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dc.contributor.authorLittlechild, Stephen
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-06T04:03:18Z
dc.date.available2012-04-06T04:03:18Z
dc.date.issued2011-10
dc.identifier.otherCWPE1160
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/242029
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/242029
dc.description.abstractEconomists acknowledge the problems of regulated transmission but take different views about the likely efficiency of merchant transmission. This paper examines the evidence on alleged market failure and regulatory failure as experienced in practice in Australia and Argentina. In these examples, merchant transmission (broadly defined to include private initiatives) has generally not exhibited the standard examples of market failure but regulated transmission generally has exhibited the standard examples of regulatory failure. Imperfect information – more specifically, in the form of lack of coordination – has often been a challenge whatever the approach. Policy should therefore seek to improve the regulatory framework and to remove barriers to merchant transmission and private initiatives. An important role for regulation is to facilitate coordination between potential providers and users of transmission lines.en_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subjectregulated transmissionen_GB
dc.subjectmarket transmissionen_GB
dc.titleMerchant and Regulated Transmission: Theory, Evidence and Policyen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen_GB
dc.type.versionnot applicableen_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5533


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