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There's Nothing Quasi about Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

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Authors

Kramer, MH 

Abstract

This paper seeks to clarify and defend the proposition that moral realism is best elaborated as a moral doctrine. I begin by upholding Ronald Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean critique of the error theory against some strictures by Michael Smith, and I then briefly suggest how a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine would respond to Smith’s defense of the Archimedeanism of expressivism. Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor. By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism (or moral realism as a moral doctrine), the paper highlights both their distinctness and their compatibility. In so doing, it underscores the affinities between Blackburnian quasi-realism and moral realism as a moral doctrine. Finally, this paper contends ─ in line with my earlier work on these matters ─ that moral realism as a moral doctrine points to the need for some reorienting of meta-ethical enquiries rather than for the abandoning of them.

Description

Keywords

5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies

Journal Title

The Journal of Ethics

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

1382-4554
1572-8609

Volume Title

21

Publisher

Kluwer Academic Publishers