated at 60-70 donums (ibid., 58). In other words the most heavily indebted peasants

were those with holdings below the minimum limit necessary for social reproduction. (1 donum = 0.33 acre, 0.133 hectare).

Persons	Non-Debtors	Debtors	Total Amount of Debts	Percentage of Non-Debtors	Percentage of Debtors	Average Debt of Debtors	Estimated Value of Property
			£	%	%	£	
574	115	459	57,400	20	80	125	Above £400
686	103	583	43,904	15	85	75	Between £300 & £400
994	149	845	42,742	15	85	50	" £200 & £300
1,314	171	1,143	42,048	35	87	36	" £150 & £200
1,572	173	1,399	36,156	11	89	26	" £100 & £150
2,381	167	2,214	33,334	7	93	15	" £ 50 & £100
3,308	331	2,977	29,772	10	90	10	Up to £ 50
10,829	1,209	9,620	285,356	11	89	26	

TABLE 2.1 EXTENT OF RURAL INDEBTEDNESS IN THE PAPHOS DISTRICT, 1927-28

Source: Survey results commissioned by Surridge, 1930

That were the causes of such debt which gave so much power to the merchants? There were three discrete causes for such widespread peasant debts: first, the natural and ecological framework which set limits to the mode of appropriation from nature; second, the distribution of property and the large Church land holdings which defined access to resources outside the family; finally, the pattern of transmission of resources within the family. The first cause was 'natural' and ecological; the second economic and political; and the third, cultural and related to the exigencies of social reproduction. The working out of the limitations and possiblities inherent within each factor is the working out of

the tendency towards rural debt, and any transformation in the limitation and possibility inherent within any one factor was bound to have repercussions upon the others.

For the first factor it is important to note that with the exception of the large Mesaoria plains in the Morphou region (which characteristically had a lower percentage of rural debt) most of the land is Cyprus is hilly, characterized by poor soils and erosion. Summers extend from April to October and the rainfall in winter is often minimal. Drought is a common phenomenon. The mean average rainfall ranges from about 11 inches to over 50 and the three rainiest months (December to February) account for most of the year's rainfall. The maximum rainfall ranges from 6 inches for Peyia (West Paphos plateau) in January and December to nearly 3 inches for three months in Morphou in the West Central lowlands. In the sparsely populated Troodos mountain range the average monthly maximum is 13 inches for January.[11]

In addition peasant holdings were, and are, extremely fragmented and the possibility of conserving land and preventing fragmentation through cousin marriages (as in Southern Italy) absent through matrimonial prohibitions in Greek Orthodoxy, stricter in this regard than Roman Catholicism. Inherited property is divided equally amonst all heirs. In 1930 it was calculated that overall 25% of the total private holdings consisted of less than 10 donums (3 acres), 27% of 10-30 donums (3-10 acres); 21% of 30-60 donums (10-20 acres) and the remaining 27% of over 60 donums (20 acres). In the 1946 census registered plots numbered 12.6 per holding with an average size of 4.25 donums per plot.

Technology was labour intensive. Most families possessed

a team of oxen to plough their land with rich farmers often employing poor men to do the ploughing for others. Mechanization came late to Cypriot agriculture. Up until 1939 only 27 tractors had been imported and they were used extensively by large owners or corporations. In the early part of this century the Metropolitan See of Paphos purchased a tractor for use on its large estates but discontinued its use after a few years and the Church withdrew from the production process. Other tractors were introduced into the Paphos District in 1937-39 mainly by a few enterprising rural merchants and the first tractor made its appearance in Peyia in 1948 purchased not by a rural merchant, but by a full-time solvent farmer. In 1946 there were 120 tractors for a whole island and in 1958 there were 2,250.

Villages took long to take to mechanization for two reasons. First, credit was restricted and so related to the basic agricultural cycle and basic needs that it refracted against the adoption of further risks and capital outlays. A reason more specific to Peyia was that most peasant holdings prior to the 1960s were located in the hilly areas of the village which made machine access and ploughing difficult.

Artificial fertilizers were also absent and began to be introduced on a large scale in the early 1950s mainly through the efforts of the Farmers Unions, the right-wing PEK and the left-wing EKA. Until that period the fallow system was in force in most of the island with fields being left fallow for one year.

Low productivity, absence of fertilizers and the fallow system required comparatively large holdings. In 1930 Surridge estimated that between 60 and 70 donums (20-30 acres) were necessary to support

a farming family composed of five members. It thus emerges that over 50% of all privately owned holdings were below the minimum standards necessary to support a family. To supplement their income peasants often rented or sharecropped land from the large estates held by the Church, monasteries or religious foundations. Overall, the Greek Orthodox Church, Evkaf and the irrigated Chiftliks comprised nearly 10 per cent of the total arable land. As these large estates were mainly concentrated in the plains where the soils are more fertile and irrigated, their productive value was very high.

A final factor contributing towards the reproduction of peasant debt was due to the pattern of property transmissions within the family. These debts were due much more to prosperity than adversity. Although treated in more detail in Chapter 5, marriage basically involves a transfer of land and a dowry house to daughters. Men often purchased properties on credit in order to obtain better matches for their children (and hence it differs from the previous two causes which were ecological rather than an expression of rationality and cultural choice). A man's prestige and standing within the community depended upon the provisioning of his children especially daughters at marriage. Within the undeveloped village economy where men competed for village partners this implied land. To obtain such land for matrimonial strategies men were obliged to borrow cash to buy properties on the market, either through natural causes of sale or through sales of mortgaged properties. Surridge notes that: "it is estimated that over 60% of dowries for the provision of a house, animals and furniture are paid from loans obtained at a high rate of interest from the

local money lenders ... and there is always a hope that speculation in dowries may be profitable in the end" (1930:25). Consequently matrimonial strategies entailing transfers of property often implied either the transfer of mortgaged property to the newly-established household thus establishing them in debt, or the addition of such debts to the parents' accounts often leading to forced sales of their properties.

Such cycles tended to reproduce themselves to a certain extent because the pattern of agricultural production required recourse to credit (a normal feature of a peasant economy), whilst the distribution of privately held property (see Chapter 3) and low productivity necessitated access to Church land which could only be exploited through further access to credit. It was only a combination of these factors which contributed to a somewhat oppressive system. When claims of creditors, causing forced sales of property, were effected some of the peasants were left destitute and landless with little alternatives except emigration or the sale of their labour at harvest time on the estates held by the village merchants. Furthermore, in order to reproduce themselves within the village the peasantry required land for matrimonial strategies which was often obtained on credit, thus transmitting debts to heirs.

Tables 2.2 and 2.3, which concern forced sales to satisfy debts for the Paphos District and Cyprus, bring out the effects of the interarticulation of these three factors. They show not only the significant land areas involved, but also the <u>predominance</u> of this cycle of peasant debt-forced sales in the pre-1946 period. Thus the total number of forced sales (i.e. Judgement and Mortgage

YEAR	JUDGEMENT DEBTS			MORTGAGE DEBTS		
	NO OF CASES CYPRUS	AREA OF LAND SOLD PAPHOS DONUMS	AREA OF LAND SOLD CYPRUS DONUMS	NO OF CASES CYPRUS	AREA OF LAND SOLD PAPHOS DONUMS	AREA OF LAND SOLD CYPRUS DONUMS
1929	979	2,470	9,859	580	2,578	15,434
1934	165	116	1,711	222	416	4,904
1935	627	1,476	9,849	881	4,797	30,470
1936	774	1,353	12,810	1,293	9,824	41,437
1938	628	1,352	6,223	863	4,027	19,298
1939	337	681	3,903	446	2,236	10,485
1946	65	54	359	23	57	301

TABLE 2.2 Forced Sales (Judgement and Mortgage Debts) for the Paphos District and Total Cyprus

SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Land Registration and Survey Department, 1929, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 46

YEAR	TOTAL FORCED SALES										
	PAPHOS						CYPRUS				
	JUDGE-MENT AREAS	MORT-GAGE AREAS	TOTAL AREA Donums	TOTAL NO OF CASES	% OF JUDGE MENT DEBTS	% OF MORT-GAGE DEBTS	JUDGE-MENT AREA	MORT-GAGE AREA	TOTAL AREAS Donums	% OF JUDGE-MENT DEBTS	% OF MORT-GAGE DEBTS
1929	48·9%	51·1%	5,049	323	77·3%	22·7%	38·9%	61·1%	25,292	62·7%	37·3%
1934	21·8%	78·2%	532	29	48·2%	51·8%	25·8%	74·2%	6,615	42·6%	57·4%
1935	23·5%	76·5%	6,273	235	48·9%	51·1%	24·4%	75·6%	40,319	41·5%	58·5%
1936	12·1%	87·9%	11,177	411	42·3%	57·7%	23·6%	76·4%	54,247	37·4%	62·6%
1938	25·1%	74·9%	5,379	228	50·4%	49·6%	24·3%	75·7%	25,522	42·1%	57·9%
1939	23·3%	76·7%	2,917	145	40·6%	59·4%	27·1%	72·9%	14,388	45·8%	54·2%
1946	48·6%	51·4%	111	32	90·6%	9·4%	58·1%	41·9%	617	73·8%	26·2%

TABLE 2.3: Total Forced Sales for Paphos District and Total Cyprus. Areas and numbers of cases involved according to type of Forced Sale

SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Land Registration and Survey Department, 1929, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 46.

Debts) remains high for the 1929-39 period (1,559 cases to 823 cases) but drops significantly in 1946 when the total number was 88 (Table 2.2). The causes of this drop are examined later. The areas involved are also high. In 1929, 25,292 donums were forcefully sold (Table 2.3, third column from right). They continue rising (with one exception in 1934) until 1939, but again drop by 1946 to 617 donums. The tables also indicate the nature of security required for credit. Judgement Debts were the outcomes of court cases for the payment of loans which were not initially tied to land as security. Mortgage Debt sales were of two kinds: sales of those properties which had been purchased on credit but which were defaulted in payment (e.g. land required for matrimonial strategies), and sales of those properties which were given as security to obtain credit and cash (e.g. land pledged when an account was established with a village or town merchant). Hence the basic difference between the two revolves around the use of land as security - in the former it is absent, in the latter it is present. An indication that land became increasingly important as credit security is shown by the increase of mortgaged debts (land as credit security) which rose from 37.3% for Cyprus (22.7% for Paphos) in 1929 to 54.2% for Cyprus (59.4% for Paphos) in 1939 (see Table 2.3, last column).

Although I shall deal more specifically with Peyia later, Table 2.4 shows that it was no exception. Sales of mortgaged property accounted for 21 per cent of all areas transferred in 1920. The number continued to rise until 1939 and decreased dramatically in 1940 when the Government restricted the conditions under which Forced Sales could be enforced. The structural causes

for the continued drop are discussed later.

Year	% of Total Area Transferred through Sales	% of Total Area Transferred through Sales of Mortgaged Property	% of Total Area Transferred through Other Means	Total (donums)
1920	21.41 %	21.07 %	57.52 %	550.86
1925	24.13	31.83	44.04	857.6
1930	29.55	29.83	40.62	964.05
1935	43.12	32.73	24.15	955.8
1940	46.15	6.95	46.9	562.4
1950	15.78	2.21	82.01	847.99

TABLE 2.4: PERCENTAGES OF LAND AREA TRANSFERS ACCORDING TO TYPE. PEYIA, 1920-50

Source: Records of the Land Registry Office, Paphos

At this point given the high incidence of peasant debt and of forced sales it is important to investigate which segments of the population benefitted through the purchase of these properties, which were placed on the market. Table 2.5 indicates that a considerable percentage of these properties were purchased by the creditors themselves. It also indicates that there was a significant bias in the prices fetched in such sales. Whereas most properties bought by non-creditors (i.e. 'others' in Table) fetched sale prices close to their registered values (and sometimes actually exceeded them), creditors purchased properties more cheaply. They could choose the right moment to recall their debts at a difficult time for the peasant, precipitating a forced sale. As auctions were held in the villages concerned which were the power domains of the embori (merchants) they could influence sale

YEAR	PROPERTIES PURCHASED THROUGH JUDGEMENT DEBTS				PROPERTIES PURCHASED THROUGH MORTGAGE DEBTS			
	BY CREDITORS		BY OTHERS		BY CREDITORS		BY OTHERS	
	% OF TOTAL AREA PURCH.	% OF S.P.* TO R.V.	% OF TOTAL AREA PURCH.	% OF S.P.* TO R.V.	% OF TOTAL AREA PURCH.	% OF S.P.* TO R.V.	% OF TOTAL AREA PURCH.	% OF S.P.* TO R.V.
1929	36.0%	81·2%	64·0%	96·47%	51·1%	93·69%	48·9%	105·53%
1934	43·9%	108·27%	56·1%	107·37%	22·7%	110·38%	77·3%	100·98%
1935	72·8%	72·4%	27·2%	88·5%	77·2%	72·77%	22·8%	97·37%
1936	61·8%	76·34%	38·2%	119·34%	87·6%	70·02%	12·4%	86·98%
1938	64·2%	74·14%	35·8%	99·95%	74·6%	77·35%	25·4%	105·89%
1939	60·2%	88·81%	39·8%	104·76%	53·8%	87·31%	46·2%	131·33%
1946	5·2%	182.0%	94·8%	324·0%	23·0%	241.0%	77.0%	229.0%

* S.P. = Sale Price; R.V. = Registered Value

TABLE 25: Forced Sales according to Purchaser Categories

SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Land Registration and Survey Department, 1929, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 46.

prices to a greater or lesser extent partly through their greater solvency, but mainly through the unwillingness of the peasants to compete openly in auctions with their 'benefactors'.

Most of this property was sold back to the peasants who often borrowed money to buy, but some was retained by the embori. Although there are no figures for the total amount held at any one time by the merchants and their village representatives, Surridge in 1929 made a conservative estimate of 5 per cent for the Limassol district. This figure must have increased as the cycle of forced sales continued until 1939. There is slightly more available material for Peyia. According to the 1946 Census of Agriculture, 26-40% of the total land operated in the village was either leased or sharecropped. This figure includes Church land (nearly 25%) and contracts among kin. Although it is impossible to make generalizations about the whole island, town

merchants who owned village properties sold them in the 1940s whilst village merchants tended to keep their land where possible. In 1978 the largest village property (300 donums) was held by the son-in-law of the former Mukhtar who was a merchant. His total property was originally much higher as it had been sub-divided among his heirs and parts of the patrimony sold to pay for their University education abroad.

The dispossessed peasantry entered petty crafts (shoemakers, tailors, etc.) and many men began searching for employment within working distance of the villages. In the Paphos district men joined the rapidly swelling workforce in the mining industry in the north of the island, others entered the building industry in the town searching for work wherever they could find it especially in the 1930s on road building.

The climate of uncertainty in ownership clearly did not contribute to an increased productivity. For the peasantry the spirit of rational long-term calculation so essential to the planting of new cash crops other than carobs (which required little maintenance) was delayed by the uncertainty surrounding ownership. For new crops to be planted (e.g. citrus or vines) secure sources of credit are essential to tide over the producer for a number of years until the initial capital outlay and early costs can be recouped. This was impossible when credit was so restricted.

In such conditions it might have been expected that the class most likely to take a lead in improving production were the embori. Merchants however were largely uninterested in investing in improved productivity. The situation resembled Bobek's

characterization that "rent capitalism differed from the more recent 'capitalism' in that it was not linked to production, but rather was satisfied with skimming off its proceeds. In regard to production it remained fundamentally sterile...The ideal of rent capitalism is attained when the share cropping farmer does not touch more than a meagre share of the work with his hands" (Bobek, 1962:235). The reasons for this underdevelopment are complex and subject to regional variation. First, the town merchants obtained land mainly, if not exclusively, as a security. Their distance from the villages where they owned land effectively excluded them from treating it as other than a rentable resource. Compared with mere cereal cultivation other sources of wealth were more lucrative and likely to yield quick profits such as the marketing of carobs and other specialized exports. It is characteristic that the main crop valued by merchants was the carob tree which thrives on hard rocky ground and requires little maintenance and care. In such cases they could expand. For example in 1935 the Peyia Mukhtar purchased large tracts of carob trees with a town merchant and importer who had previously financed the campaign of a prominent Nationalist politician of the district (see pages 81-90). Under the Ottoman Land Code (in force until 1946) trees could be alienated separately from the land upon which they stood. The expense consequently was minimal.

Nor was there any attempt to discover sources of water to transform the state of agriculture and introduce new crops as occurred in the Morphou region which had a low incidence of rural debt. In fact the first attempts to drill for water in Peyia were made by peasants returning in 1945 from the Cyprus Volunteer

Regiment with some ready cash. Instead merchants invested in University education for their children and the professions at a time when most village children only attended primary school. Consequently the status differences between them and their co-villagers tended to increase. Their children continue to dominate regional life in a variety of ways. Many of these merchants were intensely nationalistic, and as they were extremely powerful in the villages I now examine politics in Peyia during this period.

2.4 Notes

1 The precise nature of this complicity has never been adequately ascertained. As Koumoulides's account shows Cypriot Church leaders were unwilling to do much more than promise some financial support to the Greek revolutionaries.

2 Drummond (1750) and other observers noted that the post of the Archbishop was often sold by auction. Cyprianos also noted that the First Archbishop under the Turks obtained his post through a gift (Cobham:349). Such a practice could only be maintained when the Clerics held an independent source of income, such as trade (Cobham:280). Mouzelis (1978:159) has argued that the "formalistic and secular character of the Greek Orthodox Church was relevant to the development of Greek Commerce".

3 According to Mouzelis (1979) the development of Greek commerce passed through a number of stages dependent upon its articulation with European capitalism. The evolution of Cypriot elites occurred later than in Greece and did not take the shipbuilding character of mainland Greece.

4 According to Stanford (1976) this was an essential feature of the Ottoman Empire. Most attempts at reform consistently ran into the problem of balancing reform with the requirements of maintaining control over far-flung regions.

5 Weisser (1976) also refers to a similar process in the Montes, Spain. cf. also Drummond (in Cobham, p 280).

6 cf. Heiberg (1980) for a similar if somewhat overdetermined analysis of Basque nationalism.

7 Perhaps the clearest example of this is an icon at Kykkos which depicts St George (representing Greek Christians) slaying a dragon which the painter left no doubt was Muslim-Turkish.

8 Although there is no doubt that the Church suffered adversely from the beginning of the British Occupation, Georghallides' figures must be taken with caution as they are taken from public statements by prelates.

9 cf. Galatopoulos (1979).

10 'St George of the Harvest' on April 23rd, and 'St George of the Sowing' in November.

11 Christodoulou (1959).

CHAPTER 3

VILLAGE POLITICS, 1920-60

3.1 Introduction

In the last chapter I examined the political and economic framework of early Greek nationalism. I now examine politics in Peyia between 1920-60 before examining (the very different) modern politics later.

Dependence upon land and credit-marketing is the key to politics in this early period, and this is reflected in the occupational structure of Peyia. Peyia was effectively divided into two discrete groups: peasant families and the merchants (themselves of peasant origin) who purchased agricultural products and extended credit. This was a classic pattern of traditional patron-client relations for the merchants possessed three sources of power: (i) control of credit and marketing, which gave them *de facto* economic power, (ii) control of village posts such as the *Mukhtar*-ship, which gave them a certain measure of legitimacy, and (iii) influence with Government officials and with the Church (which made them 'indispensable' to the peasants). When these three sources of power were combined their position was unassailable, and the multi-stranded concept of '*ipohreosi*' (obligation, dependence) expresses the relationship of the peasants upon the merchants. This is shown in an account of village *Mukhtar* elections.

However, in the 1930s a younger generation of urban politicans introduced new ideas, and a more radical nationalism in Peyia through regional elections. This begins the transformation of

traditional social relations of patronage. In an account of regional elections I show how populist modern leadership threatens the village elites and forces a grouping at the top. As the importance of land diminished and cooperatives were established (strongly resisted by merchants), the traditional village elite began losing its power. Their place was taken by a group of young nationalist EOKA fighters who have continued to influence national and village politics.

3.2 Church and Land Tenure

The Church is the key to land tenure in Peyia and ultimately to early politics, and it is probable that it owned a great deal of land there for at least three centuries. However, information on the state of land distribution in the village prior to 1909 is scant as few records are available for the Ottoman period when the expansion of the cultivation of land was encouraged and reflected in the land code which remained in force until 1946. The British Administration was reluctant to change it. The code specified that wild trees which were grafted to produce fruit became the property of those who grafted them irrespective of where they were situated and on whose land they were. Trees could be alienated separately from the land they were situated upon. This gave rise to many quarrels over access and has been a continual theme in village relations. In the early years of the British occupation attempts were made to bring the land records up-to-date, and registration was made compulsory in 1885. This remained largely ineffective until 1909 when a general survey of properties was carried out. During this period there was a scramble to transform State Land, especially forest, into private

property. There was little a rudimentary bureaucracy could do and this process went by largely unchecked. Older Peyiotes claim that during this period large tracts of forest were cleared and men laid claim to them by possession. Fights were common and men who had cleared the land discovered that more powerful men claimed their land and dislodged them.

By 1909-20 the following picture emerges. Table 3.1 indicates the distribution of property during this period. The data must be treated with caution but a few general features can be sketched out. Out of the total area of 32,620.4 donums which comprised the village area, 20,176 donums or 61.8% of the total area was owned by private individuals. The Church (Kykkos Monastery and the Paphos Metropolitan See) owned 21.6% of the land.[1] Fields and carob trees were leased out either separately or together to the peasants in a variety of ways and in varying forms of payment. Up till the early 1900s payment was in wheat (the Antikucci system), but was later in cash. Auctions were held yearly in September and the fields offered to the highest bids. The agreements, drawn up through a solvent guarantor, were bonds (grammatia) which specified that the lessees owed the See or Monastery a certain sum of money payable after the rental period had expired on the 1st September. These leases, lasting for 2-5 years, were dependent upon a number of factors not least being the 'friendship' the peasant had for the representative of the Church. Up till the 1920s monks came to collect the rents in person, oversee the collection of the carob harvest, and draw up the following year's rents.[2] In summer Peyia was a hub of activity, with the monks organizing most economic transactions. Carobs were stored in Monastery warehouses and

Ownership Category	1909-29 (i)		
	Number of Owners	Area (donums)	Area %
Private Individuals	757 (ii)	20,176	61.8
Private Companies	-	-	-
State Land (Hali)	1	1,485.5	4.5
(Forest)	1	3,867.8	11.9
Chiftlik	-	-	-
Religious Institutions			
Paphos Metropolitan See	1	4,001.6	12.2
Kykkos Monastery	1	3,366.5	9.4
TOTAL	761	32,620.4	99.8

TABLE 3.1: LAND DISTRIBUTION IN PEYIA: 1909-29

NOTES: (i) Pieced together from the General Survey of Properties, conducted in this period
(ii) Number refers to single owners, i.e. properties owned by one person.
The 757 single owners held 10,949 donums. The rest of the area seems to have been held in joint ownership

Source: Records of the Land Registry Office, Paphos

shipped out to Egypt from a nearby port. But inevitably the Church came to rely increasingly on certain influential men in the village to oversee its property. These men had to have a good knowledge of local affairs, such as the solvency of the lessees. They became middlemen responsible for renting out Church property. In addition caiques ceased calling at the nearby port but instead

called at Paphos, 9 miles away. In time these Churchmen were to acquire much local influence and power within Peyia and other villages. By the 1930s the Metropolitan See and Kykkos Monastery had delegated most of the organization and overseeing of their property to their secular representatives and had withdrawn from direct labour recruitment and exportation of carobs. Both the See of Paphos and Kykkos had their own village representatives. Kykkos's representative seems to have been more independent in his dealings with the Peyiotes probably because, in contrast to the See which was based in Paphos, the monastery was located in the remote and inaccessible Troodos mountains. The property of the Metropolitan See of Paphos was more tightly controlled: under the 1924 Church constitution management of episcopal properties was vested in committees in which clerical and lay interests were represented. Most of the secular members of these committees were town merchants and professionals. Both the Metropolitan See and the Monastery did not make much use of the village papas as their official representative, but instead utilized local influential men who were invariably merchants (embori) and middlemen (mesites).

It is not hard to see that the effect of this system was to give the Church a greater liberty in changing its secular representatives if and when it saw fit. The papas, who depended upon co-villagers for his income, was not officially responsible for Church land. Although the papas held much prestige his influence over access to resources was of an unofficial kind and he rented land in much the same way as the other Peyiotes, though Church records indicate that he never went without land from the Monastery. The Church representatives wielded enormous power. To obtain land

from them (i.e. the Church) peasants often had to work their fields as '*corvee* labour'; as a result "the *mesites* did not do any work". There were even cases of the sexual exploitation of womenfolk from poor families.

The dependence upon land becomes more meaningful when placed against the occupational structure of the village (Table 3.2).

Occupational Groups	1925-35	1978-9
	%	%
Civil servants (teachers, policemen, white collar workers, National Guard officers, Co-op employees)	0	10
Skilled manual workers (mainly craftsmen, tailors, masons, barbers, waiters)	4.5	10
Coffee shop owners, grocers, carob merchants, retailers, etc.	12	6.5
Full-time farmers	31.5	25
Shepherds	21	17
Shepherds and farmers	7	4
Bus owners, tractor drivers, taxi drivers	0	5
Unskilled labourers	19.5	21
Charcoal burners	1	0

TABLE 3.2: OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, PEYIA, 1925-79

Source: *Mukhtar*'s list of births

During this period nearly 70 per cent of the Peyiotes depended upon land either for farming or for grazing. The number of full-time civil servants and white-collar workers was minimal then. Unskilled workers also formed a considerable part of the population although most did some part-time agricultural work in their own properties and at harvest when all reaping was done by hand and there was much demand for labour, and carobs collected. Although most

villagers do some agricultural work nowadays, in 1925 there were fewer opportunities for outside non-agricultural employment. Thus some men worked as charcoal burners, the main domestic fuel of the period.

The following Table indicates the extent of lessees of Kykkos property. As they refer to the formal written agreements over land, rather than carobs (which were leased out separately and for which no records are available), and as their precision could not be ascertained, they must be treated with caution. Sub-letting and sharecropping were common. Consequently the number of Peyiotes who directly or indirectly depended on Kykkos property must have been much greater. Most of the lessees were family heads, the population of the village in 1931 being 1,128; it is clear that the proportion of Peyiotes who rented Church land must have been considerably higher, as they also rented land from the Metropolitan See for which figures are unavailable.

Year	Number of Lessees	Year	Number of Lessees
1935	98	1943	38
1936	98	1944	37
1937	98	1945	40
1938	119	1946	48
1939	119	1947	53
1940	119	1948	42
1941	133	1949	39
1942	8	1950	54

TABLE 3.3: WRITTEN LAND CONTRACTS FOR LEASES OF KYKKOS PROPERTY (1935-50)

Source: Records of Kykkos Monastery, Metoschii.

Due to the system of dispensing land to the highest bidders much of the better quality land was leased to the richer villagers, often mesites, who cultivated as much as they could and sublet the rest. The records also indicate that village merchants often rented land together which they then sublet at higher prices, according to the recollections of older informants. In other cases when merchants could not compete openly with each other without raising the rents, they would group together for limited periods and obtain a large proportion of this property at cheaper prices.

For example in 1936 five village merchants grouped together to rent Church land. Of these five one was a village merchant who represented the most important town merchant in the District; another was the Metropolis's representative, whilst the other was the Mukhtar, who was to become the largest merchant in the village and a very powerful man. Between 1942-46 most of Kykkos land was leased out to a merchant from Stroumbi, a neighbouring village, and a relative of the Monastery's lawyer. Hence the reduced figures in the Table, for the merchant then sublet all the property. This man had a reputation for collecting overdue rents, a problem which seems to have plagued the Church in this period. As the Church was reluctant to take defaulters to court, the system of disposing of property to local individuals of standing and influence guaranteed that whilst the Church was secure of a regular income it escaped the onus of enforcing rent extraction. This ambiguous responsibility belonged to merchants who were less scrupulous in their dealings with the peasantry. Again, in the '50s much property was rented to a Peyioti merchant. In the interval between the two contracts when a number of rents were

still outstanding the Abbot let it be known that those with overdue rents would not be allowed to rent further land. The urgency of these measures can be gauged from the fact that Kykkos had already lost much of its overseas property (in Russia, due to the 1917 revolution) and was then attempting to purchase urban real estate.[3]

During this period there were a great deal of Forced Sales in Peyia. As land was the major productive resource then this was bound to undermine the relationship of the peasants to the land and generated a climate of despair and rural unrest. The economic and productive life style with a cyclical conception of time was not yet accustomed to treat land as a commodity. Forces sales impressed upon the reluctant peasantry that their property was paradoxically a commodity insofar as it was potentially the property of others, such as mesites and embori who could claim it at their whim irrespective of the tenant's will. Where land is both productive resource, and security valued for its own sake, as well as the main means for social mobility, forced sales generated a climate of despair and hopelessness, e.g. "They only left us with the oxen".

In recounting their experiences Peyiotes undoubtedly present themselves as 'down trodden peasants', but beneath the amplification there is a kernel of truth. Some families emigrated as a strategy for social advancement, others due to insufficient land holdings for there were little opportunities for outside employment given the poor means of communication.

There are no figures for Peyia and Cyprus in the pre-1950 period but from villager accounts and genealogies it seems that emigration to Egypt was a common phenomenon prior to 1939.

Genealogies show that almost every family had some members abroad. This may also have been partly due to the system of property transmissions (younger sons often receiving little property). From my survey of family heads (husband and wife) in 1979 it emerged that 28 per cent of all siblings were abroad. This figure is not tied to the pre-war period as it extends into the present, but it nevertheless indicates considerable migration. Support comes from the population figures for the village (Table 1.2, page 19). Peyiotes say that there are as many villagers outside Peyia as there are within it, and although such claims may be exaggerated there is some truth to the claim. As passage to Egypt was relatively easy and inexpensive many families abandoned their holdings never to return. Other families owning lucrative cash crops, such as vines or carobs, went to Egypt returning yearly for the harvest.

3.3 The Social Origins of Local Elites

The social origin of the village moneylender (*tokoglifos*) and his eventual evolution into the town merchant (*emboras*) was the peasantry. Essential requirements in the initial stages were mainly large landholdings, enabling the 'primitive accumulation' of some cash. Then, "after a few years of profitable money-lending in a village he opens a small shop and while contriving to farm his own land he also acts as an agent for a town merchant" (Surridge, 1929:46). Luck was also important. One Peyioti having won £1,000 in Egypt, a fabulous sum in those days, returned to open a *bakkallis* (grocer's shop). Prior to 1939 there were at least 10 large and small merchants in the village, all with contacts with town merchants. To act as a village middleman

(mesites) literacy was an important practical asset. By contrast among the town merchants literacy was a sign of prestige and status qualifying them for competition in regional and national domains. Many merchants invested heavily in education sending their children to University in Athens; this conception of social mobility filtered down to the village merchants.



DIAGRAM 3.1. : INFLUENTIAL KINSHIP CONNECTIONS WITHIN THE NICOLAIDES FAMILY

The case of the Nicolaides Family is not only a good example of the process of social mobility, but also an instructive indication of how, through the judicious use of kinship links, domination was exercised and reproduced on regional and village levels.

Hadji-Neophytos (Diagram 3.1) was born in Peyia during the Turkish occupation into a family of wealthy peasants. After the Church had lost its monopoly over the collection of taxes he entered the tax-farming business and began trading in carobs.

In the 1880s he settled in Paphos to expand his interests whilst still maintaining strong links with Peyia, where he made a donation to build the village church. He was reputed to be a 'leader' (in the local idom known as an '*archontas*'), extremely wealthy, and all his children received a University education in Greece.

One of his sons, an advocate, Nicolaides (1885-1964) became the leading politician of the District. His first political appearance as a 'moderate' was in the newly-established Legislative Assembly and he was later appointed Mayor of Paphos, a position he continued to occupy intermittently until the late 1950s. From villager accounts, Nicolaides seemed to have been a patron of considerable powers; indeed they refer to him by saying '*itan givernisi*' (he was the law unto himself) and he was reputed to be so powerful that 'he could save a man from the gallows'. Many older informants recall that when he used to enter the village coffee shops all the men there used to rise and offer him a chair. There were numerous accounts of the practically mythical patronage powers this man could command and while significant as 'the myth of patronage' (Sylverman, 1977), it is important at this point to concentrate on actual processes by which manipulation of credit networks in the villages could be affected maintaining a state of critical political balance in Peyia.

In the early 1900s most village *Mukhtar* (headmen) elections took place every two years. The *Mukhtar* was then the most important village post. *Mukhtars* were expected to represent their villages, offer hospitality to visiting Government officials, and maintain law and order. Given that then this post was elective

and an index of popularity it is not hard to see their importance in the eyes of Peyiotes. The outcomes of these elections were determined partly by personal factions and the kinsmen a candidate could muster. However, the support of outsiders was often critical. Most Mukhtar candidates were then samll grocers (bakkalles) and middlemen (mesites) for town merchants. Their village support hence depended upon the number of families indebted to them. Consequently a certain amount of solvency and access to outside sources of credit supplied by town merchants implied the ability to expand a man's political following in the village. To become a Mukhtar often implied to have 'the best contact', to 'have the best merchant'. Between 1909-25 a series of elections were fought in Peyia between two men, Hadji-Antoni and Michaelides (Diagram 3.1). Both men were sighambri (men married to sisters), their wives being Nicolaides' sisters. They were also middlemen for Nicolaides, selling him the carobs they purchased in the village in return for credit accounts at 12% interest rate which they re-lent to Peyiotes at 30% interest. In the village context where both men were struggling and competing for pre-eminence, relations between both men got so strained that they refused to have any economic dealings with each other's clients and even to speak to each other. Both possessed their own factions whose members frequented their coffee houses. Their Kounyiados (W.B.) Nicolaides, however, could selectively strengthen one or the other through the withdrawal or reduction of credit, thus indirectly affecting the outcome of elections. There were accusations of favouritism which seems to have been the case as he is known to have favoured Hadji-Antoni whose circle of clients

was greater and was Mukhtar more often probably because he was a 'pallikaris' (tough guy) reputed to have settled village differences "in his own way, without the police" by personally beating up offenders to the law thus maintaining the autonomy and separation of the village. When Michaelides' wife died, the man ceased to act as Nicolaides' middleman and unsuccessfully attempted to establish links with another less powerful Paphos emboras, Pavlos Kitreotis. Soon after Michaelides threw his support behind an ultra-nationalist politician, Galatopoulos known for his anti-Nicolaides stance, whose electoral campaign for the Legislative Council was financed by Pavlos Kitreotis. (This is examined on pages 81-90). The system of direct elections having been abandoned in 1925, M.Ps. had the power to suggest certain names to the Governor who then nominated one as Mukhtar and the rest as azas (headman's assistants). An extent of Nicolaides' power can be glimpsed at by the fact that he refused to intervene on Michaelides' behalf or support him when his creditors claimed his property.

Michaelides, a former Mukhtar, is known to have died poor and property-less. In the village idiom "he supported the wrong man, the merchants ate all his property".

Such cases of dependency, conflict and ultimate sanctions such as the sales of mortgaged property were extreme examples of the exercise of power, but they nevertheless indicate the extent of control exercised by the town merchants. They also indicate that many village grocers had little independent access to, and control of, resources in the early stages, who were thus as helpless and as dependent upon the town merchants as their peasant creditors were upon them. Due to this dependence they were bound

to be more rapacious than their town counterparts and to have special claims to status and prestige in the village to reinforce these claims. Many rode horses instead of donkeys, were greeted by the honorific title of '*effendikon*' (master) and had large two-storey houses. But in peasant eyes they were still, to a certain extent, illiterate co-villagers when compared to their town counterparts. Through their claims to be the 'natural' representatives of the village, town merchants could mediate more effectively between the village and the administration than the local grocers thereby ensuring the reproduction of their ultimate pre-eminence. In addition, they had few direct economic dealings with the peasantry, their relations being mediated through village middlemen.

This is the difference between mere usury and leadership: Hadji-Neophytos and Nicolaides were leaders, most village merchants were not. As Peters has claimed:

> "Leadership is too important a business to rest on friendships and understandings. It rests at the point of maximum reciprocity in relations, covering the greatest diversity in relations, and relations, moreover, which are bound by mutual acceptance of obligations imprecisely defined, so that assessment of debits and credits is always difficult and well nigh impossible" (1972:185).

The village still bears the marks of such a distribution of power. Hadji-Neophytos is the only Peyioti buried outside the village church, the construction of which he financed. The large two-storey buildings which still stand in the village square served as merchant-owned coffeehouses and grocer shops. In return for opening credit accounts *embori* would provide services in the peasantry's dealings with the Government administration, with

access to Church land, etc. Nicolaides is well remembered and respected for his readiness in offering free legal advice to the Peyiotes. When a village delegation led by the papas proceeded to Paphos in the 1931 uprising, Nicolaides sent messengers warning them to turn back as the Government had proclaimed martial law. Norwithstanding, a few fervent Enosists went ahead to be arrested in Paphos. Through Nicolaides' intercession they got off with light fines, which he even paid on their behalf.[4] Indeed it is precisely this convergence of such selective magnanimity by patrons and the economic dependence of villagers that contributed to the ambivalent reaction of the peasantry towards their representatives. Whilst old men point proudly to Nicolaides' village origin through the idiom of which he often assisted Peyiotes, they are uneasy at the fact that he, like other merchants, heavily indebted peasants and that the pre-1939 period was 'the rule of terror' (tromokratia) with a helpless peasantry in an uncertain state.[5]

It is important to note that the power of these patrons (and therefore the pattern of representation and domination), was one based not on an absolute control of the means of production (as in West Sicily), but rather with the supply of credit which determined ownership of the means of production. Their symbolic power derived mainly from their mediating role between town and village, as 'natural leaders' of the communities they were born into, or were descendants of, and as men occupying influential positions in the Colonial administration. Their power base, by contrast, lay in the control of marketing and credit networks. Sanctions lay in the withdrawal of credit and more extremely in the forcing of a sale, not in the application of physical violence

as with the Mafia. Indeed, with a well-developed rural police force they had no monopoly of physical violence.[6] Any transformation in the system of marketing and credit was bound to affect their relationship to the villages, their local power domains.

Furthermore their alignments changed with amazing rapidity. There was no equivalent to the Massaria complex around which, and through which, alignments could be permanently organized; rather alignments depended upon credit and marketing monopolies which were often fluid. When reconstructing the alignments between village and town merchants of this period I was struck by the rapidity with which alliances were created and dissolved. There were few long-term enduring coalitions; instead there were temporary alignments determined by certain parameters, and wider structures. In essence this was a fragmented power field composed of merchants, professionals and the Church. An individual may often have been a member of two groups concurrently. To illustrate this I give an account of the 1930 Legislative Assembly elections. This shows how credit networks were utilized, how temporary and limited coalitions could be formed, and how issues were presented to the villagers. It is good case of how structural contradictions, which are of a regional-economic and political nature, interact with village-based contradictions in the social exploitation of resources. In spite of the difficulty in reconstruction it is clear that the lack of 'fit' between village realities and regional issues highlights certain basic contradictions within the village and the underlying peasant unrest, which remains, at this point, unresolved, because the combination of three factors underlying rural credit is still dominant.

3.4 District Elections, 1930-31

Up till now I have mainly dealt with village politics and Mukhtar elections. I now deal with regional elections for the Legislative Council which was the national assembly under the chairmanship of the Governor. The reason for this section is that it brings out the consolidation of village merchants against a new type of politician whose ideas on social reform strongly influenced Peyioti collective mentalities.

The Legislative Council was composed of elected representatives from all regions until 1931 (when it was dissolved). The Governor of the time noted that it was dominated by usury interests and factionalism among the Greek elite normally concerned the nature of cooperation with Britain. There were two groups known as the uncompromizing nationalists and the moderates. Until 1930 Paphos was part of the more populous and prosperous Limassol electoral division which supplied most of the elected politicians. In 1930 Paphos became a separate electoral district with one Greek seat for which there were two contestants: the advocate Aristotelis Galatopoulos and the Abbot of Kykkos, Igoumenos Kleopas. Galatopoulos was known as an extreme nationalist representing that merchant segment largely excluded from Civil Service posts and marketing monopolies.[7] His campaign was financed by a Paphos merchant and importer, Pavlos Kitreotis who purchased a small proportion of the carobs produced by Peyia, and had some land there. All men above 21 and who had paid verghi (a small tax paid by most villagers) were eligible to vote.

The election was fought over the nature of cooperation with the Colonial Administration, rural credit and taxation. The island

due to the 1930s Depression was passing through an economic crisis which led to a restriction of credit, contracting external markets, and forced sales, which left many peasants destitute with little alternative except migration. In 1924 the newspaper Eleftheria had estimated that there were 25,000 Greek Cypriots resident in Egypt and the Sudan.

Some local politicians, including Galatopoulos, suggested that such crises could only be solved through the gradual transfer of Church land to the rural poor. Indeed the Governor in 1923 had noted that:

> "the tendency of the day in Cyprus is for popular feeling to manifest itself against the vested interests of the Episcopal Sees and monasteries; the spoliation of ecclesiastical properties is freely discussed, and the Bishops and Abbots who prosper therein are beginning to have misgivings as to the security of their own position". (Quoted in Geoghallides, 1979)

Although Colonial administrators had their own particular reasons for reading cleavage in the society mainly because permanent local structures such as the Church and ad hoc merchant coalitions obstructed proper administration of the island, these comments are nevertheless revealing. A new Church constitution was proposed in 1924 which attempted to give more secular control over the administration of Church property thus allaying criticism by making administration more financially efficient, and eliminating abuses. The more extreme nationalist politicians not only criticized the moderates for colluding with the colonial authorities, but also utilized the sensitive issue of peasant debt which was beginning to cause concern to all politicians in their long-term social implications. This

was particularly true of the urban based town merchants and, with a large part of the island's agriculture in distress (which led to a fivefold increase in the areas sold by forced sales in 1926 to those in 1920), the state of the rural economy became a subject of debate.[8] Exports upon which the credit networks depended were undergoing a recession. Spain had set up tariff barriers, Britain had substituted cheaper molasses for carobs, and France could not afford to purchase many specialized commodities after the devaluation of its currency. Indeed the merchant class as a whole was beginning to feel the financial squeeze.

The remedies recommended by the uncompromizing Nationalists were instructive: the re-scheduling of rural debts and their settlement through the establishment of an Agricultural Bank with up to £500,000 of capital, the abolition of the 'Tribute' (taxes paid by Greeks which went to Ottoman coffers), the adoption of a less oppressive forest policy and the creation of local industries by the urban classes where necessary in conjunction with Athenian capital (Eleftheria, September-October 1926). There were also political considerations: a Communist Party had been established in Limassol in 1922. It concerned itself with the financial problems of the rural population and early in 1924 it asked the British authorities to proclaim a moratorium on rural debts (Χαραυγη August 22, 1976). They also demanded independence when the Nationalists were pressing for Union with Greece, which greatly annoyed the latter. Indeed comments by politicians indicate that they were extremely aware of the potentially disruptive effects of a communist

ideology which addressed itself to the dispossessed.

