Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGoyal, S
dc.contributor.authorHeidari, H
dc.contributor.authorKearns, M
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-13T12:38:48Z
dc.date.available2014-11-13T12:38:48Z
dc.date.issued2019-01-01
dc.identifier.citation(2014) Games and Economic Behavior DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.002
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/246379
dc.description.abstractWe develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to “seed” the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a social network. We identify a general property of the adoption dynamics — namely, decreasing returns to local adoption — for which the inefficiency of resource use at equilibrium (the Price of Anarchy) is uniformly bounded above, across all networks. We also show that if this property is violated, even the Price of Stability can be unbounded, thus yielding sharp threshold behavior for a broad class of dynamics. We provide similar results for a new notion, the Budget Multiplier, that measures the extent to which the imbalances in player budgets can be amplified at equilibrium.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV
dc.titleCompetitive contagion in networks
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage79
prism.publicationDate2019
prism.publicationNameGames and Economic Behavior
prism.startingPage58
prism.volume113
dcterms.dateAccepted2014-09-12
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.002
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-01-01
dc.contributor.orcidGoyal, Sanjeev [0000-0002-9827-5998]
dc.identifier.eissn1090-2473
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.issuedOnline2014-10-05


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record