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dc.contributor.authorEisler, Jacoben
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-19T13:55:29Z
dc.date.available2017-01-19T13:55:29Z
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/261927
dc.description.abstractIn 'McDonnell v. United States', the Supreme Court constrained the reach of federal anti-corruption law, declared the inevitability and even desirability of representatives aggrandizing favored constituents, and asserted patronage to be a hallmark of democracy. The unanimous decision is the latest and clearest indication that the Court will frustrate regulations that require officials to discharge their roles with disinterested neutrality. This article demonstrates the impact of the Court’s minimalist view of integrity through political philosophy and game theory. Given the Court’s hostility to regulatory prohibition of self-interested political behavior, the final bulwark of public-minded governance is the electorate, which must use the ballot box to reject corrupt representatives. Additionally, the Court’s position erects significant obstacles for campaign finance progressives and advocates for institutional political reform. The article concludes that implementing civic anti-corruption requires either jurisprudential innovation or novel approaches to enforcement. This article thereby integrates the history of modern anti-corruption law with the latest leading decision on the topic, weaves together the Court’s blackletter doctrine with its substantive politics, describes the impact of the law on democratic governance, and points the way forward for both scholarship and policy.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUC Davis School of Law
dc.titleMcDonnell and Anti-Corruption's Last Standen
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage1669
prism.publicationNameUC Davis Law Reviewen
prism.startingPage1619
prism.volume50en
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.7165
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-10-07en
rioxxterms.versionAMen
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2016-10-07en
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
cam.issuedOnline2017-04-20en
dc.identifier.urlhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2837814en
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