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dc.contributor.authorToxvaerd, Flavioen
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-13T15:36:45Z
dc.date.available2016-12-13T15:36:45Z
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/261550
dc.description.abstractI study a multi-period model of limit pricing under one-sided incomplete information. I characterize pooling and separating equilibria and their existence, and determine when these involve limit pricing. For some parameter constellations, the unique equilibrium surviving a D1 type refinement involves immediate separation on monopoly prices. For others, there are limit price equilibria surviving the refinement in which different types may initially pool and then (possibly) separate. Separation involves setting prices such that the inefficient incumbent's profits from mimicking are negative. As the horizon increases or as firms become more patient, limit pricing becomes increasingly difficult to sustain in equilibrium.
dc.languageEnglishen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.subjectdynamic limit pricingen
dc.subjectentry deterrenceen
dc.subjectdynamic signalingen
dc.subjectequilibrium selectionen
dc.titleDynamic Limit Pricingen
dc.typeArticle
prism.publicationNameThe RAND Journal of Economicsen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.6750
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-10-03en
rioxxterms.versionAMen
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2016-10-03en
dc.contributor.orcidToxvaerd, Flavio [0000-0003-1979-9695]
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2018-02-07


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