Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong
Published version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Sliwa, Paulina
Abstract
Moral understanding is a valuable epistemic and moral good. I argue that moral understanding is the ability to know right from wrong. I defend the account against challenges from nonreductionists, such as Alison Hills, who argue that moral understanding is distinct from moral knowledge. Moral understanding, she suggests, is constituted by a set of abilities: to give and follow moral explanations and to draw moral conclusions. I argue that Hills’s account rests on too narrow a conception of moral understanding. Among other things, it cannot account for the importance of first-personal experience for achieving moral understanding.
Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Journal Title
Ethics
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0014-1704
1539-297X
1539-297X
Volume Title
127
Publisher
University of Chicago Press