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dc.contributor.authorCowie, Christopheren
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-02T10:15:42Z
dc.date.available2017-03-02T10:15:42Z
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/262822
dc.description.abstractIn engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.
dc.languageEnglishen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.titleDoes the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?en
dc.typeArticle
prism.publicationNamePhilosophical Studiesen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.8109
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-12-02en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1007/s11098-016-0844-7en
rioxxterms.versionVoRen
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2016-12-02en
dc.identifier.eissn1573-0883
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
cam.issuedOnline2016-12-18en
cam.orpheus.successThu Jan 30 12:56:43 GMT 2020 - The item has an open VoR version.*
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2100-01-01


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