Corporate governance and countervailing power
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Authors
Publication Date
2018-08-03Journal Title
Business Lawyer
ISSN
0007-6899
Publisher
American Bar Association
Volume
74
Issue
1
Pages
1-52
Type
Article
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Cheffins, B. (2018). Corporate governance and countervailing power. Business Lawyer, 74 (1), 1-52. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.32110
Abstract
The analysis of corporate governance has been a one-sided affair. The focus has been on “internal” accountability mechanisms, namely boards and shareholders. Each has become more effective since debates about corporate governance began in earnest in the 1970s but it is doubtful whether this process can continue. Correspondingly, it is an opportune time to expand the analysis of corporate governance. This article does so by focusing on three “external” accountability mechanisms that can operate as significant constraints on managerial discretion, namely governmental regulation of corporate activity, competitive pressure from rival firms and organized labor. A unifying feature is that each was an element of a theory of “countervailing power” economist John Kenneth Galbraith developed in the 1950s with respect to corporations, an era when external accountability mechanisms did more than their internal counterparts to keep management in check.
Sponsorship
Major Research Fellowship, Leverhulme Trust
Funder references
Leverhulme Trust (MRF-2015-050)
Identifiers
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.32110
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/284738
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