

**Education and extraversion in post-war Somaliland: naming, valuing and contesting  
'modern' and 'indigenous' knowledge at the University of Hargeisa**

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**Abstract:** In response to the view that the ‘extraverted’ or ‘mimetic’ nature of post-colonial universities reveals an enduring ‘colonial mindset’ have come various efforts to ‘decolonize’ African universities by incorporating indigenous knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At first blush, the University of Hargeisa’s (UoH) Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies’ (IPCS) stated commitment to teaching indigenous knowledge appears to follow this trend. In practice, however, IPCS has established itself as an intentionally ‘modern’ Institute valued by staff and students alike for the ‘extraverted’ globally-oriented education it provides. Against the view that this proclivity for the modern simply represents the presence of an enduring colonial mentality, this article explores how, why and to what effect an intentionally ‘modern’ education has been implemented at IPCS. I build on Bayart’s concept of ‘extraversion’ to show how invocations of modern and indigenous knowledge entail various claims to inclusion that reflect internal social changes, Somaliland’s hybrid political order, and lack of recognition. Drawing on ethnographic research that included classroom observation, interviews and informal interactions with staff and students, and reflection on my own teaching experiences, I explore how staff and students have embraced particular modes of education as a means to both ‘engage the world’ and increase their own opportunities for domestic political and socio-economic inclusion. Furthermore, I show that IPCS’ approach has not led to the devaluation of indigenous knowledge, but has instead facilitated debate about the relative merits of different knowledge systems for contemporary Somaliland. This case highlights the value of approaching (post)colonial educational institutes not simply as sites where knowledge is passively ‘imbibed’, but rather as compelling windows into the ‘complexities and contradictions of social change’.<sup>2</sup>

**Key words:** post-colonial/post-war education; Somaliland; extraversion; indigenous knowledge

In a 1993 address on academic freedom in African universities, Mahmood Mamdani lamented the ‘triumphantly universalistic and uncompromisingly foreign’ nature of post-colonial institutions as evidence that universities had failed to be ‘decolonized’.<sup>3</sup> In response to the view that the ‘extraverted’ or ‘mimetic’ nature of universities reveals an enduring ‘colonial mindset’ and preference for dependency among African elites have come calls for the incorporation of indigenous knowledge into university curricula.<sup>4</sup> At first blush, the University of Hargeisa’s Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies appears to respond to this call. Founded in 2008, IPCS is committed to increasing the capacity of Somaliland’s political elite and emerging professionals to promote peace and stability, by documenting and teaching ‘indigenous knowledge’ alongside ‘modern’ approaches. Guided by my own interest in the integration of indigenous knowledge into educational and peacebuilding policy I took up a teaching position at the Institute in 2013. I was thus surprised on my arrival to find a preference for foreign lecturers, exclusively English-language instruction, and a curriculum similar to those I had studied and taught in North America. Yet more intriguing was the sentiment expressed by staff and students that while ‘indigenous knowledge’ should be celebrated – particularly as it is credited with bringing stability to the region – IPCS is an intentionally ‘modern’ Institute valued for the internationally-oriented, ‘extraverted’ education it provides.

While proponents of indigenizing African universities may be quick to dismiss IPCS’ approach as evidence of an enduring colonial mentality, my own experiences have revealed something more complex at work in how, why and to what effect an intentionally ‘modern’ curriculum has been conceived, implemented and received. In this article, I consider how the Institute and its students conceive of and value the ‘modern’ education IPCS provides, while also exploring what is at stake when ‘modern’ and ‘indigenous’ knowledge are invoked in IPCS’ engagement with external partners, and in the classroom itself. I suggest that invocations of ‘modern’ and ‘indigenous’ knowledge entail various claims to inclusion that reflect Somaliland’s hybrid political order, as well as a desire to ‘engage the world’ that is heightened by Somaliland’s lack of recognition. While staff and students alike have embraced this ‘extraverted’ education as a means to ‘engage the world’, I also show that this has not simply led to the devaluation of indigenous knowledge, but has instead facilitated debate about the relative merits of different knowledge systems for contemporary Somaliland. This case highlights the value of approaching (post)colonial educational institutes not simply as sites where certain types of (modern) subjects are produced, but rather as compelling windows into the ‘complexities and contradictions of social change’.<sup>5</sup>

Against the view that colonial education and its post-colonial equivalents are sites where ‘colonial mindsets’ are reproduced and (Western) knowledge is ‘imbibed’ in unmediated fashion,<sup>6</sup> my analysis builds on research that highlights how (post)colonial education is diversely experienced, contested, and appropriated for various (not always hegemonic) purposes. Simpson, for instance, has shown that far from being ‘docile bodies’, boys at a mission school in Zambia readily engaged in education as a ‘modernizing’ project that allowed for the ‘refashioning... [of] their own subjectivities’.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, Bayly shows that ‘self-consciously modern’ Vietnamese intellectuals simultaneously value the ‘modern’ skills and knowledge gained through colonial education *and* ‘love all things Vietnamese’. As one of her informants explains, ‘we like French civilization – but we don’t like the people who gave us this civilization! We can distinguish between them’.<sup>8</sup> Based on a view that colonialism (and its contemporary iterations) entails both domination and dialogue,<sup>9</sup> these approaches suggest (post)colonial education represents ‘neither a “provincializing” of dominant European knowledge systems...nor the tame acceptance of an alien Western universalism’.<sup>10</sup> While I do not wish to downplay education’s potentially violent forms, this

approach underscores the need to consider the complex ways that education is locally perceived, constructed and received.

Also at stake in this analysis are competing anthropological approaches to the seeming imitation of Western, or so-called ‘modern’ institutions and behaviors in (post)colonial settings. While anthropologists have often opted to view mimicry as parody and thus a form of resistance,<sup>11</sup> I follow Ferguson’s assumption that certain forms of mimicry may entail claims to socio-economic and political membership in a ‘spectacularly unequal global society.’<sup>12</sup> As Wilson recognized in colonial southern Africa, urban Africans who adopted European cultural forms ‘were asserting rights to the city...and pressing, by their conduct, claims to the political and social rights of full membership in a wider society.’<sup>13</sup> Significantly, Ferguson and Thomas imply that such claims may be present in the very ways terms like ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ are invoked. While social scientists wary of ‘modernist metanarratives’ may view such terms as outdated sociological concepts,<sup>14</sup> Thomas highlights that the term ‘modern’ is frequently invoked as a means of political and socio-economic claim making.<sup>15</sup> Following Ferguson and Thomas, I use the terms ‘modern’, ‘traditional’ and ‘indigenous’ as contested emic concepts, not analytical categories, which should be approached with an ethnographic sensitivity to what is at stake in their invocation. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges of my research was discerning what my interlocutors had in mind when employing these terms, and I have attempted to indicate at various places throughout this piece what is implied by their usage. The reader should bear in mind these terms’ contested and variable meanings.