Peyiotes partly remember the election as a contest between two men and consequently between two styles of political rhetoric. But beneath this were subtle differences which they also recognized: Galatopoulos was known for his oratory and his use of the Cypriot dialect. By contrast his opponent Kleopas, as a prelate, utilized the more restrained formalized Greek (Katharevousa) in his speeches. The contents of their programmes, when they could be discerned at all, created a number of glaring contradictions. As a fervent Enotist (supporter of Union with Greece) Galatopoulos seemed to be more critical of the forced sales of property and peasant debt, and promised to abolish the Dekatia tax on products.[9] Hence, not only did the election represent a distinction in the forms of leadership (secular vs religious) but also suggested that a solution to such problems could only come from a radical secular nationalism, rather than from a religiously based one.

Galatopoulos' campaign in Peyia ran into violent opposition by the village merchants and mesites. During his first speech a group of hecklers, staunch merchant clients, attempted to prevent him from being heard. Schneider, Schneider & Hansen (1972), have said that "dependence elites are reactive, quick to nationalize their class interests, but not to take the initiative". Whilst there are difficulties in establishing what precisely a 'dependence' elite is, such groupings are instructive. Merchant opposition to Galatopoulos was clearly related to their desire to preserve the autonomy of their local domains probably because they feared that his election

would shift credit relations towards those merchants he represented. They were also supported by Nicolaides who had previously clashed with Galatopoulos over a rivers issue. Galatopoulos had campaigned for a transfer in ownership of water rights of the large Chiftliks to their neighbouring villages. Nicolaides as legal counsel of one absentee landlord had through his official position as Mayor used his considerable influence to shelve discussion of the issue in Government. The opposition between the two men was well-known in the District; Nicolaides represented that segment favouring limited cooperation with the British, Galatopoulos favoured outright opposition in favour of Enosis.

The reaction of the embori in Peyia must also be seen in the light of previous developments there. In 1929 three part-time (largely unsuccessful) grocers and a full-time farmer had established a cooperative bank which was by-passing merchant credit networks. The bank, like many others elsewhere, later shut down because of poor management and lack of 'know-how' but in the difficult 1930s it was considered a grave enough threat by the village merchants for them to forbid clients from dealing with the bank under threat of forfeiture of their properties.

Galatopoulos did however draw some support from young men who were working in the copper mines in the north. As young single men they lacked property and thus directly attributable debts, but as wage-earners earning higher wages than in agricultural work they formed a new social stratum with more money at their disposal than the agricultural labourers. They were potentially the Cooperative Bank's

securest and strongest customers. This clique was organized by Michaelides, a former Mukhtar (see Diagram 3.1) who probably had his own reasons to support the politician (see above, page 77).

Religious sanctions were also used to influence voters. The village papas is reported to have said that all those who voted for Galatopoulos would lose their right to rent Church land. It is not clear whether this threat emanated directly from the Abbot or from his more enthusiastic supporters such as the Kykkos representative who also dealt in credit. But given the widespread illiteracy then and the predominant belief at that time that the vote was not secret (a view I believe they were correct in maintaining, though I have no direct proofs), such threats could not be taken lightly when access to Church land was for many peasants a matter of life and death.

The then Mukhtar also seemed to have played a role. As representative of land held by the Paphos Bishopric and as the only butcher he was in continuous contact with the more unruly villagers, the shepherds, who depended upon the poorer quality land for grazing. As Mukhtar he possessed a discrete power domain by protecting favoured clients from the law. Many shepherds grazed in State forests, a heavily punishable offence which often spelt disaster for a family. Such favours could not be lightly dismissed and I came across one case (and I am sure there must have been more) of such favours being used to pledge votes for the Abbot. According to informants bribery was also prevalent.

Threats and sanctions were accompanied by practices and signs more part of village political culture. Large banquets were held by both groups and meat was eaten, a rarity in those days.

Schneider (1972) has pointed out the essential coalition forming characteristics for Sicily of collective meals but in Cyprus their meaning is different. Whereas in Sicily occasions for banquets and friend/friendship sharing often take place to cement broken-down coalitions and take place in private, in Cypriot political culture they are much more public-oriented and are more strategic, taking place not to commemorate an executed task but to create the right psychological climate to execute it. The emphasis is on the outward sign and at coercion disguised in sentiment. Men known to be '<u>pazzali</u>' (i.e. of no clear political belief) were invited to joined the assembled companies, the clear implication being that all those who broke bread together should vote together. The Abbot faction's banquet was housed in the village school, having been handed over by the village school teacher related to Nicolaides by marriage.

Scuffles broke out in a number of villages, but in spite of the excitement created by Galatopoulos, most Peyiotes voted for Kleopas. Many old men recall how they had wished to vote for Galatopoulos having been attracted by his more rhetorical and populist stance, "but at that time we were all <u>ipohreomeni</u> to the <u>embori</u> so what could we do?" The word <u>ipohreomenos</u> means both to be in actual financial debt or even morally potentially obliged, a social debt. It brings out the multi-stranded dependency of the villagers upon the merchants. Kleopas received the major village vote, and although Galatopoulos won the election for the District by 29 votes, the result was declared invalid by the discovery of rigged ballot boxes in Paphos, reputed to have been fixed by his more enthusiastic supporters.

The second election six months later, handsomely won by Galatopoulos, was marked by two changes. The Abbot was replaced as a candidate by an advocate (Loizos Philippou), a relative of Nicolaides (Diagram 3.1) with strong Church connections,[10] and there were further attempts by this electoral pressure group to influence voters through their control of the lower levels of the State administration.[11]

What did this election mean for the Peyiotes? First, Galatopoulos' campaign was of sufficient criticality to engage both their interests and their unclear passions. Although this account based upon villager recollections may concentrate unduly on the often naked exercise of economic dominance, this is what they themselves desire to express. Old men often say that this period was a tromokratia i.e. the rule of terror, to explain their voting behaviour. Contained within this statement is an often personal opposition to the merchants. In peasant eyes merchants acquired their land illegitimately, but the market as an impersonal mechanism concealed the processes underlying peasant debt and instead impressed upon collective mentalities the blame for all exploitation upon the whims of individuals. Second, villagers indirectly recognized that the contestants represented two types of leadership - traditional religious authority and the emergent secular leadership - it highlighted certain latent social cleavages. When placed within the village context, and the establishment of the cooperative bank, such passions become more understandable expecially the reactions exhibited by the village grocers (bakallika) who reacted as a class.

This class reaction was strengthened by a continuous

interaction among themselves which, in certain critical cases, was sufficiently strong enough to overcome competition between them. Their common goals could be cemented selectively through the idioms of friendship and kinship, and through joint economic activities (such as in the common renting of Church lands or purchases of carob trees) which prejudiced neither the individuality of the strategies available to them, nor the sense of group consciousness in the face of perceived external threats to their dominance. But, as has been pointed out, coalitions were not enduring; individuals would group together for short periods and with a specific programme in mind. Once these initial conditions would be removed, so too would the coalition.

As leadership within the village was defined by economic power these forms of organization prevented the emergence of any horizontal alliances among the peasants and substituted them by vertical coalitions of a largely protective nature. However, whilst it is possible to read the manifestation of internal contradictions through the support of the young men for Galatopoulos, such contradictions remain as yet unclear and undefined. This is not only due to the fact that external organization of the peasantry on a permanent basis was absent, but also because the ideologies offered for consumption to the peasants were drawn from the urban sector. Whereas the uncompromizing nationalist movement was, within the urban sector, primarily an ideology to legitimate and orient competition for scarce state resources and marketing monopolies, within the village the Enosis movement was incongruously identified with peasant unrest. Undirected it was expressed in simple and intermittent activities, such as the burning of Government

House in 1931 which suspended the constitution. Although it is quite clear that in the 1930-31 elections personal animosities did play a part in orienting behaviour, as did notions of village membership, the reactions of the village merchant-grocers cannot be explained solely by reference to personal animosities, as for example Loizos (1975) does in his analysis of similar elections in Kalo.

The eventual working out of these social conflicts and their replacement by others was to be dependent upon, and determined by, the local productive structure, the articulation of the three structural factors underlying peasant debt, the possibilities for marketing and credit, political organization and last, but not least, the actions of the Colonial Government to such cleavages. It is to the working out of these factors that analysis must now turn.

3.5 Transition, 1940-60

The period of the merchants' greatest power in the countryside and of the old type of politician (who was often a professional with strong contacts with trade) was the pre-1939 one. After 1940 new forms of political organization emerged in the countryside and the Church's economic dominance decreased. 1940-55 was marked by intense conflict between right-wing nationalists and communists, and the nationalist uprising broke out in 1955-60.

Although I shall not be dealing with the emergence of militant nationalism during this period for reasons of space, it is important to note that this cannot be comprehended without reference to the radical political and economic transformations occurring in the island then. Attalides has noted that "the decision to resort

to arms appears to have been taken by the conservative Greek Cypriot nationalist leadership after the 2nd World War, during a period of intense class conflict and considerable gains by the Left among the swelling urban population ... this fact lent an additional characteristic to the Greek nationalist movement" (1977;29).[12] My subsequent comments mainly on village politics must be approached against this background as most Peyiotes derive their political positions by reference to this period.

Formal politics were established in 1943 when municipal elections were held in the towns. A new communist party (AKEL) had been established in 1941 which soon dominated trade unions, organized strikes in the mining sector, and insisted initially not on enosis but on self-government. By 1946 AKEL had established itself as the only well organized party in the island and won four main towns in the 1946 municipal elections. This greatly worried the Colonial administration and the Church, which established rival right-wing trade unions. Violence often broke out between nationalists and communists.

In the countryside AKEL agitated for a return of Church property back to the farmers, and communists were involved in establishing marketing cooperatives. Colonial administrators had long been aware of the political implications of rural debt and had encouraged the establishment of rural cooperatives for social and political purposes, as the power bases of merchants (who were often strongly nationalist) were credit and marketing. Their growth was slow: in 1925 there were 29 registered societies in the island which had risen to 318 by 1939. By 1945 cooperatives had been established in nearly all villages. Credit societies

were vigorously opposed by village merchants and feuds were commonplace (Balfour, 1951). In Peyia it centred around the Mukhtar and the Church representatives (all merchants) on the one hand, and the teacher and young farmers as well as dispossessed craftsmen on the other. Most of these (over 100) had joined the Cyprus Volunteer Force in the 2nd World War where they had been exposed to communist ideas. Together with the village teacher, who was the First Secretary, they established a bank whose membership increased steadily. As the bank also purchased products the village merchants reacted by raising their purchasing price for carobs. But the bank's main attraction was that it could supply loans at low rates of interest (8%), accounts were not shrouded in secrecy, and forces sales were not enforced to recall loans. The wartime activities of a Debt Settlement Board which restricted the conditions under which forced sales could be enforced as settlements on debts, undoubtedly provided a securer economic climate. This was strengthened by the pent-up purchasing power due to the war. In Peyia the percentage of forced sales dropped from 44.2% in 1925 to 1.3% in 1950 (Table 3.4).

	% Type of Transmission		
Year	Sales	Sales of Mortgaged Property	Other
1925	-	44.2	55.8
1930	26.6	22.3	51.5
1940	56.9	-	43.1
1950	9.6	1.3	89.1
1960	27.7	7.7	64.6
1970	15.8	.2	84

TABLE 3.4: PERCENTAGES OF LAND TRANSMISSIONS BY CATEGORY, 1925-70, PEYIA

SOURCE: Records of the Land Registry Office, Paphos

During this period there was a great deal of social conflict in Peyia. Apart from the conflict between the merchants and the farmers over marketing of carobs, there was a great deal of political activism by dispossessed craftsmen who joined the ranks of AKEL. Many of the older type of village craftsmen (tailors, shoemakers, etc.) found themselves in a precarious economic position as they could not compete with the newly imported mass-produced goods. These were not 'primitive rebels' like the young men who had voted for Galatopoulos in 1930. They were organized in national parties, in labour unions and agitation for the return of Church land found fertile ground in the village. A class idiom emerged, and most men derive their political positions now by reference to the stand they adopted in this period.

The communists also attempted to dominate the Church as a vehicle for social reform. The last bishop had died in the pre-war period and in 1946 there was only one Bishop alive in Cyprus. In Paphos AKEL backed a candidate for the Bishopric and an encyclical condemning communism was read out in all the churches together with an order by the Archbishop that anyone suspected of communist sympathies would lose the right to vote in the election of Church committees. Peyia's Church representative used this licence to exclude not only known leftists working in the mines but also some men noted for their opposition to the merchants (which he himself practised). The excluded men retaliated by forbidding the papas from visiting their homes for the yearly 'blessing of the house'.

Some time later violence broke out. In 1948 the Communist mayor of Famagusta came to give a speech. His visit was greeted in largely the same manner as that afforded to Galatopoulos 18 years

previously. Foremost among the hecklers was the Mukhtar and some of his clients. Passions were raised to such an extent that the leftists locked up these men in a nearby coffee shop and poured petrol down the roof. It was only the intervention of the speaker that averted a very serious incident.

The Colonial government attempted to dampen rural unrest by establishing Village Development Boards[13] and transferring Chiftliks to the farmers and craftsmen. The nearby Potima Chiftlik totalling 862 donums was offered to landless farmers in 1950 on a 30-year lease.[14]

Finally, the Church attempted to alleviate Communist-led rural unrest by transferring its land to the villagers. Three sales were held in Peyia (in 1953, 1956 and 1960) and the political and economic implications are dealt with later. But it is important to note that the Church was eager then to transform what was then 'unproductive land' (i.e. with little capital and crop investment) into far more lucrative urban real estate. Whilst the suspicious villagers viewed this as an extraordinary gesture by the Church (e.g. "we should build the Bishop a statue") Church officials were neither mystified nor surprised. They all commented to me on how useful and far-sighted these sales were, and that the Church had benefitted economically by selling agricultural land and invested in urban property.

The Church also established right-wing nationalist religious clubs to draw grass-roots support. The young Peyiotes who joined subsequently formed the nucleus of the EOKA group. EOKA was established by Colonel Grivas, a Cypriot who had previously fought communists in the Greek civil war. He returned to Cyprus in 1955

and organized a hit-and-run war against the British which resulted in Independence in 1960. The political campaign was run by Archbishop Makarios but there were serious differences between them.

During the 1955-59 EOKA campaign there were many defections from the leftist camp. Of the three prominent village EOKA militants one was a shepherd and the other two redundant craftsmen, all young unmarried men. After the communist defeat in Greece AKEL switched from self-government to Enosis. But EOKA had a decidedly anti-left stance,[15] and known communists were excluded and even shot. The political initiative from 1955 passed to the young right-wing nationalists.

3.6 Notes

1 The higher percentage of Church land in Peyia to the District's percentage (11%) is probably due to a pre-existing monastery in the village which was abandoned in 1800 for unknown reasons. Peyiotes believe that it was destroyed by the Turks. Known as the Zalakia it was in operation at the time of Archbishop Kyprianos. According to Hackett (1901), in that year it was a dependent monastery under the See of Paphos, but he notes there were no monks resident there at the time. Its property was transferred to Kykkos Monastery.

2 The number of monks was much higher during the Turkish Occupation. Van Bruyn noted that in 1678 Kykkos had 400 Caloyers "part of whom are sent to Muscovy, and elsewhere on various duties" (Cobham:242).

3 There had been strong relations between the Cypriot Orthodox Church and the Russian one. Unfortunately, exact figures are unavailable on the amount of land held in Russia. This information was obtained in a personal interview with the Kykkos lawyer of the 1930-50 period. Balfour (1951) also noted that the Church held land there, but gives no figures.

4 Clearly Nicolaides was eager to dampen any disenchantment with British rule.

5 Loizos (1975) also gives parallel accounts for this period in Kalo.

6 Probably more the case in Peyia than other villages. Inspector Kareklas' report (1931) on the Hassanpovlia bandits who terrorized the Paphos District in the 1890s indicates that in the early period of British administration violence was endemic.

7 Galatopoulos (1979) had 'discovered' the phil-Hellenism of literary romanticism when studying law in London. The prelates and politicians reached Greek Nationalism by different routes, the former through the Byzantine Tradition, the latter through Romanticism.

8 This was particularly true of certain merchants such as N.P. Lanitis.

9 Hill (1952) takes the Tribute to be the predominant rallying cry of the Enotists. Loizos (personal communication) has suggested that across time this might have encouraged Greek Cypriots to believe that they had to subsidize the Ottoman Empire. This is certainly reasonable, and after 1914 the Tribute was in fact held by the British Exchequer.

10 He was the lawyer of the Paphos Metropolitan See. The Church in fact split vertically over these elections.

11 To the one previous polling station in Paphos, three others were added: in Philippou's native village, in the extreme outskirts of the District, and in Peyia. This may have been to encourage more people to vote and to prevent a repeat of the successful nationalist boycott of the 1923 elections. The nationalists interpreted this change as due to the machinations of Nicolaides and other moderates mainly because those villages which were more nationalistically inclined were obliged to vote in villages held by moderates. Given strong inter-village rivalry it would have been a brave man to vote in another village which supported an opposing candidate.

12 Indeed the emergence of militant nationalism can be seen as an effect of what Gramsci called a crisis of authority, "which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcefully extracted, the consent of the broad masses, or because huge masses (especially of peasants and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit notorganically formulated, add up to a revolution" (1976:210). See the torrid propaganda of this period. On the other hand the Church performed the functions of leadership taken by the State of Piedmont in the Unification of Italy (cf. Ginsborg, 1979).

13 Development Boards were established to improve the quality of life in the villages. The seats, which had some powers of patronage, were allocated by the Mukhtar who had good relations with the Colonial administration. Two of the most influential Peyiotes and former allies of the Mukhtar were not approached. The representative of the Paphos See desisted after pressure by the Bishop not to collaborate with the Government. The Kykkos representative was also a likely candidate but was not under any pressure from the Monastery. Indeed he and the Mukhtar (who later resigned his post after death threats by EOKA) had just quarrelled bitterly over the sales of Church land. The Mukhtar sent a secret report to his superiors suggesting that the two men could not remain as his assistants 'as they have joined AKEL'! He then recommended two of his clients. This report brings out that not only was the power field fragmented and ultimately determined by the outside, but that individuals occupying critical positions such as the Mukhtar-ship could exploit colonial ignorance of village realities and submit completely unfounded reports calculated to bring the downfall of their opponents. In Cypriot political culture the lie is a creative strategy and closely resembles Kizb (cf. Gilsenan, 1976). The Kykkos representative was a virulent anti-communist but he and the Mukhtar had fallen out with each other and the latter wished to have his own dependents in village positions of importance.

14 This Chiftlik was originally offered to a neighbouring village whose inhabitants wanted to purchase it. After the Government discovered that they were leftist the land was offered to Peyiotes.

15 cf. Grivas' memoirs, 1961, for his views on EOKA and Papachrysostomou, 1977, for an analysis of the Fallen in 1955-59:

Craftsmen	12
Farmers	13
Students	16
Clerical	7
'Various' occupations or unemployed	13
Labourers	4
'Scientists'	1
Teachers	1
Housewife	1

Of the 68 fallen 3 were from the towns, 62 were born in the villages and 3 were of an unknown residence. This percentage does not reflect the rural-urban distribution of the population; it is even more heavily rurally biased. The variety of occupations suggests a wide rural base and indicates the variety of conflicts being played out in the EOKA uprising. Most of the fallen were between 20-30 years old.

CHAPTER 4

THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND (1960-80): ITS IMPLICATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the implications of the distribution of land within the village between 1960 and 1980. During this period not only have there been radical changes in the distribution of land within the village, but also the importance of land has changed within the total economy. So, for the purposes of clarity it seems worthwhile to single out the following three general themes for analysis:

(1) changes to the ownership of land with parallel corresponding changes to the social relations of production within the village;

(2) changes to the social relationships surrounding the marketing of agricultural products which has affected the types of economic relationships which Peyiotes, and the village itself, are involved in;

(3) changes to the social composition of the labour force involved in exploiting the land, which is partly due to an increased participation of the village within the national economy.

4.2 The General Distribution of Land

Since 1960 Peyiotes have owned the majority of agricultural land in the village. The property owned by the Church has shrunk to 6.1% (Table 4.1). This area, a huge single tract of land is largely unproductive and rocky. It is rented to a shepherding family from a neighbouring village. In 1979 the See gave out a small percentage of this land to the Central Cooperative fruit exporting company (SEDIGEP) on a hundred year lease. Vines have

been planted and the proceeds are to be split halfway, the Cooperative bearing all the costs.

Ownership Category	1975 (i)		
	Number of Owners	Area (donums)	Area %
Private Individuals	1,364 (ii)	24,686.1	75.6
Private Companies	6	579.5	1.8
State Land (Hali)	1	1,485.5	4.6
(Forest)	1	3,867.8	11.9
Chiftlik	-	-	-
Religious Institutions			
Paphos Metropolitan See	1	2,001.6	6.1
Kykkos Monastery	-	-	-
TOTAL	1,374	32,620.4	100%

TABLE 4.1: THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN PEYIA, 1975

NOTES: (i) Source: Records of the Land Registry Department, Paphos
(ii) Total number of owners, single and joint ownership

In the past most families possessed a team of oxen to work the land, and some donkeys for transport. According to most villager accounts work was a back-breaking task then. Many older men will say, unsolicited, that "they used to work from sunrise to sunset". It seems, though, with a predominantly cereal farming, that there were intense periods of activity at sowing and harvesting of cereals and carobs, but with some inactivity during the winter

when men would tend goats or remain in the village. Due to the great work load and for fear of theft farmers slept in their fields during harvest. Workers were sometimes drawn from neighbouring hillside villages where the agricultural cycle was difficult.

The sale of Church property in Peyia began in 1953 and ended ten years later. This was part of the general trend of the day and some of the causes have been outlined in the previous chapter. During this period cereal cultivation was undergoing a decline and rents were often in arrears. There were three sales in 1953, 1955 and 1963. In 1953 the Paphos Metropolitan See sold some 2,000 donums to the village Cooperative Bank which distributed them on a lottery basis to Peyiotes. A £25 cash down deposit served the right to participate, a considerable sum in the period. This was to be deducted from the total cost of the plot. After consultation with the Paphos Bishop Photios the Bank committee laid down that men who had smallish properties had a first preference. Photios' electoral campaign, the Bishop who initiated the sales, had been supported by the Left and he was replaced a year later by a more nationalist-oriented candidate.[1] During this period an intense conflict had emerged between the Cooperative Bank and the merchants over the marketing of carobs. But when the Bank acquired this land it acquired an upper hand in village politics for it could dispense a number of resources. Indeed the Bank committee excluded the Mukhtar and some other merchants from purchasing in order to widen its membership and support. Likewise it excluded clients of the merchants who refused to sell their products through the Bank. Following this many of these clients claimed that they did not want to partake in the sales as it belonged to the Panayia

(Our Lady) the clear implication being that the committee was committing a sacrilege to alienate Church property and those who purchased it would be unlucky! This cut no ice with the majority of Peyiotes but the £25 deposit was sufficiently high to prevent families from participating. To conceal this inability many poorer men began adopting this reasoning but on closer questioning it emerged that they had strongly desired to purchase land but were financially unable to do so. The political repercussions are dealt with elsewhere but it is worthwhile to mention one incident. The Mukhtar retaliated to this exclusion by sending a secret report to the Government recommending that his two azas, who were the Church representatives unable and unwilling to intercede for him with the Bank (due to the Bishop's orders and the Mukhtar's pro-British sympathies), be removed as they had joined the Communist Party! (see note 13, Chapter 3).

In April 1955 when the EOKA campaign had just commenced Kykkos Monastery sold 963.5 donums, after the Abbot had given a gift of 36 donums to a young shepherd who had come to his notice. Soon after this man, Arapis, became an agonistis (fighter), took to the hills and organized the village EOKA group. The 963 donums were sold once more to the Cooperative Bank and divided into 124 lots. Five of these were kept by the Bank and the remaining 119 were given to Peyiotes; this included 15 married women who held a better credit rating at the Bank than their husbands. The offer was limited to 1 plot per family but there were a number of cases when men secretly persuaded poorer kin to purchase a share on their behalf. They were roundly criticized by Peyiotes. The drawing of lots was supervised by officials of the Cooperative

Department and the Government. The average price of the plots was £143 and the size varied from 6 donums to 25 donums. Most men took up to ten years to pay the debt. A number of poor leftists received larger properties, but it was impossible to ascertain whether it was due to chance (given that there was a greater percentage of leftists then and the Bank committee was left-dominated) or collusion. The land was not, according to Peyiotes, of exceptional quality but it was nevertheless of a higher standard than their own privately held land.

In 1963 Kykkos Monastery sold the remainder of its property in the village. The total amount was 1,380.25 donums. The organization of this was sale was radically different to the previous ones and was to be a source of conflict within the village. Arapis had been appointed Mukhtar and had maintained cordial relations with the Abbot, mainly through the leader of the Paphos EOKA group who had entered the Diplomatic Service. During this period former agonistes were being feted as the heroes of the day and the Monastery was anxious to sell some of its rural property and invest it in Nicosia urban estate. Arapis was entrusted with the organization of the sale and the division of the fields into plots. For this he drew upon his former village EOKA companions as the experience of joining EOKA for young men was then still a fresh source of emotional and sentimental camaraderie. Inevitably however some men were left out; foremost amongst these was Savvas Symeou, a former agonistis who, as a fevghos (wanted man on the run), felt that he had been unjustly excluded. He hurriedly formed a delegation together with other rightists who had generally trafficked in intelligence gathering during the 1955-59 campaign and sought

an interview with the Abbot. The latter made a few encouraging and sympathetic remarks but did not wish to take up the case. Most villagers felt that Symeou had a genuine case as he had risked life and limb, but scoffed at the other men saying that their contribution was minimal and indeed that they held no genuine political beliefs but were merely taking advantage of a situation. The Abbot had agreed beforehand that Arapis and his men would be given first preference in choosing the plots they desired and that they could charge handsomely for the work involved. Arapis received the highest acreage purchased by any one man, 6 plots totalling 65 donums, and another 50 donums as a gift. One non-Peyioti also received some land: the former Paphos EOKA chief who had interceded so ably on Arapis' behalf. The former Kykkos representative also received a plot as a gift for services rendered to the Monastery. Out of the total of 166 plots, 16 went prior to the public sale to the agonistes and the rest sold on a lottery basis to the Peyiotes, one share per each family, at an average price of £18-20 per donum.

Leftists were not excluded, but the rupture among rightists, especially those who felt slighted, was to remain a major division within Peyia. Given the relatively undiversified regional economy then and the emotional investment in claiming rewards for having risked life for country, it is not hard to see why the sale raised so much passions. Symeou and Arapis quarrelled bitterly and eventually supported rival nationalist parties. This is treated in Chapter 8 but it is important to note that a village-based conflict eventually linked up with nationally-based distinctions.

As leftists were not excluded, such a sale placed them at

psychological disadvantage for any type of criticism was construed as ingratitude. Agonistes could claim that not only did they risk their lives for the patrida whilst leftist leaders were hiding in London and elsewhere,[2] but also, that they had actually brought benefits to the village through such sales.

This was by far the best land of the village. Not only were the soils rich, but it was situated close to the village and is easily accessible by road. The organizing group left out a further 579.5 donums which was then considered largely worthless as it was rocky and could be utilized only as pasture. This was sold to the Improvement Board and used until 1967 mainly as pasture land.

4.3 Some General Implications

At this point it is worthwhile to investigate some general effects of these sales as Peyiotes now own the major part of agricultural land within the village. The effects of such sales cannot be viewed separately from their articulation with largely independent transformations which have affected the status of the village within the regional economy. But a number of special features can be singled out for particular investigation because they have tended to affect the nature of politics and stratification within Peyia, either directly or indirectly. Whilst it will be necessary to reassemble these features at a later point it is worthwhile to treat the following as analytically distinct for the present:

1. Transformations in the social relations of production over access to land.
2. Transformations in the pattern of property transmission within the family.
3. Transformations in the internal structure of agriculture

which has led to certain patterns in the social relations of labour recruitment and marketing of agricultural products. As new crops have been planted the nature of stratification has changed, as have criteria for stratification.

4. Transformations in the nature of political dialogue within the village due to changes in the definition of politics. New definitions of politics have emerged for Peyiotes due to the specific way land was distributed and its articulation with national politics.

5. Transformations in the content of village sentiment and collective mentalities by providing new 'reference points' for Peyiotes in their collective history (i.e. the way they perceive the past and in the way they collectively view resources such as land).

First, who actually benefitted from such sales? For its part the Church (excepting the final sale), was primarily concerned to distribute land as evenly as possible and invest the proceeds in urban real estate. However cleavages did emerge over all sales. For some families the problems were not political but economic. The £25 down payments was sufficiently high effectively to prevent those who perhaps were in most need of land from actually purchasing it. Out of a total of 45 households surveyed in 1979, 32 households had participated in one or more sales, whilst 13 had not participated at all (Table 4.2). Of these 53.7% had holdings of less than 20 donums.

Why these families did not participate is brought out in Table 4.3. What this shows is that 60.9% of the non-purchases were due to the lack of the necessary capital. The other

Minimum Holdings	Purchased Church Property		
	In All Sales	In One or More Sales	Did not Purchase in Any Sale
0 donum	-	7 : 21.8%	1 : 7.6%
1 - 20 donums	-	17 : 53 %	6 : 46.1%
21 - 40 "	-	4 : 12.4%	3 : 22.8%
41+ "	4	- : 12.4%	3 : 22.8%
TOTAL: 45	4 : 8.8%	28 : 62.2%	13 : 28.8%

TABLE 4.2: SALES OF CHURCH PROPERTY ACCORDING TO MINIMUM HOLDINGS AT TIME OF SALE(S)

Reason	Purchase in one or more Sales	Non-purchase in any Sale	Total Per-Centage
Young and not interested	-	1	2.4%
Did not have the down payment at time of sales	16	9	60.9%
Planning to emigrate or leave the village	1	-	1.4%
Absent from village then (e.g. abroad)	3	-	7.3%
Not interested (due to other occupation)	0	1	2.4%
'Other reasons'	8	2	24.3%

TABLE 4.3: REASONS FOR NON-PURCHASE OF CHURCH LAND

significant percentage, 24.3%, did not purchase due to the refusal of the local Cooperative Bank committee to allow the merchants and their clients to participate; in short 'other reasons' are political reasons.

To a certain extent, therefore, these sales tended to increase inequality among Peyiotes. The effects, or the what-came-out of these sales amongst other things is brought out in Table 4.4.

Area Class (donums)	Number of Owners	Area (donums)	Owners %	Area %
0 - 2	389	299.2	28.4	1.2
2 - 5	200	667.6	14.6	2.6
5 - 10	218	1,581.9	15.9	6.3
10 - 15	105	1,276.4	7.7	5.1
15 - 20	98	1,680.8	7.2	6.7
20 - 30	111	2,731.5	8.1	10.8
30 - 50	111	4,286.8	8.1	16.9
50 - 75	59	3,685.8	4.3	14.6
75 - 100	44	3,773.3	3.2	14.9
100 - 200	29	3,877.3	2.1	15.3
200 - 300	5	1,104.3	0.4	4.4
300 - 500	1	300.6	0.1	1.2
500 +	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1,370	25,265.6	100	100

TABLE 4.4: HOLDING SIZE CLASSES OF PRIVATELY HELD LAND, PEYIA, 1974

SOURCE: Records of the Land Registry Office, Paphos

What is striking is the large amount of small properties, which are mainly owned by absentee Peyiotes. Holdings above 100 donums which are very large properties are held by 35 men or 2.6% of the owners, and account for 20.9% of the total area. These large

properties belong to three classes: those inherited from the merchants, those belonging to former agonistes, and those accumulated during a man's working life. The largest village property belongs to the first class. It is owned by a Paphos doctor who married the daughter of the previous Mukhtar. In the 1950s this was considered a handsome dowry, but with investment in new crops, and a lack of interest by its owner, it is now rented out to shepherds and the carobs are sharecropped by his Koumparos. A few other large properties belong to former agonistes such as Arapis the present Mukhtar who has continued purchasing land from individuals after the sale of Church property. Finally, there are those properties which were actually purchased by Peyiotes. Most belong to some returned migrants who emigrated to Australia in the late 1940s and early 1950s and then returned. Their original intention seems to have been to emigrate permanently; this was the general characteristic of emigration during this period. For a variety of reasons (health, marriage, difficulties in integration) some returned with large sums of cash and invested it in land, its value being low then. As these returned migrants are a fraction of the total Peyioti migrants, their return cannot be reviewed as representative of a general trend in the migration pattern. Investment in land was then, and is to a certain extent even now (though for very different reasons) the most secure savings bank for largely conservative farmers.

These figures are useful in indicating the overall ownership pattern, but they do not indicate where resources are located. There are no figures for the total amounts held by resident and absentee landowners, but in 1974 there was a total of 1,370 individual

owners, far greater than the number of adults in the village which did not exceed 900 souls. It is clear that a considerable number of individuals who do not live in the village own land there. Most are absentee Peyiotes though in recent years a number of 'outsiders' (xenoi) have begun purchasing land largely for speculative and tourism purposes. (The attitudes of Peyiotes towards xenoi are examined later).

Absentee Peyiotes own land mainly because they prefer retaining some part of the patrimony for sentimental and economic reasons where possible. Parents in the village vigorously resist demands by their children to sell these properties. Parents (especially fathers) feel that absentee children should receive at least some property irrespective of where they are located. As shall be shown this causes certain conflicts within the family. Some migrants purchase property (but do not return) and are often encouraged to purchase land when visiting kinsmen.[3]

Finally there are properties held by Peyiotes who have migrated to the cities or married into other villages. A rough indication of the distribution of properties according to villager resident/non-resident categories is given in Table 4.5. This concerns a certain locality which has a total area of 5,600 donums earmarked for large irrigation works. The choice of this area for irrigation was determined mainly by technical factors and consequently can be taken as a rough guide. It should be made clear that basing a picture upon a specific area of land rather than families or individuals can only present an incomplete account largely because individuals tend to own more land in certain localities and less in others. In the absence of other data, however, some conclusions

Number of Owners	Residence	% of Owners	Number of Plots	Total Area (donums)	% of Total Area	Average Area per Individual	Average Size of Plot (donums)
430	Peyia	58.0%	950	3,890	69.4%	9.0	4.09
65	Other Paphos villages	8.7%	105	400	7.1%	6.1	3.80
65	Other Districts	8.7%	115	300	5.3%	4.6	2.60
35	? Unknown	4.7%	40	150	2.6%	4.2	3.75
105	Abroad	14.0%	210	450	8.0%	4.2	2.14

TABLE 4.5: OWNERSHIP OF LAND ACCORDING TO RESIDENT/NON-RESIDENT CATEGORY

Source: Records of the Land Registry Office, Paphos

may be drawn regarding plot sizes and total areas owned.

These figures indicate that nearly 60% of the total owners were resident in Peyia, but that Peyiotes own by far more property (69% of the total area under consideration). In addition it also indicates that Peyiotes own larger plots of land (4.09 donums to 2.14 donums for those abroad). This is consistent with the causes underlying emigration, part of which was smaller land holdings and the uneconomical nature of farming.

These figures must be treated with caution as they refer to an area which is primarily agricultural. Other areas which are by the coast and which have now a very different value are owned by non-Peyiotes to a greater extent.

So far the account has concentrated on the distribution of property according to residential categories, but the above account indicates that Peyiotes have access to land in a number of ways.

Most families have some land to a greater or lesser extent, but as the land is so variable in quality, may be irrigated, and can vary from a holding of a few donums to over a hundred, it is unwise to come to the conclusion that there are no 'landless labourers' in the village. It would be more precise to note that there are a largish number of individuals who are constrained to obtain a livelihood away from the land - owning a few donums of land or even 40 donums of poor land does not make a family self-sufficient unless there is some capital investment and cash crops are grown. Nor is acreage the absolute criterion of wealth. As I have shown in Chapter 1 other criteria come into play.

4.4 Land Contracts

Perhaps the most important effects of the sales of Church property have been the changes in the social relations involved in access to land. In contrast to the past, access to land outside the framework of the family does not involve Peyiotes in collective dealings with outside institutions; it involves resident Peyiotes dealing either with other residents or absentee Peyioti landowners. This has affected inter-village dialogue. In the previous system with the Church owning 21% of agricultural land in an undiversified economy Peyiotes were in fierce competition amongst themselves at specific periods of the year. They competed through rental auctions and through the mediation of highly placed men such as the Church representatives. In the present system they contract among themselves as individuals without the use of mediators. With a change in the value of land, i.e. a transformation in the way Peyiotes view land (due to a variety of factors discussed below) and a general transformation of the economy, land as such is not as

highly valued as in the past; competition is less fierce for certain types of land and fiercer for others. Indeed there is a much denser social network with a greater number of individuals now than in the past. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the social expectations involved will tend to be different, and an implicit set of expectations surround access to land. To rent land from a co-villager implies some type of give and take to a certain extent containing more than a mere exchange of money. Friendship to Peyiotes implies a material element. One Peyioti commented that he would not re-let some of his fields to another villager as he had not been asked to plough them. Within the village as men now have more resources to trade they have more obligations to satisfy. There is also, thus, a greater tendency towards ambiguity.

As 42% of the families resident within the village rent some type of property it is worthwhile to explore further the nature of land contracts. Most contracts involve farmers, shepherds and labourers; skilled workers and to a greater extent, clerks, white-collar workers, do not rent much land.

There are two types of rental agreements with absentee land-owners: those with owners resident abroad and those with owners resident in the island. In both cases the expectations and use land is put to tend to be different. Owners resident abroad nominate a close relative as their legal representative (plirexusyio), responsible for seeing that the property does not fall in disrepair. No rents are paid, the proceeds belong wholly to the user out of which is paid the property tax. As the owner usually tends to have little direct economic interest in the property little productive investments are made.

Owners resident in the island, but outside Peyia, rent out their land, in the absence of kin, for short contracts lasting from one to two years. Agreements are usually written. The largest single village property belongs to this category.

Finally there are those contracts which involve resident owners. They tend to be leases and sharecropping arrangements. Agreements are verbal and are usually renewable each year. Most of the land leased out in this manner is used for cereals. The greatest demand comes from shepherds who usually have little land. But demand by shepherds is determined by two factors: distance and accessibility. As land is required close to the sheep pen shepherds are obliged to rent land within close distance. Most shepherds graze in the north-eastern area of the village which is less fertile and less hemmed in by new crops. A few have two pastures for summer and winter.

A considerable part of land contracts among Peyiotes is an aspect of the developmental cycle; as men become old and their children marry they decrease their work load. In addition, as children are married, the land held by a man tends to decrease until it becomes uneconomical to work his depleted land holdings. Consequently many men change their jobs at this point, either becoming labourers or purusing a variety of different jobs.

Sharecropping involves three types of parties within the village. First, by old men unable to work the fields but who have a need for a supply of barley as animal fodder; second, between men who cannot afford the expense of mechanized ploughing and who give out their land to tractorists. These are mainly labourers, as expenses can be considerable. There were two tractor owners

in the village who owned hardly any land but who sharecropped over a hundred donums each in such a manner. The agreements are usually very similar. The sharecropper contributes all the ploughing and sowing, harvesting and half the fertilizer. The owner gives his field, all the seed and half the fertilizer. The proceeds are split equally.

Finally there are those contracts among kin usually concerning land which is owned jointly usually the result of an inheritance which has not been divided. The word for sharecropping '<u>syneterika</u>' (collaboration, joint-ownership) in fact is the term used to designate such undivided property.

Sharecropping is decreasing within the village due to the uneconomical nature of cereal production. Whereas previously sharecropping was a common way of exploiting land outside the family framework and indeed merchants often gave out their land in that way, nowadays it is generally undertaken by those who have the technical instruments to do so. Whereas previously it was a lack of land which led to its adoption, nowadays it is non-possession of, and dependence upon, mechanized means which lead to the reliance upon the tractor-owner-sharecropper. It is important to note that most sharecroppers own some land in contrast to the past. They are now more independent.

Hence the resumption of control of land by Peyiotes has had a number of effects upon the social relations surrounding access to land. Generally it may be said that the system is less exploitative than in the past. More specifically Peyiotes now rely upon similarly placed individuals for access to land outside the family which presupposes a qualitatively different type of

social relations within the village. Clearly, however, the importance of these social relations will be dependent upon the value placed upon land, in other words upon the status of land within the economy. As the value of land had changed due to the transformations in the organization and productive value of agriculture, and due to the external changes which have affected its overall importance within the economy, it is now necessary to examine the transformations which have occurred in agriculture itself.

4.5 The Use of Land

Until 1963 land was valued primarily by its soil fertility, size and accessibility. This was due to the type of cultivation which was extensive. Wheat, barley and pulses were grown. A few olives were grown and the oil was mainly used for home consumption. The two export crops were carobs and, to a less extent, wine-grapes.

Farmers kept enough wheat for home consumption and sold their surplus either at fairs or to Turkish grain merchants in Paphos. In 1953 the Government established the 'Grain Commission' which is empowered to regulate, licence and control the production and importation of wheat and barley as controlled commodities. These cereals are purchased by the Cooperative Bank acting as an agent for the government Grain Commission which has a monopoly on the purchase, distribution and storing of grains. Financial assistance is given to farmers for damage or loss of crop due to drought. Carobs have been marketed through the Cooperative and are kibbled in a Paphos Cooperative plant since the 1950s. After returning from the 1939-45 war some Peyiotes invested their savings in land and in a few wells. Vegetables were grown for home consumption.

Peyiotes had little direct personal dealings with the market for a variety of reasons, structural and cultural. Vegetables have to be transported quickly to the market place and the grower needs some type of transport. The transformations to marketing are dealt with below but at this point it is important to realize that until 1963 differences between Peyiotes existed insofar as differences in sizes of land holdings; there was no specialization within agriculture. The major social difference was between those who worked the land, and those who did not such as the merchants.

Since 1963 however, this state of affairs has been changing rapidly. That year two men who had married into the village from predominantly viticulture villages planted a new strain of table-grape on land they had just obtained from the Church. They had been in contact with an agronomist in the Agricultural Department and one of these men was Arapis. Initially many of the older Peyiotes scoffed at the attempt asserting that these 'outsiders' clearly were very ignorant of the hot temperatures in that particular area which would shrivel the grapes. To a certain extent this reaction was justified as the variety of grapes Peyiotes were accustomed to were hill-area wine grapes, but this new variety was an early harvesting type which thrives on a certain temperature characteristic of this particular area. After seeing that these attempts were successful and also that white-collar workers were investing in this variety many Peyiotes decided that there were still things to learn and followed suit. The majority of table-grape planting took place between 1966 and 1974 when the Government imposed restrictions on their cultivation, the main one being that they must be irrigated.

Generally this was a younger generation of farmers who had been exposed to more formal education than their parents and more ready to experiment and take risks. They were also more economically independent as Table 4.6 brings out.

