Leibniz - A freedom libertarian
dc.contributor.author | Beck, Ori | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-09-29T06:07:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-09-29T06:07:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-01-01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0039-3185 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/282884 | |
dc.description.abstract | Leibniz s views about human freedom are much debated today. While traditionalists hold that Leibniz was a compatibilist about freedom, some commentators are now suggesting that Leibniz can be read as an incompatibilist. This exciting new reading is often based on Leibniz's "Necessary and Contingent Truths" (AVI, 4 B, 1514-1524; henceforth: NCT). This paper shall argue that NCT supports not only an understanding of Leibniz as a freedom incompatibilist, but more radically, as embracing a particularly intriguing kind of libertarianism. On this Leibnizian brand of libertarianism, a human action may be both free and unavoidable (in the sense that the agent could not have acted otherwise). | |
dc.title | Leibniz - A freedom libertarian | |
dc.type | Article | |
prism.endingPage | 85 | |
prism.issueIdentifier | 1 | |
prism.publicationDate | 2015 | |
prism.publicationName | Studia Leibnitiana | |
prism.startingPage | 67 | |
prism.volume | 47 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.17863/CAM.30247 | |
rioxxterms.licenseref.uri | http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved | |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2015-01-01 | |
dc.contributor.orcid | Beck, Ori [0000-0002-3127-3023] | |
dc.publisher.url | https://www.jstor.org/stable/43818502 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate | 2016-01-01 |
Files in this item
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
-
Cambridge University Research Outputs
Research outputs of the University of Cambridge