To make sense of what is at stake in IPCS’ self-conceived ‘modern’ education, I also draw insight from Bayart’s concept of ‘extraversion’. For him, Africa’s current dependent position is not the inevitable result of *structure*, but itself a *mode of action* characterized by ‘strategies of extraversion’ – that is, the ‘mobiliz[ation] [of] resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment’ to integrate themselves into the international community.<sup>16</sup> Africans’ sometimes-voracious appetite for borrowing from abroad thus cannot be explained by simple theories of domination and alienation. Significantly, such ‘strategies of extraversion’ are frequently characterized by the appropriation and instrumentalization of ‘Western’ forms and discourses as a means of engaging external actors. Such was the case in Senegal, where the ‘institutional image’ of democracy was mobilized to garner support from international donors, effectively replacing groundnuts as the country’s main export.<sup>17</sup> While my own ethnography challenges the extent to which dependency is an intentional goal of such interactions, the notion of ‘extraversion’ highlights the very intentional (often creative) ways that African actors have appropriated (reinterpreted and reinvented) so-called ‘modern’ forms as an active means of pursuing global integration – and thus goes some way making sense of the motivations and logic of staff and students’ usage and valuation of a ‘modern’ education.

This research grows out of my experiences as a lecturer at IPCS in 2013, and fieldwork conducted in Hargeisa in 2014. In addition to my teaching, I observed classes of two post-graduate cohorts (taught by an American and an Ethiopian). To better understand IPCS’ outlook, I interviewed three previous directors, and consulted internal program documents. To gain insight into how students’ understood their education, I interviewed twenty current and former students from IPCS’ five cohorts, including a representative cross-section of men and women, elders and young professionals. For the duration of my research, I lived with other instructors, and interacted with students informally outside of the classroom.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss how historical and political developments have shaped attitudes in Somaliland towards education. With this context in mind, I explore how invocations of ‘modern’ and ‘indigenous’ knowledge factored into IPCS’ founding and curriculum development. I then consider how students conceptualize, value and

make use of education in ways that reveal subtle generational and gendered claims to socio-economic and political inclusion. Next I explore the classroom as a space not of passive knowledge ‘imbibing’,<sup>18</sup> but one of debate where ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ knowledge are named and contested. I conclude with a reflection on the implications of this case for the study of post-colonial education, as well as the relationship between extraversion, dependency, and the realities of claim-making in a ‘spectacularly unequal global society’.<sup>19</sup>

### **Shifting attitudes towards education**

Formerly the Somaliland British Protectorate, Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960, and joined with (Italian) southern Somalia on 1 July as the Somali Republic. While post-independence pan-Somalism tried to unite Somali identities, perceived socio-economic and political marginalization among the predominantly Isaaq-inhabited northern region soon led to resistance. In 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was established and began a campaign of armed resistance. Although not originally an independence-motivated movement, heavy fighting in 1988 mobilized many Isaaq clans, and upon gaining control of the northwest on May 18, 1991, Somaliland declared independence.<sup>20</sup> Particularly because of the ongoing war in southern Somalia, Somaliland is frequently hailed as a success story for its use of indigenous conflict resolution practices – in the internal governance of the SNM, in quelling inter-clan violence in the early 1990s, and in state formation itself. Such practices include respect for elders as mediators, and use of *xeer* (customary law) to settle disputes. Praise for these ‘indigeneous’ practices exists both in peacebuilding literature,<sup>21</sup> and in the way that most Somalilanders narrate their history. Comments like ‘Our tradition saved us,’ ‘Our process succeeded because it started at the grassroots and wasn’t imposed by international actors’ and ‘Somalis say “rob, caano iyo nabad” [rain, milk and peace], these values brought us peace’ were ubiquitous in conversations with people about this past.

Significantly, the political order that emerged out of this process was intentionally hybrid. On the one hand, Somaliland adopted many elements of a democratic nation-state (a Constitution, bicameral parliament, elections, etcetera). Drawing on Doornbos’ observation that there are clear linkages between ‘the emulation and adoption of worldly state institutions, the assertion of political power and the articulation of identity,’ Hoehne suggests there were clear elements of mimicry in Somaliland’s state formation, echoing Bayart’s assertion that the appropriation of particular state institutions itself represents a ‘strategy of extraversion’.<sup>22</sup> Yet local governance mechanisms were also intentionally incorporated in the form of the House of Elders (*Guurti*) as the Upper House of Parliament, and recognizing *xeer* as an accepted legal tradition (alongside *shari’a* and modern law). While the functionality and legitimacy of this hybrid system remains contested domestically and in the literature,<sup>23</sup> since the 1990s Somaliland has maintained an impressive level of stability. However, Somaliland’s lack of international recognition has left the state fragile, as the government is unable to engage in meaningful international partnerships that may otherwise provide socio-economic support for post-war reconstruction efforts and democratic consolidation.

Alongside these historical and political developments, attitudes towards education have undergone significant changes. While early colonial educational efforts were met with such fierce resistance that mission schools were prohibited, by the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century attitudes towards formal education began to warm. This shift occurred in part as a result of the campaigning of Mahmoud Ahmed Ali, a former colonial clerk now considered the ‘father of modern education’ in Somaliland, who emphasized that Western-style education need not compromise a commitment to Islam, and maintained that students first complete Qur’anic school before being exposed to Western-style education.<sup>24</sup> By the 1940s many nascent political parties included ‘modern education’ – classroom-based learning in subjects beyond religion – as part of their political platforms,<sup>25</sup> making the climate ripe for a more robust

educational policy, and in the wake of WWII the British launched a more concerted campaign to build schools. While education during this era was limited to the urban elite and geared towards the needs of the colonial administration, educational projects proved to be more successful when religious leaders were included in planning, and when Somalis themselves took initiative in their implementation.<sup>26</sup> Compared to other colonial settings Somaliland enjoys a longer history of locally owned education projects, in part because education projects have only succeeded when pursued with local support.

As in other post-colonial settings, mass public education was embraced in Somalia as a vehicle for national development, and as a means to ‘create a clan-transcending Somali nationalism’.<sup>27</sup> Barre’s project of scientific socialism led to radical changes in education policy, including nationalizing private schools, making primary education free and compulsory, the adoption of a Somali script, and mass literacy campaigns. Somali replaced English and Italian as the language of instruction at primary schools, yet given the lack of Somali materials and Somalis with graduate degrees, ‘necessity overrode ideology’, and courses at the country’s two post-secondary institutes remained in Italian and English.<sup>28</sup> This led some Somali scholars to be critical of the enduring ‘colonial character’ of post-independence education, and its role in creating a ‘captive intelligentsia’ whose exposure to Western values fostered antipathy towards indigenous ways.<sup>29</sup> Yet however enthusiastically mass education was embraced by the central government, it largely remained the purview of the urban elite. Given that most of Somaliland’s population remained pastoral nomads and universities were restricted to the south, acquisition of a formal education remained a low priority for most of the country’s population.