Occupational Class	Total Number	Table Grapes		Wine Grapes	
		Planted	Did not plant	Planted	Did not plant
Full-time farmers and shepherds	30	17 56.6%	13 43.2%	19 63.2%	11 36.6%
Labourers and Unskilled workers	14	1 7.1%	13 92.8%	7 49.9%	7 49.9%
Skilled workers	17	3 17.6%	14 82.3%	11 64.6%	6 32.2%
White collar	13	6 46.1%	7 53.8%	10 76.9%	3 23[illegible]%
TOTAL:	74	27 36.4%	47 63.5%	47 63.5%	27 36.4%

TABLE 4.6: TABLE/WINE GRAPE GROWERS ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION

This survey of 74 households brings out the essential differences between the groups owning table-and wine-grapes. Whereas wine-grapes are generally owned by the majority of Peyiotes, table-grapes are owned by a much smaller number. The wine-grape data do not show any significant differences in ownership and indeed show that ownership is prevalent, for a great part have been transmitted and extended. They are located in those areas which have always belonged to Peyiotes. Table-grapes, by contrast are most planted on land previously held by the Church, and data indicate that their distribution is more clearly related to socio-economic factors. Labourers and unskilled workers at

the lowest end of the prestige scale do not as a whole possess table-grapes. This is due to their general lack of land and the considerable expenses involved in planting and maintaining a vineyard for an initial 3-5 year period. Table-grapes are also labour intensive and require the learning of new skills: labourers have little time for consistent work necessary in vineyards, their time is usually occupied in seeking out paid employment.

Other new crops have since been planted. Most farmers now grow some vegetables (onions, potatoes) and bananas, citrus and tobacco have recently been planted. Many Peyiotes have invested in wells which are powered by old tractors attached to turbines. The expense can be considerable (£2,000) but most farmers can recoup the outlay after 3 years. By 1979 nearly half of the resident Peyiotes owned at least one irrigated plot (Table 4.7).

Number of Non-Irrigated Holdings	Number by Type 1	Area (donums)	Number by Type 2	Area (donums)	Number by Type 3	Area (donums)	Total Number	Area (donums)
42	9	96.5	12	63	9	132.5	33	342

TABLE 4.7: IRRIGATED TO NON-IRRIGATED HOLDINGS.
SURVEY OF 75 HOUSEHOLDS.

NOTES: Type 1 - irrigated by privately sunk well
Type 2 - irrigated gy Government well
Type 3 - irrigated by Mavrokolymbos well, mainly at Potima Chiftlik

As the mainstay of agriculture is still the table-grape it is important to investigate what is actually involved in planting and tending a vineyard. Vine cuttings are normally obtained from

the Agricultural Department and are planted in regular rows which are ten feet apart to enable mechanized ploughing to take place. The cuttings require a considerable amount of water. Capital investment tends to be high. In 1971 the trellises upon which the vines rest cost £400 for a vineyard of 7-1/2 donums. For the first two years there is little actual work involved, but after this quantities of fertilizer are needed. After three years some grapes are produced and full production begins after the fourth year. Ploughing is necessary three times a year. Vines are grafted in the second year. Most vineyards are not watered unless there is a drought. There is the added danger of them being over-watered which would burst the grapes. Fertilizer, weedkiller and ploughing costs amount to approximately £400 per year for a vineyard of 7-1/2 donums. Vines are labour intensive and the work involved requires both skill and drudgery. For a vineyard of 7-1/2 donums labour involved in spraying, pruning (excluding collection) amounts to 140 man hours, 258 woman hours and 24 child hours; harvesting amounts to 140 hours for a man, woman and child. Income, however, tends to be correspondingly high. In 1978 a 7-1/2 donum vineyard could yield a gross income of £1,600 and a net income of £1,200, assuming that the cultivator were to cost his and his family's labour.

There are now 72 table-grape and 250 wine-grape growers within the village. As the crop is labour intensive new forms of labour recruitment have emerged which have their own specific effects upon village social relations. Pruning occurs between December and January and is mainly done by men. This requires some skill and most grape growers have learnt the <u>techne</u> (craft). They learn

from others and from the Agricultural Department in Paphos which runs popular yearly courses lasting for a few mornings. Following this the fields have to be cleared of the twigs to enable a further ploughing to take place. This is done by women and it is customary to burn the twigs after collection. In March spraying of pesticides is done by the men and is followed by the intricate task of thinning. This is the trimming of certain parts of the bunches of unripe grapes to enable remaining ones to grow larger and less tightly packed together. Thinning is a woman's task and is the most labour intensive chore in viticulture, requiring skill and experience. By June table-grapes are ready for harvesting which usually lasts for a maximum of three weeks until July. Great care has to be exercised in harvesting; grapes have to be cut gingerly and packed lightly to prevent brusing.

There are certain differences between the work required for table- and wine-grapes. Whilst both require pruning and ploughing, thinning is not required for wine-grapes. Nor is much caution required during harvest as the latter are crushed. Harvesting for this crop is in September, so there is no conflict over labour supply.

The system of labour requirement is determined by three factors. First there is the labour requirements of the tasks in question, the what-is-necessary to grow table-grapes; second there is the total labour situation within the village itself, which means how far labour is available; finally there is the influence of cultural attitudes towards work which sets limits to the use of labour. Any transformation to one factor is bound to have repercussions upon any other factor; the limits and possibilities inherent in any one factor will influence the other. Most, but not all,

table-grape growers rely on labour supplied by their families where possible. The ideal is to be autonomous and independent both economically, and also in terms of labour requirements. This is because most growers have small vineyards and also because of transmission of past attitudes regarding work. The exceptions are the white-collar workers, such as teachers, who employ men to do the most physically exerting tasks but personally take over the organization of harvesting. There are two exceptions: two men employ workers to do all the work. They are the only two absentee grape growers in Peyia, the rest are Peyiotes. One is the Mukhtar of a neighbouring village who has recently purchased a vineyard in Peyia; the other is an ex-Police Superintendent who has retired to tend his vineyard, one of the largest in the village. But in 1979 Peyia's Mukhtar Arapis, gave out his vineyard on a share-cropping basis to his kounyiados (wife's brother) as he was busy building a tourist restaurant. The agreement was that the kounyiados would do all the work and incur all the expenses, and the proceeds were to be divided equally. In the village this was considered the ultimate in wealth as Arapis indicated that his time was more important than a potentially large income.

Although the ideal is to conduct the work independently there are certain requirements and limits which tend to increase the division of labour and establish new forms of labour association. First, not all tasks can be executed by the grower because certain tools and technical means may not be owned. Not all vinegrowers possess tractors, spraying machines and trucks to work the land and transport the grapes. In contrast to the past when most farmers owned their tools such as oxen, most grape growers do not possess

them. They are therefore obliged to contract with others. In 1969 there were 27 tractors. Some well-to-do farmers retain their tractors exclusively for their own use. In addition not all men feel sufficiently confident to prune, a task which requires calculation and experience. Finally there are limitations of family labour - children may be resident elsewhere or at school. They are therefore obliged to rely on labour recruitment. Close kin are therefore asked to fill in the labour gaps. These are not paid. Most men are reluctant to allow their wives to work as there is a certain prestige attached to being an ambelurghos (vinegrower). The ideal is still to keep the womenfolk at home or at least working in one's own fields. In spite of the intense demand for female labour during the pruning and thinning season, paid work is not popular - it denotes dependence. In addition there is now a demand for female labour in Paphos factories which is more popular amongst poorer families, as it is less exerting physically and not so morally exposed. To solve this labour shortage ambelurghi, especially when close friends or kin, exchange the labour of each other's wives. By exchanging the labour of their womenfolk with similarly economically independent families ambelurghi maintain their claim to status and guarantee that the work is executed. Indirectly, therefore, the cultivation of table-grapes has somewhat transformed the social role of women through cash employment and also through their greater participation in organizing work through neighbourhood and kinship ties.

By contrast harvesting is determined by the total labour situation in the village and the system of collection and packaging. The village packing house employs a considerable amount of the

poorer women. Work is popular because it is light, has an atmosphere of conviviality and concerns the direct interests of the producers themselves. In addition, as it is regular work for three weeks it provides a lump sum of cash which encourages saving. Grapes are collected, placed in trucks and transported with great care to the packaging house. There they are checked for their sugar content by a Trade Department official and if below a certain level (16%) rejected. Once accepted they are weighed and given to the women to clean and pack.

During this period not only is paid labour scarce but also there is no possibility of exchanging labour with other ambelurghii as they have their own collection and harvesting to do. The time schedule is tighter at harvesting than with pruning when producers can arrange labour exchange. Each family is obliged to work independently and in many cases absentee members of the family (such as married sons resident elsewhere) return to lend a hand. As many producers remain in the packing house to observe how their grapes are being packed (and to prevent any injustices in rejection or undue trimming of the bunches which would decrease their income), there is a further demand on their labour-time.

It is not hard to see the effects of this system. Its effect on the grape growers is to regularly bring them together for specific periods and purposes, whilst also systematically separating them at other times. In addition, whilst most farmer grape-growers also employ paid labour for work on vegetable patches (which require a fairly continuous labour input) they often cannot call on their services when they are needed most as they are employed in the packing house. It is important to note the perceptions here

because the level of ambiguity is great. For the vine grower who needs to employ labourers at harvesting, employment of other poor families for work on vegetable patches often implies the implicit expectation that he could call for assistance when he is hard pressed; for the paid labourer who has to obtain cash under the best conditions 'work is where you find it' and to which other considerations are secondary. Hence the attitudes of the ambelurghii: 'the labourers are lazy, they don't work, they prefer to sit on their backsides all day, and when we need them they don't come.'

Table 4.8 which concerns incidents of agricultural cooperation shows that poorer men tend to rely on more individuals for short-term tasks who are often paid through exchange-labour or products; richer farmers tend to rely on paid labour, choose a smaller pool of individuals who are less closely related. The reliance on women's connections is significant. They are arranged in ascending order of wealth and prestige.

	Type of Work	Number of Days	How Related	How Reciprocated
Poor labourer	Planting onions	6 days 3 for 3 days 6 days	W.Z. Koumeres (also 1st C) 1st Cousin	By products
Poor farmer	Ploughing	2 days 1 day	1st C. of W. Z	Paid when products are sold
Tractorist	Thinning of grapes	2 days 2 days	1st C. of W. 1st C. of W.	Exchange labour
Craftsman	Thinning of grapes	3 days 3 days	W.M.Z. Koumera	Exchange labour
Vinegrower	Planting & Collection	10 days 29 days	1st C. of W. 2nd C. of W.	Cash

TABLE 4.8: SAMPLE OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION

4.6 The Social Relations of Marketing

Corresponding to these changes in the social relations surrounding production have been changes in the social relations surrounding marketing. There are now quantitative and qualitative differences with the past. Not only are more types of crops grown, but they are marketed differently. Peyiotes now have a variety of avenues available. The grocer shops in the village do not purchase any products, although the private ones often given credit to white-collar workers. A few purchase cheeses from the shepherds and then sell them to other grocers in Paphos. Vegetables are usually sold individually, to bulk purchasing merchants in Paphos and Limassol. There is much resistance to this, partly because Peyiotes believe that merchants are klephtes (thieves) and partly because it involves certain skills in bargining which they believe they lack. A few men with good contacts act as middlemen but they do not charge a commission, these are 'favours' (hattirka). But the major part of marketing is through group selling schemes. Carobs have been marketed through the Cooperative since the 1950s and Peyiotes became members of SEDIGEP, the cooperative fruit marketing organization, in 1971. SEDIGEP was established in 1966 primarily to can and market fruit juices and by 1971 had expanded its operations to Paphos which grows a large amount of table-grapes. Peyiotes describe their initial enthusiasm to joining SEDIGEP to their desire to obtain better prices than those given by merchants. Their perceptions of the past and future expectations are clearly important considerations. Membership is on a share basis: 2 shares costing £1 each per donum. Consequently the number of shares is determined by the size of the vineyard, and there

is no limit on the amount produced.

The cooperative utilizes four packaging houses in the district, one of which is in the village. This belongs to the Village Bank which built it in 1979 at a considerable expense (£80,000). That the committee members took such a risk is indicative of the forward-looking attitude towards intensive cultivation, encouraged by one irrigation project which is due to supply the village with large quantities of water.[4]

SEDIGEP is organized on three distinct levels. The village committee, elected by the producers, is responsible for the employment of women and the packaging of grapes. The District Committee has a seat allocation system according to the village and has a total of 9 elected members, and two officials from the District Cooperative centre, an agricultural officer and a Secretary. Membership in the District Committee is on a village basis, which varies according to the amount produced. Peyia has three members, two drawn from the District Committee and one from the village committee. The Peyia members in 1979 were Kappedgis, Arapis and Zinonas, all village leaders and with standing in the village. Finally there is the Central Committee drawn from members from all the District Committees.

The movement from dyadic ties and networks to participation in collective group marketing structures implies a qualitative change in representation within the village. Responsibility is attached to these posts if only because the incomes of a considerable number of villagers depend upon them. In the village idiom men have to be economically independent to be leaders.

Grape producers experience three general problems with SEDIGEP.

As the central office of the cooperatives is responsible for the finding of markets overseas, men are naturally eager to know what prices their products fetch. Many Peyiotes suspect that their grapes fetch consistently higher prices than they are actually paid, but to them the cooperative organization is a semi-mysterious organization above the village level. A second cause for complaint is that payment is usually late, often four months later. As the sums involved are high many Peyiotes believe that the Cooperative invests the money and pockets the interest. There was no means for me to check the veracity of this belief as the Cooperative movement is administratively distinct from the Government and its accounts are controlled separately and are non-taxable. Finally there are always general problems of the collection of grapes. Many smaller producers feel that those with large quantities are given precedence in the packaging house. The following account of a District committee meeting in Nicosia clearly brings out the complex problems involved:

> In November 1978 the Paphos District committee met in Nicosia, five months after the harvest. Peyiotes had been grumbling about the late payment; their complaint was given an added urgency as this was the time of sowing of wheat and tractor drivers had to be paid. Of the 3 Peyia representatives only Kappedgis and Zinonas attended, Arapis was away on business. Generally Kappedgis is the most informed village committee member partly because he is the Secretary of the Village Bank. He has a high handed manner and most Peyiotes are in awe of him, due to his contacts with Azinas, the Commissioner of Cooperatives. He is feared in the village and most men call him 'Maestros'. He also makes no secret of the fact that he scorns Zinonas, the village leftist leader, and does not inform him of minor developments which may be useful in strengthening the producers' hand in negotiating with the organization. For example when the central cooperative laid a party for some Swedish grape importers in Paphos a few weeks previously Kappedgis did not invite Zinonas and instead invited his koumparos, Pantellis. During this meeting

the District Cooperative official, Malekkides, had mentioned to Kappedgis that Peyiotes were going to receive interest for late payment. In presenting this information to Zinonas, Kappedgis suggested that most problems were solved. There are good reasons why Kappedgis attempts to deal privately rather than publicly: as a known client of Azinas he is naturally keen to protect his patron's interests. But as village representative and Azinas' client he is in an ambivalent position. On the day of the meeting (which I attended in Nicosia) I asked Kappedgis what points he intended to raise. He mentioned that he wanted to question the prices fetched abroad, the type of marketing undergone and the delay in payment. He hinted darkly that there were some committee members from other villages who wanted to "cause trouble for the committee" for "political reasons".

In Paphos Kappedgis and Zinonas met Malekkides (the District Committee Secretary), and the Cooperative agronomist and proceeded together to Nicosia. They agreed that they would ask Azinas to arrange for the Peyiotes to receive interest on late payments. Grapes packaged elsewhere had been given a down payment in anticipation of eventual payment. This had not been the case with Peyia. Kappedgis and Malekkides are both known to be 'Azinas' men', the former often visits Malekkides, a senior Cooperative District official, to arrange for the employment of Peyiotes in the cooperative factories. It was also agreed that this matter would not be disclosed at the meeting as the other representatuves might object to this preferential treatment. The accounts for the Paphos District are kept by Malekkides and upon arrival he met Azinas privately who agreed to the proposal.

As the accounts had to be reworked the meeting was postponed for three hours. Azinas' secretary informed the committee members that Azinas had 'other appointments', and they seemed unaware of what was occurring. Indeed the committee members formed into two groups each following their separate strategies. The President of the District Committee (an importer and real estate agent) and a teacher together with other representatives formed one group. The teacher was trying to cajole the rest on the necessity to speak up if any problems arose. By contrast Zinonas, Kappedgis and Malekkides formed a separate group in another part of the building, and the latter two entered a separate office with the accounts. Around 11.30 a.m. Kappedgis came out of the office and whispered to Zinonas who had been sitting uncomfortably alone that the matter had been arranged.

Soon after Azinas' secretary informed us that Azinas would see us. As the committee entered the room

Kappedgis turned to the teacher and said that he had heard that the prices were good this year to which the teacher remained silent.

Azinas greeted all the members briefly but it was very clear that he had a special relationship with Kappedgis who addressed him by his first name, whilst all others used the Kyrie form. Azinas then apologized for the delay. He was leaving for the United States and had to make travel arrangements (in fact he left a week later), although I believe that the delay enabled the accounts to be reworked.

After refreshments had been taken the General Manager of SEDIGEP, Kakoullis, began talking on the grape harvest. He compared it to previous ones which had been better, and said that there had been some marketing problems. He was then suddenly cut short by Azinas who said that he was interested in figures. Kakoullis dived into his file, brought out a number of photocopied sheets, distributed them to the committee members, and read out the prices according to the type of grape and date of packaging.

Whilst the committee members studied the prices the Paphos teacher asked Kakoullis for the prices the grapes fetched abroad according to the dates shown. Up till two years previously grape prices abroad were not disclosed to the members. The teacher had written to a friend working in the London Embassy to obtain price lists. He had then pointed out the discrepancies between the prices fetched and those paid. This had incurred the wrath of some committee members: Kappedgis accused him of not collaborating with the committee and trying to wreck it, and Azinas had said that this was a serious matter as it involved the use of confidential information. As a result the teacher became apprehensive and did not use this information as he had intended to, (for example he did not disclose it to the newspapers). But the incident had some effects. The organization began to disclose the prices abroad and the teacher became aware of where the ultimate loyalties of men like Kappedgis lay. Since then he has worked independently from Kappedgis and Zinonas (who does not take an active role in peddling information), whom he calls "those two in Peyia" and afterwards he commented that if he were to say anything to Kappedgis, Azinas would immediately know. In the local idiom Kappedgis is 'Azinas' man' (dikhas tou).

Apparently the prices abroad satisfied the teacher but not other points. Turning to Azinas he said "Well Mr Azinas what I have to say is that the prices the producers are paid are low. After the 2nd July they are the lowest for a number of years". He then compared the prices of previous years and noted that they had

suddenly plummeted. The conversation then turned to the causes of this drop. The teacher was not deterred; merchants had paid good prices and they had paid the total amount immediately on delivery. Under the cooperative system money is withdrawn in anticipation of payment. He concluded with a rhetorical question, but nevertheless a crucial one for it struck at the very basis of the cooperative venture and philosophy: "Why", he asked, "do prices always drop to the same level as those paid by the merchants. Every year the same thing happens: prices tend to be equal". His question suggested that it made little difference if grapes were sold individually or collectively and as such could not be bypassed.

Azinas replied in a very serious tone that the cooperatives were 'losing', which was the reason why the prices always fell down to the same levels. This was enough to worry all the committee as cooperative marketing is highly valued. He then turned this disclosure to an advantage. And of course, he added, if we do an accounting now, gentlemen, you would not get the right amount of money, you would get less. He left unsaid the implication that the cooperative was using the profits from other ventures to sustain the high prices. He continued: "By all means gentlemen call for an accounting (this was a standing right of the committee), but you will see that you will get less money. Only a telephone call is in the way." This was something the committee members were unwilling to insist on, as there was no way of knowing without running a risk. Some committe members said uneasily that of course they believed Mr Azinas, and were hesitant to press further. In addition, they felt, even if Azinas were bluffing how could they possibly check such intricacies. Would it not be the case that accountants, who are cooperative employees, could discover some loophole to back Azinas' threat?

Azinas then warned the committee that they were facing competition from Italy, Spain and Israel and that the best way to increase production was to grow the grapes earlier under glasshouses and to transport them by air. He said that loans were to be given to farmers to grow grapes in glasshouses and concluded by calling for secrecy.

By this technique the conversation shifted from a discussion of actual procedure to the possibilities inherent in the future. The committee seemed impressed by Azinas' forward looking attitude, and the teacher was reluctant to press further. In fact no loans materialized the following year.

The committee then left to discuss further matters in Kakoullis' office. There, the atmosphere was more relaxed and most men seemed relieved to be out of

> Azinas' presence. Some money was due to be paid and Kakoullis said vaguely that it could be obtained from 'elsewhere'. One of the committee members broke in joking: "this money will come from the sale of the lemons" which provoked laughter. His remark was clearly a self-deprecatory gesture which implied that they remained unconvinced about the claims of losses by the cooperative.
>
> There was one further incident. At lunch the District Committee President said to Kakoullis in a semi-joking manner (both the joke and the smile having certain nuances in Cypriot culture): "Next year we shall go to the merchants". Kakoullis made the sign of the cross whilst Kappedgis interrupted quickly saying: "no, we are satisfied with the prices".
>
> Afterwards I spoke privately with the teacher. He feels a genuine resentment at the way affairs are conducted and prides himself on his linguistic skills and his ability to ask intelligent questions. He claimed that he did not really believe Azinas' threat to show that SEDIGEP was running at a loss, but he had not said anything at the meeting.

This account has focussed on a specific incident at length to bring out an essential point. The social relations surrounding marketing have not only changed from networks to structures, they now imply a certain type of <u>representation</u> which was absent previously. At this stage it is worthwhile to bring out certain essential characteristics.

First, there was clearly a separation within the committee in alignments. Whilst the teacher was not economically dependent upon or a client of Azinas, he clearly felt representation implied a more open attitude. By contrast, Kappedgis is not only in an ambiguous position as representative of the village and Azinas' client, but undoubtedly feels that the best interests of the village can be served through collaboration rather than opposition. The reasons why men like Azinas so strongly support rural clients is brought out in a later chapter.

Second, although the teacher perceived both Kappedgis and Zinonas as Azinas' clients and hence as dangerous, this is not exactly the case. Zinonas is a committed leftist, is by no means Azinas' client and as a village representative has special problems. He has to create a vocabulary of justification to justify his involvement in practices and an institution which as a political activist he strongly objects to. He does so by emphasizing that he has to represent the village and producers may benefit through such close contacts and favouritism. In his case the level of ambiguity is great. Third, Peyiotes suspect that their interests are not adequately protected and pursued by Kappedgis whose loyalties are split in different directions. They feel that teachers who are independent can more adequately protect their interests. But as the example showed there are certain limits beyond which even these men do not feel confident to tread, especially when they concern such powerful opponents. Finally Department officials attempted to all criticism by suggesting to producers that they were being subsidized at the expense of others (e.g. citrus producers). These divisive tactics seem to be prevalent in the cooperative movement (cf. Loizos, 1975).

4.7 Political Implications

The introduction of new cash crops within the framework of increasing mechanization has had two further implications. First, the articulation of material resources within the village has changed and, together with externally derived forces, affected the general structure of agriculture and the way it is viewed. Table-grapes have brought a certain prosperty to the village (that is, to those who possess them) and cereal cultivation is

now viewed as insufficient for supporting a family. There are only a handful of farmers who rely solely on cereals and they are all old. Most say that cereal cultivation is 'not worth it' (dhen synferei) and that "the machines eat all the profits". Now it is not how much land a man owns, but what grows on it. To survive farmers have to invest in new crops which yield greater profits. Peyiotes are now very keen to cultivate new crops. In recent years bananas and citrus have been planted and the former has already begun to yield a good income, even higher than table-grapes. Competition is expressed in how 'progressive' men are in planting new crops. In contrast to the Maniotes who rank each other in terms of long distance marketing contacts (Lineton, 1971), Peyiotes are now ranking themselves, amongst other things, in terms of agricultural innovation.

Attitudes towards work have also changed. To be an ambelurghos is a sign of independence and wealth. Ambelurghi pride themselves on working 'scientifically' and show great interest in the intricacies of pruning and grafting.

There are three other effects of this village resumption of control of land: changes in (i) the pattern of property transmissions within the family, (ii) the definition of politics, and (iii) the content of village sentiment. (I shall examine property transmissions in the next chapter).

To begin with social stratification has become more complex (see Chapter 1) and individuals are now ranked much more in 'market terms'. This will be brought out in the next chapter. More important for present purposes is that the actual distribution of land created cleavages among the rightists themselves, whilst

also placing the leftists in a submissive political position. In terms of 'fighting for the village', rightists claimed that they had obtained land from which the village benefitted. In addition a new conception of upward mobility was created. Within the traditional schema education had been considered the surest means of social mobility either in the form of regular Government employment or in a more prosaic form through the intrigues which literacy permitted merchants to operate. The adoption of land together with other factors emanicipated Peyiotes from merchant networks, but it also created a new concept of social mobility which co-existed with the traditional one. As EOKA gunmen were given jobs in Government service and were young and often illiterate it became customary to view fighting for the patrida as a means of social mobility. The gun existed side by side with the book, and indeed in the EOKA honeymoon upstaged it. Peyiotes point incessantly to Arapis. To them his movement from a poor shepherd's son, a xenos married into the village, to become the most powerful man there is nothing less than staggering.

Has 'activism' decreased as a result of the sales? To be sure Peyiotes collectively feel highly possessive over their land asserting "We fought for it. The land belonged to our grandparents and now it has come back." They resent outsiders who purchase property and speculate with it. But they do not object to outsiders marrying into the village, for marriage now involves more than the putting together of property. Indeed their assertion of having 'fought' for their land highlights that both leftist and rightist activism yielded results at different periods. One method of activism was not discredited in favour of another.

Unlike White's Luco (1980) the distribution of land did not lead to a collective rejection of clientilist practices. To explain this it will be necessary to examine how experiences of the past are linked with conditions in the present, and how the past is often redefined to legitimate the present.

4.8 Conclusion

The sales of Church land have radically changed the village. Whereas Peyiotes were all equally dependent upon outside institutions they are now more unequally differentiated. New social groups have emerged and the criteria of stratification have changed. Marketing is collective and this requires a certain type of specialized leadership absent previously. Furthermore, the sales of Church land have contributed to transforming the patterns of property transmission within the family. This is examined in the next chapter.

4.9 Notes

1 See previous chapter.

2 Andreas Ziartiadis, Secretary-General of the left-wing union PEO was in London and Grivas believed that the Colonial administration was in collusion with AKEL.

3 Marriages of children, however, and the insecure political climate have discouraged their original intentions.

4 The Paphos Irrigation Project is to irrigate the West Paphos coastland up till Peyia, where it will irrigate 5,600 donums.

CHAPTER 5

THE TRANSMISSION OF PROPERTY WITHIN THE FAMILY, 1920-80

"Among kinsmen there is no matchmaking, there is theft"

Greek Cypriot saying

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I examine the other major theme of this thesis, the politics of affinity, for marriage marks the assumption of the individual to full adult status. The normal household in Peyia is the nuclear family, established virilocally. I shall be approaching the family primarily through property transmissions, but I shall also refer to marriage celebrations, a topic which has recently received interest by Comaroff and others (1980). My point is that it makes little sense to rhetorically oppose property and the 'meaning of marriage payments' and that the two must be approached together in a dialectical relationship.

I first examine the significance of a shift in the pattern of property transmission within the family between 1920 and 1980. In 1920 there was roughly an equal amount of inter vivos (gifts) and post mortem (inheritances) property transmission, by 1980 with a negligible increase in population (1.12) the amounts transmitted as gifts had increased to 3.8 times their 1920 level, whilst inheritances had decreased somewhat. This is partly, but not exclusively, due to the sales of Church property to the villagers, outlined in the previous chapter. Peyiotes now own more property and they tend to give more to their children during their lifetime.

Given this change it is reasonable to assume three things. First, that there have been parallel corresponding changes in marriage strategies; if what is transmitted and put together through marriage in 1980 is different to 1920, then it is natural that the means employed to establish affinity will be different. Second, that the significance of ties within and between families (e.g. parents to children, among siblings and between affines) will have correspondingly changed. These may well have political implications if only because the types of kinship links used for political purposes (e.g. coalitions, cliques, etc.) may well change across time. And finally it is reasonable to assume that the 'meaning' of marriage has changed. Although property can analytically be said to be the 'base' of marriage, the types of celebrations of affinity (wedding celebrations, etc.) can guide us to their meanings for the protagonists themselves.

5.2 The 'Rules' of Marriage

There are certain 'rules' regarding marriage among Greek Cypriots which are essential in understanding marriage strategies. These are:

1. A man cannot marry his first or second cousins, nor his spiritual siblings.
2. There is little acceptable alternative to marriage.
3. All children should marry.
4. A family consisting of a newly-married couple should constitute a separate and autonomous unit of production.
5. There is an order to marriage: daughters should marry first, sons later.
6. Daughters should receive a dowry consisting of land and a house.

7. All property transmitted at the death of the owner should be divided equally among the heirs, sons as well as daughters and from a legal point of view, irrespective of whether any property has been transmitted as a dowry.

Some of these 'rules' are static and 'given' as constants as they constitute an essential part of the system (rules 1-4), whilst others are fluid and can be made to change across time (rules 5-7). Marriage strategies can be seen as attempts to adhere to, and even modify where possible, some or all of these rules according to a certain rationality of conservation and maximization of resources. Here I want to examine the implications of these rules upon the village as a matrimonial market and upon the individual actors concerned.

According to the rules of the Greek Orthodox Church a man may not marry those who are either his first or second counsins and his Kal'adelphia, who are those children born to his Godparent once the relationship of spiritual kinship has been established through Baptism (see below). This has one obvious effect on the village as a matrimonial market: it automatically excludes a large number of individuals as suitable spouses. This can be problematic in small villages, and the extent of its gravity depends upon the possibilities and limits inherent within the size of the village population, the number of households, and the extent of migration which will tend to influence the size of the household. Table 5.1 indicates that this has not be problematic in Peyia as villagers have sought each other out as spouses. The matrimonial market rarely extended beyond the village prior to 1931 as three-quarters of total marriages took place within

the village. Since then Peyiotes have tended to marry outside the village, but they have not done so because suitable non-kin are unavailable as I shall show. This change is much more due to the transformation of the local economy and the significance of marriage.

Period	Total Marriages within Village	Total from Outside Village	Marriages with Outside Village: Groom from Outside Village	Marriages with Outside Village: Bride from Outside Village	Total of all Marriages
1915-30	110	40	21	19	150
1931-40	62	38	18	20	100
1941-50	74	51	25	26	125
1951-60	56	68	41	27	124
1961-70	56	61	29	31	117
1971-75	15	48	33	15	63

TABLE 5.1: PEYIA MARRIAGES ACCORDING TO THE ORIGIN OF THE SPOUSE

Source: Records of the Paphos Bishopric

Marriages which crossed village boundaries until 1930 almost invariably involved neighbouring villages. Some Peyioti women married widowers in other villages who had acquired houses from their deceased wives. Loizos (1976) has suggested that the custom of the dowry house being supplied by the groom during this period (as was the case in the Morphou region and other parts of Cyprus excluding Paphos hill villages) may be due to the greater number of men over women then. Investigations in Paphos and surrounding villages did not reveal a similar custom. In Peyia women have (at least since 1920) supplied the dowry

house and most land though the pattern may have been different previously. Inmarrying men whose first marriages were to Peyiotes were consequently considered usurpers of local resources.[1] In addition, they were morally suspect in that their social backgrounds could never be presumed to be known totally, it being accepted that their co-villagers would have concealed any past misdemeanours. They were referred to jokingly, as shillokualima, a dog brought to the village, and emphasized in a whole series of symbolic rituals the most important being a mock beating of the groom's party who, on entering the village for the wedding celebrations, were expected to alight from their mules, thereby indicating their status as guests and as dependent upon the charity and good wishes of the villagers. They may well be seen as challenges to test the 'worth' of strangers (Pitt-Rivers, 1977), but serious brawls sometimes developed when Peyioti families had been thwarted in their matrimonial aims. As a 'foreigner', (xenos), an inmarrying man brought a bed with him distinct from the matrimonial bed which was supplied by the bride. In the event of any marital quarrels, and as a stranger with no kin to have recourse to, he had to sleep alone.[2] There were clearly material reasons for this symbolic and corporate attitude towards outsiders: poor communication between the villages themselves implied that such men were unlikely to be able to exploit any land owned or expected in their native villages, and hence to be completely dependent on their wives' village resources.

The prohibition of marriage up to five degrees of consanguinity is strictly enforced by the Orthodox Church and is echoed by the Peyiotes themselves. There is little or no dispensation except

in the case of rape or sexual exploitation.[3] Likewise, third cousin marriages, although permitted, are not considered good matches: "It must be a 'xenos' (i.e. non-kinsman)" Peyiotes claim. Peyia strongly differs to Alona where "marriages of third cousins are the preferred marriages" (Peristiany, 1968:84).[4] Greek Orthodoxy thus differs somewhat from Roman Catholicism and even more strongly from the North African practice of FBD marriage. For within the Catholic system dispensation is sometimes possible at a price and cousin marriages can sometimes be used to conserve land and maintain rank if the accruing benefits far outweigh the possible advantages and risks through marriages with non-kin. Davis (1973) shows clearly that this was followed in Pisticci though clearly for different reasons by the Magnates and the poorest families. FBD marriage in North Africa is even clearer (Bourdieu, 1979). By contrast Greek Orthodox Canon Law does not permit such marriages: all families are equal for the purpose of marriage. Resources cannot be conserved through close cousin marriages, they can only be gambled totally. Sentiment closely follows religion in this regard. A further difference to the Western Mediterraneans is that there is little accepted alternative <u>to</u> marriage nowadays, such as celibacy or the priesthood. Celibacy is no practical alternative either. There were no convents in Cyprus prior to 1960 and celibacy through the Church is not an accepted alternative (Hackett, 1901). The village <u>papas</u> has to be a married man and there are few positions in the higher levels of the Church hierarchy and the monasteries.[5]

These two factors (prohibited spouses and absence of alternatives to marriage) merely indicate the structural possibilities

inherent within a system, but they give little indication of the practical organization of marriage itself, or what goes into marriage, and even less of the way in which certain structural tensions are resolved through marriage strategies.

For the practical organization of marriage, or the what-goes-into-marriage, we might consider the following three factors:

FIRST, property investment. Here one can take the village as a suitable social field and compare the gross areas of land transmitted through the family to transfers through the market. The general economic significance of the family as a means of access to resources could thus be brought out. It is then important to examine how much land and other resources are transferred at different points in the developmental cycle, indicating the specificity of marriage strategies.

SECOND, there is the social investment, or the investment in social relationships. Here it is important to ask whether access to spouses is individual and direct or mediated through a collectivity. If collective, what is the investment in social relationships and in the use of signs necessary to seek out affines or proposals to affinity.

THIRD, there is the semiotic investment. Here one can include all the exchanges of labour and gifts between the contracting families and spouses in the interval between the agreement on, and the ritual celebration of affinity, including the actual celebrations. They can be classed as signs because two families are involved in establishing a link through marriage, and also because the actual celebrations can be used by the couple and/or the families concerned to make special claims to status and prestige. This should indicate

the value of marriage for the group, or groups, concerned.

The effects, or the what-comes-out-of-marriage, will obviously depend upon the limits and possibilities contained within the first two factors, or can be made to change across time. So for the purposes of clarity I begin with a discussion of the first factor, the property investment and its relation to other means of access to resources. This is brought out in Table 5.2 which concerns land transfers within Peyia for the period 1920-75. All the land transfers for the years: 1920, 1925, 1930, 1935, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1975 were transcribed from the Land Registry and then grouped into various categories which were then totalled separately to produce a representative sample.

Type	Number	Area	% Number	% Area
Prescription and Possession	297	502.9 donums	8.81%	6.5%
Gifts (inter vivos from parents to children)	786	2447.3 "	24.83%	31.6%
Inheritances (at death of parents)	850	1217.6 "	26.85%	15.7%
Sales	719	2227.9 "	22.71%	28.8%
Exchange of Properties	28	134.8 "	.88%	1.7%
Sales of Indivisible Property	17	81.9 "	.53%	1.0%
Sales of Mortgaged Property	486	1112.1 "	15.35%	14.3%
TOTAL	3165	7724.6 "	99.96%	99.9%

TABLE 5.2: LAND TRANSFERS OR CONVEYANCES IN PEYIA, 1920-75

Source: Records of the Land Registry Office, Paphos

I will now explain this Table. To begin with many inter vivos land transfers such as Gifts from parents to children were often not immediately registered at the Land Registry Office in the

early parts of the period under consideration. They were thus legally usufruct transfers rather than transfers of actual ownership rights. The Land Registry recognized this practice and rather than registering them as Gifts registered them as Prescriptions and Possessions. Prescriptions and Possessions were, therefore, the legal recognistion of use transfers, which were later converted into Gifts once a period of undisputed ownership had been established: for fields, after a period of 10 years; for vineyards, after a period of 15 years. They were almost invariably property transfers between kin, i.e. from parents to children, as were the category of Gifts. Hence to understand how much property was transferred amongst kin it is necessary to add Prescriptions and Possessions, Gifts and Inheritances. These amount to 60.49% of the total number of transfers and 53.94% of the total areas transferred. By contrast Sales, Exchanges of Properties, and Sales of Indivisible and Mortgaged Property involved non-kin and amounted to 40.06% of the total area.

These figures indicate that property transmissions within the family constitute a considerable proportion of the turnover of property within the village. However, they do not indicate much about the proportions of different types of property transfers within the family at and across specific points in time. We can, of course, turn to the Land Registry data for further explication. Table 5.3 shows that there is clearly a slight decrease in the amounts transferred by inheritance and a spectacular increase in the amounts transferred as gifts, which are all <u>inter vivos</u>, and are mostly, but not exclusively, dowries at point of marriage.

Years	1920	1925	1930	1935	1950	1960	1970	1975
Inheritances (in donums)	149.6	37	217.7	102.2	288.1	196	158	66
Gifts (All inter vivos including Prescriptions and Possessions) (in donums)	167.2	340.6	173.8	81	354.2	331.1	845.7	646

TABLE 5.3: INHERITANCES IN RELATION TO INTER VIVOS TRANSMISSIONS, 1920-75, PEYIA

Source: Records of the Land Registry Office, Paphos

In relying solely on these data there are two difficulties. First, in the pre-1950 period there was a high incidence of rural debt and Sales of mortgaged properties account for 20-40% of all land areas transferred between 1920 and 1940. One of their causes was matrimonial as men needed credit to purchase land in order to marry their children well. Surridge, writing in 1930, noted that "it is estimated that over 60% of dowries for the provision of a house, animals and furniture etc., are paid from loans obtained at high rates of interest from the local money-lenders... The lands given as part of a dowry not infrequently are mortgaged and newly married couples have to take over the obligations of their parents" (1930:25). It is also clear from this account that some sales of mortgaged properties were also dowries.

The second difficulty in relying exclusively upon these data is the conventional one: legal transfership was often registered much later than rights in usufruct. Gifts were often given at different intervals at and after marriage. In addition it does not take into account the turnover of plots or how many times a plot changed hands. Table 5.3 must therefore be taken more

as a general indication that there has been a somewhat erratic decrease in inheritances and an increase in inter vivos gifts. It is crude, the data should merely be illustrative, but nevertheless suggestive.

The causes of this shift cannot be attributed to an increase in the population or marriages. Put differently the following change has occurred:

1. In 1920 there was an almost equal amount of inter vivos and inheritance transmissions.
2. By 1980, with a 1.12 increase in the village population, the amounts of land transmitted within the family by inter vivos means had increased to 3.8 times the 1920 level, and inheritances had decreased.

In both cases dowry houses and some land went to daughters but sons now receive proportionally more property than in 1920. A typical endowment of a son at marriage in 1920 would have been in the region of 0-10 donums; in 1980 it was much more, 5-20 donums.

5.3 Marriage in 1920

Before examining the causes of this change I give an account of marriage in 1920 as this gives a good indication of how the 'meaning' of marriage may have changed across time. To begin with as Douglass (1968) and others (Goody et al., 1976) have indicated it is often misleading to base accounts upon legal codes as legal and actual rights to property often differ. According to the Ottoman Land Code, which was based upon customary law and which remained in force until 1946, land belonged in theory to the State, operators having only usufructory rights to it. Children of both sexes had equal rights in property transmitted

as inheritance (Fisher, 1919).[6] Although it is impossible to ascertain in detail how this system operated in practice in Cyprus prior to 1920, there seems to have been no essential conflict between legal rights of children to land and actual customary rights. In addition these laws complement three broad features of the Ottoman empire. First, it brought out the patrimonial character of the Ottoman State, where land belonged in theory to the State;[7] second it discouraged the emergence of any hereditary local elites who could threaten the State;[8] third, it encouraged the expansion of cultivated lands and usufructory access to State land which led to the increased cereal cultivation necessary to supply the essential corn upon which the Army and Constantinople depended. The State had on the one hand to retain incentives to encourage taxable cultivation; on the other it sought to extract the greatest possible revenues from the population in question. If it taxed too harshly, the population declined or the cultivators ceased to cultivate.[9] Most observers agree that Cyprus was under-populated in relation to the available land until 1878. As there was a great deal of land available for cultivation, property transmission was not constrained: men cleared the forests to increase their holdings (see p.65). After 1898, and especially by 1920, the boundaries of State land were fixed and the population had increased. Peyiotes discovered that to adhere to one or more of the 'rules' of marriage often resulted in the non-adherence to others, even excluding purely fortuitous factors, such as forced sales or bad harvests. Often, to satisfy the first three conditions, especially the daughters' dowries, the principle that there should be an eventual equal partition was the first to be discarded.

One main cause for the mutually contradictory pulls of these conditions lay in the conception of time: whereas the daughter's dowry was immediate and a pre-condition to marriage, the idea that property should be eventually divided equally was a distant ideal which was hardly ever put into practice. It was as if the idea of an equal eventual division of property existed mainly to conceal the sets of tensions created by the necessity of dowries on the one hand, and the necessity for the economic autonomy of the father in old age on the other, thus ensuring some type of uneasy, ambiguous harmony whilst the aged parents were alive.

The first major undertaking of the Father was to calculate how much land could be given to his daughters, whilst ideally retaining some property to maintain him in his old age. This was a rough calculation, the extent of the precision being influenced by whether any particular family was the premeditated object of a strategy. In any event, the amount of land actually given often differed from the rough calculation, having been re-negotiated in the course of the match-making. This calculation was influenced by three factors: the number of daughters and the 'going rate', so to speak of land in marriage (i.e. the amounts given by others in the matrimonial market), and finally, by how much land was necessary to maintain a couple. The last two were not actually or necessarily identical; Surridge noted that in the larger villages there was a natural tendency towards display which meant that often very large amounts of land were given. If a father had too little land or too many daughters, he would either have to settle for a poorer groom with an alternate source of income such as a craft; alternatively, he could purchase land on credit and mortgage his

own property. According to Surridge:

> "The very natural attempt to show off on these occasions and to pretend that their financial circumstances are better than those of their neighbours leads peasants to cripple themselves in an attempt to marry their children successfully. A rich bride can always find a rich husband and vice versa, and there is always hope that speculations in dowries may be profitable in the end."

