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dc.contributor.authorPollitt, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorRichter, Laura-Luciaen
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-24T09:48:27Z
dc.date.available2018-07-24T09:48:27Z
dc.date.issued2018-05en
dc.identifier.issn0140-9883
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/278418
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the heterogeneity of household consumer preferences for electricity service contracts in a smart grid context. Platform pricing strategies that could incentivise consumers to participate in a two-sided electricity platform market are discussed. The research is based on original data from a discrete choice experiment on electricity service contracts that was conducted with 1,892 electricity consumers in Great Britain in 2015. We estimate a flexible mixed logit model in willingness to pay space and exploit the results in posterior analysis. The findings suggest that while consumers are willing to pay for technical support services, they are likely to demand significant compensation to share their usage and personally identifying data and to participate in automated demand response programs involving remote monitoring and control of electricity usage. Cross-subsidisation of consumers combining appropriate participation payments with sharing of bill savings could incentivise participation of the number of consumers required to provide the optimal level of demand response. We also examine the preference heterogeneity to suggest how, by targeting customers with specific characteristics, smart electricity service providers could significantly reduce their customer acquisition costs.
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors acknowledge the financial support of the EPSRC Autonomic Power System project (Grant No: EP/I031650/1) and the Energy Policy Research Group.
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.titleWhich smart electricity service contracts will consumers accept? The demand for compensation in a platform marketen
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage450
prism.publicationDate2018en
prism.publicationNameEnergy Economicsen
prism.startingPage436
prism.volume72en
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.25764
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-04-01en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1016/j.eneco.2018.04.004en
rioxxterms.versionVoR*
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2018-05en
dc.contributor.orcidPollitt, Michael [0000-0002-6858-129X]
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
pubs.funder-project-idUNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE (FB EPSRC) (EP/I031650/1)
cam.issuedOnline2018-04-12en
cam.orpheus.successThu Jan 30 13:00:03 GMT 2020 - The item has an open VoR version.*
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2100-01-01


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Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as Attribution 4.0 International