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dc.contributor.authorAidt, TS
dc.contributor.authorVeiga, FJ
dc.contributor.authorVeiga, LG
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-07T11:34:45Z
dc.date.available2011-01-07T11:34:45Z
dc.date.issued2009-09-24
dc.identifier.issn1573-7101
dc.identifier.otherCWPE0934
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/229496
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/229496
dc.description.abstractThe literature on the rational political business cycle suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chance of gaining reelection. Most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre- election distortions in fiscal policy. We propose a new test that, instead, explores the implied two-way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory. The test is implemented using a panel of 278 Portuguese municipalities (from 1979 to 2005). The results show that (1) opportunism pays off, leading to a larger win-margin for the incumbent; (2) incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win-margin is small. These results are consistent with the theoretical model.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.subjectVoting and popularity functions
dc.subjectopportunism
dc.subjectrational political business cycles
dc.subjectlocal government
dc.subjectsystem estimation
dc.subjectPortugal
dc.titleElection results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model
dc.typeWorking Paper
prism.publicationNamePublic Choice
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5626
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.17863/CAM.5626
dc.contributor.orcidAidt, Toke [0000-0002-8319-6568]


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