Perhaps no other event in Somaliland’s history had a greater impact on attitudes towards education than the civil war, as the dramatic socio-economic impact of the war, mass forced migration, and urbanization led to a re-valuation of the necessity and potential of education. One former IPCS director explained that the forced migration precipitated by the war had radically increased Somalilanders’ exposure to the ‘outside world’; whereas before only a small group of elite and male migrant labourers travelled abroad, ‘now there are elderly Somali women in their *hijabs* in almost every airport’. Whereas before the war pastoralists were concerned with raising children to help care for small animals, the war caused people to spread to other countries ‘where there were no animals, and nothing to do’. Even wealth was no safeguard, as a ‘rich man in Hargeisa may find himself two days later in a refugee camp with nothing, unable to read, and having never sent his kids to school’. Those who were educated, however, ‘got opportunities for small jobs to feed their families’. In the wake of the war, education has come to be perceived as a principal means of survival and security, and ‘people now praise education and are ready to spend money’.

In the wake of a war that nearly completely destroyed the educational infrastructure, education was linked to broader security and development projects. ‘Qoriga dhig, qalinka qaad’ (put down the gun, take up the pen) became the demobilization campaign motto, and education became a means out of instability, most immediately by giving youth who may otherwise be ‘roaming armed bandits’ something to do.<sup>30</sup> This was clearly the case in the founding of Somaliland’s first two universities (described by one lecturer as ‘rehabilitation centres’): Amoud University in Boroma in 1998, and UoH in 2000. Both universities came about through partnerships between diaspora members and local actors motivated by a desire ‘to provide the first generation of post-war secondary students in Somaliland with follow-up opportunities’ and ‘contribute to the national development by providing well-educated local students for the local market’.<sup>31</sup> Students echo such motivations, noting links between peace, education, and job opportunities, the possibility of private economic success, and migration.<sup>32</sup> This has precipitated massive growth in universities – from 2006 to 2016 the number of universities has exploded, from four to over two dozen and counting – that clearly indexes a

shift in the way that education is valued in a post-war context, and begins to reveal the significance of IPCS' development.

### **'Education to engage the world': making sense of IPCS' extraversion**

IPCS was created at UoH in 2008, through a USAID-funded partnership with Virginia-based Eastern Mennonite University (EMU), with a goal of increasing the capacity of Somalilanders to promote peace and stability, through documenting and teaching indigenous knowledge alongside modern theories and practices. Today, IPCS intentionally defines itself as a 'modern' institution. According to staff, 'modern' here is used to signify being intentionally oriented towards 'Western' or 'international' approaches that are 'new' or 'foreign' to Somaliland – or, as Mamdani lamented, 'extraverted' – in contrast to clan-centric modes of 'traditional' or 'local' knowledge and practice. While on the surface this extraverted orientation appears to have resulted in a mimetic (and largely imported) curriculum, closer consideration reveals this approach is not simply the product of an enduring 'colonial mindset', but rather a result of specific and inter-related strategies on the part of IPCS' local leadership to engage external partners, justify their approach to local constituents, raise their local reputation and prepare students to 'engage the world'. In light of shifting attitudes towards education, in this section I explore how invocations of 'indigenous knowledge' and the intentional embrace of a 'modern' curriculum reveal the logic of extraversion.

*Exporting indigenous knowledge:* IPCS' dual mandate (to teach modern and indigenous approaches) and extraverted character begins with its founding. The original idea first arose at a UoH staff retreat in 2006 hosted by CARE International (who were funding UoH), where staff members were asked to write short concept papers that could lead to strategic funding proposals. One paper suggested the establishment of a centre to document and teach indigenous peacebuilding practices. Significantly, according to one former director, the original vision was not simply to teach such things to Somalilanders, but 'to document tradition in order to sell it to the international community'. Likewise, the current director highlighted the original desire to 'get support from international figures, to get international people to teach us about how peacebuilding things are going on in the world, and also to teach *them* how indigenous peacebuilding works'. CARE circulated the original concept paper amongst potential donors – which, significantly, uses the term 'indigenous' rather than 'traditional', as this is the preferred language of international donors – USAID expressed interest in the project, and issued a call for partners that eventually brought EMU on board. While it is unclear whether EMU understood that UoH was as concerned with 'exporting' local knowledge as they were with making it the core of their curriculum, UoH staff used what was unique about the Somaliland experience as a selling point of sorts (in a field where attending to indigenous resources is in fashion<sup>33</sup>), to gain international attention and foster collaboration.

Although the original EMU partnership has ended, IPCS has used its unique mandate and founding partnership to establish itself as a trusted go-to institute for international peacebuilding organizations and universities keen to partner with local institutes, and has secured a number of financially substantial partnerships as a result. In a highly unpredictable and rapidly changing educational sector, where universities usually rely on slim profit margins netted almost entirely from student fees,<sup>34</sup> these partnerships and funding have proved instrumental in cementing IPCS' reputation, its ability to attract international lecturers, and have provided the financial stability necessary to survive in a rapidly shifting market.<sup>35</sup> While a stated commitment to indigenous knowledge first appears to be a potentially 'decolonizing' strategy, it has been primarily used to market IPCS to secure lucrative international partnerships – not unlike Senegal's 'exporting' of a particular image of democracy to engage international donors.<sup>36</sup>

***Developing a local ‘modern’ curriculum:*** Like the original founding, IPCS’ current curriculum is the result of a dialectic process between UoH actors and international funders, necessity and intentionality. While the original proposal advanced by EMU included teaching peace studies courses within existing undergraduate programs, in an attempt to fill a void in educational opportunities (at the time there were no post-graduate programs), and to directly engage the country’s political elite, UoH pushed to upgrade this into a post-graduate program. This decision, however, came with logistical challenges as UoH lacked instructors qualified to teach post-graduate courses. In its early years, the curriculum and instructors came from EMU, with the hope that existing faculty from UoH would be trained at EMU’s Summer Peacebuilding Institute; however, owing to visas issues, this never materialized. In the meantime, four young lecturers from UoH were selected to undertake a one-year MA degree program, and gain training in curriculum development, at the UN-mandated University for Peace (UPeace) in Costa Rica. By 2010, four lecturers had completed MAs and returned to Hargeisa to rotate through the position of director, and serve as core teaching faculty.

