XII-The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument
Change log
Authors
Button, Timothy https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8865-9795
Abstract
Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied to minimalism, these lessons show us why we should abandon it.
Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Journal Title
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0066-7374
Volume Title
114
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)