Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDas, Nilanjanen
dc.contributor.authorSalow, Bernhard Joachimen
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-03T12:48:00Z
dc.date.available2017-05-03T12:48:00Z
dc.date.issued2016-06en
dc.identifier.issn0029-4624
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/263990
dc.description.abstractAn important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that $\textit{p}$ is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that$\textit{p}$. We explain how a “transparency” account of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version of the KK principle with an “externalist” or “reliabilist” conception of knowledge commonly thought to make that principle particularly problematic.
dc.languageEnglishen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.titleTransparency and the KK Principleen
dc.typeArticle
prism.publicationDate2016en
prism.publicationNameNoûsen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.9351
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-05-01en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1111/nous.12158en
rioxxterms.versionAMen
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2016-06en
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
cam.issuedOnline2016-07-05en
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2018-07-05


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record