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dc.contributor.authorWaibel, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-31T06:51:08Z
dc.date.available2018-10-31T06:51:08Z
dc.date.issued2018-07-01
dc.identifier.issn1750-7219
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/284432
dc.description.abstractCreditor-debtor engagement in one form or another has been a feature of many sovereign debt restructurings. In some cases, debtor-creditor engagement has been formalized and took the specific form of creditor committees. Views differ considerably on the merits and demerits of CCs, and on the level of prescription and detail that is desirable from a policy perspective. The incentives of the main actors in sovereign debt also differ with respect to creditor engagement, particularly as regards ex ante contractual clauses. The article focuses on the possible content of creditor-debtor engagement. Creditor-debtor engagement can take four main forms: (i) the insertion ex ante of contractual clauses in bond documentation for creditor committees (CCs); (ii) ex ante best practices for formal creditor committees; (iii) ex ante best practices for engagement between creditors and debtors or (iv) ex post agreement between the debtor and creditor on creditor engagement or CCs.
dc.description.sponsorshipUnited Nations
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.titleTo formalize or not to formalize: creditor-debtor engagement in sovereign debt restructurings
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage466
prism.issueIdentifier3
prism.publicationNameCapital Markets Law Journal
prism.startingPage452
prism.volume13
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.31804
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-06-07
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1093/cmlj/kmy014
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2018-06-07
dc.contributor.orcidWaibel, Michael [0000-0002-3777-8487]
dc.identifier.eissn1750-7227
dc.publisher.urlhttps://academic.oup.com/cmlj/article/13/3/452/5062922
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.issuedOnline2018-07-31
dc.identifier.urlhttps://academic.oup.com/cmlj/article/13/3/452/5062922
cam.orpheus.successThu Jan 30 10:54:10 GMT 2020 - Embargo updated
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2020-07-31


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