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dc.contributor.authorDai, Y
dc.contributor.authorRau, Raghavendra
dc.contributor.authorStouraitis, A
dc.contributor.authorTan, W
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-15T00:31:07Z
dc.date.available2019-01-15T00:31:07Z
dc.date.issued2020-02
dc.identifier.issn0304-405X
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/287987
dc.description.abstractUsing multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium.
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.titleAn ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage398
prism.issueIdentifier2
prism.publicationDate2020
prism.publicationNameJournal of Financial Economics
prism.startingPage379
prism.volume135
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.35307
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-09-13
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.06.005
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2020-02
dc.contributor.orcidRau, Raghavendra [0000-0002-3320-5104]
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.issuedOnline2019-06-14
cam.orpheus.successThu Jan 30 10:53:12 GMT 2020 - Embargo updated
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2020-12-14


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