Intentions and instability: a defence of causal decision theory
View / Open Files
Authors
Publication Date
2020-03Journal Title
Philosophical Studies
ISSN
0031-8116
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Volume
177
Issue
3
Pages
793-804
Type
Article
This Version
VoR
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Bales, A. (2020). Intentions and instability: a defence of causal decision theory. Philosophical Studies, 177 (3), 793-804. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1206-4
Abstract
Andy Egan has recently presented a prominent objection to causal decision theory (CDT). However, in this paper, I argue that this objection fails if CDT’s proponent accepts the plausible view that decision-theoretic options are intentions. This result both provides a defence of CDT against a prominent objection and highlights the importance of resolving the nature of decision-theoretic options.
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1206-4
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/287401
Statistics
Total file downloads (since January 2020). For more information on metrics see the
IRUS guide.