Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong
University of Chicago Press
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Sliwa, P. (2017). Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong. Ethics, 127 521-552. https://doi.org/10.1086/690011
Moral understanding is a valuable epistemic and moral good. I argue that moral understanding is the ability to know right from wrong. I defend the account against challenges from nonreductionists, such as Alison Hills, who argue that moral understanding is distinct from moral knowledge. Moral understanding, she suggests, is constituted by a set of abilities: to give and follow moral explanations and to draw moral conclusions. I argue that Hills’s account rests on too narrow a conception of moral understanding. Among other things, it cannot account for the importance of first-personal experience for achieving moral understanding.
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External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/690011
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/261237