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The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

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Authors

Hanson, L 

Abstract

There is a substantial literature on evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) in metaethics. According to these arguments, evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs pose a significant problem for moral realism, specifically by committing the realist to an unattractive pessimism about the prospects of our having moral knowledge. In this paper, I argue that EDAs exploit an equivocation between two distinct readings of their central claim. One is plausibly true but has no epistemic relevance, and the other would have epistemic consequences for realism, but is false. If I'm right, this undermines attempts to use evolutionary explanations to debunk belief in other domains too.

Description

Keywords

metaethics, moral epistemology, evolutionary debunking arguments, moral realism

Journal Title

The Philosophical Quarterly

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0031-8094
1467-9213

Volume Title

67

Publisher

Oxford University Press