Upon their 2010 return, a curriculum review began. Although the curriculum that resulted from this process seems to mimic that of UPeace, conversations with IPCS’ leadership reveal curriculum choices to be a result of both necessity and the intentional conceptualization of a ‘modern’ curriculum – that is, an ‘international’, ‘Western’-inspired curriculum – as itself a *local* need. Consideration of who was available and capable of teaching factored into their decisions, and the curriculum reflects attempts to best make use of available human resources and materials. Yet IPCS’ leadership also collectively professed a belief that while ‘tradition’ played a key role in bringing stability to Somaliland, there are ‘deficiencies’ or ‘weaknesses’ in local conflict resolution mechanisms that should be supplemented or ‘corrected’ by international approaches. The course on human rights, for example, was added based on a view that the principles of *xeer* need to be ‘updated’. One former director explained that while elders say ‘peace is when there is milk and rain’, this perspective ‘needs to be widened’. Without ‘human rights, governance, health services, schools, and social services,’ peace remains fragile, because ‘if you have milk and rain but are dying with disease, peace will not last’. Similarly, the current director explained that they were conscious of a shift from ‘nomadic, customary ways’ to ‘urban and modern ways of life’, explaining ‘we can’t rely on customary people. [Rather] there should be modern institutions, [and] scholars and institutions working on peacebuilding’. He also noted that whereas knowledge was previously transferred orally and through practical experience, ‘youth today are always on Facebook and Twitter’ and learn in different ways; ‘modern’ institutions, like IPCS, are necessary to accommodate such changes. IPCS has thus conceived and positioned itself in precisely these terms, ready to fill the needs of a changing community, to ‘widen perspectives’ and to ‘correct’ local practices that no longer provide adequate knowledge and skills for contemporary Somaliland.

***‘Education to engage the world’:*** Also related to the view that an internationally-oriented curriculum is a local necessity is an underlying understanding that it is through education that Somalilanders will be best equipped to ‘engage the world’. Responding to a World Bank presentation of a large-scale household survey, where audience members were upset with the perceived bias and misinformation, a UoH lecturer remarked to me, ‘Education is our key to the outside world; we need education to engage with the world’. This statement served to highlight not only the changing value of education in Somaliland, but its critical importance in an unrecognized state; if Somalilanders are to be able to engage in meaningful dialogue with international actors – NGOs, investors, foreign diplomats, and others – including to correct biases in externally-produced research, then a certain type of education becomes not only a mechanism for domestic development, but a means for students to develop the skills necessary to ‘engage the world’. IPCS is no exception in this regard, and its



own preference for internationally-produced material grows from a belief that students need to learn the skills and ‘language’ that will allow them to interact with international actors. The current director thus emphasized that IPCS intentionally does not ‘customize’ or ‘translate’ any of their curriculum (either by teaching in Somali, or altering the material), because their priority is to ‘learn from the world’ and ‘produce graduates with skills that are linked to modern theories and modern knowledge’. He further explained: ‘we cannot be isolated from the rest of the world’ so ‘first and foremost we need the experiences, knowledge and literatures of other countries’.

While elements of IPCS’ curriculum certainly appear (are) mimetic, interpreting this as evidence of an enduring colonial mindset misses both the specific contextual origins of the Institute, as well the dialectic process of its formation, which included both the pull of necessity and lack of experience, but continued and intentional pushing from local actors themselves. Somaliland’s long history of locally-owned education projects, and the increasing importance of education in a post-war, unrecognized state paved the way for the emergence of an Institute that is purposefully ‘modern’ and globally oriented yet entirely local – indeed, the director constantly highlighted IPCS’ ‘locally-driven’ nature, in contrast to NGOs whose mandates are dictated by foreign donors. Bayart’s ‘logic of extraversion’ is evident here on a number of levels: in IPCS’ ‘exporting’ of indigenous knowledge; in the leadership’s conceptualization of an international curriculum as a local necessity to ‘correct’ and complement ‘tradition’; and in an over-arching desire to speak the language of the international community (both that of international peacebuilding, as well as English) in order to ‘engage the world’. In this way, IPCS has established itself as a ‘knowledge broker’ of sorts.<sup>37</sup> Yet while Merry suggests the role of ‘knowledge brokers’ is to ‘translate’ or ‘vernacularize’ the language of the international community both ‘up’ and ‘down,’<sup>38</sup> the knowledge brokered by IPCS has intentionally *not* been translated ‘down’, as this would compromise students’ ability to speak the language of the international community. In many ways, the Institute mirrors the intentionally hybrid nature of Somaliland’s political order, and the implicit claims to socio-economic and political inclusion inherent in conceiving themselves as a ‘modern’ Institute are particularly heightened in Somaliland’s fragile, unrecognized post-war context. Rather than evidencing an enduring ‘colonial mindset’, IPCS’ orientation is better conceived as part of an intentional and creative mobilization of available resources to simultaneously respond to local needs and ‘engage the world’.

### **The value of a ‘modern’ education**

Having established a sense of IPCS’ institutional-level extraversion, I turn to an exploration of how this education is conceptualized, valued and used by students. In industrial and colonial settings, education has long been linked to the formation of social class, and the promise of ‘upward mobility’ via the acquisition of particular forms of ‘capital’.<sup>39</sup> The cases presented here in many ways confirm such findings, and uphold Thomas and Ferguson’s notion that invocations of the ‘modern’ may entail implicit claims to inclusion. Yet instead of simply desiring to become certain types of modern subjects, specific features of the Somaliland context – particularly transformations in generational and gendered relationships – need to be considered to account for individuals’ desires to study at IPCS.

***Formalizing and contextualizing traditional leadership:*** Congruent with IPCS’ mandate to increase the capacity of the country’s political elite, IPCS counts among its alumni government ministers, clan elders and other political officers. Indeed, one former director remarked: ‘only the president has been kept from the Institute!’ Many of these men (and this group is exclusively male) were members of the SNM, mediators during the peace process, and then elected or appointed to political office in Somaliland’s emergent government. For such students, the education provided by IPCS is primarily valued as a means to ‘upgrade’ or

‘formalize’ their skills, to reflect on and share their own experiences, and to gain perspective on how Somaliland is perceived by others. Consider the following cases.<sup>40</sup>

Isack and Omar are current and former politicians. When asked why he had come to IPCS, Isack emphatically replied: ‘Peacebuilding and conflict resolution is what I do; I needed a certificate/qualification for what I was doing!’ Omar likewise emphasized, ‘I do international relations’, and thus wanted to ‘formalize’ his skill-set. Both also highlighted that their studies had allowed them to reflect on and share their experiences with others, and to critically assess Somaliland’s situation. Isack noted that IPCS helped him ‘to see the names and ideas behind the things we do’. On a more critical note, Omar highlighted that Somaliland ‘started from scratch’ and leaders ‘didn’t understand their roles’. The promise of IPCS was thus that it would ‘help leaders to understand their roles’; for him, IPCS helped put his own work into perspective, gave him a better understanding of why the international community had intervened in southern Somalia but largely ignored Somaliland, and also helped to give names to the political problems and opportunities faced by Somaliland’s political leadership.

A desire to better understand their own on-the-ground experiences, and to put these into (international) perspective also motivated Ali and Abdiwali, both members of the *Guurti*, and former SNM officers. Ali, who was responsible for coordinating the massive demobilization campaign of the 1990s – using his own inter-clan affiliations, applying the principles of *xeer*, and invoking what he referred to as ‘traditional values’ to ‘convince the mothers to tell their sons to put down the guns’ – explained that coming to IPCS allowed him to share his experiences with others, to ‘study them in English’ and through ‘modern frameworks’. On a similar note, Abdiwali emphasized that he already knew about ‘traditional’ mechanisms, but came to IPCS to better understand ‘what others think of these’. Now a student in the MA program, Abdiwali highlighted a desire to ‘understand what is going on in the world, and how countries manipulate each other’.

