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The golden hello and political transitions

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

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Authors

Aidt, TS 
Albornoz, F 
Gassebner, M 

Abstract

© 2017. We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately af ter a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

Description

Keywords

Political transitions, Democracy, Autocracy, IMF, World bank

Journal Title

Journal of Comparative Economics

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0147-5967
1095-7227

Volume Title

46

Publisher

Elsevier BV