There's Nothing Quasi about Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine
The Journal of Ethics
Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Kramer, M. (2017). There's Nothing Quasi about Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. The Journal of Ethics, 21 (2), 185-212. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-017-9247-z
This paper seeks to clarify and defend the proposition that moral realism is best elaborated as a moral doctrine. I begin by upholding Ronald Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean critique of the error theory against some strictures by Michael Smith, and I then briefly suggest how a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine would respond to Smith’s defense of the Archimedeanism of expressivism. Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor. By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism (or moral realism as a moral doctrine), the paper highlights both their distinctness and their compatibility. In so doing, it underscores the affinities between Blackburnian quasi-realism and moral realism as a moral doctrine. Finally, this paper contends ─ in line with my earlier work on these matters ─ that moral realism as a moral doctrine points to the need for some reorienting of meta-ethical enquiries rather than for the abandoning of them.
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-017-9247-z
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/262421