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dc.contributor.authorElliott, M.
dc.contributor.authorGolub, B.
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-06T13:28:44Z
dc.date.available2018-04-06T13:28:44Z
dc.date.issued2018-02-07
dc.identifier.otherCWPE1813
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/274655
dc.description.abstractSuppose agents can exert costly effort that creates nonrival, heterogeneous benefits for each other. At each possible outcome, a weighted, directed network describing marginal externalities is defined. We show that Pareto efficient outcomes are those at which the largest eigenvalue of the network is 1. An important set of efficient solutions - Lindahl outcomes - are characterized by contributions being proportional to agents' eigenvector centralities in the network. The outcomes we focus on are motivated by negotiations. We apply the results to identify who is essential for Pareto improvements, how to efficiently subdivide negotiations, and whom to optimally add to a team.
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.titleA Network Approach to Public Goods
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cambridge
dc.publisher.departmentFaculty of Economics
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.21788


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