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dc.contributor.authorJóhannesson, Sveinnen
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-16T10:40:52Z
dc.date.available2017-02-16T10:40:52Z
dc.date.issued2017-09-01en
dc.identifier.issn0021-8723
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/262618
dc.description.abstractPlacing the creation of emergency powers for the internal security of the state at the heart of the framing and adoption of the Federal Constitution, this essay offers a new perspective on the rise of the American liberal state. In the period following the end of the Revolution, domestic insurrections raised serious problems for the new state and federal governments, placing questions of internal security at the center of public authority. I argue that overcoming the difficulties posed by popular rebellion required James Madison and other American statecrafters to deal with a specific problem of statebuilding, one that scholars have largely ignored. Confronting the rebels meant building new federal emergency powers as well as reconciling the expansion of federal power with the ideological traditions of the new republic. These were critical matters in the constitutional deliberations of 1787-1788. I make the case that Madison and his Federalists allies devised a set of solutions to the problem of federal power that the insurrections of the 1780s had posed. Constitutionally, Madison developed a system that made the federal government responsible for suppressing rebellions and granted it wide-ranging authority to act in times of crisis. Institutionally, the Federalists granted the federal government unqualified power to recruit and maintain armies as well as an expansive power to tax and borrow money to pay for them as a way of asserting this new authority. Most important was James Madison’s effort to rationalize and justify the new emergency powers. The new provisions ran up against a powerful ideological barrier. They posed serious problems for a republican principle holding that both political legitimacy (or right) and armed force (or might) resided with the people themselves. According to this principle, the might of the people—not the federal government—should underpin internal security in the republic. Thus, I argue that James Madison engineered an ideological transformation into the nature of republican government—until now inadequately recognized by scholars—to legitimize the new federal security power. Realizing the limits of the classical republican tradition for issues of internal security, Madison carved out a sphere for federal emergency power by dismantling and setting aside the republican principle of right and might, which was grounded in the people themselves. He replaced it with the fundamental tenets of constitutional liberalism, which underscored the primacy of constitutional government, the rule of law, and protection of rights. Granting the federal government emergency powers was, then, intimately connected with the rise of the liberal state in post-revolutionary America. Placing the creation of emergency powers for the internal security of the state at the heart of the framing and adoption of the Federal Constitution, this essay offers a new perspective on the rise of the American liberal state. In the period following the end of the Revolution, domestic insurrections raised serious problems for the new state and federal governments, placing questions of internal security at the center of public authority. I argue that overcoming the difficulties posed by popular rebellion required James Madison and other American statecrafters to deal with a specific problem of statebuilding, one that scholars have largely ignored. Confronting the rebels meant building new federal emergency powers as well as reconciling the expansion of federal power with the ideological traditions of the new republic. These were critical matters in the constitutional deliberations of 1787-1788. I make the case that Madison and his Federalists allies devised a set of solutions to the problem of federal power that the insurrections of the 1780s had posed. Constitutionally, Madison developed a system that made the federal government responsible for suppressing rebellions and granted it wide-ranging authority to act in times of crisis. Institutionally, the Federalists granted the federal government unqualified power to recruit and maintain armies as well as an expansive power to tax and borrow money to pay for them as a way of asserting this new authority. Most important was James Madison’s effort to rationalize and justify the new emergency powers. The new provisions ran up against a powerful ideological barrier. They posed serious problems for a republican principle holding that both political legitimacy (or right) and armed force (or might) resided with the people themselves. According to this principle, the might of the people—not the federal government—should underpin internal security in the republic. Thus, I argue that James Madison engineered an ideological transformation into the nature of republican government—until now inadequately recognized by scholars—to legitimize the new federal security power. Realizing the limits of the classical republican tradition for issues of internal security, Madison carved out a sphere for federal emergency power by dismantling and setting aside the republican principle of right and might, which was grounded in the people themselves. He replaced it with the fundamental tenets of constitutional liberalism, which underscored the primacy of constitutional government, the rule of law, and protection of rights. Granting the federal government emergency powers was, then, intimately connected with the rise of the liberal state in post-revolutionary America.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.title“Securing the State”: James Madison, Federal Emergency Powers, and the Rise of the Liberal State in Postrevolutionary Americaen
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage385
prism.issueIdentifier2en
prism.publicationDate2017en
prism.publicationNameThe Journal of American Historyen
prism.startingPage363
prism.volume104en
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.7886
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-06-20en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1093/jahist/jax173en
rioxxterms.versionAMen
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2017-09-01en
dc.identifier.eissn1945-2314
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
cam.issuedOnline2017-09-01en
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2019-09-01


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