Presidential control of the judiciary via the appointment power: Evidence from Russia
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
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Repository DOI
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Authors
Shvets, J
Abstract
In many countries, the president is involved in appointing judges. Does this lead to selection of friendly judges who then promote the president’s interests? This question is explored here in the context of Russia, where judges are often said to favor the executive. I gather data on 2000 court cases, and analyze them by exploiting changes in the appointment rules. I find clear evidence that judges selected by the president favor the government more than do their peers. In the process, the article develops a new solution to the sample selection problem endemic to the analysis of court decisions. (JEL D02, K40, P37)
Description
Keywords
judiciary, political selection, institutions
Journal Title
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
8756-6222
1465-7341
1465-7341
Volume Title
32
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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Sponsorship
I gratefully acknowledge funding from the Legal Reform Project and LCCI Commercial Education Trust.