De Finetti and Savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning: a reply to Arthmar and Brady
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
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Authors
Feduzi, A
Runde, JH
Zappia, C
Abstract
This paper examines the claim that de Finetti and Savage completely rejected the notion of indeterminate, as distinct from imprecise, probabilities. It argues that their examination of imprecise reasoning refers both to descriptive and normative issues, and that the inability for a decision-maker to commit to a single prior cannot be limited to measurement problems, as argued by Arthmar and Brady in a recent contribution to this Journal. The paper shows that de Finetti and Savage admitted that having an interval of initial probabilities may sometimes have normative relevance, thereby leaving an opening for indeterminate probabilities.
Description
Keywords
Probability, Uncertainty, Decision-making
Journal Title
History of Economic Ideas
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
1122-8792
1724-2169
1724-2169
Volume Title
25
Publisher
Fabrizio Serra Editore