Repository logo
 

The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

Change log

Authors

Salow, Bernhard 

Abstract

Suppose you’d like to believe that p (for example, that you are popular), whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry: you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is to show that reflections on intentionally biased inquiry strongly support a controversial ‘access’ principle which states that, for all p, if p is (not) part of our evidence, then that p is (not) part of our evidence is itself part of our evidence.

Description

Keywords

5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies

Journal Title

Mind

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0026-4423
1460-2113

Volume Title

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)