The Prologue surveys some of the major publications on Churchill and their argument that his contradictory and divisive campaigns in the 1930s were the main cause of his exclusion from office. Churchill's position in the Conservative Party in 1929 is appraised and the options then open to him for attaining the Party leadership are explored. This prepares the ground for the conclusion of the thesis, that even in 1929 Churchill had little prospect of assuming a greater role in the Party and that his subsequent actions were not the main reason for his exclusion from office during these 'wilderness years'. Part One argues that the Conservatives' loss of office in 1929 further undermined Churchill's position. Moreover his economic strategy was progressively abandoned by his own Party. Advocacy of an understanding with Lloyd George emerged as Churchill's strategy to overcome both these setbacks. This encouraged him to follow his instincts in opposing his Party leaders' enthusiasm for Indian constitutional reform. When support from Lloyd George failed to materialise, Churchill attempted to find a constituency among the Party's 'diehards' with whom he was now in agreement over India. The formation of the National Government in August 1931 ensured a Cabinet of those with broadly liberal inclinations from which Churchill and the diehards were to be excluded. Part Two concentrates on Churchill's fight against Indian constitutional reform. With the diehards, he attempted to overturn Government objectives both in parliament and through an extraparliamentary campaign conducted in the constituencies and the caucus. It is argued that his ambition was to divide the Party sufficiently for the diehards (led by himself) to be brought into the Cabinet as a way of reuniting the Party and broadening the political spectrum of the National Government. Part Three deals with Churchill's critique of Government defence and foreign policy. The scale of the National Government's 1935 Election victory prevented the realisation of his existing strategy for returning to office. The divisions over foreign policy in the Conservative Party are analysed as are the lessons to be learned from Churchill's failure to return to the Cabinet. Faced with this impasse, Churchill's resulting strategy was the broadening of his appeal to include those of different political persuasions. It is argued that his attitude over the Abdication crisis though a strategic folly, was motivated by honourable intentions. The difficulties which Churchill faced in keeping the momentum of his campaign going during 1937 are brought out. The thesis concludes that his Indian campaign was less harmful to his rearmament crusade than has been argued by other historians.