***Education for professional development and political participation:*** The other major cohort of students at IPCS includes early- and middle-career professionals (NGO and UN-employees, lawyers, members of political parties) whose motives for studying are clearly linked to professional and political aspirations, as well as a desire to better understand their own experiences of living through a period of violence and reconstruction. Given that at the time of its establishment the IPCS diploma was the only post-graduate course in the country, combined with the ample job opportunities in peacebuilding and development provided by the proliferation of NGOs in post-war Somaliland, the post-graduate diploma and now the MA are highly coveted qualifications for aspiring professionals and politicians. Consider the following stories.

Said and Abdisalan are both in their early 30s and work for a UNDP-funded conflict research organization. Both are from Hargeisa, and were young adolescents at the time of the war. For Said, a desire to understand what caused this violence factored into his decision to study at IPCS, yet he was frank in stating that his primary motive ‘was to boost and develop [his] career’; since there were no other post-graduate courses in the country at the time, he came to IPCS. Following on this comment, Abdisalan noted that the course would increase his understanding of peacebuilding and development, and that such skills were ‘very rich in potential’, because ‘you can apply for many different positions’ in such fields. While critical of certain elements of the program (particularly what they perceived to be the ‘poorer quality’ of local lecturers compared to the ‘higher international standards’ upheld by foreign instructors), the skills and knowledge of international peacebuilding and development issues, as well as research methodologies, had served them well in their professional careers, particularly as employment with international NGOs/UN bodies is lucrative and competitive.

Muse, a good-humored student who frequently came to class in a t-shirt reading *mzungu* (white person) across the chest, is in his late 30s and the director of a UN agency. A

native of Somaliland, he grew up in Mogadishu and began his 20-year UN career as a teenage interpreter for UNOSOM. Already well established, Muse lamented that the current quality of leaders in Somaliland was weak, and that if he was ‘going to become a politician’, he would need to have the appropriate knowledge and skills – aspirations that led him to IPCS. Despite his love for *mzungu* clothing and music, and the potential for mobility his high-ranking UN-post affords him, Muse emphasized a desire to stay in Somaliland to serve his ‘home’. His time at IPCS allowed him space to reflect on his own experiences of war and reconstruction, and to cultivate the leadership skills and knowledge of the international system he believed necessary to launch a political career.

Amina, Faisa and Samia are young professionals (a UNDP-researcher, an opposition party member, and lawyer respectively) whose status as women in a setting where women’s public, decision-making roles have been historically limited adds different significance to their studies. All three women highlighted that IPCS provided them an initial entry into a field historically dominated by men; most immediately, this happened by putting them in the same classroom (indeed, one ‘surprise’ mentioned by an elderly male member of the class was that ‘there were women there!’), while also opening aspirations and possibilities for political participation. Samia underscored that ‘young people are supposed to lead, but we don’t yet have the skills’; she emphasized that learning about the ‘international system’ and ‘modern approaches’ provided promise, as they afford more avenues for women’s and youth involvement. Amina noted that she had a long interest in politics, and that if she was to become a leader in her field, she would need to acquire knowledge of ‘both modern and traditional ways of doing things’. Faisa, likewise, explained that the knowledge and skills afforded by her time at IPCS would help her to better support her party.

***Generational and gendered claims to inclusion:*** While links between education, social class, and various forms of ‘capital’ have been highlighted in the anthropological literature on education, the motives and valuation of education expressed by these various students upholds and challenges this conventional wisdom and highlights the need to pay attention to the way the value of education is locally produced. To begin, while all of the students are among Somaliland’s elite in one way or another, they belong to distinct sub-groups whose motivations vary. For the elders and political elite – whose status as elite is well-established, making the incentive of ‘upward mobility’ less significant – an IPCS education offers the promise of ‘formalizing’ and ‘upgrading’ skills, and thus a re-valuation and recognition of their existing expertise and authority. Significantly, this is occurring in a self-conceived hybrid political order, where formal education is increasingly seen as a necessary qualification for leadership (as Svanikier finds in Ghana<sup>41</sup>). Indeed, while the *Guurti* is often celebrated as part of a successful hybrid political order, it is also often decried as ‘backward’ and ‘outdated’. A frequent lament is that members of the *Guurti* are ‘uneducated’ and ‘don’t know what they’re doing’. Somaliland’s continued lack of recognition is also frequently blamed on political leaders’ inability to effectively engage international audiences, owing to a perceived lack of diplomacy knowledge and skill. As elsewhere in Africa, the potential compatibility of traditional authority with democratic state institutions is highly contested. In light of such criticism, the desire expressed by this group of students to ‘formalize’ their experiences, to learn about how the world interacts and understands Somaliland, and to gain fluency in English and its associated ‘modern frameworks’ entails recognition of the contested nature of traditional authority, Somaliland’s somewhat precarious hybrid political order, and thus an implicit demand for continued political inclusion. Significantly, pursuing higher education does not undermine traditional authority, but rather lends it further legitimacy.

For younger professionals whose status as elites is not predetermined, the benefits of an IPCS education are more clearly linked to the acquisition of forms of ‘capital’ that will

facilitate upward mobility. While a university degree, even at the post-graduate level, has become less and less of an assurance of employment in Somaliland – indeed, university degree holders are often among the ranks of those who undertake *tahrib* (illegal migration) to seek out better employment and educational opportunities abroad<sup>42</sup> – a degree from IPCS continues to be seen as particularly valuable, thanks to IPCS’ long reputation, use of foreign lecturers, and the particular set of knowledge and skills it provides. Students see an IPCS degree as a way to gain the skills, knowledge and accreditation required to advance their careers, increasing their chances of socio-economic and political inclusion. What this looks like cannot be separated from the Somaliland context – where links between education and socio-economic inclusion have become particularly pronounced since the war – and reveals shifting generational and gender dynamics. The knowledge and skills provided by IPCS, particularly related to peacebuilding and the international system, are valued as they are because NGO and UN employers working in a post-war setting require (prospective) employees to have such skills. Furthermore, given the contested nature of traditional authority and perceived lack of skill amongst the current political elite, acquiring such skills increases students’ opportunities for direct political participation. Significantly, the desire to increase one’s leadership capacity through gaining knowledge of the ‘international system’ is particularly pronounced among IPCS’ few female students, whose opportunities for political participation in the ‘traditional’ system are limited.

