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dc.contributor.authorAshley, Stephen F.
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-19T13:56:56Z
dc.date.available2018-07-19T13:56:56Z
dc.date.issued2012-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/278297
dc.description.abstractThe barriers that impede the acquisition of materials which could be used to manufacture a weapon of mass destruction or weapon of mass effect can generally be classified into two groups (e.g. as done by the Generation IV International Forum). The first group are classed as intrinsic barriers, which are characteristics that impede the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by the Host State to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second group are classed as extrinsic barriers, which are characteristics that impede the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices and the sabotage of facilities and transportation by sub-national entities and other non-Host State adversaries. Proliferation resistance assessments generally focus towards the intrinsic barriers, with physical protection assessment catering toward appraising the extrinsic barriers.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCUSPE
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.titleOpen questions regarding proliferation resistance assessments of future nuclear fuel cycles
dc.typeWorking Paper
prism.publicationNameCUSPE Communications
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.25645


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