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dc.contributor.authorJohn, Stephenen
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-17T23:30:20Z
dc.date.available2019-04-17T23:30:20Z
dc.identifier.issn2155-0085
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/291821
dc.description.abstractThis paper re-interprets the precautionary principle as a “social epistemic rule”. First, it argues that sometimes policy-makers should act on claims which have not been scientifically established. Second, it argues that, given how scientists ought to solve “inductive risk” problems, such guidance is required not only under actual conditions, but under any plausible conditions. Third, it suggests that procedural fairness may provide policy-makers with reasons to be very reluctant to act on claims which are not scientifically established. The restriction of precautionary reasoning to contexts of significant environmental or public health disaster may respond to this problem.
dc.languageenen
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis
dc.rightsAll rights reserved
dc.rights.uri
dc.titleThe Politics of Certainty: The Precautionary Principle, Inductive Risk and Procedural Fairnessen
dc.typeArticle
prism.publicationNameEthics, Policy & Environmenten
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.38981
dcterms.dateAccepted2019-02-04en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1080/21550085.2019.1581418en
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-02-04en
dc.contributor.orcidJohn, Stephen [0000-0002-1062-0188]
dc.identifier.eissn2155-0093
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
pubs.funder-project-idIndependent Social Research Foundation (ISRF) (unknown)
cam.issuedOnline2019-03-01en
cam.orpheus.successThu Jan 30 10:47:58 GMT 2020 - Embargo updated*
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2020-09-01


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