The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Hanson, L
Abstract
There is a substantial literature on evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) in metaethics. According to these arguments, evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs pose a significant problem for moral realism, specifically by committing the realist to an unattractive pessimism about the prospects of our having moral knowledge. In this paper, I argue that EDAs exploit an equivocation between two distinct readings of their central claim. One is plausibly true but has no epistemic relevance, and the other would have epistemic consequences for realism, but is false. If I'm right, this undermines attempts to use evolutionary explanations to debunk belief in other domains too.
Description
Keywords
metaethics, moral epistemology, evolutionary debunking arguments, moral realism
Journal Title
The Philosophical Quarterly
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0031-8094
1467-9213
1467-9213
Volume Title
67
Publisher
Oxford University Press