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dc.contributor.authorAggarwal, P
dc.contributor.authorChauffaille Saffi, PA
dc.contributor.authorSturgess, J
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-15T13:40:45Z
dc.date.available2015-05-15T13:40:45Z
dc.date.issued2015-10
dc.identifier.citationThe Journal of Finance Volume 70, Issue 5, pages 2309–2346, October 2015. DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12284
dc.identifier.issn0022-1082
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/247728
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Investors restrict lendable supply and/or recall loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor, for firms with poor performance or weak governance, and for proposals where returns to governance are likely higher. At the subsequent vote, recall is associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process to affect corporate governance.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.titleThe role of institutional investors in voting: evidence from the securities lending market
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage2346
prism.issueIdentifier5
prism.publicationDate2015
prism.publicationNameThe Journal of Finance
prism.startingPage2309
prism.volume70
dcterms.dateAccepted2015-04-05
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1111/jofi.12284
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2015-10
dc.contributor.orcidSaffi, Pedro [0000-0002-3347-6801]
dc.identifier.eissn1540-6261
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.issuedOnline2015-05-01
datacite.isderivedfrom.doi10.2139/ssrn.2023480
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2017-05-01


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