Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • From Rags to Rifles: The Economics of Deprevation, Conflict and Welfare State 

      Rohner, Dominic (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK, 2007-12)
      Historical evidence has taught us that it is often the poorest and most deprived people in unequal societies who are recruited to fight in civil wars. The present contribution constructs a theoretical model of the choice ...
    • Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advanage 

      Hodler, Roland; Loertscher, Simon; Rohner, Dominic (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK, 2007-08)
      We study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of ...
    • Information, Reputation and Ethic Conflict 

      Rohner, Dominic (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK, 2006-11)
      Empirical studies have found ethic cleavages to play an important role in the occurrence of civil conflict. Surprisingly, theoretical research on ethnic conflict has been very scarce. In the present contribution a theoretical ...
    • Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income and welfare spending 

      Lind, Jo Thori; Rohner, Dominic (Faculty of Economics, 2011-10-10)
      No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge ...
    • War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict 

      Rohner, Dominic; Thoenig, Mathias; Zilibotti, Fabrizio (Faculty of Economics, 2011-03-15)
      We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one ...