Now showing items 1-8 of 8

    • Banker Compensation and Confirmation Bias 

      Sabourian, Hamid; Sibert, A. C. (Faculty of Economics, 2009-10)
    • Complexity and Competition, Part I: Sequential Matching 

      Gale, Douglas; Sabourian, Hamid (Faculty of Economics, 2004-06-16)
      This paper uses the complexity of non-competitive behaviour to provide a new justification for competitive equilibrium in the context of extensive-form market games with a finite number of agents. This paper demonstrates ...
    • Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation 

      Lee, Jihong; Sabourian, Hamid (Faculty of Economics, 2004-06-16)
      This paper considers the �negotiation game� (Busch and Wen [4]) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a ...
    • Complexity and repeated implementation 

      Lee, Jihong; Sabourian, Hamid (Elsevier, 2015-05-06)
      This paper examines the problem of repeatedly implementing an efficient social choice function when the agents’ preferences evolve randomly. We show that the freedom to set different mechanisms at different histories can ...
    • Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem 

      Bag, Parimal Kanti; Sabourian, Hamid (Faculty of Economics, 2004-06-16)
      We consider a multi-award generalisation of King Solomon's problem: k identical and indivisible awards should be distributed among agents, k < n, with the top k valuation agents receiving the awards. Agents have complete ...
    • Efficient Repeated Implementation 

      Lee, J.; Sabourian, Hamid (Faculty of Economics, 2009-11)
    • Herding and Contrarian Behaviour in Financial Markets 

      Park, A.; Sabourian, Hamid (Faculty of Economics, 2009-09)
    • Markov Equilibria in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games 

      Gale, Douglas; Sabourian, Hamid (Faculty of Economics, 2004-06-16)
      Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) show that a simple homogeneous market with exogenous matching has continuum of (non-competitive) perfect equilibria, but the unique Markov perfect equilibrium is competitive. By contrast, ...