Taken together, these student reflections suggest there are indeed implicit claims to inclusion embodied in the desire to pursue the type of globally-oriented education IPCS provides. Just as IPCS has mobilized the resources available to it to ‘engage the world’, so too do students mirror this extraverted tendency in the ways that each uses education as a means of socio-economic or political advancement/inclusion. Significantly, this has taken many forms – ‘formalizing’ skills, acquiring ‘capital’ for career advancement, gaining perspective on ‘what others think of Somaliland’ – which can only be understood as the result of shifting generational and gender dynamics, and the contested nature of leadership in a post-war, hybrid political order. As in other contexts, students do value education as a ‘link to elsewhere’,<sup>43</sup> yet the link between education and ‘elsewhere’ is not automatic or straightforward, nor is there anything here to suggest that valuing what is locally understood as a ‘modern education’ is accompanied by a ‘colonized mindset’. Students may come to class, after all, as traditional leaders to revalidate and reflect on their own experiences, alongside others pursuing the skills required to potentially challenge this very status quo. Just as Bayly finds that Vietnamese intellectuals may use forms of ‘cultural capital’ variously attained through colonial education and revolutionary experiences to engage an increasingly ‘transnational’ world,<sup>44</sup> so too do the students of IPCS exhibit an understanding that this education represents but one set of skills that does not undermine their ability to value what is unique about their own identities and experiences.

### **Contesting ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ knowledge in the classroom**

In this section I consider the effect of classroom experiences on the way that students talk about and understand the relationship between ‘traditional/indigenous knowledge’ – understood in this context to be knowledge that is locally produced, and rarely written down – and ‘modern’ or ‘international’ approaches. Whereas the literature on education as *socialization* highlights how education produces ‘modern subjects’, and homogenizes or reproduces normative values, my research revealed the IPCS classroom to be a much more complex and multifaceted space. I focus here on three distinct effects of IPCS’ curriculum: the direct challenging or rejection of ‘Western’ biases and methods; the use of ‘modern’ theories to critique ‘tradition’; and the use of this same material to re-value and articulate

indigenous knowledge in ways that help to ‘name and globalize’ what is unique about the Somaliland experience.<sup>45</sup>

**Challenging bias in the classroom:** While students clearly exhibit a desire to study ‘modern approaches’, the Western bias and applicability to the Somaliland context of this material rarely goes unchecked. Queries such as ‘Where are the Somali scholars?’ ‘Why did the authors talk about Judeo-Christian conceptions of ‘peace’ and forget about Islam?’ ‘If these authors want to criticize clan influence here, they should also criticize the impact of interest groups on American democracy’ – frequently peppered the classroom. At times this even involved complete rejection of the analytical frameworks provided by the instructor. In one class I observed, the American instructor tasked groups with coming to a ‘consensus’ (using conflict resolution skills taught in the class) to agree on a topic to use as a case study. While most groups obliged, one group of three men and two women could not agree. The women wanted to look at gender, while the men wanted to focus on clan violence, and unable to come to agreement, wanted to vote. After being told this was not an option, they asked if they could ‘solve it our way’. While wary this would lead the men to bully the women into accepting their position, the instructor obliged. The students went away for prayer, and returned having decided that they would in fact look at gender, and picked a case involving a woman upset at her husband for taking another wife. To the disappointment of the instructor, the proposed ‘traditional’ resolution to the conflict involved the brother-in-law reminding the wife of her duties to her husband – a response that the group members agreed was best, as the woman should not be ‘selfish’ and should put the needs of others before her own.

**Reconsidering Somaliland’s peace:** While the above example illustrates an instance of rejection of ‘modern’ (i.e. foreign or new) methods in favour of tradition, at many other times the reverse was true: the language of modern conflict resolution theory was used to challenge and contest traditional approaches. Such debates reflect broader discussions in Somaliland about the proper balance of tradition and modernity in a hybrid political order, yet students suggest that debates were heightened in this setting because the theory and examples to which they were exposed served to broaden their understanding of conceptions of ‘peace’ and ‘justice’. In one of my classes a discussion of ‘positive peace’ precipitated debate about whether or not Somaliland was actually ‘at peace’. More than one student expressed the sentiment that they had previously thought there was ‘enough peace in Somaliland’, but they had realized Somaliland only has ‘negative peace’, and conflicts could arise at any time ‘because we have corruption, limited democracy, and justice, as well as poverty and resource scarcity’. Where *rob iyo caano* are not enough, international approaches – e.g human rights law, formal courts – become necessary supplements.

In a similar vein, classroom conversations led some students to challenge the celebrated nature of Somaliland’s supposedly ‘grassroots’ approach to conflict resolution. Samia, for example, questioned if the traditional approach of having ‘elders solve things under a tree’ is really ‘grassroots’ at all, as it leads to imposing solutions on others (particularly women), and overlooks the causes of conflict. Isack, a clan chief who had been part of an initiative to convince clan elders to integrate principles of human rights into their application of *xeer*, also suggested that while people seem to accept, on the surface, the way of elders coming together to solve conflicts, some clans may not always be happy about the way in which solutions are reached and imposed. Implicitly accepting many of the lessons of international conflict theory about the causes of conflict, and the distinction between positive and negative peace, has thus led to challenges of the durability and desirability of ‘traditional’ approaches.

No single issue is perhaps more contested than the role that women should properly play in public life. As ‘gender mainstreaming’ has entered international peace studies in the last decade, IPCS’ curriculum includes an entire course on ‘gender and peacebuilding’, and

increased attention to human rights law at a national level has led to the renunciation of a number of practices seen to be an affront to women's rights (such as the conciliatory exchange of women between clans, and the forced marriage of rape victims to their rapists). As the classroom incident noted above suggests, this is an issue that frequently divided classroom conversations: on the one hand, whenever this issue arose, some students were quick to explain the unique role women played in traditional conciliation processes – as informal 'diplomats' who used their inter-clan (marriage) affiliations to prepare the way for negotiation, whose distinct roles made their participation 'more important' than in the 'international system' where men and women are perceived to do the 'same thing'. On the other hand, however, were students who drew on the language of human rights to suggest the 'international system' was 'more fair to women', as it allowed them a direct seat at the table and a voice of their own. Such comments frequently incited heated debate: in one instance a male student adamantly maintained that having men acting on woman's behalf did not devalue her place, while two female students insisted they should be able to speak for themselves without a male family member intervening on their behalf. While attending to the nuances of these debates is beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that the classroom served as a site where such issues are raised and contested, and where the language provided by IPCS' internationally-oriented curriculum has provided fodder both for upholding and challenging local attitudes and approaches.