Hence a man could purchase land on credit and give more to his children, especially to daughters, whilst courting financial insecurity in his old age although he could rely on his children (especially daughters) to support him. If he overplayed his hand (and one first good marriage through the use of credit often necessitated successive good ones in order to maintain a certain amount of prestige) most of his remaining property was often heavily mortgaged. A crop failure or arrears in interest payments often resulted in a forced sale of the remaining property, thus pre-empting any possibility of the eventual equal distribution of property, and reducing the chances of sons receiving their shares. It also created tensions between brothers and sisters. In 1930, Surridge observed that many old parents were maintained at the expense of their children. Indeed sales of mortgaged property were, in part, the dowries, either directly or indirectly, of poorer families.

This alternative held mainly for poor men with too little land and too many dependents, resorted to as a last alternative as it conflicted with the desire of the parents to maintain their autonomy in their old age.

Hence the tension between generations was not usually between the father and the daughters (who often lived in the same

neighbourhood), but between him and his sons, often living elsewhere in other neighbourhoods. To alleviate this tension a father would sometimes give his remaining property to be worked jointly by his sons, who would split the proceeds. As sons were expected to postpone their marriages until after their sisters, there was little property left for them by the time they got married, except this scarce land which the father allocated to them. They were therefore obliged to rely on the land brought by their wives and they could also acquire it on short leases from the Church. It was also customary for many young men in poorer families to be apprenticed to village craftsmen, thus accumulating some capital prior to marriage and helping see their sisters married off by remaining unmarried and giving them some of their earnings. Between 1920-40 many young men temporarily left the village to work in the newly reopened copper mines where wages were more secure and higher than in agricultural work.

As women carried most of the property at marriage the criteria used to judge the suitability of men were mainly 'natural' criteria (such as the ability to work the land) and 'political' ones, such as good family histories, etc. Women retained their fathers' names after marriage (in contrast to the present where they adopt their husbands' names).

The dowry consisted of a house, some land, and some sacks of seed to tide over the couple for the coming year as most marriages were celebrated in the summer prior to the sowing season. This property was legally the wife's, who therefore had a weighty say in decisions over its alienation and devolution. This was brought out in a number of sayings.[10] The house was simple,

a long room known as a makrinari, divided along its width for the animals. It was usually, but not exclusively, built after the engagement and prior to the wedding next to the wife's parents. The materials were completely locally obtained. If parents held some spare land in their frakti (a courtyard which served as a vegetable patch) they would usually build there. If no building land was available and the frakti was too small, the house would be given to the daughter, often the youngest, and the parents would move to a small room or shack in the yard corner. The following is a typical marriage of the period:

> Tumbas was engaged at 16 and married six years later in 1924. He received 4 donums from his parents as he had only one sister and another brother. His wife brought 20 donums, a mule, 2 oxen for ploughing, 200 okes of wheat and 100 okes of barley. He brought some mattresses, some sheep and some goats. The house was built at the edge of the village by his Petheros (father-in-law). This was suitable for his occupation as a shepherd, but as it was on the village outskirts his wife felt out of things and when they could afford it they moved further up the neighbourhood. This was considered a good marriage at the time, and it is clear from this example that the emphasis in marriage lay in establishing an autonomous unit of production.

5.4 Some Causes of the Change in Property Transfers

I now examine the external factors which seem to have affected this mode of property transmission and has resulted in the tendency towards more inter vivos gifts to both sons and daughters. Following this, I shall examine the new types of marriage strategies employed to deal with the new sets of tensions generated by this new system of property transmissions.

Clearly, there is no one single cause but a variety, mutually affecting and re-affecting each other. What I am concerned with here is a reasonable set of causes. By far the most important

seems to be the Church sales which placed 5,366 donums on the market and increased the amount of land held by Peyiotes from 61% to 75% of the total village area. The average area held per head of the village population in 1909-20 was roughly 14.4 donums which had risen to 18 donums in 1963. A further contributory cause is the introduction of secure sources of credit due to the establishment of a Cooperative Bank. It is the official policy of the Cooperatives not to place land on the market as a settlement of debts, and the unofficial policy of the village committee not to object to loans for matrimonial purposes. In 1979 a man and his wife could obtain a maximum loan of £2,400 which could be used towards building dowry houses.

The introduction of State-sponsored old age security since the 1950s has also encouraged the early release of land. In 1978 a single man could expect roughly £20 per month and a couple over 65 years, roughly £28. This is sometimes supplemented by monthly or tri-monthly small remittances by emigrant children. Although men now keep land until their old age and after their children's marriages, they now do so for very different reasons than in the past. Whereas land was then kept mainly as a means of income in the event of incapacity and the onset of unproductive old age, it is now mainly retained as a means of security to be sold in the event of illness, to offset the often expensive cost of private medical treatment which is preferred to the State-sponsored one.

Another added reason is that the rate of emigration has increased in the post-1945 period and continued until the late 60s.

This has freed some land which is now available to those children who remain, though migrant children still receive some property which is mainly symbolic, and has often little productive value. They are often given building plots in the village rather than productive agricultural land.

Furthermore, the means of livelihood available to men after their dependents' marriages has also changed. In the past there were few realistic work opportunities outside agriculture which did not involve labour migration. Now it is easier to live within the village whilst working outside elsewhere. A man's children, particularly his daughters (given that young marriage ages are preferred), often marry prior to his receiving his pension at 65, and many poorer farmers and shepherds often enter the Public Works Department as road labourers, etc., the most lowly paid jobs, once their daughters are married. To a Peyioti the limits of his children's marriages are the limits of his world; once a man can marry his children, life changes radically. The decrease in status is offset by the prestige accruing from successfully marrying one's children.

Estate Duties also provide a direct, if legalistic, incentive towards more inter vivos transmission. The law, introduced in 1945, states that any property not transferred from up to three years prior to the death of the owner is taxable, in contrast to inter vivos transmissions for which only a small registration fee is charged. Estate Duty is equivalent to the share of an inheritor and it is therefore in the family's interest to transfer land in good time. To Peyiotes, Estate Duties are tantamount to a theft from the patrimony. The family, including the parents, is therefore

unanimous in desiring an eventual inter vivos division of residual property, though they often quarrel on how the division shall take place.

Finally, there has been the transformation in agriculture and in the availability of work outside the village. Agriculture has become more specialized and more cash crop oriented; much less land is necessary to maintain the parents and there are more opportunities for symbolic land transfers, i.e. transfers of small amounts of property to counteract the centripetal tendencies of fission.

The contemporary content of marriage is, therefore, considerably different to the 1920 situation. Not only are there less equal partible inheritances, but there are more inter vivos transmissions, including dowries. Another change has been in the internal value-relationship between the components of the dowry. Whereas in the pre-1945 period land and cash were the main matrimonial resources, nowadays the importance of land has been displaced by other resources. It is now valued only when it supports a specialized export crop, not in terms of its size. Furthermore the introduction of table-grapes has encouraged the early release of land as intensive labour and careful planning are necessary to tend such crops. This is the province of the young farmer. Education has now replaced land as the main matrimonial resource for sons, and to a lesser extent for daughters. Increased access to education and the social prestige attached to it, as the only main means of social mobility in post-Independence Cyprus (with the exception of the gun which had certain periods of predominance) has resulted in the desirability of educated men, not farmers, as affines.

The number of Peyiotes holding white-collar jobs has increased from 0% in 1920 to 10% in 1978.

It is also important to note that the major economic burdens in marrying children have been modified. In 1920, the most important dowry component was land; in 1979 it was the dowry house (Loizos, 1976). In 1920 the dowry house was not only less costly relative to agricultural land, it was also very easy to construct. Its materials were obtained locally and built by the father and sons. In 1980, the cost of a village dowry house with all socially modern amenities could easily amount to £6,000, equivalent to the total wages of a labourer for six years. Town houses are even costlier, in the region of £14,000. Construction also involves a specialized division of labour. Correspondingly, there has been a transformation in the productive value of the house: the traditional house involved a whole complex necessary for subsistence in the form of food, through the vegetable patches, a few sheep and fowl; the modern house displays a consumption identity through the exchange-values of signs indulged in for their own sake, such as architectural features which are purely decorative and an indication of status (e.g. wrought-iron railings, decorative arches, 'television-viewing rooms', etc.). No provision is made for vegetable patches and the keeping of fowls. This is not a trivial change for it indicates that there has been a change in the rationality surrounding marriage, a point I want to explore next. To a certain extent Peyiotes are uneasy prisoners of a dilemma of provision and some indication of the difficulties they face can be gleaned from the fact that whenever news of an engagement is public announed, Peyiotes invariably ask: 'Did the

ghambros (son-in-law) get a house?' Land is not referred to except when it is a table-grape vineyard, an irrigated plot, or has some particular monetary value such as land earmarked for tourist development.

5.5 Marriage and Marriage Strategies in 1980

I shall now examine the implications of such changes upon marriage strategies, but at this point I want to draw a distinction between 'social capital' and 'political capital'. I shall be looking at marriage strategies primarily in terms of the former by which I mean prestige, status, symbolic power of all kinds. Political capital I take to mean a store of enduring relationships of a party - political nature. This distinction is essential because I shall be looking at stretegies in terms of the amassing of status and prestige, which can then be put to other more political purposes. It is important to note that most Peyiotes do not take party-political considerations unduly into account when discussing or contracting marriages. There are many marriages which cross political party boundaries. The few men who believe in 'party-endogamy' are considered fanatiki, foregoing the potential long-term benefits for the couple for short-term harmony between father-in-law and ghambros. There is a considerable variation in political beliefs between generations, siblings and affines, and indeed Peyiotes believe that a man would be stupid to fight actively with his kinsmen over politics.

This having been said I shall sometimes refer to 'political marriages', by which I mean power of a different order, of status, prestige and honour, ranking criteria of the family.

Nowadays there are two specific 'rules' marriage strategies

attempt to deal with: the dowry house for daughters, and training for sons. All other considerations are secondary. In other words whereas daughters are now given a capital asset, they are not primarily given first-order productive resources and the family is increasingly united in consumption, not production. Sons are now given the training to work elsewhere than in agriculture. Another difference is that whereas Peyiotes were previously competing for scarce land, they are now competing for educated men. Nowadays the major problem a man faces is the dowry house provision, not land. For the poorer families there are only two alternatives: the sale of land or the emigration of daughters. The latter is usually followed by the poorer members of the community, such as shepherds who rent most of their land. Lacking the necessary capital, these families have chosen the only alternative possible (except socially unacceptable spinsterhood), sending their daughters to affines abroad where they can be married without the necessary dowry house. This phenomenon dates from the period 1959-69 approximately. Sending a daughter abroad is not only an admission of poverty and of low status but it also does not involve any investment in new social relationships as it is limited to those relationships a man is given through marriage. The wife's brother or sister is usually preferred as they can arrange a marriage among the Greek-Cypriots in communities abroad. They sometimes, but not always, receive some land. Such a strategy allows the conservation of scarce resources usually permitting the marriage of at least one daughter within the village who can live next to the parents in their old age.

If a matrimonial strategy is an attempt to conserve or expand

resources, it is also by implication a process which creates a certain dispersal of property. The forms and patterns of disagreement within the family over access to, and assumption of these resources will tend to be influenced by (a) the timing of these transmissions, (b) the presence or absence of authority in decision making, and (c) the ideological value placed upon kinship by the wider society within which marriage operates. When Peyiotes recall that in the past there used to be a greater incidence of conflicts over property they are not merely highlighting the scarcity of privately held land and its value as the main productive resource, as well as a greater dependence on agriculture. They are also referring to the structure in the system of property transmissions with a greater incidence of inheritances. If brothers did not recognize the value of cooperation or implement it, there tended to be an absolute division with every inheritor insisting on a share in each field left in the patrimony. Division therefore either did not take place at all when the brothers recognized the value of a residual joint-ownership to guarantee some form of mutual assistance, or it tended to be an absolute division. I shall deal with the political significances later.

Nowadays, the type of competition over access to resources has been modified: from a tendency to have a sudden break with intense conflict, to the contemporary pattern of long-standing uneasiness and ambiguity between the heirs. In the latter case a man's attentions will be directed towards the actions of his siblings, and the variety of resources now being transmitted - land, cash, education, houses and even tools to set up a trade - have resulted in a greater difficulty in accounting. This mutual

untranslatability between different resources and the monetary attitude in accounting among the heirs has itself caused difficulties. Relations between siblings are marked by a general sense of uneasiness once they have established their own families (cf. Peristiany, 1968). Indeed fathers and mothers in their old age often differ on the division of the remaining property. According to the men the ideal distribution, after the daughters have been married, is that eventually the property should be distributed equally. Women are more pragmatic: it is ultimately on the basis of need (of each particular child) and help (the desire to have a married daughter nearby to help her in her old age) that the division ought to be directed. Women emphasize give and take.

Furthermore one has to take geographical dispersion into account when discussing solidarity and competition between siblings. The settlement pattern, which is virilocal, has remained unchanged and this naturally encourages a great deal of solidarity between sisters who live in the same neighbourhood. Relations between affines (sighambri: men married to sisters) are likewise warm and cordial. But competition tends to be more strongly expressed when siblings have been dispersed, especially when some children are abroad and others are left in the village. Relations between siblings (including sisters) become more uneasy for two reasons: first because contact can only be renewed sporadically, and second because there are usually less resources to go round especially when this has been the cause of emigration. Indeed whilst those children who remain in the village view the remaining property as legitimately theirs, those abroad feel embittered that they may be excluded.

Finally, a new set of tensions have emerged regarding the expected contribution of sons to dowries, and the behaviour of the couple during the betrothal period. These are the result of both internal and external factors.

To begin with the obligation brothers have to assist their sisters in obtaining dowries can be more easily satisfied when men have no independent access to resources and where they are not independent and autonomous producers with their own incomes, in short in a productive structure dominated by peasant family agriculture. With increasing education and urban employment possibilities young men now have more autonomous access to resources and consequently the independence to dispense them. When brothers are spatially dispersed in the towns there are even greater difficulties in the financial contribution they can make, which is the most important, given mechanized agriculture and the high cost of the dowry house. Consequently the burden of the dowry house now falls more heavily on the father.

Second, a number of difficulties have emerged regarding the expected behaviour of the engaged couple. Until recently relations between the couple were strictly supervised and under parental control. But nowadays there is little parental supervision and as Loizos (1975) has pointed out, men treat life with a sort of Wildean realism which maintains that they can resist everything but temptation. Whether or not the couple actually have considerable physical intimacy does not interest us, but if the couple are left unsupervised it is ipso facto presumed that they do. This greatly worries the girl's parents who realize that a calling-off of the engagement would seriously hinder the daughter's future matrimonial

prospects. As a result, relations between the girl's parents and the groom are ambiguous, the former deeply concerned that the couple marry as quickly as possible and the latter eager to allay any suspicions. Parents are often so concerned that they will often allow the young man to sleep at their house.[11] This is ipso facto marraige.

There are a number of reasons for this change. First, there is the obvious intrusion of western concepts through the media, education in Greece, etc., which has encouraged the young men to view the period between engagement and marriage as a post facto courtship; second, there is the shortage of young men in the village, and finally, there is the difficulty created by later marriages for men who have to enter the army, university, obtain jobs and so on. This has affected the 'containment of sexuality' (Flandrin, 1979) and which, together with the new opportunities provided by visiting female tourists for the young men, has distanced the generations and created particular problems of rationalization for the women.

By way of illustration, the following examples are offered. They move from the most basic strategies where the problem is that of finding grooms for daughters in cases where there are few resources, to those cases where the problem lies in the allocation of resources. Finally, a case where the problem is not of this order but is, rather, of the conservation of resources according to a certain rationality of symbolic and political criteria.

> Example 1: Georghios is a part-time farmer who rents most of his land from the irrigated Potima Chiftlik. He and his wife are also occasionally obliged to work as labourers to supplement his meagre holdings. He first married in 1942, his wife brought 15 donums and a house. In 1953 after his first wife's death he

remarried. His second wife, also from Peyia, came from a poor family and brought 10 donums with her. They now live in the first wife's house. He has 11 children from both marriages; three, all daughters from the first, and five daughters from the second marriage. His first three daughters from his first marriage are all in Canada. One daughter was engaged to a mainland Greek, and on settling in Toronto arranged her other two sisters' marriages. They received no property at marriage, but have residual rights to the 15 donums which belonged to their mother and which Georghios presently exploits. He sent his first daughter from his second marriage to his wife's sister in Rhodesia, where she arranged another sister's marriage, partly also to be surrounded by kin. None received any property. Georghios needs all of it to support himself and if possible to marry his youngest daughter in the village. His third daughter from his second marriage was married to a Peyioti who had returned from South Africa for a holiday. As she married a co-villager and there are possibilities for their eventual return as well as questions of prestige (you can lie to a stranger about your financial means but not to a co-villager), he has allocated her 9 donums. Georghios did not benefit from the Church sales in the '50s as he did not have the $25 down payment for participation. He has remained one of the poorest men in the village, possessing only 15 donums, excepting the 28 donums he rents from the Cooperative Potima Chiftlik. If he has enough money he will build two houses for his youngest remaining daughters; if not, he will either have to send one or both abroad, or else sell his land. There is little likelihood that these 15 donums can maintain a couple, even if he could find an uneducated man as a groom.

It is important to remember that Georghios' children are either unmarried and living in the village or married and abroad.

The second example brings out a number of different problems. Here it is not so much finding a groom or grooms, but of maintaining some type of balance between those children left in the village and those outside it.

Example 2: Anastasis has 9 children; in order of birth - a son, 2 daughters, 2 sons, another daughter and finally 3 sons. His first son, the eldest, married into a neighbouring village in the mountains, a clear admission of poverty and low status. He received 8 donums from

his father, but sold it contrary to Anastasis' wishes. Father and son quarrelled bitterly over the remaining property and the latter did not visit his father for ten years. He was roundly criticized in the village for doing so; most men do not offer him a coffee when he visits the village coffee shops.

Anastasis' second oldest, a daughter, married in Peyia. She received a dowry house and 10 donums of land. The next daughter married in Australia; to her he transferred his present house and 8 donums. His fourth, a son, received a secondary education and no property. His youngest daughter married a Cypriot in Australia. He has promised her 7 donums. The last three children, all sons, have received symbolic transfers of land as they are all in Australia. It is over this remaining property that he has had problems with his eldest son, for he said: 'my sons (in Australia) will say that they received no property from their father'.

Anastasis' problem is maintaining a balance between the demands of dispersed children. Compared to Georghios, he is more fortunate: not only did he have fewer daughters, but he can also rely on the help and emotional support of one daughter living close by.

Finally, the third example indicates that for wealthier families the problems are neither finding a groom, nor dowry houses, but finding the right groom. Here the rationality is different.

Kappedgis has the job of Cooperative Bank Secretary which is well paid and highly prestigious. He has three daughters who all attended secondary school. Although he could easily have afforded it, none were sent to University in Athens. The first two are married. For the first, he built an expensive dowry house in Paphos and allocated her 40 donums. However, her engagement was broken off due to certain disagreements over the dowry house and its provisioning. The prospective groom was from Paphos, which made negotiations and trust more difficult to achieve. In poorer, less powerful families, the daughter's matrimonial prospects would have been diminished tremendously, but through his contacts with highly-placed Cooperative Department officials, Kappedgis found another groom also working in the District Cooperative offices as an accountant. The couple were married almost immediately and the groom was reputed to have received a £15,000 settlement as well as a car. For his second daughter, Kappedgis was more cautious. Although she had a house in Paphos, he was less ambitious this time and accepted a co-villager, the son of a client whom he had helped obtain a job in a Cooperative factory. His youngest daughter will receive a house, already

built, when she reaches marriageable age (18-25). Although she will receive, in addition, 20 donums (half of what her other two sisters received), this is more than offset by the sumptuous fittings, and she will probably in any case marry an educated man for whom the land is at best of secondary value.

5.6 Changes in the "Meaning" of Marriage

Thus far the analysis suggests that the 'new' mode of property transmissions as practised in 1980 is a response to external transformations. This is part of the answer, but it is not exhaustive. For it does not address itself to why Peyiotes have so responded to such external transformations, which is a matter of their local rationality. My suggestion is that this change is also due to a transformation in the way Peyiotes view marriage, i.e. in the meaning of marriage for them. In other words, changes in property transmissions are not merely responses to the external changes which have affected the framework within which marriage operates; they are also orientative in their transformation of the meaning of contemporary marriage - they 'push', so to speak, the meaning of marriage in a new direction. There is not merely a quantitative change in the amounts of land given, there is also a qualitative change in attitude towards marriage. The best way of bringing this out is through analysis of the last two factors: the social investment and the semiotic investment, and to trace their transformations across time. It will then be possible to explore the significance of this change in attitude.

For the second factor, the social investment, it is important to examine, first, whether access to spouses is individual and direct, or mediated in, and through a collectivity.

According to the old men, marriages used to be arranged

completely over the heads of spouses at an early age. The groom, and still less the bride, had little say in the matter. There was, and is, no courtship in the proper sense of the word and practice as an institution. It was the men who arranged marriages. The engagement period tended to be long, often lasting up to three years. Older men say that prior to marriage they had never seen their wives, except briefly at the hartosha, the engagement ceremony. There are even stories of the bride's father betrothing one daughter and then substituting an uglier or older one who had little matrimonial prospects. These stories are recounted with an evident glee by the older men and there is perhaps, some foundation to this myth. It indicates suspicion and intrigue predicated upon scarce knowledge. With children being born at home and women strictly segregated, there were few chances for them to be seen in public. Nowadays there are some significant differences in the arrangements of marriages. The decision to marry is still generally collective, but the children generally have a right to refuse, though daughters have less of a say. The extent of the refusal of the children depends upon their social standing, education, and upon the total expectations of the family involved. The prospective groom may take part in the negotiations if he is of particular standing (such as a university graduate), but he never initiates them himself. Instead, the task of bringing two families together and arranging the negotiations belongs to third parties. The process of match-making is known as proxenia, which means to 'send an ambassador or representative to strangers'. Consider by contrast Davis's account from Pisticci:

> 'Mario, thirty-seven years old, anxious to find a wife told me that he had proposed to three girls in the

> four days of the S. Rocco Festival in 1965, and had been rejected each time ... Together with a friend (he) ... drew up a short list of possible brides and went out to survey them' (1973:27).

The purpose of this example is not flippant because the dynamics of marriage arrangements give a clear indication of the content of marriage, of the significance of the politics of affinity, as well as of the specific nature of the social domain. There are three reasons for the strategy of the third person.

The first is obvious: Peyiotes are in competition for scarce resources, which includes educated men, urban employment, and to a lesser extent, land. Secrecy and the third party strategy is essential to avoid the potentially disruptive effects which gossip can be put to.

Second, it makes an attempt to reduce the effects of gossip on the future matrimonial prospects of the two parties if the attempts or negotiations fail or are rejected by the other party. In Greek Cypriot political culture the lie is not a simple denial, it is a creative political strategy;[12] Peyiotes like Vasilikotes (Friedl, 1962) believe that third parties are essential to limit the effects of lies by others. As honour and prestige are social capital, public knowledge of a refusal is bound to lower the prestige and future marriage prospects of the rejected party. The risks here are clearly weighted against the family of the bride.

A final related reason is to allow the family to reach a decision and to allow the process of negotiation to proceed in a seemingly disinterested fashion, to conceal the fact that what is at issue are questions of property and status and not to cause offence if negotiations break down. As shall be seen, this is why

women are used in many cases to act as marriage negotiators. A direct answer may be postponed until discreet enquiries are made and 'crossed' (stavronountai) in order to produce a representative picture of the individual and the family concerned. This is related to the concept of the person. As the essence of the person is presumed to be unknowable the only way of forming a representative picture of someone is to amass a number of remembrances, sayings and details across generations in order to obtain some indication of what potentialities a man has.

Finally, it is important to note how refusals are framed. In general a refusal is never expressed in a direct manner because it is interpreted as a slight and indicates that a family considers itself superior. Families carefully watch each other for self-perceptions of prestige and a refusal, therefore, indicates in a most direct manner, claims for higher status or aims for more ambitious strategies. Hence the reply is usually framed elliptically, for example: "she is not of marriageable age, she is too young." In certain cases, however, when it seems that one family is driving a hard bargain, the reply may take into account that 'we cannot afford such an expensive dowry house' thus indicating that it is necessary to decrease demands, for once negotiations break down they can never to re-started. As one man said: "once the envelope is sealed it can never be reopened". Indeed property is always referred to exophorically. If one family reneges on its commitment or contribution after the official engagement no public mention of the real causes of the break is made, in contrast to Milocca (Gower Chapman, 1973).

Match-making has also changed across time. Whereas in 1920

men organized the negotiations which did not significantly differ in their arrangements, nowadays there are different types of marriage negotiations which involve both men and women. The 1920 pattern of proxenia closely resembles the Sarakatsani practice (Campbell, 1964) where marriages are arranged by men. This is clearly related to the importance of kinship as a political infrastructure between households and across generations. I shall turn to this point later, but nowadays the majority of marriages within the village which lack an overtly political sigificance are arranged by women, especially in the initial stages. A number of processes operate almost concurrently. The first indication of the intention to obtain a groom is inconspicuous. With the approval of the father, the mother accompanies her daughter (who is often fashionably dressed) to neighbouring houses and to kin in other neighbourhoods when the day's agricultural work is over and the men are away in the coffee shops. The prsopective groom is never present. These moves inform the neighbourhood women, and through them the community, of a potential bride whilst discreetly seeking out a marriage negotiator. If such moves are successful the family can wait until a proposal is made to them thereby reducing the social risk involved in a potential rebuff. The marriage negotiator may be a trusted neighbourhood friend, a sister, or a female cousin, in essence a married woman who has some standing and verbal skills. But if a specific family is in mind, attempts are usually made to use a similarly related woman to both parties, thus reducing any potential for lies and distortion.

This use of women is very specifically related both to the distribution of knowledge in the community, and to the division

of sexual roles. As women are the repositories of family histories they are capable of making the necessary connections in identifying who is useful in such moves. They also know much more of the family histories (when a man wants to know whether two people are related he often asks his wife); they are in Firth's term (1970:139) 'kin keepers'. There are further advantages in using women. They can, so to speak, 'create gossip' by indicating that a family is desirous of finding a groom, but they do not have the final public say. Hence if a proposal is made which is deemed unfavourable the risk of offence and misunderstanding between men is minimized through reference to the spurious 'words of women' (ta logia tis gynaika). As they are ultimately non-accountable they can also use strictly economic language in bargaining without causing offence. Finally, of course, mothers are closely concerned because of the special mother-daughter bond and ultimately it is the mother's house which may be given to one of her daughters, if the house is not old and is socially acceptable.

Almost concurrently attempts are made to sound out the prospective son-in-law regarding his intentions. A few chance remarks are made in the coffee house by a kinsman of the girl (usually F.B. or his sighambros) teasing the young man on the necessity of his becoming a full member of the community through marriage. As young men generally have the right to refuse a proposal (especially when they are earning their livelihood) and as they now know all the marriageable women in the village in contrast to the past (through co-educational schooling and wedding celebrations), their reactions are likely to be carefully scrutinized.

By contrast those marriages which (a) involve important scarce

resources, (b) are contracted across village boundaries or (c) have an overtly political purpose are almost always arranged by the men. Since 1960 and increasingly after 1974 urban employment possibilities have socially devalued the desirability of a farmer as an affine whilst attracting young men to the towns. Young educated men are scarce in Peyia and many fathers complain that there are few suitable young men left. To obtain such affines a family may devise a number of costly and risky strategies. One, open to the poorer families, is to invest in a daughter's education if 'she takes to letters'. This is a risky strategy; risky in that she is not under parental control abroad, and a strategy in that the ideal, even stronger amongst educated men, is that their wives should remain at home. If a daughter successfully obtains a degree her marriage prospects are very much enhanced as she usually qualifies for marriage with an educated man. One shepherd put it this way: 'My daughter has a degree from Athens University; shall I take a ghambros who comes with just his trousers?' There were several poor families who had spent a considerable part of their savings on their daughters' education with no future possibility of supplying them with the necessary dowry house. On returning the daughters could contribute to their dowries but once married and the house built through their own and their husbands' efforts, they were often withdrawn from paid employment to take care of the children. This was one attempt to escape the cost of a dowry house through a less expensive means whilst increasing the desirability of the children as marriage partners.

Another strategy, but of a different order, is for the family to build a dowry house when the daughters are still young and

prior to any matrimonial negotiations. In such a manner there is an implicit suggestion to invite proposals to affinity. This practice is most clearly expressed when houses are built in the town. A man here has a clearer chance of obtaining an educated man with a regular office job as an affine. However, to do so he needs to make use of relationships with townsmen in order to seek out the prespective son-in-law. This can be very costly. Special linguistic skills and a high status are necessary which can only be supplied by men of standing such as teachers, professionals, etc. In addition, as the family is dealing with strangers and non-villagers (who are therefore more suspicious) extreme discretion must be followed and the middleman must work fast in order to clinch a deal. The following example brings out the dynamics of continuing political relationships:

> Yiannis is a middling farmer and has two daughters. Because of his family connections (his brother, who lives in Paphos, is a dentist and a Member of Parliament) he is rather disdainful of his co-villagers and built a dowry house in Paphos for his first daughter (who does not have a University education). He preferred to contract a marriage with a non-villager. To find a suitable groom he approached his brother who then spoke to a client of his, a Mukhtar of another village. The Mukhtar recommended his kinsman, whom the MP had previously assisted in finding a job in a Paphos Cooperative factory. Normally, when marriages are conducted across village boundaries a formal dowry agreement (prikosynfono) is signed by both parties (i.e. fathers) at a 'feast of introductions' (trapezia gnorimias), usually at the bride's house, when close kin of both parties gather to celebrate the match. But in this case the groom's family did not insist on the prikosynfono because of the social credibility of the MP who also hosted the feast at his home. When the prestige stakes are high, there is a corresponding decrease in the appearance and presentation of strictly economic accounting. In such cases men are eager not to appear to drive a hard economic bargain for future unspecified benefits. The groom for his part was keen to maintain close ties with the family he had

> married into as he wished to change his job, a matter in which the MP could be of some influence. After the marriage he contrived to address the MP, who was also his Koumparos (wedding sponsor) by the honorific title of 'maestros' (boss). Normally the usual term used in such relations of sponsorship is 'koumpare', but by so using the term 'maestros' he indicated his willingness to maintain a tie of dependency and not rise, as it were, to the more equal relationship of koumparia which would entail a move overt type of reciprocity.

This example is important for my argument because if one were to concentrate exclusively on property given at marriage as Davis (1976) does, then the emphasis would lie on homogamy, "people now marry equals; social mobility is now achieved by marketing operations (ibid. 298). Clearly property is critical, but marriage should also be seen as a special type of market having its own rationality and dynamic, rather than a mere reflection of it. Table 5.4 which concerns land received at marriage indicates that market-derived criteria tell only part of the story. For once the planning, preparations, negotiations and dynamics of marriage, and even more so the celebrations, are taken into account the system becomes more flexible and has its own rationality. For example men revelling in their new-found power (like Kappedgis) prefer investing in tangible and visible signs, such as expensive town houses, rather than education for daughters, for example. Those who are higher up, or even lower in the prestige scale, by contrast, tend to invest much more in education, though for very different reasons. The differences between Kappedgis and Yiannis are significant. Kappedgis gave a great deal of resources partly because he was eager to strengthen his contacts with the Cooperative movement; Yiannis' ghambros received much less, and was eager not to appear too demanding, because he was marrying into a powerful

HUSBAND'S PROPERTY (DONUMS)	0	0-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51+
46+				1	1				1			
31-45			1									
26-30					1	1	1					
21-25							2					1
16-20	1		1	1	3							1
11-15			2			1	1					
6-10	1	1		3	1					1		
0-5	1		3	1	2	2	1	1	1			
0	7	1	4	8	4	6	4	1				

WIFE'S PROPERTY

TABLE 5.4. : LAND RECIEVED AT MARRIAGE FROM GROOM'S PARENTS AND WIFE'S PARENTS IN 74 HOUSEHOLDS.

family. Peters is making a similar point when he observes that: "status sought means promising a large amount, status granted the opposite ... The seeming differentiation of women by bridewealth is not attributable to a single cause, such as status, but to the kind of social relationships already in being or desired" (1980:152-3).

If the transfer of resources at marriage should also be approached by reference to the types of relationships required, the role of men and women as marriage negotiators is clearly related to the type of political community. In 1920 men had a strong interest in negotiating marriages, as marriage formed the basis of village political organization. Like the Sarakatsani their survival often depended on their affines.

Furthermore most of the coalitions which were politically significant were often of two types: (i) groups of cooperating brothers (e.g. Loizos' Andreadis brothers; 1975) and (ii) affinal ties, such as sighambri, kounyiadi, etc., e.g. the Nicolaides family (Chapter 3). This was clearly influenced by the transmission of property which defined the possibilities inherent for cooperation among kith and kin. Nowadays the family does not provide the basis of political organization and men have less interest in negotiations, except in specific cases. Most marriages are arranged by women, the political ones by men. But partly because the system of property transmission itself has changed, the kinship links used to establish political coalitions in highly critical situations are different. Most involve fictional kinship ties, such as Koumparia, etc. The difference is between that which is made by family, and that which is made by the individual after marriage,

through the idiom of kinship.

To further tease out changes in the 'meaning' of marriage it is important to examine the third factor, the semiotic investment, i.e. the exchanges of signs, labour and gifts in the celebrations, as this guides us to its meaning for Peyiotes.

In 1920 weddings within the village were organized and celebrated by the close kin of both families. The Koumparos of of the couple would visit the close kin of the families collecting food which was then consumed in a small feast. Nowadays weddings are organized by a far wider range of kin and are celebrated by all the village. The 'core of initiates' who contribute labour tends to be much larger, though this clearly varies according to the rank and wealth of the participants. Figure 5.1 shows the kin who assisted in a marriage between two poor-ish families; Figure 5.2 shows those who did so for Kappedgis' daughter's wedding. In the latter not only are they more distantly related, but also over 20 unrelated men and their wives assisted, clients and potential clients, men seeking to curry favour, etc.

To see large wedding celebrations as merely joining the village in a common celebration would be to miss the essential point, for such a change is not merely an amplification of pre-existing patterns, it denotes a qualitative transformation in the meaning of marriage. Whereas in 1920 a wedding celebration was a rite of political union between two families, in the modern setting the celebration is a means to create social capital through display, rather than to strengthen links between two families. For example this is even more the case in The Yemen where 'big' 'families' sometimes store weddings to occur simultaneously, exhibiting and creating further social capital to all and sundry (Mundy, 1981).



FIGURE 5.1. : COOPERATING KIN IN THE WEDDING PREPERATIONS OF TWO POOR FAMILIES

△ : CONTRIBUTING LABOUR

NOTE THE GREATER NUMBER OF OLDER WOMEN. THE CELEBRATIONS WHICH ARE USUALLY PAID FOR BY THE BRIDE'S FAMILY WAS HERE PAID FOR BY BOTH FAMILIES. THE WOMEN MARKED IN THE FIGURE SERVED THE GUESTS WITH FOOD DURING THE CELEBRATIONS, IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR MALE KOUMPARI OF THE GROOM AND THE FOUR MALE KOUMERES OF THE BRIDE



FIGURE 5.2. :COOPERATING KIN AND NON-KIN IN THE WEDDING PREPERATIONS OF A RICH STATUS SEEKING FAMILY. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, OVER 20 UNRELATED MEN TO THE BRIDE'S FATHER, MAINLY CLIENTS, KOUMPARI AND 'FRIENDS' ASSISTED IN THE PREPERATIONS. THESE 20 MEN SERVED THE GUESTS AND THE COUPLE HAD 40 KOUMPARI.

Wedding celebrations in Peyia are now generally a means to establish politically the newly-married couple in a particular way, and in certain specific situations a means for the father to pursue his own political strategies (e.g. Kappedgis). A wedding celebrates the prestige obtained from marrying one's daughter well, and more importantly, is used to attract social support for the conjugal couple from other co-villagers. This is done in a number of ways. First, the young are now more educated than their parents who usually withdraw from the limelight, unless they have other marriages to establish; second, the number of Koumpari chosen now by the groom (not partly inherited as in the past) has increased.[13]

5.7 Changes in Ritual Kinship

Koumparia or ritual kinship is a strategy which bridges the private family domain and the public one and as such is particularly sensitive to changes in their relationship. The institution has been described at length by others (Campbell, 1964; Mintz and Wolf, 1950; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Hammel, 1968), so I concentrate here on recent changes to its expression.

To begin with, it is important to take into account the general economic opportunities of social classes and the politics of isolation and expansion of the family. Koumparia denotes two types of relations: those established between a man, his wife and their marriage sponsors, and those between parents and godparents of their children (Vaptisiki Koumparia). When not cemented through Baptism, matrimonial Koumparia is considered a less binding link between individuals and a couple because it is established only through the ceremony, ritual and celebration of marriage. Previously

the number of matrimonial Koumpari (f. Koumeres) was restricted to two, chosen by the groom and bride who baptized the children in turn. Baptismal sponsors often acted as sponsors for the marriages of their godchildren ("may you live to marry him"), which meant that Koumparia often linked different generations and different families, though clearly not on the scale of Kumstvo in the Balkans (Hammel). Sometimes a man would transmit this 'right' to his son thus reproducing the links between families.

This practice has changed somewhat in the past fifteen years. To begin with there has been a strong decrease in the transmittance of the 'right' to act as marriage sponsor for one's godchild, and the number of marriage sponsors has increased from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 50. The tendency to chose unrelated persons of the same age and to chose more is partly related to the shift in property transmissions. Indeed it is important to take the transmission of property into account generally when discussing Koumparia as it often indirectly influences recruitment; the family has its own particular politics. For example the practice of asking grandparents to act as godparents in Andalusia (Pitt-Rivers, 1977:325) may well be related to the predominant form of property transmission there, which is inheritance. Godparenthood can thus be seen as an attempt to give an added dimension of intergenerational amity as well as to facilitate transmission of property from grandparents (godparents) to grandchildren (godchildren) when there is a certain ambiguity between the former and their married children.

These recent changes to the use of the institution are partly due to the shift in property transmission. A newly-established couple is now more autonomous in terms of its political economy

and hence marriage celebrations provide an opportunity for them to create allies independently and display them.

Matrimonial Koumpari are expected to help in the marriage preparations and the protos koumparos (first wedding sponsor) to act as the officiator of ceremonies. They contribute towards the costs of the ceremony, which usually amounts to approximately C£50. The expenses are divided equally between them. The tendency towards display means that the richer families tend to have a greater number of Koumpari drawn from the more important members of the village and professionals from the town.

The process whereby Koumpari are recruited is intimately determined by the developmental cycle of the individual, often the groom, and reflects the rationality which embodies family life. Due to close contact among the young unmarried men, many matrimonial Koumpari are now drawn from the friendship pool of the groom. Where marriages are contracted across village boundaries and have an overtly political purpose, the proxenitis (marriage negotiator) generally is the protos koumparos. Between marriage and the birth of the first child he is in a position of trial. How far he will show himself willing to help the newly-established couple and how far the parents will perceive him as a suitable godparent when more hard-headed criteria are beginning to suggest themselves, will often influence whether he will be asked to baptize the first child. As it is considered an honour to baptize since it indicates that others have faith in a man, and is therefore a visible validation of status and responsibility, most men will be keen to maintain and reinforce their links with the couple. Consequently the process is not automatic but one marked

by mutual often unexpressed expectations by both parties. When a man gives his child elsewhere, offence may be given, so that relations may cool and revert back to their original state. Likewise to ask to baptize a child is to ask for a validation of local status; a refusal must take cognizance of the overtures of friendship.

Baptismal godparenthood (Vaftistiki Koumparia) creates a religious triad of mutual rights and duties which is expected to last for life and involves a capital outlay by the godparent. A relationship is established between parents and godparent which holds that mutual assistance must be offered and requests never refused. A man is expected to stand up when his Koumparos enters the coffee shop and the conversation between them is often highly ritualized and formal. It is marked by a politeness which contrasts strongly with the generally verbally aggressive and hostile behaviour of unrelated men. Among unrelated men and in parents' address to children the term 're' (you!) is often used. Indeed the form 're koumpare' is often utilized among unrelated men to conceal an attempt to bend the other's will, or in adopting a position of deference to men of higher status. Among ritual kin, however, the term 're' or 're koumpare' is never used for it denotes latent hostility and a lack of respect. The essence of extreme trust which characterizes the relationship finds expression in the use of the home. A man may always call freely and unannounced at his Koumparos' house where he will be offered hospitality. As he is often the only unrelated man to do so the relationship is touched with a sexual insinuation in public discourse; 'to visit the Koumera's house' suggests an illicit sexual relationship.

Finally, the Koumparos is expected to provide for the child's religious education and it is customary for him to present gifts on feast days and at the Epiphany (Phota).

As Koumparia is considered the most binding fictional kinship link which is expected to last for life, it is instructive to examine how different social classes tend to utilize this strategy. Table 5.5 which concerns Koumparia according to social class indicates that godparents are generally drawn from higher classes in terms of prestige.

Occupation of Parents	Occupation of Godparents			
	Labourers and Unskilled	Full-time Farmers & Shepherds	Skilled Workers and Craftsmen	White-collar: Government employees, Grocers, etc.
Labourers & Unskilled	44.7%	6.2%	25.0%	23.9%
Full-time Farmers & Shepherds	35.2%	8.8%	15.6%	40.1%
Skilled Workers & Craftsmen	9.3%	2.3%	46.5%	41.8%
White-collar	0 %	0 %	5.5%	94.4%

TABLE 5.5: KOUMPARIA ACCORDING TO SOCIAL CLASS

Notes:
1. Occupations taken for Koumpari and parents at point of baptism.
2. In the case of women the occupation of the husband was taken unless the woman was herself employed.

In Table 5.5 the occupations are arranged in a descending order of prestige according to Peyioti conceptions. The lowest on the prestige scale are the labourers, the highest are white-collar

workers. The data show that with the exception of the white-collar workers (who tend to choose ritual kin from their own socio-economic group) over half of the Koumpari are drawn from a higher social class, clearly bringing out that Koumpari are drawn for the purposes of social advancement. They can provide critical information, contracts and assistance. The institution thus links individuals in asymmetrical relationships, and resembles its use by Sarakatsani more strongly than by Kalotes (Loizos, 1975) where less than 10% of godparents were of obviously different status from the parents. Such differences must be due to Kalo's greater prosperity.

Loizos (1975) has pointed out that there are special risks involved in asking non-villagers to act as godparents in that such important links can be more easily lost. However, it is worthwhile to investigate how far village boundaries influence the choice of ritual kin. Table 5.6 indicates that those classes with the greatest long-term and continuous contact with outside the village tend to search there for ritual kin. In the case of the white-collar workers the figure is as high as 55%, indeed the higher up the prestige scale one goes the greater will be the tendency to have ritual kin outside the village.

