Is statistical learning a mechanism?
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Authors
Publication Date
2016-04-08Journal Title
Philosophical Psychology
ISSN
0951-5089
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Volume
29
Pages
826-843
Language
English
Type
Article
This Version
AM
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Betzler, R. (2016). Is statistical learning a mechanism?. Philosophical Psychology, 29 826-843. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1167179
Abstract
Philosophers of science have offered several definitions of mechanism, most of which have biological or neuroscientific roots. In this paper, I consider whether these definitions apply equally well to cognitive science. I examine this question by looking at the case of statistical learning, which has been called a domain-general learning mechanism in the cognitive scientific literature. I argue that statistical learning does not constitute a mechanism in the philosophical sense of the term. This conclusion points to significant limitations in the scope of the mechanist philosophy when it comes to accounting for explanation in cognitive science.
Keywords
mechanism, philosophy of psychology, statistical learning
Sponsorship
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant agreement no 284123.
Funder references
European Research Council (284123)
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1167179
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/253468
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