Intentions and instability: a defence of causal decision theory
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Bales, A. (2020). Intentions and instability: a defence of causal decision theory. Philosophical Studies, 177 (3), 793-804. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1206-4
Andy Egan has recently presented a prominent objection to causal decision theory (CDT). However, in this paper, I argue that this objection fails if CDT’s proponent accepts the plausible view that decision-theoretic options are intentions. This result both provides a defence of CDT against a prominent objection and highlights the importance of resolving the nature of decision-theoretic options.
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1206-4
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/287401
Attribution 4.0 International
Licence URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/