	Koumpari in Village	Koumpari Outside Village
Labourers and unskilled workers	83.9%	16.0%
Full-time farmers and shepherds	59.0%	40.0%
Skilled workers and craftsmen	59.4%	40.5%
White-collar: Government employees, clerks, etc.	44.4%	55.5%

TABLE 5.6: KOUMPARIA ACCORDING TO RESIDENCE

Note: Residence taken at point of baptism

Hence the social ridicule attached to approaching those who are much higher in the prestige scale (as often happens in Peyia) becomes more explicable. It is the social ridicule attached to making too great steps in social advancement, in short of having social pretensions. To put the matter simply the risks of losing contact with a Koumparos living away from the village are greater for the less prestigeful and less socially powerful occupations because, first, the relationship is even more asymmetrical and hence has a different 'value' attached to it by the godparent who will tend to see it as less onerous and less binding. Second, because the contracting parent will have fewer opportunities to maintain such a relationship over a long period of time. Indeed he is obliged to supply a greater 'input' if the relationship is to be maintained. It is in this sense that the risks entailed of losing such valuable resources are greater for the lower groups than the more 'honourable' professions.

Finally the distribution of Koumparia amongst kin and non-kin should indicate the value placed generally upon the use of such resources vis-a-vis others. Table 5.7 shows that whilst all classes tend to utilize kin, there is a significant bias in this distribution.

	Koumpari with Pre-existing Kinship	Koumpari with no Pre-existing Kinship
Labourers and unskilled workers	31.3%	68.6%
Full-time farmers and shepherds	33.5%	60.5%
Skilled workers	52.2%	47.6%
White-collar	53.6%	44.48%

TABLE 5.7: KOUMPARIA ACCORDING TO PRE-EXISTING KINSHIP

Note: Kinship links traced to second cousin from both parents

Whereas the white-collar workers possessed 53% of their Koumpari as kin, among the labourers and unskilled workers only 33% were kin. It is clear that the poorer classes in the village tend to spread the idiom of kinship net wider than the higher status classes which pursue a policy of isolation. The reasons are clear. Farmers, labourers and shepherds have a greater real or perceived need for asymmetrical koumparia links with non-kin in order to offset their lack of other resources. This is not merely a question of greater social needs, it is also one of which strategies are available, and perceived as available by social classes. It indicates a greater tendency to 'gamble' on the relatively rare koumparia link in the village on the part of lower status groups because the availability of other strategies is severely limited, and perceived as severely limited. Indeed the attitude of Hammel's informant: "why make a kinsman into a kum?" epitomizes the attitude of the lower status groups towards koumparia.

As the relationship is created and should be durable across time, quarrels between Koumpari tend to be rare and grave. The few examples encountered were almost always connected with political misunderstandings.

Finally something must be said about the relationship between godparenthood and conflict resolution. Hammel (1968) notes that one method of preventing hostilities or blood feuds between zadrugae is to ask to be kum; Gower Chapman observes that "the establishment of the baptismal bond is the approved method of ratifying a peace between two former enemies. When a reconciliation takes place, it is customary for men to become cumpari San Giovanni at the earliest opportunity" (173:118-9). Such practices are absent

in Peyia; indeed men use the institution carefully not to solve conflicts (for that would be a 'waste' according to local rationality), but to build upon pre-existing relationships which are already very solid. Indeed it tends to be utilized by Peyiotes to execute important and delicate tasks. When Arapis established his omadha (armed team of men) in the early 1970s he drew most of the personnel from his ritual kin. Although he was married into the village and could trace previous kinship links to Peyiotes through his father who was born there, it was the relationships he had created, rather than inherited, that he drew upon. The task required tact, the willingness to use force if necessary, relations of trust, and secrecy. In choosing Koumpari for political tasks, the Mukhtar was utilizing an idiom based on village realities. When trust is required in the village it is such categories of men who can provide it.

5.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I began with a shift in the pattern of property transfers among Peyiotes between 1920 and 1980 from inheritances to a more pronounced inter vivos mode of transmission to bring out a number of points. The first was that this change was primarily an aspect of relations between centre and periphery in that kinship and marriage responds to external factors such as the distribution of property. I then showed that these transformations to the local economy have also affected the status of marriage as a means of access to resources. The contemporary significance of marriage has been displaced as the main means of access to resources through increased educational opportunities for men, separate from agricultural work.

In 1920 a marriage strategy was the means whereby a certain set of internal contradictions over rules of property transmission was resolved through the transfer of the means of production to daughters to help establish a separate unit of production. Its political significance lay in that it helped establish a set of horizontal affinal alliances between two families. In the contemporary system, although there are some obvious phenomenal similarities with the past, the specific meaning of marriage is different. It is, rather, the means whereby the process of long-term planning over the allocation of resources and training is completed through the transfer to daughters of an item of high monetary value, but which is not directly productive and which is used to attract husbands whose skills and training normally qualify them to work elsewhere in a more advanced mode of production. It is in essence the transfer of the means of consumption and the symbol of consumption which is a cultural, rather than strictly economic, qualification for the establishment of a separate unit of production. Its political significance is also very different, for it lies in providing the infrastructural framework whereby a newly-established couple can pursue a separate political course. This shift is reflected in the organization of the marriage itself: when marriage held a direct political significance for the families concerned it was organized by men; by 1980 with most marriages lacking such a significance and where honour and prestige were not the exclusive and dominant means to obtain resources, such cases of exclusive marriage organization by the men had become rare and special.

Finally, the use of koumparia has shifted to become much more of an individual contract between family heads.

5.9 Notes

1 Surridge's report had noted that "in certain Paphos hill villages the house is supplied by the bride". With some widening of the term 'hill village' Peyia could fit into this category. It is possible that village hostility could have been due to their awareness of different customs elsewhere. If so, there would have been double reasons for this hostility. By 1980, this corporate attitude towards outsiders had all but disappeared.

2 This is a further interesting difference to Loizos' material, who notes that for Kalo village this is a recent custom.

3 In 1980 there were two extant cousin marriage due to men having taken sexual advantage of their cousins. They were obliged to marry on receiving special dispensation and the payment of large sums of money to the Bishopric. Both marriages were considered scandals by Peyiotes. The Church also prohibits marriages with a 10-year age difference between the spouses, but grants dispensation more readily. The older partner pays, or donates some property to the younger one in order to give greater financial security in the case of widowhood or spinsterhood.

4 This can hardly be due to property transmission, and must be a rationalization of a lack of non-kin in a small village.

5 "The secular clergy comprises the parish clergy who before their ordination must be either married or widowers. The would-be-aspirant for Holy Orders comes as a rule from the lower ranks of society, and in many instances has only adopted his sacred calling when all other means of earning a livelihood have failed, his social status proves no bar to his acceptance" (Hackett, 1901:267). By the 1960s the social and economic postition had changed. During the Turkish Occupation, the number of priests and monks was high. Prior to 1878 Peyia had 12 priests; the number has subsequently decreased to one or two. In addition, the monasteries required much manpower during the Turkish Occupation to work their lands.

6 The Ottoman Code states that property transmitted as inheritance should be divided equally amongst all heirs 'taking into account property transmitted during the life of the owner'. A surviving spouse has rights equivalent to a child, cf. Fisher, 1919.

7 cf. S. Mardin (1969).

8 i.e. any local hereditary secular aristocracy; the Church was an obvious exception.

9 This is related to the absence of capital formation except on a primitive scale. cf. H. Inalçik (1969).

10 Old men wryly comment: '<u>tin peryousia tis gynaikas na tin kamnis ullo yallya</u>': change your wife's property into money, and hence easily transferable.

11 This is probably related to the absence of the institution of courtship which therefore holds the father responsible for the daughter's chastity until marriage and during engagement. In certain Roman Catholic Mediterranean societies, for example Portugal (Cutiliero, 1971) or Malta (Boissevain, 1969), the pattern seems to be slightly different. This is obviously partly related to the lack of resources transmitted at marriage.

12 Greek Cypriots are essentially sceptics and lies are defensive and offensive weapons. At its most basic level a lie implies discredit (e.g. "He is a <u>pseftis</u> (liar)", i.e. trust me, he turns everything around). Lying questions are often used to test the honesty of individuals, and men lie often without shame. <u>Psemata</u> do not have the nuance of <u>kizb</u> in Lebanese culture (Gilsenan, 1976) of the fantastic and incredible. But they can also be approached by reference to religious beliefs and there is an essential opposition in Orthodoxy between the Truth of the Written Word (τὸ φῶς) and the Lie of the Oral culture (cf. also Du Boulay, 1977 for the role of lying in preserving family integrity).

13 This tendency has also been noted by Peristiany (1968) and Loizos (1975). "The openly voiced opinion (is) that now that kinship solidarity beyond the basic family is breaking down one has to buttress up the new family's security by numerous and influential sponsors" (Peristiany, <u>ibid</u>., 90). But he does not investigate why this has occurred, nor its significance).

CHAPTER 6

VILLAGE POLITICAL OFFICES

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I examine political offices within Peyia. Through these offices and committees the village is linked to the wider society. It is important to stress that there are no purely village committees as in South Italian villages (e.g. Hunters Associations, cf. White, 1980) or in Malta (e.g. Festa Partiti, cf. Boissevain, 1965). The committee framework provides the basis of a 'sense of place' and of local particularities and interests, often in opposition to other villages or the central bureaucracy. This is not to say that villagers always group along territorial lines when dealing with the outside, nor that there is a great deal of unanimity in which interests are represented in councils. Just how far there is territorial solidarity or unanimity depends upon a number of complex factors, and it is worthwhile to turn to Bailey (1965) for further elucidation.

Bailey's purpose is to taxonomise councils into two types to predict the outcome of the decision-making process. "Elite councils which represent horizontal divisions within the society tend towards consensus, whilst arena councils which represent vertical divisions tend towards reluctant compromise or majority voting." (ibid., p.13). He gives three areas upon which analysis should concentrate: their task, the council's relationship to its public, and its relationship to the external political environment. Whilst this definitely furthers our understanding of councils I find this scheme limited in understanding Peyioti councils for two interrelated reasons.

One: it fails to take into account the specifically cultural nuances

CHAPTER 6

TURKISH POLITICAL COUNCILS

1. Introduction

In this chapter I examine political officers within Turkish villages. Through these officers and committees the village is linked to the wider society. It is important to stress that there are no merely village committees as such Italian villages (e.g. Cornaro and Sonnenfeldt, op. cit., 1960) or in Asia (e.g. Weale Parish, or Lebanon, 1960). The committee framework provides the basis of a 'village of place' and of local particularistic ties and interests, often in contradiction to the wider village or the nation's interests. This is not to say that the village was always group along territorial lines when dealing with the outside, nor that there is a great deal of unanimity in which interests are represented in councils. But the fact there is territorial solidarity or unanimity depends upon a number of complex factors, and it is worthwhile to turn to Bailey (1965) for further elucidation.

Bailey's purpose is to taxonomise councils into two types to predict the outcome of the decision-making process. "Title councils which represent horizontal divisions within the society tend towards consensus, whilst those councils which represent vertical divisions tend towards adversary compromise or majority voting."(Ibid., p.13). He gives three areas upon which analysis should concentrate: their task, the council's relationship to its public, and its relationship to the external political environment. Whilst this definitely furthers our understanding of councils I fear this scheme limited in understanding Turkish councils for two interrelated reasons.

One: it fails to take into account the specifically cultural nuances

of decision making such as abstentions, failures to take decisions, or even the style of decision making. Bloch is making much the same point when he says that "the functional sociological pressures can only be seen to operate within the historical-cultural framework" (1971: 60). In short Bailey seems to concentrate on results to the exclusion of the way in which decisions are reached.

Two: his distinction is too polarized. For example, the theme of the 'common good' is voiced in what would be, in Bailey's schema, Peyioti arena councils. Nor does he recognize that certain socio-economic groups may re-enforce their status positions through participation in arena councils and evolve certain characteristics of elite councils.[1] By excluding the dynamic element from councils he cannot account for change. I shall try to improve his schema by actual case examples later. This said, it is important to recognize that contemporary councils in the village demand a considerably different range of behaviour than was practiced in the past where Mukhtar and Papas acted as intermediaries with the wider society.

6.2 Functions of Village Committees

I first discuss the nine village committees by reference to (a) their respective duties, (b) the common attitude surrounding them, and (c) the way in which decisions are reached.

The Law and the State are represented by the Council of Elders (Horikhi Arkhé) and the Police. The Council consists of the Mukhtar, or village Headman and four assistants or azas. The institution, of Ottoman origin and retained in its most basic form by the British Administration and the Republic, links the village with the Government. The Mukhtar is responsible to the District Commissioner, a full time Civil Servant in the Ministry of the Interior based in Paphos. According

[illegible] making such as observations, failures to take decisions, or [illegible] the style of decision making. Since in making such the same point [illegible] says that "the functional sociological procedures can only be [illegible] to operate within the historical-cultural framework" (1951: 69). In [illegible] Bailey seems to concentrate [illegible] the analysis of the way [illegible] decisions are reached.

[illegible] his distinction is [illegible] the figure of [illegible] 'common good' is voiced [illegible] the leaders's concern. Deviant [illegible] behaviour. Nor does [illegible] the [illegible] self-interested groups [illegible] therefore their status [illegible] the [illegible] in which [illegible] would not evolve certain [illegible] the community.[2] [illegible] [illegible] the dynamic element [illegible] in order to account for change. [illegible] try to improve his status [illegible] and [illegible] overall later. This [illegible], it is important to recognize that contemporary communities in the [illegible] have a considerably different range of behaviour than was [illegible] in the past where [illegible] and [illegible] acted as intermediaries [illegible] the wider society.

[illegible] Functions of Village Committees

[illegible] that discuss the roles village committees by reference to [illegible] their respective duties, (b) the common attitude surrounding them, [illegible] (c) the way in which decisions are reached.

[illegible] the law and the State are represented by the Council of Elders (panchayat [illegible]) and the Police. The Council consists of the [illegible] or village headman and four assistants or [illegible]. The institution of [illegible] order and retained in its most basic form by the Punjab Administration and the Republic. Links the village with the government. The [illegible] is responsible to the District Commissioner, a full-time [illegible] servant in the Ministry of the Interior based in Tagbos. According

to the Village Authorities Law of 1907 the Mukhtar's powers and duties are to keep the peace within the village in collaboration with the police, assist Government Officers in the collection of revenue (such as the Property Tax), register all village births and deaths, and represent the Land Registration Office in all property transactions.

The committee's duties are to assist the headman in preparing and estimating tax-lists, who also issues certificates entitling villagers to free medical treatment at State Hospitals should they desire it.

Both Mukhtar and azas are unpaid, but the former is entitled to charge a small fee for certificates issued.[2] Until 1931 the council was elected every alternate year although in the later years the Government attempted to control its functioning by implementing a process of nomination by members of the Legislative Assembly.[3] Following the 1931 uprising[4] the Council of Elders was directly nominated by the Colonial Government, a situation which remained in force until 1979 when elections were re-established. These elections are examined in Chapter 9.

The office of Mukhtar has always been symbolically important. Until 1931 Mukhtars were the most important villagers, invariably merchants and large landowners. Due to its elective nature there was an element of village identification with it, a situation which changed after that year when Mukhtars then became identified as representatives of a foreign power.[5] The essential difference between the pre-1960 and post-1960 Mukhtars is that whereas in the former men competed by virtue of their wealth and landholdings (and to a lesser extent their contacts with Government officials) some of the present ones occupy their seats by virtue of their patriotism not their initial wealth. Peyia's present Mukhtar was previously an EOKA fighter. He is considered a very powerful

man with wide ranging contacts. In spite of his general lack of education, he is addressed as Kyrie, a term usually applied to University Graduates and white-collar workers.

In practice most of the Council's duties involve the preparation of tax lists, the most important being the Rural Constable tax. His duties are to oversee the activities of shepherds, to collect fines when sheep damage crops (a common occurrence) and charge small sums for finding stray sheep. Two thirds of his salary (£68 monthly) is paid directly out of this tax which varies from 250 mills to £3 according to landholdings. In 1978 524 property owners paid tax[6], and the remaining one third of the constable's salary is paid out of Government funds. Tax payers have 10 days in which to petition the District Officer for a revision of their tax.[7] Although there is much grumbling about taxes most men appreciate the value of a constable who requires firmness and a certain bravado when dealing with shepherds. The present incumbent relies heavily on public opinion to re-enforce his position, seeking out persistent offenders in the square where they risk the verbal hostility of the full time farmers. Furthermore the Mukhtar and azas are sensitive to public criticism and the presence of more highly educated men severely limits their capacity to use taxes as sanctions.

The Cooperative Credit Society (Synergatikê) is the main economic and marketing village organization. The Credit Society was established in 1942 on Raffeissian principles and is linked to the multi-tiered National Cooperative Movement, an independent tax-protected organization whose Commissioner is appointed by the President of the Republic.

The Society has various functions. It acts as the Government collecting agent for certain cereals (wheat and barley) upon which Government has a marketing monopoly, purchases fertilizers, pesticides,

and weed killers for its members at competitive prices with the private sector, issues loans at fixed low rates of interest for agricultural improvement, and serves as the village savings bank. In 1978 it possessed 588 shareholding members. They can obtain a £1000 maximum secured loan on property holdings at 8% interest. The society issues small unsecured loans up to a maximum of £250, popular with shepherds and landless labourers. When both husband and wife are members, the maximum secured loan for a family is £2400.

The society also coordinates the marketing of carobs and grapes; the former being sold to a Paphos Cooperative Carob Kibbling and the latter marketed through SEDIGEP, dealt with in Chapter 4.

Political competition for committee seats as indices of party strength has varied across time, intense at certain periods, disinterested at others. This is partly a function of the national political situation (which I discuss elsewhere), and of the way in which villagers perceive the role of the Bank. In effect the political leanings of the committee are largely secondary, as they are overshadowed by the Secretary. Between 1942-52 the post was held by teachers and is now held by Gymnasium Graduates. The job is important for its high secure salary, and because of its key role in village affairs. The Secretary's advice is usually followed by committee members as he deals continuously with villagers. He exerts an indirect, but nevertheless crucial influence on village affairs. Although most Secretaries have been honest hardworking men, there have been cases when they exceeded their powers and had to be removed by the committee (see Chapter 8, p.249).

The Secretary derives his power by being 'the one who issues loans' in the village idiom (which gives him a certain importance), also by

and differs for its members at competitive prices with the private sector, issues loans at fixed low rates of interest for agricultural improvement, and serves as the village savings bank. In 1970 it numbered 300 shareholding members. They can obtain a 2,000 maximum secured loan on property holdings at low rate. The society issues small unsecured loans up to a maximum of 200, together with shopworks at Ballana labourers. Over [illegible] villagers are members, the maximum secured loan for a family is [illegible].

The society also coordinates the supply and use of services and property, the former being sold to a [illegible] co-operative [illegible] and the latter marketed through [illegible], [illegible] in Chapter 6.

Political competition for [illegible] exists as indices of party changes are varied across time, intensity at certain periods, distinguished at others. This is partly a function of the national political situation (which I discuss elsewhere), and of the way in which citizens perceive the role of the bank. In effect the political leaders of the committee are largely secondary, as they are overshadowed by the Secretary. Between 1942-52 the post was held by teacher and is now held by Gymnasium Graduates. The job is important for its high secure salary, and because of its key role in village affairs. The Secretary's advice is usually followed by committee members as he deals continuously with villagers. He exerts an indirect, but nevertheless crucial influence on village affairs. Although most Secretaries have been honest hardworking men, there have been cases when they exceeded their powers and had to be removed by the committee (see Chapter 6, p.[illegible]).

The Secretary derives his power by being 'the one who issues loans' to the village ladies (which gives him a certain importance), also by

often being the client of the Commissioner of the Cooperative Movement who has to endorse his appointment and is an influential man of national importance. When these two sources of power are combined the Secretary's position is virtually unassailable and affects the grouping of the committee itself in dealings with the public and the Government. This is examined below. The present incumbent, Kappedgis makes no effort to conceal his clientship to the Commissioner and is considered a powerful man because of this. Many call him Maestros (boss) and recognize his ascendancy in numerous little signs (coffee offerings, awed silence in the building when calling for payment, etc). He also acts as middleman, selecting plots which are purchased by the Central Cooperative Movement which has entered agricultural production, and arranges employment at the newly established Cooperative light industries in Paphos. Because of his power and high handed manner he is feared rather than popular.

The Cooperative Store (Synergatikon), established in 1945, is the largest village retail store, supplying a wide variety of goods and consumables. It is a member of the national cooperative retail organization, SPOLP, from which it purchases most of its supplies. Its five man committee meets once a month. They are assisted by a Secretary who receives a small salary and whose job is to place wholesale orders. He usually travels to Paphos twice a week. A full time salesman is also employed.

The Synergatikon has largely taken over the activities of the previous numerous private grocers who also practiced money lending. Dividends are usually paid to the members yearly. Most villagers now purchase goods on a cash basis but in recent years the store has been losing business due to mismanagement, (which has weakened its reputation) and through the establishment of two grocer-shops by returned migrants. The synergatikon's committee is leftist dominated whilst the private grocers

are rightists. Shopping patterns are therefore highly polarized.

Ecclesiastical affairs are overseen by the Church Committee which was more important in the past than nowadays. It has four members: a secretary, treasurer and the two village priests. Its President is the most elderly ordained priest. The committee's duties involve collecting proceeds from the sale of candles, collecting wedding service, baptismal, funeral fees, and administering the local church property, which is minimal. This income pays for half of the priests' salaries (the rest being paid by the Paphos Bishopric), and maintaining the upkeep of the Church and the local cemetry. The former duty is recent. Until the mid 1960s the village papas depended completely upon his parishioners' charity; his position is now more secure. Much more interest was expressed in the committee than at present. Men competed fiercely for committee seats which gave them some leverage in access to Paphos Bishopric property as well as the right to carry the purple embroidered panoply of the Virgin Mary in the Easter procession. This was a highly prized distinction which symbolized religious piety and economic pre-eminence, similar to the pattern described by Boissevain for religious confraternities in Malta (1965). The committee is not an important office any more and most men are disinterested in its affairs. An extent of the changes can be obtained from the fate of Catechism classes for the young. Until 1978 Catechism classes were regularly given to children and were highly attended. They have now been discontinued; the children are now busy taking private lessons in English.

The Potima Cooperative was established in 1950. It administers an ex-Chiftlik of 862 Donums on a 30 year lease to 26 Peyiotes and 2 Kissonerghites, who are the only members of this cooperative. This is a marketing cooperative which markets products collectively (though a sig-

marketing. Shopping patterns are therefore highly polarized.

Educational efforts are overseen by the Church Committee which was more important in the past than nowadays. It has four teachers: a carpenter, tailor and two village priests. The village priest is the most highly qualified priest. The committee's duties include collecting contacts from the sale of cows, medicinal products, supplies, baptismal fees, and administration. [illegible] which is mainly used. This income pays for [illegible] and the rest being used by the Padre Elaborado. [illegible] of the church and the local priests. [illegible] the village priest depends on [illegible] upon its priests' energy; this priest is now more secure. [illegible] interest has decreased in the committee than at present. [illegible] for committee meets only few times since January. [illegible] property as well as the right to carry the purple embroidered canopy of the Virgin in the Easter procession. This was a highly prized distinction which combined religious piety and economic pre-eminence, similar to the honor described by Belasquez for religious confraternities in Mexico (1963). The committee is not an important office any more and most men are disinterested in its affairs. An account of the changes can be traced from the fate of Catechism classes for the young. Until 1964 catechism classes were regularly given to children which were highly attended. Today now lasted about; the children are now busy taking private lessons in English.

The Petra Cooperative was established in 1950. It consists an activity of 182 Cowsen on a 30 year lease to 20 Peruvian and 2 Chilean, who are the only members of this cooperative. This is a working cooperative which marketa products collectively (though a mi-

nificant portion of the produce is often sold individually), purchases fertilizers and pesticides and issues small loans against produce. The committee, consisting of 5 members, is elected every 3 years from, and by, the total membership, and meets informally at the Secretary's office every evening. Their duties are to ensure that water supplies are distributed and regulated fairly among the plot lessees (irrigation comes from a nearby dam); and the Secretary's duties involve collecting water dues and finding markets for the vegetables grown. Pantellis, the Secretary, receives a salary of £35 per month.

The Irrigation Committee was established in 1971 to oversee the administration of a Government sunk well irrigating a certain village area. The four committee members elected every 4 years by the 79 owners of the irrigated properties meet very irregularly and most of the work is done by the Secretary (Kappedgis) who checks accounts for a salary of £100 per year, and the water meter reader who is employed to take the water readings and collect payment once a month. As a considerable percentage of the irrigated area is planted with high investment cash crops (vines, bananas) members are concerned that they receive an adequate amount of water as well as proper billing. Personal and political differences can sometimes split the committee and electorate.

The Development and Improvement Board was established in 1951. Its three members were appointed on the recommendation of the then Mukhtar (cf. Chapter 3, Note 13) when the Church imposed a boycott on electoral participation. The number was increased to 5 in 1979 when the first elections were held (see Chapter 9). Its chairman is the District Commissioner and there are also three government official members. The Board is responsible for public health, issuing permits for roads, building alterations, street lighting. It has a full time Secretary who draws a fixed salary

from the taxes collected, the Government contributes a corresponding amount. They are property taxes, taxes on sheep slaughtered in the abattoir and on products sold in the square.

The present Secretary (Nicolas O'Dimarhos), who replaced the previous Mukhtar's son, was appointed in 1960 through the influence of his Koumparos (Symeou) and another ex-EOKA fighter with the Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Yeorghadjis, whose client he was until the latter's assassination in 1970. Nicolas' appointment in 1960 was a clear indication of the ascendancy then of EOKA men. He was a member of the EOKA group and was appointed over the heads of more highly educated villagers.

6.3 The Distribution of Seats

The village is therefore administratively complex when compared to other Mediterranean villages, eg South Italian ones (Wade, 1975; Davis, 1973) and Maltese ones (Boissevain, 1965). I shall now examine the distribution of seats according to two criteria: occupation and political party affiliation. The data indicate a contradiction between, on the one hand, a highly active party political competition for such seats, and on the other hand an apparent readiness to shelve politics from the decision-making process. I shall show that this tendency towards arena councils is only explicable by reference to the cultural contexts within which they occur and the 'multiplex ties' which are involved.

Out of the total 35 elective posts in 1978, 18 (51%) were full time farmers, 5 (14%) part time farmers and craftsmen (members of the 'third group'), 6 (17%) occupied full time administrative posts (eg Secretaries), 2 (6%) were salesmen, 1(3%) teachers, and the rest (8.5%) retired farmers. As seat distribution does not reflect the occupational distribution, it is clear that cultural and social stratification criteria impinge on the committees making them more of elite councils representing horizontal distinc-

on the taxes collected, the Government contributes a corresponding amount. They are property taxes, taxes on sheep slaughtered in the district and on products sold in the square.

The present Secretary (Nicolas C'Tsaroucos), who replaced the previous Lutter's son, was appointed in 1966 through the influence of his [illegible] (Dyson) and another [illegible] together with the Minister of the Interior, Polycarpos Georghadis [illegible] after the death of the latter's [illegible] in 1970. Nicolas' [illegible] was a clear indication of the ascendancy then of [illegible] in the Ministry of the Interior and has appointed over [illegible] of more highly educated villagers.

4. The distribution of seats

The village is therefore [illegible] relatively complex when compared to other mediterranean villages, e.g. [illegible] Pitt-Rivers (1966, 1971); Davis, [illegible] and Blitzer (1973); Boissevain (1974). I shall now examine the distribution of seats according to two criteria: occupation and political affiliation. The data indicate a contradiction between, on the one hand, a highly active party political competition for such seats, and on the other hand an apparent reluctance to engage politics from the decision-making process. I shall show that this tendency towards some consensus is also applicable by reference to the cultural contexts within which they occur and the 'multiplex ties' which are involved.

Out of the total 35 elective posts in 1974, 18 (51%) were full-time farmers, 5 (14%) part time farmers and occupation (members of the 'third sector'), 5 (14%) occupied full time administrative posts (as Secretaries), 1 (3%) were retirees, 1 (3%) teachers, and the rest (8.5%) retired farmers. This distribution does not reflect the occupational distribution, it is clear that cultural and social attractification criteria impinge on the consciousness making them more of elite councils representing horizontal distinc-

tions within the village. On the other hand it is certain occupational groups which predominate, the full time farmers rather than the morphomeni, whom I had earlier pointed out dominate village affairs. Why is this so?

One main reason why they do so is due to their occupying more than one committee. Loizos had called it 'overlapping leadership' (1975); I prefer calling it 'conflicting roles'. The six men occupying more than one seat in 1978 were the following:

Committee Members		Level of Education
Neophytos Pantellis	Secretary, Church Committee Secretary, Potima Cooperative Venture Member, School Committee Member, Cooperative Bank Committee	Completed Secondary Education
Dimitris Kappedgis	Treasurer, Church Committee Tressurer, Irrigation Committee Member, School Committee Member, Cooperative Store Committee Secretary, Cooperative Bank	Completed Secondary Education
Georghios Arapis	Mukhtar Ex officio Member, Development Board Member, Cooperative Bank Committee	Secondary Education till 3rd class (16 years)
Yiannis Rousos	Secretary, Cooperative Store Member, Cooperative Bank Committee	Primary Education
Nicolas O'Dimarhos	Secretary, Development Board Member, Irrigation Committee Member, Table Grape Committee	Secondary Education till 2nd class (15 years)
Bampos Aplas	Member, Potima Cooperative Venture Member, School Committee	Completed Secondary Education

TABLE 6.1: COMMITTEE MEMBERS OCCUPYING MORE THAN ONE SEAT AND THEIR LEVEL OF EDUCATION

Farmers predominate for three reasons. First, men have to be available in the village for consultation at quick notice. This automatically

excludes certain occupations. Second, four of the seven committees are concerned either directly or indirectly with agriculture. Third, certain occupations are excluded by virtue of their status. Shepherds, and labourers do not have the necessary skills to be members and are away from the village most of the day. Teachers are now legally excluded from being members of their village Cooperative Bank once they are members of their own Teachers' Cooperative Society. In addition they are now reluctant to take a lead in village life. One teacher of socialist leanings said that he had 'given up' on the villagers: "you try to explain things to them but they are always afraid of pressing for their rights especially with Government officials". Another teacher was excluded due to his political beliefs. Finally merchants, shopkeepers, grocers, etc are excluded from membership of the Cooperative Committees because of competition between them and that movement. In any case most villagers consider them thieves. This leaves membership open to the farmers and skilled workers.

With the exception of the morphomeni, therefore, the list of men occupying these posts is a virtual list of important village leaders. Recognized leadership is defined in, and through, membership. Whilst it is true that not all committees are important, nevertheless membership of a number does confer some degree of status. This has been noted by other observers (eg Nadia Abu Zahra, 1972 for Tunisian Cooperatives): certain posts are cumulative and stepping stones to even more important ones. These men are treated with respect, most Peyiotes show a considerable deference towards those whom they consider wealthier and more educated.

Qualities of leadership are defined by three factors: psychological, economic, and administrative. On the personal level men have to be statheroí (not easily influenced in their beliefs and decisions). This is required by village social realities. Manner is also important, as is the

ability to instil a certain deference in others. As committee members are often concerned with financial matters (such as the issuing of loans), they are expected to have some knowledge of the economic standing of others. Wealth is another important criteria. Peyiotes do not accept the Aristotelian definition of politics as distinct from the household and its economy. To them qualification for the public political domain depends upon having a sound independent domestic economy.

Finally literate and linguistic skills are necessary. As shown in the table, most of the committee members have had some secondary education. The less educated ones are usually older men who have built up a considerable experience and are often the political leaders of the village or men appointed due to political connections. Formal education and a certain polite restraint in dealing with others are expressed in the concept of morphosi. Committee members, in short, are required to possess more of the qualities of 'politès' (townsmen) and less of the qualities of 'horíatès' (countrymen). As these men are often involved in negotiations with the Government over water rights or grape-selling schemes, they should, ideally, not be overawed by Government officials.

Generally most committee members attempt to be fair in their dealings, especially over taxation and the issuing of loans. Indeed most are sensitive to public criticism which can damage their reputation. When noticed, transgressions are picked on with a certain delight by the villagers. As status is attached to these posts men will make an effort to assume conduct which befits them including the wearing of jackets, ties, etc. They are sometimes taunted with having put on airs.

Whilst the expression of an active interest in membership is frowned upon because of the intense competitiveness of village social relations, there is a common sentiment of possession (eg "the coopera-

tive belongs to the village, we established it and now everybody shops there"). This is usually expressed in the belief that only men "good for the village" should occupy such posts. This theme is very much like a 'restricted code', it is often repeated, but as men are now members of political parties, there are varying and conflicting views of what is 'good' for the village. This permits for strategic manipulation. In 1978 Right and Left Controlled the following committee seats:

	RIGHT	LEFT
Church Committee	3	1
Irrigation Committee	4	-
Potima Cooperative	1	4
School Committee	5	1
Cooperative Bank Committee	3	2
Table Grape Village Committee	4	1
Cooperative Store	2	3
TOTAL	22	12

TABLE 6.2: DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITTEE SEATS BETWEEN RIGHT AND LEFT IN 1978.

To a certain extent this distribution indicates the relative strengths of right and left, and also which administrative structures tend to be monopolized by the different groups. The important thing to note is that the strengths of the parties have ebbed and changed across time. Some committees are now unimportant; but others strongly indicate the institutional political divisions within the village. They also indicate, by implication, the occupational differences between right and left. The Irrigation and Table Grape Committees are right-dominated; they reflect the predominantly rightist beliefs of the young generation of full time farmers. By contrast the Potima Cooperative has 4 leftists to 1 rightist. Most of the 29 farmers who belong to this Cooperatives are part time farmers and labourers. They belong to the older generation of farmers. The Cooperative Bank and Store are dominated by the right and left respectively, the latter providing an informal meeting place for leftists.

6.4 Closed and Open Meetings

I now examine the tensions inherent in representation and expand my earlier point that some individuals occupy 'conflicting roles' in leadership. This is most clearly brought out in the case of the Cooperative Credit Society to which my subsequent comments will mainly apply.

There are two opposing pulls in this committee. On the one hand it is heavily biased in representing the full time farmers and has the makings of what Bailey calls an 'elite council' (1965). On the other hand committee members are political activists, explicitly supported by political parties and ultimately accountable to them. In short this political support orients the committee towards an arena-type council with each group concerned to represent its sectional partisan interests.

I shall examine here the way in which this committee deals with issues in two contexts, the closed and open meeting, by giving an account of two meetings which I observed.

i) Closed Meetings These exclude, by definition, the adoption of rhetorical political platforms. On the other hand closed meetings can often be used to further sectional interests. This does not normally happen; the committee meets mainly to discuss dowry house loans and applies strictly economic criteria. The dowry house provision is a problem common to all men and according to most men is 'logically prior' to politics. This is the normal situation, but one case I observed concerned a half-hearted attempt to link loans to political criteria. The committee consists of 2 Leftists, 2 Rightists and one man chosen as an 'Independent' but who has strong ties with rightists. The Leftist members are also on the administratively separate Cooperative Store committee, then running at a loss. The total conversation ran as follows:

> Leftist (after all the Committee had agreed to some loan requests): "We have given money to those who never shop at the Cooperative Store. This is wrong. We are not good synergatistes (supporters, members of the cooperative). We should tell them to shop at the store if they want loans."
> Rightist: "Why are you saying this now, Kyrie (Sir), after we have approved the loans?"
> Leftist: "I said so to make the point."

Although no decision was reached, the topic is important enough to warrant an analysis of (i) the context, (ii the issues involved, and (iii) the form of debate. First, the discussion occurred in a highly charged pre-election period dealt with in Chapter 9 and leftists were keen to support the Store then running at a loss due to the establishment of private grocers whose clientele was mainly rightist. On the other hand the leftist member was reluctant to insist on the point prior to approving loans unless supported by all the committee which could have voted against him. He used the term synergatistes to embarass the rightists, presenting them as lacking in their duty to support another cooperative. The only rightist who spoke used the term Kyrie mockingly to indicate that he was annoyed at having introduced it after a loan approval. By so speaking-up he also distanced himself from the other two members and the Secretary for his own personal reasons. The Secretary and one right committee member, the Mukhtar, were about to contest the forthcoming Mukhtar elections on a common ticket, and had excluded him from their electoral platform, a situation he was keen to change. Consequently he interjected also to embarrass both men, showing that, in contrast to them (who were silent), he agreed with the content but not with its timing. However, he stopped short of pursuing the topic once he noticed their reluctance to speak.[8] In short, the few political proposals are rejected by not replying directly to them. Confrontations are minimized, the proposer appreciates his tenous position and does not pursue the issue.

ii) Open Meetings These are the Annual General Meetings open to all members. The one I attended in 1979 also occurred in the pre-election period and some 60 men turned up. The purpose is to present the preceding year's accounts, inform members of new developments, and deal with policy questions. One committee member was absent, and with the exception of a leftist committee member, the Secretary, and a Cooperative Department official who convened the meeting, all other committee members sat with the public. As the meeting had not be sufficiently advertised most men made their points individually and there was much repetition. The issues raised were:
(i) increasing the loan limit, which according to most was not sufficiently high to prevent the sale of land to build dowry houses, and (ii) asking for more information about the grape committee. The pattern of debate was simple. Men stood up to make a point or provoke comment from the Secretary. In short, men dealt directly with the Secretary rather than with the committee members sitting in their midst. The Secretary began by saying that the Cooperative belonged to the members and appealed to them to invest some money there. After a few minutes he was interrupted by an old labourer who shouted 'don't make it a family concern'. The meaning was vague[9] and the Secretary bypassed the comment disclosing that the Cooperative was about to bring further benefits to the village, appealing to all present "to really work with the Society to be able to build dowry houses." This thinly veiled reference to the issuing of loans was not lost. He added that the Bank was run by a committee, 'your committee'. The Official then gave a run down of the Bank's financial condition. He was followed by some men who began asking questions. One man said that they wanted a new grape committee "for we do not even know who the members are". His argument was that it was a committee in name only. The Secretary interpreted this as referring to the Bank committee and said that it is elected every 3 years. However, after he understood that the man was referring to another one, he shrugged his shoulders and he suggested that they change them. Another man, who had originally planned to ask the same question, then said the whole conversation was out of subject primarily because the original proposer is an unpopular man and risked alienating many due to his manner of speaking. The conversation had become sufficiently heated to encourage the old labourer to speak out once again. He criticized the Cooperative Movement bluntly and aggressively for buying Peyioti land,[10] directing his comments to the Secretary who acts as middleman in these sales. The latter took this as a personal insult, said that this was a free sale, the Cooperative had originally helped the farmers to buy this land from the Church, and that it helped many to build dowry houses. Some murmurs of shock silenced the protagonists and the conversation then proceeded to less controversial issues. There was much repetition of questions and answers. Finally, when the matter of employment in the new Table Grape Packaging plant was raised, a leftist labourer demanded angrily that the 'right Peyiotes' be employed rather than political appointees.[11] The meeting ended inconclusively and most men were clearly stunned by the violence of the debate.

I give the gist of what was a highly emotional meeting to make the following points. First, although the atmosphere was undboutedly influ-

enced by the impending election, nevertheless there was much in common with other open meetings. They are characterised more by unclear debates than by compromises or clear-cut outcomes. This is clearly a function of the large number of participants; it is difficult to have consensus or majority voting in such cases. However, the manner of debate is itself instructive. There is little coordination between men beforehand, they raise issues individually, and many of their comments can only be understood by reference to pre-existing personal differences. This was certainly the case with the men who directly opposed the Secretary. They do this because they are largely abandoned by their leaders who occupy committee seats.

Second, these committee members occupy a particularly difficult position. Opposition and criticism of the committee's workings is mainly voiced by labourers and the disadvantaged groups who cannot, for example, obtain as high enough loans as they would like to. They also depend upon the Cooperative for employment at harvest time. But it is ultimately upon these men that committee members depend upon for votes. Committee members, it has been established, are mainly well-to-do farmers with substantial land holdings. However, the charter of the Bank, an Agricultural Bank, prevents them from adequately representing the interests of labourers and shepherds.

Open meetings bring out these contradictions in a direct way by making it difficult for the committee members to defend their policies without explicitly invoking a class-based distinction which they (including leftists) are reluctant to do. Consequently they sit with the public and do not express themselves in the hope that the lack of clarity of allegations and the anarchic atmosphere will eventually blunt the criticisms raised. Public attention shifts to the Secretary who has his own reasons

to assert his public dominance. On the other hand the emotions raised and the high-handed manner of the Secretary in stifing criticism is enough to offend their political sensibilities. Once outside the building they complained bitterly about his reference to dowry houses which they decide upon and his 'undemocratic manner, in spite of all his talk'.

By contrast the Secretary's position is much more secure. He has two sources of power. Publicly 'he is the one who issues loans', a belief he clearly encourages through such open references. Although his position depends upon the Committee, he is also a client of the Commissioner who is known to favour and protect him. The Committee therefore finds it diffiult to control his activities. Finally it is not difficult to understand his continual references to 'the common good'. His structural importance depends upon the currency of that belief and an 'arena council' deserted by its leaders. The only truly elite member of this committee is the Secretary.

6,5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the various institutional cleavages in village committees. Apart from the occupational differences, and the left-right distinction, there are added differences which arise out of the context of debates. Peyiotes oscillate between trying to maintain an ideal state of affairs where 'only men good for the village' should occupy seats and a reality which is far more complex. For the discussion of meetings indicates that the committees are particularly susceptible to purely party political considerations. In the next chapter I shall investigate these political distinctions in greater detail.

6.6 Notes

1 Kuper is making much the same point when he states that "within every arena council there are the makings of an elite council, and that this central tendency may be strong enough to introduce a bias towards consensus" (1971:19).

2 Many old men recalled Mukhtars in terms of whether they charged fees or not.

3 This provided certain opportunities for patronage especially in the appointment of teachers who were originally paid by the committee, cf. Persianis, 1978, who notes that Mukhtars often demanded payment from teachers in order to appoint them (ibid., 119).

4 Many Mukhtars were suspected of having played an overtly political role, cf. Chapter 3.

5 Clearly recognized by the old men who say that they were 'tis givernisi', 'the Government's men'.

6 These figures must be treated with caution as (i) they exclude absentee landowners, excepting those who have a legal representative in the village, and (ii) husband and wife are often taxed collectively although they often have separate title deeds.

7 No such case occurred during field work.

8 The context becomes more explicable after Chapter 9 is read.

9 In fact it emerged later on that he had not been accepted for a cooperative job he had applied for.

10 Many Peyiotes blame the Secretary for the sales of land.

11 Six months previously this man's son had applied for a vacant post of Bank Assistant but had not been supported by the rightist Committee Members. The job went to the son of Koumpouros of the Mukhtar and Secretary.

CHAPTER 7

NATIONAL AND VILLAGE POLITICAL DIVISIONS, 1960-80

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter I present certain themes in national and village politics in the post-Independence era. The account is a selective one for I shall not be dealing with interethnic conflict, nor with covert forms of political organization at this stage.

