On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality
Published version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Zarepour, MS https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5356-1691
Abstract
The intuition that we can think about non-existent objects seems to be in tension with philosophical concerns about the relationality of intentionality. Tim Crane’s psychologism removes this tension by proposing a psychologistic account of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects, and as such is insufficiently plausible to convince us to reject the relationality of intentionality.
Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields
Journal Title
Acta Analytica
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0353-5150
1874-6349
1874-6349
Volume Title
33
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC