Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHodler, Roland
dc.contributor.authorLoertscher, Simon
dc.contributor.authorRohner, Dominic
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-24T11:07:39Z
dc.date.available2007-08-24T11:07:39Z
dc.date.issued2007-08
dc.identifier.otherCWPE0738
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/194718
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/194718
dc.description.abstractWe study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of criminal activities, and can choose the quality of his policy. This quality and the state of the world determine the policy outcome, i.e., the economic growth rate or the number of crimes committed. The voter only observes the policy outcome and then decides whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Her preferences are such that she would reelect the incumbent under full information if and only if the state of the world is above a given threshold level. In equilibrium, the incumbent is reelected in more states of the world than he would be under full information. In particular, he chooses inefficient policies and generates mediocre policy outcomes whenever the voter's induced belief distribution will be such that her expected utility of reelecting the incumbent exceeds her expected utility of electing the opposition candidate. Hence, there is an incumbency advantage through inefficient policies. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the prediction that reelection concerns may induce incumbents to generate mediocre outcomes.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subjectElectionsen
dc.subjectIncumbency Advantageen
dc.subjectPolitical Economicsen
dc.titleInefficient Policies and Incumbency Advanageen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5057


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record