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On the perils of commitment to punishment when criminals are strategic

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

Change log

Authors

Larcom, ST 
Sarr, Mare 

Abstract

For some crimes the perpetrator can be detected costlessly but can only be apprehended at significant cost, or not at all for some period of time. To deter strategic behavior in the period between detection and apprehension, authorities may wish to commit themselves to punishing the criminal once apprehended, regardless of the perpetrator’s behavior or threats. However we show that such efforts at commitment to ex post punishment may induce worse behavior and that it selects potential criminals of a worse type. We show that when law enforcement authorities cannot commit themselves perfectly, it is dangerous for them to try to commit as it may invoke a strategic response that can worsen the situation. When law enforcement authorities do increase their commitment to punish such offenders, it is likely to lead to less but more gruesome crimes.

Description

Keywords

marginal deterrence, commitment, kidnapping, international criminal court, amnesty, impunity, signaling

Journal Title

The Journal of Legal Studies (Chicago)

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0047-2530
1537-5366

Volume Title

42

Publisher

University of Chicago Press
Sponsorship
Mare Sarr gratefully acknowledges financial support from the South African National Research Foundation (NRF).