Rent seeking and the economics of corruption
Aidt, T. S.
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
Faculty of Economics
MetadataShow full item record
Aidt, T. S. (2016). Rent seeking and the economics of corruption. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5801
The paper studies the influence of Gordon Tullock (1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.
Rent seeking, Corruption
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5801
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/255333
All Rights Reserved
Licence URL: https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/