Countable additivity, idealization, and conceptual realism
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Authors
Publication Date
2020-03Journal Title
Economics and Philosophy
ISSN
0266-2671
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Volume
36
Issue
1
Pages
127-147
Type
Article
This Version
AM
Metadata
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Liu, Y. (2020). Countable additivity, idealization, and conceptual realism. Economics and Philosophy, 36 (1), 127-147. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267118000536
Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper addresses the issue of finite versus countable additivity in Bayesian probability and decision theory – in particular, Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility and personal probability. I show that Savage’s reason for not requiring countable additivity in his theory is inconclusive. The assessment leads to an analysis of various highly idealized assumptions commonly adopted in Bayesian theory, where I argue that a healthy dose of, what I call, conceptual realism is often helpful in understanding the interpretational value of sophisticated mathematical structures employed in applied sciences like decision theory. In the last part, I introduce countable additivity into Savage’s theory and explore some technical properties in relation to other axioms of the system.</jats:p>
Sponsorship
The Leverhulme Trust
Funder references
Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF) (177155)
Isaac Newton Trust (18.08(o))
Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2018-305)
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267118000536
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/287849
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