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dc.contributor.authorCharron, Nicholas
dc.contributor.authorDahlstrom, Carl
dc.contributor.authorFazekas, Mihaly
dc.contributor.authorLapuente, Victor
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-27T10:28:42Z
dc.date.available2016-04-27T10:28:42Z
dc.date.issued2017-01
dc.identifier.citationCharron et al. Journal of Politics (2016)
dc.identifier.issn0022-3816
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/255735
dc.description.abstractWhy do officials in some countries favor entrenched contractors, while others assign public contracts more impartially? This article emphasizes the important interplay between politics and bureaucracy. It suggests that corruption risks are lower when bureaucrats’ careers do not depend on political connections but on their peers. We test this hypothesis with a novel measure of career incentives in the public sector—using a survey of more than 18,000 public sector employees in 212 European regions—and a new objective corruption risk measure including over 1.4 million procurement contracts. Both show a remarkable subnational variation across Europe. The study finds that corruption risks are indeed significantly lower where bureaucrats’ career incentives exclusively follow professional criteria. In substantial terms, moving EU regions so that bureaucrats’ merit and effort would matter as much as in, for example, Baden-Wüttemberg (90th percentile) could lead to a 13–20 billion Euro savings per year.
dc.description.sponsorshipFunding for this project comes from the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development of the European Union, project number 290529. This research project is part of ANTICORRP, (http://anticorrp.eu/ ).
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.titleCareers, Connections, and Corruption Risks: Investigating the Impact of Bureaucratic Meritocracy on Public Procurement Processes
dc.title.alternativeCareers, connections and corruption risks
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage104
prism.issueIdentifier1
prism.publicationDate2017
prism.publicationNameJOURNAL OF POLITICS
prism.startingPage89
prism.volume79
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-04-12
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1086/687209
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2017-01
dc.contributor.orcidFazekas, Fazekas [0000-0002-8477-3961]
dc.identifier.eissn1468-2508
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.issuedOnline2016-10-27
cam.orpheus.successThu Jan 30 12:54:28 GMT 2020 - The item has an open VoR version.
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2100-01-01


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