Explaining temporal qualia
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
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Farr, M. (2020). Explaining temporal qualia. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 10 (1)https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-019-0264-6
Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception.
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-019-0264-6
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/297533
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