***Naming and globalizing indigenous knowledge:*** A final effect of IPCS' curriculum brings us full circle in a way to IPCS' goal of documenting and teaching indigenous knowledge. While little dedicated attention has been paid to indigenous approaches, students' reflections suggest that the international peacebuilding theories encountered at IPCS allowed for new understandings of local practices. This has happened not so much because of an intentional focus on such topics, but because of the experiences brought into the classroom by students themselves, and constant reflection on the received material for the Somaliland context. A frequent lesson or surprise that some students noted was what they perceived to be 'similarities between modern and traditional approaches'. Amina recounted how before the course she thought that Somali approaches 'were very different from those that exist in the world', but the course had showed her 'that actually they are near to each other'. She further explained that although Somali elders were unaware of 'the system in the rest of the world' they used 'very near or exactly the same ideas as the international standards'. Ali, the *Guurti* member who played a key role during the peace process, echoed this sentiment, reflecting that he had learned that the long-standing practice of elders 'talking under a tree' was 'very scientific', and not that different from Western negotiation practices; 'I came to know that our ancestors were intellectuals, not ignorant', he concluded, adding that the only difference was that 'modern approaches' happened 'in English'. Similarly, Abdiwali highlighted that the course 'didn't teach him anything new about tradition', but it did 'give names [such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, etc.] to what we were already doing', and helped him understand how others viewed these.

For others, classroom experiences highlighted the 'uniqueness' of Somaliland's history, the superiority of local methods, and their potential to contribute to international peacebuilding. Faisa described that while she had heard about Somaliland's methods before, she learned that 'our tradition is unique', and that 'the bottom-up system is the most valuable system of conflict resolution in the world'. Likewise, another student explained that he had heard about how elders solved problems, but it was 'only oral' and 'not written down'; the Alternative Dispute Resolution course, however, had shown him these things 'in writing', and this had led him to believe that the Somali system was 'somehow better than the international' and that it should be 'published and given to the world' – particularly in light of the failure of international interventions in southern Somalia.

Despite the lack of intentional focus on indigenous knowledge, these reflections suggest that students have used the language and analytical tools taught at IPCS to make sense of their own experiences in a new light, and to name and re-value local approaches – in a sense, allowing for a ‘translating up’ of experiences.<sup>46</sup> As observers of the debate on indigenous knowledge promotion have noted, one impetus for naming and promoting indigenous knowledge as such is that it places different knowledge systems (including those previously not even considered ‘knowledge’ by Cartesian standards) on the same plane.<sup>47</sup> Significantly, efforts to ‘name and globalize’ indigenous knowledge – or reassert ‘local and cultural differences [within] a context of globalization’<sup>48</sup> – happen *against* a perceived negatively encroaching modernity or misinformed visions of Africa as ‘backward’, and thus serve as a way for ‘Africa as subject to authorize views of itself’.<sup>49</sup> This is indeed what is happening at IPCS, where teaching international peacebuilding gives students a way to ‘name’ and re-value their own experiences and to articulate this in a language that allows for engagement with various international actors, thus ‘globalizing’ what may be unique about their experiences. In a sense, the ‘naming and globalizing’ of indigenous knowledge in this way itself functions under the logic of extraversion, as it allows for the insertion of a now-defined ‘knowledge’ system into broader fields of ‘knowledge’, albeit on terms dependent on Western categories of knowledge.

Alternatively put, rather than serving to simply produce modern subjects, students’ classroom experiences have helped to ‘deterritorialize’ their own understandings and experiences of Somaliland’s peace process and current political context ‘by multiplying the “imaginative resources” people use to make sense of their changing lives’.<sup>50</sup> This has not led to a blanket acceptance of the values and ideas to which they have been exposed, but rather has resulted in a somewhat bewildering number of opinions, ideas and debates, and everything from rejection to appropriation of the (mainly Western) international theories and approaches entailed therein. Rather than simply ‘imbibing’ Western knowledge (and devaluing indigenous knowledge), the IPCS classroom is better conceived as a site of contestation, and a window into the ‘complexities and contradictions’<sup>51</sup> of broader changes underway in Somaliland.

### **Conclusions and implications: extraversion and dependency revisited**

Against the view that mimetic or extraverted forms of post-colonial education simply represent the presence of an enduring colonial mindset, this article has explored how, why and to what effect purposefully ‘modern’ curriculum has been adopted in a Somaliland post-secondary institution. By attending to how and why ‘modern’ and ‘indigenous’ or ‘traditional’ knowledge are evoked, I have shown IPCS’ purposefully ‘modern’ orientation to be part of an intentional strategy of engagement by which both staff and students make implicit claims to inclusion of various sorts. At the institutional level, this has involved marketing ‘indigenous knowledge’ as a way to engage external actors, as well as conceptualizing an internationally-oriented education as itself a local need offered to students as a means to ‘engage the world’. Students in turn value this education for a range of reasons – to formalize skill sets, share experiences, or increase professional opportunities – that entail a variety of gendered and generationally-differentiated claims to socio-economic and political inclusion. This self-conceived modern orientation, furthermore, has not simply led to the devaluation of indigenous knowledge – indeed, one student emphasized the need to ‘learn about the world, but without losing sight of who we are’. Rather, the language and knowledge imparted by IPCS has provided students with new ways to reflect on their own experiences, and to name and debate the relative merits of local and international knowledge system in contemporary Somaliland. This case serves to highlight the value of approaching seemingly mimetic forms of postcolonial education as ‘neither a “provincializing” of dominant European knowledge

systems...nor the tame acceptance of an alien Western universalism,'<sup>52</sup> but rather as a window into the complexities of social change.

While this case has suggested that the adoption of a 'modern' approach does not entail a simple desire to 'become like you', it would be naïve to ignore that whatever intentional strategies of extraversion are employed by staff or students in this setting occur within 'a spectacularly unequal global society',<sup>53</sup> one in which Somaliland lacks formal political membership, and where domestic unemployment rates estimated at 75% bring a different sense of urgency to aspirations for upward mobility. The fact that a formal (English) education is what is required to 'engage the world', furthermore, reflects deep inequalities in the knowledge economy. 'Engaging the world', after all, requires speaking a foreign language, making 'translating up' not so much a preference but a necessity. As Ngwane highlights, even those institutions that have taken up the call to 'decolonize' the classroom through a return to indigenous knowledge are fraught with contradictions, caught as they are between the rhetoric of an 'African Renaissance' and the realities of 'neoliberal global capitalism'.<sup>54</sup> These realities suggest that there is indeed value in attending to the implicit claims to membership that may be at stake in invocations of the 'modern' and also place accusations of a preference for dependency among African elites in new light.

Bayart's notion of 'dependent extraversion' offers a much needed alternative to views of (post)coloniality that rely on theories of domination and alienation, and is particularly helpful in highlighting the often creative and intentional ways that resources are mobilized. Yet as a meta-historical narrative Bayart's assumption that actors always act strategically and with a preference for dependent relationships – the outcome of which he views as both 'banal' and 'tragic'<sup>55</sup> – brings with it new problems, including overlooking the ways in which 'extraversion' is itself the product of particular locales.<sup>56</sup> At IPCS, a desire to 'engage the world' exists alongside a deep pride in Somaliland's own peacebuilding and state-building achievements, which have been characterized by a strong sense of self-reliance (and lack of *dependence* on external actors), challenging the notion that extraversion necessarily entails the strategic pursuit of dependence. Furthermore, while IPCS' extraversion certainly entails the mobilization of available resources in intentional and creative ways, overemphasizing a strategic preference for dependent relationships overlooks the context that necessitated this activity – a setting where education may be about 'engaging the world', but is equally also about survival in a post-war setting – and perhaps reads a knowledge of outcome back into action that cannot ever be predicted. As one Somali lecturer explained, 'sometimes we do things strategically, and sometimes we just do them because they work for us at the time. We are figuring things out as we go along'. Similarly, writing about state formation in Somaliland, Hoehne highlights that 'imitation' was sometimes employed to pursue strategic political ends, but sometimes more simply to 'cope with uncertainty'.<sup>57</sup> In Somaliland, both types of imitation have been present; assuming singular strategic intentions risks overlooking this complexity.