In dealing with modern Greek Cypriot politics, two basic facts must be kept in mind. First, that it has not always been parliamentary politics. Indeed there have been two types of political activity which can be called the 'open' and the 'covert'. The former encompasses political parties, debates, elections, politiking of all sorts, the theme of this chapter; the latter has to do with violence, a particularly virulent form of factionalism, small secret groups of armed men (omadhes), insurrection (1972-74) and civil war; this is the theme of the next chapter.

The distinction between 'open' and 'covert' politics is largely classificatory, but it is also possible to see a causal relationship between them. Covert politics started to influence the course of political life and dominated it between 1972-4 with disastrous consequences. Consequently there are particular difficulties in dealing with formal 'open' politics as some of its major issues and alignments bear a direct relationship to covert politics prior to 1974.

The second point is that there have been discontinuities and upheavals in parliamentary politics itself. This has been noted by others (Loizos, 1977; Markides, 1977; Attalides, 1979). As parties of the right have changed with amazing rapidity across time they have been unable to establish strong and enduring roots (in the institutional sense) in the

periphery. This makes it particularly problematic on the village level where the politics of the right often seems like following the rise and fall of certain individuals. Although highly instructive in indicating the linkage between centre and periphery, I concentrate here on major political differences on the national and village levels in the 1978-80 period, on what 'left' and 'right' mean in Peyia, and on the values of leadership and amity between kinsmen which bridge these political differences.

7.2 National Political Divisions

Post-Independence Greek politics does not exhibit the characteristics of certain Third World countries where one party was able to organize a nationalist uprising and subsequently dominate post-Independence politics, as for example occurred in the Ivory Coast. Instead an originally solidary nationalist movement soon split into rival groups and a vacuum was created which made it inevitable that guerrilla elements played a greater part than was desirable in the interests of stability. This problem was similar to Algeria and is present today in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the latent differences between Makarios and Grivas increasingly came to dominate national politics turning Turkish nationalism from a small movement into a mass based one.

At the risk of distortion I want to present the parliamentary strength of Left and Right Greek political parties between 1960-81 (Table 7.1), which shows that since 1970 no single party was able to command an absolute parliamentary majority.

Some elaboration on the particular complexities of Greek electoral politics is required. The 1960-76 elections were contested on a simple majority system where certain parties entered complicated pre-electoral alliances to field a specific number of candidates and to cross-vote.

	1960	1970	1976	1981
Right	30 (i)	21 (ii)	21 (iii)	20 (iv)
Left (v)	5	11	13	15
Independents	0	2	1	0

TABLE 7.1: DISTRIBUTION OF GREEK PARLIAMENTARY SEATS, 1960-81

Notes:
(i) EDMA: United Democractic Reconstruction Front
(ii) U.P. (15), P.F. (7)
(iii) D.R. (0), D.P. (21)
(iv) D.R. (12), D.P. (8)
(v) AKEL and EDEK, majority held by AKEL
(vi) Greek community: 35 seats; Turkish community: 15 seats

Their causes were complex; apart from purely inter-party strategies some were established to support Makarios and his policies in the face of a determined vocal pro-enosis movement. AKEL, the Communist Party agreed with the right-wing EDMA (United Democractic Reconstruction Front) to field 5 candidates who were all elected. In 1970 AKEL, EDEK (Socialist Party) and the Progressive Front (P.F.) collaborated in certain districts to cross-vote and exclude the United Party (U.P.); in 1976 AKEL, EDEK and the Democractic Party (D.P.) collaborated to exclude the Democratic Rally (D.R.). The 1981 elections were contested separately by all parties on a proportional representation system and probably represents the true strength of the parties.

It is therefore difficult and misleading to read in the data an increase in the support for the Left as AKEL had consistently under-represented itself electorally for its own reasons; it is more correct to say that AKEL has become increasingly essential in the coalition building of certain right-wing parties.

More important is the change in the parties of the Right at nearly every election, though some of their leaders have remained constant. (Table 7.2).

1970 PARTIES	AKEL (Communist Party)	EDEK (Socialist Party)	UNITED PARTY (U.P.)	PROGRESSIVE FRONT (P.F.)
LEADER	E. Papaioannou	V. Lyssarides	P. Yeorgadjis(i) G. Clerides	N. Sampson(ii) O. Ioannides
1976 PARTIES	AKEL	EDEK	DEMOCRACTIC RALLY (D.R.)	DEMOCRATIC PARTY (D.P.)
LEADER	E. Papaioannou	V. Lyssarides	G. Clerides	S. Kyprianou
FLANKING ORGANIZATIONS	E.K.A. P.E.O.			P.E.K. S.E.K.

TABLE 7.2: POLITICAL PARTY LEADERSHIP, 1970-80

Notes: (i) Assassinated by persons unknown in 1970, after assassination attempt on Makarios

(ii) Imprisoned for complicity in 1974 coup

I shall deal with the causes of these discontinuities later, but here it is important to note the implications for government.

To begin with no right-wing party could command an absolute parliamentary majority and most coalitions relied on the support of AKEL which made for uneasy and unstable coalitions. Second, no right-wing party has been able to penetrate the bureaucracy on a mass scale as, for example, the Demo Christian party (DC) did in Italy, nor dominate parastallal development agencies such as the Italian Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. This has meant that the recruitment of political cadres has often been left to other channels. Government in Cyprus has usually been characterized by

discrete Ministerial fiefdoms, not the distribution and mediation of these resources in and through the party framework. The President may appoint ministers from outside the parties and most of the early appointees were young ex-EOKA men whose first experience of politics was through violence and who had their own personal political ambitions. Good examples are Yeorghadjis, the Minister of the Interior (1960-69) and Andreas Azinas, the Commissioner for Cooperative Development (1960-81).

The Right has been unable to establish strong and enduring institutional roots in the periphery since 1960. It has also been unable to rely on Church organizations and institutions to mediate between the grassroots and party elites as, for example, in Italy where there is an alliance between the DC and the Vatican (cf. Kertzer, 1980). Since the Right is fragmented and the Church has sometimes split into pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas factions, it has not worked monolithically. Although the Right has been able to rely on the Church taking an anti-left position, it is much more of a freely floating sentiment than an instituionally backed political force nowadays. Furthermore, as I shall show, the 1972-74 split in the Church has confused the boundaries of religion and politics on the village level.

In looking at the relationship between centre and periphery and the role of political parties I shall be following Gilsenan's perspective "which would focus on the access of the State and ruling groups to subject populations, rather than of 'clients' access to the State" (1979: 182). The following account of political parties in the 1976-80 period is a more or less straightforward one, but one major theme I shall be dealing with is that whereas grassroots politicians of the Right have resorted to a type of political entrepreneurship often including the use of violence, clientship to the Left has been tied to party activism.

The Democratic Party (D.P.) was established in 1975 under the leadership of Spiros Kyprianou who succeeded Makarios as President in 1977. It has centre-right leanings and was reputedly supported by Makarios to group together rightists of pro-Makarios and pro-Government tendencies after the disastrous factionalism of 1970-74 which ultimately led to the coup. D.P. has strong if informal links with the Church and favours close collaboration with Greece and the EEC over a solution to the Turkish invasion. In the 1976 elections it was strongly supported by AKEL which was eager to exclude the Democratic Rally party (D.R.) suspected of harbouring extreme right-wing, pro-Enosis activists.

The Democratic Rally party (D.R.) is led by the barrister Glavkos Clerides. Clerides was previously the President of the House of Representatives and leader of the defunct U.P. party in 1970. After the coup the previously cordial relations between Makarios and Clerides became strained and the latter was suspected of having designs on the Presidency in the immediate post-coup period. The party was suspected of harbouring EOKA β gunmen and was excluded from the 1976 electoral pact between AKEL, D.P. and EDEK which formed a 'Government of National Unity'. The D.R. draws most of its support from the literate urban middle class and is strongly pro-Western. It also has strong mercantile support and is therefore hostile to the Cooperative movement. It favours a more 'realistic' policy towards the Turkish occupation, widely interpreted as favouring the return of only certain Turkish occupied areas. This distinguishes it from the other parties between 1974-80 which maintain that any settlement with the Turkish Cypriots must be based on the right of all refugees to return to their homes. During the time of fieldwork, it was insisting on a Cabinet reshuffle to include more 'representative elements' as a condition to cooperation with the other right-wing party. This was widely interpreted

as referring to the removal of the Minister of Education who enjoys the support of the Left. Ministers are appointed by the President and education has always been a particularly sensitive issue in Greek politics. In the pre-1974 period many teachers were strong political activists in favour of Enosis and EOKA was glorified in history textbooks, etc. After 1974 these textbooks were rewritten, EOKA β was labelled as an 'organization of traitors' and the Ministry of Education passed into the hands of the Left, a disturbing shift for the right-wing and right-wing teachers.

The Left-wing parties consist of AKEL and EDEK. AKEL, the Communist party, is by far the oldest party in the island, having been in operation for over 50 years. It maintains a pro-Moscow, anti-Chinese, anti-Eurocommunist stance. AKEL controls the largest trade union, PEO and the Farmers Union EKA. A wide variety of interests support the party economically: import agencies which have franchises for cheap Soviet Block consumer goods, travel agencies, etc. It also controls LOEL, a cooperative wine distillery. The party has certain patronage resources: Soviet Block scholarships for party activists, (a valuable resource in socially mobile Cyprus), and to a lesser extent, jobs in the retail business, either directly through the import agencies or through the village store cooperatives when these are administratively distinct from the Bank committees. Through LOEL it can provide access to sales of wine grapes for farmers. As there is a wine-quota system, many farmers can only sell a limited amount of their grapes unless they have shares in the cooperatives, which are often distributed along party lines.

AKEL's domestic policy has generally been low key and it has had its own unofficial 'historic compromise' with certain right-wing parties which is very different to the Italian type. In the immediate post-1960 period it was hampered by its vacillating attitude over the EOKA struggle and was

portrayed as opportunistic by the right-wing in the heady early years of the Republic. After first opposing Makarios in 1960, it then strongly supported him especially in 1970-74 when omadhes emerged. Its aim has been not to provoke a unification of the right-wing parties and it has always negotiated with other pro-Makarios parties during elections over the number of Parliamentary seats; consequently many observers feel that it is parliamentarily under-represented. Communists are excluded from Government service and in the pre-1974 period, young party members were often harassed when serving in the National Guard, which was controlled by Greek Army officers. It is now insisting a 'purge' (Katharsis) of the Civil Service of pro-Grivas and pro-coup supporters and their replacement by loyal Government employees. As the Civil Service is composed of over 13,000 salaried employees and as investigation tribunals meet secretly (hence a suitable domain for intrigues and secret reports), it is not surprising that there is considerable reluctance to initiate a complete cleanout of the Civil Service. Finally the party did not resort to violence in the 1972-74 period.

The small socialist EDEK party is led by Vassos Lyssarides, its leading luminary. It is by far the most radical of all Greek Cypriot political parties and emphasises the necessity of a Cypriot, in contrast to a Greek, national consciousness. Its political and economic programmes stress the need to nationalise Banks, control the Cooperative movement, and in the post-coup period, to establish a 'national liberation' struggle enabling the return of refugees to their homes. It lacks a wide base as its supporters are drawn mainly from the young, educated and disenchanted urbanites who have been exposed to western ideas, but the party has a readiness to resort to violence. In the 1972-4 period it established omadhes (armed teams of men) in support of Makarios.

Finally there are a number of organizations which although not part of the parliamentary system have a decidedly political orientation. The most important is the PEAM movement (Pan-Greek Fighters Front), an offshoot of the Fighters organization established after 1960 when EOKA gunmen were lionised as national heroes. This organization later split into pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas factions, and a new pro-Makarios group was established first in Paphos, Makarios' birthplace, and later all over the island. It is led by Mikis Tempriotis, the previous head of KYP (the Cypriot CID which reputedly collects information on political leanings of individuals) and received tacit support and arms from pro-Makarios elements to establish its own omadhes.

7.3 Political Party Organization in Peyia

There are major organizational differences between the parties in Peyia. As the oldest party, AKEL has had a long history of organization in contrast to the right-wing parties which are more akin to the impermanent coalitions and pressure-groups of the Colonial era. Its central committee is drawn from the District committees together with representatives of the unions PEO and EKA. AKEL has always chosen its village committee members in terms of their singlemindedness and responsibility, and membership is carefully screened. A member is not readmitted once he leaves the party or is judged to be irresponsible. The party runs a coffee-house in the village, half the rent of which is paid by PEO, the labour union. Although not heavily frequented as there are other coffee-houses with leftish proprietors (the personality of the coffee-house owner does play a part in attracting a clientele), party delegates sometimes give talks there. In the 1978-80 period there were at least four occasions when the Paphos District MP gave speeches. Tombola and lotteries are held with increasing frequency prior to elections. For youths there is a football

Finally there are a number of organizations which although not part of the parliamentary system have a decidedly political orientation. The most important is the MRAM movement (Pan-Greek Nationalist Front), an offshoot of the Nightmare organization established after 1963 when MRAM became licensed as national heroes. This organization later split into pro-Marxian and pro-Nazian factions, and a new pro-Marxian group was established that is Fagbos, headed by Chandrasekhar, and later PJA over the Nazis. It is led by Nikia Tsarkidis, who formerly served as [illegible] for the union responsibly collecting information on political leanings of individuals and received tests supposedly [illegible] from pro-Nazian elements to establish its own [illegible].

Political Party Organization in Avia

There are major organizational differences between the parties in Avia. In the oldest party, KKA, one had a long history of organization in contrast to the right-wing parties which are more akin to the impromptu coalitions and pressure-groups of the Colonial era. Its central committee is drawn from the District committees together with representatives of the unions PGO and PJA. KKA has always chosen its village committee in terms of their alignedness and responsibility, and member-ship is carefully screened. A member is not reapplied once he leaves the party or is judged to be irresponsible. The party runs a coffee-house in the village, half the rent of which is paid by PGO, the labour union. Though not heavily frequented as there are other coffee-houses with social proprietors (the personality of the coffee-house owner does play a part in attracting a clientele), party delegates sometimes give talks there. In the 1970-80 period there were at least four occasions when the whole District is drawn upwards. Tombola and lotteries are held with reasonable frequency prior to elections. For Youths there is a football

team which does not play with other village teams, and lessons in Greek Dancing. The committee meets normally once every three months, there being much informal contact through the Cooperative store. AKEL has had a coffee-house in the village since the late 1940s and leftists usually exercise extreme discretion when meetings are held. They gather silently in small groups and reach the coffee-house by various routes, though the fact is not concealed from others in the village square. Such caution springs partly from their past experiences. During the EOKA campaign a number of Communists were killed, accused of informing on the agonistes, and a few miles to the south of the village an EOKA fighter who had reportedly leftist views was betrayed and killed. In Peyia a number of leftists were arrested in the late 1940s accused of disturbing the peace, a trumped-up charge since they were at their coffee-house; a client of the former Mukhtar had given their names to the police. Leftists were also killed in the immediate post-coup period, so caution is necessary. A pro-Makarios rightist claimed that during the immediate post-coup period a 'death list' with the names of 32 Peyiotes had been drawn up by 'outsiders'. This contained the Mukhtar, the Secretary of the Bank, himself, and prominent leftists.

They are also extremely sensitive to public criticism; a leftist who ran the coffee-shop was removed because he introduced cards and drinks to youths.

The D.P. and D.R. parties are led by ex-EOKA fighters and are more loosely organized in their infra-structure and personnel recruitment. The D.P. has village representatives and draws most of its support by being "The Government Party", and to a certain extent, in rural areas from the right-wing Farmers Union PEK, many of whose personnel are highly placed officials in the Cooperative movement. The Commissioner of Cooperatives,

Andreas Azinas, is a very powerful man for the Cooperative movement has banks and stores in every village, retail agencies, and agricultural marketing networks, as well as light manufacturing industry. Consequently its economic and patronage powers are considerable. In Peyioti terms Azinas is '<u>misi givernisi</u>' ('half the government'). His influence is widely felt in the village, mainly through the Secretary of the Village Bank, Kappedgis. The latter is the PEK village representative and a member of the PEK District Committee. Although there is a PEK coffee-house in the village, there have recently been problems in finding a man willing to run it due to a lack of clientele. As the prominent rightists prefer to pass their time playing cards, the coffee-shop is usually deserted. The D.P. Peyia group is led by Arapis, the <u>Mukhtar</u>, who is a member of the party's central committee drawn from delegates all over the island. Arapis has contacts with Alekkos Michaelides, the President of the House of Representatives and Vice President. He also could trace links to Makarios when the latter was alive.

Finally, the D.R. group is a loosely organized coalition of individuals not possessing a committee and led by the Secretary of the Development Board, Nicolas O'Dimarhos. They have their own coffee-house which is attended by the more diehard members. They were much more strongly organized in the past; a point I shall discuss later.

These observations bring out that one essential difference between the right and left is that whereas the former is composed of individuals, the latter is composed of a party. Consequently, one of the key features which often underlies the organization and grouping of the village rightists is personal antagonisms and alignments. This shall be examined later.

7.4 Factors Influencing Political Alignment

Peyiotes generally describe themselves as either 'right' and 'nationalist' (dekshoi) or 'left' and 'progressive' (aristeri), not by reference to political parties except in the latter case which means membership of AKEL. Most men harbour political beliefs though they might be unwilling to divulge them for very real reasons.

When discussing the right/left distinction Peyiotes almost invariably collapse it on to a rich/poor distinction. This is especially common with the more ideologically-committed and less educated leftists, whereas it is treated with discomfort and unease by rightists. The use of the rich/poor distinction is clearly strategic as there are both poor rightists and rich leftists, but to a certain extent this distinction is grounded in village reality as is shown in Table 7.3

Minimum Holdings	0 - 20	20 - 60	60+ (in donums)
Left	58%	38.5%	3.2%
Right	40%	47.5%	12.5%

TABLE 7.3: DISTRIBUTION OF LAND ACCORDING TO POLITICAL BELIEF

Note: Land taken at minimum holdings

Such data merely indicate that leftists tend to start life with smaller holdings. But when placed in the context of the village economy, the implications of smaller holdings upon the formation of a weltanschaung become clearer.

First, to start life with smaller land holdings often implies the necessity of searching for a livelihood elsewhere from the land, and, by implication, the village. It also implies that for those men who start life with larger landholdings, the acquisition of further land becomes more profitable, as does investment in agriculture and new crops. Most, but not all, of the new table-grape growing elite in the village have, to

a greater or lesser extent, right-wing views and are of a younger generation than the left.

Most of the employment possibilities exist in factories, on building sites, etc. In many cases employment is tenuous, men do one job part of the year and work in their fields at harvest or for a few months when vegetables are grown if the fields are irrigated. Of the leftists interviewed 71% had held a number of jobs different to the one they were presently engaged in, whilst only 50% of the rightists interviewed had done so. To pursue life through a succession of jobs and '<u>combinazioni</u>' implies a differentiation of consciousness and thus a clearer awareness of the implications of different life-styles and occupations. In the modern context of mass ideologies it implies, in short, a greater capacity to compare, without the means necessary for social advancement. It was those men who held two jobs who were the most vocal in their private discussions with me on the social differences within the village.

In these cases, too, to start life with less has often meant to start life <u>earlier</u>. The normal pattern for poor families was to apprentice some sons at a young age to a master craftsman such as a mason, tailor or shoemaker. Apprentices were often constrained to put in long hours and were, until recently, unpaid until they learnt the craft. Upon mastering it, they were often laid off work as many <u>mastroi</u> (craftsmen) could only operate economically due to the labour put in by apprentices. Exposed to the inherent insecurity of their situation at an early age, these men readily appreciate the value of trade unions. One mason expressed it this way: "What is a mason? Basically he is no different from a mere labourer; he is poor. You have no security, when it rains you are not paid and your <u>maestros</u> (boss) can lay you off when there is no work."

In Peyia leftist ideology is intimately related to the experiences of

the forties and fifties. Although treated in detail in an earlier chapter, to be a leftist means essentially a '*synergatistis*', i.e. a supporter of the basic idea of cooperatives. Leftists point proudly to the fact that they had established the Cooperative Bank and Store in the late 1940s in the face of opposition by the merchants. Consequently the bulk of the village left are men in their late forties and early fifties, who have direct experiences of this period. Although the right does recognize the value of the cooperatives, the left, because of this clear association with rural-credit, often act as if they possessed an ideological monopoly over the whole concept. Likewise they pride themselves on being *prodeftiki*, (progressive), and on being 'democratic' by which is meant discussions beforehand, and of being 'scientific' in their beliefs. In Greek the word '*epistemon*' can mean both 'educated' or 'scientific', and suggests a formal literate culture. Part of this belief is undoubtedly generated by the distribution of party books and pamphlets. Although I doubt whether they are in fact read, a number of leftists were proud of possessing some books. A few remarks must be made here about this notion of being 'democratic'. Formally it suggests that leftist beliefs would lend themselves more readily to the notion of 'village solidarity'. Why this is not so shall be examined later.

Political culture within the village has two further characteristics. First, both right and left define each other by mutual opposition and derive the essence of their meanings *through* this opposition. This is brought out in the type of political rhetoric in the village, the content of which has been radically modified by the events leading to the 1974 coup. Prior to that year both right and left held unambiguous positions. The right stood for the *ethnos* (the nation composed of persons with the same nationality and religion), religion and the family, and, by implica-

tion, union with Greece. The left stood for 'the people' (laos), non-alignment (which was previously picked on as being pro-Soviet), and of being tainted with atheistic beliefs. This had the implication of not being Greek and thus differs from the beliefs of communists in Italy for example (Kertzer, 1980) where ethnicity is not inextricably linked to religion.

After the emergence of EOKA β and the outbreak of violence between rightists over Makarios' foreign policy, the Church itself split vertically when three Bishops questioned Makarios' right to be both spiritual and political leader. As a result the Church and religion came to have an ambiguous value, and some rightists have begun adopting an anti-Makarios, and by implication, an anti-Church stance. This is gleefully picked up by the leftists who now criticise the right for being anti-Makarios, and hence anti-Church in villager categories, of supporting a country (i.e. Greece) which caused a coup leading to the Turkish invasion, and of being traitors to their country. Although leftists distinguish between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas elements it was relatively easy for them to slip into lumping them indiscriminately together when the occasion arose, as shall be shown in the account of the Mukhtar elections (see Chapter 9). Consequently rightists have abandoned the ethnos theme, and this has been replaced by the word 'Kratos' (State) which fits in more closely with the Left's insistence on non-alignment and independence.

Political rhetoric is not only expressed in the present, and the future, it is also projected backwards into the past in efforts to discredit opponents. Thus leftists now criticise the first EOKA and say that it was "a mistake". For many village leftists there is no difference between the first and second EOKA as they were both oriented towards union with Greece. Their reasoning is that as the activities of EOKA β led to

the coup and the Turkish invasion, the first EOKA was essentially wrong and 'a mistake.' There is no attempt to see the essential differences between the two. There is little historical specificity or a respect for the particularity of the present in such a type of rhetoric. In many ways this use of history (or non-use) is symptomatic of the predominant oral culture of the village (cf. Goody, 1979).

Right and left also differ in coffee-house use, shopping patterns, and consumption preferences.

Besides the PEO and PEK coffee-shops there are at least two other coffee-shops with decidedly political leanings, one right and one left. This often reflects the beliefs of the owners. The extreme-right one is frequented by D.R. men, has portraits of the Greek heroes of the 1821 uprising, the Greek Kings, and Grivas. There is also a picture of a young girl standing on Cyprus looking towards Greece upon which stands an older woman holding a stoli (cloth of refreshment). The left coffee-shop is sparser, its only decoration being a poster of a child placing a flower in the barrel of a gun, whilst the PEK coffee-shop displays portraits of Makarios and earlier Archbishops of Cyprus.

Coffee-house use firmly identifies an individual's political leanings as does newspaper subscriptions. Some men only visit the coffee-shops of similar belief. However, the coffee-house framework provides the opportunity for the peddling of information essential to village life, especially to those occupations working in the village, such as farmers. Consequently, extreme politicization works against such an essential practice if carried to extremes. Men will therefore divide their time strategically, either by visiting them all in order to preserve their 'independence' (anexartisia) in a time of need; or else by visiting opposing coffee-shops at occasional intervals thus keeping up with local affairs

whilst not prejudicing their ideological position in the eyes of others. In certain cases a critical balance can be maintained through careful use of time.

Card game groups bring out even further the distinctions of wealth, prestige and politics. There are two general categories: those composed of the poor, young and statusless, and those composed of rich rightists. In the first, ad-hoc groups of men gather together to play for trifles and mainly to pass the time. Playing is usually accompanied by larger than life gestures, such as when men bang the cards down with their fists. The emphasis is on self assertion through physical means when the actual stakes are trifles, and cannot be used to gauge relative standing and prestige within the village. By contrast, the second group is more permanent, being composed mainly of well-to-do rightists and takes place in public, but behind closed doors in the coffee-shops. These usually revolve around the Mukhtar and are composed of men who occupy leadership positions within the village. Card playing allows them to get together and play for large sums of money whilst re-enforcing the ambiguous and uneasy solidarity among them. The games are silent affairs, economical in gesture, not accompanied by the sudden movements of existential self assertion as in the former case; the very fact that they take place behind closed doors in public is not merely due to illegality, it serves to assert the economic superiority and separateness of those playing. To be asked to play is to be asked to join an elite group within the village and the poor approach such ostentatious and semi-concealed display with a silent awe. Rich leftists do not join such groups and the only social group able to move freely from one domain to the other are the teachers. Observers of more 'primitive' cultures (e.g. Hadza cf. Woodburn, 1968) have noted that gambling serves as a means of redistribution (in this case of arrowheads). Among

rich Peyiotes, however, the meaning and function of gambling is different. It is the use of money as a currency of signs, as a bond between rightists. These men do not play to accumulate cash, they play by virtue of being rich and rightist; it is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. This explains why rich leftists do not participate and why teachers and the white collar workers can move freely from one domain to another. They are considered above these political divisions by virtue of their higher status.

Shopping patterns also differ. Between the late 1950s and early 70s the Cooperative Store held the lion's share of retailing. It has always been run by the left and many rightists were constrained to shop there. In 1972 after the establishment of omadhes some rightists began patronizing a small private grocer, and a returned migrant later opened up a much larger store which was patronized by rightists. Encouraged by this reception, the grocer later contested the Development Board elections but as a 'xenos' he was not elected. This is discussed in Chapter 9.

Finally, consumption preferences are minor but significant. The left purchase Russian evaporated milk ("because it is cheaper and because we want to support those countries which support us") and LOEL Brandy; rightists purchase Carlsberg, brewed by a private company.

These may be minute details but they, nevertheless, indicate that men take their political differences seriously in the village.

Not only is the use of the public domain structured along lines of wealth, status and political orientation, but it is actually used strategically by different social groups to further their own interests and maintain their own structural positions. The higher status members of the village establish distance making ties within the village; the lower status ones attempt to bridge these gaps. For example, when the Mukhtar or

the Secretary of the Cooperative Bank visit the coffee-houses, most men will be eager to pay for their coffees, irrespective of where they sit. This is even more the case when important outsiders visit the village. When a Doctor, lawyer, Government Official or Secondary School teacher visits a coffee-house, most men will call the proprietor and attempt to pay for the coffee, even although the dignitary may be at the other end of the room. On hearing that it has already been paid for, it is common to hear the angry demand: "Who has paid?" Those who have obtained the ear of such men are objects of jealous resentment. In lieu of a coffee they will offer small chocolates, and important men often leave the village with their jacket pockets bulging with such small gifts. This is not merely a case of 'village hospitality' as outsiders, once their backgrounds are known, are treated differently. Merchants, for example, are rarely offered any hospitality at all, instead men maintain a wary distance. Likewise the older farmers take small presents of garden produce when visiting doctors and lawyers; these are usually presented discreetly and in private. The younger, more educated men ridicule such practices as old fashioned.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined contemporary political differences and the factors influencing political beliefs. Although Peyiotes are clearly divided politically, and leftists and rightists define themselves in opposition to each other, there are certain cross-cutting ties which bridge these differences. One is a belief that politics should not disturb the amity between kinsmen, discussed in Chapter 5. Another is a view that there are certain areas of village public life such as leadership positions which should be 'above politics'. A final, if negative, common sentiment is the tendency to view political affiliation as an

individual strategy, as self-interest (i.e. the interests of one's dependents), synferon (Loizos, 1975). Part of this belief must be undoubtedly due to the particular characteristics of modern Cypriot politics which has been spectacularly unsettled. Indeed cross-cutting ties, such as the belief that there are certain areas in public life which should be 'above politics', have tended to be strongly influenced by the overall national climate, and they tend to be used strategically. In the next chapter I shall be dealing with the other form of political organization, that of violence and omadhes, which brings out two points. First, that such definitions are often difficult to maintain, and second, that grass-roots politicians of the Right have often resorted to political entrepreneurship of a violent type to obtain resources from the centre.

CHAPTER 8

FACTIONALISM AND COVERT POLITICS, 1963-74

"Cyprus, after 1964, became a vast arsenal, far larger forces than ever before were driven into the conflict between Makarios and Grivas; the island was at the mercy of intrigues and uncertainties of mainland politics, and eventually the ambitions of the military dictatorship." (Crawshaw, 1978:380).

8.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the process of factionalism in Greek Cypriot politics and of the emergence of omadhes (small secret groups of armed men grouped for political purposes) between 1963-74. Factionalism in modern Greek Cypriot politics is extremely complex and I do not provide an exhaustive analysis of the events leading to the 1974 coup. Rather my purpose is to highlight certain basic reasons for the amergence of factional conflict and the emergence of omadhes in Peyia,

Recent writing on factionalism admits that factions are more complex than they were originally presumed to be. The editors of a recent sympoisum have said that "factions are best seen as evanescent structural forms which occur in predictable patterns within a dynamic political process" (Salisbury and Silverman, 1977:1). Here I take the view that most attempts to specify something about factionalism ignore the role of the State as a causative or shaping agent. I therefore begin by reviewing how different types of factionalism on the local level are integrated with national divisions and vice versa. I then trace the emergence of omadhes and their transformation across time, by reference to the State, to become almost politically corporate groups, in contrast to Loizos (1975) who views them as merely 'action sets'.

8.2 Parties and Factions

"The term party is not, in itself, loathsome; the term faction always is." Voltaire.

In analyzing factional conflict I believe that it makes little sense to produce typological characteristics as Nicholas (1965) does. Rather I take the view that three central questions must be posed: (i) the question of centrality, i.e. whether factionalism is pervasive and central, or peripheral, to the society, (ii) the basis of the conflict, which may vary from, for example, the relationship of resources to population as with the Mbuti (ibid., 27-29), to the fragmentation of the popular vote as in Italy which leads to an immobile political system and competing groups in the ruling DC party. In complex polities factionalism may well 'filter down' to the local community. Finally, (iii) it is important to take the role of the State and its institutions into account when dealing with complex polities such as Cyprus. By this I do not merely mean the State's monopoly of violence, I am also referring to modern political parties. In most anthropological accounts the distinction between party and faction is rarely pursued.[1] Nor is a distinction drawn between scale and the type of conflict For example Boissevain's account of religion and politics in rural Malta (1965) groups together Festa Partiti (competing village clubs dedicated to rival patron saints) and the national conflict between the Church and Mintoff's Labour Party as factions. Boissevain was doubtlessly guided by the local concept of pika (hostility between groups) and the fact that the language itself does not distinguish between Festa Partiti and political parties (1965: 74), but a grouping together of two very different types of conflict is indiscriminate.

Following Simmel (1950) village festa conflicts may be termed "unrealistic conflict" for they have been in operation for decades, symbols have evolved, and there is a game-like quality to the competition, in con-

trast to national political divisions which are particularly short-term and virulent.[2]

These observations are not linguistic and semantic quibbles and ultimately the phenomenon has to be explained as it appears, but it is important to remember that the Latin origin of the word implied "dire doings". Burke had said that factions are "the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument"[3] a definition I find particularly apt for Greek Cypriot factionalism. It is also important to distinguish short-term violent conflict from long-standing ones legitimated and rationalised through the accretion of symbolism. Factions, finally, may well evolve into semi-permanent institutions (e.g. Festa Partiti) subject to developmental cycles like the family.

Bailey has provided a useful working definition of factionalism as a type of conflict. He narrows the analytical focus to process and exchange but does not make any assumptions about the permanence of factions nor their evolution. Indeed factionalism is a specific type of short-term conflict characterized by: (i) "near horizons", i.e. short-term plotting and planning, (ii) the 'personalization of politics', where men must look after themselves often through violent action "outside the existing rules of competition, urged on by a fanatical enthusiasm and unhindered by consideration of justice and fairness" (1977: 23), and (iii) covertness, a liking for precipitate action to keep opponents off balance, usually through secrecy. Finally, factionalism is 'disaster prone', there is a concern for, and a pessimism about, the larger order.

According to Bailey the meaning of factionalism as 'politics in the shade' only emerges in opposition to 'open politics', i.e. processes of legitimated expression and representation. Without this distinction the term has little meaning. Inevitably in practice there is always a mix

between the two modes: "any normal political system develops shady institutions in order to supplement the channels of open interchange" (ibid.;31). His point is that factionalism emerges either when the use of such shady institutions becomes the dominant means of political expression leaving the field open for violent unpredictable solutions, or when certain patterns of conflict lack legitimation.

This is particularly clear in modern complex polities. Sartori has observed that "factions emerge as the despair of polities - at least of republican polities" (1976: 105). To Bailey such 'despair' means "when the controlling rules fall into disuse ... when there is no numen to refer to the entity which, so to speak, holds the ring" (1977: 29). He identifies numen as sentiments[4] rather than systems, such as the parliamentary system, political parties, their functions, and so on. This is undoubtedly influenced by the community study approach, but it is highly unsatisfactory to search for all the numen in the controlling rules or individuals in the case of complex polities as we are here dealing with the State. In these cases there is often a mix between 'personalized' numen, which Bailey is referring to, and the role of State systems, as I shall show.

There are various ways by which the role of the State may be integrated into the study of local community conflicts. One may emphasize the extent to which the State is effectively the monopolist of violence, (cf. Blok, 1969). Alternatively one may analyze the extent to which the State provides the institutional means for 'interest articulation' (Almond and Powell, 1966). Ultimately, however, three variables can be isolated in studying the relationship: (i) the extent to which the State and market forces have penetrated the local community; (ii) the concentration of locally sited resources, and (iii) ideological uniformity. Blok portrays a highly specific case where local mafiosi emerged prior to the modern

State. Other cases show local leaders deriving their power by being party functionaries, as with the DC party in South Italy. The mix of these types may well be very complex. For example the DC which is much more of a federation of parties has been called a 'clientilist mass party' (Caciagli, 1977) because it is organized in a pyramidal structure with a "manager at the summit who controls the local distribution of resources, mediates conflicts between subordinates and keeps the interests which constitute the party in line" (Allum, 1980: 154).

Grassroots DC politicians compete among themselves for votes to be adopted as official party candidates; "a man's striving at the sezione elections is taken to be a demonstration of the number of votes he can guarantee the party in an election" (White, 1980: 50). Rural Italians usually stick to their party (Parisi and Pasquino, 1980), but which party candidate they vote for is largely a matter of choice, or of interest. Consequently relatively discrete power domains emerge with candidates employing 'multiplex ties' to build up personal followings, or what anthropologists have called 'factions' (White, ibid.).

This may well be so from the community perspective as villagers are often more concerned with individuals and their antagonisms, with campanilismo (Silverman, 1975), but it may be worthwhile to use the term fraction or frazione here. The term can be contrasted with faction to denote the party origin and possibilities for lateral movement and growth of small groups. Fractions are indices of the cohesiveness or fragmentation of parties, and there is usually some unanimity on the expression of conflict. The term is more useful than faction as it usually implies a specific ideological commitment on the national level, possesses a degree of legitimation absent in factions, and involves coordination in exchanges with other similar groups within the party framework. Fractions

can only exist within political parties upon which they owe their existence, and parties like the Italian DC may well thrive on such 'political capitalism' integrating 'underdeveloped' modes of political organization such as campanilismo within more developed ones. By maintaining feuding local groups in a state of balanced opposition the party, through its District Secretaries, ensures its capacity to mediate conflicts. It also guarantees a high electoral turnout as men are concerned to advance their material interests by participating in local 'factions'. Wade (1975) has illustrated the critical role District Secretaries perform in mediating conflicts, and that they are more concerned with numbers than village personalities. In such a manner local feuds persist, 'big men' can only 'win' in and through the party framework, and local personal conflicts are replaced by ideological cleavages at higher levels (cf. Pasquino, 1980).

The relationship between a party, its constituent fractions and local factions outside the party framework is clearly variable. For example, The National Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh can be said to rely more on local factions than the Italian DC depends upon its party fractions. In Uttar Pradesh the level of integration between local groups and the party is more fluid and less predictable. Local 'big men' can properly be called factional leaders as they participate within the party framework only when it suits them and are at greater liberty than their DC counterparts in changing alliances irrespective of ideological criteria. With stronger control over scarce local resources such as land rented out to the lower castes, an autonomous local economy preventing the establishment of alliances between factions (leaders and followers) across regional boundaries, and the absence of external threats, "factional loyalty is more important than party loyalty" (Brass, 1965: 234). As factional leaders can often utilize their private resources, "the capacity of the Congress to win an

election may depend more on its ability to maintain internal cohesion than on its ability to compete with opposition parties for external support from the electorate" (ibid.;232).

I now examine the process of factionalism in Greek Cypriot politics between 1960-74. Three factors are important to note here. First, the split between Makarios and Grivas widened and they ultimately became populist figures operating outside the parliamentary framework. Short-lived political parties and the small size and good communications of the island encouraged the emergence of extreme forms of personal ties between villagers and national politicians.

Second, the EOKA struggle created a visible and vociferous political elite consisting of ex-fighters. The absence of local elections or local institutions of self-government, however, such as Italian sezione elections, do not permit their party bureaucratization and legitimation. Such men had few political institutional avenues available to them save participation in rare General Elections in short-lived political parties where they had to compete with traditional urban intellectuals: doctors, lawyers, notaries, etc. Nor did they control sufficient local resources such as land to establish power bases. They responded to a new and very fluid field of political competition by emphasizing their patriotism and their readiness to use violence.

Finally the interethnic troubles, which were undoubtedly exploited by these men to increase their popularity and following, strained the open parliamentary system obliging Greek Cypriot parties to attempt an ultimately disharmonious unity in dealing with the common problem of Turkish Cypriots. This influenced the political dialogue between Greeks and Turks making it unrealistic.

8.3 Factionalism and Omadhes

Three different theories have been advanced to explain the political instability that ultimately led to the 1974 coup. The first, the 'External Connection' thesis, attributes instability to international geopolitics, especially the tension-ridden relationship between Makarios' non-aligned foreign policy and the Greek Colonels' irredentist ambitions (e.g. Crawshaw, 1978). The second, the 'Ideological Constraints' thesis locates instability internally holding that for a variety of complex historical and ethnic factors Greek Cypriot politicans were unable or reluctant to officially renounce Enosis, with the result that they were the victims of their own cultural traditions (cf. Attalides, 1979). Finally, the 'Problem of Transition' thesis follows D. Apter and P. Nettl in attributing instability to the problems of transition from a traditional to a modern society (cf. Markides, 1977). An originally solidary nationalist movement disintegrated in a political vacuum, there was a sudden political mobilization of the masses, without any corresponding means to satisfy and articulate demands, and so on. The truth would probably lie in a complex combination of factors. I take ethnicity to be a suigeneris phenomenon and there was clearly a conjuncture between external geopolitics and internal change.

Two points are relevant here. First, 'open interchange' within the Greek political system was both limited (in the sense that it did not develop due to the original chasm between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas elements), and circumscribed (in that the 'ideological space' available to Greek parties was strongly influenced by the interethnic troubles of 1963, 1967).

Secondly, an electorally weak segment of extreme right-wing enotists was neither impressed with parliamentary politics, nor given much leeway in the parliamentary framework due to the official Greek attitude of

c. Nationalism and Ideology

Three different theories have been advanced to explain the political instability that ultimately led to the 1971 coup. The first, the 'External Interaction' thesis, attributes instability to international irregularities, especially the tension-ridden relationship between Pakistan's non-alignment foreign policy and the Great Powers' strategic interests (e.g. Chandra, 1971). The second, the 'Ideological' [illegible] thesis that [illegible] internally politics thus for a [illegible] Pakistan's [illegible] Great Powers' political [illegible] [illegible] variance thesis, with the [illegible] [illegible] of their own cultural traditions (cf. Jalal, 1971). [illegible], the 'problem of Integration' thesis follows [illegible] attributes instability to the problems of transition from a traditional to a modern society (cf. Rashid, 1971). In substantiality multi-ideological movement flourished in a political vacuum. There was a sudden political modernization of the masses, without any corresponding change to partisan and articulate groups, and so on. The truth would probably lie in a complex combination of factors. I take stability to be a gradual phenomenon and there was clearly a combination between external (geopolitics and internal change.

Two points are relevant here. First, 'open institutions' within the inner political arena and both limited (in the sense that it did not develop due to the original choice between pro-Islamics and pro-Secular elements), and circumscribed (in that the 'ideological space' available to Jinnah politics was absolutely influenced by the international [illegible] [illegible], 1972).

Secondly, an electorally weak segment of extreme right-wing ancillaries [illegible] neither increased with parliamentary politics, nor given such latency in the parliamentary framework due to the political [illegible] attitude of

'enosis in theory but not in practice'. As a result such men came to rely increasingly on covert forms of political activity and organization, in the form of omadhes (teams of armed men pledged to national politicians). The EOKA campaign introduced the organized use of violence as a means of reaching goals and expressing beliefs, which, as a tactic, was never effectively challenged or made illegitimate by the institutions of the State. Although the militants were lionized they never made much headway in electoral politics and consequently were indirectly encouraged to revert back to the tactical use of violence. As there was no effective disarmament of EOKA during this period, the guns were used originally against Turkish Cypriots, and later against the State, when the militants came to realize that they could not pursue their strategies through parliamentary means.

Omadhes represented attempts to solve contradictions and stalemates, which were both structural (i.e. due to the sociology of the political system) and ideological (i.e. due to the history of the political system). These included Makarios' non-aligned policy, his flirtation with local and international communism alarming to the extreme right; the slow growth of the Public Service Sector (the traditional means of social mobility), which could not absorb Greek investment in secondary and tertiary education;[5] the alternative image of short-cut social mobility through the taking up of violence for patriotic purposes, popular among young Greek graduates who discovered their Greek degrees devalued in comparison to Anglo-Saxon ones[6]; and finally the problem of choosing a 'Language of Wider Communication' (Fishman, 1971) for nation building not from one, but two 'Great Traditions'.

Covert politics in Cyprus has traditionally been expressed in omadhes, (Sing., omadha), which means a team or a group. In its most

basic form an omadha is a small group of men, usually drawn from a particular geographical area (a village or an urban suburb) bound together by ties of dependency to a leader. It is an ego-centred coalition of a non-corporate character. Two characteristics give omadhes the properties of a secret society: the members are pledged to secrecy and are ready to use force if necessary. In reality this is an ideal type characterization for omadhes have varied in their internal organization to fit the type of covert politics required.

