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dc.contributor.authorHerresthal, C.
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-15T16:45:18Z
dc.date.available2018-01-15T16:45:18Z
dc.date.issued2017-03-06
dc.identifier.otherCWPE1712
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/270618
dc.description.abstractThis paper contrasts a decision maker's payoff under public and private information acquisition by a biased advisor. Both players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but differ in how they trade off the loss from errors. The advisor can sequentially acquire informative test outcomes. If acquisition is private he decides in the final period which realizations to verifiably disclose. If players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned, the decision maker is weakly better off under private rather than public information acquisition. The effect on the advisor's payoff depends on the direction of his bias.
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subjectendogenous information acquisition
dc.subjectveriable disclosure
dc.subjectstrategic experimentatio
dc.subjectendogenous information acquisition
dc.subjectverifiable disclosure
dc.subjecttransparency
dc.titleHidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cambridge
dc.publisher.departmentFaculty of Economics
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.17545


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