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dc.contributor.authorHarris, Donna
dc.contributor.authorHerrmann, Benedikt
dc.contributor.authorKontoleon, Andreas
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-06T16:47:52Z
dc.date.available2012-04-06T16:47:52Z
dc.date.issued2010-12-01
dc.identifier.otherCWPE1062
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/242087
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/242087
dc.description.abstractIn-group favouritism behaviour is observed everywhere around the world and previous research has shown that this behaviour is also easily triggered in a laboratory in various contexts. However, little is known about why different magnitudes of in-group favouritism are observed across societies. In this paper, we use a new allocation experiment to examine the nature of social norms within the context of in-group favouritism behaviour. In this experiment, a decision-maker has to decide only once how to allocate a fixed amount of resource between each of the three members of her own group and each of the three members of the out-group, whilst the decision- maker's own payo is not a ected by her decision. Three treatments are implemented: in the first treatment, only the members of the in-group can punish the decision-maker. In the second treatment, only the members of the out-group can punish the decision-maker. Finally, in the third treatment, only an independent third-party observer can punish the decision-maker. The aim of these treatments is to test whether there is a prevailing social norm which dominates the behavioural standard within the context of in-group favouritism and whether this mechanism varies across di erent subject pools, namely Thailand and the UK. Compared to a baseline treatment with no punishment opportunity, we observed that among the Thai subjects in-group favouritism significantly increased once the in-group members were given the opportunity to punish the decision-maker. The threat of punishment from a third-party punisher also increased in-group favouritism in Thailand. However, when only the out-group members had the opportunity to punish, no change in in-group favouritism behaviour was observed. On the contrary, within the British subject pool, when the out-group members had the opportunity to punish the decision-maker, we observed a decline in in-group favouritism as well as a marked shift towards an equitable outcome. The threats of punishments from the in-group members and the third-party, on the other hand, did not have any impact on in-group favouritism behaviour in the UK. The results suggest that within the Thai subject pool, there appears to be a prevailing `in-group bias norm' which is strongly enforced within and outside the group. Within the UK subject pool, however, it is less clear what the prevailing norm is. Whilst the threat of punishment from the out-group members who directly lose out from favouritism behaviour appeared to significantly reduce this behaviour, an uninvolved third-party was not willing to incur a cost to punish this behaviour. This interesting result indicates two possible explanations: first, in-group favouritism, in contrast to selfish or opportunistic behaviour, may not considered as a strong enough violation of a social norm; and second, the norm of egalitarianism within the context of favouritism may still be `evolving'.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the British Academy, the Leverhulme Trust, and the Suzy Paine Trust of the Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridgeen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subjectSocial Normsen_GB
dc.subjectIn-group Favouritismen_GB
dc.subjectGroup Behaviouren_GB
dc.subjectIn-group Punishmenten_GB
dc.subjectOut-group Punishmenten_GB
dc.subjectThird-party Punishmenten_GB
dc.subjectExperimental Designen_GB
dc.titleWhat is the Nature and Social Norm within the Context of In-Group Favouritism?en_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen_GB
dc.type.versionnot applicableen_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5542


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