Omadhes seem to have had roots in Cypriot culture. In the early twentieth century local politicians relied on small groups to organize their campaigns, apply threats, especially in cases of pre-existing debt relations, and heckle supports of rival politicians. This was not a pervasive system, but physical violence was common; warehouses storing rivals' products were burnt down (including in Peyia) and other similar acts were common. In the early 50s two rival groups in Limassol emerged organizing protection rackets, feuds, and covert politics against EOKA.[7]

The organizational prototype and ideology upon which the 1960-74 omadhes were based, however, were the Grivas established EOKA groups of 1955. For classificatory purposes they can be distinguished into two distinct types corresponding to two periods (1960-70; 1970-74), as they differed in orientation, composition and structure:

(i) The 1960-70 omadhes were largely spontaneous responses by ambitious Greek politicians to the intercommunal strife of 1963, 1967. After EOKA gunmen returned to civilian life (some were given important Cabinet posts), new omadhes were re-established in 1963. These were unofficial loosely structured teams of anti-Turk, especially anti-TMT (Turkish Defence Force) gunmen. They can be characterized as 'action sets' (Mayer, 1966). Although composed mainly of ex-EOKA fighters, their

groupings were initially chaotic and did not follow previous lines of organization. The Greek right was then parliamentarily united and most omadha members who had been given minor Civil Service jobs had a direct interest in protecting the ethnic monopoly of resources such as the 70-30 percentage distribution of Government posts among the two ethnic groups.

(ii) The 1970-74 omadhes, by contrast, had evolved into the private armies of Greek politicians (Sampson, Lyssarides, Yeorghadjis, Grivas, Azinas) or under the influence of Mainland Greek National Guard officers. By 1972 they had evolved into two opposing groups, composed in turn of a variety of sub-groups: PEAM, Lyssarides' omadhes and the Tactical Strike Force on the government pro-Makarios side, and EOKA-β under Grivas and Greek officers on the other. This was a highly complex set-up, nationally extensive and highly stratified. By contrast to the 1960-70 omadhes these groups were oriented primarily towards rival ones within the Greek camp. This was an intra rather than an inter-ethnic conflict centring on two issues: outright pursuit of union with Greece, or support for Makarios.

The nature of the subsequent factional conflict is common knowledge: the status of the State itself became the main issue, there were extreme forms of violence, a liking for precipitate action and a pessimism about the larger order. Finally political dialogue became detached from the party and parliamentary matrix, assumed populist nuances and ultimately dominated parliamentary politics. Omadhes took over the functions of political parties for those groups largely dissatisfied with the existing order and largely unimpressed with open politics, but with an added significance: as secret organizations they suffered from a number of weaknesses.

8.4 Omadhes as Secret Political Societies

Simmel has said that the secret society "emerges everywhere as the

counterpart of despotism and police restriction, as the protection of both the defensive and the offensive in their struggle against the overwhelming pressure of central powers - by no means of political powers only, but also of the Church ... it is the suitable form for contents which still are in their infancy, subject to the vulnerability of early developmental stages." (1950: 346, 7). However they can also be well-developed institutions such as the West African Poro of the Mende, surrounded by rituals which can be called instruments of domination.[8] A. Cohen has also shown that secret societies can act as the infrastructural means of political organization. Freemasonry "has provided the Creoles of Sierra Leone with the means for the articulation of the organizational functions of a political group" (1971: 444).

Both cases indicate that secret societies may well flourish at the higher levels of a social formation where they are prone to a number of weaknesses.

First, secrets do not remain guarded forever, and second, "by seeking to create a sort of life totality" they risk absorbing conflicts from the wider society. Among the Creoles such dangers are minimised, but the case we are dealing with here is one where secret societies (<u>omadhes</u>) emerged as <u>alternatives</u> to established politics. <u>Omadhes</u> suffered from the contradiction that whilst they emerged as responses to the stalemates of open politics (such as '<u>Enosis</u> in theory but not in practice') they were also 'offensive' in their orientation rather than 'defensive' and aimed at transforming the wider society. Consequently they incorporated conflicts of an 'open society' type. For example, the balance usually reached in political parties between long-term ideals and short-term rewards through a high degree of interaction and open communication between the various strata was not only absent, but proscribed. Although men might have

joined omadhes to pursue long-term ideals their motives were varied and even mutually exclusive. The channels for the standardization of motives as is found in political parties were absent. Differences among members took long to appear as secrecy limited vertical and horizontal communication amongst them. This indeterminacy of aims and the incorporation of conflicts of an 'open society' origin characterized early omadhes such as the Ethnikon Metopon (National Front) which appeared in 1969 amid preparations for the first general elections after ten years. According to P. Papadimitris (1978) it was organized by two National Guard officers, two police officers, and two ex-EOKA agonistes. It demanded a 'strengthening of the national sentiment' (a reference to a more whole-hearted pursuit of Enosis), a 'purge' in the Government machinery, and the 'rule of the worthy'.

The E.M. represented the transition from the early omadhes, mainly localized impermanent groups of anti-Turk gunmen, to the second type of omadhes which evolved into nationally based organizations of a more permanent nature oriented towards Greek internal political issues. It also catalysed that transition. Indeed its aims were a curious combination of party political programmes and idealized projections such as the Enosis ideal which parties were unprepared or reluctant to pursue as openly. The E.M.'s insistence on a purge and 'the rule of the worthy' was undoubtedly influenced by Sampson's vaguely leftist and populist Progressive Front party then campaigning in favour of the 'real patriots' who had been wrongly excluded from their just rewards by other rightist parties. In short the E.M. differed from some political parties only to the extent it was prepared to pursue such ideals, and to the extent of its millenerian ideals, the most important of which, instant enosis, appeared as a panacea for all social injustices. The fact that parties had not officially rejec-

ted Enosis, together with Makarios' seemingly contradictory statements undoubtedly influenced most of the 70 members who were subsequently arrested after capturing Limassol Police Headquarters to claim that when recruited they had been led to believe Makarios supported their efforts.[9] Indeed, the following statement indicates the perceived need for a vocabulary of justification and legitimation towards the parliamentary matrix and historical factors:

> "There was only one reason for the establishment of the E.M.: Enosis and only ENOSIS. Now, if a struggle for enosis is considered betrayal, then we are not to blame for this view. Who are to blame? Those who are to blame are History, the Teachers, our Archbishops, our Bishops, our Priests, the Newspapers. For all these years, even centuries, they taught us that we are Greeks, that our mother country is Greece, and that our aim is enosis. To blame is the whole Cypriot nation when it voted in (the) 1950 plebiscite for enosis."

The E.M. was organizationally fluid and ultimately short-lived. Three factors explain its brief life. First, it possessed insufficient resources, although its follow-up, EOKA-β , was readily supplied by Greek Army officers. Second, it grouped together men from different political parties which ultimately split it by party type differences. Finally, most members were reluctant to pursue whole-heartedly the organization's aims.[10]

More corporate enduring groups emerged between 1972-4. EOKA-β (E.B.) "overlapped with the National Guard, thereby coming under the influence of Greek Army officers" (Crawshaw, 1978: 387), was strongly anti-Communist and anti-Cooperative Movement, and was counteracted by at least three pro-Government omadhes: the Lyssarides socialist omadhes; omadhes composed of pro-Makarios ex-EOKA fighters; and the Tactical Strike Force of para-military policemen. The former two were irregular bands linked to national politicians or highly placed civil servants, and only the latter can be considered the State's legitimate organ for the monopoly of violence.

These organizations overlapped in certain occasions and remained discrete at others. Known communists were excluded from these groups; indeed, although communists had the most to lose they were also distrustful of the populism then rampant and AKEL's insistence on dark CIA plots, whatever their veracity, directed attention away from the particular internal strains of the society. In the next section I examine Peyiote omadhes.

8.5 Omadhes in Peyia

Many Peyiotes would agree with Burke that omadhes, like factions, were "the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument", but they are also aware that what was once 'mean and interested' often becomes 'patriotic', that factions are affected by and affect the distribution of resources, and that they indelibly influenced village politics.

Peyiotes invariably present omadhes as a type of personal vendetta between two men, Arapis and his former EOKA comrade Symeou. But the ramifications extend far from their personal origins. The initial source of conflict centred around the sale of Church land outlined in Chapter 4, which favoured Arapis. There were bitter exchanges between the two. Peyiotes say that the two men 'pulled pistols on each other' and it was only the intervention of others that prevented bloodshed. These differences were institutionalized through the 1963 intercommunal troubles. The two men established rival omadhes consisting mainly of ex-fighters, and engaged in some heavy anti-Turk fighting in Paphos. Repeated attempts by their coordinator, their ex-EOKA chief, to make them collaborate were unsuccessful; the two men were 'mallomeni', i.e. at loggerheads.

Although both omadhes disbanded a year later, differences between both men were institutionalized through the establishment of rival coffee-houses, clubs, and committees. EOKA men were then highly respected, and even feared by their fellow villagers due to manifest readiness to use

violence. The lack of local institutions of self-government, however, meant that there were few avenues available for political legitimation other than through peripheral institutions: Cooperative Committees, Trade Unions, etc., i.e. village committees which, although indices of local popularity, could not function as 'stepping stones' to higher more lucrative positions such as the Italian sezione elections. Indeed, the small size of the island, good communications, the absence of critical local resources, and short-lived political parties encouraged the emergence of a special type of political entrepreneurship, ties of extreme personal dependency between local politicians, such as Arapis and Symeou, and national politicians. Villagers were also prone to the partisan acceptance of, and participation in, populist ideologies in which violence was the ultima ratio of politics. Unlike 'big men' in Uttar Pradesh or DC party activists in Italy, EOKA fighters neither controlled land, nor formed part of nationally extensive structures; they were primarily brokers in violence pledged to national patrons in exchange for access to State resources. Both men re-established new omadhes in 1972 after some masked men blew up the police station and a nearby radio relay station. Some Peyiotes were arrested but released for lack of evidence.[11] The new omadhes substantially differed from the 1963 ones but had certain common feature.

First, these were not spontaneous ad hoc groups competing through the idiom and practice of nationalism. They were small groups of men who had been recruited during the inter-omadha period by Arapis and Symeou who, in turn, could trace links to powerful outsiders. Symeou, previously Yeorgadjis' client prior to the latter's assassination in 1970, had contacts with senior Mainland Greek officers and a Doctor who was reputed to be the leader of the Paphos EOKA- β. Arapis had contacts with Mikis

Tempriotis, leader of PEAM, who had been given Czech guns by senior Government officials.

Secondly, although all omadha members knew each other, only the village leader had contact with the external coordinator. This was particularly clear in the case of E.B. which was highly stratified, divided into town and country branches. Village leaders were free to choose their men, who could be trusted absolutely and were known as "the men of". The phrase "o anthropos tou" denotes absolute loyalty and even possession, and is used to denote relations of clientship.

Thirdly, members were expected to use violence where necessary, as well as to traffic in information and intelligence. In the shady world of Greek covert politics, intelligence transfers are nearly as significant as violence.

Fourthly, omadhes had a semi-corporate ideology and resources were collectively owned. Members were pledged to secrecy,[12] and the Grivas-led E.B. possessed initiation rites, oaths of secrecy, pledges towards the pursuit of Enosis, and so on. In short, these omadhes came closer to being institutions in the Malinowskian sense rather than mere potential 'action sets' as Loizos (1975) maintains.

In Fig. 8.1 I show the members of both groups. The diagram is incomplete as it includes only the core members who could still be identified in 1978; nevertheless some striking points emerge. To begin with Arapis' Makariaki omadha (M.O.) was built upon an infrastructure of fictional kinship, of Koumparia (i.e. Godfatherhood); Symeou's Griviki omadha (G.O.) possessed mainly real kinship ties or completely lacked them. The different natures of these bonds is important. The Mukhtar had established his Koumparia bonds during his 13 years of standing as village headman and in various committee memberships. He was in a very real sense 'the god-

Tarpiletis, leader of PIAM, who had been given Cuban guns by senior government officials.

Secondly, although all *cuadros* members knew each other, only the village leader had contact with the external coordinator. This was particularly clear in the case of R.T. which was highly stratified, divided into town and country branches. Village leaders were free to choose their men, who could be trusted absolutely and were known as "the men-of-". The phrase "*a ambrosia con*" denotes a mobile loyalty and even possession, and is used to denote relations of alliance.

Thirdly, members were encouraged to use violence where necessary, as well as to traffic in information and intelligence. In the study area of Great covert politics, intelligence transfers are nearly as significant as violence.

Fourthly, *cuadros* had a semi-corporate ideology and procedures were collectively owned. Members were pledged to secrecy,[12] and the Grivas-led K.E. possessed initiation rites, oaths of secrecy, pledges towards the purchase of *Zonaki*, and so on. In short, these *cuadros* came closer to being institutions in the Malinowskian sense rather than mere potential 'action sets' (Nolan, 1975) endures.

In Fig. 8.1 I show the members of both groups. The diagram is incomplete as it includes only the core members who could still be identified in 1976; nevertheless some startling points emerge. To begin with Grivas' *Ethnikoi cuadros* (E.C.) was built upon an infrastructure of flotilled kinship, of *Lamprata* (i.e. Nolatzinadhes); Grivas's *Grivaki cuadros* (G.C.) generated mainly real kinship ties or conspicuously lacked them. The different natures of these bonds is important. The *Ethnikoi* had established his *Lamprata* bonds during his 12 years of standing as village benefactor and in various committee membership. He was in a very real sense 'the gun-



FIGURE 8.1. : KINSHIP AND FICTIONAL KINSHIP LINKS BETWEEN AND AMONGST PEYIOTI OMADHES (1948-74).

— — — — — — Ⓚ : Koumparia links. The individual against whom the Ⓚ is placed is 'dependent' upon the individual to whom he is linked according to the rationality of the institution of koumparia.

father' to such men, Koumparia being a personal bond.

Symeou's G.O., by contrast, was a much looser coalition, but it possessed a more pronounced symbolic component than the former which relied on dyadic ties. Indeed not only was a focal individual lacking, but the members were more equal in their social relationships to one another, equal at least in their adversity. For these were men who were politically dissatisfied, men who had been bypassed for some reason or another in the Civil Service, or young men unsuccessful in obtaining posts. Leadership was not centralized in one individual, but centred around two National Guard Officers (who acted as liaison men with their Greek superiors and who possessed some minor powers of patronage) and former ex-fighters, those who had 'really fought' for enosis and were doing so again. They were mainly farmers or in services employment, peddling a repetitive view of history, glorifying past times as EOKA comrades-in-arms to be renewed once more in the millenium of Enosis. Nationalism held a direct appeal not only because of its populist, vaguely leftist nuances, but also because of its simplicity and directness in contrast to the disenchanting, complex parliamentary politics. This popular mythology of rewards at the beginning of the millenium lent readily to the public feasting, heavy drinking and swaggers of the Kalasnikov toting EOKA-β men. Public feasting has a particular meaning in Greek political culture; unlike Sicilians (Schneider, 1972) Greeks rely on public feasts to reenforce pre-existing links, not to bridge differences with former enemies. Lacking a kinship infrastructure to the degree of the other omadha, such men relied on overt means of integration and camaraderie. They also attracted young unmarried men dazzled by such displays of 'men of respect'.

By contrast, most members of the M.O. were not eager to take up the gun as they were youngish married men in their 30s and 40s with their own

families, little direct experience of the violent 50s, and with much more to lose. They rationalized their commitment by reference to their personal links to the Mukhtar, their 'Godfather' who had helped them obtain minor official posts. They had also received a full secondary education which placed them at a higher level in the village ranking idiom. To them Griviki men were trophodotes, men paid to take up the gun; they asserted that they, by contrast, had done so for no reward. Griviki had another story: Makariaki men had now expeditiously abandoned the hard and honest path to Enosis on obtaining their posts.

One further difference between both groups lay in the role of young men. In the G.O. they were mainly fringe members; in the M.O. they were core members.

With two such highly politicized, heavily armed groups, violence broke out between extreme rightists and extreme leftists.[13] Although AKEL men were excluded from both omadhes, they often publicly expressed their disapproval of the populism and the potentially disastrous consequences of such factionalism. However, it makes little sense to discuss violence generically and Marx's (1976) distinction between 'appealing violence' and 'coercive violence' is more useful. Within the former can be included most public expressions: non-communication, non-movement of men from one coffee-house to the other, the circulation of rumour, and public demonstrations. Within the latter can be included the private attempts at coercion, i.e. actions done out of the public eye: influencing village committee appointments as rewards to staunch followers, 'dissuading' men from 'entering politics' through car bombs, beatings at night, etc. Indeed, with such semi-corporate vigilante groups manifesting a philosophy of swift and immediate retribution, many men (leaders included) were reluctant to resort to coercive physical violence in public, nor eager in encouraging

'outsiders' to apply such 'pressure'. Other villages closer to the town centres, and hence closer to the issues, were not so fortunate and large scale violence erupted immediately after the coup. One case, however, is important. It concerned a secret threat by Arapis to influence a villager of uncertain political loyalties to withdraw his candidature for the post of Cooperative Bank Secretary.

8.6 The Statios Case

The public presentation of this case has the characteristics of a didactic myth, highlighting the attitudes of villagers towards their representatives, an ambiguous and reluctant respect; the less talked about aspects concern secret threats of violence. Statios was the Secretary of the Cooperative Bank and the Potima Cooperative, in the habit of issuing small loans without asking the Committee's prior approval, a practice considered by many to have been a 'favour'. His internally based 'respect' was matched by his political contacts; as client of the Commissioner of Cooperatives he passed on critical political information on leftists working in the Cooperative Store who were refused salary increases. Statios was also unpopular with the new generation of young unemployed Gymnasium graduates who unsuccessfully petitioned Azinas to ask him to vacate one of his jobs. In the 1972 annual stock-taking anomalies were discovered, Statios held responsible and suspended. While the Committee debated what best course to follow, two men circulated a petition demanding his expulsion. Embarrassed at being portrayed as inept, and by this public indication of a general lack of faith in them, the Committee decided on his expulsion. Statios' reputation fell and he was now presented as the Devil incarnate, men taking a delight in pulling down a man if they get a chance, especially if it involves 'the corruption of the pen'; many men now came forward claiming that they had been robbed. Statios was unable to

defend himself and his son-in-law approached the Committee members separately; it was ungrateful to expel him - he should be allowed to resign and obtain a job elsewhere. Embarrassed, the Committee members pointed to the petition and to public anger. While his son who was an educated man, emphasized emotive village-based criteria ('he has worked hard for the village'), the Committee members, not as highly educated, emphasized due processes of bureaucratic responsibility. In any event, the Committee modified its opinions after Azinas met them 'suggesting' that they allow him to resign. In the village idiom 'he ate', the vocabulary of food being used to denote relations of clientship. Reluctant to oppose the wishes of such powerful men, the Committee decided on resignation. Statios then left Peyia to be re-employed in the Cooperative movement. In the jockeying for the vacant post there were two candidates: Kappedgis, a Koumparos of Arapis, then employed as an assistant at the Bank, and Costakis, brother to Zinonas, the village leftist leader, and a Koumparos of Schelis, a junior officer in the National Guard and a member of the Griviki omadha (Figure 8.2).



Fig.8.2: LINKS INVOLVED IN THE STATIOS CASE

Note: R = Rightist
L = Leftist
E.R. = Extreme Rightist
K = Koumparia

With the Committee composed of two rightists, two leftists and an independent, and with Kappedgis supported by Arapis, and Costakis by the left, the appointment could have gone either way. To Arapis, Costakis was politically suspect. On the closing date for applications he called at Costakis' house (an unusual, omen-filled occurrence) asking him to withdraw his application. The conversation was sparse, the threat implicit, the reference to violence exophoric, as it often is in these cases.[14] As Arapis was leader of an omadha, Costakis became apprehensive and secretly withdraw at the last moment. The Left Committee members realized that something was wrong, Kappedgis was appointed, and for a long time afterwards Costakis refused to divulge why he had withdrawn.

8.7 Conclusion

This chapter concerned covert politics and violence, explicit or implicit. My initial point, re-enforced by comparative examples, was that it is myopic to overlook the total framework within which factions evolve, however 'localized' and parochial they may seem. I then examined the national factors which influenced the transformation of omadhes from 'action sets' to more substantial institutions.

Grassroots politicians of the Right have often resorted to a type of 'personalized violence', pledging the use of violence on behalf of national politicians. This is a risky undertaking and support of the 'wrong' politician can often be disastrous for the village follower. To give an example: Symeou's career as a minor Customs official was beset by little promotion prospects, no pay increases, and the ever-present threat of being 'purged' from service. Arapis' career and influence took an opposite path. He subsequently obtained a scarce building permit for a Tourist restaurant, and a £100,000 Government

loan to build it. From a poor shepherd to EOKA fighter Arapis has moved on to become a 'patron' of considerable influence, engaged in Tourism and about to become an employer of local labour on a large scale. To this must be added land holdings and new crops; small wonder that even Peyiotes are staggered by such social mobility.

The conflicts raised by such divisions have continued to influence village political culture. In the concluding chapter I examine the paradoxical unification of the right-wing when contesting village elections. The pattern of politics here is rather different, but common is the intimate connection with national politics.

8.8 Notes

1 Particularly clear in transactionalist writings, e.g. Boissevain: "The account must shift from the group towards the individual ... Individuals and the loose coalitions they form are logically prior to groups and society". (1968: 544-5).

2 But cf. Boissevain (1979) for a change is his original perspective.

3 In contrast to a party which is "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed". (1838: 425-6).

4 'Numen' vary from 'sentiments' to 'individuals' (cf. Bailey, 1978).

5 The number of Government and Public Service Sector employees increased from 10,468 in 1961 to 12,852 in 1971, a small percentage of the totally gainfully employed. Approximately 12,000 Greek students leave the island every year for Tertiary Education.

6 cf. Loizos (1975).

7 cf. Foley (ed.) (1964) and Grivas (1961).

8 Little (1965) notes the political uses of secret societies on a national modern scale.

9 Whatever the extent of Makarios' involvement (and there seems little proof on the matter) what is important are the references in the vocabulary of justification: history, tradition, church.

10 Advanced by the organizers themselves (cf. Papadimitris).

11 Peyiotes were not directly involved, but they did supply critical information to the Paphos organizers.

12 Because of this men could sometimes be members of one omadha and participate in another. One example was Stasis (see Fig. 8.1) who, due to his kinship contacts with Griviki members, soon switched to that side in the immediate post-coup period.

13 Most involved beatings when fathers objected to the political courtship of their sons. Peyiotes say that the most traumatic effect of omadhes was the strain upon kinship bonds.

14 In contrast to Malta and Sicily threats in Cyprus never refer directly to violence; it is left unsaid.

Notes

1. Particularly clear in transcontinental politics, e.g. Malaparte: "The secret sect melts from the groups towards the individual ... Individuals and the loose qualities they form are accessible only to groups and society". (1960: 94-5).

2. cf. Solzhenitsyn (1979) for a similar [illegible] perspective.

3. In contrast to a party which is "[illegible]", for [illegible] mean by single joint endeavours [illegible] clearly principle in [illegible].

4. 'Power' very from 'morality' [illegible].

5. The number of Government [illegible] [illegible] from 10,000 to [illegible] of the overall population [illegible] from large the [illegible] [illegible].

6. cf. Sakaya (1979).

7. cf. Ruhy (ed.) (1964) and Grass (1979).

8. Ruhle (1968) notes the political uses of secret societies on a national modern scale.

9. Whatever the extent of Masonic involvement (and there seems little proof on the matter) what is important are the references in the rituals to justification: history, tradition, church.

10. Advanced by the organisers themselves (cf. Papadhimitriu).

11. Masons were not directly involved, but they did supply critical information to the Fascist organisers.

12. Because of this ten could sometimes be members of one cmmdhe and participate in another. The example was Stavis (see Ch. 6.1) who, due to his already contacts with Grivas members, soon switched to that side in the immediate post-coup period.

13. Not involved meetings when Masons objected to the political course of their sons. Psychotes say that the most traumatic effect of combos was the strain upon kinship bonds.

14. In contrast to Malta and Italy threats in Cyprus never refer directly to violence; it is left unsaid.

CHAPTER 9

VILLAGE ELECTIONS, 1979

9.1 Introduction

In the last chapter I examined covert forms of political organization in Peyia, and its relation to national politics. In this chapter I deal with 'open' politics and elections, where issues are freely discussed, though not always in a clear-headed manner. After an interval of nearly 50 years elections were re-introduced in the villages for the Council of Elders, and the Improvement and Development Board. Although there was a discontinuity in experience from the previous elections discussed in Chapter 3, these elections are characterized by an apparent readiness of Peyiotes to participate in national politics.

I begin by showing why the previously opposed right-wing groups in Peyia joined forces against the Left. I then show how both Right and Left used the theme of 'the village' strategically, in spite of the radical value differences between them. Following this I analyse the election results and try to show that both right and left were common in one respect: they both attempted to dampen conflict between kinsmen. Although 'politics' and 'the village' do 'mix', 'politics' and 'kinship' do not.

9.2 The National Context

It is important to place these elections for the Mukhtarship and the Development Board in their national context. As outlined in Chapter 7, the governing coalition consisted of the left-wing AKEL and EDEK, and the centre-right D.P. which together formed a 'Government of National Unity'. The right-wing D.R. party led by Clerides was then parliamentarily unrepresented due to the 1976 pre-electoral pact between the other three parties. It was suspected of harbouring anti-Makarios elements, which was certainly

partly true, but it also drew support from other segments of the right-wing vote.

By 1979 the original unity between the three parties began wearing thin. AKEL, EDEK and D.P. had originally collaborated under Makarios' presidency, but after his death the onus of collaboration decreased, as did the relevancy of his policies which were clearly inappropriate to the de facto partition of Cyprus. AKEL became disenchanted with the D.P.'s reluctance to pursue a purge and replace them by leftists, while the D.P. was uneasy with AKEL's insistence on a more non-aligned foreign policy.

These village elections were held to be significant as they represented the first electoral test of the parties after nearly three years. There was an unofficial policy of collaboration between the right-wing parties, completely at variance to the national political situation. This move surprised village leftists who interpreted it as presaging an eventual right-wing unification in the forthcoming 1981 General Elections. In the event all parties, including D.P. and D.R., contested the 1981 General Elections separately and the village elections must subsequently be seen as one more example of the complex process of Greek politics, of sudden changes in national alignments and of the exercise of power from within ministerial fiefdoms.

9.3 The Significance of Village Elections

Peyiotes have had more experience of village committee elections than of national ones. Indeed, the history of village committees encapsulates the history of the village and the dominant institutions within it. For example, during the late 1940s and early 50s the Church committee was hotly contested for by both right and left. By 1979 this committee was no longer an area of political competition.

Although not all committees are considered to be important enough to

warrant the taking up of political positions, most are significant in establishing the reputation of the participants. They provide individuals with the means to make claims to leadership when they are aiming for higher posts. Active interest in committee affairs varies. Peyiotes are generally willing to allow committees to proceed in their own way as long as they feel their interests adequately represented. But some committees involve the whole village and often concern critical resources. All Peyiotes are members of the Cooperative Bank which regulates the economic life of the village, provides essential loans, sells fertilizers, advances payment on agricultural products and markets the table grapes. Consequently, all have an interest in ensuring that the Committee works timia (honestly). The expertise required for the successful execution of these duties limits the number of those qualified for membership; nevertheless political parties are usually directly involved as such committees occupy a critical role in village affairs. They are both suceptible to outside political influence (either directly or 'symptomatically') and have a sufficiently local base to reflect wealth, prestige and political party strength.

Peyiotes view these elections in a number of mutually conflicting ways. On the one hand they are considered 'troublesome' in that they are seen to cause problems between villagers. On the other hand they enable political parties to manifest their strength. These conflicting modes are partly the result of the perceptions of different generations. For the older men, modern politics in whatever form is potentially divisive. This is due to their past experiences and stem in part from changes in the developmental cycle. As men grow older and as life becomes less competitive after the endowment of their children, their activities become oriented towards the maintenance of harmonious relations among their chil-

dren who may not only conflict over property but may exacerbate these conflicts by political differences. A 45-year-old man put it this way: Politics to the old is more manageable when there is the prosopolatria (personal adoration) to which they were accustomed in the past; now that there are kommata (parties), they often ask anxiously whether this is common elsewhere. For the younger men political parties are a fact of life; for them what is problematic is not their existence, but rather the best way of pursuing their political interests at the least cost, preferably, but not exclusively, through the strategy of negotiation. Elections to the Cooperative Bank often reflect the exigencies of the national situation on the one hand (the emphasis on cooperation) and on the other, the claims of village political groups for adequate representation. The distribution of committee seats are viewed as indices of political party strength, but two problems are experienced in this regard. First, once negotiations are followed and compromises reached, the original reality which lay behind such negotiations often becomes blurred and problematic. In other words it becomes ipso facto difficult to substantiate claims to strength. Second, major national events such as the coup and its aftermath, the Turkish invasion, have had the effect of discrediting certain segments and reducing them to a cautious silence. Hence, political parties not only make inflated claims of their strengths, which are impossible to substantiate short of elections, but also such claims have a blunter cutting edge in that certain groups voluntarily withdraw from the competitive domain after they have been discredited.

When the Government signalled its intention to hold the first elections for the Council of Elders and the Development Board in 1978, the situation in Peyia reflected the national political situation. The village extreme-rightists, who had previously established an omadha, were keeping

a low profile. They had been expelled from the Cooperative Store committee and had not contested any village committee elections after the 1974 coup. Leftists and centre-rightists of pro-Makarios sympathies were collaborating and dominating village committees. But this was a tension ridden alliance between centre-right and left, both nationally and in Peyia. In the original 1978 negotiations the centre-right, under Arapis, and the left agreed to split the 4 seats on the Council of Elders in half, with both groups having 2 seats. Griviki were not consulted, but in any case they were in no position to argue. Consequently, barring any other claims, elections would not have been necessary. Leftists for their part claimed that they were eager to support Arapis 'because he is a good man and unifies the village'. In fact they were extremely reluctant to oppose him due to his reputation and powerful links.

However, the Government postponed the elections which took place a year later. In the interval the situation had changed. The 'unity' between the parties was shakier than ever and powerful outsiders intervened. This was mainly due to PEK, the right-wing Farmers Union under the influence of the Commissioner of Cooperatives, Andreas Azinas. PEK attempted to unify right-wingers in the countryside and thus completely prejudiced the second round of negotiations in Peyia as the centre-right, under the influence of Arapis and Kappedgis, insisted on including the extreme-rightists in their midst. Azinas' influence was mainly manifested through Kappedgis, his client, who arranged a secret meeting in Paphos between himself, Arapis, and Azinas, his patron. This shift in the centre-right position came as a complete shock to the leftists who now felt that could not collaborate as they were offered one seat to the previous two, and because of their traditional hostility to extreme-rightists. Negotiations broke down, the familiar and more comfortable division between Right

and Left re-asserted itself, and hotly contested elections followed. The Right won the first election for the Mukhtarship, but lost in the second round for the Development Board elections ten days later.

During that years interval there were two main problems. To begin with an influential rightist named Pantellis wanted to be an official rightist candidate, but two other men had a better chance. One was Kappedgis, the other was Bampos, both previous members of the Makariaki omadha. Pantellis was reluctant to break openly with Arapis and Kappedgis who were his koumpari but supported Bampos. Consequently he resorted to other strategies to emphasize his indispensibility, mainly his administrative activism as Secretary of the Potima Irrigation and Marketing Cooperative. His competitor, Bampos, was also a member of this committee. The following incident brings out the strategies employed and is also significant for its own sake:

> 1977 was a drought year. The Dam supplying the Potima Estate and two neighbouring villages was running dry. For most of the 29 Potima lessees, this was a grave situation; if the drought continued, not only would they lose their crops, but they would be obliged to seek tenuous employment elsewhere. So they often gathered in Pantellis' office to discuss the matter. One day the water meter reader came in claiming to have heard that their present water supply would soon be halved. The two neighbouring villages, by contrast, would not be affected in the same way. The men started grumbling that most of the inhabitants of these villages were government employees whilst Peyioti farmers were about to receive less than their fair share. There was a certain amount of inter-village hostility and Pantellis took the initiative. Peyiotes, he said, were only concerned when their synferon (self-interest) was directly affected. We must meet Government officials and not be afraid to speak up. Bampos was also present. He jokingly suggested that the best strategy would be to offer the officials some gifts. Bampos belongs to the 30-40 year old generation of educated villagers with urban employment and his remark is typical of this group. These men consistently attempt to distance themselves from the formally uneducated farmers by emphasizing the ease with which they can influence Government officials. Pantellis,however, was eager to emphasize his administrative activism to the largely leftist farmers, rather than political entrepreneurship of the type Bampos represented. Whilst he agreed that 'they have all got used to eating', he added that the District Officer, although a recent appointee, was an educated man and would listen to our request. The men present agreed to go the

next day with no prior appointment.

Not surprisingly, next day the District Officer was busy, but his assistant (known to Pantellis) said that he would deal with the matter. Pantellis then introduced all the men individually.

When my turn came, a lessee, also the village EKA representative, turned to me and said: 'You mean that our troubles will be heard all the way to England?' As both men knew the purpose of my stay, his statement was clearly designed to show the official that this meeting had to be taken seriously, the Peyiotes were considered important enough to warrant such close observation, and that consequently, maladministration would be known outside. Irritated, the official replied: 'not your troubles Kyrie (Sir), but ours'. The EKA representative did not wish to have a confrontation and replied self-consciously that 'we are suffering, otherwise we wouldn't be here'. In fact, most Peyiotes are extremely cautious in dealing with officials, their philosophy being not to bite the hand that feeds you, an attitude encouraged by the officials themselves. Peyiotes see this as an impediment to the assertion of their rights, known in theory and ideally, but often difficult to practice. This was the meeting's main theme: how best to obtain one's purpose and the various conceptions of it. Pantellis then proceeded to their purpose. The water they received at the Potima was too little, their crops had nearly dried out; Government's plan to halve their water supply would definitely ruin them. At this point the official asked him where he got his information. He then corrected Pantellis, giving alternative figures. Utterly confused, Pantellis stopped to make some quick calculations. Others took the lead: the EKA representative said that water was their livelihood; a part time shepherd added that they were not Government employees, they did not have an extra income, they lived off the land, alluding to the neighbouring villages. But the official apparently took this as a personal affront; he did work in his fields as a hobby, very interested in their problems and wanted to help. The shepherd then backed down saying that of course they knew that he wanted to help. Most men did not wish to say anything which might sour the atmosphere and give the slightest cause for offence. Bambos tried to pacify the shepherd by signs hidden from the Assistant. When the discussion resumed, the shepherd spoke up in the same vein, irritating the official. Bambos tried to pacify him and redirect the conversation, which then turned to other subjects and most men seemed satisfied that they had received a relatively good deal. Outside there was much discussion on whether the shepherd's outburst was tactful. The EKA representative suggested calling at the EKA offices. There Pantellis stressed that they had gone individually as they felt that they had to represent themselves due to their separate contract with the Government. He did not wish to alienate the Union. Once outside, Pantellis suggested that they also call on the right-wing Farmers Union, PEK, 'so that they won't say we only went to EKA'. Once Bambos had left, on the way back, Pantellis started making his point. "This morning should have shown you all which is the best strategy, not only for the Potima but for the Koinotikon Synferon (social good). You can't get things by offering a feast (as Bambos suggested)

but by pressing for your rights." He then discussed different types of gifts. Gifts for 'private purposes' are different to gifts for 'social ones'. The former are acceptable, the latter not. He concluded: "Unfortunately this is how our committees (i.e. prospective candidates) work (i.e. think)", and alluded to Arapis' influence in high places. Most men kept silent, but the significance of his comment was not lost.

Pantellis' reference was to Arapis' influence in having a proposed Tourist Road resited when it had been planned to pass over some of his property. As this land was of prime value, this action placed other properties potentially at risk; passions were understandably high. Kappedgis and some other owners of properties in the area had asked Arapis to sign a request to the Government asking for caution to be exercised in the planning of the road so as not to take over complete fields. This would have given official status to the request but Arapis declined to comply saying that the road would still affect properties; consequently he would be held responsible by the unfortunate Peyiotes. Kappedgis was on the verge of directly insinuating that in his opinion, and in that of others, Arapis was the root of all these problems, but then decided against it. Instead he and the other property owners contacted their M.P.'s (both Left and Right) union representatives and met the District Officer. It was rumoured that Arapis would not contest the elections, although he had indicated nothing to that effect. In this context such rumour can be seen as a nuance of censure, designed to reverberate back to the object of gossip (cf. Lienhardt, 1975). Given Arapis' standing few men were willing to take issue.

This type of gossip was clearly symptomatic of a suspicious disenchantment with local leaders, but some ambiguity was also generated from outside Peyia, mainly by PEK's announcement that it would be fielding its own candidates.

Most villagers (especially leftists) had ignored the PEK announcement. Indeed there was an initial general reluctance to work out carefully strategies and programmes. Older men excepted, Peyiotes had had no experience of Mukhtarship elections. Lacking precedents they were torn between viewing them as a purely village affair or as part of a national process to be compared with General Elections. But these newspaper statements sufficiently alerted most men to the issues so that they spontaneously claimed that they would be voting 'for the person, not the party'. Given the general uncertainty regarding the eventual outcome, such

repeated utterances suggest an element of unease: Mukhtar elections are potentially more divisive than national ones because they are directly village affairs. In addition through positing person and party as mutually contradictory, a vocabulary of justification for future actions was generated. The phrase 'for the good of the village' is ultimately vague and unspecific; as a norm in the hierarchical pyramid of values, it can eventually be used to cover a variety of motives in the sense outlined by Bailey (1973). Left leaders spoke vaguely of the value of cooperation and of 'the wishes of the majority' while most rightists felt that cooperation laid down in the old agreement should be followed. The extreme right, by contrast, studiously ignored the affair.

The breakdown in negotiations and the decision of the parties to contest separately came as a shock to the village, and there were hurried discussions in every coffeehouse. Most spectacular was the change among the extreme rightists who were suddenly galvanized into action by the possibility of a comeback. They were to be involved in some extremely close bargaining with the centre-right. Leftist leaders were originally euphoric, but they were apprehensive and asked themselves rhetorically: 'is it shameful (entropi) to fight?' In leftist eyes the rightists were treacherous, attempting to cling to power by any means at their disposal. This was a PEK inspired plot and Kappedgis was behind the merger. Cooperation with the EOKA Vita men would be cooperation with murderers, men who had taken up the gun and betrayed the island. There was an element of self-righteousness in their campaign which eventually diminished their electoral prospects. Rightists, for their part, kept silent over the reasons of their merger. Leftists then recalled the various problems of the village and came to the conclusion that it was in a sorry state. Shouting matches developed in the tavernas. Leftists emphasized inconsistency, the

rightists retorted that: 'this is a village and all wanted synergasia (cooperation)'. Leftists riposted that they had been cooperating for very long and that it was the Right that hadn't cooperated in the last elections.[1] They had been the first to press for cooperation and recalled their various initiatives as well as the delaying tactics of the right. There was much discussion of whether these attempts at compromises were conducted in good faith. Finally, leftists concluded, the right comes to us and informs us of their decision 'as if we were living off charity'; in addition, their proposals are offensive in that they do not represent our true strength. This was the general drift of most taverna shouting matches which, having exhausted the rhetorical possibilities often relapsed into personal attacks ('You joined the Juntists'. Riposte: 'Your daughter married a Juntist').

> Rightists themselves were involved in some extremely close bargaining. Certain influential enotists such as Symeou and Nicolas Dimarhos were eager to grasp the hand of legitimation extended to them. As minor Government employees it was clearly in their interest to reintegrate themselves politically. Symeou, for example, had not received a salary increase for over 8 years; Dimarhos (as Secretary of the Development Board) was eager to have a committee which would not insist on his remaining in his office all day and prevent him for getting on with his farming. But while he had originally said to me, "We are a party of 'manliness'", indicating a disinclination towards cooperation, a personal visit by the PEK District Secretary soon convinced him of its value. In fact there was continual trafficking of information between villagers and highly placed officials. The latter often visited certain men who seemed to be pursuing an independent policy. One of these men was the farmer Christos, a previous member of the Griviki omadha, who opposed cooperation; Arapis failed to convince him, and it was only after his previous omadha chief, the Doctor, approached him that he changed his mind. Christos then attempted to press for two EOKA vita candidates in a joint right-wing meeting but backed down when he saw that he was not receiving any support.

There were critical differences between both groups in their self-presentation, their candidates and in the institutional resources they could command. In coffee-house discourse, which was completely different to discourses conducted within the privacy of the home, where women par-

ticipated and beliefs were often displaced by more hard-headed family criteria, rightists emphasized that they would be voting for individuals, leftists that they would be voting as a party. A few highly committed leftists viewed it as a class struggle; others asked: 'What are they afraid of - that we shall take their fields?'

There were also important differences in the candidates of both groups. In terms of the traditional qualities of leadership leftist candidates were at a grave disadvantage. They fielded a truck driver, a tavern keeper, a cooperative store salesman, a mason and a blacksmith. With the exception of the salesman, none had completed their secondary education; they were all generally poor to middling men and had no bureaucratic experience. They countered the derision of the right (who called them '<u>apoliti</u>', bare bummed and bare footed, uncivilized) by a cocky assertion that they were 'socially educated'. Whereas the right attacked the left for lacking honour, the latter criticized the rightists for having obtained wealth by dishonourable means.

Against them the right put forward an impressive array. Apart from Arapis there was the Cooperative Bank Secretary, a clerk, a farmer who was also the Secretary of the Potima Cooperative (Pantellis who was then taken on as a candidate), and a butcher. Four out of these five had completed their secondary education and most had contacts with highly placed officials in the Government. Most had invested heavily in new cash crops, representing, as it were, the 'progressive face' of future farming. They were also wealthy, and wealth is important in Peyia. More significantly they could claim services to the community that leftists never had a chance to practice. Arapis had consistently issued the certificates necessary for dealing with Government Departments free of charge. Although the sums were small, this lent him an air of generosity which not only contrasted

with the rapaciousness of his merchant-Mukhtar predecessors ('they were only interested in eating'), but which was considered grossly ungrateful to repay by electoral opposition even for ideological reasons. Arapis possessed most characteristics necessary for leadership in a small Greek community. He had assumed various roles as intermediary and representative ranging from seeking Church dispensation for prohibited marriages[2], facilitating payment for Church-held land, and acting as intermediary with Government officials. Not only had he kept, perhaps fortuitously, to the 'right' (i.e. winning) side in national politics, he had also 'brought' benefits to Peyiotes (the sale of church land). On the other hand by leaving the debt unspecific, he maintained a certain distance from fellow Peyiotes, preserving that aura of untouchability and power which constant loose interaction and close accounting could tarnish. As a man and leader Arapis had the respect of all Peyiotes; in contrast to much of his company he never swaggered and never seemed to forget his humble origins. Small wonder that Leftists felt like the conspirators on the eve of Caesar's assassination, reluctant to take him on, but obliged to do so. Furthermore he was about to become a large employer of local labour due to his tourist centre.[3] The important thing to note is that he never personally asked for votes, in contrast to Kappedgis who had not only 'helped' young men obtain jobs at the Cooperative factories, but was responsible for employing women at the packing house, giving him, in his view, the right to demand electoral support from them. To many Peyiotes a vote is a trade-off for a 'favour'.

