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dc.contributor.authorShvets, Juliaen
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-03T10:54:22Z
dc.date.available2016-03-03T10:54:22Z
dc.date.issued2016-04-18en
dc.identifier.citationShvets. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organsiation (2016)en
dc.identifier.issn8756-6222
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/254124
dc.description.abstractIn many countries, the president is involved in appointing judges. Does this lead to selection of friendly judges who then promote the president’s interests? This question is explored here in the context of Russia, where judges are often said to favor the executive. I gather data on 2000 court cases, and analyze them by exploiting changes in the appointment rules. I find clear evidence that judges selected by the president favor the government more than do their peers. In the process, the article develops a new solution to the sample selection problem endemic to the analysis of court decisions. (JEL D02, K40, P37)
dc.languageEnglishen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.subjectjudiciaryen
dc.subjectpolitical selectionen
dc.subjectinstitutionsen
dc.titlePresidential Control of the Judiciary via the Appointment Power: Evidence from Russiaen
dc.typeArticle
dc.description.versionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press via http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/eww004en
prism.endingPage507
prism.publicationDate2016en
prism.publicationNameJournal of Law, Economics, & Organsiationen
prism.startingPage478
prism.volume32en
dcterms.dateAccepted2015-09-09en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1093/jleo/eww004en
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2016-04-18en
dc.identifier.eissn1465-7341
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2018-04-18


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