Pointer Provenance in a Capability Architecture
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Mazzinghi, A
Watson, Robert NM
Sohan, Ripduman
Abstract
We design and implement a framework for tracking pointer provenance, using our CHERI fat-pointer capability architec- ture to facilitate analysis of security implications of program pointer flows in both user and privileged code, with mini- mal instrumentation. CHERI enforces pointer provenance validity at the architectural level, in the presence of complex pointer arithmetic and type casting. CHERI present new op- portunities for provenance research: we discuss use cases and highlight lessons and open questions from our work.
Description
Keywords
Journal Title
10th USENIX Workshop on Theory and Practice of Provenance
Conference Name
USENIX Theory and Practice of Provenance
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
USENIX
Publisher DOI
Sponsorship
DARPA/AFRL FA8750-10-C-0237, Google Chrome University Research Program Award