The right could also draw upon other forms of coercion. The field watchman, whose main job was to oversee the activities of shepherds, visited a number of them asking that they vote for Arapis, the implication being that he would be less lenient in future if they did not. Against

this leftists had few resources to exploit.

Some leftists doing piece-work at cooperative mills in Paphos discovered that they were laid-off earlier than expected. It is not surprising that there was a certain element of political paranoia. Some leftists planned to play the illiterate when voting to check the honesty of electoral officials.

These elections differed significantly from other Mediterranean ones (Bailey, 1973, Boissevain, 1965, Kertzer, 1980) as well as from earlier Cypriot ones (see Chapter 4) in that they were marked by the complete absence of the Church as a confessional party. In sharp contrast to previous elections, the village papas played no role in these elections, nor did rightists attempt to resurrect the identification, current in the 1940s, of atheism with the left. With few men attending Church services, any claims to religious backing would have cut no ice.

Instead both groups based their campaigns upon two widely divergent bases. The right asserted that they had the best contacts with the central administration ('it is our Government') and modelled their conception of the relationship between village and central administration to that of filial relations. As Arapis claimed: "the relationship of the village to the Government is like that of a child to its mother; it is only when it cries that the mother notices". The analogy was implicitly carried further to liken a potential left-dominated administration to a cuckoo ('if the left were to be elected Peyia will go 100 years backwards'). The left, by contrast, pointed to past mistakes, the sale of Peyioti land back to the Church[4], the Tourist zones and road. They wanted a 'democratic administration', but when I asked them for specific details, the reaction I received was similar to that experienced by Bailey, in Losa: 'My question stopped the flow of eloquence ... fare comizii what else?' (1973: 170).

Finally, they said dismissively, our programmes will emerge after we are elected. Part of the reason underlying this indeterminacy of aims among leftists may possibly be due to the different criteria employed in the selection of candidates. Right candidates were chosen in terms of traditional values of leadership, who had been prominent members of the Makariaki omadha five years previously. The left selected their candidates in terms of their performance as party members. Indeed they differed from previous leftist members of committees in that they were now almost exclusively craftsmen rather than farmers. AKEL, which closely models itself upon the Soviet Communist Party, places much more reliance upon urban workers and labourers as its vanguard for change; their concept of the village was modelled on that of the party.

The fact that Peyia is a densely nucleated settlement made the trafficking of information easy (cf. Wade, 1975) and there was intense pressure upon voters. 'Independent' voters (i.e. men who have less need of politics, such as the older men and women) were courted in a variety of ways. By far the most effective were kinship ties, though neighbourhood links were also utilized. Indeed, the keen interest expressed in those borderline cases (and they were numerous) where kinship duties conflicted with political belief is symptomatic of the individual trauma created by the potentially disruptive effects of politics upon kinship bonds. Many men spontaneously approached their kinsmen who were candidates in opposing camps and assured them of their vote, though they were not always believed; equally, men felt obliged to excuse their kinsmen's political beliefs if these conflicted with those of their company. Moreover, although ideally each conjugal couple and nuclear family is politically autonomous, outside pressure was in fact exercised; one leftist informed his Juntist ghambros that if he were to ferry voters in his car (i.e. actively participate,

rather than merely vote), he would not receive some property that had been promised to him. Voters were presented with two lists and each voter's total of five votes could have been allocated either to a single group, or to five individuals drawn from both lists. The results of both elections which we will now analyze were as follows:

Right-Wing Alliance		AKEL	
Arapis	382 votes*	Zinonas	299 votes
Kappedgis	372 votes*	Ktistis	299 votes
Bampos	338 votes*	Nikos	302 votes
Pantellis	341 votes*	Georghios	276 votes
Tillyros	341 votes*	Nicolas	274 votes
Total Block Votes	302	Total Block Votes	248

Total voters: 674. Invalid: 8. 'Split Votes': 116

* Elected

TABLE 9.1: MUKHTAR ELECTION RESULTS (9th July, 1979)

Right-Wing Alliance		AKEL	
Kounturos	347 votes*	Zinonas	332 votes
Andreas	329 votes	Ktistis	339 votes*
Miccos	330 votes	Karras	336 votes*
Rebekkos	336 votes*	Statis	334 votes
Panikkos	326 votes	Dimitris	332 votes*
Total Block Votes	303	Total Block Votes	306

Total voters: 674. Invalid: 6. 'Split Votes': 59

* Elected

TABLE 9.2: DEVELOPMENT BOARD ELECTION RESULTS (22nd July, 1979)

9.4 Why the Right Won and then Lost

I now analyze why the Right won the first elections and then lost the second round. The Tables show the preponderance of block/party voting in contrast to 'split' votes. 'Split' votes decreased from 116 or 17.2 per cent in the first election to 59 or 8.7 per cent in the second, indicating that Peyiotes got progressively politicized. Wade's account of Colombesi

election (1975) shows a lesser degree of politicization. Political party boundaries thus fluctuated dramatically and given such divergencies it is not surprising that both parties made conflicting claims of the 'true' state of their strengths.

These elections were not won and lost because of the divisiveness of 'open debate' which Bailey (1973) maintained for Losa, but rather because some individuals and leaders were considered more accountable and powerful than others. Both groups attributed the results of the first elections to the particular qualities of the rightist candidates, especially Arapis. Indeed, the left concluded in their autopsy that they had paid insufficient attention to those likely to be easily influenced - the elderly and illiterate voters. During the course of election day they tried to convince voters that 'personal obligations' (ipohreosii) should not be translated into political votes. This and their pre-election rhetoric was ineffective in drawing votes, because not only was it believed that the real source of power lay elsewhere, but also because Peyiotes were little affected by the Turkish invasion in their personal lives. The issues which the left emphasized were far removed from village realities. In contrast when the rightists drew upon personal experience ('if your children will marry the Juntists, then why shouldn't you cooperate with them?'), they had more impact.

Thus far, what has been explained have been the first election results, but not why the right lost the second round. There would seem to be at least four interconnected reasons which mutually influenced each other.

To begin with, the rightists changed their candidates. Given their loose coalition with its particular tensions, it was felt necessary to offer candidatures to men who had been prominent in their support and who

had been chosen for their kinship links to Arapis, Kappedgis, or to other highly placed men. But whereas men reluctantly recognized men such as Arapis, Kappedgis or Pantellis as leaders, they were unwilling to do so for the second set. In Cypriot political culture the qualities required for leadership must often be delicately balanced between accessibility and distance; between a certain sociability and ease of approach on the one hand, and the capacity to obtain benefits in a semi-mysterious manner which itself confers a respectful distance. What is important in such cases is not that men are clients of other powerful men but rather that the sources of their patronage are dimly perceived. Indeed respect is magnified when it is known that men have the ear of highly placed men, but it is important that the nature of such clientage must be vaguely perceived by others. The new rightist candidates lacked their predecessor's capital of respect primarily because they were known to be clients of Peyiotes themselves, in short clients of Arapis and Kappedgis.

Secondly, the right made two moves in the inter-election period which were ultimately contradictory and lost them the support originally extended to them. After their victory they drove their cars at breakneck speed around the square, rang the Church bells furiously and bullied men believed to have voted left. Whilst this may have been post-election euphoria, the leftists did nothing of the kind following their victory and most Peyiotes felt that rather than winning gracefully, the right did so hysterically. As the pre-election period had passed uneventfully, such incidents could not be attributed to natural excitement, but rather to a delight in lording a victory which disturbed most villagers. On the other hand they extended an offer of cooperation to the left, a strategy clearly intended to elicit a refusal thus portraying the opposition as continuing an unnecessary division. The proposal was double edged in that had the

left accepted, the right would have created rhetorical capital for themselves by presenting the leftists as opportunists in defeat. The rhetorical and strategic element was clearly manifest in that in contrast to the previous negotiations the proposal was presented publicly.

A third reason was due as much to the re-emergence of indeterminacy among the voters themselves, itself encouraged by a shift in leftist tactics which was the final reason. Following their defeat, the leftists did some critical re-thinking. They dropped their rallying cry of cooperation with 'traitors and murderers' and concentrated on the pragmatics of reaching the electorate by every means at their disposal, on the individual rather than collective level. These included positive measures such as selecting candidates from most neighbourhoods, and preventive ones such as handing voters their numbers on the electoral roll beforehand. During the first elections both groups had established themselves at opposite tables at the side of the door of the school which served as the polling booth. Both issued slips of paper with the number from the electoral roll which was then checked by Government polling officials inside. The clear implication was that a man would vote for that group whose table he approached. This system favoured the right more than their opponents in that the cautious atmosphere created with massed groups of men outside was more useful as a reminder of dependency links while discouraging the expression of horizontal action that leftists desired to establish. When leftists emphasized the degree of non-correspondence between personal obligations and votes, they were implicitly trying to counteract this tendency. In the second elections such differences in the means of approaching the electorate were submerged in the uniformity of intrigue and manoeuvre on the personal individual, which dominated the rhetorical, collective level. Leftists utilized the links of kinship and neighbourhood to a greater

extent, although both groups laid on collective feasts immediately prior to and after elections.

The significant differences between the sobriety of the left and the bullying of the right were closely observed. It seemed as if to win the elections leftists reverted to even more traditional forms of discourse in an attempt to distance themselves from their opponents. The effect of such a regression was to encourage the re-emergence of an indeterminacy of aims among voters themselves. The original differences between the two groups, which could easily be grasped because they were qualitative ones in the forms of approach (as well as their content), were submerged and even reversed. The emotionalism of the right and their spoiling for a further election alienated villagers and contrasted with the low profile of the left allowing them to re-activate well tried themes. One old man, and he was not alone, explained his voting this way: 'Last time we voted for one relative, this time for another'. Whilst the relation between what men do and say is problematic, this statement is significant because the vocabulary of justification was itself drawn from kinship.

9.5 Conclusion

These elections should indicate categorically that Peyiotes do not present 'a united front' to strangers (Peristiany, 1968) and even less so in political issues. Although local sentiments clearly influenced voting patterns it makes little sense to treat elections as purely local issues as Bailey (1973) has done. For the unification of the Right was part of a wider process then being pursued by PEK, which leftists resisted as party members, not as members of a village. In effect the impingement of national politicians like Azinas, and the activities of PEK officials to unify rightists, created alignments at the grassroots completely at variance to the national political situation. This is an aspect of the type of govern-

where, although both groups laid on collective feasts immediately prior to and after elections.

The significant differences between the societies of the Left and the Rights of the right were clearly observed. It seemed as if to win the elections Leftists resorted to even more traditional forms of discourse in an effort to distance themselves from their opponents. The effect of this progression was to encourage the increasing use of a discourse of loss among voters interviews. The ordinary citizens were [illegible] the accounts could easily be grouped between [illegible] [illegible] forms of approach (as well as their [illegible]) [illegible] process. The sociologists of the right [illegible] for a further section alienated villagers [illegible] the low profile of the left allowing them to re-activate self-[illegible] themselves. The old man, and he was not alone, explained his voting this way: 'Once upon a time we voted for one side, this time for another'. Whilst the relation between what men say is problematic, this statement is significant because the voca-tion of justification was itself drawn from kinship.

Conclusion

These elections should indicate categorically that Rights do not [illegible] 'a united front' to strategists (Wrightsman, 1972) and even less so in political issues. Although local sentiments clearly influenced voting [illegible] it makes little sense to treat elections as purely local issues as Sahlins (1972) has done. For the unification of the Right was part of a [illegible] process then being pursued by [illegible], which Leftists resisted as party [illegible], not as members of a village. In effect the implacement of nation-al politicians like Aziana, and the activities of [illegible] officials to unify [illegible], created alignments at the grassroots completely at variance to the national political alignation. This is an aspect of the type of govern-

ment in Cyprus where certain individuals have autonomous power bases. At the time I left Peyia Right and Left there were planning all-out contests for other forthcoming committee elections.

It is important to note the differences in voting patterns between rightists and leftists. The leftist vote can be seen as what Parisi and Pasquino call the 'vote of appartenenza', i.e. 'belonging' (1980: 15): "appartenenza is the sum of social embeddedness and party identification. Its expression is manifested by the exclusion of any assessment of the programmatic positions of the parties ... it is part of a global and more complex assessment in which the vote is but one type of behaviour - among many - that stresses the feeling of belonging." (ibid., 16). They continue: "the social base which expresses this type of vote is ... produced by the encounter between subordinate or marginal social groups and organized collective movements which have accepted in a strategy of adaptation to the system, ... some form of participation in the institutional context" (loc. cit.). They caution that it is characterized by "limited exposure to political conjunctural events, continuity through time and lack of specificity" (loc. cit.).

Rightists, by contrast, practiced a 'vote of exchange'. I am not only referring here to Arapis' sudden switch from negotiating with the leftists to electorally embrace his former omadha opponents, mainly because he saw greater possibilities in clientage to Azinas rather than the grassroots support of the left. I am also referring to the votes cast in support of Arapis and his group in the first election, which also explains the shift in electoral support in the second election. Parisi and Pasquino note that the candidate here "is always an individual or an easily recognisable group because only such an actor can respond directly to this kind of expectation (of exchange) and offer basically individual incentives and

sanctions. This type of vote expresses at the same time the refusal and impossibility to take a programmatic stand in an aggregate and global way (as in the vote of appartenenza), with respect to the merit of the choice at stake" (ibid., 17). The shift in the electoral support of the Right in the second elections thus becomes more explicable. In the first place the second group of candidates did not have their predecessor's capital of respect; as the two authors state: "when, for reasons related to organizational problems, this type of vote is unable to find expression in an exchange relationship, it transforms itself into a 'vote against'" (loc.cit.), a tendency encouraged by the actions of rightists themselves in the inter-electoral period.

Beneath these differences lay a common stratum of the ambiguous relationship between kinship loyalties and political beliefs. Both leftists and rightists were similar in one respect: they tried to justify their kinsmen, and they also voluntarily assured them of their electoral support. Whilst rightists and leftists quarrelled incessantly over 'cooperation' and its breakdown in what Paine (1976) has called a 'restricted code of negotiation' which permitted differences in values to persist, one rationalization: "If your children marry Juntists, then why shouldn't you vote for them?", was ultimately morally compelling. In the conclusion I deal with the relationship between the divisive politics of the State and the solidary politics of the family.

9.6 Notes

1 In the 1976 General Elections leftists claimed that they had voted for D.P. candidates, whereas D.P. men had not done so for AKEL candidates, in contravention to the pre-electoral pact.

2 Those with a 10 year difference between spouses.

3 Some leftists claimed that his 'synferon' was to attract the heavy drinking extreme-rightists to his establishment!

4 In 1967 the Development Board sold back over 500 donums to Kykkos Monastery for £12,000, which promptly leased it to a Holiday Villa company for £1 million. The sale and details were kept secret. I have not referred to the social effects of tourism in this thesis because the process was just beginning and no radical economic transformations had occurred as yet.

CONCLUSION

"Two Greeks, three parties". Cypriot proverb.

This thesis has been concerned with the patterns of politics and kinship in a Greek-Cypriot village between 1920 and 1980. Briefly put the patterns of politics have varied across time from traditional patron-clientage based upon land and credit, to political entrepreneurship involving the use of violence; whilst the patterns of kinship have been influenced by the patterns of property transmission which have shifted from one which was laregly inheritance based to one which is now almost exclusively intervivos at point of marriage. Throughout I have emphasized that such changes are largely a function of political and economic relationships with the outside, and that whilst they cannot be seen in isolation, village politics is often a combination of national issues and local sentiments arising out of dense face-to-face interaction and a common morality.

Rather than summarizing each chapter I want to conclude by commenting on two topics and their interrelationship. First, I briefly discuss the means employed by the State and its ruling groups to obtain access to citizens in the periphery, and the strategies employed by grassroots politicians to obtain resources from the centre. Although my thesis and field research have concentrated on a village, the impact of the State has been a necessary part of the 'data' I have had to grasp when studying village politics. Many anthropologists have written about 'Traditional States' in Africa and elsewhere, and there ought not, in principle, be much difference between doing this for an African Kingdom than for a complex modern polity. There is, of course, a good deal more historical documentation (which I have referred to) and bureaucratic complexity to be grasped here, so I

CONCLUSION

Can Greece, three problems, provide prospects.

1. This thesis has been concerned with the relationship between land-hungry and in a land-hungry village [illegible] the [illegible] and the [illegible] or villagers have [illegible] [illegible] changes based upon land and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the use of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] influenced by the patterns [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

shall be referring primarily to the political relationship between centre and periphery.

Second, I want to discuss the role of the family as an institution in what has ultimately been an unstable political environment. My contention is that the solidarity of the family becomes more understandable when placed within this context.

Although Cyprus is a small island with good communications, any cursory glance at its recent history can easily show that the State has been weak. Indeed the State has never been the supreme authority for its citizens' loyalties. I am not merely referring here to the Greek desire for enosis or the Turkish insistence on taksim (partition), although such sentiments which have changed in intensity across time have clearly weakened the State's popular legitimacy. Nor has its weakness been of the North African type with its tribal loyalties, admirably portrayed by Ibn Khaldun. It is rather because it has always been a far-flung colony until recently containing different and competing sources of power. In the pre-1960 period the Colonial State had to contend with that nationally extensive political organization, the Orthodox Church. The Church not only limited the Colonial Government's influence, but also controlled education and the ownership of some land. Unlike Catholicism and Islam Orthodoxy after the 15th Century has been the religion of a subject ethnic group defined by religion. As an interstitial structure, a state within a state, the Church possessed both weaknesses and strengths. Its strength lay in its claim to be the political representative of the dominated group and in its control of resources. Dependent upon the family as the bulwark of religion, Orthodoxy emphasized the indissolubility of Greekness and Christianity and represented in the popular mind the 'natural State' in contrast to i givernisi, the secular non-Greek State.

shall be referring primarily to the political relationship between center and periphery.

Second, I want to discuss the role of the family as an institution in that has ultimately been an important political environment. My contention is that the solidarity of the family becomes more important in the view placed within this context.

In Ethnic Groups is a small land - with good communications, and nearly always at its nearest is reached easily, so that the state has been able to maintain a fairly effective control over the population. Indeed the State has never had opposed primarily the ethnic loyalties. I am not really arguing here in the usual sense for a change on the Jordan from a "tribal" to a "civil" society. Although some events which have occurred in Jordan have caused the State to change its policies towards the State's popular legitimacy. Or has its emergence been of the form which type with its tribal roots, authority percolates up from the bottom. It is rather because it has always been a far-flung polity with precarily mobilized different and competing sources of power. In the pre-1920 period the Ottoman State had to contend with that mechanically extensive political organization, the Ottoman Church. The Church not only limited the Ottoman's influence, but also politicized education and the economy of Arab land. Tribal Bedouinism and Islam (Wahhabi) after the 19th century has been the religion of a modern ethnic group defined by religion. In an intermediate structure, a state within a state, the Church possessed both resources and strategies. Its growth had in its view to bring the political representative of the dominant group and in its control of resources. Dependent upon the family as the bulwark of religion, Wahhabi emphasized the indispensability of dependence and fidelity and represented in the popular mind the 'natural state' in contrast to Islamism, the secular non-tribal state.

In many villages the Church also controlled the material means of existence. The papas and the Churchmen wielded immense power there as they controlled access to some land. They were also recognized as legitimate political leaders in contrast to the mere merchants and Government appointed Mukhtars, who could not command public support. Indeed, as the Galatopoulos case shows, the Church did sometimes apply direct political pressure. These were usually extreme cases, for whilst the Church was mainly concerned with enosis it did not actively involve itself with village matters until 1945-55 when it established short-lived nationalist-religious clubs in response to a strong left-wing movement. Until 1945 the papas was the single most important political and moral authority in the village. He could influence the renting of church land, suspend the Easter liturgy until all villagers were gathered in the church, refuse to perform religious ceremonies and, more seriously, he could ostracize parishioners by not performing the annual blessing of the house. In a highly religious community such sanctions could not be dismissed lightly.

In the post-1960 period the State has been weak for other reasons. Although the Church is still an important institution it is not a critical political structure. In the first place, the emergence of new types of secular leadership and the Church-Communist Party conflict, although of short duration, alienated many from the Church. Since 1960 the Church has concentrated on diversifying its wealth in urban real estate, industry and tourism, rather than concerning itself with directly political matters. In the villages, too, once it sold its land there it implicitly relinquished its claim to economic, political and moral dominance in the periphery.

In the post-1960 period the State has been weak for three reasons:

First, its 'unworkable constitution' (Polyvivu: 1980) undoubtedly discouraged interethnic cooperation in government. Indeed one group

attempted to monopolize the State to pursue an ideal (Enosis) and for economic resources. Both ethnic groups became disenchanted with parliamentary politics and institutions though for very different reasons. The Turks came to believe that the structure of the State itself could not protect them sufficiently; the Greeks on the other hand became disenchanted with parliamentary politics as a means of pursuing an ideal or dealing with internal strife, and increasingly resorted to covert forms of political activities. This ultimately de-stabilized the State. Thus for very different reasons and through different routes both ethnic groups ceased to place ultimate faith in the State as a means of protecting their interests or articulating them.

Second, the State lacked a monopoly of violence to control inter-ethnic violence and ultimately to safeguard its own legitimacy. Greek politicians sometimes resorted to attacking Turksih enclaves to increase their populairty, whilst at a later date the National Guard became a Trojan Horse. The State was obliged to rely on unofficial or semi-official omadhes to protect itself from its own legitimate organs.

Finally, there has not been a good deal of continuity in the ruling groups, and the government itself was weak. Although I must stress that my field research has been based on a village, it is clear that the individuals who have occupied important positions in the Capital or District Capitals whom the Peyiotes have dealt with have changed across time. Although there has been no traditional secular land-owning aristocracy the old types of politicians (such as Nicolaides and Galatopoulos) relied on 'traditional' forms of patron-clientage (land, credit, marketing) for their sources of power. They could also sometimes rely on lower level functionaries of the Orthodox Church, as the Church is much less centralized and bureaucratically 'coherent' than the Catholic one. The new elites that emerged after

1960 have been very different. They have been young men, often from rural origins whose power and qualifications for leadership derived from their patriotism and participation in the EOKA struggle. Probably because a new and very open field of political competition was created in 1960 this discontinuity in the leading political groups was accompanied by a very fluid parliamentary system of short-lived political parties (with the exception of AKEL which never had a parliamentary majority). Rather than having unstable post-electoral inter-party ruling coalitions as in post-war Italy, Cyprus after 1960 has been characterized by pre-electoral inter-party pacts which have not contributed to stable government. Although these characteristics have been present elsewhere, it is a combination of all of them which have contributed to a weak State in Cyprus.

What have the implications of this been for (i) the political relationship between centre and periphery on the administrative and party level, (ii) for political dialogue in the village, and (iii) for the solidarity of the family and kinship bonds?

To begin with, given such fragmentation at the top of the political system no party could penetrate the bureaucracy on a mass scale as the DC did in Italy, nor ensure its permanence by controlling Development resources such as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Although the DC has been in power since 1945 in a period of post-war reconstruction, and there are difficulties in straightforward comparisons, other examples show that longevity or a non-expanding economy are no suitable guides. Cyprus does not have such far-flung regions as Italy, and Malta is perhaps a more suitable comparison. Boissevain's comments on the 'demise' of patronage there (1977) refer to the demise of 'traditional' patronage there (priests, professionals, etc.) and its replacement by a more mass-clientilistic

party-based system in a highly centralized and parliamentarily stable State (Boswell, 1980). In contrast government in Cyprus has been characterized by discrete ministerial fiefdoms run by the new political generation of ex-EOKA fighters, and often drawn from outside the party framework, having their own personal political ambitions. Indeed such men (like Yorghadjis, the Minister of the Interior from 1960-69, Andreas Azinas, Commissioner for Cooperatives, 1960-81, and Sofianos, Minister of Education, 1977-80) have often used their ministerial bases as electoral platforms. In tracing the links between villagers and highly placed officials or politicians, I was struck by their diversity and multiplicity as well as their changes across time.

The Right, in contrast to AKEL, has been unable to establish enduring institutional roots in the periphery since 1960; this has certain implications for linkage between the village and the centre. It has also been unable to rely on Church organizations to mediate between the grassroots and party elites as in Italy where there is an alliance between the DC called a 'confessional party' and the Vatican (Kertzer, 1980). In Pisticei the priest supplies valued raccomandazioni (Davis, 1973). Although the small scale of the island might warrant little actual need for such linkage, there are examples of even smaller polities (e.g. Malta) where the Church has provided linkage between the grassroots and party elites. My point here is not that the Right cannot rely on the Church to take an anti-Left position, but that religiosity is much more a freely floating sentiment rather than an institutionally backed political force. Part of the reason lies in the organization and history of the Orthodox Church; another more specific to Peyia is the withdrawal of the Church from ownership of land there.

I make these comparisons as they are useful from an anthropological

viewpoint and help explain the specificity of local level politics. They indicate that the patronage and links with the outside I have been dealing with is neither mass-clientilistic (as in Southern Italy) nor of the 'preventive type', e.g. finding loopholes in a byzantine bureaucracy in exchange for votes. The efficiency of the Cypriot Civil Service guarantees that there is scant need for the Italian type of clientilism which thrives on 'mastadonic bureaucratic blockages' (Tarrow, 1977).

Indeed accounts of the 'myth of patronage' (Silverman, 1977) have come from Italy, where "pensions do eventually reach those entitled to them without the intervention of 'mediators', even though this may happen after long apparently unwarranted delays" (White, 1980: 164). By contrast patronage in contemporary Cyprus is neither a 'myth', nor peripheral to daily life. Although the 'traditional' type of patronage has died out, its modern variant is of the 'individual' and 'agressive' type linking key individuals (Ministers, national politicians) in the centre to their followers in the periphery. These networks are complex and there are few 'mediators'. As the political field has been extremely fluid it is not surprising to find men contracting with a number of patrons. The resources involved are of high value; in Cyprus clients have often had to pledge their readiness to apply violence for that scarce resource or job. The example of the two <u>omadhites</u> (Arapis and Symeou) graphically portrays that backing the 'right' side can result in incredible benefits; backing the 'wrong' one can be followed by severe sanctions. It is not surprising that clientship is described as 'eating'. The type of clientship I am describing here is that of the Right. The Left, by contrast, has had grassroots activists and its clientship is strongly tied to party activism, not political entrepreneurship.

It is also important to note that the State administration and the

bureaucratic hierarchy from District Capital to Village does not provide avenues for a specialized caste of grassroots politicians (as, for example, in France, cf. Tarrow, 1977). The post of Mukhtar does not endow the holder with any degree of leverage with the administration as they are considered low level functionaries of the State. Until 1979 the office did not guarantee popularity for its holder. Kalo's Mukhtar (Loizos, 1975) is a typical example: an unimportant individual often bypassed by villagers in their dealings with officialdom and overshadowed by local political entrepreneurs. Peyia's last two Mukhtars have derived their power either through economic entrepreneurship or through partisan clientship to national politicians.

One village post, however, carries some power, highlighting my point about 'discrete ministerial fiefdoms'. The Secretary of the Cooperative Bank is an important grassroots politician as he controls credit and marketing. But the Cooperative movement has become for the modern State what the Church was in the past, a national institution possessing great patronage resources. Most village bank secretaries have been clients of the Commissioner and are feared by villagers as they are suspected of putting their partisanship before their duties.

The new type of grassroots politician in Cyprus is not primarily a political party entrepreneur. He is much more an entrepreneur in personal contacts using all the means available to establish links with highly placed officials and national politicians. Such men must be adept at 'managing meanings' to use Cohen and Comaroff's phrase (1976), for, lacking resources to trade in such relationships, they can offer the readiness to use violence in an uncertain world.

With the exception of leftists most have done so through the dangerous and risky course of 'crises management', adapting to and exploiting

bureaucratic hierarchy from District Officer down to Village Head provide avenues for a specialized caste of grassroots politicians (as, for example, in France, cf. Tarrow, 1977). The post of *Mukhtar* does not allow the holder with any degree of leverage with the administration as they are considered low level functionaries of the state. Until 1979 the article did not guarantee popularity for the holder. *Mukhtar Elections*, 1979) is a typical example: an urban or [illegible] by [illegible] villagers in their dealings with officials [illegible] by local political entrepreneurs. Tevia's book *[illegible]* shows clearly how a power elite through economic entrepreneurship [illegible] differently to national politicians.

The village post, however, carries some power, highlighted by point about 'diamond ministerial clientele'. The Tanzibag of the Cooperative has is an important grassroots politician as he controls credit and marketing. But the Cooperative movement has become for the modern State what the Tanzi was in the past, a national institutionsponsoring great patronage resources. Most village Tanzi secretaries have been clients of the Tanzibaar and are feared by villagers as they are suspected of putting their partisanship before their duties.

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With the exception of Leftists most have done so through the dangerous and tricky course of 'crisis management', adapting to and exploiting an

sudden and violent changes in national politics. This is a dangerous and risky undertaking. Dangerous as violence has often been the ultima ratio of politics; risky because of its inherent instability. Support for the wrong politician can often be disastrous for the village supporter. Politicians may suddenly fall out of favour for reasons beyond their followers' control (Clerides is a good example) or they may follow an unpredictable course for their village followers (e.g. Sampson). This has tended to produce disenchantment for rightists who do not have enduring party frameworks to fall back on in periods of crises. A village follower may often have to justify shifts in policy which defy logical explanation from the village perspective and sense the meaning of such shifts. Such men often have to create some measure of ambiguity in keeping likely alternatives open, their political survival and credibility depends upon it.

My point here is that the overall national political framework not only defines the possibilities for grassroots politicians and their strategies, but also influences the types of risks involved. This affects the popular conception of politics. White (1980) shows that what parties villagers support is largely a result of traces of past struggles. This is largely true in Peyia. But it is also important to take into account the aetiology of national politics and its effects upon collective mentalities. This often influences the readiness of villagers in participating in politics. Villagers have not only had a plethora of short-lived political parties to choose from, they have also been faced with the choice of two different political alternatives: participation in open parliamentary politics or in covert forms of organized activities such omadhes. In contrast to the Luchesi and Trasacanni (White, ibid.) Peyiotes have had to choose their political alternatives more carefully, the stakes and risks

involved being much higher.

The fact that (i) politics at the top has been fragmented and fluid, (ii) that political contacts between the grassroots and the centre has often been personal clientship rather than instituionally based, and (iii) that village official representatives such as Mukhtars have had no popular base and were regarded by the central bureaucracy as minor administrative officials, explain why villagers resort to territorial solidarity in dealing with the centre, when certain administrative issues affect the village. Unlike Loizos (1975) I do not attribute such solidarity in Peyia to rising prosperity, although this is clearly important. There are in any case more gradations in socio-economic inequality now than in the past (although social relations are much less exploitative) and the table-grape elite have a greater 'investment' in the village than the labourers or white collar workers who commute daily to the towns. And whilst men clearly do resort more to politics when they cannot obtain material security, the type of political representation they resort to is largely a byproduct of national political structures, and of the means available for representation. Sentiments of campanilismo are undoubtedly important, as is village pride, but my point is that such beliefs are a poor guide to the place of a village in a complex polity. Villagers have resorted often to territorial solidarity in dealing with the State in spite of their radical political differences partly because whilst the State has been weak, they have little institutional means (through the bureaucracy or parties) to make their representations effectively felt at the centre. From the bureaucracy's perspective the village is an administrative entity lacking any popular representatives. To villagers who are traditionally suspicious and hostile towards i givernisi (which means the bureaucracy) external threats are enough to encourage solidarity grouping (Loudon,

involved being much higher.

The fact that (i) politics at the top has been fragmented and fluid, (ii) that political contacts between the grassroots and the centre has often been personal clientship rather than institutionally based, and (iii) that village official representatives such as [illegible] have had to popular [illegible] were regarded by the central government as state administrative officials, explains why villagers have [illegible] dealing with the centre, [illegible] administrative issues affect the village. Unlike Lorna [illegible] and [illegible] and [illegible] dealing properly without [illegible] important. There are [illegible] over more grievances [illegible] and that is the most (although social relations are [illegible] relative) and the [illegible] range alike have a greater 'awareness' in the village than the [illegible] or white collar workers who are idle daily in the town, and which may clearly be greater more so, although when they cannot satisfy material needs, the type of political representation they resort to is largely a product of national political structures, and of the means available for representation. Backlands of communities are undoubtedly important, as is village pride, but my point is that such beliefs are a poor guide to the place of a village in a complex polity. Villagers have reacted often to territorial solidarity in dealing with the state in spite of their radical political differences partly because whilst the State has been weak, they have little institutional means (through the bureaucracy or parties) to make their representations effectively felt at the centre. From the bureaucracy's perspective the village is an administrative entity lacking any popular representatives. To villagers who are traditionally suspicious and hostile towards a diversified (which means the bureaucracy) external threats are enough to encourage solidarity grouping (London,

1970). Finally, no party monopolizes central resources, so partisan political entrepreneurship would not work.

Thus when dealing with the centre over administrative decisions which affect all the village Peyiotes have grouped themselves territorially using all the contacts they can muster: their appointed representatives, important individuals of all political persuasions (including urban Peyiotes), M.P.s and union officials.

However, this territorial solidarity is manifestly ineffective in limiting political conflict in Peyia. Conflict is dampened amongst kinsmen, a point I shall turn to later. But amongst unrelated men things are different; omadhes were still established and elections did occur. Probably this oscillation between covert politics (involving a few select men) and open mass politics have created particular tensions and influenced perceptions. Loizos conducted fieldwork when omadhes were beginning to emerge, which clearly limited the extent to which men were prepared to 'take up politics'. The national political climate was then extremely murky, men had less knowledge and certainty of national alignments, and this undoubtedly influenced Loizos to emphasize 'village solidarity' which was much more of an 'internal' constraint upon participation. But when open politics was once more dominant men participated readily. Indeed the elections show that all parties attempted to monopolize the theme of 'the common good' for different reasons. The Right hinted at potential benefits through the political entrepreneurship of certain individuals, the Left insisted on a type of administrative activism. These differences are significant, but the fact that this theme was freely voiced should not conceal their unrealism, nor the polarisation in Peyia. Indeed the recriminations in the coffee-shops over 'cooperation' and its breakdown must be seen as a 'restricted code' (Paine, 1976). As Kapferer has noted "if a

transaction occurs on the basis of a restricted code, value disjunctions are likely to be maintained" (1976: 9). Unlike Wade's Colombesi (1975) Peyiotes do not logically distinguish between 'politics' and 'the village', they incorporate them. This creates problems. My view is that Peyiotes will abandon this theme once there are enduring divisions at the top, and their plans for all-out contests indicate that they seem to be doing so.

In such an unstable environment the family as an institution has strongly resisted attempts to weaken its solidarity. In this it has been aided by being a property-holding institution which gives it particular strengths and weaknesses. Its strength is the predominant belief that kinsmen should not quarrel over politics. Not only may they 'need each other in the future', but kinship provides security and stability in an uncertain world. Kinship is a long-term investment in contrast to the short-term strategies of politics. Cypriot villagers differ from the Maltese who allow party political considerations to influence the choice of spouses and affines. To Peyiotes this is phanatismos and they view themselves as potentially all kinsmen. Indeed wedding celebrations have now taken on the same functions of religious ceremonies such as Easter festivities of the past, they group together all villagers in a collective celebration. Party political considerations have not affected the core of the family, highlighting Burguiere's claim that "whenever the State no longer wields enough power to act and to protect its people, the family expands, assumes control of every aspect of the individuals life and becomes a bastion" (1976: viii).

I do not mean that tensions of a party origin are absent among kinsmen. There certainly are differences of opinion and belief, but Peyiotes suspend them in favour of the harmony of general reciprocity. The few festering political differences between kinsmen, have usually been grafted on

transaction occurs on the basis of a restricted code, value assumptions are likely to be maintained" (1970: 3). Walter Vade's Gofannon (1979) Fyldotes do not logically distinguish between 'politics' and 'the village', they incorporate these. This creates problems. My view is that Fyldotes will abandon this theme once there are emerging divisions as the top, and their plans for all-out contests indicate that they seem to be doing so.

In such an unstable environment the Family as an institution has strongly resisted attempts to weaken its solidarity. In this it has been aided by being a property-owning institution which gives it particular strengths and weaknesses. Its strength is the predominant belief that kinsmen should not quarrel over politics. 'Not only may they need each other in the future', but kinship provides security and stability in an uncertain world. Kinship is a long-term investment in matters to the who short-term strategies of politics. Popolot villagers differ from the Walker who allow party political considerations to left above the choice of spouses and affines. To Fyldotes this is paramount and they view themselves as potentially all kinsmen. Indeed reading celebrations have now taken on the same functions of religious ceremonies such as Easter festivities of past, with everybody together all villagers in a collective celebration. Party political considerations have not affected the core of the Family. Nightingale Anguiere's claim that "whenever the state no longer wields enough power to act and to protect its people, the Family expands, assumes control of every aspect of the individuals life and becomes a bastion" (1970: viii).

I do not mean that factions of a party origin are absent among kinsmen. There certainly are differences of opinion and belief, but Fyldotes argued then in favour of the memory of general recipricity. The few fasting political differences between kinsmen, have usually been greeted on

the politics of kinship and affinity, i.e. differences over the distribution of resources within the family. In contrast to British middle-class urbanites (Firth, et al., 1970) the term 'relative' (singenis) has affective significance. The 'is/ought' question regarding relatives has little relevance - one is obliged to act in certain ways towards kinsmen.

Kinship ties have also been the basis of enduring political coalitions across time. In a small community lacking enduring grassroots political organizations this is hardly surprizing. But my point has been that the ties involved have changed across time. This is largely, but not exclusively, a function of the changing pattern of property transmission within the family. Briefly put in the earlier period there were two types of kinship links used for political coalitions: groups of cooperating brothers, and manipulable affinal relationships as with the Nicolaides - Hadji-Antonis dependency. In the contemporary system where most property is transmitted at marriage the emphasis has shifted towards cooperation on a more equal basis between affines and between apiritual kin, i.e. relations men establish as autonomous household heads rather than inherit. Indeed the omadhes example indicates that the spiritual kinship idiom has often been used as the basis for ad hoc political recruitment. How far kinship will remain a main idiom of political organization will depend mainly on the ability of political parties to establish enduring institutional grassroots which will undoubtedly affect the solidarity of the family.

APPENDIX 1

The Religious Calendar and the Agricultural Cycle

The religious calendar cannot be separated from the traditional agricultural cycle. Indeed the evident participation of villagers and the meanings they attach to such rituals and practices have a direct relationship to the traditional agricultural cycle. These rituals bring out the dependence of man upon God, nature, and fellow men. The subsequent comments apply to the traditional cycle of monoculture.

The year can be divided into two periods each with different types of agricultural, social and religious activities and practices: the period of abstinence and the period of conspicuous consumption. Religious events mark the transition from one to the other.

The period of fasting, abstinence and economy in consumption and in social relationships lasts from November 14th till Easter, which is celebrated on the first Sunday following the full moon of the Spring Equinox. It is characterized by uncertainty, the dependence of men upon God and private (i.e. familial) religious practices. The second period, starting at Easter and continuing until November 3rd, is more joyous, marked by mass pilgrimages, feasting and the making of marriages. The point of connection between the two is November 3rd, the feast of Aghios Yeorghios tou Sporou (St George of the Seed) when each family brings some seeds to be blessed by the papas. They are to be sown after the first ploughing and the first rains.

The first period, that of 'the family', commences on Aghios Philippis (November 14th) which heralds the 40-day fast (Sarakosti) until Christmas. Traditionally women used to fast from between 110-160 days until Easter. This is very much the 'time of the women' for they are actively involved in religious rituals which emphasize the sanctity of the house and the unity of the family. No marriages are contracted during this period, unmarried women are teased, and the family settles for a long vigil until Spring and harvesting. The family withdraws into the home and social contacts with other families decrease in intensity. This is a period of insecurity as men 'wait upon God for rain', and also because in times of the hardship and waiting which follow the bonds of amity between kinsmen will be strained. The family attempts to assert itself by symbols and practices which emphasize the interdependence of family members. The Kalikantzari appear between December 24th and January 6th (Phota). Mischievous gnome-like creatures they are the souls (psyches) of unbaptized children or of adults who had no-one to sit vigil during the night after their death. Both cases bring out the dependence of young upon the old, and the aged upon the able. The Kalikantzari must be placated and ritual food offerings are left for them. Women protect the living by cutting olive branches from Church property and sprinkling them with holy water. The Kalikantzari also bring out the tension between the worlds of men and women, and between adults and children: men abandon the home to gamble in the coffee shops, women reverie seeing 'love omens' and children form gangs which must be humoured.

Subsequent practices attempt to reassert traditional bonds

emphasizing the predominance of the family in face of coming hardships. On Aghios Vasili (January 1st) the vasilopitta (St Basil's loaf) is broken. This is the only time when guests come last, for the first portion belongs "to the poor", the second for the "house" (symbolizing austerity and that resources, however meagre, must be shared), the third for the family, and the fourth for the guests. Wheat is planted in the courtyard, blessed by the papas on Phota (January 6th) and then transplanted in the fields where it will supply the next year's store of seed.

Phota marks the outward expression of the family's solidarity. The papas blesses the house and Koumpari present their godchildren with gifts. Until Easter most religious practices will be family-based and performed by women who fast most of the time.

Easter is a joyous time heralding the triumph of Christ over death, of the seed over winter and of life over death. This second period is marked by its collectivity which reasserts itself over the family. Women whitewash the home and men cut their hair signifying that mourning is over. Dishes which swell (flaounes) are baked. The village, which is packed by friends and returning relatives, prepares for Christ's drama of hope. Religious practices are collective: women decorate the Holy Sepulchre with flowers and unmarried men collect wood for a fire to be lit in the church courtyard symbolizing the 'burning of Judas' and the triumph of good over evil. Each family takes water jars to the church where they are blessed and then sprinkled in the house, on animals and fields. It is considered a good omen when it rains at Easter.

On Sunday the villagers form a procession walk under the panoply of the Virgin holding hands. In the past a collective meal

used to be held in the church courtyard. This is the time when marriages will once more be contracted, of collective pilgraimages and collective feasts.



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


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Dhekapentavgousto : Religious pilgrimage to fair at Troodos Monastery.
Aghios Parlos Kai Petrou
Kata Klysmos: the day of the Holy Ghost.
Aghios Georghios tou theros. Meat eaten at religious fair.
Sunday: Collective meal and procession.
Saturday: Faki xidhati : Vinegar and lentil soup.
Friday : Women decorate epitaphios, men collect firewood
Thursday: Women bake flawnes, whitewash homes; Men cut hair Ayiasmos : holy water sprinkled on fields
HARVESTING.
Hunting season.

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