This case has affirmed the value of approaching self-conceived modern forms not simply as parody or resistance, or as evidence of an enduring colonial mindset, but as actions that may teach us something about claims to membership in a vastly unequal global society. While 'extraversion' helps to capture the intentionality and creativity involved in such processes, we would do well not to overlook the context-specific forms that extraversion may take, as well as the possibility that such practices may not lead to dependency (even if 'dependence' is interpreted in less pitiable or tragic terms<sup>58</sup>) but to more equitable terms of engagement. The outcome of IPCS' extraversion remains to be seen – IPCS, and Somaliland more generally, are incredibly young works-in-progress. Only by attending to Somaliland's unique historical-political context, education's multifaceted and dialectic relationship to social



change, and the context-specific forms ‘extraversion’ may take, will we be able to fully appreciate the complexity and possibilities of these processes underway.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Nyamnjoh and Jua ‘African Universities in Crisis’; Alvares & Faruqi, *Decolonising the University*; Ocholla, ‘Marginalized knowledge’.
- <sup>2</sup> Stambach, *Lessons from Mount Kilimanjaro*, 2.
- <sup>3</sup> Mamdani, ‘University crisis and reform’, 11.
- <sup>4</sup> Nyamnjoh and Jua ‘African Universities in Crisis’; Alvares & Faruqi, *Decolonising the University*; Ocholla, ‘Marginalized knowledge’.
- <sup>5</sup> Stambach, *Lessons from Mount Kilimanjaro*, 2.
- <sup>6</sup> Nyamnjoh, ‘Colonial Education in Africa.’
- <sup>7</sup> Simpson, *‘Half-London’ in Zambia*, 5.
- <sup>8</sup> Bayly, ‘Vietnamese Intellectuals’ (my translation).
- <sup>9</sup> Zachernuk, *Colonial Subjects*.
- <sup>10</sup> Bayly, ‘Vietnamese Intellectuals’, 326.
- <sup>11</sup> Stoller ‘Cultural Resistance’; Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity*.
- <sup>12</sup> Ferguson, ‘Of Mimicry and Membership’, 565.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., 555
- <sup>14</sup> Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity*, 84.
- <sup>15</sup> Thomas, ‘Modernity’s Failings’, 736.
- <sup>16</sup> Bayart, ‘Africa in the World’, 218.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> Nyamnjoh, ‘Colonial Education in Africa.’
- <sup>19</sup> Ferguson, ‘Of Mimicry and Membership’, 565.
- <sup>20</sup> See Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*.
- <sup>21</sup> See Farah, *The Roots of Reconciliation*; Walls et al. *Peace in Somaliland*.
- <sup>22</sup> Doornbos, *Global Forces*, 19 (cited in Hoehne ‘Mimicry and mimesis in state formation’).
- <sup>23</sup> Hoehne, ‘Limits of Hybrid Political Orders.’
- <sup>24</sup> Cassanelli & Abdikadar, ‘Somalia: Education in Transition’
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid. See also Abdi ‘Education in Somalia’
- <sup>27</sup> Abdi, ‘Education in Somalia’, 332.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., 334.
- <sup>29</sup> Bulhan, ‘The Captive Intelligentsia’; Mah, ‘Marginalizing African Indigenous Knowledge’.
- <sup>30</sup> Hoehne, ‘Education and Peace-building’; Samatar, ‘Somali Reconstruction and Local Initiative’.
- <sup>31</sup> Macgregor et al., ‘Diaspora and development,’ 246-8.
- <sup>32</sup> Hoehne, ‘Education and Peace-building.’
- <sup>33</sup> Funk, ‘Valuing the local.’
- <sup>34</sup> In 2016 average fees for post-graduate programs in Somaliland were approximately \$400-450/semester – a rate that is prohibitively high by local standards, though in the absence of any other revenue sources is often barely enough to pay instructors and cover administrative and building costs.
- <sup>35</sup> It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the political-economic ramifications of rapid evolution of the post-secondary education sector. For a preliminary discussion of the intersection of this growth with youth employment opportunities, see Ali, ‘Youth in Somaliland: Education and Employment.’
- <sup>36</sup> Bayart, ‘Africa in the World’, 226.
- <sup>37</sup> Merry, ‘Mapping the Middle’, 2006.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> See Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*; Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’; Scudder & Colson, *Secondary Education and the Formation of an Elite*.
- <sup>40</sup> All names are pseudonyms.
- <sup>41</sup> Svanikier, ‘Political Elite Circulation.’
- <sup>42</sup> See Ali, ‘Youth in Somaliland’, and Samuel Hall ‘Investing in Somali Youth.’
- <sup>43</sup> Corbett, *Learning to Leave*, 119.
- <sup>44</sup> Bayly ‘Vietnamese Intellectuals’.
- <sup>45</sup> Zegeye & Vambe, ‘African Indigenous Knowledge Systems’, 2006.
- <sup>46</sup> Merry, ‘Mapping the Middle’, 2006.
- <sup>47</sup> Crossman & Devisch, ‘Endogeneous Knowledge.’

- <sup>48</sup> Bayart, 'Africa in the World', 263.  
<sup>49</sup> Zegeye & Vambe, 'African Indigenous Knowledge Systems', 331  
<sup>50</sup> Stambach, *Lessons from Mount Kilimanjaro*, 172-3.  
<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 2.  
<sup>52</sup> Bayly, 'Vietnamese Intellectuals', 326.  
<sup>53</sup> Ferguson, 'Of Mimicry and Membership', 565.  
<sup>54</sup> Ngwane, 'Enduring Salience of Colonial Encounters,' 67  
<sup>55</sup> Bayart, 'Africa in the World', 264.  
<sup>56</sup> For an alternative application of 'extraversion', see Hagmaan, 'Stabilization, extraversion and political settlements in Somalia'. While I concur with much of Hagmaan's use of 'extraversion' as a diagnostic for state-building failures in Somalia, he, like Bayart, seems to assume a 'tragic' outcome and a preference for dependency among local actors. This alternative perspective perhaps further underscores the importance of considering how 'extraversion' is locally produced.  
<sup>57</sup> Hoehne, 'Mimicry and mimesis in state formation', 254.  
<sup>58</sup> See Ferguson, 'Declarations of Dependence'.

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