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dc.contributor.authorDziubiński, Marcinen
dc.contributor.authorGoyal, Sanjeeven
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-29T08:34:58Z
dc.date.available2013-08-29T08:34:58Z
dc.date.issued2013-01-10en
dc.identifier.citationGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 79, Pp. 30–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.007en
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/244868
dc.description.abstractInfrastructure networks are a key feature of an economy. Their functionality depends on the connectivity and sizes of different components and they face a variety of threats, from natural disasters to intelligent attacks. How should networks be defended and designed to ensure the best functionality? We develop a model to study this question. There are two players, the Designer and the Adversary. The Designer forms costly links among n given nodes and chooses to protect some of them at a cost. The Adversary then allocates resources to attack nodes. Successful attack on a node leads to its elimination. We study sub-game perfect equilibria of this game. Our main finding is that if defence is affordable and reliable, then the network is sparse and heterogeneous, and either centrally or fully protected. On the other hand, if defence is relatively costly compared to linking, then dense and homogeneous networks arise in equilibrium.
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported by European Research Area Complexity-Net (http://www.complexitynet.eu) through grant, Resilience and interaction of networks in ecology and economics (RESINEE).
dc.languageEnglishen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.titleNetwork design and defenceen
dc.typeArticle
dc.description.versionThis is the accepted version of the original publication in Games and Economic Behavior, available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613000031. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.en
prism.endingPage43
prism.publicationDate2013en
prism.publicationNameGames and Economic Behavioren
prism.startingPage30
prism.volume79en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.007en
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2013-01-10en
dc.contributor.orcidGoyal, Sanjeev [0000-0002-9827-5998]
dc.identifier.eissn1090-2473
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
pubs.funder-project-idEPSRC (EP/I019170/1)
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2016-01-10


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