Not null enough: pseudo-null hypotheses in community ecology and comparative psychology
View / Open Files
Publication Date
2018Journal Title
Biology and Philosophy
ISSN
0169-3867
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Volume
33
Issue
3-4
Type
Article
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Bausman, W., & Halina, M. (2018). Not null enough: pseudo-null hypotheses in community ecology and comparative psychology. Biology and Philosophy, 33 (3-4) https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-018-9640-4
Abstract
We evaluate a common reasoning strategy used in community ecology and comparative psychology for selecting between competing hypotheses. This strategy labels one hypothesis as a “null” on the grounds of its simplicity and epistemically privileges it as accepted until rejected. We argue that this strategy is unjustified. The asymmetrical treatment of statistical null hypotheses is justified through the experimental and mathematical contexts in which they are used, but these contexts are missing in the case of the “pseudo-null hypotheses” found in our case studies. Moreover, statistical nulls are often not epistemically privileged in practice over their alternatives because failing to reject the null is usually a negative result about the alternative, experimental hypothesis. Scientists should eschew the appeal to pseudo-nulls. It is a rhetorical strategy that glosses over a commitment to valuing simplicity over other epistemic virtues in the name of good scientific and statistical methodology.
Sponsorship
Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence
Funder references
Leverhulme Trust (RC-2015-067)
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-018-9640-4
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/279941
Rights
Licence:
http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
Statistics
Total file downloads (since January 2020). For more information on metrics see the
IRUS guide.