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dc.contributor.authorFeduzi, Albertoen
dc.contributor.authorRunde, Jochenen
dc.contributor.authorZappia, Cen
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-03T14:35:58Z
dc.date.available2017-04-03T14:35:58Z
dc.date.issued2017-02-06en
dc.identifier.issn1122-8792
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/263447
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the claim that de Finetti and Savage completely rejected the notion of indeterminate, as distinct from imprecise, probabilities. It argues that their examination of imprecise reasoning refers both to descriptive and normative issues, and that the inability for a decision-maker to commit to a single prior cannot be limited to measurement problems, as argued by Arthmar and Brady in a recent contribution to this Journal. The paper shows that de Finetti and Savage admitted that having an interval of initial probabilities may sometimes have normative relevance, thereby leaving an opening for indeterminate probabilities.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherFabrizio Serra Editore
dc.titleDe Finetti and Savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning: a reply to Arthmar and Bradyen
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage223
prism.issueIdentifier1en
prism.publicationDate2017en
prism.publicationNameHistory of Economic Ideasen
prism.startingPage211
prism.volume25en
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.8789
dcterms.dateAccepted2017-02-06en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.19272/201706101009en
rioxxterms.versionAMen
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2017-02-06en
dc.contributor.orcidRunde, Jochen [0000-0001-9596-5144]
dc.identifier.eissn1724-2169
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
dc.identifier.urlhttps://store.torrossa.com/resources/an/4202297en


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